FSHC Group Holdings Ltd v Glas Trust Corporation Ltd: CA 31 Jul 2019

Rectification – Chartbrook not followed

Opportunity for an appellate court to clarify the correct test to apply in deciding whether the written terms of a contract may be rectified because of a common mistake.
Held: The appeal failed. The judge was right to conclude that an objective observer would have understood – just as Barclays in fact understood – that the accession deeds were not intended to do more than fill the gap in the security.
‘we are unable to accept that the objective test of rectification for common mistake articulated in Lord Hoffmann’s obiter remarks in the Chartbrook case correctly states the law. We consider that we are bound by authority, which also accords with sound legal principle and policy, to hold that, before a written contract may be rectified on the basis of a common mistake, it is necessary to show either (1) that the document fails to give effect to a prior concluded contract or (2) that, when they executed the document, the parties had a common intention in respect of a particular matter which, by mistake, the document did not accurately record. In the latter case it is necessary to show not only that each party to the contract had the same actual intention with regard to the relevant matter, but also that there was an ‘outward expression of accord’ – meaning that, as a result of communication between them, the parties understood each other to share that intention.’

Flaux, Leggatt, Rose LJJ
[2019] EWCA Civ 1361
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Not FollowedChartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd and Others HL 1-Jul-2009
Mutual Knowledge admissible to construe contract
The parties had entered into a development contract in respect of a site in Wandsworth, under which balancing compensation was to be paid. They disagreed as to its calculation. Persimmon sought rectification to reflect the negotiations.
Held: . .
CitedDaventry District Council v Daventry and District Housing Ltd CA 13-Oct-2011
The appellant challenged refusal of rectification of its agreement with the defendant. They asserted either mutual or unilateral mistake. The parties had agreed for the transfer of housing stock and management staff to the respondents. The claimant . .
CitedHenkle v Royal Exchange Assurance Company 14-Nov-1749
(Court of Chancery) Lord Hardwicke LC was in ‘no doubt, that this court has jurisdiction to relieve in respect of a plain mistake in contracts in writing as well as against frauds in contracts: so that if reduced into writing contrary to intent of . .
CitedThe Right Honourable Mary Countess Dowager of Shelburne, John Hamilton Fitzmaurice, An Infant, By The Said Countess, His Grandmother And Next Friend v Morough Earl of Inchiquin And Others 22-Mar-1781
On a claim to rectify a written agreement made in contemplation of marriage, Lord Thurlow LC considered it ‘impossible to refuse, as incompetent, parol evidence, which goes to prove, that the words taken down in writing were contrary to the current . .
CitedThe Marquis Townshend v Stangroom 21-Jul-1801
. .
CitedCalverley v Williams, Williams v Calverley 2-Jul-1790
The question was whether a particular piece of land was correctly included in the description of the land to be conveyed under a contract of sale.
Lord Thurlow LC said that:
‘ . . if both [parties] understood the whole was to be conveyed, . .
CitedFowler v Fowler 12-May-1859
Lord Chelmsford LC said that a party seeking rectification must establish clearly ‘that the alleged intention to which he desires’ (the instrument) ‘to be made conformable continued concurrently in the minds of all parties down to the time of its . .
CitedMackenzie v Coulson 1869
James V-C said: ‘Courts of Equity do not rectify contracts; they may and do rectify instruments purporting to have been made in pursuance of the terms of contracts. But it is always necessary for a plaintiff to show that there was an actual . .
CitedLovell and Christmas Ltd v Wall CA 1911
The written contract contained a restrictive covenant limiting the defendant’s freedom to carry on the business of a ‘provision merchant’ other than on behalf of the plaintiff company. On the facts found, the parties in their discussions before the . .
CitedShipley Urban District Council v Bradford Corporation ChD 1936
The parties had reached a clear common understanding in their negotiations as to how they intended the price of water supplied to the plaintiff council by the defendant corporation to be calculated; but, as each party only had power to contract . .
CitedCrane v Hegeman-Harris Co Inc CA 1939
Judgment approved . .
CitedCrane v Hegeman-Harris Co Inc ChD 1939
A continuing common intention of the parties to a document alone will not suffice to justify rectification. For rectification to be appropriate, there must be convincing proof that the concluded instrument does not represent the common intention of . .
CitedFrederick E Rose (London) Limited v William H Pim Junior and Co Limited 1953
The plaintiffs, who were London merchants, had been asked by Egyptian buyers to supply ‘feveroles’. Not knowing what this term meant, they asked the defendants’ representative, who responded that ‘feveroles’ meant horsebeans. Relying on this . .
CitedLondon Weekend Television Ltd v Paris and Griffith ChD 1969
Megaw J said: ‘Where two persons agreed expressly with one another what was the meaning of a particular phrase but did not record their definition in the contract itself, if one of the parties sought to enforce the agreement on the basis of some . .
CitedJoscelyne v Nissen CA 1970
A father entered into a written contract with his daughter by which he transferred to her his car hire business in return for her agreement to pay him a pension and discharge certain expenses. In their discussions it had been agreed between them . .
CitedLloyd v Stanbury 1971
A purchaser who had been let into possession before completion and had spent money on improvements to the property was not entitled to claim for such expenses because they would not usually have been within the contemplation of the parties. As to . .
Appeal FromFSHC Group Holdings Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc ChD 22-Jun-2018
Claim for rectification of two Deeds . .
CitedRe Butlin’s Settlement Trusts 1976
Sir Billy Butlin had executed a voluntary settlement to allow a majority of trustees to exercise a power under the settlement. By a drafting error the settlement did not give effect to this intention.
Held: The court could rectify the . .
CitedBritoil plc v Hunt Overseas Oil Inc CA 1994
After the failure of the attempt by the Texan oil tycoon, Nelson Bunker Hunt, in the 1970s to corner the world silver market, his fortune collapsed and his companies were forced to sell off assets. In 1979 two of those companies (the defendants in . .
CitedGallaher Limited v Gallaher Pensions Limited, C Foster, D Silver ChD 21-Jan-2005
Construction of amendments to pension scheme. . .
CitedMunt v Beasley CA 4-Apr-2006
Mummery LJ expressed the view that an outward expression of accord, although established on the facts of that case, was not a strict legal requirement for rectification where the party resisting rectification had in fact admitted that his true state . .
CitedTartsinis v Navona Management Company ComC 19-Jan-2015
The parties disputed the price to be paid in a sale of shares under a contract for their sale. The company which owned a fleet of ships. The shares were sold by two Greek businessmen, Mr Mihail Tartsinis and Mr Antonis Nikolaou, to Navona Management . .
CitedRyledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd 20-Apr-2007
Campbell JA asked rhetorically: ‘If two negotiating parties each had a particular intention about the agreement they would enter, and their intentions were identical, but that intention was disclosed by neither of them, and they later entered [into] . .
CitedJIS (1974) Ltd v MCP Investment Nominees I Ltd ChD 2002
Hart J said: A particular intention may, as it seems to me, as a matter of the general nature of human discourse, be communicated by one party to another without express words necessarily being used. It may therefore sometimes be possible for the . .
CitedJIS (1974) Ltd v MCP Investment Nominees I Ltd CA 9-Apr-2003
The parties agreed for a lease to be granted of a new building. Part had been intended to be excluded for shops, but permission was not obtained, the shops area was included and leased back. When the tenants sought to determine the lease, the . .
CitedRe IBM Pension Plan ChD 2012
The court considered an application to rectify a pension scheme.
Held: Warren J said: ‘There needs to be cogent evidence of the intentions of both the trustee and the employer where the power of amendment requires the consent of both. . . In a . .
CitedCaraman, Rowley and May v Aperghis 1923
Two contracts for the sale of sultanas on cif terms were drawn up by a broker acting for the sellers. By mistake, the broker used a form intended for spot contracts instead of the form for cif contracts with the result that the written contracts did . .
CitedCodelfa Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales 1982
(High Court of Australia) Mason J said: ‘The implication of a term is to be compared, and at the same time contrasted, with rectification of the contract. In each case the problem is caused by a deficiency in the expression of the consensual . .
CitedCooperative Insurance Society Ltd v Centremoor Ltd CA 1983
Rectification of a contract was sought.
Held: While it must be shown what was the common intention, the exact form of words in which the common intention is to be expressed is immaterial if, in substance and in detail, the common intention can . .
CitedA Roberts and Co Ltd v Leicestershire County Council ChD 1961
The court considered the circumstances required for rectification of a contract after a unilateral mistake. Pennycuick J said: ‘a party is entitled to rectification of a contract upon proof that he believed a particular term to be included in the . .
CitedAmerican Airlines Inc v Hope HL 1974
A claim was made for the rectification of an aviation insurance contract.
Lord Diplock said: ‘Rectification is a remedy which is available where parties to a contract, intending to reproduce in a more formal document the terms of an agreement . .
CitedThomas Bates and Sons Ltd v Wyndham’s Lingerie Ltd CA 21-Nov-1980
An application was made for rectification of a rent review clause in a lease. When executing the lease, the tenants’ officer, Mr Avon, noticed that the rent review clause in the lease drafted by the landlords was defective in not including a . .
CitedAgip SpA v Navigazione Alta Italia SpA, ‘The Nai Genova’ CA 1984
Rectification was sought of an escalation clause in a charter-party which provided for a base figure in US dollars to be increased by reference to Italian inflation. The plaintiffs claimed that an accord had been reached that the base figure should . .
CitedBritoil plc v Hunt Overseas Oil Inc CA 1994
After the failure of the attempt by the Texan oil tycoon, Nelson Bunker Hunt, in the 1970s to corner the world silver market, his fortune collapsed and his companies were forced to sell off assets. In 1979 two of those companies (the defendants in . .
CitedHolaw (470) Ltd v Stockton Estates Ltd ChD 2000
In a sale and immediate sub-sale of land, the contracts used different standard terms and conditions. The result was that the sub-sale excluded a right of access to the property.
Neuberger J summarised the law in what were then uncontroversial . .
CitedSwainland Builders Ltd v Freehold Properties Ltd CA 2002
Swainland Builders Ltd owned the freehold of a block of flats. It had granted 99-year leases at ground rents of all the flats except numbers 11 and 18. It had intended to sell the block subject to the retention of flats 11 and 18 which it initially . .
CitedRe Hetherington 1990
The court looked to whether a decision of a superior court was binding when the point had not been argued: ‘In my judgment the authorities clearly establish that even where a decision of a point of law in a particular sense was essential to an . .
CitedKadhim v Housing Benefit Board, London Borough of Brent CA 20-Dec-2000
A lower court was not bound to follow a decision of a higher court, where the decision at issue had been based, on the relevant point, on an unargued assumption about the law, which had in turn been pivotal to the decision of that higher court: ‘The . .
CitedKiriacoulis Lines Sa v Compagnie D’Assurances Maritime Aeriennes Et Terrestres (Camat) and Another (‘The Demetra K’) CA 16-Jul-2002
The court set out the elements to be satisfied before ordering a rectification of a commercial contract, in particular, the need for an antecedent agreement with outward expression of a common intent, and convincing evidence sufficient to discharge . .
CitedCrossco No 4 Unltd and Others v Jolan Ltd and Others ChD 31-Mar-2011
. .
CitedDay and Another v Day CA 27-Mar-2013
Appeal against refusal of order to rectify a conveyance of 1985.
Held: The conveyance was in the nature of a voluntary settlement and in such a case what is relevant is the subjective intention of the settlor. . .
CitedMackenzie v Coulson 1869
James V-C said: ‘Courts of Equity do not rectify contracts; they may and do rectify instruments purporting to have been made in pursuance of the terms of contracts. But it is always necessary for a plaintiff to show that there was an actual . .
CitedLovell and Christmas Ltd v Wall CA 1911
The written contract contained a restrictive covenant limiting the defendant’s freedom to carry on the business of a ‘provision merchant’ other than on behalf of the plaintiff company. On the facts found, the parties in their discussions before the . .
CitedInland Revenue Commissioners v Raphael and Ezra HL 1935
Parties to a contract should be presumed to have intended what in fact they have said.
The function of the recitals in a lease is to narrate the history leading up to the making of the lease.
Lord Wright said: ‘ . . the principle of the . .
CitedGeorge Cohen Sons and Co Ltd v Docks and Inland Waterways Executive CA 1950
The landlord negotiating a new lease proposed to the tenant that ‘the terms and conditions contained in the present lease to be embodied in the new lease where applicable.’ The tenant accepted this offer, but the new lease as executed made the . .
CitedThe Olympic Pride (Etablissements Georges et Paul Levy v Adderley Navigation Co Panama SA 1980
In the case of a bilateral transaction, there must be convincing proof that the concluded instrument does not represent the common intention of the parties to allow rectification. The policy reason for the need for convincing proof is that certainty . .
CitedWestland Savings Bank v Hancock 1987
Tipping J set out the requirements for rectification for common mistake: ‘(1) That, whether there is an antecedent agreement or not, the parties formed and continued to hold a single corresponding intention on the point in question.
(2) That . .
CitedMannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Assurance HL 21-May-1997
Minor Irregularity in Break Notice Not Fatal
Leases contained clauses allowing the tenant to break the lease by serving not less than six months notice to expire on the third anniversary of the commencement date of the term of the lease. The tenant gave notice to determine the leases on 12th . .
CitedPimlico Properties Limited v Driftwood Developments Limited 10-Nov-2009
Court of Appeal of New Zealand – Rectification is an equitable remedy whereby a written contract which does not reflect the common intention of the parties can be modified or corrected so that it does. . .
CitedPimlico Properties Limited v Driftwood Developments Limited 10-Nov-2009
Court of Appeal of New Zealand – Rectification is an equitable remedy whereby a written contract which does not reflect the common intention of the parties can be modified or corrected so that it does. . .
CitedAhmad v Secret Garden (Cheshire) Ltd CA 6-Aug-2013
The tenant appealed against an order for the rectification of the lease agreement between the parties. The recorder at first instance had found that both parties had been mistaken in their belief about the effect of a lease and had granted . .
CitedMarley v Rawlings and Another SC 22-Jan-2014
A husband and wife had each executed the will which had been prepared for the other, owing to an oversight on the part of their solicitor; the question which arose was whether the will of the husband, who died after his wife, was valid. The parties . .
CitedRobb v James 28-Feb-2014
(New Zealand Court of Appeal) The Court contrasted ‘the state of some uncertainty as to the requisites for rectification in English law’ (referring to the Daventry case) with the ‘relatively settled’ position in New Zealand where ‘Tipping J’s 1987 . .
CitedRawlinson and Hunter Trustees SA and Others v Director of The Serious Fraud Office CA 31-Jul-2014
Documents had been disclosed in error in related proceedings, and the appellants now challenged refusal of an order that their use within the current proceedings should be restrained. . .
CitedSimic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation 7-Dec-2016
(HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA) In holding that certain performance bonds should be rectified in order to correct a common mistake, applied the traditional test of asking what was the actual or true common intention of the parties
Kiefel J (with . .
CitedTartsinis v Navona Management Company ComC 19-Jan-2015
The parties disputed the price to be paid in a sale of shares under a contract for their sale. The company which owned a fleet of ships. The shares were sold by two Greek businessmen, Mr Mihail Tartsinis and Mr Antonis Nikolaou, to Navona Management . .
CitedLSREF III Wight Ltd v Millvalley Ltd ComC 8-Mar-2016
. .
CitedVan der Linde v Van der Linde ChD 1947
Evershed J said that the remedy of rectification is not appropriate if the grantor’s real intention: ‘be no more precise than this, namely, that he intended, by whatever formulation of words was appropriate or possible, to achieve the result that he . .
CitedRacal Group Services Limited v Ashmore CA 1995
The company had covenanted to pay an annual sum to charity. Since the last payment under the covenant was to be made less than three years after the execution of the deed, an intended tax advantage was not secured.
Held: The company’s appeal . .
CitedAMP (UK) Plc and Another v Barker and Others ChD 8-Dec-2000
The claimants were interested under a pension scheme. Alterations had been made, which the said had been in error, and they sought rectification to remove a link between early leaver benefits and incapacity benefits. The defendant trustees agreed . .
CitedFutter and Another v Revenue and Customs; Pitt v Same SC 9-May-2013
Application of Hastings-Bass Rule
F had created two settlements. Distributions were made, but overlooking the effect of section 2(4) of the 2002 Act, creating a large tax liability. P had taken advice on the investment of the proceeds of a damages claim and created a discretionary . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Equity

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.640097

Hanak v Green: CA 1958

A builder was sued for his failure to complete the works he had contracted for. The buider sought a set-off against that claim of three of his one claims. One, under the contract, was for losses from the defendant’s refusal to allow his workmen access, the second was in quantum meruit for the works completed, and the third was inn tort for trespass to his tools.
Held: The court was able to order a set-off of claims between the parties despite the absence of any specific plea in that behalf. Equitable set-off is not confined to debts or liquidated damages and so long as the cross-claim is sufficiently closely connected with the debt as to make it inequitable to take account of one without taking account of the other, then the set-off of the claim operates to reduce or eliminate the debt. Set-off operates by way of a defence. There are three occasions on which set-off is permissible: (1) set-off under the rule replacing the statutes of set-off; (2) what might be called abatement in certain cases at common law; and (3) equitable set-off.
Morris LJ said as to the first occasion: ‘The claims on both sides had to be liquidated debts or money demands which could be ascertained with certainty at the time of the pleading.’ and ‘The plaintiff, suing as agent or trustee for her son, claimed andpound; 50 from the defendant. The defendant had a perfectly good claim for andpound; 51 damages against the plaintiff’s son. It was held that the defendant could set up as a defence to the claim against him that the plaintiff’s son (the cestui que trust of the plaintiff) was indebted to the defendant in a sum for unliquidated damages exceeding the amount of the claim.
The conclusion seems to me to be clearly correct and obviously fair. It would have been manifestly unjust if the defendant had had to pay andpound;50 to the plaintiff (who was an agent or trustee for her son) at a time when the defendant had an unquestioned claim of andpound;51 against the plaintiff’s son who had left the country. There was a close relationship between the dealings and transactions which gave rise to the respective claims. If the case had been brought before the Judicature Act it would appear that the defendant would have had strong equitable grounds for asking a Court of Chancery to restrain the plaintiff from proceeding with her case. But since the Judicature Act the position is that matters of equity on which such injunctions might formerly have been obtained, may now be relied on by way of defence.’

Buxton LJ, Morris LJ
[1958] 2 QB 9, [1958] 2 WLR 755, [1958] 2 All ER 141
England and Wales
Citing:
ApprovedIn re a Bankruptcy Notice CA 1934
. .
ExaminedBankes v Jarvis 1903
The plaintiff was his son’s agent. The son purchased a veterinary surgeon’s practice from the defendant, agreeing to pay the rent and indemnify the defendant against liability under a lease of premises from which the practice was carried on. The son . .

Cited by:
CitedBoynton and Another v Willers CA 3-Jul-2003
The appellants challenged a finding that they were liable for their builders’ bill.
Held: Work which had been rejected had not in fact been charged for. The defendant’s appeal on that point failed. The measure of damages for distress and . .
CitedPlatts v Trustees Savings Bank Plc CA 13-Feb-1998
A counterclaim for negligent sale was a valid claim allowing potential against repossessing bank but would not make bank’s claim unliquidated. The Judge could properly hold that there was a liquidated and unsecured debt the subject of the statutory . .
CitedSmith v Muscat CA 10-Jul-2003
The tenant was sued by his landlord for arrears of rent, but sought an equitable set-off for damages for disrepair accruing under the previous landlord.
Held: If the entitlement to recover arrears of rent passes from assignor to assignee, and . .
CitedSonia Burkett, Regina (on the Application of) v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham CA 15-Oct-2004
The appellant challenged an order for costs after dismissal of her application for judicial review of the respondent’s planning decision. The claimant had been granted legal aid at about the time of the bringing in of the new legal aid scheme. The . .
CitedJohn Louis Carter Fourie v Allan Le Roux and others CA 7-Mar-2005
The defendant’s company in South Africa had become insolvent and the claimant had recovered judgment for arrears of rent. They obtained a freezing order against the defendant. The defendant appealed saying the court did not have jurisdiction, and . .
CitedMellham Ltd v Collector of Taxes CA 17-Jan-2003
Buxton LJ: ‘The issue therefore is one of simple statutory construction. Can the expression ‘payment’ when used in section 87 of the 1970 Act, or ‘pays’ when used both in section 246N(2) of the 1988 Act and section 239 of the 1988 Act, encompass a . .
CitedBurton (Collector of Taxes) v Mellham Ltd HL 15-Feb-2006
The claimant sought interest on an overpayment of Advance Corporation Tax. The tax itself had been paid late, and the Collector claimed a set off.
Held: The claim to DTR could not be described as an attempt at self-help. It had a statutory . .
ApprovedModern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd v Gilbert Ash (Northern) Ltd HL 1974
The court considered how to construe a clause in a contract which excluded a remedy provided by law. Lord Diplock said: ‘It is, of course, open to parties to a contract . . to exclude by express agreement a remedy for its breach which would . .
CitedBritish Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Marine Management (UK) Ltd ChD 19-Dec-1978
Money expended by a tenant on discharging his landlord’s covenants will in appropriate circumstances operate as a partial or a complete discharge so as to furnish a defence at law to a claim for unpaid rent; and where the tenant has suffered damage . .
ApprovedDole Dried Fruit and Nut Co v Trustin Kerwood Ltd CA 1990
The defendant had an exclusive distributorship agency for the plaintiff in England. Under that agreement, the plaintiff sold its prunes and raisins to the defendant under separate contracts of sale. The plaintiff claimed the price of goods sold . .
CitedGeldof Metaalconstructie Nv v Simon Carves Ltd CA 11-Jun-2010
The parties contracted for the supply and installation of pressure vessels by Geldof (G) for a building constructed by Simon Carves (SC). The contract contained a clause denying the remedy of set-off. G sued for the sale price, and SC now sought an . .
CitedAries Tanker Corp v Total Transport Ltd; The Aries HL 1977
Claims for freight charges are an exception to the general rule that all claims between parties must be resolved in one action. A claim for freight cannot be a claim ‘on the same grounds’ as a counter-claim for loss or damage arising out of the . .
CitedDole Dried Fruit and Nut Co v Trustin Kerwood Ltd CA 1990
The defendant had an exclusive distributorship agency for the plaintiff in England. Under that agreement, the plaintiff sold its prunes and raisins to the defendant under separate contracts of sale. The plaintiff claimed the price of goods sold . .
CitedRedd Factors Ltd v Bombardier Transportation UK Ltd QBD 6-Oct-2014
The claimant sought payment under a contract for train seats supplied to the defendant. It had taken an assignment of the debt from the manufacturer. . .
CitedCape Distribution Ltd v Cape Intermediate Holdings Plc QBD 19-Jul-2016
Further judgment . .
CitedOfficeserve Technologies Ltd and Another v Anthony-Mike ChD 28-Jul-2017
Judgment on certain preliminary issues . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Equity, Landlord and Tenant

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.184247

Johnson v Agnew: HL 1979

The seller had obtained a summary order for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land against the buyer.
Held: The breach was continuing and was still capable of being remedied by compliance with the order for specific performance. The seller was entitled, after the buyer had failed to comply with the order, to apply to court to put an end to the contract and claim damages for breach. A plaintiff who is refused specific performance or an injunction is left to his damages in contract or tort. The measure of such damages is exactly what it would be at common law.
Lord Wilberforce said: ‘In my opinion, the argument based on irrevocable election, strongly pressed by the appellant’s counsel in the present appeal is unsound. Election, though the subject of much learning and refinement, is in the end a doctrine based on simple considerations of common sense and equity. It is easy to see that a party who has put an end to a contract by accepting the other party’s repudiation cannot afterwards seek specific performance. This is simply because the contract has gone – what is dead is dead. But it is no more difficult to agree that a party who has chosen specific performance, may quite well thereafter, if specific performance fails to be realised say, ‘very well, then the contract should be regarded as terminated’.
It is quite consistent with a decision provisionally to keep alive, to say, ‘Well this is no use – let us now end the contract’s life’. A vendor who seeks (and gets) specific performance is merely electing for a course which may or may not lead to implementation of the contract – what he elects for is not eternal and unconditional affirmation, but a continuance of the contract under the control of the court which control involves the power, in certain events, to terminate it.’ and
‘In cases where a breach of a contract for sale has occurred, and the innocent party reasonably continues to try to have the contract completed, it would to me appear more logical and just rather than tie him to the date of the original breach, to assess damages as at the date when (otherwise than by his default) the contract is lost.’
In the law of contract, the date of breach rule ‘is not an absolute rule: if to follow it would give rise to injustice, the court has power to fix such other date as may be appropriate in the circumstances.’

Lord Wilberforce
[1980] AC 367, [1979] 2 WLR 487, [1979] 1 All ER 883
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedOgle v Vane 1868
. .
CitedRadford v De Froberville 2-Jan-1977
A contract was made for the sale of a plot of land adjoining a house belonging to the plaintiff (the vendor) but occupied by his tenants, under which the defendant (the purchaser) undertook to build a house on the plot and also to erect a wall to a . .

Cited by:
CitedWilliam Sindall Plc v Cambridgeshire County Council CA 21-May-1993
Land was bought for development, but the purchaser later discovered a sewage pipe which very substantially limited its development potential. The existence of the pipe had not been disclosed on the sale, being unknown to the seller.
Held: . .
CitedSurrey County Council and Mole District Council v Bredero Homes Ltd ChD 1992
Land was agreed to be sold for development in accordance with an existing planning permission. Instead a later permission was obtained, and more houses were built. The plaintiff had not sought to restrain or prevent the breach, but now sought . .
CitedOliver Ashworth (Holdings) Limited v Ballard (Kent) Limited CA 18-Mar-1999
In order for the landlord to claim double rent where a tenant held over unlawfully after the tenancy was determined, the landlord must not do anything to indicate that the lease might be continuing, for example by denying the validity of break . .
CitedSmith New Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour Vickers HL 21-Nov-1996
The defendant had made misrepresentations, inducing the claimant to enter into share transactions which he would not otherwise have entered into, and which lost money.
Held: A deceitful wrongdoer is properly liable for all actual damage . .
CitedSurrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd CA 7-Apr-1993
A local authority had sold surplus land to a developer and obtained a covenant that the developer would develop the land in accordance with an existing planning permission. The sole purpose of the local authority in imposing the covenant was to . .
CitedCollins Stewart Ltd and Another v The Financial Times Ltd QBD 20-Oct-2004
The claimants sought damages for defamation. The claimed that the article had caused very substantial losses (andpound;230 million) to them by affecting their market capitalisation value. The defendant sought to strike out that part of the claim. . .
CitedPegler Ltd v Wang (UK) Ltd TCC 25-Feb-2000
Standard Conract – Wide Exclusions, Apply 1977 Act
The claimant had acquired a computer system from the defendant, which had failed. It was admitted that the contract had been broken, and the court set out to decide the issue of damages.
Held: Even though Wang had been ready to amend one or . .
CitedDomb and Another v Isoz CA 29-Nov-1979
In a chain of conveyancing transactions, a solicitor sent his contract and deposit to his vendor’s solicitor, asking him to hold it to his order pending exchange. On the next day, that vendor’s solicitors agreed to an exchange of contracts over the . .
CitedGolden Strait Corporation v Nippon Yusen Kubishka Kaisha (‘The Golden Victory’) HL 28-Mar-2007
The claimant sought damages for repudiation of a charterparty. The charterpary had been intended to continue until 2005. The charterer repudiated the contract and that repudiation was accepted, but before the arbitrator could set his award, the Iraq . .
CitedAlcoa Minerals of Jamaica Inc v Herbert Broderick PC 20-Mar-2000
(Jamaica) Damage had been caused to the claimant’s property, but, because of his lack of funds, he was dependent upon the receipt of the damages to carry out the works of repair necessary. By the time the matter came to trial, inflation meant that . .
CitedPersonal Representatives of Tang Man Sit v Capacious Investments Ltd PC 18-Dec-1995
The claimant, Capacious Investments Ltd, brought proceedings against Tang’s estate for damages for the loss of use and occupation, and also an account of profits and damages for loss and damage incurred, for example by encumbering the property with . .
MentionedRamzan v Brookwide Ltd CA 19-Aug-2011
The defendant had broken through into a neighbour’s flying freehold room, closed it off, and then included it in its own premises for let. It now appealed against the quantum of damages awarded. The judge had found the actions deliberate and with a . .
CitedHooper and Another v Oates CA 20-Feb-2013
The parties had agreed for the purchase of land, but the buyer, Mr Oates, failed to complete. A notice to complete was served, and on non-compliance, the repudiation was accepted. It proved difficult to resell, and they suffered substantial losses. . .
CitedDowns and Another v Chappell and Another CA 3-Apr-1996
The plaintiffs had suceeded in variously establishing claims in deceit and negligence, but now appealed against the finding that no damages had flowed from the wrongs. They had been sold a business on the basis of incorrect figures.
Held: . .
CitedDowns and Another v Chappell and Another CA 3-Apr-1996
The plaintiffs had suceeded in variously establishing claims in deceit and negligence, but now appealed against the finding that no damages had flowed from the wrongs. They had been sold a business on the basis of incorrect figures.
Held: . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Contract

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.185672

Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council: HL 22 May 1996

Simple interest only on rate swap damages

The bank had paid money to the local authority under a contract which turned out to be ultra vires and void. The question was whether, in addition to ordering the repayment of the money to the bank on unjust enrichment principles, the court could also award compound interest. It was clear law that the court had power to do so in the case of a breach of trust.
Held: Simple interest only was payable on a debt payable for an interest rate swap agreement which had been avoided as ultra vires the council’s powers. The failure of the swap agreement did not place the authority under any fiduciary duty to the claimants. A finding to that effect would create equitable interests with uncertain consequences for others. Accordingly simple interest only was payable. Parliament had made its intentions clear and it was not for the courts to create new situations in which compound interest would be awarded. ‘Although it is difficult to find clear authority for the proposition, when property has been obtained by fraud equity imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient: the property is recoverable and traceable in equity.’ An innocent recipient of property wrongfully obtained does not become a constructive trustee of it until receipt of knowledge of the claim in equity of the true owner.
HL Lord Goff said: ‘Claims in restitution are founded upon a principle of justice, being designed to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant: see Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548. Long ago, in Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, Lord Mansfield C.J. said that the gist of the action for money had and received is that ‘the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money’. It would be strange indeed if the courts lacked jurisdiction in such a case to ensure that justice could be fully achieved by means of an award of compound interest, where it is appropriate to make such an award, despite the fact that the jurisdiction to award such interest is itself said to rest upon the demands of justice. I am glad not to be forced to hold that English law is so inadequate as to be incapable of achieving such a result. In my opinion the jurisdiction should now be made available, as justice requires, in cases of restitution, to ensure that full justice can be done. The seed is there, but the growth has hitherto been confined within a small area. That growth should now be permitted to spread naturally elsewhere within this newly recognised branch of the law. No genetic engineering is required, only that the warm sun of judicial creativity should exercise its benign influence rather than remain hidden behind the dark clouds of legal history.’
Lord Browne-Wilkinson said (obiter): ‘The argument for a resulting trust was said to be supported by the case of a thief who steals a bag of coins. At law those coins remain traceable only so long as they are kept separate: as soon as they are mixed with other coins or paid into a mixed bank account they cease to be traceable at law. Can it really be the case, it is asked, that in such circumstances the thief cannot be required to disgorge the property which, in equity, represents the stolen coins? Moneys can only be traced in equity if there has been at some stage a breach of fiduciary duty, i.e. if either before the theft there was an equitable proprietary interest (e.g. the coins were stolen trust moneys) or such interest arises under a resulting trust at the time of the theft or the mixing of the moneys. Therefore, it is said, a resulting trust must arise either at the time of the theft or when the moneys are subsequently mixed. Unless this is the law, there will be no right to recover the assets representing the stolen moneys once the moneys have become mixed.
I agree that the stolen moneys are traceable in equity. But the proprietary interest which equity is enforcing in such circumstances arises under a constructive, not a resulting, trust. Although it is difficult to find clear authority for the proposition, when property is obtained by fraud equity imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient: the property is recoverable and traceable in equity. Thus, an infant who has obtained property by fraud is bound in equity to restore it: Stocks v. Wilson [1913] 2 K.B. 235, 244; R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill [1914] 3 K.B. 607. Moneys stolen from a bank account can be traced in equity: Bankers Trust Co. v. Shapira [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1274, 1282C-E: see also McCormick v. Grogan (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 82, 97′.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained the differences between institutional and remedial constructive trusts: ‘Under an institutional constructive trust, the trust arises by operation of law as from the date of the circumstances which give rise to it: the function of the court is merely to declare that such trust has arisen in the past. The consequences that flow from such trust having arisen (including the possibly unfair consequences to third parties who in the interim have received the trust property) are also determined by rules of law, not under a discretion. A remedial constructive trust, as I understand it, is different. It is a judicial remedy giving rise to an enforceable equitable obligation: the extent to which it operates retrospectively to the prejudice of third parties lies in the discretion of the court.’

Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Goff, Lord Woolf
Times 30-May-1996, [1996] 2 All ER 961, [1996] 2 AC 669, [1996] UKHL 12, [1996] 2 WLR 802, [1996] 5 Bank LR 341
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromWestdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council CA 30-Dec-1993
A bank paid money to a local authority under an interest rate swap agreement, which was held later to be outside the local authority’s powers.
Held: The local authority was to repay the money paid to it for an ultra vires purpose (a swap . .
CitedBurdick v Garrick HL 1870
In the courts of Chancery, the statute of limitations would not apply when the person in a confidential relationship had got the property into his hands. A court presumes against the party against whom relief is sought that he has made that profit . .
CitedWallersteiner v Moir (No 2) CA 1975
The court was asked whether Moir would be entitled to legal aid to bring a derivative action on behalf of a company against its majority shareholder.
Held: A minority shareholder bringing a derivative action on behalf of a company could obtain . .
AppliedHazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council HL 1991
Swap deals outwith Council powers
The authority entered into interest rate swap deals to protect itself against adverse money market movements. They began to lose substantial amounts when interest rates rose, and the district auditor sought a declaration that the contracts were . .

Cited by:
CitedSmithkline Beecham Plc Glaxosmithkline UK Ltd and Another v Apotex Europe Ltd and others (No 2) CA 23-May-2006
The parties to the action had given cross undertakings to support the grant of an interim injunction. A third party subsequently applied to be joined, and now sought to take advantage of the cross undertakings to claim the losses incurred through . .
CitedIslamic Republic of Pakistan v Zardari and others ComC 6-Oct-2006
The claimant alleged that the defendants had funded the purchase of various properties by secret and unlawful commissions taken by them whilst in power in Pakistan. They sought to recover the proceeds. They now sought permission to serve proceedings . .
CitedStack v Dowden HL 25-Apr-2007
The parties had cohabited for a long time, in a home bought by Ms Dowden. After the breakdown of the relationship, Mr Stack claimed an equal interest in the second family home, which they had bought in joint names. The House was asked whether, when . .
CitedBryce Ashworth v Newnote Ltd CA 27-Jul-2007
The appellant challenged a refusal to set aside a statutory demand, in respect of his director’s loan account with the respondent company, saying the court should have accepted other accounts to set off against that debt.
Held: A statutory . .
CitedSempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another HL 18-Jul-2007
The parties agreed that damages were payable in an action for restitution, but the sum depended upon to a calculation of interest. They disputed whether such interest should be calculated on a simple or compound basis. The company sought compound . .
CitedKommune and Another v DEPFA Acs Bank ComC 4-Sep-2009
Local authorities in Denmark sought to recover sums paid to the defendant banks for swap trading, saying that the payments had been outwith their powers. . .
CitedClarence House Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc CA 8-Dec-2009
The defendant tenants, anticipating that the landlord might delay or refuse consent to a subletting entered into a ‘virtual assignment’ of the lease, an assignment in everything but the deed and with no registration. The lease contained a standard . .
CitedTwentieth Century Fox Film Corp and Others v Harris and Others ChD 5-Feb-2013
The court was asked whether a copyright owner has a proprietary claim to money derived from infringement of the copyright.
Held: He did not. No such argument could be shown to have suceeded before. . .
CitedPindell v AirAsia CA 2011
Tomlinson LJ drew attention to the danger of attempting to draw parallels between an aircraft operating (dry) lease and some other more commonly litigated superficially similar instruments such as time charters of ships, where the legal incidents . .
CitedOlympic Airlines Sa v ACG Acquisition XX Llc CA 17-Apr-2013
The parties disputed their mutual obligations under aircraft leasing agreements. The insolvent airline said that in signing to accept the condition of the aircraft on delivery, it had not created an estoppel against itself when the aircraft later . .
CitedBailey and Another v Angove’s Pty Ltd SC 27-Jul-2016
The defendant had agreed to act as the claimant’s agent and distributor of the claimant’s wines in the UK. It acted both as agent and also bought wines on its own account. When the defendant went into litigation the parties disputed the right of the . .
CitedFilby v Mortgage Express (No 2) Limited CA 22-Jun-2004
Mr and Mrs Filby’s matrimonial home was charged to the Halifax. They also had an unsecured loan with the Midland Bank. Mr Filby sought to remortgage the matrimonial home with Mortgage Express. The mortgage advance was paid to solicitors who used . .
CitedAkers and Others v Samba Financial Group SC 1-Feb-2017
Saad Investments was a Cayman Islands company in liquidation. The liquidator brought an action here, but the defendant sought a stay saying that another forum was clearly more appropriate. Shares in Saudi banks were said to be held in trust for the . .
Obiter comments doubtedShalson and others v Russo and others ChD 11-Jul-2003
Rimer J doubted obiter comments of Lord Brown-Wilkinson: ‘I do not find that an easy passage. As to the first paragraph, a thief ordinarily acquires no property in what he steals and cannot give a title to it even to a good faith purchaser: both the . .
CitedScott v Bridge and Others ChD 25-Nov-2020
Claim to recover money and property said to have been transferred by the claimant to the defendants or one or more of them. The money concerned came from a bank account belonging to the claimant. The property concerned consisted of two . .
CitedPrudential Assurance Company Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 25-Jul-2018
PAC sought to recover excess advance corporation tax paid under a UK system contrary to EU law. It was now agreed that some was repayable but now the quantum. Five issues separated the parties.
Issue I: does EU law require the tax credit to be . .
CitedFetch.AI Ltd and Another v Persons Unknown Category A and Others ComC 15-Jul-2021
Cryptocurrency Action
The claimants sought damages and other remedies saying that the unknown defendants had obtained access to the private key guarding their crypto currency assets, and then sold them at an undervalue, acquiring substantial profits for themselves in . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Banking, Local Government, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.90405

Jones v Lipman and Another: ChD 1962

The defendant had contracted to sell his land. He changed his mind, and formed a company of which he was owner and director, transferred the land to the company, and refused to complete. The plaintiff sought relief.
Held: Specific performance is available against a contracting vendor who has it in his power to compel another person to convey the property in question. An order for specific performance was made against both the director and the company. The company could not escape from or divest itself of its knowledge gained through the director. The company was: ‘A creature of [the controlling director], a device and a sham, a mask which he holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of equity.’

Russell J
[1962] 1 WLR 832, [1962] 1 All ER 442
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedGilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne CA 1933
The defendant was the plaintiff’s former managing director. He was bound by a restrictive covenant after he left them. To avoid the covenant, he formed a company and sought to transact his business through it. At first instance, Farwell J had found . .
CitedElliott and H Elliott (Builders) Ltd v Pierson ChD 1948
Harmon J: ‘At law A may contract to sell to B any defined subject matter and can enforce the contract if by the time when he is obliged to do so he has obtained a sufficient interest or can compel other interested parties to concur in the sale. It . .

Cited by:
CitedCrawford v Financial Institutions Services Ltd PC 2-Nov-2005
(Jamaica) The government had intervened in banking institutions under the control of the appellant. Subsequently orders had been made against him for compensation in respect of loans made negligently or otherwise than in accordance with good banking . .
CitedColes and others (Trustees of the Ward Green Working Mens Club) v Samuel Smith Old Brewery (Tadcaster) (Unltd Company) and Another CA 29-Nov-2007
The claimants appealed refusal of an order for specific performance of a contract for the purchase of land under the exercise of an option agreement. The defendant had conveyed the land to a subsidiary in order to defeat the option.
Held: ‘The . .
CitedPrest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and Others SC 12-Jun-2013
In the course of ancillary relief proceedings in a divorce, questions arose regarding company assets owned by the husband. The court was asked as to the power of the court to order the transfer of assets owned entirely in the company’s names. The . .
CitedBen Hashem v Ali Shayif and Another FD 22-Sep-2008
The court was asked to pierce the veil of incorporation of a company in the course of ancillary relief proceedings in a divorce. H had failed to co-operate with the court.
After a comprehensive review of all the authorities, Munby J said: ‘The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.237486

Abacus Trust Company (Isle of Man) Colyb Limited v Barr, Barr, and Barr: ChD 6 Feb 2003

The court considered the Rule in Hastings-Bass, and specifically (1) whether the trustee’s decision is open to challenge when the failure to take a consideration into account is not attributable to a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the trustee; and (2) whether, where a decision is open to challenge on the ground that the trustee failed to take a factor into account, the decision is void or voidable. The trustees had exercised their power of appointment, but on the basis of mistaken information.
Held: The appointment was voidable and not void. As to the rule in Hastings Bass: ‘A successful challenge made to a decision under the rule should in principle result in the decision being held voidable and not void.’
Lightman J identified three important differences between the duties owed by trustees and by those making a public law decision, as the discretionary nature of relief on judicial review, a different approach to nullity, and strict time limits.

The Hon Mr Justice Lightman
[2003] EWHC 114 (Ch), Gazette 03-Apr-2003, [2003] WTLR 149, [2003] 2 WLR 1362, [2003] 1 All ER 763, [2003] Ch 409
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRe Hastings-Bass; Hastings v Inland Revenue CA 14-Mar-1974
Trustees of a settlement had exercised their power of advancement under the section, in order to save estate duty by transferring investments to be held on the trusts of a later settlement. However the actual effect of the advancement was that the . .
CitedAnker-Petersen v Christensen ChD 2002
Where a mistake is made as to the effect of an appointment under a trust it may be possible to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to rescind the appointment. Davis J considered Millett J’s distinction between ‘effect’ and ‘consequences’: ‘An example in . .
CitedEdge and others v Pensions Ombudsman and Another CA 29-Jul-1999
The Pensions Ombudsman was wrong to set aside the decision of pensions trustees where that decision was properly made within the scope of a discretion given to the Trustees. He should not carry out an investigation where no particular benefit could . .
CitedMettoy Pension Trustees v Evans ChD 1990
Where a trustee acts under a discretion given to him by the terms of the trust the court will interfere with his action if it is clear that he would not have so acted as he did had he not failed to take into account considerations which he ought to . .
CitedGibbon v Mitchell ChD 1990
G executed a deed surrendering his life interest in a trust fund in order to vest the property in his two children: the deed did not have that effect because of two errors (one of which was ignoring the fact that his life interest was subject to . .
CitedTurner v Turner ChD 1983
The trustees for many years signed every document placed before them by their solicitors (including appointments) without understanding that they had any discretion in the exercise.
Held: What might first appear to have been a decision of . .
CitedSaunders (Executrix of the Will of Rose Maude Gallie, Deceased) v Anglia Building Society HL 9-Nov-1970
The Appellant had signed an assignment of her lease in favour of her nephew. She said she thought the effect of it would protect her right to continue to live in the house. She now appealed rejection of her plea of non est factum.
Held: The . .
CitedStannard v Fisons Pension Trust Limited CA 1991
Fisons had sold their fertiliser division to Norsk Hydro. Acting on advice of actuaries and thinking that the fund was in deficit, the trustees made a transfer to a new fund to provide for pensions of transferring employees in accordance with a . .

Cited by:
CitedKohli v Lit and Others ChD 13-Nov-2009
The claimant asserted that the other shareholders had acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to her within the company.
Held: The claimant was allowed to bring in without prejudice correspondence to contradict evidence by the defendant which . .
AppliedHunter v Senate Support Services Ltd and others ChD 2005
The court set aside a forfeiture of shares for non-payment of a call. The decisions of the directors to forfeit the shares and to transfer the forfeited shares to the group holding company were flawed, though not improperly motivated, because the . .
CitedPitt and Another v Holt and Others ChD 18-Jan-2010
The deceased had created a settlement in favour of his wife. He suffered serious injury and placed the damages in trust, but in a form which created an unnecessary liability to Inheritance Tax on his death. The wife’s mental health act receiver now . .
CitedPitt and Another v Holt and Another ChD 18-Jan-2010
The claimant sought to unravel a settlement she had made as receiver for her late husband, saying that it had been made without consideration of its Inheritance Tax implications. The Revenue said that there was no operative mistake so as to allow . .
CitedFutter and Another v Revenue and Customs; Pitt v Same SC 9-May-2013
Application of Hastings-Bass Rule
F had created two settlements. Distributions were made, but overlooking the effect of section 2(4) of the 2002 Act, creating a large tax liability. P had taken advice on the investment of the proceeds of a damages claim and created a discretionary . .
CitedFutter and Another v Revenue and Customs; Pitt v Same SC 9-May-2013
Application of Hastings-Bass Rule
F had created two settlements. Distributions were made, but overlooking the effect of section 2(4) of the 2002 Act, creating a large tax liability. P had taken advice on the investment of the proceeds of a damages claim and created a discretionary . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Trusts, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.179013

Walsh v Lonsdale: CA 1882

Lonsdale purported to grant to Walsh a seven year lease with rent payable in advance. The lease was not embodied in a deed, and when Walsh went into possession, an annual tenancy with rent payable in arrear was created. Walsh did not pay in advance, Lonsdale issued an execution against the premises, and Walsh sought damages.
Held: Equity, as embodied in the maxim ‘equity regards as done what ought to be done’, required that the lease should take effect on the terms originally intended. ‘He [Walsh] holds, therefore, under the same terms in equity as if a lease had been granted . . He cannot complain of the exercise by the landlord of the same rights as the landlord would have had if a lease had been granted.’ This was: ‘a case in which both parties admit that relief is capable of being given by specific performance.’

Sir George Jessel MR
[1882] 21 ChD 9
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedPadgham and another v Rochelle and another ChD 1-Aug-2002
The testator occupied farmland and buildings. He was helped in maintaining the farm by his son, but gave the land to his grandchildren by his will. The son claimed to have been granted an informal written agricultural tenancy by his father before . .
CitedIngram and Palmer-Tomkinson (Executors of the Estate of Lady Jane Lindsay Morgan Ingram Deceased) v Commissioners of Inland Revenue CA 28-Jul-1997
The deceased had first conveyed property to her solicitor. Leases back were then created in her favour, and then the freeholds were conveyed at her direction to her children and grandchildren. They were potentially exempt transfers.
Held: . .
CitedHarris v Kent and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The claimant said the defendant had failed to complete his promise to arrange for the issue of shares in a company in return for a loan. The defendant denied the contract.
Held: It had been agreed to treat the claimant as a fifty per cent . .
CitedFoster v Reeves CA 1892
An agreement was made on May 12 1890 for a tenancy for three years to commence on June 24 1890 and thereafter from year to year until determined. The landlord sued to recover rent after the tenant had given up possession. The tenant argued that no . .
CitedLong v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council ChD 20-Mar-1996
The parties had agreed for a lease, and the tenant entered possession, but no formal lease was executed. The tenant stopped paying rent in 1977 or 1984. He now claimed rectification of the registers to show him as proprietor. The landlord argued . .
CitedTruro Diocesan Board of Finance Ltd v Foley CA 22-Oct-2008
The tenant appealed against a decision that a deed he had entered into with the claimant did not operate to give him the status of a protected or statutory tenancy.
Held: The tenant had had a full Rent Act tenancy. The Board claimed . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.181811

Sir Ralph Bovey v Skipwith: 1671

Mortgage Priorities

In 1651, Sir Francis Drake made the Plaintiff a Security out of the Manor and Rectory of Waltham upon Thames. Afterwards in 1656, Drake made the Defendant a Security for Money out of the Rectory only (the Defendant having no Notice then of the Plaintiff’s Security which was for Money also). Afterwards tha Defendant hearing of the Plaintiffs Security, buys in a Security precedent to the Plaintiff’s which one Beddingfield had both upon the Manor and Rectory.
1. Question was, ‘Whether the Plaintiff should be admitted to redeem Beddingfield’s Security without paying off what was due to Skipwith? And it was ruled he should not. Vide Marsh and Lee’s Case.
2. Question was, Whether inasmuch as the Defendant’s Security was only out of the Rectory, and the Security he bought in from Beddingfield was of both the Manor and Rectory, the Defendant should make Use of Beddingfield’s Security as to the Manor after that by the Profits of the Manor and Rectory Beddingfield’s Debt was satisfied ? And whether then the Plaintiff should not then be admitted to enjoy the Manor, his Security being as well of the Manor as the Rectory, and the Defendant to hold only the Rectory till he was satisfied.
Wyld and Twisden were of Opinion, That after Skipwith had received what was due on Beddingfield’s Security, he should receive no more Profits of the Manor, but the Plaintiff to be let in to receive them, and the Defendant only to make use of Beddingfield’s Security, as to the Rectory, to protect his Security of the Rectory. But it was resolved and ruled, that the Defensant should hold both the Manor and Rectory against the Plaintiff, till all due to him on both Securities was paid him. Quaere tamen.

Wyld, Twisden JJ
[1671] EngR 9, (1671) 3 Rep Ch 67, (1671) 21 ER 731 (A)
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
See AlsoSir Ralph Bovey v Skipwith 25-May-1671
. .
CitedSzepietowski v The National Crime Agency SC 23-Oct-2013
S owned several propertie in charge to the bank, but the Agency said that each had been acquired with the proceeds of criminal activity. The parties had settled the claim by the grant of a second charge in favour of the Agency. However when that . .
See AlsoBoeve v Skipwith 1678
The Bill is a Supplemental Bill, to have a further Discovery from the Defendant by Way of Evidence, for the better clearing the Matters depending on the Account, which the Defendant hath not answered in the former Cause.
The Plaintiff pleaded . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.406423

Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd: HL 1977

Transactions were entered into under which loans were made to enable the borrower to acquire and develop certain properties were held to be unenforceable under the 1927 Act. The effect was to enrich the borrower, who had fallen into arrears of payments of interest and moneys due but was successful in his defence that all the transactions including those which provided security rights to the creditor were unenforceable.
Held: While the Acts were designed to protect unsophisticated borrowers from being overreached by unscrupulous moneylenders, they were capable of being used by unscrupulous borrowers to avoid paying their just debts to moneylenders. Whether a remedy in subrogation to redress the unjust enrichment might be available was considered, but it was not open to the court to mitigate the harshness to the moneylender and the undeserved enrichment of the borrower which had resulted from the technical failure to observe the provisions of the Act.
Lord Diplock stated the principle in relation to such provisions as follows: ‘Agreements or securities that are unenforceable are not devoid of all legal effect. Payments made voluntarily pursuant to their terms are not recoverable and I regard it as open to question whether the unenforceability of a higher ranking security which is not void ab initio excludes the doctrine of the merger in it of a lower ranking security in respect of the same charge, at any rate when the higher ranking security remains potentially enforceable in the hands of an assignee.’
As to subrogation: ‘It is a convenient way of describing a transfer of rights from one person to another, without assignment or assent of the person from whom the rights are transferred and which takes place by operation of law in a whole variety of widely different circumstances.’ and as an example ‘One of the sets of circumstances in which a right of subrogation arises is when a liability of a borrower B to an existing creditor C secured on the property of B is discharged out of moneys provided by the lender L and paid to C either by L himself at B’s request and on B’s behalf or directly by B pursuant to his agreement with L. In these circumstances L is prima facie entitled to be treated as if he were the transferee of the benefit of C’s security on the property to the extent that the moneys lent by L to B were applied to the discharge of B’s liability to C. This subrogation of L to the security upon the property of B is based upon the presumed mutual intentions of L and B; in other words where a contract of loan provides that moneys lent by L to B are to be applied in discharging a liability of B to C secured on property, it is an implied term of that contract that L is to be subrogated to C’s security.’
As to unjust enrichment, Lord Diplock said: ‘My Lords, there is no general doctrine of unjust enrichment recognised in English law. What it does is to provide specific remedies in particular cases of what might be classified as unjust enrichment in a legal system that is based upon the civil law. There are some circumstances in which the remedy takes the form of ‘subrogation’, but this expression embraces more than a single concept in English law. It is a convenient way of describing a transfer of rights from one person to another, without assignment or assent of the person from whom the rights are transferred and which takes place by operation of law in a whole variety of widely different circumstances. Some rights by subrogation are contractual in their origin, as in the case of contracts of insurance. Others, such as the right of an innocent lender to recover from a company moneys borrowed ultra vires to the extent that these have been expended on discharging the company’s lawful debts, are in no way based on contract and appear to defeat classification except as an empirical remedy to prevent a particular kind of unjust enrichment.’
Lord Salmon said: ‘The test as to whether the courts will apply the doctrine of subrogation to the facts of any particular case is entirely empirical. It is, I think, impossible to formulate any narrower principle than that the doctrine will be applied only when the courts are satisfied that reason and justice demand that it should be.’

Lords Diplock, Salmon and Keith
[1978] AC 95, [1977] 3 All ER 1
Moneylenders Act 1927 6 13(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedWilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry; Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) HL 10-Jul-2003
The respondent appealed against a finding that the provision which made a loan agreement completely invalid for lack of compliance with the 1974 Act was itself invalid under the Human Rights Act since it deprived the respondent of its property . .
CitedCastle Phillips Finance v Piddington CA 1995
The wife charged the matrimonial home to Lloyds to secure the husband’s indebtedness. The husband subsequently agreed with Barclays for the indebtedness to be refinanced. The husband and an accomplice forged her signature on a transfer of the . .
CitedDimond v Lovell HL 12-May-2000
A claimant sought as part of her damages for the cost of hiring a care whilst her own was off the road after an accident caused by the defendant. She agreed with a hire company to hire a car, but payment was delayed until the claim was settled.
AppliedCheltenham and Gloucester Plc v Appleyard and Another CA 15-Mar-2004
The owners had purchased their property with a loan from the BBBS. A charge was then given to BCCI, which charge said no further charge could be registered without BCCI ‘s consent. The C and G agreed to lend a sum to refinance the entire borrowings, . .
CitedBoscawen and Others v Bajwa and Others; Abbey National Plc v Boscawen and Others CA 10-Apr-1995
The defendant had charged his property to the Halifax. Abbey supplied funds to secure its discharge, but its own charge was not registered. It sought to take advantage of the Halifax’s charge which had still not been removed.
Held: A mortgagee . .
CitedMcGuffick v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc ComC 6-Oct-2009
Requirements for Enforcing Consumer Loan Agreement
The claimant challenged the validity of a loan agreement with his bank as a regulated consumer credit agreement. After default, the lender failed to satisfy a request for a copy of the agreement under section 77. The bank said that though it could . .
CitedBankers Trust Company v Namdar and Namdar CA 14-Feb-1997
The bank sought repayment of its loan and possession of the defendants’ property. The second defendant said that the charge had only her forged signature.
Held: Non-compliance with section 2 of the 1989 Act does not make a bargain illegal, and . .
CitedBank of Cyprus UK Ltd v Menelaou SC 4-Nov-2015
The bank customers, now appellants, redeemed a mortgage over their property, and the property was transferred to family members, who in turn borrowed from the same lender. A bank employee simply changed the name on the mortgage. This was ineffective . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Consumer, Financial Services, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.184428

Green v Cobham: ChD 19 Jan 2000

cw The Trustees had overlooked the fact that a Will Trust and two sub-settlements together constituted a single composite settlement for the purposes of CGT with a single body of trustees. As a result of his retirement from practice the solicitor to a non-resident will trust was no longer treated as non-resident for capital gains tax purposes, with the result that there was no longer a majority of non-resident trustees and the will trust became a United Kingdom resident trust.
Held: The deed of appointment was set aside. The exercise of the power of appointment, by trustees failing to take any account of the potentially adverse capital gains tax consequences, was invalid.

Jonathan Parker J
(2002) STC 820, [2000] EWHC 1564 (Ch), (2001-02) 4 ITELR 785, [2000] WTLR 1101, [2002] STC 820, [2002] STI 879, [2002] BTC 170
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
appliedAbacus Trust Company (Isle of Man) Ltd and Another v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children ChD 17-Jul-2001
abacus_nspccChD01
The claimants were beneficiaries, trustee and protector of a trust fund. In order to mitigate Capital Gains Tax liability they sought advice, and, following that advice, entered into a deed of gift in favour of the respondent charity. The deed . .
CitedAMP (UK) Plc and Another v Barker and Others ChD 8-Dec-2000
The claimants were interested under a pension scheme. Alterations had been made, which the said had been in error, and they sought rectification to remove a link between early leaver benefits and incapacity benefits. The defendant trustees agreed . .
CitedFutter and Another v Futter and Others ChD 11-Mar-2010
Various family settlements had been created. The trustees wished to use the rule in Hastings-Bass to re-open decisions they had made after receiving incorrect advice.
Held: The deeds were set aside as void. The Rule in Hastings-Bass derives . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Capital Gains Tax, Equity

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.182188

Aluminium Industrie Vaassen B V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd: CA 16 Jan 1976

The seller sold aluminium to the defendant, but included a clause under which they retained title in the materials sold, even if mixed in with manufactured goods, until they had been paid for the metal. The defendants appealed a finding that the receivers held the proceeds of sale of the manufactured goods on trust for the plaintiffs.
Held: The appeal failed. The intention of the clause was to secure for as long as possible payment of the purchase price of the aluminium. There had to be read into the contract a duty on the defendant to act under the fiduciary relationship of principal and agent, bailor and bailee, as was contemplated in the clause. The plaintiffs could trace the proceeds of the sub-sales, and recover them.

Megaw, Roskill and Goff L.JJ
[1976] 1 WLR 676
lip
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re Hallett’s Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett CA 1880
Where a trustee of a policy used money received from others to make payment of premiums on an insurance policy, they would be entitled to a lien on the policy. Where an asset was acquired exclusively with trust money, the beneficiary could either . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Company, Equity, Agency

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.174733

In Re Pilkington’s Will Trusts; Pilkington v Inland Revenue Commissioners: HL 8 Oct 1962

The trustees proposed establishing a new trust in respect of the share of an estate to which an infant beneficiary had a contingent entitlement. A portion of the trust fund would be allocated to the new trust.
Held: This was a lawful exercise of the statutory power of advancement. The new trusts must be read as if they had been created by the settlor of the existing settlement, at the time of the existing settlement, and, when tested against the rule against perpetuities in that situation, they failed. In the context of a power of advancement, it is no bar to an exercise of the power that the primary object neither requested nor consented to it, and the power was not limited to the conferring of benefit ‘personal to the person concerned in the sense of being related to his or her own real or personal needs’. Nevertheless, trusts created in remainder after the life interest of the settlor’s son were void for perpetuity. The phrase ‘advancement or benefit’ in setion 32 of the 1925 Act covered: ‘any use of the money which will improve the material situation of the beneficiary.’
A power of advancement was a special power and accordingly trusts called into existence by its exercise must be written into the instrument creating the power far the purposes of applying the perpetuity rule.
Viscount Radcliffe said: ‘I ought to note for the record (1) that the transaction envisaged does not actually involve the raising of money, since the trustees propose to appropriate a block of shares in the family’s private limited company as the trust investment, and (2) there will not be any actual transfer, since the trustees of the proposed settlement and the will trustees are the same persons. As I have already said, I do not attach any importance to these factors . . To transfer or appropriate outright is only to do by shortcut what could be done in a more roundabout way by selling the shares to a consenting party, paying the money over to the new settlement with appropriate instructions and arranging for it to be used in buying back the shares as the trust investment. It cannot make any difference to follow the course taken in In Re Collard’s Will Trusts and deal with the property direct. On the other point, so long as there are separate trusts, the property effectually passes out of the old settlement into the new one, and it is of no relevance that, at any rate for the time being, the persons administering the new trust are the same individuals.’
TC Trusts – Will settlement – Infant beneficiary with contingent interest – Statutory power of advancement – Whether exercisable by resettlement on new trusts – Rule against perpetuities – Whether new trusts to be treated as if contained in original settlement – Trustee Act, 1925 (15 and 16 Geo. V, c. 19), Section 32.

Viscount Radcliffe
[1964] AC 612, [1962] 3 All ER 622, [1962] 3 WLR 1051, 106 Sol Jo 834, 40 Tax Cas 433, [1962] UKHL TC – 40 – 416
Bailii
Trustee Act 1925 32
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRe Kershaw’s Trusts 1868
In the particular circumstances a provision made for the benefit of the husband was for the benefit of the wife. . .
At First InstanceIn Re Pilkington’s Will Trusts; Pilkington v Inland Revenue Commissioners ChD 1959
Whether Trust was void for perpetuity . .
See Alsoin Re Pilkington’s Will Trusts; Pilkington v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 2-Jan-1961
. .
See AlsoIn Re Pilkington’s Will Trusts; Pilkington v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1961
. .
CitedIn Re Collard’s Will Trusts 1961
Buckley J said: ‘In the present case, the farm has recently been valued by qualified valuers at andpound;20,000, and an advance of andpound;20,000 would be within the financial limit of the power of the advancement which the trustees at present . .

Cited by:
CitedAMP (UK) Plc and Another v Barker and Others ChD 8-Dec-2000
The claimants were interested under a pension scheme. Alterations had been made, which the said had been in error, and they sought rectification to remove a link between early leaver benefits and incapacity benefits. The defendant trustees agreed . .
CitedIn Re the Estate of Marjorie Langdon Cameron (Deceased); Peter David Phillips v Donald Cameron and Others ChD 24-Mar-1999
One of the testatrix’s children was thought to be profligate, and had failed to maintain his own son. Acting under an enduring power of attorney, the testatrix’s attorneys made a substantial gift in establishing an educational trust for that son’s . .
CitedTrennery v West (Inspector of Taxes) HL 27-Jan-2005
The House considered the application of the section to ‘flip-flop trusts’. The section allocated liability to charge on gains within a settlement under certain circumstances onto the settlor, and at his rate of tax. Assets were allocated to two . .
CitedX v A and others ChD 29-Nov-2005
The wife sought confirmation that the trustees of a discretionary marriage settlement created by her husband could release sums which she intended to pay out for charitable purposes.
Held: The trust required money to be released for the . .
CitedRe Hastings-Bass; Hastings v Inland Revenue CA 14-Mar-1974
Trustees of a settlement had exercised their power of advancement under the section, in order to save estate duty by transferring investments to be held on the trusts of a later settlement. However the actual effect of the advancement was that the . .
CitedBarclays Bank Trust Company Ltd v Revenue and Customs CA 14-Jul-2011
Parents had each left a share of their estate to the bank on trusts for their disabled son. The revenue said that the gifts were caught by and taxable by virtue of sections 5, 49 and 89 of the 1984 Act, the residuary estates of both parents forming . .
CitedFutter and Another v Revenue and Customs; Pitt v Same SC 9-May-2013
Application of Hastings-Bass Rule
F had created two settlements. Distributions were made, but overlooking the effect of section 2(4) of the 2002 Act, creating a large tax liability. P had taken advice on the investment of the proceeds of a damages claim and created a discretionary . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Trusts

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.184588

Pullan v Coe: ChD 1913

A marriage settlement settled property on the husband, wife, and prospective children. The wife also promised to settle after-acquired property on the same trusts. She later received andpound;285 which she invested in part in bearer bonds which remained at the bank in the husband’s name until his death. The trustees sought to obtain the bonds from the husband’s executors on behalf of the settlements.
Held: Equity treats as done that which ought to have been done.
Swinfen Eady J said: ‘It was contended that the bonds never in fact became trust property, as both the wife and husband were only liable in damages for breach of covenant, and that the case was different from cases where property which has once admittedly become subject to the trusts of an instrument has been improperly dealt with, and is sought to be recovered. In my opinion as soon as the 285l. was paid to the wife it became in equity bound by and subject to the trusts of the settlement. The trustees could have claimed that particular sum, could have obtained at once the appointment of a receiver of it, if they could have followed the money and claimed the investment.’

Swinfen Eady J
[1913] 1 Ch 9
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSmith v Lucas CA 1881
Jessel MR said: ‘What is the effect of such a covenant in equity? It has been said that the effect in equity of the covenant of the wife, as far as she is concerned, is that it does not affect her personally, but that it binds the property: that is . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Trusts, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.471501

Fisher v Brooker and Others: HL 30 Jul 2009

The claimant sought a share in the royalties from the song ‘A whiter shade of pale’ but had delayed his claim for 38 years. He had contributed the organ solo which had contributed significantly to the song’s success. He now sought a share of future royalties.
Held: His appeal was allowed. Limitation did not apply, and nor could the equitable doctrines of estoppel or laches be applied where the benefit of the delay to the defendant far outweighed any detriment from the delay. The issuing of a claim in 2005 revoked any implied licence to the defendants to continue to exploit the song.
Neuberger L said that laches could only bar equitable relief and a declaration as to the existence of a long term property right recognised as such by statute was not equitable relief, and in order to defeat the claimant’s claims on the ground of laches, the defendants had to demonstrate some acts during the delay period which resulted in a balance of justice justifying the refusal of relief to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled.

Lord Hope of Craighead
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Mance, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
[2009] UKHL 41, Times 12-Aug-2009, [2009] 1 WLR 1764, [2009] FSR 25, [2009] Bus LR 1334, [2009] 4 All ER 789, [2009] ECDR 17, [2010] EMLR 2
Bailii
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 12, Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/3297), Limitation Act 1980 39
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedZouch, Ex Dimiss Abbot And Hallet v Parsons 23-Nov-1765
Contract by Children for Necessities
Lord Mansfield said that: ‘miserable must the condition of minors be; excluded from the society and commerce of the world; deprived of necessaries, education, employment, and many advantages; if they could do no binding acts. Great inconvenience . .
Appeal fromBrooker and Another v Fisher CA 4-Apr-2008
The claimant had asserted a joint authorship of the song ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’ written in the sixties. The defendant appealed saying that the claim had been brought too late, and that the finding ignored practice in the music industry. The . .
At first instanceFisher v Brooker and Another ChD 20-Dec-2006
The claimant said that he had contributed to the copyright in the song ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’ but had been denied royalties. He had played the organ and particularly the organ solo which had contrbuted significantly to the fame of the record.
CitedGillett v Holt and Another CA 23-Mar-2000
Repeated Assurances Created Equitable Estoppel
Repeated assurances, given over years, that the claimant would acquire an interest in property on the death of the person giving the re-assurance, and upon which the claimant relied to his detriment, could found a claim of equitable estoppel. The . .
CitedSledmore v Dalby CA 8-Feb-1996
The plaintiff sought possession of a house. She had owned it with her late husband. The defendant lived in and had done much work on the house, but the deceased left it all to the plaintiff and the defendant’s wife who had since also died. She . .
CitedEdwards v Carter HL 1893
If an infant choses to repudiate a disposition, he must do so within a reasonable time after coming of age. . .
CitedJaggard v Sawyer and Another CA 18-Jul-1994
Recovery of damages after Refusal of Injunction
The plaintiff appealed against the award of damages instead of an injunction aftter the County court had found the defendant to have trespassed on his land by a new building making use of a private right of way.
Held: The appeal failed.
CitedShelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Company, Meux’s Brewery Co v Same CA 1895
The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction for nuisance by noise and vibration which was causing structural injury to a public house.
Held: The court set out the rules for when a court should not grant an injunction for an infringement of . .
CitedTaylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd ChD 1981
The fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine of estoppel. In the light of the more recent cases, the principle ‘requires a very much broader approach which is . .
CitedDoyle v White City Stadium Ltd CA 1934
A professional boxer, below the age for making a contract generally, was held to be bound by the terms of his licence from the British Boxing Board of Control, which allowed him to earn his living boxing but required him to keep the rules. It was . .
CitedShaw v Applegate CA 1977
There was a covenant against the use of a property as an amusement arcade. Within three years the purchaser had installed amusement machines, but it was not until three years later that the plaintiffs issued proceedings for an injunction and . .
CitedChaplin v Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd 1966
It had been agreed that the defendant publishers should during the legal term of the copyright have the exclusive right of producing, publishing and selling a work in volume form in any language throughout the world. The author warranted that he was . .

Cited by:
CitedAdamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Intellectual Property, Limitation, Equity, Children, Contract

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.368926

Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc: HL 29 Jul 1998

Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake

Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap agreements were unlawful. Kleinwort Benson then sought restitution of the payments on the basis of a mistake of law.
Held: It should be recognised that there was a general right to recover money paid under a mistake, whether of fact or law. ‘the mistake of law rule no longer forms part of English law.’ Where the law was deemed to have changed after a court decision, money paid under a view of the previous settled law became recoverable. The law is deemed always to have been as now found. The limitation period ran from the date of the discovery of the error of law. The old rule is not to be followed. Money paid under a mistake of law should be recoverable on the same footing as money paid under a mistake of fact, subject in the same way to the defences available in the law of restitution, which include the defence of change of position. ‘I should consider whether parties in the position of the appellant bank were mistaken when they paid money to local authorities under interest swap agreements which they, like others, understood to be valid but have later been held to be void. To me, it is plain that the money was indeed paid over under a mistake, the mistake being a mistake of law. The payer believed, when he paid the money, that he was bound in law to pay it. He is now told that, on the law as held to be applicable at the date of the payment, he was not bound to pay it. Plainly, therefore, he paid the money under a mistake of law, and accordingly subject to any applicable defences, he is entitled to recover it.’ and ‘The present rule, under which in general money is not recoverable in restitution on the ground that it has been paid under a mistake of law, should no longer be maintained as part of English law, from which it follows that the facts pleaded by the bank in each action disclose a cause of action in mistake. There is no principle of English law that payments made under a settled understanding of the law which is subsequently departed from by judicial decision shall not be recoverable in restitution on the ground of mistake of law.’
Lord Lloyd of Berwick discussed the ability of the common law to change: ‘This brings us to the central question. Nobody now suggests that the common law is static. It is capable of adapting itself to new circumstances. Is it then capable of being changed? or is it only capable of being developed? The common sense answer is that the common law is capable of being changed, not only by legislation, but also by judicial decision. This is nowhere clearer than when a long-standing decision of the Court of Appeal is overruled. Indeed in a system such as ours, where the Court of Appeal is bound by its own previous decisions, the main justification for the existence of a second tier appeal is that it enables the House to re-direct the law when it has taken a wrong turning. ‘

Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead
Gazette 18-Nov-1998, Gazette 10-Feb-1999, Times 30-Oct-1998, [1998] UKHL 38, [1999] 2 AC 349, [1998] 4 All ER 513, [1998] 3 WLR 1095, [1998] Lloyds Rep Bank 387
House of Lords, Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
LimitedDavid Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia 1992
(High Court of Australia) Moneys paid away as a result of a causative mistake of law are recoverable: ‘the payer will be entitled prima facie to recover moneys paid under a mistake if it appears that the moneys were paid by the payer in the mistaken . .
Appeal fromKleinwort Benson Ltd v Birmingham City Council CA 20-May-1996
No defence of unjust enrichment was available to defend a claim on a failed interest rate swap agreement. . .
CitedHazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council HL 1991
Swap deals outwith Council powers
The authority entered into interest rate swap deals to protect itself against adverse money market movements. They began to lose substantial amounts when interest rates rose, and the district auditor sought a declaration that the contracts were . .
OverruledBilbie v Lumley and Others 28-Jun-1802
Contract Not Set Aside for Mistake as to Law
An underwriter paid a claim under a policy which he was entitled in law to repudiate for non-disclosure. Although he knew the relevant facts, he was not aware of their legal significance. He claimed back the money he had paid.
Held: A contract . .
CitedUniversity of Wollongong v Merwally 22-Nov-1984
(High Court of Australia) Deane J said: ‘A parliament may legislate that, for the purposes of the law which it controls, past facts or past laws are to be deemed and treated as having been different to what they were. It cannot however objectively . .
CitedHenderson v Folkestone Waterworks Co 1885
The plaintiff had paid water rates to the defendant calculated in accordance with the law as it was held to be by the Court of Appeal. After payment, the House of Lords in the Dobbs case changed the law, and if calculated under the changed law the . .
CitedIn re Roberts 1905
A compromise made under a mistake of law can be set aside. . .
CitedBaker v Courage and Co 1910
The plaintiff had owned a public house. On selling the leasehold to the defendants brewers, they had overpaid him by andpound;1,000. He deposited a sum at interest with the defendants. When he came to withdraw the last of the deposit (by coincidence . .
CitedDerrick v Williams CA 1939
The plaintiff had accepted a payment into court on a basis that a Court of Appeal decision declared the law in a form which precluded the recovery of certain types of damages. Subsequently the House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal decision and . .
CitedCommissioner of State Revenue v The Royal Insurance Australia Ltd 7-Dec-1994
(High Court of Australia) A payment had been made under statute which was later repealed with retrospective effect.
Held: The monies paid under the retrospectively repealed statute had not been paid under a mistake of law at common law. . .
CitedIn re Hollis’ Hospital and Hague’s Contract ChD 5-Jul-1899
In October, 1898, a contract was entered into on behalf of the present trustees of Hollis Hospital for the sale of certain freehold property belonging to the hospital.
The property contracted to be sold formed part of certain property which . .
CitedIn re Downshire Settled Estates CA 1953
A scheme of arrangements was proposed on behalf of infant beneficiaries to three settlements. The object of the scheme was to avoid losses to the beneficiaries by reason of inheritance tax.
Held: The court rejected the contention that it had . .
CitedHazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council QBD 1990
The issue before the courts was whether, in the absence of any express power authorising the Council to do so, the Council was within its power under s 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 to enter into certain swap transactions;
‘The fact . .
CitedKelly v Solari CEC 18-Nov-1841
Recovery was sought of money (pounds 200) paid an error of fact. There had been a life policy, but it had lapsed before the death of the life assured. The policy had been marked ‘lapsed’ but the marking had been overlooked.
Held: Where money . .
CitedLowry v Bourdieu 1780
A mistake of law was not a good ground for recovery of money paid in error. . .
CitedWoolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (2) HL 20-Jul-1992
The society had set out to assert that regulations were unlawful in creating a double taxation. It paid money on account of the tax demanded. It won and recovered the sums paid, but the revenue refused to pay any interest accrued on the sums paid. . .
CitedBrisbane v Dacres 1813
The commander of a naval vessel, HMS Arethusa, had paid to the Admiral in command a proportion of freight received for the carriage of publicly owned bullion on board the Arethusa in the belief that this was due to the Admiral as a matter of usage. . .
CitedLipkin Gorman (a Firm) v Karpnale Ltd HL 6-Jun-1991
The plaintiff firm of solicitors sought to recover money which had been stolen from them by a partner, and then gambled away with the defendant. He had purchased their gaming chips, and the plaintiff argued that these, being gambling debts, were . .
CitedWilson and M’Lellan v Sinclair 1830
Lord Brougham LC said that since Brisbane v. Dacres it had been considered an established point that a mistake must be ‘in the fact’ to allow recovery of money paid in error. . .
CitedHazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council CA 2-Jan-1990
The authority entered into interest rate swap agreements, whose validity was challenged. The court considered what were the functions of a local authority within the Act. ‘We agree with the Divisional Court that in [section 111(1)] the word . .
CitedDixon v Monkland Canal Company 1831
Recovery of money paid in error of law. . .
CitedIn re Hallett’s Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett CA 1880
Where a trustee of a policy used money received from others to make payment of premiums on an insurance policy, they would be entitled to a lien on the policy. Where an asset was acquired exclusively with trust money, the beneficiary could either . .
CitedMorgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lothian Regional Council IHCS 19-Jan-1995
Money paid under error in law is repayable according to equity, and without statutory authority on the ground of unjustified enrichment. . .
CitedWestdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council; Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Sandwell Borough Council ChD 23-Feb-1993
A bank, having made payment under an void interest rate swap agreement to a local authority, was entitled to recover the payments made under the equitable doctrine of restitution. It would be wrong to allow the local authorities to enjoy an unjust . .
CitedRegina v Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Woolwich Equitable Building Society HL 25-Oct-1990
The society challenged the validity of transitional provisions in the 1986 regulations on the ground that they were ultra vires. The House considered the specific presumption against double taxation, and also a power in general terms to make . .
CitedEarl Beauchamp v Winn HL 1873
The rules in equity as to restitution after a payment made under a mistake of law apply as much to mistakes of fact as to mistakes of law. . .
CitedIn re Diplock CA 1948
S 26 of the Act of 1939 would operate to postpone the running of time in the case of an action at common law to recover money paid under a mistake of fact, and would likewise apply to an analogous claim in equity to recover money paid under a . .
CitedPhillips-Higgins v Harper QBD 1954
A claim was made to recover monies due under a contract where the plaintiff had failed to realise that the balance was due to her, and by that mistake the action was concealed from her.
Held: Pearson J said: ‘But that is not sufficient. . .
CitedStirling v Earl of Lauderdale 1733
The maxim ignorantia juris non excusat did not apply only to the law of delict. . .
CitedKiriri Cotton Co Ltd v Dewani PC 1-Dec-1959
(Eastern Africa) A premium had been paid in consideration of the grant of a sub-lease of property contrary to the provisions of an ordinance. Restitution was ordered because payment had been made pursuant to a contractual obligation rendered void by . .
CitedFibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd HL 15-Jun-1942
A contract for the supply by the respondents of special machinery to be manufactured by them was treated as an ordinary contract for the sale of goods. It began valid, but suffered frustration by the outbreak of war.
Held: Lord Wright restated . .
CitedIn re Condon, Ex parte James 1874
The Trustee in bankruptcy has relevant duties as the Trustee as an officer of the Court. Such a Trustee would not engage in conduct which could be seen to involve an unfair use of that position, and ‘where it would be unfair’ for a trustee in . .
CitedRegina v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, ex parte Chetnik Developments Limited HL 1988
The House was asked whether a rating authority could refuse to repay rates which had been paid by mistake.
Held: ‘Parliament must have intended the rating authorities to act in the same high principled way expected by the court of its own . .

Cited by:
CitedDeutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue, HM Attorney General ChD 18-Jul-2003
The taxpayer sought to bring an action for restitution by the revenue of sums paid under a mistake of law. Under the Metallgesellschaft decision, rights of election for recovery of overpaid tax applied only between UK resident companies.
Held: . .
CitedNiru Battery Manufacturing Company, Bank Sepah Iran v Milestone Trading Limited CA 23-Oct-2003
The claimant had contracted to purchase lead from some of the defendants. There were delays in payment but when funds were made available they should have been repaid. An incorrect bill of lading was presented. The bill certified that the goods had . .
AppliedMargaret Brennan v Bolt Burdon, London Borough of Islington, Leigh Day and Co QBD 30-Oct-2003
The claimant had sought relief for the injury to her health suffered by condition of her flat. The legal advisers had settled the matter, thinking that the claim had not been timeously served. The defendant appealed an order that the compromise was . .
AppliedPankhania v The London Borough of Hackney ChD 2002
A brochure listing properties to be sold at auction decribed the property as being subject to a terminable licence. In fact it was a secure tenancy. The question arose as to whether a misrepresentation of law could found a cause of action.
DistinguishedS v S (Ancillary Relief: Consent Order) FD 4-Mar-2002
An order for ancillary relief had been made by consent. Later the House of Lords issued a judgment which changed the law which had been the basis of the decision to accept the settlement. The wife now sought to set aside the consent order, and . .
CitedOliver Ashworth (Holdings) Limited v Ballard (Kent) Limited CA 18-Mar-1999
In order for the landlord to claim double rent where a tenant held over unlawfully after the tenancy was determined, the landlord must not do anything to indicate that the lease might be continuing, for example by denying the validity of break . .
CitedGeorge Worme Grenada Today Limited v The Commissioner of Police PC 29-Jan-2004
PC (Grenada) The defendant was editor of a newspaper which carried a story severely defamatory of the prime minister. He was convicted of criminal libel, and appealed.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The . .
CitedDFS Furniture Company Plc v Commissioners of Customs and Excise CA 16-Mar-2004
The taxpayers said that the Commissioners’ assessment to VAT was out of time, and appealed a finding that it was not. They said that time should run from the point at which the Commissioners knew the facts upon which the assessment was based. The . .
CitedBrennan v Bolt Burdon and Others, London Borough of Islington, Leigh Day and Co CA 29-Jul-2004
The claimant sought damages for injury alleged to have been suffered as tenant of a house after being subjected to carbon monoxide poisoning, and also from her former solicitors for their delay in her claim. The effective question was whether the . .
CitedInland Revenue and Another v Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc CA 4-Feb-2005
The company sought repayment of excess advance corporation tax payments made under a mistake of law. The question was the extent of the effect of the ruling in Klienwort Benson, in particular whether it covered sums paid as taxation, and how the law . .
CitedNational Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Limited and others HL 30-Jun-2005
Former HL decision in Siebe Gorman overruled
The company had become insolvent. The bank had a debenture and claimed that its charge over the book debts had become a fixed charge. The preferential creditors said that the charge was a floating charge and that they took priority.
Held: The . .
CitedHalpern and Another v Halpern and others ComC 24-Mar-2006
The deceased parents, being orthodox Jews, had first made standard wills and then made provision accoding to Jewish law. A dispute after the second death was referred to a Beth Din arbitration. After an initial resolution, various distributions were . .
CitedMeretz Investments Nv and Another v ACP Ltd and others ChD 30-Jan-2006
The applicant challenged the exercise of a power of sale under a mortgage, saying that the mortgagee’s purposes included purposes not those under the mortgage. The parties had been involved in an attempted development of a penthouse.
Held: The . .
CitedSmithkline Beecham Plc Glaxosmithkline UK Ltd and Another v Apotex Europe Ltd and others (No 2) CA 23-May-2006
The parties to the action had given cross undertakings to support the grant of an interim injunction. A third party subsequently applied to be joined, and now sought to take advantage of the cross undertakings to claim the losses incurred through . .
CitedLloyds Bank Plc v Independent Insurance Co Ltd CA 26-Nov-1998
The bank had made an electronic transfer of funds for a customer in satisfaction of that customer’s proper debt, but it was done under a mistake of fact as to the cleared status of funds received.
Held: The appeal was turned down. The bank was . .
CitedDeutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue and Another HL 25-Oct-2006
The tax payer had overpaid Advance Corporation Tax under an error of law. It sought repayment. The revenue contended that the claim was time barred.
Held: The claim was in restitution, and the limitation period began to run from the date when . .
CitedAwoyomi v Radford and Another QBD 12-Jul-2007
The claimant sought damages from the defendant barristers who had represented her in criminal proceedings. They had not passed on to her the statement made by the judge in chambers that if she pleaded guilty he would not impose a sentence of . .
CitedSempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another HL 18-Jul-2007
The parties agreed that damages were payable in an action for restitution, but the sum depended upon to a calculation of interest. They disputed whether such interest should be calculated on a simple or compound basis. The company sought compound . .
CitedSomerville v Scottish Ministers HL 24-Oct-2007
The claimants complained of their segregation while in prison. Several preliminary questions were to be decided: whether damages might be payable for breach of a Convention Right; wheher the act of a prison governor was the act of the executive; . .
CitedFender (Administrator of FG Collier and Sons Ltd) v National Westminster Bank Plc ChD 26-Sep-2008
The administrator sought declarations as to whether to treat the bank as a secured or unsecured creditor.
Held: The court directed the Administrator to recognise the Bank as a secured creditor, as if the Deed of Release had never been . .
CitedKommune and Another v DEPFA Acs Bank ComC 4-Sep-2009
Local authorities in Denmark sought to recover sums paid to the defendant banks for swap trading, saying that the payments had been outwith their powers. . .
CitedBrazzill and Others v Willoughby and Others CA 27-May-2010
The regulated bank Kaupthing Singer and Friedlander Ltd (KSF) was in financial difficulties. The Bank of England required KSF to credit to a trust account all future deposits. KSF later went into insolvency. Some deposits had been credited to the . .
CitedJones v Churcher and Another QBD 18-Mar-2009
. .
CitedThe Law Debenture Trust Corporation Plc v Elektrim Sa and Another ChD 20-Jul-2009
. .
CitedBloomsbury International Ltd and Others v Sea Fish Industry Authority and Another QBD 24-Jul-2009
Parties challenged the legality of a levy imposed by the defendant for the purposes of supporting the sea food industry. They said that a levy imposed on fish products imported to the UK was beyond the powers given by the 1981 Act, and was contrary . .
CitedHaugesund Kommune and Another v Depfa Acs Bank CA 27-May-2010
. .
CitedLittlewoods Retail Ltd and Others v HM Revenue and Customs ChD 19-May-2010
The claimants had overpaid large sums of VAT over several years, and been, eventually, refunded, with simple interest. The claimants now said that the interest should have been compounded. The revenue contended that such a claim was excluded under . .
CitedDeutsche Bank Ag v Vik and Another ComC 19-Mar-2010
. .
CitedFranked Investment Group Litigation Test Claimants v Inland Revenue and Another CA 23-Feb-2010
. .
CitedMarine Trade Sa v Pioneer Freight Futures Co Ltd Bvi and Another ComC 29-Oct-2009
The parties stood to make substantial losses against each other under contracts for differences after the dramatic fall in the freight market in the financial turmoil of late 2008. . .
CitedThin Cap Group Litigation, Test Claimants In v Revenue and Customs ChD 17-Nov-2009
. .
CitedTest Claimants In The Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Inland Revenue SC 23-May-2012
The European Court had found the UK to have unlawfully treated differently payment of franked dividends between subsidiaries of UK companies according to whether all the UK subsidiaries were themselves UK based, thus prejudicing European . .
CitedAspect Contracts (Asbetos) Ltd v Higgins Construction Plc SC 17-Jun-2015
Aspect had claimed the return of funds paid by it to the appellant Higgins under an adjudication award in a construction contract disute. The claimant had been asked to prpare asbestos surveys and reports on maisonettes which Higgins was to acquire . .
CitedRevenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies SC 11-Apr-2017
Certain investment trust companies (ITCs) sought refunds of VAT paid on the supply of investment management services. EU law however clarified that they were not due. Refunds were restricted by the Commissioners both as to the amounts and limitation . .
CitedPrudential Assurance Company Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 25-Jul-2018
PAC sought to recover excess advance corporation tax paid under a UK system contrary to EU law. It was now agreed that some was repayable but now the quantum. Five issues separated the parties.
Issue I: does EU law require the tax credit to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.135173

In Re Ritson: ChD 1898

Romer J
[1898] 1 Ch 667
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromIn Re Ritson, Ritson v Ritson CA 1899
The joint debts of a partnership are payable out of the joint assets if sufficient even though secured on the separate property of one partner.
Chitty LJ said of a deceased partner that his ‘interest in the joint assets [of the partnership] . .
CitedHighbury Pension Fund Management Company and Another v Zirfin Investments Ltd and Others ChD 14-Feb-2013
The court was asked: ‘a) Does the doctrine of marshalling permit the marshalling of securities held over property that does not belong to the common debtor? In particular, is a creditor of a guarantor entitled to marshal (or be subrogated to) . .
CitedMcLean and Another v Trustees of The Bankruptcy Estate of Dent and Others ChD 26-Oct-2016
Marshalling your Dogs Equitably
Application by the joint administrators of a partnership affording the opportunity to consider the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over a dog.
Held: The equitable principle of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Company

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.570480

Thomas Bates and Sons Ltd v Wyndham’s Lingerie Ltd: CA 21 Nov 1980

An application was made for rectification of a rent review clause in a lease. When executing the lease, the tenants’ officer, Mr Avon, noticed that the rent review clause in the lease drafted by the landlords was defective in not including a provision in default of agreement. The trial judge held that the conduct of Mr Avon, who had not given evidence, amounted to sharp practice.
Held: The tenants knew of the omission and of the landlords’ mistake. When establishing the right to rectification of a document, the claimant does not have to meet more than the civil standard of balance of probabilities, but convincing proof is required to counteract the cogent evidence of the parties’ intention displayed by the instrument.
Referring to Riverlake, Buckley LJ said: ‘Undoubtedly I think in any such case the conduct of the defendant must be such as to make it inequitable that he should be allowed to object to the rectification of the document. If this necessarily implies some measure of ‘sharp practice’, so be it; but for my part I think that the doctrine is one which depends more on the equity of the position. The graver the character of the conduct involved, no doubt the heavier the burden of proof may be; but, in my view, the conduct must be such as to affect the conscience of the party who has suppressed the fact that he has recognised the presence of a mistake.
For this doctrine – that is to say the doctrine of A Roberts v Leicestershire County Council – to apply I think it must be shown: first, that one party A erroneously believed that the document sought to be rectified contained a particular term or provision, or possibly did not contain a particular term or provision which, mistakenly, it did contain; secondly, that the other party B was aware of the omission or the inclusion and that it was due to a mistake on the part of A; thirdly, that B has omitted to draw the mistake to the notice of A. And I think there must be a fourth element involved, namely, that the mistake must be one calculated to benefit B. If these requirements are satisfied, the court may regard it as inequitable to allow B to resist rectification to give effect to A’s intention on the ground that the mistake was not, at the time of execution of the document, a mutual mistake.’
As to the burden of proof: ‘The standard of proof required in an action of rectification to establish the common intention of the parties is, in my view, the civil standard of balance of probability. But as the alleged common intention ex hypothesi contradicts the written instrument, convincing proof is required in order to counteract the cogent evidence of the parties’ intention displayed by the instrument itself. It is not, I think, the standard of proof which is high, so differing from the normal civil standard, but the evidential requirement needed to counteract the inherent probability that the written instrument truly represents the parties’ intention because it is a document signed by the parties. The standard of proof is no different in a case of so-called unilateral mistake such as the present.’

Buckley LJ, Brightman LJ
[1981] 1 WLR 505, [1980] EWCA Civ 3, [1981] 1 All ER 1077
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedA Roberts and Co Ltd v Leicestershire County Council ChD 1961
The court considered the circumstances required for rectification of a contract after a unilateral mistake. Pennycuick J said: ‘a party is entitled to rectification of a contract upon proof that he believed a particular term to be included in the . .
CitedRiverlate Properties Ltd v Paul CA 1974
A lessor sought to have the lease rectified against the tenant, saying the tenant had sufficient knowledge of the error in the lease to permit that remedy.
Held: The tenant had no such knowledge as would have brought the doctrine into play. In . .

Cited by:
CitedAMP (UK) Plc and Another v Barker and Others ChD 8-Dec-2000
The claimants were interested under a pension scheme. Alterations had been made, which the said had been in error, and they sought rectification to remove a link between early leaver benefits and incapacity benefits. The defendant trustees agreed . .
ApprovedGeorge Wimpey UK Ltd v VI Construction Ltd CA 3-Feb-2005
A land purchase contract had been rectified by the judge for unilateral mistake. A factor had been dropped from a formula for calculating the price.
Held: The judge’s conclusion that the circumstances existed to allow a rectification was . .
CitedLittman, Young v Aspen Oil (Broking) Ltd ChD 1-Jul-2005
The tenant sought to exercise a break clause in the lease. The landlord said that the exercise of the right was subject to the tenant having first complied with the terms of the lease.
Held: There was an obvious mistake in the clause which . .
CitedLittman and Another v Aspen Oil (Broking) Ltd CA 19-Dec-2005
A lease had been granted with a break clause, which the tenant exercised. The Landlord said it had not complied with its obligations and was not free to exercise that clause. The clause had included the word ‘landlord’ where it should have read . .
CitedConnolly Ltd v Bellway Homes Ltd ChD 23-Apr-2007
connolly_bellwayChD2007
The claimant sought rectification of a contract for the sale of land, or damages in deceit. They said that it had been agreed that the price would be adjusted to reflect any change in values. The formula inserted made no great sense mathematically, . .
CitedDaventry District Council v Daventry and District Housing Ltd CA 13-Oct-2011
The appellant challenged refusal of rectification of its agreement with the defendant. They asserted either mutual or unilateral mistake. The parties had agreed for the transfer of housing stock and management staff to the respondents. The claimant . .
CitedFSHC Group Holdings Ltd v Glas Trust Corporation Ltd CA 31-Jul-2019
Rectification – Chartbrook not followed
Opportunity for an appellate court to clarify the correct test to apply in deciding whether the written terms of a contract may be rectified because of a common mistake.
Held: The appeal failed. The judge was right to conclude that an . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Landlord and Tenant, Contract

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.184572

Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commissioners: HL 24 Nov 1966

The taxpayer made a gift of shares to a trust set up to fund a medical professorship. The shares were in a private company, and an option was given for their repurchase once a certain level of dividends had been attributed to them. He was assessed to substantial surcharges on them on the basis that the arrangement was a settlement under which he retained an interest and of which he had not divested himself absolutely.
Lord Upjohn said: ‘If A intends to give away all his beneficial interest in a piece of property and thinks he has done so but, by some mistake or accident or failure to comply with the requirements of the law, he has failed to do so, either wholly or partially, there will, by operation of law, be a resulting trust for him of the beneficial interest of which he had failed effectually to dispose. If the beneficial interest was in A and he fails to give it away effectively to another or others or on charitable trusts it must remain in him’

Lord Reid, Lord Pearce, Lord Upjohn, Lord Donovan, Lord Wilberforce
[1966] UKHL 3, [1967] 2 AC 291, [1966] UKHL TC – 43 – 519
Bailii, Bailii
Income Tax Act 1952 411 415, Law of Property Act 1925 53
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedOughtred v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 4-Nov-1959
The taxpayer and her son owned through a trust the entire beneficial interest in the shares of a company. She agreed to transfer other shares to him in return for his interest in the shares subject to the trust, releasing the trust. The Revenue . .
CitedGrey and Another (Hunter’s Nominees) v Inland Revenue Commissioners; Orse Gray v IRC HL 2-Nov-1959
The House considered whether certain instruments which were presented for adjudication to stamp duty under section 13 of the Stamp Act 1891, are or are not chargeable with ad valorem duty.
Held: The word ‘disposition’ is to be given its . .
CitedAttorney General v Brown 1849
. .

Cited by:
See AlsoRe Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) ChD 17-Jul-1973
The court considered the requirement that a proposed beneficiary must establish some positive act on the part of the person creating the trust for that person to be bound by the trust asserted. Megarry J said: ‘(1) If a transaction fails to make any . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Income Tax

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.248562

Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith No.2: CA 1969

There had been long running disputes between the plaintiffs and a defendant in which the plaintiffs claimed that all of the defendant’s assets were held for the plaintiffs on trust. Before those claims had been resolved the plaintiff brought a separate claim against the defendant’s solicitors, Herbert Smith, contending that they were liable to account to the claimant for the fees paid by the defendant from the trust assets. The solicitors applied to strike out the claims. At first instance Pennycuick J decided that the proceedings were contrary to public policy in that they obstructed the due administration of justice.
Held: The appeal failed. t the claims did not give rise to a reasonably arguable claim that the solicitors were constructive trustees under the relevant legal tests. The Court of Appeal did not need to address the public policy argument, though it expressed some sympathy for the judge’s decision.
The court approved the statement in Snell’s Principles of Equity that: ‘A constructive trust is a trust which is imposed by equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and good conscience without reference to any express or presumed intentions of the parties.’
Danckwerts LJ said that ‘knowledge of a claim being made against the solicitor’s client by the other party is not sufficient to amount to notice of a trust or notice of misapplication of the moneys’ and ‘[Counsel for the plaintiff’s] contention was that the defendant solicitors knew where the moneys that they received came from and knew that the source was trust funds. In my view this contention fails at the outset. What the defendant solicitors knew was that the moneys came from the West German foundation and they knew of the allegations contained in the proceedings brought against that foundation by the plaintiffs in which they were instructed to act as solicitors for the West German foundation. They knew that claims were being made against the West German foundation that all their property and assets belonged to the plaintiffs or were held on trust for them. But claims are not the same thing as facts. [The plaintiffs’ counsel] contended that for the purposes of the present issue all the allegations contained in the statements of claim in both the actions must be taken as true. That will not do. What we have to deal with is the state of the defendant solicitors’ knowledge (actual or imputed) at the date when they received payments of their costs and disbursements. At that date they cannot have had more than knowledge of the claims above mentioned. It was not possible for them to know whether they were well-founded or not. The claims depended upon most complicated facts still to be proved or disproved, and very difficult questions of German and English law. It is not a case where the West German foundation were holding property upon any express trust. They were denying the existence of any trust or any right of property in the assets claimed by the plaintiffs. Why should the solicitors of the West German foundation assume anything against their clients?’
Sachs LJ agreed: ‘Firstly, and to my mind decisively, whatever be the nature of the knowledge or notice required, cognisance of what has been termed ‘a doubtful equity’ is not enough. This phrase is to be found in Lewin on Trusts, 16th ed. (1964), p. 658, and Underhill’s Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees 11th ed (1959) p. 606: it appears first to have been used by Lord Grant M.R. in Parker v. Brooke (1804) 9 Ves. 583, 588. The rule, as I understand it, is that no stranger can become a constructive trustee merely because he is made aware of a disputed claim the validity of which he cannot properly assess. Here it has been rightly conceded that no one can foretell the result of the litigation even if the plaintiffs were to prove all the facts they allege.’ and ‘As to facts alleged in a statement of claim, [counsel for the defendants] was, to my mind, correct in submitting that a defendant’s solicitor is under no duty to the plaintiffs to inquire into their accuracy for the purposes urged by [counsel for the plaintiff], nor, where there is a likelihood of a conflict of evidence between his client’s witnesses and those of the plaintiffs is he under any such duty to assess the result.
Edmund Davies LJ agreeing said: ‘The law being reluctant to make a mere agent a constructive trustee, as Lord Selborne L.C put in in Barnes v. Addy, 9 Ch. App. 244, 251-252, mere notice of a claim asserted by a third party is insufficient to render the agent guilty of a wrongful act in dealing with property derived from his principal in accordance with the latter’s instructions unless the agent knows that the third party’s claim is well-founded and that the principal accordingly had no authority to give such instructions’.
Edmund Davies LJ, Danckwerts LJ, Sachs LJ
[1969] 2 WLR 427
England and Wales
Citing:
AdoptedLa Roche v Armstrong KBD 1922
Lush J said: ‘Here the solicitor has received a sum of money from his client for the purpose of his resisting on her behalf a claim by A, who says it is trust money and that the client is under a duty to return it. Under such circumstances I should . .

Cited by:
CitedCobbe v Yeomans Row Management Ltd and Others ChD 25-Feb-2005
Principles for Proprietary Estoppel
A developer claimed to have agreed that upon obtaining necessary planning permissions for land belonging to the respondents, he would purchase the land at a price reflecting its new value. The defendant denied that any legally enforceable agreement . .
Still Good LawXX and Others v YY and Others ChD 2-Jul-2021
The first defendant applies for an order that the claimants are not entitled to pursue legal action against his lawyers in respect of funds over which the claimants claim a proprietary interest and paid to the first defendant’s lawyers as legal fees . .
CitedThe Serious Fraud Office and Another v Litigation Capital Ltd and Others ComC 18-May-2021
. .
CitedSinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd and Others ChD 30-Jun-2010
Lord Neuberger MR said that Carl Zeiss ‘supports the proposition that notice of a claim is not the same as notice of a right’. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 October 2021; Ref: scu.223731

Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd and Another v Akindele: CA 22 Jun 2000

The test of whether a person who received funds held them on constructive trust, was not whether he himself was dishonest, but rather whether he had knowledge of circumstances which made it unconscionable to hold on to the money received. In respect of commercial transactions actual knowledge rather than mere constructive knowledge was required. The court distinguished between cases of knowing receipt and cases of knowing or dishonest assistance. Just as ‘there is now a single test of dishonesty for knowing assistance, so ought there to be a single test of knowledge for knowing receipt. The recipient’s state of knowledge must be such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the receipt. A test in that form, though it cannot, any more than any other, avoid difficulties of application, ought to avoid those of definition and allocation to which the previous categorisations have led. Moreover, it should better enable the courts to give commonsense decisions in the commercial context in which claims in knowing receipt are now frequently made.’
Nourse, Ward and Sedley LJJ
Times 22-Jun-2000, Gazette 29-Jun-2000, [2001] Ch 437, [2000] EWCA Civ 502, [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 292, [2000] 4 All ER 221, (1999-2000) 2 ITELR 788, [2000] 3 WLR 1423, [2000] WTLR 1049, [2000] BCC 968
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedEl Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd CA 2-Dec-1993
The court was asked whether, for the purposes of establishing a company’s liability under the knowing receipt head of constructive trust, the knowledge of one of its directors can be treated as having been the knowledge of the company.
Held: . .
CitedBelmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2) 1980
It had been alleged that there had been a conspiracy involving the company giving unlawful financial assistance for the purchase of its own shares.
Held: Dishonesty is not a necessary ingredient of liability in an allegation of a ‘knowing . .
ApprovedEagle Trust Plc v SBC Securities Ltd; Same v Sbci Bank Corporation Investment Banking Ltd ChD 28-Sep-1994
A financial adviser was not liable in negligence for the allegedly negligent selection of sub-underwriters. On the issue of knowing receipt in a claim for restitution, ‘What the decision in Belmont (No 2) . . shows most clearly is that in a . .
CitedIn re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts 1987
In the context of knowing receipt, a categorisation of knowledge is used to determine whether a person is bound by notice.
Sir Robert Megarry V-C said: ‘The cold calculus of constructive and imputed notice does not seem to me to be an . .
Appeal fromBank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd and Another v Akindele ChD 1999
Chief Akindele agreed in 1985 with ICIC Overseas to invest US$10m in the purchase of 250,000 shares of BCCI Holdings, and to hold the shares for two years. If he wanted to sell the shares after the expiry of two years and up to five years from the . .
Disapproved in partRoyal Brunei Airlines SDN BHD v Tan PC 24-May-1995
(Brunei) The defendants were a one-man company, BLT, and the one man, Mr Tan. A dishonest third party to a breach of trust was liable to make good a resulting loss even though he had received no trust property. The test of knowledge was an objective . .
CitedManchester Corporation v Furness 1895
The court placed emphasis on the desirability of upholding bona fide commercial transactions, and the corresponding undesirability of allowing notions of constructive notice to intrude into commercial transactions. . .

Cited by:
CitedNiru Battery Manufacturing Company, Bank Sepah Iran v Milestone Trading Limited CA 23-Oct-2003
The claimant had contracted to purchase lead from some of the defendants. There were delays in payment but when funds were made available they should have been repaid. An incorrect bill of lading was presented. The bill certified that the goods had . .
CitedCriterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties and others CA 18-Dec-2002
The parties came together in a limited partnership to develop property. The appeal was against a refusal to grant summary judgment on a claim that one party had been induced to enter the contract by a fraudulent misrepresentation.
Held: In . .
CitedCriterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties Llc and others ChD 27-Mar-2002
Criterion sought to set aside a shareholders agreement. Their partner had said they were concerned that another party was taking Criterion over and that this would put at risk their working relationships. The agreement sought to add a poison pill to . .
CitedCharter Plc and Another v City Index Ltd and others ChD 12-Oct-2006
An employee of the claimant had fraudulently spent several million pounds of the claimant’s money on personal bets through the defendant company. The claimant said that the defendants knew the origin of the funds and were liable to repay them. . .
CitedCity Index Ltd and others v Gawler and others; Charter plc v City Index Ltd CA 21-Dec-2007
A senior employee of Charter had fraudulently spent substantial sums with City Index. City Index had paid out on a claim of knowing receipt, and sought contributions from directors of Charter and their auditors, saying that they had known of the . .
CriticisedCriterion Properties plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC and others HL 17-Jun-2004
The parties presented their claim before the House, but the House found that it was to be argued differently. The new arguments had not been pursued or prepared before the case came to the House, and it was remitted to the lower courts for the issue . .
CitedYeoman’s Row Management Ltd and Another v Cobbe HL 30-Jul-2008
The parties agreed in principle for the sale of land with potential development value. Considerable sums were spent, and permission achieved, but the owner then sought to renegotiate the deal.
Held: The appeal succeeded in part. The finding . .
CitedLaw Society of England and Wales v Isaac and Isaac International Holdings Ltd and Others ChD 7-Jul-2010
. .
CitedXX and Others v YY and Others ChD 2-Jul-2021
The first defendant applies for an order that the claimants are not entitled to pursue legal action against his lawyers in respect of funds over which the claimants claim a proprietary interest and paid to the first defendant’s lawyers as legal fees . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 October 2021; Ref: scu.78137

Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd and Others: ChD 30 Jun 2010

Lord Neuberger MR said that Carl Zeiss ‘supports the proposition that notice of a claim is not the same as notice of a right’.
Lord Neuberger MR
[2010] EWHC 1614 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoSinclair Investment Holdings Sa v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd and others CA 25-Jan-2005
leave . .
See AlsoSinclair Investment Holdings Sa v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd and Another CA 12-May-2005
. .
CitedCarl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith No.2 CA 1969
There had been long running disputes between the plaintiffs and a defendant in which the plaintiffs claimed that all of the defendant’s assets were held for the plaintiffs on trust. Before those claims had been resolved the plaintiff brought a . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromSinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd and Others CA 29-Mar-2011
The appellant challenged a decision that it was not entitled to a proprietary interest in the proceeds of sale of some shares which had been acquired with the proceeds of a breach of trust. Specifically, the claims gave rise to (i) an issue as to . .
CitedXX and Others v YY and Others ChD 2-Jul-2021
The first defendant applies for an order that the claimants are not entitled to pursue legal action against his lawyers in respect of funds over which the claimants claim a proprietary interest and paid to the first defendant’s lawyers as legal fees . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 October 2021; Ref: scu.420220

Smith v Peters: ChD 24 Jun 1875

Where an agreement has been entered into for the sale of a house at a fixed price, and of the fixtures and furniture therein at a valuation by a person named by both parties, and he undertakes the valuation, but if refused permission by the vendor to enter the premises for that purpose, the Court will make a mandatory order to compel the vendor to allow the entry to enable the valuation to proceed.
The Court has jurisdiction to make any interlocutory order which is
reasonably asked as ancillary to the administration of justice at the hearing.
Sir George Jessel MR said: ‘I have no hesitation in saying that there is no limit to the practice of the court with regard to interlocutory applications so far as they are necessary and reasonable applications ancillary to the due performance of its functions, namely, the administration of justice at the hearing of the cause.’
Sir George Jessel MR
[1875] UKLawRpEq 126, (1875) LR 20 Eq 511
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBayer v Winter CA 1986
Fox LJ said: ‘Bearing in mind we are exercising a jurisdiction which is statutory, and which is expressed in terms of considerable width, it seems to me that the court should not shrink if it is of the opinion that an injunction is necessary for the . .
CitedXX and Others v YY and Others ChD 2-Jul-2021
The first defendant applies for an order that the claimants are not entitled to pursue legal action against his lawyers in respect of funds over which the claimants claim a proprietary interest and paid to the first defendant’s lawyers as legal fees . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 October 2021; Ref: scu.668765

Lovelock v Margo: CA 1963

The tenant wished to assign the lease. The lease contained the ‘usual covenant’ not to assign without consent, that consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The landlord had refused a request from the tenant to assign the lease because she was ‘not satisfied with the area proposed to be used’.
Held: The tenant succeeded. Where the covenant states that the landlord must not unreasonably refuse that consent, the court has to have regard to the landlord’s actual state of mind at the relevant time.
Lord Denning MR said: ‘it is not right to say that this is an objective question, as counsel said. This matter cannot be considered without regard to the state of mind of the landlord herself as to her reasons for refusing consent. How otherwise can a lessee hope to see whether he can assign unless he knows the landlord’s reasons for objection’
Section 191 (3) of the County Courts Act 1959 gave the county court power to grant relief against forfeiture following peaceable re-entry. The landlord argued that the county court had no power at all to grant relief against forfeiture after a peaceable re-entry. This court, not surprisingly in view of section 191 (3), rejected that argument.
Pullin J, Lord Denning MR, Slade LJ, Cumming-Bruce LJ
[1963] 2 All ER 13, [1963] 2 QB 786
County Courts Act 1959 191(3)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedThatcher v CH Pearce and Sons (Contractors) Ltd 1968
(Bristol Assizes) The tenant was the tenant of a scrap yard. He had paid his rent promptly, until he was sent to prison. Thereafter he failed to pay the rent; and had no access to legal advice. The landlord peaceably re-entered for non-payment of . .
CitedVision Golf Ltd v Weightmans (A Firm) ChD 26-Jul-2005
A lease had been forfeited. The defendant firm of solicitors had negligently failed to apply for relief. They argued that that failure had in fact caused no loss to the claimants, since they would have lost the lease anyway.
Held: The ‘but . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 October 2021; Ref: scu.234851

Howard v Fanshawe: 29 Jun 1895

In equity a proviso for re-entry in a lease is to be treated as a security for the payment of the rent.
A tenant applying for relief from forfeiture will normally be required to pay the lessor’s costs of the forfeiture proceedings, save in so far as those costs have been increased by the lessor’s opposition to the grant of relief, upon appropriate terms.
The forfeiture by peaceable re-entry took place on 21 February 1894 and the application for relief was made on 6 July 1894: within six months. Stirling J said: ‘The statute fixes a period of six months only from recovery in ejectment within which an application for relief may be made, and it is said that the whole evil which the Act was passed to remove would be re-introduced if it were to be held that the jurisdiction to give relief were to be applied in a case where peaceable possession had been taken. Upon that two observations may be made: first, that if the landlord desires to limit the time within which the tenant can apply for relief, he can avail himself of legal process to recover possession and so get the benefit of the statute; and, secondly, that it does not follow that a Court of Equity would now grant relief at any distance of time from the happening of the event which gave rise to it. It appears to me that, inasmuch as the inconvenience of so doing has been recognised by the legislature, and a time has been fixed after which, in a case of ejectment, no proceedings for relief can be taken, a similar period might well be fixed, by analogy, within which an application for general relief in Equity must be made. A Court of Equity might possibly say that the action for relief must be brought within six months from the resumption of possession by the lessor.’
McMullen J
[1895] 2 Ch 581, [1895] UKLawRpCh 111
Commomlii
Common Law Procedure Act 1852
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedDaejan Investments Ltd v Benson and Others SC 6-Mar-2013
Daejan owned the freehold of a block of apartments, managing it through an agency. The tenants were members of a resident’s association. The landlord wished to carry out works, but failed to complete the consultation requirements. The court was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 October 2021; Ref: scu.471751

Thatcher v CH Pearce and Sons (Contractors) Ltd: 1968

(Bristol Assizes) The tenant was the tenant of a scrap yard. He had paid his rent promptly, until he was sent to prison. Thereafter he failed to pay the rent; and had no access to legal advice. The landlord peaceably re-entered for non-payment of one quarter’s rent. Six months and four days after the re-entry the tenant applied for relief.
Held: The court considered the exercise of the equitable right of a court to grant relief from forfeiture. Simon P said: ‘The decision of the Court of Appeal in Lovelock v. Margo makes it plain that where a landlord re-enters peaceably and not through an action for forfeiture of the lease the jurisdiction of the court to give relief from forfeiture is not a statutory one but the old equitable one. As I understand the old equitable doctrine, the court would not give relief in respect of stale claims. Furthermore, if there were a statute of limitation applying at common law, equity followed the law and applied the statute to strictly analogous proceedings in Chancery. But there is no question in the instant case of a Limitation Act applying to the present situation; and it seems to me to be contrary to the whole spirit of equity to boggle at a matter of days, which is all that we are concerned with here, when justice indicates relief.
I think that a court of equity -. and it is such jurisdiction that I am exercising now — would look at the situation of the plaintiff to see whether in all the circumstances he acted with reasonable promptitude. Naturally it would also have to look at the situation of the defendants to see if anything has happened, particularly by way of delay on the part of the plaintiff, which would cause a greater hardship to them by the extension of the relief sought than by its denial to the plaintiff.’
Sir Jocelyn Simon P
[1968] 1 WLR 748
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedLovelock v Margo CA 1963
The tenant wished to assign the lease. The lease contained the ‘usual covenant’ not to assign without consent, that consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The landlord had refused a request from the tenant to assign the lease because she was ‘not . .

Cited by:
CitedVision Golf Ltd v Weightmans (A Firm) ChD 26-Jul-2005
A lease had been forfeited. The defendant firm of solicitors had negligently failed to apply for relief. They argued that that failure had in fact caused no loss to the claimants, since they would have lost the lease anyway.
Held: The ‘but . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 October 2021; Ref: scu.234850

Billson and Others v Residential Tenancies Ltd: CA 11 Feb 1991

As to the exercise of relief in equity outside the limitation period: ‘This is not to say that courts of equity should now grant relief without any regard to the statutory provisions. Equity follows the law, but not slavishly nor always: see Cardozo C.J. in Graf v. Hope Building Corporation (1930) 254 N.Y. 1,9. On this we have the benefit of guidance elsewhere in the field of relief from forfeiture. Section 210 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1852, which is still in force, limited to six months after judgment the period within which a tenant could apply for relief in the non-payment of rent cases to which that statute applied, viz., where the rent was six months in arrears. Courts of equity have due regard to this statutory limitation in non-payment of rent cases where the statute does not apply: in cases of forfeiture by peaceable re-entry, and’ in cases where possession has been taken under a court order where less than six months’ rent was in arrears.’
Nicholls LJ
[1992] 1 All ER 141
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromBillson and Others v Residential Tenancies Ltd HL 12-Dec-1991
Relief from forfeiture was available against a landlord who had peaceably re-entered property subject to a tenancy without a court order. Such a landlord was still ‘proceeding’ to enforce his rights of forfeiture until he obtained a judgment for . .
CitedVision Golf Ltd v Weightmans (A Firm) ChD 26-Jul-2005
A lease had been forfeited. The defendant firm of solicitors had negligently failed to apply for relief. They argued that that failure had in fact caused no loss to the claimants, since they would have lost the lease anyway.
Held: The ‘but . .
CitedDesnousse v London Borough of Newham and others CA 17-May-2006
The occupier had been granted a temporary licence by the authority under the homelessness provisions whilst it made its assessment. The assessment concluded that she had become homeless intentionally, and therefore terminated the licence and set out . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 October 2021; Ref: scu.234852

Sport Internationaal Bussum BV v Inter-Footwear Ltd: CA 1984

There had been a contractual licence to use names and trademarks for sports shoes. An earlier action between the parties had been stayed on the terms scheduled to a Tomlin order, which provided for Inter-Footwear to pay andpound;105,000 in three instalments and to have a licence (partly exclusive and partly non-exclusive) to use the names and marks. If any instalment was not paid on the due date, the whole unpaid balance became due at once and the licensor could determine the licence. There was a delay in payment of the second instalment and the licensor terminated the licence.
Held: The court had no jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture. Oliver LJ said that taken at its narrowest The Scaptrade case ‘may be said to establish no more than this: that the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture does not extend to a time charter not being a charter by demise. There is, however, the more general proposition to be derived from it, that, even where the primary object of the insertion of a forfeiture clause may be said to be to secure the payment of money or the performance of some other obligation, the equitable jurisdiction does not extend to contracts which do not involve the transfer or creation of proprietary or possessory rights.’ There is a need for certainty in commercial contracts and the court doubted whether the licensor’s right to terminate the licence in the event of default could be primarily a security for the payment of money: ‘This is sufficient to dispose of the appeal, but, in fact, there appears to us to be another reason why the equitable jurisdiction to grant relief could not apply to a case such as this. The case is one of contract only and, in so far as there were any rights created or transferred which could be described as ‘proprietary’, they were rights which rested only in contract and to that extent distinguishable from the legal estate created by the grant of a lease or a mortgage. Assuming that relief were capable of being granted, effectively it could be granted only by compelling the plaintiffs to re-grant the permission which had been revoked. An exclusive licence to use a trade mark creates no estate, although it enables the licensee to obtain an injunction if the licensor, in breach of contract, seeks to use the mark in competition with him. Thus, effectively, the licensee applying for relief from forfeiture is in exactly the same position as the charterer in [The Scaptrade].’
Oliver LJ
[1984] 1 WLR 776
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedScandinavian Trading Tanker Co AB v Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) HL 1983
The House considered giving relief from forfeiture where an owner had justifiably withdrawn his vessel in accordance with the terms of the charter.
Held: A withdrawal clause under a time charter, exercised on the ground of the charterer’s . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromSport International Bussum BV v Inter-Footwear Ltd HL 2-Jan-1984
A contractual licence was granted to use names and trademarks for sports shoes. An earlier action between the parties had been stayed on the terms scheduled to a Tomlin order, which provided for Inter-Footwear to pay a sum in instalments and to have . .
CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
CitedOceanbulk Shipping and Trading Sa v TMT Asia Ltd CA 15-Feb-2010
The parties had settled their disagreement, but now disputed the interpretation of the settlement. The defendant sought to be allowed to give in evidence correspondence leading up to the settlement which had been conducted on a without prejudice . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 October 2021; Ref: scu.230289

MCC Proceeds Inc (Incorporated Under the Laws of the State of Delaware, USA As Trustee of the Maxwell Macmillan Realization Liquidating Trust) v Lehman Brothers International (Europe): CA 19 Dec 1997

The owner only of an equitable interest in goods may not assert his interest against a bona fide purchaser of the legal title to the goods. International Factors v. Rodriguez was decided per incuriam to the extent that it held that equitable rights conferred a status to sue in conversion, or that the holding was obiter.
Mummery LJ said: ‘There was no valid reason for Macmillan not joining LB as a defendant to the first action, so that all claims in relation to the title to the Berlitz shares could be decided in the same action and bind all interested parties . . it is an abuse of the process of the court to bring [the action] against LB: the substantial issue raised in it (i.e. the title to the Berlitz shares) has already been decided, on both law and fact, in the first action in circumstances which preclude the parties in this action from attempting to litigate that issue again.’
Mummery Hobhouse, Pill LJJ
Times 14-Jan-1998, Gazette 04-Feb-1998, [1997] EWCA Civ 3068, [1998] 4 All ER 675, [1998] 2 BCLC 659
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Per incuriamInternational Factors v Rodriguez CA 1978
(Majority) Cheques were made payable to a company which had entered into a factoring agreement with the plaintiffs. The cheques were sent to the company in settlement of debts owed to the company but which had been assigned to the plaintiffs. The . .

Cited by:
CitedMazur Media Limited and Another v Mazur Media Gmbh in Others ChD 8-Jul-2004
Proceedings were brought in England. The respondents sought a stay, saying the company was subject to insolvency proceedings in Germany.
Held: Our domestic insolvency law was not applicable to foreign proceedings, and so could not be used to . .
ApprovedMorris v Wentworth-Stanley CA 4-Sep-1998
Two actions had been brought by a contractor against the partners in a farming partnership. Those actions were consolidated. One of the partners died and when the plaintiff found that out he discontinued his claims against the deceased partner and . .
CitedBarrett v Universal-Island Records Ltd and others ChD 15-May-2006
The claimant was entitled to share in the copyright royalties of Bob Marley and the Wailers, and claimed payment from the defendants. The defendants said that the matters had already been settled and that the claim was an abuse of process, and also . .
CitedIran v The Barakat Galleries Ltd QBD 29-Mar-2007
The claimant government sought the return to it of historical artefacts in the possession of the defendants. The defendant said the claimant could not establish title and that if it could the title under which the claim was made was punitive and not . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 October 2021; Ref: scu.143467

Bloomenthal v Ford: HL 1897

The appellant lent money to a limited company upon the terms that he should have as collateral security fully paid shares in the company and the company handed to the appellant certificates for 10000 shares of 1 pound each. The certificates stated that he was the registered holder of the shares, and that on each of them before and I don’t have been paid. no money had in fact been paid apologise, which were issued from the company direct to the appellant, but he did not know this and believe the documentation that they were fully paid shares. An order having been made to wind up the company the appellant was placed on the list of contributors.
Held: Since the company had obtained the loan by a representation that the shares were fully paid which the appellant believed and acted upon, the company and the liquidator were estopped from alleging that the shares were not fully paid and the appellant was entitled to have his name removed from the list of contributors.
If a company issues, as security to someone who provides the company with a loan, certificates stating that shares are fully paid up, the liquidator is estopped from denying that the shares are fully paid up when settling a list of contributories
There is no need, and indeed it is wrong, to introduce into the common law notion of estoppel, the equitable doctrine of the bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
Lord Halsbury C said: ‘The ground upon which it is suggested appears to be possibly a question of law and partly a question of fact. As to the question of law I confess for myself I entertain a doubt whether it is ever true in a case where one person has been induced to act by the misrepresentation and another that you can go beyond the fact whether it is so or not. In arriving at a conclusion upon this question of fact all the circumstances must be considered. A statement may be made so preposterous in its nature that nobody could believe but anyone was misled’.
Lord Herschell said: ‘I cannot myself think that, where an unequivocal statement is made by one party to another of a particular fact, the party who made that statement can get rid of the estoppel which arises from another man acting upon it by saying that if the person to whom he made the statement had reflected and thought all about it he would have come to see that it could not be true. Of course, if the person to whom the statement was made did not believe it, and they did not act on the belief induced by it, there is no estoppel. But supposing he did believe it and did act on the belief induced by it then it seems to me you do not get rid of the estoppel by saying ‘If you had thought more about it you would have seen it was not true.’
The very person who makes the statement of that sort has put the other party off making further inquiry. He had produced on his mind and impression as a result of which further inquiry is thought to be unnecessary or useless. Therefore, I confess I do not think that it is legitimate to speculate what is the conclusion at which a man would have arrived if he had put together – pieced together – all the considerations that might have occurred to a reflective mind cogitating on the whole subject, and then to say that because he would have come to the conclusion that the statement made to him could not have been true, he is not entitled to act upon it as if it had been true, when in point of fact he did not enter into those considerations, but did believe it and did act upon it.’
Lord Herschell, Lord Halsbury C
[1897] AC 16, (1897) 66 LJ Ch 253, (1897) LT 205, (1897) 45 WR 449, (1897) 13 TLR 240, (1897) 4 Mans 156
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromVeuve Monnier et ses Fils, Limited, In re; Ex parte Bloomenthal CA 9-Jun-1896
B lent to a limited company 1000 pounds on its promissory note on the terms that the company should give him collateral security on 10,000 fully paid up 1 pound preference shares, and that if the company should wish to pay off any part of the amount . .

Cited by:
CitedCadbury Schweppes Plc and Another v Halifax Share Dealing Ltd and Another ChD 23-May-2006
Fraudsters had successfully contrived to sell shares of others, by re-registering the shares to new addresses and requesting new certificates. The question was which of the company, the company registrars and the stockbrokers should bear the loss. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.242176

Highbury Pension Fund Management Company and Another v Zirfin Investments Management Ltd and Others: CA 3 Oct 2013

Lewison LJ discussed the operation of the principle of marshalling: ‘One consequence of the application of the principle is that if the first mortgagee with more than one security satisfies his debt out of the property over which the second mortgagee has his only security, the second mortgagee is entitled to stand pro tanto in the place of the first mortgagee in relation to the property over which the second mortgagee has no legal security . . It is in this sense that we can say that the second mortgagee is in effect subrogated to the rights of the first mortgagee.’ and ‘the way in which the original principle in its classic form is framed fastens on the conduct and conscience of the doubly secured creditor. It is the fact that he has the choice which fund to resort to and the power at law to disappoint the singly secured creditor which brings the equity into play.’
Riker, Lewison LJJ, Silber J
[2013] EWCA Civ 1283, [2014] 1 P andCR 13, [2014] 1 All ER 674, [2014] 1 BCLC 118, [2014] 1 CH 359, [2014] 2 WLR 1129
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromMcLean and Another v Trustees of The Bankruptcy Estate of Dent and Others ChD 26-Oct-2016
Marshalling your Dogs Equitably
Application by the joint administrators of a partnership affording the opportunity to consider the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over a dog.
Held: The equitable principle of . .

Cited by:
CitedHighbury Pension Fund Management Company and Another v Zirfin Investments Ltd and Others ChD 14-Feb-2013
The court was asked: ‘a) Does the doctrine of marshalling permit the marshalling of securities held over property that does not belong to the common debtor? In particular, is a creditor of a guarantor entitled to marshal (or be subrogated to) . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 September 2021; Ref: scu.517451

Killick v Roberts: CA 1991

The landlord claimed that the tenancy had expired by effluxion of time. The tenant alleged that the tenancy was a protected tenancy and that, since no written notice had been served on him pursuant to Case 13, he was a statutory tenant entitled to the protection of the Rent Act 1977. The recorder had held that, although the landlord was not entitled to rely on Case 13, she was entitled to rescind the tenancy agreement by reason of the tenant’s misrepresentation.
Held: The tenant’s appeal failed. Where a protected tenancy was rescinded while it was still subsisting, the tenant did not become a statutory tenant, because there was no longer any contractual tenancy from which it could spring. A tenancy agreement procured by a fraudulent misrepresentation by the tenant may be rescinded even after it has expired by effluxion of time.
[1991] 1 WLR 1146, [1991] 4 All ER 289
Rent Act 1977 2
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
CitedIslington v Uckac and Another CA 30-Mar-2006
The council’s tenant had unlawfully secured assignment of a secure tenancy to the defendant. The council sought possession.
Held: A secure tenancy granted by an authority pursuant to a misrepresentation by the tenant is nonetheless valid. The . .
CitedHussain v Mehlman CC 5-Mar-1992
(County Court) The defendant landlord granted the plaintiff a three year assured shorthold tenancy. He now appealed a finding that he was in breach of an implied covenant to maintain the space heating, and otherwise. The tenant had returned the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 September 2021; Ref: scu.230296

Powys v Blagrave: 2 Aug 1854

The appellants were tenants in tail in remainder and were not able to proceed at law against their co-defendant since he was only an equitable tenant for life. They argued that he ought by analogy to have the obligation not to commit permissive waste imposed on him in the court of equity, and to be impeachable of waste in equity.
Held: The application was refused. Even legal liability was very doubtful.
Lord Cranworth, LC
[1854] EngR 795, (1854) 4 De G M and G 448, (1854) 43 ER 582
Commonlii
England and Wales
Citing:
FollowedWood v Gaynon 2-Mar-1761
The plaintiff sought a decree to compel a life tenant and her husband to put and keep the premises in repair, or the appointment of a receiver with directions to repair the premises. The plaintiff could not sue at law because a party who shared the . .
Appeal fromPowys v Blagrave 24-Mar-1854
Tenant for Life. Permissive Waste
Courts of Equity have no means of interfering in cases of permissive waste by a tenant for life of real property.
There is no implied trust to keep the property in repair imposed upon a tenant for life under a will; for, if there were, he . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.293652

Powys v Blagrave: 24 Mar 1854

Tenant for Life. Permissive Waste

Courts of Equity have no means of interfering in cases of permissive waste by a tenant for life of real property.
There is no implied trust to keep the property in repair imposed upon a tenant for life under a will; for, if there were, he could not convey away his life-estate without committing a breach of trust, nor, if he did, would he get rid of the trust by so doing.
A trustee, to whom real property is devised in trust for one for life, cannot interfere with the possession of the equitable tenant for life because he neglects to keep the property in repair ; but if the tenant for life is committing active waste it seems that the trustee may, and probably ought, to interfere, at least if the persons entitled in remainder are under disability. Therefore, such a trustee is not liable to the remainderman for the neglect of the tenant for life to repair.
Sir W Page Wood VC
43 ER 582, [1854] EngR 380, (1854) Kay 495, (1854) 69 ER 210
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRe Cartwright; Avis v Newman ChD 1889
Permissive Waste: Tenant for Life / Remainderman
A tenant for life is not liable in damages for permissive waste. ‘Since the Statutes of Marlbridge and of Gloucester there must have been hundreds of thousands of tenants for life who have died leaving their estates in a condition of great . .
CitedDayani v London Borough of Bromley TCC 25-Nov-1999
LA Tenant liable for permissive waste
The local authority was tenant of properties which it sub-licensed to homeless persons for three years was liable for having allowed the properties to deteriorate. It was claimed that they were liable for permissive waste as tenants for a fixed . .
Appeal fromPowys v Blagrave 2-Aug-1854
The appellants were tenants in tail in remainder and were not able to proceed at law against their co-defendant since he was only an equitable tenant for life. They argued that he ought by analogy to have the obligation not to commit permissive . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.196846

Re Cartwright; Avis v Newman: ChD 1889

Permissive Waste: Tenant for Life / Remainderman

A tenant for life is not liable in damages for permissive waste. ‘Since the Statutes of Marlbridge and of Gloucester there must have been hundreds of thousands of tenants for life who have died leaving their estates in a condition of great dilapidation. Not once, so far as legal records go, have damages been recovered against the estate of a tenant for life on that ground. To ask me in that state of the authorities to hold that a tenant for life is liable for permissive waste to a remainderman is to my mind a proposition altogether startling. I should not think of coming to such a decision without direct authority upon the point. Such authority as there is seems to me to be against the contention, and in opposition to the positive decisions in Gibson v. Wells, Herne v. Bembow, and Jones v. Hill 7 Taunt. 392, there are only to be found certain dicta of Baron Parke and the late Lord Justice Lush which seem to amount to this, that the words of the Statutes of Marlbridge and Gloucester are sufficient to include the case of permissive waste, at any rate where there is an obligation on the person who has the particular estate not to permit waste, whether that obligation does or does not exist at the common law in the case of a tenant for life. But at the present day it would certainly require either an Act of Parliament or a very deliberate decision of a Court of great authority to establish the law that a tenant for life is liable to a remainderman in case he should have permitted the buildings on the land to fall into a state of dilapidation. I therefore think that this claim must be disallowed.’
Kay J
(1889) 41 Ch D 532, [1889] UKLawRpCh 89
Commonlii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedPowys v Blagrave 24-Mar-1854
Tenant for Life. Permissive Waste
Courts of Equity have no means of interfering in cases of permissive waste by a tenant for life of real property.
There is no implied trust to keep the property in repair imposed upon a tenant for life under a will; for, if there were, he . .

Cited by:
CitedDayani v London Borough of Bromley TCC 25-Nov-1999
LA Tenant liable for permissive waste
The local authority was tenant of properties which it sub-licensed to homeless persons for three years was liable for having allowed the properties to deteriorate. It was claimed that they were liable for permissive waste as tenants for a fixed . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.196731

Mascall v Mascall: CA 13 Jun 1984

The question was whether a gift of land was completely constituted by delivery of the land certificate
Held: Equity will not come to the aid of a volunteer. Therefore, if a donee needs to get an order from a court of equity in order to complete his title, he will not get it. If, on the other hand, the donee has under his control everything necessary to constitute his title completely without any further assistance from the donor, the donee needs no assistance from equity and the gift is complete. It is on that principle, which is laid down in Re Rose, that in equity it is held that a gift is complete as soon as the settlor or donor has done everything that the donor has to do, that is to say, as soon as the donee has within his control all those things necessary to enable him, the donee, to complete his title. Milroy v Lord established that the settlor must have done everything that was necessary for him to do. In that case, however, the transfer had been put under the control of the donee.
Browne-Wilkinson LJ
[1984] 50 P and CR 119, [1984] EWCA Civ 10
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re Re Rose, Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company Limited v Rose ChD 1949
The testator handed a transfer of the relevant shares to the donee, Mr Hook, together with the relevant certificates. The transfer had not been registered by the date of his death.
Held: Equity will not compel an imperfect gift to be . .
CitedMilroy v Lord CA 26-Jul-1862
The donor executed a transfer of 50 shares. The shares were only transferable by entry in the books of the bank. No such transfer was ever made. The defendant had a power of attorney authorising him to transfer the donor’s shares and after the deed . .

Cited by:
CitedPennington and Another v Waine, Crampton and others CA 4-Mar-2002
The deceased had made a gift of shares. She had executed a transfer, and acting upon the promise, the donee had agreed to become a director which he could only do if he also became a shareholder. The transfer was delivered to the deceased’s agent, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.183413

Richards v Delbridge: CA 16 Apr 1874

The donor purported to make a voluntary gift of leasehold premises and stock in trade by endorsing on the lease ‘This deed and all thereto belonging I give to E from this time forth, and all the stock in trade.’ This document was delivered to E’s mother on his behalf.
Held: No valid declaration of trust was made in favour of E. For a man to make himself a trustee, he must express an intention to become a trustee.
Jessel MR said: ‘The principle is a very simple one. A man may transfer his property, without valuable consideration in two ways: he may either do such acts as amount in law to a conveyance or assignment of the property, and thus completely divest himself of the legal ownership, in which case the person who by those acts acquires the property takes it beneficially, or on trust as the case may be; or the legal owner of the property may, by one or other of the modes recognised as amounting to a valid declaration of trust, constitute himself a trustee, and, without an actual transfer of the legal title, may so deal with the property as to deprive himself of its beneficial ownership, and declare that he will hold it from that time forward on trust for the other person. It is true he need not use the words, ‘I declare myself trustee’, but he must do something which is equivalent to it, and use expressions which have that meaning, for, however anxious the court may be to carry out a man’s intentions, it is not at liberty to construe the words otherwise than according to their proper meaning.’
Sir George Jessel MR
(1874) LR 18 Eq 11, [1874] UKLawRpEq 67
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedPennington and Another v Waine, Crampton and others CA 4-Mar-2002
The deceased had made a gift of shares. She had executed a transfer, and acting upon the promise, the donee had agreed to become a director which he could only do if he also became a shareholder. The transfer was delivered to the deceased’s agent, . .
CitedClarence House Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc CA 8-Dec-2009
The defendant tenants, anticipating that the landlord might delay or refuse consent to a subletting entered into a ‘virtual assignment’ of the lease, an assignment in everything but the deed and with no registration. The lease contained a standard . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.183416

White and others v Vandervell Trustees Ltd. (No. 2), Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2): CA 3 Jul 1974

Lord Denning MR described the modern practice concerning pleadings: ‘It is sufficient for the pleader to state the material facts. He need not state the legal result. If, for convenience, he does so, he is not bound by, or limited to, what he has stated.’
Lord Denning MR, Stephenson LJ, Lawton LJ
[1974] EWCA Civ 7, [1974] Ch 269, [1974] 1 All ER 47, [1974] 3 WLR 256
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromRe Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) ChD 17-Jul-1973
The court considered the requirement that a proposed beneficiary must establish some positive act on the part of the person creating the trust for that person to be bound by the trust asserted. Megarry J said: ‘(1) If a transaction fails to make any . .

Cited by:
CitedUnited Bank of Kuwait Plc v Sahib and Others CA 2-Feb-1996
The bank appealed against a decision that the simple deposit of deeds with a bank did not take effect as an equitable charge.
Held: Depositing deeds with a bank is not sufficient to create a charge over them. The old law as to the creation of . .
CitedNML Capital Ltd v Argentina SC 6-Jul-2011
The respondent had issued bonds but in 2001 had declared a moratorium on paying them. The appellant hedge fund later bought the bonds, heavily discounted. Judgment was obtained in New York, which the appellants now sought to enforce against assets . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 September 2021; Ref: scu.262732

Dextra Bank and Trust Company Limited v Bank of Jamaica: PC 26 Nov 2001

(Jamaica) A cheque was drawn which was used as part a complex financial arrangement intended to purchase foreign currency to work around Jamaica’s foreign exchange control regulations. It was asserted that by presenting the cheque used in the deception, it had been converted. The principle question was whether the cheque had been delivered as required under the Act. It was argued that the agent delivering the cheque was acting outside any authority entrusted to him by the drawer, and that accordingly no delivery was made. However his involvement was merely adventitious and could not invalidate delivery. The claimants sought restitution. The appellants asserted that they could rely upon the defence of ‘change of position’ and that the court should consider the relative degrees of fault of the parties. The court held that it was wrong to include any such calculation. ‘Their Lordships are, however, most reluctant to recognise the propriety of introducing the concept of relative fault into this branch of the common law, and indeed decline to do so. They regard good faith on the part of the recipient as a sufficient requirement in this context.’ The appeal was dismissed.
Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Sir Martin Nourse, Sir Patrick Russell
[2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193
PC, PC
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedMarfani and Co Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd CA 1968
A rogue opened a new bank account under a false name with the help of an incorrect reference from a valued customer.
Held: When an account is fraudulently opened with the bank in the name of another person by someone pretending to be that . .
CitedLipkin Gorman (a Firm) v Karpnale Ltd HL 6-Jun-1991
The plaintiff firm of solicitors sought to recover money which had been stolen from them by a partner, and then gambled away with the defendant. He had purchased their gaming chips, and the plaintiff argued that these, being gambling debts, were . .

Cited by:
CitedRose v AIB Group (UK) plc and Another ChD 9-Jun-2003
The bank had received and paid substantial sums from the company before the petition for insolvency had been presented, and had discharged the director’s charge on his house. The liquidator sought restitution under the Act. The bank replied that it . .
CitedNiru Battery Manufacturing Company, Bank Sepah Iran v Milestone Trading Limited CA 23-Oct-2003
The claimant had contracted to purchase lead from some of the defendants. There were delays in payment but when funds were made available they should have been repaid. An incorrect bill of lading was presented. The bill certified that the goods had . .
CitedCommerzbank Ag v Price-Jones CA 21-Nov-2003
The respondent had received a bonus of andpound;250,000. His employers wrote to him in error increasing it. He later chose to stay rather than take redundancy because he now expected the full amount. He resisted an order for restitution. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 September 2021; Ref: scu.166873

Banker’s Trust v Shapira: CA 1980

Enforcement through innocent third party bank

Two forged cheques, each for USD500,000, had been presented by two men and as a result USD1,000,000 had been transferred to accounts in their names. The plaintiff sought to trace assets through the banks involved.
Held: The court approved the use of Norwich Pharmacol procedures in actions where those who have been deprived of property have sought to obtain from banks and others information to enable them to trace the assets. The bank, though involved through no fault of their own in the wrongful acts of others, came ‘under a duty to assist [the plaintiffs] by giving them and the court full information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers’, with an important caveat that: ‘This new jurisdiction must of course be carefully exercised. It is a strong thing to order a bank to disclose the state of its customers account and the documents and correspondence relating to it.’ However the court would, if necessary, make a more wide-ranging order.
Lord Denning MR said: ‘The plaintiff who has been defrauded has a right in equity to follow the money. He is entitled, in Lord Atkin’s words, to lift the latch of the banker’s door: see Banque Belge pour l’Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 K B 321, 355. The customer, who has prima facie been guilty of fraud, cannot bolt the door against him. . . If the plaintiff’s equity is to be of any avail, he must be given access to the bank’s books and documents – for that is the only way of tracing the money or of knowing what has happened to it: see Mediterranea Raffineria Siciliana Petroli Spa v Mabanaft GmbH (unreported). So the court, in order to give effect to equity, will be prepared in a proper case to make an order on the bank for their discovery.’
Lord Denning MR
[1980] 1 WLR 1274, [1980] 3 All ER 353
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedNorwich Pharmacal Co and others v Customs and Excise Commissioners HL 26-Jun-1973
Innocent third Party May still have duty to assist
The plaintiffs sought discovery from the defendants of documents received by them innocently in the exercise of their statutory functions. They sought to identify people who had been importing drugs unlawfully manufactured in breach of their . .
ApprovedA v C (Note) ChD 1980
The plaintiffs said the first defendant had defrauded them of substantial sums, and implicated other defendants. They claimed against five defendants variously for conspiracy to defraud and deceit and for breach of warranty. They also sought to . .
CitedBanque Belge pour L’Etranger v Hambrouck 1921
Money was stolen by a thief. He then paid it by way of a gift into the bank account of the woman with whom he was living. The victim claimed its return from the woman and her bankers. GBP315 of the balance in her account represented part of the . .
CitedUpmann v Elkan CA 5-Jun-1871
The defendant freight forwarding agent was innocently in possession of consignments of counterfeit cigars in transit to Germany through a London dock. The action was not for discovery, but for an order restraining the forwarder from releasing the . .

Cited by:
CitedMohamed, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 1) Admn 21-Aug-2008
The claimant had been detained by the US in Guantanamo Bay suspected of terrorist involvement. He sought to support his defence documents from the respondent which showed that the evidence to be relied on in the US courts had been obtained by . .
CitedA J Bekhor and Co Ltd v Bilton CA 6-Feb-1981
The plaintiff had applied for disclosure of assets under the Rules of the Supreme Court in support of a Mareva freezing order. The rules were held not to provide any such power: disclosure of assets could not be obtained as part of discovery as the . .
CitedCartier International Ag and Others v British Telecommunications Plc and Another SC 13-Jun-2018
The respondent ISP companies had been injuncted to stop the transmission of websites which infringed the trade mark rights of the claimants. The ISPs now appealed from the element of the order that they pay the claimants’ costs of implementing the . .
CitedKryiakou v Christie’s QBD 2017
Warby J summarised the five criteria for the grant of a bankers Trust order: there must be good grounds for concluding that the money or assets about which information is sought belonged to the claimant.
whether there is a real prospect that . .
CitedFetch.AI Ltd and Another v Persons Unknown Category A and Others ComC 15-Jul-2021
Cryptocurrency Action
The claimants sought damages and other remedies saying that the unknown defendants had obtained access to the private key guarding their crypto currency assets, and then sold them at an undervalue, acquiring substantial profits for themselves in . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 August 2021; Ref: scu.272823

Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2): 1980

It had been alleged that there had been a conspiracy involving the company giving unlawful financial assistance for the purchase of its own shares.
Held: Dishonesty is not a necessary ingredient of liability in an allegation of a ‘knowing receipt’. The court was not swayed by the parties having obtained counsel’s advice that the scheme was lawful, apparently on the basis that: ‘if all the facts which make the transaction unlawful were known to the parties . . ignorance of the law will not excuse them’ and ‘A limited company is of course not a trustee of its own funds: it is their beneficial owner; but in consequence of the fiduciary character of their duties the directors of a limited company are treated as if they were trustees of those funds.’
Brown-Wilkinson LJ: ‘. . . If a transaction falls within the objects, and therefore the capacity, of the company, it is not ultra vires the company and accordingly it is not absolutely void. (5) If a company enters into a transaction which is intra vires (as being within its capacity) but in excess or abuse of its powers, such transaction will be set aside at the instance of the shareholders. (6) A third party who has notice – actual or constructive – that a transaction, although intra vires the company, was entered into in excess or abuse of the powers of the company cannot enforce such transaction against the company and will be accountable as constructive trustee for any money or property of the company received by the third party. (7) The fact that a power is expressly or impliedly limited so as to be exercisable only ‘for the purposes of the company’s business’ (or other words to that effect) does not put a third party on inquiry as to whether the power is being so exercised, i.e. such provision does not give him constructive notice of excess or abuse of such power.’
Buckley LJ: ‘In my judgment, the alleged conspiracy is established in respect of these three defendants, and they are not exempt from liability on account of counsel’s opinion or because they may have believed in good faith that the transaction did not transgress s 54. If all the facts which make the transaction unlawful were known to the parties, as I think they were, ignorance of the law will not excuse them: see Churchill v Walton ([1967] 2 AC 224 at 237). That case was one of criminal conspiracy, but it seems to me that precisely similar principles must apply to a conspiracy for which a civil remedy is sought. Nor, in my opinion, can the fact that their ignorance of, or failure to appreciate, the unlawful nature of the transaction was due to the unfortunate fact that they were, as I think, erroneously advised excuse them (Cooper v Simmons, and see Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions, where the appellant had taken professional legal advice).
If they had sincerely believed in a factual state of affairs which, if true, would have made their actions legal, this would have afforded a defence (Kamara v Director of Public Prosecutions ([1974] AC 104 at 119)); but on my view of the effect of s 54 in the present case, even if andpound;500,000 had been a fair price for the share capital of Maximum and all other benefits under the agreement, this would not have made the agreement legal.’
Waller LJ: ‘A person is a party to a conspiracy if he knows the essential facts to constitute that conspiracy even though he does not know that they constitute an offence (see Churchill v Walton). Since there was a breach of s 54 and the defendants through their directors made all the arrangements and knew all the facts constituting the breach, it would follow that they conspired together to contravene s 54, the object of their conspiracy being Belmont, and if Belmont suffered damage they are liable.’
Buckley LJ, Browne-Wilkinson LJ, Waller LJ
[1980] 1 All ER 392
Companies Act 1948 54
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedChurchill v Walton CA 1967
In a criminal conspiracy to evade fuel duties, the fact that the defendant had first obtained counsel’s opinion was no defence. . .
CitedRe Lands Allotment Company CA 1894
A limited company is not a trustee of its funds, but their beneficial owner. However, the fiduciary character of the duties of its directors mean that they are treated as if they were trustees of those funds of the company which are in their hands . .
CitedRussell v Wakefield Waterworks Co 1875
Jessel MR said: ‘In this court the money of the company is a trust fund, because it is applicable only to the special purposes of the company in the hands of the agents of the company, and it is in that sense a trust fund applicable by them to those . .
See alsoBelmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd CA 1979
The company directors operated an elaborate scheme to extract value from Belmont by causing it to buy the shares of a company called Maximum at a considerable overvalue. This was a breach of the fiduciary duties of the directors. They sought to . .

Cited by:
CitedBank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd and Another v Akindele CA 22-Jun-2000
The test of whether a person who received funds held them on constructive trust, was not whether he himself was dishonest, but rather whether he had knowledge of circumstances which made it unconscionable to hold on to the money received. In respect . .
CitedEagle Trust Plc v SBC Securities Ltd; Same v Sbci Bank Corporation Investment Banking Ltd ChD 28-Sep-1994
A financial adviser was not liable in negligence for the allegedly negligent selection of sub-underwriters. On the issue of knowing receipt in a claim for restitution, ‘What the decision in Belmont (No 2) . . shows most clearly is that in a . .
CitedCriterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties and others CA 18-Dec-2002
The parties came together in a limited partnership to develop property. The appeal was against a refusal to grant summary judgment on a claim that one party had been induced to enter the contract by a fraudulent misrepresentation.
Held: In . .
CitedCriterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties and others CA 18-Dec-2002
The parties came together in a limited partnership to develop property. The appeal was against a refusal to grant summary judgment on a claim that one party had been induced to enter the contract by a fraudulent misrepresentation.
Held: In . .
CitedCriterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties Llc and others ChD 27-Mar-2002
Criterion sought to set aside a shareholders agreement. Their partner had said they were concerned that another party was taking Criterion over and that this would put at risk their working relationships. The agreement sought to add a poison pill to . .
CitedRoyal Brunei Airlines SDN BHD v Tan PC 24-May-1995
(Brunei) The defendants were a one-man company, BLT, and the one man, Mr Tan. A dishonest third party to a breach of trust was liable to make good a resulting loss even though he had received no trust property. The test of knowledge was an objective . .
See alsoBelmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd CA 1979
The company directors operated an elaborate scheme to extract value from Belmont by causing it to buy the shares of a company called Maximum at a considerable overvalue. This was a breach of the fiduciary duties of the directors. They sought to . .
CitedMeretz Investments Nv and Another v ACP Ltd and others ChD 30-Jan-2006
The applicant challenged the exercise of a power of sale under a mortgage, saying that the mortgagee’s purposes included purposes not those under the mortgage. The parties had been involved in an attempted development of a penthouse.
Held: The . .
CitedCriterion Properties plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC and others HL 17-Jun-2004
The parties presented their claim before the House, but the House found that it was to be argued differently. The new arguments had not been pursued or prepared before the case came to the House, and it was remitted to the lower courts for the issue . .
CitedHolland v Revenue and Customs and Another SC 24-Nov-2010
The Revenue sought an order under section 212 of the 1986 Act, for payment of the tax debts of the insolvent company by a de facto director. H had organised a scheme under which IT contractors had worked through companies created by him under a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 August 2021; Ref: scu.187272

Federal Commerce Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc; (The “Nanfri”): CA 1978

The court considered whether claim as against a shipowner could be set off against sums due under a time charter hire.
Held: Save for any contractual provision to the contrary a tenant is entitled to deduct from the rent payable, so as to extinguish or reduce an instalment of rent due, any cross claim arising out of the provisions of the lease and the operation of the lease. Equitable set-off is ultimately based on considerations of justice.
Lord Denning MR said: ‘It is now far too late to search through the old books and dig them out. Over 100 years have passed since the Judicature Act 1873. During that time the streams of common law and equity have flown together and combined so as to be indistinguishable the one from the other. We have no longer to ask ourselves what would the courts of common law or courts of equity have done before the Judicature Act? We have to ask ourselves: what should we do now so as to ensure fair dealing between the parties? See United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v. Burnley Borough Council [1978] A.C. 904 per Lord Diplock. This question must be asked in each case as it arises for decision: and then, from case to case, we shall build up a series of precedents to guide those who come after us. But one thing is clear: it is not every cross-claim which can be deducted. It is only cross-claims that arise out of the same transaction or are closely connected with it. And it is only cross-claims which go directly to impeach the plaintiff’s demands, that is, so closely connected with his demands that it would be manifestly unjust to allow him to enforce payment without taking into account the cross-claim. Such was . . Hanak v. Green.’
Goff LJ, Lord Denning MR
[1978] QB 927
Judicature Act 1873
England and Wales
Citing:
ApprovedThe Teno 1977
The court considered the circumstances necessary to establish a right to a set-off in equity: ‘where the cross-claim not only arises out of the same contract as the claim but is so directly connected with it that it would be manifestly unjust to . .
ApprovedRoss T Smyth and Co Ltd v Bailey Son and Co HL 1940
The court looked to what had to be shown for one party to a contract to take the actions of the other as a repudiation.
Lord Wright said that: ‘repudiation of a contract is a serious matter, not to be lightly found or inferred’ and ‘I do not . .

Cited by:
CitedSonia Burkett, Regina (on the Application of) v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham CA 15-Oct-2004
The appellant challenged an order for costs after dismissal of her application for judicial review of the respondent’s planning decision. The claimant had been granted legal aid at about the time of the bringing in of the new legal aid scheme. The . .
CitedAltonwood Ltd v Crystal Palace FC (2000) Ltd ChD 7-Mar-2005
The landlord claimed arrears of rent and other payments due under the lease of the football ground occupied by the club. A licence had been granted for the accomodation to be shared with Wimbledon Football Club. The rent varied with the gate . .
CitedEdlington Properties Limited v J H Fenner and Co Limited CA 22-Mar-2006
The landlord had assigned the reversion of the lease. There was an outstanding dispute with the tenant defendant who owed arrears of rent, but sought to set these off against a claim for damages for the landlord’s failure to construct the factory in . .
CitedBritish Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Marine Management (UK) Ltd ChD 19-Dec-1978
Money expended by a tenant on discharging his landlord’s covenants will in appropriate circumstances operate as a partial or a complete discharge so as to furnish a defence at law to a claim for unpaid rent; and where the tenant has suffered damage . .
Appeal fromFederal Commerce Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc (The Nanfri) HL 1979
The charterers of three ships on time charter had made deductions from time charter hire payments which the shipowners regarded as unjustified. In retaliation the shipowners purported to revoke the authority of the Charterers (to be implied under . .
CitedGold Group Properties Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd TCC 3-Mar-2010
The parties had contracted for the construction of an estate of houses and flats to be followed by the interim purchase by the defendants. The defendants argued that the slump in land prices frustrated the contract and that they should not be called . .
CitedEller v Grovecrest Investments Ltd CA 1995
The court set out the history of the development of the law relating to the availability of set-off in the case where a landlord has levied or intends to levy distress.
Held: The law had developed, and an equitable right of set off against a . .
CitedFuller v Happy Shopper Markets Ltd and Another ChD 6-Mar-2001
A tenant complained to the landlord about his failure to repair. He ceased paying rent, and the landlord eventually distrained for rent by direct action.
Held: The tenant was unable to claim a legal set-off because there was no context of . .
FollowedGeldof Metaalconstructie Nv v Simon Carves Ltd CA 11-Jun-2010
The parties contracted for the supply and installation of pressure vessels by Geldof (G) for a building constructed by Simon Carves (SC). The contract contained a clause denying the remedy of set-off. G sued for the sale price, and SC now sought an . .
CitedDole Dried Fruit and Nut Co v Trustin Kerwood Ltd CA 1990
The defendant had an exclusive distributorship agency for the plaintiff in England. Under that agreement, the plaintiff sold its prunes and raisins to the defendant under separate contracts of sale. The plaintiff claimed the price of goods sold . .
CitedDurkin v DSG Retail Ltd and Another SC 26-Mar-2014
Cancellation of Hire Finance Contract
The claimant had bought a PC with a finance agreement with the respondent. He rejected it a day later, but the respondent refused to cancel the credit agreement. The respondent had threatened to report his non-payment to credit reference companies, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 August 2021; Ref: scu.185990

Letterstedt v Broers: PC 22 Mar 1884

(Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope) Lack of harmony may be of itself a good reason for a trustee to resign or be dismissed. Lord Blackburn approved a passage in Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, s 1289: ‘But in cases of positive misconduct, courts of equity have no difficulty in interposing to remove trustees who have abused their trust; it is not indeed every mistake or neglect of duty, or inaccuracy of conduct of trustees, which will induce courts of equity to adopt such a course. But the acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust property or to shew a want of honesty, or a want of proper capacity to execute the duties, or a want of reasonable fidelity.’
. . and ‘It seems to their Lordships that the jurisdiction which a court of equity has no difficulty in exercising under the circumstances indicated by Story is merely ancillary to its principal duty, to see that the trusts are properly executed. This duty is constantly being performed by the substitution of new trustees in the place of original trustees for a variety of reasons in non-contentious cases. And therefore, though it should appear that the charges of misconduct were either not made out, or were greatly exaggerated, so that the trustee was justified in resisting them, and the court might consider that in awarding costs, yet if satisfied that the continuance of the trustee would prevent the trusts being properly executed, the trustee might be removed. It must always be borne in mind that trustees exist for the benefit of those to whom the creator of the trust has given the trust estate.’
The court set out the principles underlying a decision to remove a trustee. Lord Blackburn said: ‘The whole of the matters which have been complained of, and the whole that, if this judgment stands, may yet have to be done by the Board, are matters which they had to do, as having accepted the burthen of carrying out the trusts which on the true construction of the will were imposed upon them, and so become trustees. What they had to do as executors merely, such as paying debts, collecting assets, andc., have long ago been over, and by the terms of the compromise the plaintiff cannot now say they have not been done properly. There may be some peculiarity in the Dutch Colonial law, which made it proper to make the prayer in the way in which it was done to remove them from the office of executor; if so, it has not been brought to their Lordships’ notice; the whole case has been argued here, and, as far as their Lordships can perceive, in the Court below, as depending on the principles which should guide an English Court of Equity when called upon to remove old trustees and substitute new ones. It is not disputed that there is a jurisdiction ‘in cases requiring such a remedy,’ as is said in Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, s. 1287, but there is very little to be found to guide us in saying what are the cases requiring such a remedy; so little that their Lordships are compelled to have recourse to general principles.
Story says, s. 1289, ‘But in cases of positive misconduct, Courts of Equity have no difficulty in interposing to remove trustees who have abused their trust; it is not indeed every mistake or neglect of duty, or inaccuracy of conduct of trustees, which will induce Courts of Equity to adopt such a course. But the acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust property or to shew a want of honesty, or a want of proper capacity to execute the duties, or a want of reasonable fidelity’
It seems to their Lordships that the jurisdiction which a Court of Equity has no difficulty in exercising under the circumstances indicated by Story is merely ancillary to its principal duty, to see that the trusts are properly executed. This duty is constantly being performed by the substitution of new trustees in the place of original trustees for a variety of reasons in non-contentious cases. And therefore, though it should appear that the charges of misconduct were either not made out, or were greatly exaggerated, so that the trustee was justified in resisting them, and the Court might consider that in awarding costs, yet if satisfied that the continuance of the trustee would prevent the trusts being properly executed, the trustee might be removed. It must always be borne in mind that trustees exist for the benefit of those to whom the creator of the trust has given the trust estate. The reason why there is so little to be found in the books on this subject is probably that suggested by Mr. Davey in his argument. As soon as all questions of character are as far settled as the nature of the case admits, if it appears clear that the continuance of the trustee would be detrimental to the execution of the trusts, even if for no other reason than that human infirmity would prevent those beneficially interested, or those who act for them, from working in harmony with the trustee, and if there is no reason to the contrary from the intentions of the framer of the trust to give this trustee a benefit or otherwise, the trustee is always advised by his own counsel to resign, and does so. If, without any reasonable ground, he refused to do so, it seems to their Lordships that the Court might think it proper to remove him; but cases involving the necessity of deciding this, if they ever arise, do so without getting reported. It is to be lamented that the case was not considered in this light by the parties in the Court below, for, as far as their Lordships can see, the Board would have little or no profit from continuing to be trustees, and as such coming into continual conflict with the appellant and her legal advisers, and would probably have been glad to resign, and get out of an onerous and disagreeable position. But the case was not so treated.
In exercising so delicate a jurisdiction as that of removing trustees, their Lordships do not venture to lay down any general rule beyond the very broad principle above enunciated, that their main guide must be the welfare of the beneficiaries.’ He referred to cases in which there was a conflict between trustee and beneficiary and continued: ‘As soon as all questions of character are as far settled as the nature of the case admits, if it appears clear that the continuance of the trustee would be detrimental to the execution of the trusts, even if for no other reason than that human infirmity would prevent those beneficially interested, or those who act for them, from working in harmony with the trustee, and if there is no reason to the contrary from the intentions of the framer of the trust to give this trustee a benefit or otherwise, the trustee is always advised by his own counsel to resign, and does so. If, without any reasonable ground, he refused to do so, it seems to their Lordships that the Court might think it proper to remove him; but cases involving the necessity of deciding this, if they ever arise, do so without getting reported.’
However: ‘It is quite true that friction or hostility between trustees and the immediate possessor of the trust estate is not of itself a reason for the removal of the trustees. But where the hostility is grounded on the mode in which the trust has been administered, where it has been caused wholly or partially by substantial overcharges against the trust estate, it is certainly not to be disregarded.’
Lord Blackburn
[1884] UKPC 1, (1884) 9 App Cas 371, [1884] UKPC 18, [1884] UKLawRpAC 12
Bailii, Bailii, Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedCharman v Charman CA 20-Dec-2005
The court considered orders to third parties abroad to produce docments for use in ancillary relief proceedings. The husband had built up considerable assets within an offshore discretionary trust. The court was asked whether these were family . .
CitedThe Thomas and Agnes Carvel Foundation v Carvel and Another ChD 11-Jun-2007
The husband and wife had made mutual wills in the US with an express agreement not to make later alterations or dispositions without the agreement of the other or at all after the first death. The wife survived, but having lost the first will made a . .
CitedJones and others v Firkin-Flood ChD 17-Oct-2008
The trustees had contracted to sell shares in a private company held within the estate. A family member now claimed that they were held in trust after a settlement of a possible challenge to the will based in lack of testamentary capacity and undue . .
CitedGreen and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
CitedKershaw v Micklethwaite and Others ChD 12-Feb-2010
Application by the claimant, Mr Kershaw, for some or all of the defendants to be removed as executors of the Will of Mr Kershaw’s mother. . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.247442

Chambers v Randell: 1923

Where there is no express annexation of the benefit of a covenant the Court will usually regard the covenant as imposed simply to protect the covenantee while he or she holds the land, or to enable the covenantee to dispose of the land, together with an express assignment of the benefit of the covenant, more advantageously. Sargant J said that the principle: ‘is that the equitable doctrine enabling restrictive covenants to be enforced against assigns with notice ought not to be extended in derogation of the ordinary rights at common law of purchasers, and that it ought to be applied only where it is sought to enforce the covenant in connection with the enjoyment of land that the covenant was intended to protect.’
Sargant J
[1923] 1 Ch 149
Conveyancing Act 1881
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedUniversity of East London Higher Education Corporation v London Borough of Barking and Dagenham and others ChD 9-Dec-2004
The University wanted to sell land for development free of restrictive covenants. It had previously been in the ownership of both the servient and dominant land in respect of a restrictive covenant. The Borough contended that the restrictive . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.220705

Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council; Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Sandwell Borough Council: ChD 23 Feb 1993

A bank, having made payment under an void interest rate swap agreement to a local authority, was entitled to recover the payments made under the equitable doctrine of restitution. It would be wrong to allow the local authorities to enjoy an unjust enrichment. There had been no effective consideration given by the local authorities. ‘The application of the principle is subject to the requirement that the courts should not grant a remedy which amounts to the direct or indirect enforcement of a contract which the law requires to be treated as ineffective.’
Hobhouse J
Independent 25-Feb-1993, Times 23-Feb-1993, [1994] 4 All ER 890
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromWestdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council CA 30-Dec-1993
A bank paid money to a local authority under an interest rate swap agreement, which was held later to be outside the local authority’s powers.
Held: The local authority was to repay the money paid to it for an ultra vires purpose (a swap . .
CitedYaxley v Gotts and Another CA 24-Jun-1999
Oral Agreement Creating Proprietory Estoppel
The defendant offered to give to the Plaintiff, a builder, the ground floor of a property in return for converting the house, and then managing it. They were friends, and the oral offer was accepted. The property was then actually bought in the name . .
CitedKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
CitedAspect Contracts (Asbetos) Ltd v Higgins Construction Plc SC 17-Jun-2015
Aspect had claimed the return of funds paid by it to the appellant Higgins under an adjudication award in a construction contract disute. The claimant had been asked to prpare asbestos surveys and reports on maisonettes which Higgins was to acquire . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.90409

Kleinwort Benson Ltd v South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council: ChD 1994

A claim for money had and received fell within section 5 Limitation Act, should be treated with caution. Hobhouse J said: ‘The cause of action in money had and received arises when the relevant money is paid by the plaintiff to the defendant.’
As to the general claim for recovery after unjust enrichment: ‘The position is therefore that if a plaintiff is entitled to a proprietary remedy against a defendant who has been unjustly enriched, the court may but is not bound to order the repayment of the sum with compound interest. If on the other hand the plaintiff is only entitled to a personal remedy which will be the case where, although there was initially a fiduciary relationship and the payer was entitled in equity to treat the sum received by the payee as his, the payer’s, money and trace it, but because of subsequent developments he is no longer able to trace the sum in the hands of the payee, then there is no subject matter to which the rationale on which the compound interest is awarded can be applied. The payee cannot be shown to have a fund belonging to the payer or to have used it to make profits for himself. The legal analysis which is the basis of the award of compound interest is not applicable. (It is possible that in some cases there might be an intermediate position where it could be demonstrated that the fiduciary had, over part of the period, profited from holding a fund as a fiduciary even though he no longer held the fund at the date of trial and that in such a case the court might make some order equivalent to requiring him to account for those profits; but that is not the situation which I am asked to consider in the present case.)’
Hobhouse J
[1994] 4 All ER 972
Limitation Act 1980 5
England and Wales
Cited by:
FollowedSouth Tyneside Metropolitan BC v Svenska International plc 1995
The question was asked as to whether an anticipatory change of position could support a defence to a claim for restitution: ‘save perhaps in exceptional circumstances, the defence of change of position is in principle confined to changes which take . .
CitedFuller v Happy Shopper Markets Ltd and Another ChD 6-Mar-2001
A tenant complained to the landlord about his failure to repair. He ceased paying rent, and the landlord eventually distrained for rent by direct action.
Held: The tenant was unable to claim a legal set-off because there was no context of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.188269

Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Birmingham City Council: CA 20 May 1996

No defence of unjust enrichment was available to defend a claim on a failed interest rate swap agreement.
Times 20-May-1996, [1997] QB 380
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
CitedRevenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies SC 11-Apr-2017
Certain investment trust companies (ITCs) sought refunds of VAT paid on the supply of investment management services. EU law however clarified that they were not due. Refunds were restricted by the Commissioners both as to the amounts and limitation . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.82811

In re Clark (a bankrupt); ex parte the Trustee v Texaco Ltd: ChD 1975

Walton J restated the rule in In re James: ‘the rule provides that where it would be unfair for a trustee to take full advantage of his legal rights as such, the court will order him not to do so, and, indeed, will order him to return money which he may have collected.’ To attract the defense it must be shown that: (1) There must be some form of enrichment of the assets of the bankrupt by the person seeking to have the rule applied (citing Government of India v Taylor [1955] AC 491 per Lord Keith). (2) Except in the most unusual cases, the claimant must not be in a position to submit an ordinary proof of debt. The rule is not to be used merely to confer a preference on an otherwise unsecured creditor, but to provide relief for a person who would otherwise be without any. (3) In all the circumstances, it was not fair for an honest person to keep the money. (4) When the rule applies, it applies only to the extent necessary to nullify the enrichment of the estate.’
Walton J
[1975] 1 WLR 559, [1975] 1 All ER 453
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedIn re Nortel Companies and Others SC 24-Jul-2013
The court was asked as to the interrelationship of the statutory schemes relating to the protection of employees’ pensions and to corporate insolvency.
Held: Liabilities which arose from financial support directions or contribution notices . .
CitedGetliffe and Another, Re Lune Metal Products Ltd CA 14-Dec-2006
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 August 2021; Ref: scu.537956

Evans v Clayhope Properties Ltd: CA 1988

Nourse LJ doubted whether a receiver’s remuneration could be recovered as litigation costs.
Nourse LJ
[1988] 1 WLR 358
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBoehm v Goodall ChD 24-Nov-1910
Receiver – Partnership Action – Consent Order appointing Receiver and Manager
– Payments by Receiver – Insufficiency of Assets – Indemnity – Claim
against Partners personally.
In an action for dissolution of partnership a receiver . .
Appeal fromEvans v Clayhope Properties Ltd ChD 1987
Vinelott J doubted whether a receiver’s remuneration could be recovered as litigation costs . .

Cited by:
CitedCapewell v Revenue and Customs and Another HL 31-Jan-2007
The defendant appealed against an order regarding the remuneration of a receiver appointed to administer a restraint order placed on the assets of the defendant under the 1988 Act on the basis of an allegation that the defendant had been involved in . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 August 2021; Ref: scu.248337

Evans v Clayhope Properties Ltd: ChD 1987

Vinelott J doubted whether a receiver’s remuneration could be recovered as litigation costs
Vinelott J
[1987] 1 WLR 225, [1987] 2 All ER 40
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBoehm v Goodall ChD 24-Nov-1910
Receiver – Partnership Action – Consent Order appointing Receiver and Manager
– Payments by Receiver – Insufficiency of Assets – Indemnity – Claim
against Partners personally.
In an action for dissolution of partnership a receiver . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromEvans v Clayhope Properties Ltd CA 1988
Nourse LJ doubted whether a receiver’s remuneration could be recovered as litigation costs. . .
CitedCapewell v Revenue and Customs and Another HL 31-Jan-2007
The defendant appealed against an order regarding the remuneration of a receiver appointed to administer a restraint order placed on the assets of the defendant under the 1988 Act on the basis of an allegation that the defendant had been involved in . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 August 2021; Ref: scu.248336

Thames Cruises Limited v George Wheeler Launches Limited, Kingwood Launches Limited: ChD 16 Dec 2003

The parties had previously worked to gether to provide ferry services on the Thames. A new tender to operate the services was not submitted. It was alleged that the Defendants had inequitably seized for themselves a business opportunity which the parties had agreed to secure jointly, and that the new licence was held in trust for all parties.
Held: There was no partnership; each company operated separately. Even so, the defendants were in breach of the agreement they made to make a joint tender and it was not conscionable for them to have made a bid without reference to the Claimant and to retain the benefit of that bid without recompense to the Claimant.
The Honourable Mr Justice Peter Smith
[2003] EWHC 3093 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedPallant v Morgan ChD 1952
The agents of two neighbouring landowners orally agreed in the auction room that the plaintiff’s agent would refrain from bidding at auction and that the defendant, if his agent’s bid was successful, would divide the land according to an agreed . .
CitedBanner Homes Group Plc v Luff Developments and Another CA 10-Feb-2000
banner_luffCA2000
Competing building companies agreed not to bid against each other for the purchase of land. One proceeded and the other asserted that the land was then held on trust for the two parties as a joint venture.
Held: Although there was no formal . .
CitedWeiner v Harris CA 18-Nov-1909
The plaintiff, a manufacturing jeweller, was accustomed to send articles of jewellery to F, a retail jeweller, for sale on the terms of a letter written by F to the plaintiff, in which F, after acknowledging that he had had from the plaintiff ‘on . .
CitedLondon and Regional Investments Ltd v TBI Plc and Others CA 22-Mar-2002
TBI was a property investor and developer with several subsidiaries. It agreed to sell some to London and Regional. The agreement provided for the vendor and the purchaser to use reasonable endeavours to agree the terms of a joint venture agreement . .
CitedHampton and Sons v Garrard Smith (Estate Agents) CA 2002
(Year?) A joint venture can give rise to an obligation for good faith as between the parties. . .
CitedBrostoff v Clarke Kenneth Leventhal 11-Mar-1996
No partnership between supposed partners where genuinely separate businesses were carried on. . .
CitedSeager v Copydex (No. 2) CA 1969
. .
CitedIsland Holdings Ltd v Birchington Engineering Co Ltd 7-Jul-1981
Two prospectively separate purchasers in a later ‘subject to contract’ arrangement between them had replaced their earlier concluded agreement as to how a property, if acquired, would be dealt with.
Held: Effect was to be given to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 August 2021; Ref: scu.188916

Palmer v Carey: PC 1926

A lender financed a trader in goods, on the basis the proceeds of sale of the goods be paid into an account in the name of the lender, and that the lender recoup himself on a monthly basis in respect of sums advanced, with the balance being released to the trader subject to a right for the lender to retain a sum representing an agreed share of the trader’s profit. The trader subsequently became bankrupt. At the date of the bankruptcy, a substantial sum was owing to the lender in respect of sums advanced. The lender claimed security over goods and proceeds of sale in the hands of the trader.
Held: The lender had no such security: ‘The law as to equitable assignment, as stated by Lord Truro in Rodick v. Gandell, is this: ‘The extent of the principle to be deduced is that an agreement between a debtor and a creditor that the debt owing shall be paid out of a specific fund coming to the debtor, or an order given by a debtor to his creditor upon a person owing money or holding funds belonging to the giver of the order, directing such person to pay such funds to the creditor, will create a valid equitable charge upon such fund, in other words, will operate as an equitable assignment of the debts or fund to which the order refers. An agreement for valuable consideration that a fund shall be applied in a particular way may found an injunction to restrain its application in another way. But if there be nothing more, such a stipulation will not amount to an equitable assignment. It is necessary to find, further, that an obligation has been imposed in favour of the creditor to pay the debt out of the fund. This is but an instance of the familiar doctrine of equity that a contract for valuable consideration to transfer or charge a subject matter passes a beneficial interest by way of property in that subject matter if the contract is one of which a Court of equity will decree specific performance.’
Lord Wrenbury
[1926] AC 703
Commonwealth
Cited by:
CitedEdwards, Drummond Smith v Flightline Limited CA 5-Feb-2003
The applicant company obtained an injunction against another company. That freezing injunction was discharged upon the payment of a sum into the names of the respective parties’ solicitors. The company went into liquidation, and the claimant . .
AdoptedSwiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd CA 1981
An equitable charge is created when property is expressly or constructively made liable to the discharge of a debt or some other obligation, and the charge confers on the chargee a right of realisation by judicial process such as a sale order. . .
CitedErnst Kastner v Marc Jason, Davis Sherman, Brigitte Sherman CA 2-Dec-2004
The parties had agreed that their dispute should be resolved before the Jewish Beth Din according to Jewish substantive and procedural law. K was granted an interim freezing order. The defendant sold the asset, and K sought to assert a charge.
Updated: 11 August 2021; Ref: scu.179796

Moses v Macferlan: KBD 1760

An action for money had and received will only lie where it is inequitable for the defendant to retain the money. The defendant in an action for money had and received ‘can be liable no further than the money he has received’.
Lord Mansfield CJ
(1760) 2 Burr 1005, [1760] EngR 713, (1760) 97 ER 676
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLipkin Gorman (a Firm) v Karpnale Ltd HL 6-Jun-1991
The plaintiff firm of solicitors sought to recover money which had been stolen from them by a partner, and then gambled away with the defendant. He had purchased their gaming chips, and the plaintiff argued that these, being gambling debts, were . .
CitedSempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another HL 18-Jul-2007
The parties agreed that damages were payable in an action for restitution, but the sum depended upon to a calculation of interest. They disputed whether such interest should be calculated on a simple or compound basis. The company sought compound . .
Vexing legal scholarsJohn Ruskin College v Harley QBD 26-Nov-2013
A sum had been paid into court in 1997. Other sums were paid out, but this sum was left against costs liability. It was discovered much laterand paid out to the claimant. The former defendant now said that it had been paid out twice, and alleged . .
CitedHolt v Markham CA 1923
Scrutton LJ described the legacy of Moses v Macferlan as ‘a history of well-meaning sloppiness of thought’ . .
CitedRevenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies SC 11-Apr-2017
Certain investment trust companies (ITCs) sought refunds of VAT paid on the supply of investment management services. EU law however clarified that they were not due. Refunds were restricted by the Commissioners both as to the amounts and limitation . .
MentionedRevenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies SC 11-Apr-2017
Certain investment trust companies (ITCs) sought refunds of VAT paid on the supply of investment management services. EU law however clarified that they were not due. Refunds were restricted by the Commissioners both as to the amounts and limitation . .
CitedPrudential Assurance Company Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 25-Jul-2018
PAC sought to recover excess advance corporation tax paid under a UK system contrary to EU law. It was now agreed that some was repayable but now the quantum. Five issues separated the parties.
Issue I: does EU law require the tax credit to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 August 2021; Ref: scu.259527

Sempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another: HL 18 Jul 2007

The parties agreed that damages were payable in an action for restitution, but the sum depended upon to a calculation of interest. They disputed whether such interest should be calculated on a simple or compound basis. The company sought compound interest on three different bases: (i) damages for breach of statutory duty, (ii) restitution of money paid pursuant to an unlawful demand and (iii) restitution of money paid under a mistake of law.
Held: Compound interest was appliccable where money was to be repaid by way of restitution. It was to be computed on the conventional basis applicable to government borrowing, on all their successful claims for repayment of unlawfully levied tax.
Lord Nicholls said that: ‘a benefit is not always worth its market value to a particular defendant’, and ‘when it is not it may be unjust to treat the defendant as having received a benefit possessing the value it has to others’ and . . ‘We live in a world where interest payments for the use of money are calculated on a compound basis. Money is not available commercially on simple interest terms.’
Lord Hope said: ‘Simple interest is an artificial construct which has no relation to the way money is obtained or turned to account in the real world. It is an imperfect way of measuring the time value of what was received prematurely.’
Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Mance
[2007] UKHL 34, [2007] 3 WLR 354, Times 25-Jul-2007, [2008] 1 AC 561, [2008] Eu LR 1, [2007] 4 All ER 657, [2007] STC 1559, [2007] BTC 509, [2008] Bus LR 49, [2007] All ER (D) 294, 151 Sol Jo 985
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
At First InstanceSempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellshaft Ltd) v Inland Revenue Commissioners and another ChD 16-Jun-2004
The claimants were due to have substantial sums repaid after it had been found that the system of making premature reclaims of advance corporation tax had been was discriminatory under European Law.
Held: The sums payable were to carry . .
Appeal fromSempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue and Another CA 12-Apr-2005
The court was asked whether it was contrary to Community law – specifically, the provisions then contained in article 52 of the EC Treaty (now renumbered as article 43) – for the domestic tax law in the United Kingdom to differentiate, in the . .
CitedPage v Newman 1829
Under common law ‘the long-established rule that interest is not due on money secured by a written instrument, unless it appears on the face of the instrument that interest was intended to be paid, or unless it be implied from the usage of trade, as . .
CitedHadley v Baxendale Exc 23-Feb-1854
Contract Damages; What follows the Breach Naturaly
The plaintiffs had sent a part of their milling machinery for repair. The defendants contracted to carry it, but delayed in breach of contract. The plaintiffs claimed damages for the earnings lost through the delay. The defendants appealed, saying . .
CitedCarmichael v Caledonian Railway Co HL 1870
Interest can be demanded only in virtue of a contract express or implied ‘or by virtue of the principal sum of money having been wrongfully withheld, and not paid on the day when it ought to have been paid.’ Interest was due when money was . .
CitedLondon, Chatham and Dover Railway Co v South Eastern Railway Co HL 1893
The Lord Chancellor was considering the position of a creditor whose debtor refused to exchange accounts as agreed, thus preventing the creditor from quantifying the debt.
Held: The House declined to alter the rule in Page -v- Newman.
CitedWestdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council HL 22-May-1996
Simple interest only on rate swap damages
The bank had paid money to the local authority under a contract which turned out to be ultra vires and void. The question was whether, in addition to ordering the repayment of the money to the bank on unjust enrichment principles, the court could . .
CitedTrans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd CA 1952
Lord Justice Denning said: ‘It was also said that the damages were the result of the impecuniosity of the sellers and that it was a rule of law that such damages are too remote. I do not think there is any such rule. In the case of a breach of . .
CitedPresident of India v La Pintada Compagnia Navigacia SA (‘La Pintada’) HL 1985
The house decided against altering the rule in Page -v- Newman. ‘The common law does not award general damages for delay in payment of a debt beyond the date when it is contractually due’ The power given to the court under s 35A is discretionary. It . .
CitedMoses v Macferlan KBD 1760
An action for money had and received will only lie where it is inequitable for the defendant to retain the money. The defendant in an action for money had and received ‘can be liable no further than the money he has received’. . .
CitedFruhling v Schroeder 1835
An action for money had and received can recover only the original sum. . .
CitedHungerfords v Walker 1989
To allow a claimant to recover special, but not general, damages for loss of the use of money is widely seen as illogical. In Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125, 142 Mason CJ said that it subverted the second limb in Hadley v Baxendale from its . .
CitedRodger v Comptior d’Escompte de Paris 1871
Where restitution followed the reversal on appeal of a previously satisfied judgment, common law interest was awarded. . .
CitedBoake Allen Ltd and others v HM Revenue and Customs CA 31-Jan-2006
The claimant companies had paid corporation tax under rules which had later been found to be discriminatory. They now sought repayment by virtue of double taxation agreements with the countries in which the parent companies were based.
Held: . .
CitedMetallgesellschaft Ltd and Others v Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another Hoechst Ag and Another v Same ECJ 8-Mar-2001
The British law which meant that non-resident parent companies of British based businesses were not able to recover interest on payments of advance corporation tax, was discriminatory against other European based companies. Accordingly the law was . .
CitedF G Minter v Welsh Health Technical Services Organisation CA 1980
Where a claim is for a debt incurred by a building contractor to raise the necessary capital which has interest charges as one of its constituents, the loss suffered as a result of the late payment of money was recoverable. . .
CitedLipkin Gorman (a Firm) v Karpnale Ltd HL 6-Jun-1991
The plaintiff firm of solicitors sought to recover money which had been stolen from them by a partner, and then gambled away with the defendant. He had purchased their gaming chips, and the plaintiff argued that these, being gambling debts, were . .
CitedDeutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue and Another HL 25-Oct-2006
The tax payer had overpaid Advance Corporation Tax under an error of law. It sought repayment. The revenue contended that the claim was time barred.
Held: The claim was in restitution, and the limitation period began to run from the date when . .
CitedMargrie Holdings Ltd v City of Edinburgh District Council IHCS 1994
When asking whether a claim for damages could properly include an additional element to recover additional costs of an impecunious pursuer, the proper approach, consistent with the modern authorities, was to ask whether the loss was or was not . .
CitedKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
CitedCredit Lyonnais v George Stevenson and Co Ltd 1901
Lord Kyllachy explained the relationship between a claim and a defence in the law of unjustified enrichment: ‘The money in question was paid in error under a mistake of fact. It was therefore reclaimable, unless (the pursuer’s remedy being . .

Cited by:
CitedPenwith District Council v VP Developments Ltd TCC 2-Nov-2007
The council sought to appeal against an interim arbitration award.
Held: Leave to appeal was refused. The application was wholly unjustified. This was an appeal on the facts dressed up as an appeal on law. . .
CitedSomerville v Scottish Ministers HL 24-Oct-2007
The claimants complained of their segregation while in prison. Several preliminary questions were to be decided: whether damages might be payable for breach of a Convention Right; wheher the act of a prison governor was the act of the executive; . .
CitedDevenish Nutrition Ltd and others v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) and others ChD 19-Oct-2007
The claimant sought damages for the losses it had suffered as a result of price fixing by the defendant companies in the vitamin market. The European Commission had already fined the defendant for its involvement.
Held: In an action for breach . .
CitedStar Energy Weald Basin Ltd and Another v Bocardo Sa SC 28-Jul-2010
The defendant had obtained a licence to extract oil from its land. In order to do so it had to drill out and deep under the Bocardo’s land. No damage at all was caused to B’s land at or near the surface. B claimed in trespass for damages. It now . .
CitedBenedetti v Sawiris and Others SC 17-Jul-2013
The claimant appealed against reduction of the sum awarded on his claim for a quantum meruit after helping to facilitate a very substantial business deal for the defendants.
Held: The correct approach to the amount to be paid by way of a . .
CitedAspect Contracts (Asbetos) Ltd v Higgins Construction Plc SC 17-Jun-2015
Aspect had claimed the return of funds paid by it to the appellant Higgins under an adjudication award in a construction contract disute. The claimant had been asked to prpare asbestos surveys and reports on maisonettes which Higgins was to acquire . .
CitedPST Energy 7 Shipping Llc and Another v OW Bunker Malta Ltd and Another SC 11-May-2016
Parties had entered into a bunker supply contract which contained a retention of title clause in favour of the supplier. It purported to allow the buyer to use the goods before title came to be passed.
Held: The owner’s appeal failed. It did . .
CitedLittlewoods Ltd and Others v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs SC 1-Nov-2017
The appellants had overpaid under a mistake of law very substantial sums in VAT over several years. The excess had been repaid, but with simple interest and not compound interest, which the now claimed (together with other taxpayers amounting to 17 . .
Overruled in PartPrudential Assurance Company Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 25-Jul-2018
PAC sought to recover excess advance corporation tax paid under a UK system contrary to EU law. It was now agreed that some was repayable but now the quantum. Five issues separated the parties.
Issue I: does EU law require the tax credit to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 August 2021; Ref: scu.259904

Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd: HL 15 Jun 1942

A contract for the supply by the respondents of special machinery to be manufactured by them was treated as an ordinary contract for the sale of goods. It began valid, but suffered frustration by the outbreak of war.
Held: Lord Wright restated in the English language the maxim ‘nemo debet locupletari aliena jactura of the civil law: ‘It is clear that any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognised to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution.’
Viscount Salmon said: ‘when one is considering the law of failure of consideration and of the quasi-contractual right to recover money on that ground, it is, generally speaking, not the promise which is referred to as the consideration, but the performance of the promise. If this were not so, there could never be any recovery of money, for failure of consideration, by the payer of the money in return for a promise of future performance, yet there are endless examples which show that money can be recovered, as for a complete failure of consideration, in cases where the promise was given but could not be fulfilled.’ and ‘In English law, an enforceable contract may be formed by an exchange of a promise for a promise, or by the exchange of a promise for an act . . . but when one is considering the law of failure of consideration and of the quasi-contractual right to recover money on that ground, it is, generally speaking, not the promise which is referred to as the consideration, but the performance of the promise.’
Viscount Simon LC said that: ‘In English law an enforceable contract may be formed by the exchange of a promise for a promise or by the exchange of a promise for an act . . but when one is considering the law of failure of consideration and the quasi-contractual right to recover money on that ground, it is, generally speaking, not the promise that is referred to as the consideration but the performance of the promise.’
Lord Wright, Viscount Simon
[1942] UKHL 4, [1943] AC 32
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
OverruledChandler v Webster 1904
When a contract is frustrated, ‘the loss lies where it falls.’ . .

Cited by:
CitedKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
CitedLipkin Gorman (a Firm) v Karpnale Ltd HL 6-Jun-1991
The plaintiff firm of solicitors sought to recover money which had been stolen from them by a partner, and then gambled away with the defendant. He had purchased their gaming chips, and the plaintiff argued that these, being gambling debts, were . .
CitedRowe, Regina (on the Application of) v Vale of White Horse District Council Admn 7-Mar-2003
The local council sought to claim payment for sewerage services enjoyed by a householder.
Held: Where a supplier has supplied services to another and there is no contractual relationship in existence, the law may afford to the supplier . .
CitedGoss and others v Laurence George Chilcott As Liquidator of Central Acceptance Limited (In Liquidation) PC 23-May-1996
(New Zealand) Mr and Mrs Goss, had been granted a loan by the claimant finance company under a mortgage instrument that had been avoided by the claimant because it had been fraudulently altered by Mr Haddon, an employee of the claimant, without the . .
CitedSharma and Another v Simposh Ltd CA 23-Nov-2011
The parties created an oral (and therefore void) contract for a development, the claimants paid a deposit, expressed to be non-refundable, and the defendant builders completed the building work. The buyers backed out. The developer now appealed . .
CitedBarnes (As Former Court Appointed Receiver) v The Eastenders Group and Another SC 8-May-2014
Costs of Wrongly Appointed Receiver
‘The contest in this case is about who should bear the costs and expenses of a receiver appointed under an order which ought not to have been made. The appellant, who is a former partner in a well known firm of accountants, was appointed to act as . .
CitedPrudential Assurance Company Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 25-Jul-2018
PAC sought to recover excess advance corporation tax paid under a UK system contrary to EU law. It was now agreed that some was repayable but now the quantum. Five issues separated the parties.
Issue I: does EU law require the tax credit to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 August 2021; Ref: scu.236543

Revenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies: SC 11 Apr 2017

Certain investment trust companies (ITCs) sought refunds of VAT paid on the supply of investment management services. EU law however clarified that they were not due. Refunds were restricted by the Commissioners both as to the amounts and limitation period applied. The claimants’ allegation of unjust enrichment by the Commissioners had been accepted by the CA. The Court was now asked whether the ITCs in principle could make out a claim in unjust enrichment against the Commissioners, whether such a claim was excluded by the statutory scheme under s.80 and whether the lack of any such claim was incompatible with EU law.
Held: The commissioners’ appeal was granted, and the cross appeal dismissed.
The Commissioners had been enriched only by the VAT it had received from the managers. This was the surplus of output tax over deducted input tax which it had actually received. Since the claimants had only paid the VAT to the managers, not direct to the revenue, that payment and the managers’ accounting to the revenue for and paying the VAT due was not reducible to one transaction of the transfer of value from the claimants to the revenue. The Commissioners had not been enriched at the direct expense of the claimants, so they had no right at common law to restitution from the revenue, although they may well have a claim against the managers for the VAT they had paid.
The limitation period is designed to avoid the disruption of public finances. Section 80(7) should be construed as excluding non-statutory claims by customers, as well as taxpayers (as was conceded), which might otherwise lie against HMRC in circumstances falling within the scope of section 80: ‘Parliament cannot sensibly be taken to have intended, when it created this scheme for the reimbursement of suppliers (with provision for them in turn to reimburse their customers), subject to strict time limits, that it should exist concurrently with non-statutory liabilities towards suppliers and their customers which were potentially wider in scope and were subject to a longer and less certain limitation period. Such an intention would be inconsistent with the rationale of the statutory scheme.’
Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath, Lord Hodge
[2017] UKSC 29, [2017] STI 1041, [2017] 2 WLR 1200, [2017] BVC 16, [2017] 3 All ER 113, [2017] WLR(D) 28, [2017] STC 985, [2018] AC 275, UKSC 2015/0058
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC, SC Summary, SC Summary Video
VAT Act 1994 80, Value Added Tax Regulations 1995
England and Wales
Citing:
At First InstanceInvestment Trust Companies v HM Revenue and Customs ChD 2-Mar-2012
The claimant had properly accounted for VAT on its transactions for many years, but a decision of the European court had latterly ruled that the services were exempt. The claimant sought restitution from HMRC, who responded by arguing that . .
At ChD (2)Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs ChD 26-Mar-2013
The claimant investment Trust companies sought repayment of taxes paid in error by way of restitution.
Held: The range of the the law of restitution to recover any tax unlawfully exacted was to be be restricted to those situations where the . .
Appeal fromInvestment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs CA 12-Feb-2015
The claimants having sought repayment of overpaid VAT, they now complained of sums deducted by the Revenue.
Held: The Court allowed the Lead Claimants’ appeal, to the extent of the notional pounds 75 paid in respect of dead periods, and . .
CitedJP Morgan Fleming Claverhouse Investment Trust and Another v HM Revenue and Customs (Taxation) ECJ 1-Mar-2007
ECJ Value added tax – Exemption of the management of special investment funds Concept of ‘special investment funds as defined by Member States’ discretion limits – Closed-ended investment funds. . .
CitedFleming (T/A Bodycraft) v Revenue and Customs HL 23-Jan-2008
The transitional rules introducing time limits for failing to deduct VAT inputs made insufficient allowance for the decisions in Marks and Spencer and Grundig.
Held: Lord Hope said: ‘To be compatible with EU law, taxpayers were entitled to be . .
CitedWoolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (2) HL 20-Jul-1992
The society had set out to assert that regulations were unlawful in creating a double taxation. It paid money on account of the tax demanded. It won and recovered the sums paid, but the revenue refused to pay any interest accrued on the sums paid. . .
CitedTest Claimants In The Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Inland Revenue SC 23-May-2012
The European Court had found the UK to have unlawfully treated differently payment of franked dividends between subsidiaries of UK companies according to whether all the UK subsidiaries were themselves UK based, thus prejudicing European . .
CitedMoses v Macferlan KBD 1760
An action for money had and received will only lie where it is inequitable for the defendant to retain the money. The defendant in an action for money had and received ‘can be liable no further than the money he has received’. . .
MentionedMoses v Macferlan KBD 1760
An action for money had and received will only lie where it is inequitable for the defendant to retain the money. The defendant in an action for money had and received ‘can be liable no further than the money he has received’. . .
CitedBecker v Finanzamt Muenster-Innenstadt ECJ 19-Jan-1982
ECJ It would be incompatible with the binding effect which article 189 of the EEC treaty ascribes to directives to exclude in principle the possibility of the obligation imposed by it being relied upon by persons . .
CitedLipkin Gorman (a Firm) v Karpnale Ltd HL 6-Jun-1991
The plaintiff firm of solicitors sought to recover money which had been stolen from them by a partner, and then gambled away with the defendant. He had purchased their gaming chips, and the plaintiff argued that these, being gambling debts, were . .
CitedPeter v Beblow 25-Mar-1993
Supreme Court of Canada – Family law – Trusts – Constructive trust – Long-term common law relationship – Unpaid homemaker – Homemaker maintaining and improving property – Whether proprietary link necessary to constructive trust established – Whether . .
CitedElida Gibbs Ltd v Commissioners Of Customs And Excise ECJ 24-Oct-1996
ECJ Where
(a) a manufacturer issues a money-off coupon, which is redeemable at the amount stated on the coupon by or at the expense of the manufacturer in favour of the retailer, (b) the coupon, which is . .
CitedBanque Financiere De La Cite v Parc (Battersea) Ltd and Others HL 16-Apr-1998
The making of an order for restitution after finding an unjust enrichment by subrogation, is not dependant upon having found any common or unilateral intention of the parties. The House distinguished between contractual subrogation of the kind most . .
CitedMinistero delle Finanze v IN CO GE ’90 and others ECJ 22-Oct-1998
(Rec 1998,p I-6307) (Judgment) The case concerned claims for the repayment of a charge which had been levied under Italian legislation which was inconsistent with EU law. A preliminary issue before the national court was whether the claims fell . .
CitedLittlewoods Retail Ltd and Others v Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Revenue and Customs ECJ 19-Jul-2012
(Grand Chamber) Second and Sixth VAT Directives – Input tax – Refund of excess – Payment of interest – Procedures
The court considered whether on repayment to a taxpayer of wrongly imposed VAT, the interest returned with the repayment should be . .
CitedThe Child Poverty Action Group v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions SC 8-Dec-2010
The Action Group had obtained a declaration that, where an overpayment of benefits had arisen due to a miscalculation by the officers of the Department, any process of recovering the overpayment must be by the Act, and that the Department could not . .
CitedTFL Management Services Ltd v Lloyds Bank Plc CA 14-Nov-2013
The court was asked: ‘A spends money seeking a judgment for the recovery of a debt from B. A fails to recover the debt because, so the court holds, the debt is not in fact owed by B to A (as A mistakenly thought), but owed by B to C. C then recovers . .
CitedRelfo Ltd (In Liquidation) v Varsani CA 28-Mar-2014
. .
CitedBank of Cyprus UK Ltd v Menelaou SC 4-Nov-2015
The bank customers, now appellants, redeemed a mortgage over their property, and the property was transferred to family members, who in turn borrowed from the same lender. A bank employee simply changed the name on the mortgage. This was ineffective . .
CitedRuabon Steamship Co v The London Assurance Co HL 1900
Lord Halisbury said: ‘I cannot understand how it can be asserted that it is part of the common law that where one person gets some advantage from the act of another, a right of contribution towards the expense from that act arises.’ Rejecting the . .
CitedMenelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd CA 19-Jun-2013
The Court was asked questions about the law of unjust enrichment, and one of the remedies which may be granted to reverse the effect of unjust enrichment, namely subrogation to an unpaid vendor’s lien. The bank had released its charges over property . .
CitedBurston Finance Ltd v Speirway Ltd ChD 1974
Walton J described the typical case of subrogation: ‘What is the basis of the doctrine of subrogation? It is simply that, where A’s money is used to pay off the claim of B, who is a secured creditor, A is entitled to be regarded in equity as having . .
Cited123 East Fifty-Fourth Street Inc v United States 1946
(Learned Hand J dissenting) The majority affirmed a judgment for refund of cabaret taxes improperly levied in the erroneous belief that the taxpayer’s establishment qualified as a cabaret. The majority held that the limitation statute, in its then . .
CitedHanover Shoe Inc v United Shoe Machinery Corporation 14-Oct-1968
United States Supreme Court . .
CitedBarclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd; etc HL 31-Oct-1968
R Ltd were in serious financial difficulties. The company’s overdraft with the appellant bank was almost twice its permitted limit. The company sought a loan of 1 million pounds from a financier, who was willing to lend the company that sum provided . .
CitedAmministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v Spa San Giorgio ECJ 9-Nov-1983
ECJ Questions submitted for a preliminary ruling – reference to the court – right of every national court – stage of the proceedings before the national court – nature of the decision to be given by the national . .
CitedAbbey National Building Society v Cann HL 29-Mar-1990
Registered land was bought with an advance from the plaintiff. The transfer and charge were registered one month later, but in the meantime, the buyer’s parents moved in. When the buyer defaulted, his mother resisted possession proceedings, saying . .
CitedCommissioner of State Revenue v The Royal Insurance Australia Ltd 7-Dec-1994
(High Court of Australia) A payment had been made under statute which was later repealed with retrospective effect.
Held: The monies paid under the retrospectively repealed statute had not been paid under a mistake of law at common law. . .
CitedKleinwort Benson Ltd v Birmingham City Council CA 20-May-1996
No defence of unjust enrichment was available to defend a claim on a failed interest rate swap agreement. . .
CitedKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
CitedVDP Dental Laboratory v Staatssecretaris van Financien ECJ 26-Feb-2015
Reference for a preliminary ruling – Value added tax – Deductions – Exemptions – Supplies of dental prostheses . .
CitedMonro v HM Revenue and Customs CA 9-Apr-2008
The Commissioners conceded that, in principle, there could be a common law right to recover sums paid by way of tax under a mistake of law, but argued that such a claim was precluded because it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme under . .
CitedKingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick (Finance) Ltd 11-Jan-2007
(Supreme Court of Canada) . .
CitedBritish Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd 11-Jun-2004
Canlii Damages – Environmental damages to public lands – Compensation – Forest fire – Valuation of loss of harvestable trees, and of non-harvestable trees in environmentally sensitive areas – Appropriate basis to . .
CitedEquuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton 8-Mar-2012
High Court of Australia – Restitution – Restitution of benefits derived from unenforceable or illegal contracts – Recovery of money paid as money had and received – Respondents invested in tax driven blueberry farming schemes – Respondents borrowed . .
CitedLittlewoods Retail Ltd and Others v HM Revenue and Customs (No 2) ChD 28-Mar-2014
The claimants had recovered very substantial overpayments made of VAT. They sought recovery of compound interest. The ECJ, on reference, said that this was a matter for national law.
Held: The claim succeeded. The sections of the 1994 Act were . .

Cited by:
CitedLittlewoods Ltd and Others v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs SC 1-Nov-2017
The appellants had overpaid under a mistake of law very substantial sums in VAT over several years. The excess had been repaid, but with simple interest and not compound interest, which the now claimed (together with other taxpayers amounting to 17 . .
CitedLowick Rose Llp v Swynson Ltd and Another SC 11-Apr-2017
Losses arose from the misvaluation of a company before its purchase. The respondent had funded the purchase, relying upon a valuation by the predecessor of the appellant firm of accountants. Further advances had been made when the true situation was . .
CitedPrudential Assurance Company Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 25-Jul-2018
PAC sought to recover excess advance corporation tax paid under a UK system contrary to EU law. It was now agreed that some was repayable but now the quantum. Five issues separated the parties.
Issue I: does EU law require the tax credit to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 August 2021; Ref: scu.581647

Banque Financiere De La Cite v Parc (Battersea) Ltd and Others: HL 16 Apr 1998

The making of an order for restitution after finding an unjust enrichment by subrogation, is not dependant upon having found any common or unilateral intention of the parties. The House distinguished between contractual subrogation of the kind most commonly encountered in connection with contracts of insurance and subrogation in equity. The former is founded on the common intention of the parties whereas the latter is an equitable remedy designed to reverse or prevent unjust enrichment. It does not depend on agreement between the party enriched and the party deprived but upon principles of restitution. The principles governing the availability of the equitable remedy are that this is a restitutionary remedy and that the appropriate questions are therefore, first, whether the defendant would be enriched at the plaintiff’s expense; secondly, whether such enrichment would be unjust; and thirdly, whether there are nevertheless reasons of policy for denying a remedy.
A court must first ask itself four questions when faced with a claim for unjust enrichment as follows. (1) Has the defendant been enriched? (2) Was the enrichment at the claimant’s expense? (3) Was the enrichment unjust? (4) Are there any defences available to the defendant?
Lord Hoffmann summarised the position: ‘Lord Diplock, for example, was of the view that the doctrine of subrogation in contracts of insurance operated entirely by virtue of an implied term of the contract of insurance (Hobbs v Marlowe [1978] AC 16, 39) and although in Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter [1993] AC 713 your Lordships rejected the exclusivity of this claim for the common law and assigned a larger role to equitable principles, there was no dispute that the doctrine of subrogation in insurance rests upon the common intention of the parties and gives effect to the principle of indemnity embodied in the contract. . . Subrogation in this sense is a contractual arrangement for the transfer of rights against third parties and is founded upon the common intention of the parties.’
The principle of unjust enrichment: ‘requires at least that the plaintiff should have sustained a loss through the provision of something for the benefit of some other person with no intention of making a gift, that the defendant should have received some form of enrichment, and that the enrichment has come about because of the loss.’ (Lord Clyde)
Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hutton, Lord Clyde
Times 02-Mar-1998, Gazette 16-Apr-1998, [1998] 1 All ER 737, [1998] 2 WLR 475, [1998] UKHL 7, [1999] 1 AC 221
House of Lords, Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromBanque Financiere De La Cite v Parc (Battersea) Limited Omnicorp Overseas Limited CA 29-Nov-1996
. .
ApprovedPaul v Speirway Ltd (in liquidation) 1976
The plaintiff had made a loan to a company in which he had a joint interest in order to enable it to pay the price due under a contract for the purchase of development land. The company failed, and he now claimed to be a secured creditor by . .

Cited by:
CitedHalifax Plc v Omar CA 20-Feb-2002
The respondent occupied a flat as a tenant. The landlord had acquired it by means of a fraud on the claimant lender. The lender had been given an equitable charge over the property, and now claimed possession as subrogated to the original fraudulent . .
CitedVedatech Corporation v Crystal Decisions (UK) Limited ChD 21-May-2002
The defendant wanted to amend its software and introduce it to the Japanese market, and worked with the claimants for this purpose. The defendant suggested that a concluded agreement existed, the claimant that only no contract was concluded. There . .
CitedCheltenham and Gloucester Plc v Appleyard and Another CA 15-Mar-2004
The owners had purchased their property with a loan from the BBBS. A charge was then given to BCCI, which charge said no further charge could be registered without BCCI ‘s consent. The C and G agreed to lend a sum to refinance the entire borrowings, . .
CitedBee v Jenson ComC 21-Dec-2006
The defendant objected to paying the plaintiff the costs of a replacement hire car after the accident for which he was liable. He said that the plaintiff was in any event insured to recover that cost, and the insurance company were subrogated to the . .
CitedSerious Organised Crime Agency v Szepietowski and Others ChD 15-Oct-2010
The court was asked whether, as second mortgagee on the defendant’s properties, the claimant agency had the equitable power of marshalling of prior charges. The first chargee had charges over two properties, and sold the first, satisfying it debt, . .
CitedPickenham Romford Ltd v Deville ChD 31-Jul-2013
The claimant company’s administrators sought an order to have vacated unilateral notices entered against land titles registered to the claimant. The court now gave its reasons for making the order as requested by way of summary relief. The notices . .
AppliedInvestment Trust Companies v HM Revenue and Customs ChD 2-Mar-2012
The claimant had properly accounted for VAT on its transactions for many years, but a decision of the European court had latterly ruled that the services were exempt. The claimant sought restitution from HMRC, who responded by arguing that . .
CitedBenedetti v Sawiris and Others SC 17-Jul-2013
The claimant appealed against reduction of the sum awarded on his claim for a quantum meruit after helping to facilitate a very substantial business deal for the defendants.
Held: The correct approach to the amount to be paid by way of a . .
CitedBank of Cyprus UK Ltd v Menelaou SC 4-Nov-2015
The bank customers, now appellants, redeemed a mortgage over their property, and the property was transferred to family members, who in turn borrowed from the same lender. A bank employee simply changed the name on the mortgage. This was ineffective . .
CitedMenelaou v Bank of Cyprus Plc ChD 19-Jul-2012
On the sale of the claimant’s property, the solicitors received agreement by the defendant bank to the release of their charge over the property for a certainsum, being less than the loan outstanding. In the course of discharging the loan, a bank . .
CitedRevenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies SC 11-Apr-2017
Certain investment trust companies (ITCs) sought refunds of VAT paid on the supply of investment management services. EU law however clarified that they were not due. Refunds were restricted by the Commissioners both as to the amounts and limitation . .
CitedLowick Rose Llp v Swynson Ltd and Another SC 11-Apr-2017
Losses arose from the misvaluation of a company before its purchase. The respondent had funded the purchase, relying upon a valuation by the predecessor of the appellant firm of accountants. Further advances had been made when the true situation was . .
CitedPrudential Assurance Company Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 25-Jul-2018
PAC sought to recover excess advance corporation tax paid under a UK system contrary to EU law. It was now agreed that some was repayable but now the quantum. Five issues separated the parties.
Issue I: does EU law require the tax credit to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 August 2021; Ref: scu.78177

CB Liggett (Liverpool) Limited v Barclays Bank Limited: 1928

The defendant bank had paid cheques drawn on the plaintiff’s account in breach of a mandate requiring two signatories. The plaintiff brought an action for money had and received.
Held: The action failed. The bank was entitled to the benefit of that payment if it could show that that payment went to discharge a legal liability of the customer. Wright J referred to ‘the equitable doctrine under which a person who has in fact paid the debts of another without authority is allowed to take advantage of his payment’ and continued: ‘I think that the equity I have referred to ought to be extended even in the case where the cheque which was paid was paid out of the credit balance, and was not paid by way of overdraft, so that the banker will be entitled to the benefit of that payment if he can show that that payment went to discharge a legal liability of the customer. The customer in such a case is really no worse off, because the legal liability which has to be discharged is discharged, though it is discharged under circumstances which at common law would not entitle the bank to debit the customer.’
Wright J
[1928] 1 KB 48
England and Wales
Cited by:
LimitedCrantrave Ltd (In Liquidation) v Lloyd’s Bank Plc CA 18-May-2000
The bank received a garnishee order nisi, but acted before it was made absolute to pay the judgment creditor.
Held: The bank had no defence against the customer claiming restitution relying on the equitable doctrine that one person paying the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.427358

Lister and Co v Stubbs: CA 1890

It was alleged by the plaintiffs that their foreman had received secret commissions which he had invested in land and other investments. They sought interlocutory relief to prevent him dealing with the land and requiring him to bring the other investments into court.
Held: The injunction was refused because the money was not that of the plaintiffs so as to make the defendant a trustee, but was money to which the plaintiffs would be entitled to claim in the action, i.e. ‘a debt due from the Defendant to the Plaintiffs in consequence of the corrupt bargain which he entered into’ but (a) the money which he had received under that bargain could not be treated as being money of the Plaintiffs ‘before any judgment or decree in the action had been made’ The court will not grant an injunction to restrain a defendant from parting with his assets so that they may be preserved in case the plaintiff’s claim succeeds. A claim relating to the acceptance of bribes was not within a proprietary claim.
Lindley LJ discussed the relation between the employer and employee who was accused of betraying his trust in taking a bribe, saying the relationship: ‘is that of debtor and creditor; it is not that of trustee and cestui que trust. We are asked to hold that it is – which would involve consequences which, I confess, startle me. One consequence, of course, would be that, if Stubbs were to become bankrupt, this property acquired by him with the money paid to him by Messrs Varley would be withdrawn from the mass of his creditors and be handed over bodily to Lister and Co. Can that be right?
Another consequence would be that, if the Appellants are right, Lister and Co could compel Stubbs to account to them, not only for the money with interest, but for all the profits which he might have made by embarking in trade with it. Can that be right? ‘
Cotton LJ, Lindley LJ
(1890) 45 Ch D 1
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
Wrongly decidedAttorney General for Hong Kong v Reid and Others PC 24-Nov-1993
Principalhas proprietary interest in Trust assets
Bribes were taken by an employee, a crown prosecutor in Hong Kong, in a fraud on his employer. He then invested the proceeds in the purchase of property in New Zealand. The property had increased in value. The employer sought repayment of the bribes . .
CitedIslamic Republic of Pakistan v Zardari and others ComC 6-Oct-2006
The claimant alleged that the defendants had funded the purchase of various properties by secret and unlawful commissions taken by them whilst in power in Pakistan. They sought to recover the proceeds. They now sought permission to serve proceedings . .
CitedA J Bekhor and Co Ltd v Bilton CA 6-Feb-1981
The plaintiff had applied for disclosure of assets under the Rules of the Supreme Court in support of a Mareva freezing order. The rules were held not to provide any such power: disclosure of assets could not be obtained as part of discovery as the . .
CitedFHR European Ventures Llp and Others v Cedar Capital Partners Llc SC 16-Jul-2014
Approprietary remedy against Fraudulent Agent
The Court was asked whether a bribe or secret commission received by an agent is held by the agent on trust for his principal, or whether the principal merely has a claim for equitable compensation in a sum equal to the value of the bribe or . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.230342

Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2): 21 Feb 2012

Federal Court of Australia
CORPORATIONS – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9 – ‘director’ – ‘officer’ – de facto director – no single test for determining whether a person is such – assuming or performing the functions of a director of the company in question – directors or consultants or both – blurring of ‘de facto’ and ‘shadow’ – de facto officer – unnecessary to differentiate de facto director from de facto officers
CORPORATIONS – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 181 and 182 – director and de facto director misappropriating corporate funds – effecting a transaction in which they had a personal interest – using position in expectation of obtaining an introduction fee
CORPORATIONS – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1317H – construction of provision – inclusion of ‘profits’ within ‘damage suffered’ – whether profits can be sought without claim for, or proof of, loss
CORPORATIONS – knowledge of corporation – imputation of director’s knowledge to corporation – knowledge of own wrongdoing – ‘fraud on the company’ exception – receipt of a secret commission
EQUITY – Fiduciary obligations – imposing standards of conduct – overlap of conflict of duty and interest and misuse of fiduciary position – defining the subject matter over which fiduciary obligations extend
EQUITY – Fiduciary obligations – receipt of civil law bribe or secret commission – characteristics of secret commission – third party payer’s position – assumption of risk of agent’s nondisclosure to its principal
EQUITY – Participation in the wrongdoing of a trustee or fiduciary – classes of case – Barnes v Addy – liabilities as a knowing recipient or a knowing assistant – fault based liabilities – the ‘knowledge’ of wrongdoing required of a knowing recipient – present Australian law – unhelpful formulae
EQUITY – Corporate property as ‘trust property’ for Barnes v Addy purposes – money paid or property transferred under a contract – breach of fiduciary duty – whether the transaction must be avoided before proprietary relief can be awarded – Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange – constructive trusts and tracing corporate property
EQUITY – Remedies – fashioning remedy to fit the nature of the case and its facts – doing what is ‘practically just’ – awarding the remedy which is ‘appropriate’ in the circumstances – the remedial constructive trust and appropriateness – discretionary considerations
EQUITY – Fiduciaries’ Liability to Account and the Account of Profits – purpose and limits of an account of profits – breach of duty only one of several sources of profit – misuse of ‘trust moneys’ in a fiduciary’s trade or business – applicable principles – the ‘just allowance’ device
EQUITY – Account of Profits – accounting for the profits actually made – when parties may be jointly and severally liable for profits
EQUITY – Interest awards where trust moneys misused – presumption of profit made reflected in award of interest – award of compound interest and periodic rests
EQUITY – Remedies – against knowing recipients and knowing assistances – whether joint and several as between fiduciary/trustee and the third party participants
EQUITY – Remedies – for bribes and secret commissions – Lister and Co v Stubbs not followed – constructive trust of the property received an available remedy if appropriate in the circumstances
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Appeals – application to amend – application to reopen decision to refuse amendment to Notice of Contention – application to reopen on grounds of legal error – Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 1) [2011] FCAFC 95 reopened – Federal Court Rules 2011 r 39.04 – application to further amend notice of appeal
‘a person will be in a fiduciary relationship with another when and insofar as that person has undertaken to perform such a function for, or has assumed such a responsibility to, another as would thereby reasonably entitle that other to expect that he or she will act in that other’s interest to the exclusion of his or her own or a third party’s interest’
Finn, Stome, and Perram JJ
[2012] FCAFC 6, (2012) 200 FCR 296, (2012) 287 ALR 22, (2012) 87 ACSR 260
Austlii
Australia
Cited by:
CitedFHR European Ventures Llp and Others v Cedar Capital Partners Llc SC 16-Jul-2014
Approprietary remedy against Fraudulent Agent
The Court was asked whether a bribe or secret commission received by an agent is held by the agent on trust for his principal, or whether the principal merely has a claim for equitable compensation in a sum equal to the value of the bribe or . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 05 August 2021; Ref: scu.551511

Eclairs Group Ltd and Glengary Overseas Ltd v JKX Oil and Gas Plc: SC 2 Dec 2015

Company Director not Trustee but is Fiduciary

The Court was asked about an alleged ‘corporate raid’, an attempt to exploit a minority shareholding in a company to obtain effective management or voting control without paying what other shareholders would regard as a proper price.
Held: The appeal succeeded.
Lord Sumption said: ‘A company director differs from an express trustee in having no title to the company’s assets. But he is unquestionably a fiduciary and has always been treated as a trustee for the company of his powers. Their exercise is limited to the purpose for which they were conferred. One of the commonest applications of the principle in company law is to prevent the use of the directors’ powers for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a general meeting. This is not only an abuse of a power for a collateral purpose. It also offends the constitutional distribution of powers between the different organs of the company, because it involves the use of the board’s powers to control or influence a decision which the company’s constitution assigns to the general body of shareholders.’
and: ‘I am unable to accept the majority’s parting assertion, at para 143, that the application of the proper purpose rule would be an ‘encouragement to deceitful conduct’ by predators with ‘subversive but secret’ projects. There is, however, a more fundamental objection to it, which is that it is incoherent once the operation of the rule is properly understood. If the ‘deceit’ consists simply in the secrecy, ie in the withholding or deemed withholding of the information, a decision to impose restrictions which is based simply on that fact will be entirely consistent with the proper purpose of the power. But secrecy is one thing, subversion another. If the real objection is to the subversion, it is nothing to do with the issue or enforcement of disclosure notices. Directors owe a duty of loyalty to the company, but shareholders owe no loyalty either to the company or its board. Within broad limits, derived for the most part from Part 30 of the Companies Act 2006 (Protection of Members against Unfair Prejudice) and the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, they are entitled to exercise their rights in their own interest as they see it and to challenge the existing management for good reasons or bad.’
As to the proper purpose rule: ‘The rule is not a term of the contract and does not necessarily depend on any limitation on the scope of the power as a matter of construction. The proper purpose rule is a principle by which equity controls the exercise of a fiduciary’s powers in respects which are not, or not necessarily, determined by the instrument. Ascertaining the purpose of a power where the instrument is silent depends on an inference from the mischief of the provision conferring it, which is itself deduced from its express terms, from an analysis of their effect, and from the court’s understanding of the business context.’
‘the imposition of restrictions under article 42 is a serious interference with financial and constitutional rights which exist for the benefit of the shareholder and not the company. In the case of listed companies such as JKX a restriction notice is also an interference with the proper operation of the market in its shares, in which there is not only a private but a significant public interest. One would expect such a draconian power to be circumscribed by something more than the directors’ duty to act in the company’s interest as they may in good faith perceive it.’
Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, Lord Hodge
[2015] UKSC 71, [2015] WLR(D) 497, [2016] 2 All ER (Comm) 413, [2016] 3 All ER 641, [2016] BCC 79, [2015] BUS LR 1395, [2016] 1 BCLC 1, UKSC 2014/0179
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary
Companies Act 2006 793 794
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedLane v Page 15-Jun-1754
Fraudulent execution of a power to jointure. A power to jointure having been executed under an agreement that the creditor of the husband should have part of the jointure, the appointment was set aside as far as the creditors were to benefit. The . .
CitedVatcher v Pault PC 17-Dec-2014
(Jersey) A fraudulent exercise of a trust power is constituted if it is exercised for a purpose or with an intention beyond the scope of the power. It was said that ‘it is not enough that an appointor or some person not an object of power may . .
CitedAleyn v Belchier 5-Jul-1758
Power of jointuring executed in favour of a wife, but with an agreement that the wife should only receive a part as an annuity for her own benefit, and that the residue should be applied to the payment of the husband’s debts : held, a fraud upon the . .
CitedThe Duke Of Portland And Others v Lady Mary E Topham And Others HL 6-Apr-1864
A power, to be validly executed, must be executed without any indirect object. The donee of the power must give the property which is the subject of it, as property, to the person to whom he affects to give it.
A created a power to appoint a . .
Appeal fromJKX Oil and Gas Plc and Others v Eclairs Group Ltd CA 13-May-2014
The court was asked as to important issues on the validity and constitutionality of restrictions imposed by the directors pursuant to Part 22 of the 2006 Act and the company’s Articles of Association, including the purported disenfranchisement of . .
CitedHindle v John Cotton Ltd HL 3-Jul-1919
Viscount Finlay said: ‘Where the question is one of abuse of powers, the state of mind of those who acted, and the motive on which they acted, are all important, and you may go into the question of what their intention was, collecting from the . .
CitedIn re Ricardo Group Plc ChD 1989
The company had obtained a restrictions order under Part XV. An application was made to the court for relief.
Held: On the facts relief was refused. The respondent had secured discharge of the order under the liberty to apply, having provided . .
At First InstanceEclairs Group Ltd and Another v JKX Oil and Gas Plc and Others ChD 30-Aug-2013
Challenge was made to restrictions on voting imposed on the directors under the company’s articles.
Held: The purpose of article 42 is to provide a ‘sanction or incentive’ to remedy a failure to comply with the disclosure notice. . .
CitedIn re TR Technology Investment Trust Plc ChD 1988
The court was asked whether the limition on the circumstances in which the court could remove restrictions imposed under section 794, applied to a merely interim order.
Held: It did not. Hoffmann J said of the powers t demand information given . .
CitedCannon v Trask 1875
The Court was asked as to the use of the directors’ powers to fix a time for the general meeting,
Held: It was improper to fix a general meeting at a time when hostile shareholders were known to be unable to attend. . .
CitedMills v Mills 1938
(High Court of Australia) Where the main purpose of the directors’ resolution (in this case to increase the share base) is to benefit the company it matters not that it incidentally also benefits a director.
Dixon J pointed out the difficulties . .
CitedBirley v Birley CA 12-Mar-1858
An absolute appointment was made to an object of a power, under a prior ‘understanding’ between the appointor and appointee, to hold in ‘In trust ‘ for persons, some of whom were objects and some not.
Held: The whole was void. . .
CitedPryor v Pryor CA 29-Apr-1864
Parents having a power of appointing an estate to all or any of their children appointed it absolutely to two of their sons, upon the understanding that the appointments should resettle the estate upon certain trusts for the benefit of all the . .
CitedRe Turner’s Settled Estates 1884
In the case of mixed motives the Court will apply a ‘but for’ test, namely whether the power to transfer would have been exercised but for the intent to achieve the ulterior purpose or whether the power would have been exercised in any event . .
CitedHogg v Cramphorn Limited ChD 1966
An honest belief that directors should seek to maintain their office for the good of the company did not prevent the motive for issuing additional shares to prevent a take-over from being an improper motive. The directors’ powers to issue shares . .
CitedFraser v Whalley CA 27-Feb-1864
The directors of a railway compriy are not justified in acting on an old resolution auithorising the issue of shares after the particular purpose for which the authority was given has ceased to be available.
Nor in issuing shares, supposing . .
CitedLloyds Bank plc v Bundy CA 1974
‘Broadchalke is one of the most pleasing villages in England. Old Herbert Bundy, the defendant, was a farmer there. His home was at Yew Tree Farm. It went back for 300 years. His family had been there for generations. It was his only asset. But he . .
CitedHoward Smith Limited v Ampol Petroleum Limited PC 14-Feb-1974
(New South Wales) The court considered the use by directors of their fiduciary power of allotment of shares for a different purpose than that for which it was granted, and so as to dilute the voting power of the majority shareholding of issued . .
CitedAnglo-Universal Bank v Baragnon CA 1881
If it was shown that the power to make calls was being exercised for the purpose of disqualifying hostile shareholders at a general meeting, that would be an improper exercise of the directors’ powers. . .
CitedWhitehouse v Carlton House Pty 7-Apr-1987
High Court of Australia – Companies – Shares – Issue and allotment – Powers of directors – Bona fides of exercise – Ulterior purpose – Article vesting powers of directors in named governing director – Issue and allotment of shares by governing . .
CitedRoadchef (Employee Benefits Trustees) Ltd v Hill and Another ChD 29-Jan-2014
Challenge to share transfer. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 05 August 2021; Ref: scu.556258

Noakes and Co Ltd v Rice: HL 17 Dec 1901

Rule Against Clog on equity of Redemption

A mortgage of a leasehold public house contained a covenant with the mortgagee, a brewery, that the mortgagor and his successors in title would not, during the continuance of the leasehold term and whether or not any money should be owing on the security of the mortgage, sell malt liquor in the public house other that that purchased from the brewery.
Held: The covenant was not enforceable after redemption of the charge.
Lord MacNaghten said of the rule preventing a clog on the equity of redemption of a mortgage: ‘Redemption is of the very nature and essence of a mortgage, as mortgages are regarded in equity. It is inherent in the thing itself. And it is, I think, as firmly settled now as it ever was in former times that equity will not permit any device or contrivance designed or calculated to prevent or impede redemption. It follows as a necessary consequence that, when the money secured by a mortgage of land is paid off, the land itself and the owner of the land in the use and enjoyment of it must be as free and unfettered to all intents and purposes as if the land had never been made the subject of the security.’
Lord Lindley said: ‘My Lords, I agree in thinking that the covenant contained in this mortgage, and by which the mortgagees have attempted to convert the house mortgaged from a free public-house into a tied public-house even after redemption, is invalid. I see no answer to the objection taken to it that upon payment off of the mortgage money the mortgagor cannot get back what he mortgaged, namely, a free public-house.’
Earl of Halsbury LC, Lord MacNaghten, Lord Lindley
[1902] AC 24, [1901] UKHL 3
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedG and C Kreglinger v The New Patagonian Meat and Cold Storage Company HL 20-Nov-1913
Mortgagor’s collateral dvantage is not a clog
The appellant woolbrokers had lent the respondent andpound;10,000 with a floating charge over its undertaking. The loan agreement provided that, for five years, the appellants would have first refusal over all sheepskins sold by the company. The . .
CitedJones v Morgan CA 28-Jun-2001
The claimant appealed against an order refusing him enforcement an agreement for the purchase of a one half share in a property. The judge had found the agreement to be unconscionable.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The judge had wrongly . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 04 August 2021; Ref: scu.443246

Swiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd: CA 1981

An equitable charge is created when property is expressly or constructively made liable to the discharge of a debt or some other obligation, and the charge confers on the chargee a right of realisation by judicial process such as a sale order. Buckley LJ said: ‘An equitable charge may, it is said, take the form either of an equitable mortgage or of an equitable charge not by way of mortgage. An equitable mortgage is created when the legal owner of the property constituting the security enters into some instrument or does some act which, though insufficient to confer a legal estate or title in the subject matter upon the mortgagee, nevertheless demonstrates a binding intention to create a security in favour of the mortgagee, or in other words evidences a contract to do so: see Fisher and Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage, 9th ed. (1977), p. 13. An equitable charge which is not an equitable mortgage is said to be created when property is expressly or constructively made liable, or specially appropriated, to the discharge of a debt or some other obligation, and confers on the chargee a right of realisation by judicial process, that is to say, by the appointment of a receiver or an order for sale: see Fisher and Lightwood, p. 14’
He also said: ‘It follows that whether a particular transaction gives rise to an equitable charge of this nature must depend upon the intention of the parties ascertained from what they have done in the then existing circumstances. The intention may be expressed or it may be inferred. If the debtor undertakes to segregate a particular fund or asset and to pay the debt out of that fund or asset, the inference may be drawn, in the absence of any contra indication, that the parties’ intention is that the creditor should have such a proprietary interest in the segregated fund or asset as will enable him to realise out of it the amount owed to him by the debtor: compare In re Nanwa Gold Mines Ltd [1955] 1 W.L.R. 1080 and contrast Moseley v. Cressey’s Co. (1865) L.R. 1 Eq. 405 where there was no obligation to segregate the deposits. But notwithstanding that the matter depends upon the intention of the parties, if upon the true construction of the relevant documents in the light of any admissible evidence as to surrounding circumstances the parties have entered into a transaction the legal effect of which is to give rise to an equitable charge in favour of one of them over property of the other, the fact that they may not have realised this consequence will not mean that there is no charge. They must be presumed to intend the consequence of their acts.’
Buckley LJ
[1982] AC 584, [1981] 2 All ER 449, [1981] 2 WLR 893
England and Wales
Citing:
AdoptedPalmer v Carey PC 1926
A lender financed a trader in goods, on the basis the proceeds of sale of the goods be paid into an account in the name of the lender, and that the lender recoup himself on a monthly basis in respect of sums advanced, with the balance being released . .
Appeal fromSwiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd 1979
A subjective test was applied as to whether the court could find an intention to interfere with contractual relations. . .

Cited by:
CitedEdwards, Drummond Smith v Flightline Limited CA 5-Feb-2003
The applicant company obtained an injunction against another company. That freezing injunction was discharged upon the payment of a sum into the names of the respective parties’ solicitors. The company went into liquidation, and the claimant . .
CitedOldham and others v Georgina Kyrris and Another CA 4-Nov-2003
The claimant sought to bring a claim against the administrators of a partnership alleging a duty of care to creditors.
Held: Such an administrator owed no greater duty to creditors than would a director. That duty was no different whether the . .
CitedJerome v Kelly (HM Inspector of Taxes) CA 20-Dec-2002
The taxpayer had contracted for the disposal of land in three tranches. The later sales were by a Bahamian company to whom the land was assigned subject to the contract.
Held: The later sales were under the original contract. That contract . .
CitedErnst Kastner v Marc Jason, Davis Sherman, Brigitte Sherman CA 2-Dec-2004
The parties had agreed that their dispute should be resolved before the Jewish Beth Din according to Jewish substantive and procedural law. K was granted an interim freezing order. The defendant sold the asset, and K sought to assert a charge.
CitedGotham v Doodes CA 25-Jul-2006
gotham_doodesCA2008
The former bankrupt resisted sale of his property by the trustee, saying that enforcement was barred by limitation. He and his wife bought the property in early 1988, and he was made bankrupt in October 1988. He was dischaged from bankruptcy in . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 04 August 2021; Ref: scu.179797

Falcke v Gray: 13 Jun 1859

The parties contracted for the sale and purchase of two Chine Vases. The seller did not complete, and the buyer sought specific performance.
Held: A purchaser of ‘articles of unusual beauty rarity and distinction’ was entitled to obtain them in specie. The Court will enforce specific performance of a contract to purchase chattels, if damages will not be an adequate compensation: ‘a mere compensation in damages is not a sufficient remedy and satisfaction for the loss of the performance of the contract’.
But where the contract, although not actually fraudulent, was one in which the parties were not on an equal footing, the Plaintiff knowing, and the purchaser being ignorant, of the value of the thing sold, and the price appeared to be inadequate, the Court refused relief.
Kindersley V-C
[1859] EngR 710, (1859) 4 Drew 651, (1859) 62 ER 250
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 30 July 2021; Ref: scu.288062

Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil Ltd: CA 1985

The court was asked whether the terms of a lease and lease back amounted to an unconscionable bargain and was unenforceable.
Held: The court affirmed the decision at first instance, but emphasised the need for unconscientious behaviour rather than a mere disparity of bargaining power. Unequal bargaining power or objectively unreasonable terms provide no basis for equitable interference in the absence of unconscientious or extortionate abuse of power where exceptionally, and as a matter of common fairness, ‘it was not right that the strong should be allowed to push the weak to the wall’.
Dillon LJ, Waller LJ, Dunn LJ
[1985] 1 WLR 173, [1984] EWCA Civ 2, [1985] 1 All ER 303
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromAlec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil Ltd QBD 1983
To establish that a contract was unconscionable, a party had to have made an unconscientious use of its superior position or superior bargaining power to the detriment of someone suffering from some special disability or disadvantage. This weakness . .
CitedGilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne CA 1933
The defendant was the plaintiff’s former managing director. He was bound by a restrictive covenant after he left them. To avoid the covenant, he formed a company and sought to transact his business through it. At first instance, Farwell J had found . .
CitedEsso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd HL 1968
Agreement in Restraint of Trade Unenforceable
The defendant ran two garages under solus agreements with the plaintiffs who complained when the defendants began to purchase petrol from cheaper alternative sources. The House was asked whether the solus agreements were be regarded in law as an . .
CitedDHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council CA 1976
The business was owned by DHN and the land upon which the business was operated was owned by a wholly owned subsidiary, Bronze. The Council acquired land owned by Bronze on which DHN operated its cash and carry warehouse. The Council submitted that . .
CitedAmoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Engineering Co Pty Ltd PC 1975
A court looking to see if an unconscionable bargain had been reached could look at whether or not the transaction benefits the mortgagor. The fact that a covenantor had obtained and would continue to enjoy benefits under the relevant agreement which . .
CitedNordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company HL 1894
Exceptions to Freedom to Trade
The purchaser of the goodwill of a business sought to enforce a covenant in restraint of trade given by the seller.
Held: At common law a restraint of trade is prima facie contrary to public policy and void, unless it can be shown that the . .
CitedThe Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Company Limited v The Vancouver Breweries Limited PC 2-Feb-1934
(British Columbia) Lord Macmillan stated: ‘The law does not condemn every covenant which is in restraint of trade, for it recognizes that in certain cases it may be legitimate, and indeed beneficial, that a person should limit his future commercial . .
CitedThe Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Company Limited v The Vancouver Breweries Limited PC 2-Feb-1934
(British Columbia) Lord Macmillan stated: ‘The law does not condemn every covenant which is in restraint of trade, for it recognizes that in certain cases it may be legitimate, and indeed beneficial, that a person should limit his future commercial . .
CitedBennett v Bennett CA 1952
The wife sued for arrears of maintenance payments payable under a deed in consideration for which the wife covenanted not to proceed with the prayers in the petition for maintenance, to consent to their being dismissed, and not to present any . .
CitedChemidus Wavin Ltd v Societe pour La Transformation et L’exploitation des Resines Industrielles SA CA 1973
. .
CitedGoodinson v Goodinson 1954
W covenanted that for so long as the weekly payments of maintenance for herself and the child were punctually made, she would not commence or prosecute any matrimonial proceedings against the husband. The husband fell in arrears and she claimed the . .

Cited by:
CitedChagos Islanders v The Attorney General, Her Majesty’s British Indian Ocean Territory Commissioner QBD 9-Oct-2003
The Chagos Islands had been a British dependent territory since 1814. The British government repatriated the islanders in the 1960s, and the Ilois now sought damages for their wrongful displacement, misfeasance, deceit, negligence and to establish a . .
CitedBoustany v Piggott PC 1995
In discussing what was said to be unconscionable contract, the Board accepted that ‘It is not sufficient to attract the jurisdiction of equity to prove that a bargain is hard, unreasonable or foolish; it must be proved to be unconscionable, in the . .
CitedYorkshire Bank Plc v Tinsley CA 25-Jun-2004
The defendant’s husband had charged the matrimonial home on several occasions to the claimant. It was found that the first charges were affected by undue influence and could not be enforced. The defendant argued that the last charge which replaced . .
CitedStrydom v Vendside Ltd QBD 18-Aug-2009
The claimant sought recovery of a sum paid to the defendant as a commission by his union during his claim for personal injuries at work, relying on a term he sought to have implied into his contract, that the costs position should not be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 July 2021; Ref: scu.186675

Upmann v Elkan: CA 5 Jun 1871

The defendant freight forwarding agent was innocently in possession of consignments of counterfeit cigars in transit to Germany through a London dock. The action was not for discovery, but for an order restraining the forwarder from releasing the goods and an account of damages, on the footing that he had himself infringed the mark. The forwarder volunteered the names of the consignors and agreed to submit to whatever order the court should make. That left only the question of the costs of the action.
Held: Lord Romilly MR accepted that the forwarder was not an infringer, but thought that he would have been if after being told of the infringement he had not performed his duty. His duty in Lord Romilly’s view (p 145) was ‘at once to give all the information required, and to undertake that the goods shall not be removed or dealt with until the spurious brand has been removed, and to offer to give all facilities to the person injured for that purpose.’
If through no fault of his own a person gets mixed up in the tortious acts of others so as to facilitate their wrongdoing, he is not personally liable, but he does have a duty when called upon to disclose the identity of the wrongdoer.
Lord Hatherley LC, Lord Romilly MR
(1871) LR 12 Eq 140, 7 Ch App 130, [1871] UKLawRpEq 101
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
AppliedNorwich Pharmacal Co and others v Customs and Excise Commissioners HL 26-Jun-1973
Innocent third Party May still have duty to assist
The plaintiffs sought discovery from the defendants of documents received by them innocently in the exercise of their statutory functions. They sought to identify people who had been importing drugs unlawfully manufactured in breach of their . .
CitedBritish Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd HL 7-May-1980
The defendant had broadcast a TV programme using material confidential to the plaintiff, who now sought disclosure of the identity of the presumed thief.
Held: (Lord Salmon dissenting) The courts have never recognised a public interest right . .
CitedNorwich Pharmacal Co and others v Customs and Excise Commissioners CA 2-Jan-1972
The plaintiffs sought discovery of the names of patent infringers from the defendant third party, submitting that by analogy with trade mark and passing-off cases, the Customs could be ordered to give discovery of the names.
Held: Buckley LJ . .
CitedSmith v ADVFN Plc CA 15-Apr-2008
The claimant complained of defamation on internet bulletin boards. He made an application to require the forum operator to disclose IP addresses and other information about posters under a Norwich Pharmacal order. Further applications were made for . .
CitedBanker’s Trust v Shapira CA 1980
Enforcement through innocent third party bank
Two forged cheques, each for USD500,000, had been presented by two men and as a result USD1,000,000 had been transferred to accounts in their names. The plaintiff sought to trace assets through the banks involved.
Held: The court approved the . .
CitedAoot Kalmneft v Denton Wilde Sapte (A Firm) Merc 29-Oct-2001
The court ordered relief by way of disclosure against a third party: ‘In Norwich Pharmacal the information required was the identity of the wrongdoer (the applicant knew what wrong had been done but not who had done it) but I see no reason why the . .
CitedVarious Claimants v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Others ChD 12-Jul-2013
The claimants sought disclosure by the police of information relating to the phone hacking activities said to have been conducted by journalists engaged by the first defendant newspaper. They were wanting to make claims against the respondent, but . .
CitedCartier International Ag and Others v British Telecommunications Plc and Another SC 13-Jun-2018
The respondent ISP companies had been injuncted to stop the transmission of websites which infringed the trade mark rights of the claimants. The ISPs now appealed from the element of the order that they pay the claimants’ costs of implementing the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 July 2021; Ref: scu.181334

Tailby v Official Receiver: HL 1888

A creditor can create, for good consideration an equitable charge over book debts which will attach to them as soon as they come into existence.
Lord Macnaghten said: ‘It was admitted by the learned counsel for the respondent, that a trader may assign his future book debts in a specified business. Why should the line be drawn there? Between men of full age and competent understanding ought there to be any limit to the freedom of contract but that imposed by positive law or dictated by considerations of morality or public policy? The limit proposed is purely arbitrary, and I think meaningless and unreasonable.’ Future property, possibilities, and expectancies are all assignable in equity for value.
Lord MacNaghten
(1888) 13 App Cas 523
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedNational Westminster Bank Plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd and others ChD 15-Jan-2004
The company granted a debenture to the claimant purporting to secure its book debts. The company went into liquidation. The liquidator challenged the bank’s charge.
Held: Siebe was wrongly decided. The charge was ineffective over the book . .
AppliedSiebe Gorman and Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd ChD 1979
It was possible to create a fixed charge over present and future book debts and on its true construction, the debenture granted to Barclays Bank Ltd in this case had done so. If the chargor of book debts, having collected the book debts, ‘[had] had . .
CitedNational Westminster Bank Plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd; In re Spectrum Plus CA 26-May-2004
The court was asked whether a charge given over book debts in a debenture was floating or fixed.
Held: Since the charge asserted some control over receipt of the payments, it was a fixed charge. Upon payment into the account, title to the . .
CitedNational Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Limited and others HL 30-Jun-2005
Former HL decision in Siebe Gorman overruled
The company had become insolvent. The bank had a debenture and claimed that its charge over the book debts had become a fixed charge. The preferential creditors said that the charge was a floating charge and that they took priority.
Held: The . .
CitedIn re Ellenborough, Towry Law v Burne ChD 1903
The court declined to give effect to a voluntary disposition of a mere expectancy. Buckley J said: ‘It cannot be and is not disputed that if the deed had been for value the trustees could have enforced it. If value be given, it is immaterial what is . .
CitedRe Erskine 1948 Trust ChD 29-Mar-2012
The trust was created in 1948, and provided gifts over, which had now failed. The court considered the construction of the term ‘stautory next of kin’. The possible beneficiaries claimed through being adopted, arguing that at the date of the last . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.191956

In re North Australian Territory Co, Archer’s case: CA 1892

A bribe had been paid to an agent.
Lindley LJ
[1892] 1 Ch 322
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedFHR European Ventures Llp and Others v Cedar Capital Partners Llc SC 16-Jul-2014
Approprietary remedy against Fraudulent Agent
The Court was asked whether a bribe or secret commission received by an agent is held by the agent on trust for his principal, or whether the principal merely has a claim for equitable compensation in a sum equal to the value of the bribe or . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.551509

Morgan v Ashcroft: CA 1937

A gift may be recovered where it was made under the mistaken belief that the donee is someone else. The mistake must be as to a fact which, if true, would create a liability to pay .
Scott LJ said of the Kerrison case that ‘it was definitely decided by Hamilton J. and by the House of Lords that the plaintiff was entitled to recover a payment made to the defendants for the purpose of meeting an anticipated liability although he then knew that no actual liability had yet attached to him.’ The mistake of fact, in the words of Scott LJ ‘must be in some aspect or another fundamental to the transaction’
Scott LJ, Lord Greene MR
[1938] 1 KB 49, [1937] 3 All ER 92
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedKerrison v Glyn, Mills, Currie and Co HL 1912
The plaintiff arranged with his bankers for them to honour cheques of one Patterson and when they advised the plaintiff of the amount of the cheques so honoured, the plaintiff would pay Kessler and Co. The plaintiff paid andpound;500 to the . .

Cited by:
CitedRegina v Gilks CACD 27-Jun-1972
The appellant had placed a bet at a betting shop on a certain horse. A horse with a similar name won, but by mistake the shop paid out on the bet. The appellant knew of the mistake, but refused to return the winnings. He now appealed against his . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.539757

Thakker v Northern Rock Plc: QBD 5 Feb 2014

Simler QC
[2014] EWHC 2107 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedNational Westminster Bank plc v Skelton (Note) 1993
The court distinguished a claim by the mortgagee for possession from a claim on the mortgagor’s personal covenant to pay what was due. A claim for a set-off is merely a sub-species of counterclaim. The court will not readily imply a term into a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.535240

Gould v Davis: 1831

[1831] EngR 95, (1831) 1 Cr and J 415, (1831) 148 ER 1484
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd SC 18-Apr-2018
The court was asked as to use of the solicitor’s equitable lien, whereby equity provided security for the recovery by solicitors of their agreed charges for the successful conduct of litigation, out of the fruits of that litigation. It is a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 July 2021; Ref: scu.319973

Khans Solicitor (A Firm) v Chifuntwe and Another: CA 8 May 2013

C instructed the claimants to bring proceedings. They compromised those proceedings, the defendant agreeing to pay C’s costs. A bill was submitted but before it was paid C withdrew his instructions from his solicitors and accepted the defendant’s offer of andpound;6,000 in settlement of his costs, requiring that the money be paid directly to him. His solicitors had written to the defendant stating that they believed that C was attempting to avoid payment of costs properly due to them and putting the defendant on notice of their claim. The money was nevertheless paid directly to C who then disappeared. The solicitors issued proceedings under CPR Part 8, claiming a declaration that the compromise was not valid and either a charge or a lien upon the unpaid and as yet unassessed costs.
Held: The compromise was valid but that since the defendant had been on notice as to the costs due to the solicitors when it paid C, that payment was not a good discharge of the solicitors’ claim and must be paid again.
The court may intervene to protect a claim by a solicitor on funds recovered by a client where (a) the paying party appeared to have colluding with the client to cheat the solicitor of his fees, or (b) the paying party was on notice that the other party’s solicitor had a claim on the funds for outstanding fees.
Rix, Ryder, Sedley LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 481, [2013] WLR(D) 167, [2013] 4 All ER 367, [2013] PNLR 29, [2013] 4 Costs LR 564, [2014] 1 WLR 1185
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromKhans Solicitors v Chifuntwe and Another SCCO 17-Feb-2012
. .
See AlsoKhans Solicitors v Chifuntwe and Another QBD 24-Jul-2012
. .

Cited by:
CitedGavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd CA 2-Dec-2015
Appeal by Edmondson against an Order dismissing Edmondson’s claim against Haven in respect of Haven’s conduct in settling on an inclusive basis personal injury claims directly with six clients of Edmondson with whom Edmondson had concluded . .
ApprovedGavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd SC 18-Apr-2018
The court was asked as to use of the solicitor’s equitable lien, whereby equity provided security for the recovery by solicitors of their agreed charges for the successful conduct of litigation, out of the fruits of that litigation. It is a . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 18 July 2021; Ref: scu.503465

Gavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd: SC 18 Apr 2018

The court was asked as to use of the solicitor’s equitable lien, whereby equity provided security for the recovery by solicitors of their agreed charges for the successful conduct of litigation, out of the fruits of that litigation. It is a judge-made remedy, motivated not by any fondness for solicitors as fellow lawyers or even as officers of the court, but rather because it promotes access to justice. Specifically it enables solicitors to offer litigation services on credit to clients who, although they have a meritorious case, lack the financial resources to pay up front for its pursuit. It is called a solicitor’s lien because solicitors used to have a virtual monopoly on the pursuit of litigation in the higher courts. The solicitors had taken on personal injury claimants on a conditional fee basis. The appellant insurance company had settled the claims directly with the clients, depriving the solicitors of their costs.
Held: Appeal dismissed (though on differing grounds)
‘ the equity depends upon the solicitor having a claim for his charges against the client, that there must be something in the nature of a fund against which equity can recognise that his claim extends (which is usually a debt owed by the defendant to the solicitor’s client which owes its existence, at least in part, to the solicitor’s services to the client) and that for equity to intervene there must be something sufficiently affecting the conscience of the payer, either in the form of collusion to cheat the solicitor or notice (or, I would add knowledge) of the solicitor’s claim against, or interest in, the fund.’
Lady Hale, President, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Briggs
[2018] UKSC 21, [2018] RTR 22, [2018] 2 Costs LR 347, [2018] PNLR 24, [2018] 3 All ER 273, [2018] 1 WLR 2052, [2018] WLR(D) 241
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, Supreme Court, SC Summary, SC Summary Video, SC 2018 0205 am video, SC 2018 0205 pm video, SC 20180202 am Video, SC 2018 02 06 pm video
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromGavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd CA 2-Dec-2015
Appeal by Edmondson against an Order dismissing Edmondson’s claim against Haven in respect of Haven’s conduct in settling on an inclusive basis personal injury claims directly with six clients of Edmondson with whom Edmondson had concluded . .
CitedWelsh v Hole 6-Nov-1779
The plaintiff obtained judgment for pounds 20 and costs in a civil claim for assault, but then compromised the claim for a direct payment by the defendant of pounds 10. There was no collusion to defeat the solicitor’s right to payment of his bill. . .
CitedRead v Dupper 13-Jun-1795
The defendant’s solicitor paid the plaintiff direct, after notice of the plaintiff’s solicitor’s interest, and had to pay again. Lord Kenyon began:
‘The principle by which this application is to be decided was settled long ago, namely that the . .
CitedOrmerod v Tate 13-May-1801
An attorney has a lien upon a sum awarded in favour of his client, as well as if recovered by judgment: and if after notice to the defendant the latter pay it over to the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s attorney may compel a repayment of it to himself, . .
CitedEx Parte Bryant 12-Aug-1815
Person arrested on his return from proving a debt at Guildhall, discharged with costs of application.
Though an order be made on a petition in bankruptcy, directing costs to be paid to the Petitioner personally, this does not take away the . .
ApprovedKhans Solicitor (A Firm) v Chifuntwe and Another CA 8-May-2013
C instructed the claimants to bring proceedings. They compromised those proceedings, the defendant agreeing to pay C’s costs. A bill was submitted but before it was paid C withdrew his instructions from his solicitors and accepted the defendant’s . .
CitedIn re the Estate of Fuld, decd (No. 4) 1968
The solicitor sought to exercise a lien for his costs over money paid direct to his client.
Held: The solicitor’s right exists over both the amount of a judgment in favour of the client, and the amount of an order for costs in favour of the . .
CitedGould v Davis 1831
. .
CitedIn Re Moss 2-Jun-1866
Lord Romilly MR said: ‘I think it of great importance to preserve the lien of solicitors. That is the real security for solicitors engaged in business. It is also beneficial to the suitors. It would frequently happen, but for the lien which . .
CitedBarker v St Quintin, Esq 22-Jan-1844
A solicitor’s the equitable lien operates by way of security or charge.
Baron Parke said: ‘The lien which an attorney is said to have on a judgment (which is, perhaps, an incorrect expression) is merely a claim to the equitable interference of . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 18 July 2021; Ref: scu.608733

Mason v Mason and Cottrell: CA 1933

An order made against a husband for payment of the wife’s costs to her solicitor. The solicitor sought a garnishee order in respect of unpaid costs. Lord Hanworth MR described the solicitor’s lien as a mere right to claim the equitable interference of the court.
Lord Merrivale said: ‘As to the first objection to the garnishee order nisi, what has to be determined is whether the wife’s solicitors were persons who had obtained a judgment or order against the husband for recovery or payment of money – that is, were they his creditors? The order relied on is that of March 10 1933 that the husband ‘do within seven days pay to Messrs White and Co, the solicitors of the wife, the sum of pounds 366.1s.4d, being with the sum of pounds 170 still in Court and pounds 170 already paid out the amount of the wife’s costs as taxed and certified’. An affirmative answer to the question I have formulated would seem to involve a conclusion that the solicitors and the wife had each obtained a judgment or order against the alleged debtor. If so, each would be a competent applicant for the garnishee order and entitled under the terms of [the Rules] upon affidavit by himself or his solicitor ‘to attach the moneys due to the debtor’. In the everyday practice of this Division the application by the solicitor for payment by the husband of the wife’s costs is taken to be the application of the wife. If this were not so, it would seem that the wife’s solicitor, with no misconduct on his part as a solicitor, might be personally condemned in the costs of an unsuccessful application. In my view the person who is entitled to take garnishee proceedings is the actual creditor. A somewhat similar question arose in the Court of Appeal in 1929: In re a Debtor. . . There, upon an order in divorce for payment by the co-respondent to the solicitors of the petitioner of the petitioner’s costs of the suit, the solicitors proceeded in bankruptcy against the co-respondent, and it was objected that they were not creditors. The judgment of the Court did not proceed upon this ground, but in the course of the judgment of Lord Hanworth MR these words occur: ‘the person at whose suit proceedings are taken must be the principal, the person in whose interest those proceedings are necessary. In my opinion the petitioning husband in this case was the person who was really the principal, for whose indemnity legal proceedings were necessary. The solicitors were merely acting as a necessary part of the machinery, under which the sum enured for the benefit of the petitioner; but they were not the principals as against the debtor.’ This was not a decision on the present state of facts, but it appears to me to support the contention raised on the part of the husband in the present case, and my conclusion upon this matter is that the solicitors were not entitled to become applicants as of their own right . . ‘
Lord Hanworth MR, Lord Merrivale
[1933] P 199
England and Wales

Updated: 18 July 2021; Ref: scu.666006

Read v Dupper: 13 Jun 1795

The defendant’s solicitor paid the plaintiff direct, after notice of the plaintiff’s solicitor’s interest, and had to pay again. Lord Kenyon began:
‘The principle by which this application is to be decided was settled long ago, namely that the party should not run away with the fruits of the cause without satisfying the legal demands of his attorney, by whose industry, and in many instances at whose expense, those fruits are obtained.’
Lord Kenyon explained Lord Mansfield’s reference to assignment in Welsh v Hole in terms of equitable principle: ‘according to the rules of equity and honest dealing if the assignee give notice to the debtor of such assignment, he shall not afterwards be suffered to avail himself of a payment to the principal in fraud of such notice.’
Lord Kenyon
[1795] EngR 4137, (1795) 6 TR 361, (1795) 101 ER 595
Commonlii
England and Wales
Citing:
ExplainedWelsh v Hole 6-Nov-1779
The plaintiff obtained judgment for pounds 20 and costs in a civil claim for assault, but then compromised the claim for a direct payment by the defendant of pounds 10. There was no collusion to defeat the solicitor’s right to payment of his bill. . .

Cited by:
CitedGavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd SC 18-Apr-2018
The court was asked as to use of the solicitor’s equitable lien, whereby equity provided security for the recovery by solicitors of their agreed charges for the successful conduct of litigation, out of the fruits of that litigation. It is a . .
CitedGavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd CA 2-Dec-2015
Appeal by Edmondson against an Order dismissing Edmondson’s claim against Haven in respect of Haven’s conduct in settling on an inclusive basis personal injury claims directly with six clients of Edmondson with whom Edmondson had concluded . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 18 July 2021; Ref: scu.356482

East v Pantiles Plant Hire Ltd: CA 1981

The court considered the circumstances under which rectification could properly be ordered in respect of a deed. Brightman LJ said: ‘It is clear on the authorities that a mistake in a written instrument can, in certain limited circumstances, be corrected as a matter of construction without obtaining a decree in an action for rectification. Two conditions must be satisfied: first, there must be a clear mistake on the face of the instrument; secondly, it must be clear what correction ought to be made in order to cure the mistake. If those conditions are satisfied, then the correction is made as a matter of construction. If they are not satisfied then either the claimant must pursue an action for rectification or he must leave it to a court of construction to reach what answer it can on the basis that the uncorrected wording represents the manner in which the parties decided to express their intention. In Snell’s Principles of Equity 27th ed p 611 the principle of rectification by construction is said to apply only to obvious clerical blunders or grammatical mistakes. I agree with that approach. Perhaps it might be summarised by saying that the principle applies where a reader with sufficient experience of the sort of document in issue would inevitably say to himself, ‘Of course X is a mistake for Y’.’
Brightman, Lawton and Oliver LJJ
[1982] 2 EGLR 111, (1981) 263 EG 61
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedJIS (1974) Ltd v MCP Investment Nominees I Ltd CA 9-Apr-2003
The parties agreed for a lease to be granted of a new building. Part had been intended to be excluded for shops, but permission was not obtained, the shops area was included and leased back. When the tenants sought to determine the lease, the . .
CitedLittman and Another v Aspen Oil (Broking) Ltd CA 19-Dec-2005
A lease had been granted with a break clause, which the tenant exercised. The Landlord said it had not complied with its obligations and was not free to exercise that clause. The clause had included the word ‘landlord’ where it should have read . .
CitedChartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd and Others HL 1-Jul-2009
Mutual Knowledge admissible to construe contract
The parties had entered into a development contract in respect of a site in Wandsworth, under which balancing compensation was to be paid. They disagreed as to its calculation. Persimmon sought rectification to reflect the negotiations.
Held: . .
ApprovedKPMG Llp v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd CA 27-Apr-2007
The parties disputed the interpretation of a break clause in their lease. Carnwath LJ said that courts should not readily accept that parties have made mistakes in formal documents: ‘correction of mistakes by construction’ is not a separate branch . .
CitedCampbell v Daejan Properties Ltd CA 20-Nov-2012
The tenant appealed against an order requiring the amendment of what was found to be an obvious error in the lease as to the responsibility of the lessor to make repairs to certain walls and rooves, and the apportionment of liability for payment of . .
CitedPink Floyd Music Ltd and Another v EMI Records Ltd CA 14-Dec-2010
The defendant appealed against an order made on the claimant’s assertion that there were due to it substantial underpayments of royalties over many years. The issues were as to the construction of licensing agreements particularly in the context of . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.184537

Kiriri Cotton Co Ltd v Dewani: PC 1 Dec 1959

(Eastern Africa) A premium had been paid in consideration of the grant of a sub-lease of property contrary to the provisions of an ordinance. Restitution was ordered because payment had been made pursuant to a contractual obligation rendered void by statute. The action was ‘for restitution of money which the defendant has received but which the law says he ought to return to the plaintiff.’ He further said that ‘all the particular heads of money had and received, such as money paid under a mistake of fact, paid under a consideration that has wholly failed, money paid by one who is not in pari delicto with the defendant, are only instances where the law says the money ought to be returned.’ Lord Denning set out the exception to the rule regarding restitution of money paid under a mistake where there is ‘something more’ in addition to the mistake of law such as something in the defendant’s conduct which shows that he was the one who was primarily responsible for the mistake.
As an exception to the general rule of law, the fact that a transaction is illegal does not disbar a person whom the legislation is intended to protect from recovering money paid over in pursuance of the transaction.
It does not lie in the mouth of a party to an illegal contract to claim that he was unaware of the law relating to the illegality to which he is particeps criminis. However, the maxim does not mean that everybody is presumed to know the law. The true proposition means that no man can excuse himself from doing his duty by saying he did not know the law on the matter.
Lord Denning
[1960] AC 192, [1959] UKPC 27, [1960] 2 WLR 127, [1960] 1 All ER 177
Bailii
Commonwealth
Cited by:
CitedKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.236544

Oliver v Hinton: 1899

The deposit of title deeds to secure the repayment of 400 pounds was accompanied by a memorandum of the deposit, with an undertaking to execute a legal mortgage if asked to do so.
Held: When, two years after the deposit of the title deeds, the owner executed a conveyance of the property to a purchaser, whose agent (a former solicitor’s clerk) never asked to see the deeds, the equities of the case depended on whether the purchaser had acted with such with gross negligence that she had to be postponed to the equitable rights of the chargee. In order that a purchaser for value, who has acquired the legal estate without notice of a prior equitable mortgage of the property, may be postponed to that mortgage, it is not necessary to shew that he has been guilty of fraud, or negligence amounting to fraud; it is sufficient that he has been guilty of negligence so gross as to render it unjust to deprive the prior mortgagee of his priority.
[1899] 2 Ch 264
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedR Griggs Group Ltd and others v Evans and others (No 2) ChD 12-May-2004
A logo had been created for the claimants, by an independent sub-contractor. They sought assignment of their legal title, but, knowing of the claimant’s interest the copyright was assigned to a third party out of the jurisdiction. The claimant . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.199512

Midland Bank v Cooke and Another: CA 13 Jul 1995

Equal equitable interest inferrable without proof

The bank sought to enforce a charge given by the husband to secure a business loan. The property was purchased from the husband’s and his family’s resources and the loan, and was in his name. There had been no discussion or agreement between husband and wife at the time of the acquisition as to the basis upon which the property was held by the husband, or as to the extent of their respective beneficial interests.
Held: The wife was entitled to half share in the property. She had made a contribution equal to one half of the wedding gift, had a claim under Rossett. An equal equitable interest in a home could be inferred without proof of explicit words: ‘I would therefore hold that positive evidence that the parties neither discussed nor intended any agreement as to the proportions of their beneficial interest does not preclude the court, on general equitable principles, from inferring one’. Cash contributions were not the sole determinant of the value of a share of the equity in a home.
Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, Lord Justice Waite and Lord Justice Schiemann
Independent 26-Jul-1995, Times 13-Jul-1995, Gazette 31-Aug-1995, [1995] 4 All ER 562, [1995] 2 FLR 915, [1995] EWCA Civ 12, [1996] 1 FCR 442
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
FollowedLloyds Bank plc v Rosset HL 29-Mar-1990
The house had been bought during the marriage but in the husband’s sole name. The plaintiff’s charge secured the husband’s overdraft. The bank issued possession proceedings. Mr Rosset had left, but Mrs Rosset claimed, as against the bank an interest . .
CitedSpringette v Defoe CA 1-Mar-1992
Property was purchased in joint names, but with no express declaration of the beneficial interests. The couple had lived together for a short time as joint tenants of the local authority. They were able to purchase at a substantial discount from the . .
CitedGrant v Edwards and Edwards CA 24-Mar-1986
A couple were not married but lived together in Vincent Farmhouse in which the plaintiff claimed a beneficial interest on separation. The female partner was told by the male partner that the only reason for not acquiring the property in joint names . .
CitedMcHardy and Sons (A Firm) v Warren and Another CA 8-Apr-1994
A gift of the deposit to a couple can create an equal interest in the home for the spouses though the house is purchased in one name only. Lord Justice Dillon said: ‘To my mind it is irresistible conclusion that where a parent pays the deposit, . .

Cited by:
CitedOxley v Hiscock CA 6-May-2004
oxley_hiscockCA2004
The parties were not married, but had brought together their resources to purchase a home in the name of one of them. Nothing had been said about the respective shares on which the property was to be held.
Held: The shares were to be assessed . .
CitedCarlton v Goodman CA 29-Apr-2002
The defendant claimed an interest in a house. The deceased had been a sitting tenant, and wanted to purchase his house. He could not obtain finance alone, and she joined with him, becoming liable under the mortgage. She did not live in the house . .
CitedVan Laethem v Brooker and Another ChD 12-Jul-2005
The claimant asserted an interest in several properties by virtue of a common intention constructive trust or by proprietary estoppel. The parties had been engaged to be married.
Held: ‘A [constructive] trust arises in connection with the . .
CitedStack v Dowden HL 25-Apr-2007
The parties had cohabited for a long time, in a home bought by Ms Dowden. After the breakdown of the relationship, Mr Stack claimed an equal interest in the second family home, which they had bought in joint names. The House was asked whether, when . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 June 2021; Ref: scu.83713

Greer v Kettle: HL 1938

A corporate borrower agreed to repay andpound;250,000 with interest and to charge certain specified shares in another company as security. A guarantee was procured from another company, Parent Trust. The deed of guarantee recited that the lender had made the advance to the borrower ‘on the security of a charge dated March 1929 on the shares, particulars of which are set out in the schedule hereto’.
Held: Recitals may also give rise to an estoppel in respect of specific facts stated and adopted as the basis of a transaction, provided that the facts as stated are ‘certain, clear and unambiguous’. However, Parent Trust had never become liable under the guarantee because a charge had never in fact been given over the shares. Where a person guaranteed a loan which was expressed to be secured by a charge on certain shares, and the shares had not been validly issued, it was held that the surety was not liable.
Lord Killowen explained: ‘the legal rights and liabilities of these parties depend upon the true construction and effect of the agreement of guarantee . . Once it is realized that the debt which Parent Trust are undertaking to guarantee is a debt described as a debt the repayment of which by the principal debtor is secured by a charge on (amongst other shares) the 275,000 shares in Iron Industries, Ld, the case (apart from the question of estoppel, to which I will refer) becomes in my opinion a simple one . . It is not a case, as Bennett J seems to have treated it, of seeking to imply a condition, the implication of which is alleged to be inconsistent with other provisions in the document. In other words, as Romer LJ said, it is not a case of Parent Trust being released from a contractual engagement. It is a case of an attempt to impose upon them a liability which they have never undertaken. The only debt, the repayment of which by the principal debtor they undertook to guarantee, was a debt secured by a charge on the 275,000 shares in Iron Industries, Ld, and a debt so secured never in fact existed. The language of Knight Bruce LJ in Evans v Bremridge (i) may well be applied to the present litigants. In that case it was sought to make a surety liable who became a surety on the footing that a co-surety would join in the covenant with him. The co-surety had not done so, and the surety was held to be under no liability. As the Lord Justice truly said: ‘The defendants seek to charge the plaintiff with ‘a contract, into which he did not enter.’
Lord Maugham referred to the qualification imposed by equity on the doctrine of estoppel by deed: ‘The position in equity is and was always different in this respect, that where there are proper grounds for rectifying a deed, e.g., because it is based upon a common mistake of fact, then to the extent of the rectification there can plainly be no estoppel based on the original form of the instrument. It is at least equally clear that in equity a party to a deed could not set up an estoppel in reliance on a deed in relation to which there is an equitable right to rescission or in reliance on an untrue statement of an untrue recital induced by his own representation, whether innocent or otherwise, to the other party. Authority is scarcely needed for so clear a consequence of a rectification order or an admitted or proved right to such an order. The well known rule of the Chancery Courts in regard to a receipt clause in a deed not effecting an estoppel if the money has not in fact been paid is a good illustration of the equity view . . ‘
Lord Maugham, Lord Russell of Killowen
[1938] AC 156, 158 LT 433
England and Wales
Citing:
ApprovedBrooke v Haynes CA 1868
Lord Romilly MR said: ‘A party to a deed is not estopped in equity from averring against or offering evidence to controvert a recital therein contrary to the fact, which has been introduced into the deed by mistake of fact, and not through fraud or . .
ApprovedCarpenter v Buller 29-Jul-1840
. .

Cited by:
CitedPrime Sight Ltd v Lavarello PC 9-Jul-2013
(Gibraltar) Parties to a contract for the sale of land including the appellant company declared a purchase price which both knew to be false. Faced with insolvency proceedings, the appellant sought to challenge a claim for the full amount.
Updated: 20 June 2021; Ref: scu.519652

Noakes and Co Ltd v Rice: HL 17 Dec 2001

A charge on a public house provided that even after repayment of the principal, the owner continued to be obliged to purchase his beer from the brewery, and that any non-payment would be charged on the property.
Held: The clauses operated as a clog on the equity so as to prevent effective redemption, and were invalid. Earl of Halsbury L said: ‘this was a mortgage, and that the equity of redemption is clogged and fettered here by the continuance of an obligation which would render this house less available in the hands of its owner during the whole period and beyond the whole period of the term, apart from the realization of the security. Under those circumstances, as a matter of the merest and simplest reasoning, I am wholly unable to come to any other conclusion than that there is a clog and fetter here which the law will not permit.’
Lord MacNaghten said: ‘Redemption is of the very nature and essence of a mortgage, as mortgages are regarded in equity. It is inherent in the thing itself. And it is, I think, as firmly settled now as it ever was in former times that equity will not permit any device or contrivance designed or calculated to prevent or impede redemption.’
Lord Lindley said: ‘the covenant contained in this mortgage, and by which the mortgagees have attempted to convert the house mortgaged from a free public-house into a tied public-house even after redemption, is invalid. I see no answer to the objection taken to it that upon payment off of the mortgage money the mortgagor cannot get back what he mortgaged, namely, a free public-house. The attempt to strengthen the tie by stipulating for liquidated damages and charging them on the property certainly does not mend matters, but makes them worse.’
Earl of Halsbury LC, Lord MacNaghten
[1902] AC 24, [1901] UKHL 3
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBiggs v Hoddinott 1898
The owner of a freehouse had agreed to a tie in favour of a brewer who had lent him money. . .
CitedBrowne v Ryan 1901
(Ireland – Court of Appeal) A farmer mortgaged his holding to secure andpound;200 and interest; and, as part of the mortgage transaction, it was stipulated that the mortgagor should sell his holding within twelve months, employ the mortgagee as the . .
CitedSantley v Wilde CA 1899
Classic Definition of a Mortgage
Lord Lindley considered the nature of a mortgage and said: ‘The principle is this: a mortgage is a conveyance of land or an assignment of chattels as a security for the payment of a debt, or the discharge of some other obligation for which it is . .
CitedSalt v Marquis of Northampton 1892
The court was asked whether a life policy, the premiums on which were charged against the mortgagor, was comprised in the mortgage security. That question having been decided in the affirmative, it was declared to be redeemable, notwithstanding an . .
CitedTulk v Moxhay 22-Dec-1848
A, being seised of the centre garden and some houses in Leicester Square, conveyed the garden to B in fee, and B covenanted for himself and his assigns to keep the garden unbuilt upon.
Held: A purchaser from B, with notice of the covenant, was . .

Cited by:
CitedBradley v Carritt HL 11-May-1903
Shares in a tea company had been mortgaged to secure a loan from a broker on terms that the mortgagor would seek to ensure that the mortgagee should thereafter have sale of the company’s teas. The mortgage contained a covenant that, if the company . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 June 2021; Ref: scu.219911

Hammersley v Baron De Biel, An Infant, By W J Blake, His Next Friend: HL 25 Mar 1845

The Plaintiffs father, B, had agreed with one T that he would marry T’s daughter and provide a jointure for her in consideration of T’s undertaking to leave a sum of pounds 10,000 in his will to his daughter to be settled on her and her children. B married T’s daughter and provided her with a jointure, but T did not leave his daughter in his will the pounds 10,000 which he had promised. B’s son asked the Court of Chancery to order T’s executors to pay the money.
Held: A representation made by one party for the purpose of influencing the conduct of another, and acted on by him, will in general be sufficient to entitle him to the assistance of a Court of Equity, for the purpose of realising such representation.
A submission that there never had been more than ‘a rough sketch of the proposals expressly subject to revision’ was rejected. Lord Lyndhurst LC said: ‘But the principle of law, at least of equity, is this – that if a party holds out inducements to another to celebrate a marriage, and holds them out deliberately and plainly, and the other party consents, and celebrates the marriage in consequence of them, if he had good reason to expect that it was intended that he should have the benefit of the proposal which was so held out, a Court of Equity will take care that he is not disappointed and will give effect to the proposal. This is stated as a part of the arrangement; it is stated in the proposal.’
Lord Cottenham, Lord Lyndhurst LC, Lord Brougham, Lord Campbell
[1845] EngR 592, (1845) 12 Cl and Fin 45, (1845) 8 ER 1312
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedWestern Fish Products Ltd v Penwith District Council and Another CA 22-May-1978
Estoppel Cannot Oust Statutory Discretion
The plaintiff had been refused planning permission for a factory. The refusals were followed by the issue of Enforcement Notices and Stop Notices. The plaintiff said that they had been given re-assurances upon which they had relied.
Held: The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.303734

Brooksbank And Another v Smith: 24 Feb 1836

The testatrix died in 1818 leaving a fund in trust, subject to a life interest, for her children in equal shares, with substitutional gifts if any child predeceased her leaving issue. Her daughter Elizabeth did predecease her by two months, but on the death of the life tenant in 1827 the trustees were given incorrect information about the date of Elizabeth’s death and her share (andpound;1,000 nominal of stock) was transferred to her widower instead of to her children. When the mistake was discovered in 1833 the trustees claimed andpound;100 stock (which was all that remained unsold) from Elizabeth’s widower. The bill was issued within six years of discovery of the mistake. Alderson B held that the claim was not statute-barred. He treated it as a proprietary claim based on a mistake of fact.
Alderson B
[1836] EngR 446, (1836) 2 Y and C Ex 59, (1836) 160 ER 311
Commonlii
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoSmith v Brooksbank 25-Jun-1834
A bequeathed a reversionary interest, expectant on his wife’s death, in a sum of stock to B. B. bequeathed it to C., and C. bequeathed it to D, who, on the death of A’s wife, filed a bill against the trustees to have the stock transferred to him, . .
See AlsoBrooksbank v Smith 24-Feb-1836
In this case, trustees under a will, who were solicitors, had by mistake transferred stock to a person not entitled. Baron Alderson said, this being under circumstances of mistake, it appeared clear to him that the Plaintiffs were entitled to . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 March 2021; Ref: scu.314778

Moule v Garrett: CA 1872

An original tenant sought an indemnity from an assignee for a later claim by the landlord.
Held: The principles of recoupment are that where a plaintiff has been compelled by law to pay, or, being compellable by law, has paid, money which the defendant was ultimately liable to pay, so that the latter obtains the benefit of the payment by the discharge of his liability; under such circumstances the defendant is held indebted to the plaintiff in the amount.
Cockburn CJ
(1872) LR 7 Exch 101
Cited by:

  • Cited – NIRU Battery Manufacturing Company and Another v Milestone Trading Ltd and others ComC 8-May-2003
    There was a contract for the sale of lead ingots. The sale was supported by letters of credit but inaccurate certificates were issued to release payment. The parties sought now to amend the contributions in the light of the Royal Brompton Hospital . .
    [2003] EWHC 1032 (Comm)
  • Cited – Scottish and Newcastle Plc v Raguz CA 6-Mar-2007
    The claimant was the original tenant under two 99 year underleases granted in 1967, and assigned them to the defendant who then himself assigned them. The eventual assignee had become insolvent. The landlord recovered the rents from the claimant who . .
    [2007] EWCA Civ 150, [2007] 2 All ER 871

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 04 December 2020; Ref: scu.181986

Wilson v Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co: 1872

Lord Selborne LC said: ‘It is of the highest importance . . that all communications between a solicitor and a client upon a subject which may lead to litigation should be privileged, and I think the court is bound to consider that . . almost any contract entered into between man and man . . may lead to litigation before the contract is completed. Any correspondence passing between the date of the contract which afterwards becomes the subject of litigation and the litigation itself is, in my opinion, on principle, within the privilege extended to the non-production of communications between solicitors and clients . . it is absolutely essential to the interest of mankind that a person should be free to consult his solicitor upon anything which arises out of a contract which may lead to litigation; that the communications should be perfectly free, so that the client may write to the solicitor, and the solicitor to the client, without the slightest apprehension that those communications will be produced if litigation should afterwards arise on the subject to which the correspondence relates.’
Lord Selborne LC spoke about the discretion available under the law of equity, saying that equity sets out to ‘do more perfect and complete justice’ than would be the result of leaving the parties to their remedies at common law.
References: (1872) LR 14 Eq 477, (1874) LR 9 Ch App 279
Judges: Lord Selborne LC
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Three Rivers District Council and others v The Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 6) CA 1-Mar-2004
    The Bank of England had sought assistance from its lawyers to prepare for a private non-statutory enquiry. The claimant sought disclosure of that advice. The defendant bank claimed legal professional privilege.
    Held: Not all advice given by a . .
    ([2004] EWCA Civ 218, , Times 03-Mar-04, Gazette 18-Mar-04, [2004] 3 All ER 168, [2004] QB 916, [2004] 2 WLR 1065)
  • Cited – Co-Operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores HL 21-May-1997
    The tenants of a unit on a large shopping centre found the business losing money, and closed it in contravention of a ‘keep open’ clause in the lease. They now appealed from a mandatory injunction requiring them to keep the store open.
    Held: . .
    (Times 26-May-97, , , [1997] UKHL 17, [1997] 2 WLR 898, [1998] AC 1, [1997] All ER 297, [1997] 1 EGLR 52, [1997] CLC 1114, [1997] NPC 79, [1997] EG 81, [1997] 23 EG 141)
  • Cited – Brennan and others v Sunderland City Council Unison GMB EAT 16-Dec-2008
    No Waiver for disclosure of Advice
    EAT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Admissibility of evidence
    The claimant sought disclosure of certain legal advice on the basis that its effect, and a summary of its contents, had been put before the court and . .
    (, [2008] UKEAT 0349 – 08 – 1612, [2009] ICR 479)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.194268

Lowther v Bentinck: 1874

An exercise can be recognised as being for the benefit of a woman when an advance is made to set up her husband in business.
References: (1874) LR Eg 166
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.194493

Lamare v Dixon: HL 1873

The respondent resisted an order for specific performance of a contract, saying that the plaintiffs had reneged on an essential promise in a collateral contract.
Held: The defence failed. Lord Chelmsford said: ‘The exercise of the jurisdiction of equity as to enforcing the specific performance of agreements, is not a matter of right in the party seeking relief, but of discretion in the Court – not an arbitrary or capricious discretion, but one to be governed as far as possible by fixed rules and principles.’ and ‘The conduct of the party applying for relief is always an important element for consideration’.
References: (1873) LR 6 HL 414
Judges: Lord Chelmsford
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Ram, Regina (on the Application Of) v Parole Board Admn 12-Jan-2004
    The claimant had won an action for damages against the respondent. He was however released on licence, and subsequently became unlawfully at large. The question was whether the damages continued to be payable to him. The defendant insisted that the . .
    (, [2004] EWHC 1 (Admin))

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.191983

Willis v Hoare: 1999

Auld LJ said of Crabb: there ‘could be no doubt as to the nature and extent of the remedy required to give effect to [the] equity’. Of JT Developments ‘the nature and terms of the equity were readily identifiable’. Auld LJ said: ‘There may be uncertainties in transactions which go to the question whether unconscionable behaviour has given rise to any detriment to the party seeking to rely on such an equity. There may be uncertainties in transactions in which unconscionable behaviour may have produced such detriment but its nature and extent are so uncertain that even equity may not be able to devise an appropriate remedy for it. There are parts that sometimes even equity cannot reach; and sometimes, as here, the two aspects of uncertainty may overlap.’
Chadwick LJ: ‘I am unable to recognise an equitable estoppel based on a representation which is so uncertain. It seems to me essential, if the respondent is to be prevented from exercising a clear legal right unless he first satisfies some condition which is to be imposed on him to meet by what is described as ‘the equity of the case’, that it should be possible to tell him what it is that he has to do. To fetter the respondent’s legal right by reference to some obligation which cannot be spelt out seems to me to be thoroughly inequitable.’
References: (1999) 77 P and CR D42
Judges: Auld LJ
This case cites:

  • Cited – Crabb v Arun District Council CA 23-Jul-1975
    The plaintiff was led to believe that he would acquire a right of access to his land. In reliance on that belief he sold off part of his land, leaving the remainder landlocked.
    Held: His claim to have raised an equity was upheld. The plaintiff . .
    ([1976] Ch 179, , [1975] 3 All ER 865, [1975] EWCA Civ 7)
  • Cited – JT Developments v Quinn and Another CA 1990
    The plaintiff told the defendant it was willing to grant a lease on the same terms as those contained in a new tenancy that the plaintiff had recently granted to the tenant of a nearby shop, also owned by the plaintiff. The defendant carried out . .
    ([1991] 2 EGLR 257, (1990) 62 P and CR 33)

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Parker v Parker ChD 24-Jul-2003
    Lord Macclesfield claimed a right to occupy a castle. The owners claimed that he had only a mere tenancy at will. The exact rooms in the castle which had been occupied had varied over time.
    Held: The applicant was entitled to reasonable . .
    (, [2003] EWHC 1846 (Ch))

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192085

A Roberts and Co Ltd v Leicestershire County Council: ChD 1961

The court considered the circumstances required for rectification of a contract after a unilateral mistake. Pennycuick J said: ‘a party is entitled to rectification of a contract upon proof that he believed a particular term to be included in the contract, and that the other party concluded the contract with the omission or a variation of that term in the knowledge that the first party believed the term to be included. . . The principle is stated in Snell on Equity, 25th edition (1960), p 569 as follows: ‘By what appears to be a species of equitable estoppel, if one party to a transaction knows that the instrument contains a mistake in his favour but does nothing to correct it, he (and those claiming under him) will be precluded from resisting rectification on the ground that the mistake is unilateral and not common.”
References: [1961] Ch 555, [1961] 2 All ER 545
Judges: Pennycuick J
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Approved – Riverlate Properties Ltd v Paul CA 1974 ([1975] Ch 133, [1974] 2 All ER 656)
    A lessor sought to have the lease rectified against the tenant, saying the tenant had sufficient knowledge of the error in the lease to permit that remedy.
    Held: The tenant had no such knowledge as would have brought the doctrine into play. In . .
  • Cited – George Wimpey UK Ltd v VI Construction Ltd CA 3-Feb-2005 (, [2005] EWCA Civ 77, Times 16-Feb-05, [2005] BLR 135)
    A land purchase contract had been rectified by the judge for unilateral mistake. A factor had been dropped from a formula for calculating the price.
    Held: The judge’s conclusion that the circumstances existed to allow a rectification was . .
  • Cited – Thomas Bates and Sons Ltd v Wyndham’s Lingerie Ltd CA 21-Nov-1980 ([1981] 1 WLR 505, , [1980] EWCA Civ 3, [1981] 1 All ER 1077)
    An application was made for rectification of a rent review clause in a lease. When executing the lease, the tenants’ officer, Mr Avon, noticed that the rent review clause in the lease drafted by the landlords was defective in not including a . .
  • Cited – FSHC Group Holdings Ltd v Glas Trust Corporation Ltd CA 31-Jul-2019 (, [2019] EWCA Civ 1361)
    Opportunity for an appellate court to clarify the correct test to apply in deciding whether the written terms of a contract may be rectified because of a common mistake.
    Held: The appeal failed. The judge was right to conclude that an . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.222559

Riverlate Properties Ltd v Paul: CA 1974

A lessor sought to have the lease rectified against the tenant, saying the tenant had sufficient knowledge of the error in the lease to permit that remedy.
Held: The tenant had no such knowledge as would have brought the doctrine into play. In approving the dicta in Roberts with regard to rectification for unilateral mistake, the court added: ‘Whether there was in any particular case knowledge of the intention and mistake of the other party must be a question of fact to be decided upon the evidence. Basically it appears to us that it must be such as to involve the lessee in a degree of sharp practice.’
References: [1975] Ch 133, [1974] 2 All ER 656
Judges: Russell, Stamp and Lawton L.JJ
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Approved – A Roberts and Co Ltd v Leicestershire County Council ChD 1961 ([1961] Ch 555, [1961] 2 All ER 545)
    The court considered the circumstances required for rectification of a contract after a unilateral mistake. Pennycuick J said: ‘a party is entitled to rectification of a contract upon proof that he believed a particular term to be included in the . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – George Wimpey UK Ltd v VI Construction Ltd CA 3-Feb-2005 (, [2005] EWCA Civ 77, Times 16-Feb-05, [2005] BLR 135)
    A land purchase contract had been rectified by the judge for unilateral mistake. A factor had been dropped from a formula for calculating the price.
    Held: The judge’s conclusion that the circumstances existed to allow a rectification was . .
  • Cited – Thomas Bates and Sons Ltd v Wyndham’s Lingerie Ltd CA 21-Nov-1980 ([1981] 1 WLR 505, , [1980] EWCA Civ 3, [1981] 1 All ER 1077)
    An application was made for rectification of a rent review clause in a lease. When executing the lease, the tenants’ officer, Mr Avon, noticed that the rent review clause in the lease drafted by the landlords was defective in not including a . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.222560

Kelly v Solari: CexC 18 Nov 1841

Recovery was sought of money (andpound;200) paid an error of fact. There had been a life policy, but it had lapsed before the death of the life assured. The policy had been marked ‘lapsed’ but the marking had been overlooked.
Held: Where money is paid to another under the influence of a mistake in circumstances where if the true facts had been known the money would not have been paid, an action lies to recover the money and it is against the conscience of the recipient to retain it. Parke B said of Bilbie v Lumley that ‘All that that case decides is, that money paid with full knowledge of all the facts cannot be recovered back by reason of its having been paid in ignorance of the law’
A payment made in the knowledge that there was a ground to contest liability will be irrecoverable (Lord Abinger CB).
Lord Abinger CB accepted that Baron CB had put the matter too broadly at trial by using the expression ‘means of knowledge’. This was a very vague expression, and: ‘The safest rule however is, that if the party makes the payment with full knowledge of the facts, although under ignorance of the law, there being no fraud on the other side, he cannot recover it back again. There may also be cases in which, although he might by investigation learn the state of facts more accurately, he declines to do so, and chooses to pay the money notwithstanding; in that case there can be no doubt that he is equally bound. Then there is a third case, and the most difficult one, – where the party had once a full knowledge of the facts, but has since forgotten them. I certainly laid down the rule too widely to the jury, when I told them that if the directors once knew the facts they must be taken still to know them, and could not recover by saying that they had since forgotten them. I think the knowledge of the facts which disentitles the party from recovering, must mean a knowledge existing in the mind at the time of payment.’
Parke B agreed and said: ‘If, indeed, the money is intentionally paid, without reference to the truth or falsehood of the fact, the plaintiff meaning to waive all inquiry into it, and that the person receiving shall have the money at all events, whether the fact be true or false, the latter is certainly entitled to retain it; but if it is paid under the impression of the truth of a fact which is untrue, it may, generally speaking, be recovered back, however careless the party paying may have been, in omitting to use due diligence to inquire into the fact. In such a case the receiver was not entitled to it, nor intended to have it.’
Rolfe B mentioned two interpretations of the facts available to the jury: ‘first, that the jury may possibly find that the directors had not in truth forgotten the fact; and secondly, they may also come to the conclusion, that they had determined that they would not expose the office to unpopularity, and would therefore pay the money at all events.’
References: (1841) 9 M and W 54, [1841] EngR 1087, (1841) 152 ER 24
Links: Commonlii
Judges: Parke B, Lord Abinger CB, Gurney B, Rolfe B
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – Bilbie v Lumley and Others ((1802) 2 East 469, Commonlii, [1802] EngR 245, (1802) 102 ER 448)
    An underwriter paid a claim under a policy which he was entitled in law to repudiate for non-disclosure. Although he knew the relevant facts, he was not aware of their legal significance. He claimed back the money he had paid.
    Held: A contract . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL (Gazette 18-Nov-98, Gazette 10-Feb-99, Times 30-Oct-98, House of Lords, Bailii, [1998] UKHL 38, [1999] 2 AC 349, [1998] 4 All ER 513, [1998] 3 WLR 1095, [1998] Lloyds Rep Bank 387)
    Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
  • Cited – Fisher v Brooker and Another ChD (Bailii, [2006] EWHC 3239 (Ch), [2007] FSR 12, [2007] EMLR 9)
    The claimant said that he had contributed to the copyright in the song ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’ but had been denied royalties. He had played the organ and particularly the organ solo which had contrbuted significantly to the fame of the record.

These lists may be incomplete.Leading Case
Last Update: 21 August 2020; Ref: scu.236536

Kelly v Solari: CexC 1841

References: (1841) 9 M and W 54
Coram: Parke B, Lord Abinger CB, Gurney B, Rolfe B
Ratio: Recovery was sought of money (andpound;200) paid an error of fact. There had been a life policy, but it had lapsed before the death of the life assured. The policy had been marked ‘lapsed’ but the marking had been overlooked.
Held: Where money is paid to another under the influence of a mistake in circumstances where if the true facts had been known the money would not have been paid, an action lies to recover the money and it is against the conscience of the recipient to retain it. Parke B said of Bilbie v Lumley that ‘All that that case decides is, that money paid with full knowledge of all the facts cannot be recovered back by reason of its having been paid in ignorance of the law’
A payment made in the knowledge that there was a ground to contest liability will be irrecoverable (Lord Abinger CB).
Lord Abinger CB accepted that Baron CB had put the matter too broadly at trial by using the expression ‘means of knowledge’. This was a very vague expression, and: ‘The safest rule however is, that if the party makes the payment with full knowledge of the facts, although under ignorance of the law, there being no fraud on the other side, he cannot recover it back again. There may also be cases in which, although he might by investigation learn the state of facts more accurately, he declines to do so, and chooses to pay the money notwithstanding; in that case there can be no doubt that he is equally bound. Then there is a third case, and the most difficult one, – where the party had once a full knowledge of the facts, but has since forgotten them. I certainly laid down the rule too widely to the jury, when I told them that if the directors once knew the facts they must be taken still to know them, and could not recover by saying that they had since forgotten them. I think the knowledge of the facts which disentitles the party from recovering, must mean a knowledge existing in the mind at the time of payment.’
Parke B agreed and said: ‘If, indeed, the money is intentionally paid, without reference to the truth or falsehood of the fact, the plaintiff meaning to waive all inquiry into it, and that the person receiving shall have the money at all events, whether the fact be true or false, the latter is certainly entitled to retain it; but if it is paid under the impression of the truth of a fact which is untrue, it may, generally speaking, be recovered back, however careless the party paying may have been, in omitting to use due diligence to inquire into the fact. In such a case the receiver was not entitled to it, nor intended to have it.’
Rolfe B mentioned two interpretations of the facts available to the jury: ‘first, that the jury may possibly find that the directors had not in truth forgotten the fact; and secondly, they may also come to the conclusion, that they had determined that they would not expose the office to unpopularity, and would therefore pay the money at all events.’
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – Bilbie v Lumley and Others ((1802) 2 East 469, Commonlii, [1802] EngR 245, (1802) 102 ER 448)
    An underwriter paid a claim under a policy which he was entitled in law to repudiate for non-disclosure. Although he knew the relevant facts, he was not aware of their legal significance. He claimed back the money he had paid.
    Held: A contract . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL (Gazette 18-Nov-98, Gazette 10-Feb-99, Times 30-Oct-98, House of Lords, Bailii, [1998] UKHL 38, [1999] 2 AC 349, [1998] 4 All ER 513, [1998] 3 WLR 1095, [1998] Lloyds Rep Bank 387)
    Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap agreements were . .
  • Cited – Fisher v Brooker and Another ChD (Bailii, [2006] EWHC 3239 (Ch))
    The claimant said that he had contributed to the copyright in the song ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’ but had been denied royalties. He had played the organ and particularly the organ solo which had contrbuted significantly to the fame of the record.

(This list may be incomplete)
Leading Case
Last Update: 18 March 2019
Ref: 236536

Banque Belge pour L’Atranger v Hambrouck: 1921

References: [1921] 1 KB 321
Coram: Bankes LJ, Atkin LJ
Ratio: Money was stolen by a thief. He then paid it by way of a gift into the bank account of the woman with whom he was living. The victim claimed its return from the woman and her bankers. andpound;315 of the balance in her account represented part of the stolen money. She argued that, having no notice of the theft, she obtained a good title to it because it was a gift to her from the thief and the fact that she had paid the money into her banking account prevented any following of the money and that an action for money received would therefore not lie.
Held: The victim was entitled to the andpound;315. The woman, as a donee, had been unjustly enriched by the receipt of money stolen from the victim and retained andpound;315, part of that money. She was bound to reimburse the victim. The trust could be followed into the bank account and it ordered return of the andpound;315.
Bankes LJ said: ‘To accept either of the two contentions with which I have been so far dealing would be to assent to the proposition that a thief who has stolen money, and who from fear of detection hands that money to a beggar who happens to pass, gives a title to the money to the beggar as against the true owner – a proposition which is obviously impossible of acceptance.’
Atkin LJ said: ‘as the money paid into the bank can be identified as the product of the original money, the plaintiffs have the common law right to claim it, and can sue for money had and received.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Shalson v Russo ChD (Times 03-Sep-03, Gazette 18-Sep-03)
    The claimant sought recovery of substantial sums he had advanced by way of loan, where the loan was induced by fraud. He sought to trace the funds into, inter alia, a motor yacht which it had been used to purchase.
    Held: The transaction was . .
  • Cited – Lipkin Gorman (a Firm) v Karpnale Ltd HL ([1991] 2 AC 548, Bailii, [1988] UKHL 12, [1991] 3 WLR 10)
    The plaintiff firm of solicitors sought to recover money which had been stolen from them by a partner, and then gambled away with the defendant. He had purchased their gaming chips, and the plaintiff argued that these, being gambling debts, were . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 17 March 2019
Ref: 186100

Phipps v Boardman: HL 1966

References: [1966] 3 All ER 721, [1967] 2 AC 46, [1966] UKHL 2
Links: Bailii
Coram: Lord Upjohn, Lord Hodson
Ratio: A trustee has a duty to exploit any available opportunity for the trust. ‘Rules of equity have to be applied to such a great diversity of circumstances that they can be stated only in the most general terms and applied with particular attention to the exact circumstances of each case. The relevant rule for the decision of this case is the fundamental rule of equity that a person in a fiduciary capacity must not make a profit out of his trust, which is part of the wider rule that a trustee must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict.’ ‘The whole of the law is laid down in the fundamental principle exemplified in Lord Cranworth’s statement [in Aberdeen Railway Co v. Blaikie]. But it is applicable, like so many equitable principles which may affect a conscience, however innocent, to such a diversity of different cases that the observations of judges and even in your Lordships’ House in cases where this great principle is being applied must be regarded as applicable only to the particular facts of the particular case in question and not regarded as a new and slightly different formulation of the legal principle so well settled.’ and ‘The phrase ‘possibly may conflict’ requires consideration. In my view it means that the reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case would think that there was a real sensible possibility of conflict; not that you could imagine some situation arising which might, in some conceivable possibility in events not contemplated as real sensible possibilities by any reasonable person, result in conflict.’
The court considered the circumstances under which information has been acquired so as to impose a duty of confidence: ‘The true test is to determine in what circumstances the information has been acquired. If it has been acquired in such circumstances that it would be a breach of confidence to disclose it to another then courts of equity will restrain the recipient from communicating it to another. In such cases such confidential information is often and for many years has been described as the property of the donor, the books of authority are full of such references: knowledge of secret processes, ‘know-how’, confidential information as to the prospects of a company or of someone’s intention or the expected results of some horse race based on stable or other confidential information. But in the end the real truth is that it is not property in any normal sense but equity will restrain its transmission to another if in breach of some confidential relationship.’
Lord Upjohn said: ‘In general, information is not property at all. It is normally open to all who have eyes to read and ears to hear. The true test is to determine in what circumstances the information has been acquired. If it has been acquired in such circumstances that it would be a breach of confidence to disclose it to another, then courts of equity will restrain the recipient from communicating it to another. In such cases such confidential information is often and for many years has been described as the property of the donor, the books of authority are full of such references; knowledge of secret processes, ‘know-how’, confidential information as to the prospects of a company or of someone’s intention or the expected results of some horse race based on stable or other confidential information. But in the end the real truth is that it is not property in any normal sense, but equity will restrain its transmission to another if in breach of some confidential relationship’.
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – Bray v Ford HL ([1895-99] All ER Rep 1011, [1896] AC 44)
    An appellate court’s power to order a new trial is conditional on ‘some substantial wrong or miscarriage’ being established.
    Lord Hershell said: ‘It is an inflexible rule of the court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position, such as . .
  • Appeal from – Phipps v Boardman CA ([1965] Ch 992)
    Affirmed . .
  • At first instance – Phipps v Boardman ChD ([1964] 1 WLR 993)
    Agents of certain trustees had purchased shares, in circumstances where they only had that opportunity because they were agents.
    Held: The shares were held beneficially for the trust. . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Bhullar and others v Bhullar and Another CA (Bailii, [2003] EWCA Civ 424, [2003] 2 BCLC 241)
    The claimants were 50% shareholders in a property investment company and sought relief alleging prejudicial conduct of the company’s affairs. After a falling out, two directors purchased property adjacent to a company property but in their own . .
  • Cited – New Zealand Netherlands Society ‘Oranje’ Inc v Laurentuis Cornelis Kuys PC ([1973] 1 WLR 1126)
    (New Zealand) The scope of a fiduciary duty may be modified by a course of dealing by the person to whom the duty is owed. ‘The obligation not to profit from a position of trust, or, as it sometimes relevant to put it, not to allow a conflict to . .
  • Cited – Crown Dilmun, Dilmun Investments Limited v Nicholas Sutton, Fulham River Projects Limited ChD (Times 05-Feb-04, [2004] EWHC 52 (Ch), Bailii, [2004] 1 BCLC 468)
    There was a contract for the sale of Craven Cottage football stadium, conditional upon the grant of non-onerous planning permissions. It was claimed that the contract had been obtained by the defendant employee in breach of his fiduciary duties to . .
  • Cited – Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd and others (No 3) CA (Bailii, [2005] EWCA Civ 595, Times 24-May-05, [2005] 4 All ER 128, [2005] 3 WLR 881, [2006] QB 125)
    The principal claimants sold the rights to take photographs of their wedding to a co-claimant magazine (OK). Persons acting on behalf of the defendants took unauthorised photographs which the defendants published. The claimants had retained joint . .
  • Cited – Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD (Bailii, [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch))
    The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
  • Cited – Ratiu, Karmel, Regent House Properties Ltd v Conway CA (Bailii, [2005] EWCA Civ 1302, Times 29-Nov-05)
    The claimant sought damages for defamation. The defendant through their company had accused him acting in such a way as to allow a conflict of interest to arise. They said that he had been invited to act on a proposed purchase but had used the . .
  • Cited – Imageview Management Ltd v Jack CA (Bailii, [2009] EWCA Civ 63, Times, [2009] WLR (D) 56, WLRD, [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 921, [2009] 2 All ER 666, [2009] 1 BCLC 724, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 436, [2009] Bus LR 1034)
    The appellant company acted for the respondent footballer in placing him with a football club. The respondent said that he had also taken a payment from the club, nominally for arranging a work permit. The respondent said this was improper. The . .
  • Cited – O’Donnell v Shanahan and Another CA (Bailii, [2009] EWCA Civ 751, Times)
    The claimant appealed against dismissal of her petition for an order for the defendants to purchase her shares at a fair value, saying that they had acted unfairly toward her. Her co-directors had acquired, for another company of which they were . .
  • Cited – Gray v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Another; Coogan v Same ChD (Bailii, [2011] EWHC 349 (Ch), [2011] 2 All ER 725, [2011] 2 WLR 1401)
    The claimants said that agents of the defendant had unlawfully accessed their mobile phone systems. The court was now asked whether the agent (M) could rely on the privilege against self incrimination, and otherwise as to the progress of the case. . .
  • Cited – Phillips v Mulcaire SC (Bailii, [2012] UKSC 28, SC Summary, SC, UKSC 2012/0038, Bailii Summary, [2012] 3 WLR 312, [2012] WLR(D) 193, [2012] 4 All ER 207, [2012] 5 Costs LO 609, [2013] 1 AC 1, [2012] EMLR 31)
    The claimant worked as personal assistant to a well known public relations company. She alleged that the defendant had intercepted telephone message given by and left for her. The court was asked first as to whether the information amounted to . .
  • Cited – Halton International Inc (Holding) and Another v Guernroy Ltd ChD (Bailii, [2005] EWHC 1968 (Ch))
    Parties had entered into a shareholders’ agreement as to voting arrengemets within a company. Thay disputed whether votes had been used in reach of that agreement, particularly as to the issue of new shares and their allotment, but the court now . .

(This list may be incomplete)
Leading Case
Last Update: 10 January 2017
Ref: 180410

Cambridge Antibody Technology v Abbott Biotechnology Ltd and Another; Patc 20 Dec 2004

References: [2004] EWHC 2974 (Pat), [2005] FSR 590
Links: Bailii
Coram: Laddie J
Ratio: Rectification of an agreement was sought.
Held: Laddie J rejected a submission that evidence of the subjective state of mind of one of the parties contained in statements which had not been communicated to the other party (‘crossed the line’) was inadmissible. I
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 02-Sep-16
Ref: 227185