Collins v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills and Others: CA 23 May 2014

The claimant appealed against rejection of his claim for personal injury which had been rejected on basis that it was out of time. He had contracted cancer in 2002, but had recovered. He later came to attribute this to exposure to asbestos at work in the docks up to 1967. He made his claim in 2012. The court was asked to what extent the court should take account of a delay between 1947 and 2003, the date of his constructive knowledge of the injury.
Held: Jackson LJ said: ‘Because the test in section 14 (3) is an objective one, the practical consequence is that some injured persons fail to make reasonable and timeous inquiries, with the result that they are time-barred. This is unsurprising. Sections 11 to 14 of the Limitation Act strike a balance between the interests of (a) persons who, having suffered latent injuries, seek compensation late in the day and (b) tortfeasors who, despite their wrongdoings, ultimately need closure. Parliament has struck that balance by means of an objective test. Parliament has also provided a safety net in the form of section 33 so as to prevent injustice arising.’ In this case a reasonable man in the claimant’s position would have been asking as to the causes of his condition by mid-2003. The judge had correctly fixed the date of his construcive knowledge

Jackson, Lewison, Macur LJJJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 717
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 11(4) 14 33
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSpargo v North Essex District Health Authority CA 13-Mar-1997
The test of ‘When a plaintiff became aware of the cause of an injury’ is a subjective test of what passed through plaintiff’s mind. ‘(1) the knowledge required to satisfy s14(1)(b) is a broad knowledge of the essence of the causally relevant act or . .
Appeal fromCollins v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills QBD 2-May-2013
The claimant was seriously ill and claimed that this arose from exposure to asbestos fibres working for the defendant many years before. He now sought an extension of time to make the claim.
Held: The court upheld the limitation defences of . .
CitedAdams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council HL 17-Jun-2004
A attended the defendant’s schools between 1977 and 1988. He had always experienced difficulties with reading and writing and as an adult found those difficulties to be an impediment in his employment. He believed them to be the cause of the . .
CitedJohnson v Ministry of Defence and Another CA 21-Nov-2012
The claimant said that he had been exposed him to excessive noise during the course of his employment, causing his deafness. He noticed his hearing problems in 2001. He was also aware that exposure to noise could cause hearing loss, but did not . .
CitedPrice v United Engineering Steels Limited; J J Habershon and Sons Limited CA 12-Dec-1997
The plaintiff sought damages for deafness following exposure to excessive noise during his employment with the first and second defendants some 20 to 35 years previously. He issued his writ six years after the date of knowledge under LA section 14 . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Personal Injury

Updated: 03 December 2021; Ref: scu.525867

Hill and Another v Transport for London: ChD 16 May 2005

The claimants sought to establish title to land by adverse possession. The land was former Crown land. They had occupied the land since 1985. The defendants acquired the land from the Crown in 2000.
Held: Part II of the 1980 Act need to be read as a whole. The Crown had up to 30 years to claim from when the right of action first accrued. The successor to the Crown had the same rights. The claim failed.
Claim for land by adverse possession.

Rimer J
Times 30-May-2005, [2005] EWHC 856 (Ch), [2005] Ch 379, [2005] 3 All ER 677, [2005] 3 WLR 471
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 8Sch 1 PII p12
England and Wales

Land, Limitation

Updated: 01 December 2021; Ref: scu.226738

Williams v Mersey Docks and Harbour Board: CA 1905

The deceased suffered an injury in December 1902 which would have entitled him to institute proceedings against the harbour board within the special statutory period of six months pursuant to the 1893 Act. No such action was brought by the deceased, so that this action was statute-barred. Following his death in December 1904, his widow instituted proceedings under the 1846 Act in February 1905 to recover damages arising out of the death of her husband.
Held: The action could not be maintained. The right of action of the deceased, if he were still alive would have been barred by the provisions of the Act of 1893 which fixed a six-month time limit from the happening of the event.
Mathew L.J. stated: ‘The cases appear to establish the general principle that, where an action could not have been brought by the deceased person, it cannot be maintained in. respect of the same accident by his representative. In this case the deceased could not have maintained an action against the defendants at the time of his death, or at any time more than six months after the neglect which was said to have caused the injury to him.’

Mathew LJ
[1905] 1 KB 805
Fatal Accidents Act 1846, Public Authorities Protection Act 1893
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedPickett v British Rail Engineering HL 2-Nov-1978
Lost Earnings claim Continues after Death
The claimant, suffering from mesothelioma, had claimed against his employers and won, but his claim for loss of earnings consequent upon his anticipated premature death was not allowed. He began an appeal, but then died. His personal representatives . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 30 November 2021; Ref: scu.654043

UBAF Ltd v European American Banking Corporation: CA 1984

The defendant invited the plaintiff to take part in a syndicated loan. The defendant’s assistant secretary signed a letter to the plaintiff making representations, now claimed to be fraudulent. The defendant succeeded at first instance arguing that the signature was not that of the bank, and that even if it was, the action would be statute barred.
Held: The court refused to strike out the claim. A company itself made a representation, if it produced a document which was signed by an authorised officer or agent acting within the scope of his actual authority. This applied to bind the defendant bank. The nature of a syndicated loan was a fiduciary arrangement, and the obligations on a lead bank were continuing for limitation purposes, time did not run, and the obligation was not time barred. The issue would be settled at trial when it was established when the defendant could be said to have come to know of the alleged deceit.

Ackner LJ
[1984] QB 713, [1984] 1 WLR 508, [1984] CLY 1579
England and Wales
Citing:
ExplainedSwift v Jewsbury and Goddard 1874
. .
ExplainedHirst v West Riding Banking Co CA 1901
The representation on which the claim made was was in a letter signed by the branch manager of the defendant bank and the court evidently assumed that this could not be equated with the bank’s own signature.
Held: The action against the bank . .
ConsideredForster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .

Cited by:
CitedNykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
CitedPegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
Banking, Limitation, Torts – Other, Company

Updated: 29 November 2021; Ref: scu.181338

Jetivia Sa and Another v Bilta (UK) Ltd and Others: SC 22 Apr 2015

The liquidators of Bilta had brought proceedings against former directors and the appellant alleging that they were party to an unlawful means conspiracy which had damaged the company by engaging in a carousel fraud with carbon credits. On the pleaded facts, Mr Chopra and Mr Nazir were the directing organ of Bilta under its constitution. They constituted the board. Mr Chopra was also the sole shareholder. As between Bilta and Jetivia it was common ground on the pleadings that they were the ‘directing mind and will’ of Bilta for all purposes, and certainly in relation to those of its functions which are relevant in these proceedings.
Held: The defendant company and director failed in their appeals, both in relation to the illegality defence and in relation to section 213. The plea of ex turpi causa non oritur actio was not available to the directors of a company in a defence to an action against them by the company for acts involvig breaches of their duties as directors.
Lord Mance said: ‘ it is certainly unjust and absurd to suggest that the answer to a claim for breach of a director’s (or any employee’s) duty could lie in attributing to the company the very misconduct by which the director or employee has damaged it. A company has its own separate legal personality and interests. Duties are owed to it by those officers who constitute its directing mind and will, similarly to the way in which they are owed by other more ordinary employees or agents. All the shareholders of a solvent company acting unanimously may in certain circumstances (which need not here be considered, since it is not suggested that they may apply) be able to authorise what might otherwise be misconduct towards the company. But even the shareholders of a company which is insolvent or facing insolvency cannot do this to the prejudice of its creditors, and the company’s officers owe a particular duty to safeguard the interest of such creditors. There is no basis for regarding the various statutory remedies available to a liquidator against defaulting officers as making this duty or its enforcement redundant.’

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath, Lord Toulson, Lord Hodge
[2015] UKSC 23, [2015] WLR(D) 182, UKSC 2013/0206, [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61, [2015] 1 BCLC 443, [2015] 2 All ER (Comm) 281, [2015] BVC 20, [2015] 2 WLR 1168, [2015] BCC 343, [2015] 2 All ER 1083
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC Summary, SC
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromJetivia Sa and Another v Bilta (UK) Ltd and Others CA 31-Jul-2013
Defendants appealed against refusal of their request for a summary striking out for lack of jurisdiction, of the claims against them arising from their management of the insolvency of the first defendant. . .
CitedBowman v Secular Society Limited HL 1917
The plantiff argued that the the objects of the Secular Society Ltd, which had been registered under the Companies Acts, were unlawful.
Held: The House referred to ‘the last persons to go to the stake in this country pro salute animae’ in 1612 . .
At first Instance (1)Bilta (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Nazir and Others ChD 17-May-2010
The sixth defendant resisted a claim against it saying that matters between them were governed by a framework agreement which provided for matters to be resolved by arbitration. The claimant resisted, denying the arbitration agreement and saying . .
At first Instance (2)Bilta (Uk) Ltd v Nazir and Others ChD 24-Nov-2010
The company had been wound up by the Revenue on the basis that it had been used for a substantial VAT fraud. The liquidators now sued those said to have participated. A defendant denied the jurisdiction because of a disputed arbitration agreement. . .
Appeal fromBilta (UK) Ltd and Others v Nazir and Others ChD 30-Jul-2012
The company was said to have engaged in a fraud based on false European Trading Scheme Allowances, and had been wound up by the Revenue. The liquidators, in the company name, now sought recovery from former directors and associates.
Held: The . .
CitedAbrath v North Eastern Railway Co HL 15-Mar-1886
The plaintiff had brought an action against the company of malicious prosecution. It was rejected by the jury and again on appeal.
Held: The appeal failed. In an action for damages for the tort of malicious prosecution one of the elements of . .
CitedThe Citizens Life Assurance Company Limited v Brown PC 6-May-1904
(New South Wales) A malicious libel was alleged. The life assurance company was vicariously liable in respect of a libel contained in a circular sent out by a person who was employed by the company under a written agreement as its ‘superintendent of . .
CitedWest Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodds CA 1988
If a company continues to trade whilst insolvent but in the expectation that it would return to profitability, it should be regarded as trading not for the benefit of the shareholders, but for the creditors also. If there is a possibility of . .
CitedTinsley v Milligan CA 1992
The court considered the defence of illegal user to a claim to have established an easement by prescription: ‘These authorities seem to me to establish that when applying the ‘ex turpi causa’ maxim in a case in which a defence of illegality has been . .
CitedLennard’s Carrying Company Limited v Asiatic Petroleum Company Limited HL 1915
The House was asked as to when the acts of an individual became those of his employer under section 502 (‘any loss or damage happening without (the ship owner’s) actual fault or privity’).
Held: Viscount Haldane LC said: ‘It must be upon the . .
CitedEl Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc and Another ChD 3-Jan-1993
A non active director may still be company’s ‘directing mind’. The doctrine of attributing the actions of individuals to a company is that ‘Their minds are its mind; their intention its intention; their knowledge its knowledge.’
Tracing was no . .
CitedTinsley v Milligan HL 28-Jun-1993
Two women parties used funds generated by a joint business venture to buy a house in which they lived together. It was vested in the sole name of the plaintiff but on the understanding that they were joint beneficial owners. The purpose of the . .
CitedEl Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd CA 2-Dec-1993
The court was asked whether, for the purposes of establishing a company’s liability under the knowing receipt head of constructive trust, the knowledge of one of its directors can be treated as having been the knowledge of the company.
Held: . .
CitedMeridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v The Securities Commission Co PC 26-Jun-1995
(New Zealand) Lord Hofmann said: ‘There is in fact no such thing as the company as such, no ‘ding an sich’, only the applicable rules. To say that a company cannot do something means only that there is no one whose doing of that act would, under the . .
Not to be followedMoore Stephens (A Firm) v Stone Rolls Ltd (in liquidation) HL 30-Jul-2009
The appellants had audited the books of the respondent company, but had failed to identify substantial frauds by an employee of the respondent. The auditors appealed a finding of professional negligence, relying on the maxim ex turpi causa non . .
CitedHounga v Allen and Another SC 30-Jul-2014
The appellant, of Nigerian origin had been brought here at the age of 14 with false identity papers, and was put to work caring for the respondent’s children. In 2008 she was dismissed and ejected from the house. She brought proceedings alleging . .
CitedLes Laboratoires Servier and Another v Apotex Inc and Others SC 29-Oct-2014
Ex turpi causa explained
The parties had disputed the validity a patent and the production of infringing preparations. The english patent had failed and damages were to be awarded, but a Canadian patent remained the defendant now challenged the calculation of damages for . .
CitedAbrath v North Eastern Railway Company CA 22-Jun-1883
A claim was brought against the company for malicious prosecution. The jury acquitted it. And the plaintiff appealed.
Held: The judge’s direction had been correct.
Bowen LJ said: ‘Wherever a person asserts affirmatively as part of his . .
CitedJC Houghton and Co v Northard, Lowe and Wills HL 1927
The court was asked whether the knowledge of the directors of the latter company should be attributed to it, with the effect that the latter company could and should be treated as estopped from denying that it had consented to a particular . .
CitedRegina v ICR Haulage Ltd KBD 1944
A company can be guilty of conspiracy, in this case to defraud. Both the managing director and, through him, the haulage company were convicted of conspiracy to defraud. His acts ‘were the acts of the company and the fraud of that person was the . .
CitedMoore v I Bresler Ltd KBD 1944
The company had been required to make a return for revenue purposes (purchase tax) and the statute made it an offence to make a false return with intent to deceive. The company was charged with such, but responded that the action was of employees . . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd 1945
The court considered the liability of a company under provisions being, ‘with intent to deceive, made use . . of a document which was false in a material particular’
Held: The General Manager was capable of acting or speaking as the company; . .
CitedBelmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd CA 1979
The company directors operated an elaborate scheme to extract value from Belmont by causing it to buy the shares of a company called Maximum at a considerable overvalue. This was a breach of the fiduciary duties of the directors. They sought to . .
CitedRe Hampshire Land Company 9-Jul-1896
A company had borrowed from a building society. The borrowing was not properly authorised by resolution of the shareholders in general meeting The court was asked whether whether the knowledge of the company secretary common to both the company and . .
CitedLloyd v Grace, Smith and Co HL 1912
Mrs Lloyd delivered the title deeds of her cottages at Ellesmere Port to the solicitors’ managing clerk, who defrauded her.
Held: Vicarious liability can extend to fraudulent acts or omissions if those were carried out in the course of the . .
CitedTesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass HL 31-Mar-1971
Identification of Company’s Directing Mind
In a prosecution under the 1968 Act, the court discussed how to identify the directing mind and will of a company, and whether employees remained liable when proper instructions had been given to those in charge of a local store.
Held: ‘In the . .
CitedAshmore, Benson, Pease and Co v A V Dawson Ltd CA 1973
By acquiescing in the overloading of the hauliers’ lorries, the consignors’ assistant transport manager and his assistant made the haulage contract unenforceable at the instance of the consignors, who were unable to recover when a lorry toppled over . .
CitedAttorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1982) CACD 1984
Two men were charged with theft from a company which they wholly owned and controlled. The court considered the actions of company directors in dishonestly appropriating the property of the company, and whether since the title to the goods was . .
CitedRoyal Brunei Airlines SDN BHD v Tan PC 24-May-1995
(Brunei) The defendants were a one-man company, BLT, and the one man, Mr Tan. A dishonest third party to a breach of trust was liable to make good a resulting loss even though he had received no trust property. The test of knowledge was an objective . .
CitedLancashire County Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd CA 3-Apr-1996
The defendant agreed to indemnify the insured ‘in respect of all sums which the insured shall become legally liable to pay as compensation arising out of’ various matters including wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. The . .
CitedLister and Others v Hesley Hall Ltd HL 3-May-2001
A school board employed staff to manage a residential school for vulnerable children. The staff committed sexual abuse of the children. The school denied vicarious liability for the acts of the teachers.
Held: ‘Vicarious liability is legal . .
CitedSafeway Stores Ltd and Others v Twigger and Others CA 21-Dec-2010
The court was asked whether, when a company had been fined for anti-competitive practices, the company could then recover the penalties from the directors and senior employees involved.
Held: The undertaking was not entitled to recover the . .
CitedAberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers HL 1854
The plaintiff needed a large quantity of iron chairs (rail sockets) and contracted for their supply over an 18-month period with Blaikie Bros a partnership. Thomas Blaikie was the managing partner of Blaikie Bros and a director and the chairman of . .
CitedSalomon v A Salomon and Company Ltd HL 16-Nov-1896
A Company and its Directors are not same paersons
Mr Salomon had incorporated his long standing personal business of shoe manufacture into a limited company. He held nearly all the shares, and had received debentures on the transfer into the company of his former business. The business failed, and . .
CitedBowman v Secular Society Limited HL 1917
The plantiff argued that the the objects of the Secular Society Ltd, which had been registered under the Companies Acts, were unlawful.
Held: The House referred to ‘the last persons to go to the stake in this country pro salute animae’ in 1612 . .
CitedBrink’s Mat Ltd v Noye CA 1991
The proceeds of the theft of gold bullion from a warehouse owned by the plaintiffs were laundered through the bank account of a company called Scadlynn Ltd with Barclays Bank. The directors and sole shareholders of Scadlynn were signatories of the . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Gomez HL 3-Dec-1992
The defendant worked as a shop assistant. He had persuaded the manager to accept in payment for goods, two cheques which he knew to be stolen. The CA had decided that since the ownership of the goods was transferred on the sale, no appropriation of . .
CitedHall v Hebert 29-Apr-1993
(Canadian Supreme Court) After they had been drinking heavily together, Mr Hebert, who owned a car, allowed Mr Hall to drive it, including initially to give it a rolling start down a road on one side of which there was a steep slope. The car . .
CitedSouth Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd etc HL 24-Jun-1996
Limits of Damages for Negligent Valuations
Damages for negligent valuations are limited to the foreseeable consequences of advice, and do not include losses arising from a general fall in values. Valuation is seldom an exact science, and within a band of figures valuers may differ without . .
CitedMarks and Spencer Plc v Palmer CA 9-Oct-2001
The claimant had tripped against a weather strip which protruded by less than 1 cm above the surface of doorway of the staff exit from one of the defendant’s stores. It was a permanent fixture and, as such, was part of the construction of the floor. . .
CitedMarks and Spencer plc v Palmer CA 9-Oct-2001
A shopper carrying some heavy bags tripped and fell over a weather strip, which was proud of the floor at an exit door to the extent of some 8 to 9.5 mm high. The recorder had said that, once he was satisfied that the claimant came into contact with . .
CitedGray v Thames Trains and Others HL 17-Jun-2009
The claimant suffered severe psychiatric injured in a rail crash caused by the defendant’s negligence. Under this condition of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, the claimant had gone on to kill another person, and he had been detained under section . .
CitedRalph Schmid (Acting As Liquidator of The Assets of Aletta Zimmermann) v Lilly Hertel ECJ 16-Jan-2014
ECJ Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 – Insolvency proceedings – Action to set a transaction aside by virtue of the debtor’s insolvency – . .

Cited by:
CitedBurnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding and Another CA 17-Jun-2016
The company, now in liquidation sought to claim for the alledged misapplication by former directors of its funds in 2007. It now appealed against a summary rejection of its claim as time barred.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Section 21(1)(b) . .
CitedRoyal Mail Group Ltd v Jhuti SC 27-Nov-2019
‘if a person in the hierarchy of responsibility above the employee determines that she (or he) should be dismissed for a reason but hides it behind an invented reason which the decision-maker adopts, the reason for the dismissal is the hidden reason . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Torts – Other, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 29 November 2021; Ref: scu.545696

Chandra and Another v Brooke North (A Firm) and Another: CA 5 Dec 2013

Appeal against a decision allowing amendments to be made to the particulars of claim in two solicitors’ negligence actions. The central issue in this appeal is whether those amendments raised new causes of action after expiry of the limitation period.

Laws, Jackson, McFarlane LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 1559, [2014] TCLR 1, 151 Con LR 113, [2013] 50 EG 102
Bailii
England and Wales

Professional Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 26 November 2021; Ref: scu.518764

Nemeti and Others v Sabre Insurance Co Ltd: CA 3 Dec 2013

The court considered the power of courts to allow substitution of a new party after the expiration of the limitation period.

Sir Terence Etherton Ch, Hallett VP, Sharp LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 1555
Bailii
European Communities (Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2002, Road Traffic Act 1988 151
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Liverpool City Council Ex Parte Muldoon; Regina v Same Ex Parte Kelly HL 11-Jul-1996
The claimant sought to challenge a refusal of the Housing Authority to pay housing benefit. The Secretary of State had made the relevant Regulations determining eligibility for benefits. If the challenge were successful, the Secretary of State would . .
CitedIrwin and Another v Lynch and Another CA 6-Oct-2010
The court considered an appeal against an order allowing an amendment outside the limitation period which would . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Insurance, Road Traffic

Updated: 26 November 2021; Ref: scu.518566

Allendale Ltd v Moualem: CA 6 Jul 2004

A promissory note executed on 30 June 1988, payable on demand. The promissory note was executed as a deed and therefore was a speciality falling under section 8 of the Limitation Act 1980, with a limitation period of 12 years. No demand was made for payment under the note within the period of 12 years. It is, and has been recognised for nearly 200 years as the law, that a promissory note payable on demand is enforceable from the date of its execution, and not from the date of any demand.

Waller, Buxton LJJ
[2004] EWCA Civ 915
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedNorton v Ellam 1837
Baron Parke said: ‘It is quite clear that a promissory note, payable on demand, is a present debt, and is payable without any demand, and the statute begins to run from the date of it.’ . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Limitation

Updated: 23 November 2021; Ref: scu.517237

Smart v The London Borough of Lambeth: CA 7 Nov 2013

A local authority granted a licence to a housing association which in turn allowed a housing cooperative to provide accommodation to former squatters on a licence which was initially for 5 years but was extended. A claim was made for adverse possession.

Longmore, Underhill, Floyd LJJ
2013] 46 EG 108, [2014] HLR 7, [2013] EWCA Civ 1375
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedZH and CN, Regina (on The Applications of) v London Boroughs of Newham and Lewisham SC 12-Nov-2014
The court was asked whether the 1977 Act required a local authorty to obtain a court order before taking possession of interim accommodation it provided to an apparently homeless person while it investigated whether it owed him or her a duty under . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 25 November 2021; Ref: scu.517466

Billings v Reed: CA 1945

The plaintiff’s wife had been killed by a negligently piloted RAF aeroplane. It was argued that, although this was a war injury, the language of section 3(1) did not exclude a claim based on trespass to the person.
Held: Lord Greene MR said: ‘It seems to me that in this context the phrase ‘breach of duty’ is comprehensive enough to cover the case of trespass to the person which is certainly a breach of duty as used in a wide sense.’

Lord Greene MR, Mackinnon and Lawrence LJJ
[1945] KB 11
Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act 1939
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedA v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
CitedA v Hoare HL 30-Jan-2008
Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend . .
AppliedLetang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Negligence

Updated: 25 November 2021; Ref: scu.240375

Alves v Attorney General of The Virgin Islands (British Virgin Islands): PC 18 Dec 2017

From the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (British Virgin Islands)

Lord Neuberger

Lord Kerr

Lord Carnwath

Lord Hughes

Lord Hodge
[2017] UKPC 42
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedStubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 22 November 2021; Ref: scu.601883

Archbishop Bowen and Another v JL: CA 21 Feb 2017

The defendants appealed against finding that they were responsible for the assaults by a priest on the claimant.

Lewison, Burnett LJJ, Sir Ernest Ryder SP T
[2017] EWCA Civ 82
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedStubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Limitation

Updated: 22 November 2021; Ref: scu.575330

Cattley and Another v Pollard and Another: ChD 7 Dec 2006

The first defendant solicitor misappropriated money from an estate he was administering. The beneficiaries later commenced proceedings against his wife, alleging knowing assistance. She said that that claim was out of time. The claimant responded said that any limitation period was disapplied as ‘any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was party’.
Held: The defendant was only a trustee by construction, and the section applied only to those expressly trustees. However, the running of time only began when a beneficiary’s interest in a trust ceased to be a future interst, and also only at a time when the beneficiary might with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud. On that background, the claim was not barred.

Richard Sheldon, QC
Times 23-Jan-2007, [2006] EWHC 3130 (Ch), [2007] 2 All ER 1086, [2007] Ch 353
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 21(1)(a)
England and Wales
Cited by:
See AlsoCattley and Another v Pollard ChD 6-Jul-2007
The estate had been defrauded by theis solicitor. The proceeds had been used toward the purchase of a property. The defendant had first been the solicitor’s secretary and had become his wife, and transferee of the property. She denied that she had . .
CitedWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria QBD 8-Apr-2011
The claimant had been defrauded by a customer of the defendant bank. He brought a claim against the bank, saying that they knew or ought to have known of the fraudster’s activities, and were liable. The Bank denied that the UK courts had . .
CitedWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria SC 19-Feb-2014
Bank not liable for fraud of customer
The appellant sought to make the bank liable for a fraud committed by the Bank’s customer, the appellant saying that the Bank knew or ought to have known of the fraud. The court was asked whether a party liable only as a dishonest assistant was a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Trusts, Limitation, Torts – Other, Equity

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.248263

Kimathi and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office: QBD 28 Mar 2018

Claim as to allegations of abuse in Kenya in the 1950s.

[2018] EWHC 686 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoKimathi and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Strike out) QBD 24-Nov-2016
The defendant sought to have struck out from the group litigation, as a nullity the claim by one claimant who had been deceased at the time of issue. His PRs responded that the court could deal with the matter under CPR Pt 3.
Held: The court’s . .
See AlsoKimathi and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Cross examination request) QBD 24-Nov-2016
Application to cross examine translators of claimant witness statements. . .
See AlsoKimathi and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office QBD 9-Feb-2017
Application notice seeking an order that certain issues be listed for hearing as a preliminary point. . .

Cited by:
See AlsoKimathi and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office QBD 18-Apr-2018
Continued dispute as to admissibility of certain documents . .
See AlsoKimathi and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office QBD 9-May-2018
Admissibility of extracts from Hansard . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.608378

DW Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier: CA 1988

A solicitor was instructed to prepare an agreement providing for the introduction of a new working director into an insurance broking business carried on by a company. His instructions called for the new director to enter into a restrictive covenant which would take effect on his leaving the business. Through careless drafting the covenant was ineffective. The agreement (entered into in 1971 and renewed with the same defect in 1975) continued until 1980 when, on the director’s departure from the business, the covenant was found to be defective. The company issued a writ against the solicitors in 1985. The appellant plaintiff argued that a defective covenant or similar legal document was a mere defect or weakness, that only ripened into relevant damage when the client actively and unsuccessfully sought to rely upon it.
Held: The plaintiff’s argument and appeal was rejected. The measure of damages was the measure sometimes loosely referred to as the contract or warranty measure. Had the solicitor done his job properly the plaintiffs would have obtained the benefit of an effective restraint of trade covenant. As it was, they received a worthless covenant. They suffered damage when the transaction was entered into. The limitation period ran from the date of a negligently drafted contract. However, each such case depended upon its own facts.
Bingham LJ said that if the liability is for the difference between what the plaintiff got and what he would have got if the defendant had done what he was supposed to have done, it may be relatively easy, to infer that the plaintiff has suffered some immediate damage, simply because he did not get what he should have got and: ‘On the plaintiffs’ case, which for purposes of this issue may be assumed to be wholly correct, the covenants against competition were intended, and said by the defendants, to be effective but were in truth wholly ineffective. It seems to me clear beyond argument that from the moment of executing each agreement the plaintiffs suffered damage because instead of receiving a potentially valuable chose in action they received one that was valueless.’ and
‘If, in a contractual claim for negligence, the court would have awarded other than nominal damages, I do not see how it can be said that an action in tort based on the same negligence would have been bound to fail for want of any damage as an essential ingredient of the cause of action.’
Neill LJ said: ‘In the present case the judge rightly rejected the notion that where a solicitor gives negligent advice, damage is presumed to occur at the time when the advice is acted upon. I am satisfied that there is no such presumption. It is a question of fact in each case whether actual damage has been established.’ and
‘The plaintiffs suffered damage ‘because [they] did not get what [they] should have got.’ The plaintiffs’ rights under the two agreements were demonstrably less valuable than they would have been had adequate restrictive covenants been included.’ He continued: ‘it is a question of fact in each case whether actual damage has been suffered.’

Neill LJ, Bingham LJ, Kerr LJ
[1988] 1 WLR 267, (1988) 1 All ER 400
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBaker v Ollard and Bentley CA 12-May-1982
The plaintiff and a Mr and Mrs Bodman agreed to buy a house. The plaintiff intended to live on the first floor and the Bodmans on the ground floor. The solicitor should have advised them to convey the freehold into their joint names and then to . .

Cited by:
CitedTabarrok v E D C Lord and Co (A Firm) CA 14-Feb-1997
The appellant wanted to open a pizza restaurant. He and his partners acquired a company for the purpose, which was to take a lease of premises. They sought advice from the defendants who, they said, failed to advise them of the need to be aware of . .
CitedPegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
CitedSpencer v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Moore v Similar CA 1-Jul-2008
Frankovich claim – arises with measurable loss
Each claimant sought Frankovich damages alleging a failure to implement European law leading to a loss.
Held: Such a claim was available against the government after it had failed to implement the Directive so as to provide them with the . .
CitedMartin v Triggs Turner Bartons (A Firm) and Others ChD 31-Jul-2009
The claimant sought damages alleging professional negligence against her solicitors for herself and her late husband’s estate. She said that the will should have allowed advances of capital for all but pounds 100,000 of the estate, rather than the . .
CitedAxa Insurance Ltd v Akther and Darby Solicitors and Others CA 12-Nov-2009
The court considered the application of the limitation period to answering when damage occurred when it arises under an unsecured contingent liability. The claimant insurance company had provided after the event litigation insurance policies to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 18 November 2021; Ref: scu.271021

BMW Financial Service (GB) Ltd v Hart: CA 10 Oct 2012

This appeal is concerned with a point of limitation arising out of a standard hire purchase contract concerning a car. The respondent had failed to maintain his payments, and theappelleants issued a termination notice. He was abroad fr a while, and the car repossessed and sold in his absence. Much later, the company sued for the balance due, obtaining judgment by default The defendant argued that the claim was out of time, and the judge at first instance set aside the judgment as out of time.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The judgment in default was re-instated.
Lord Justice Lewison said: ‘This is not a case of repayment of a loan already made. The consideration under the contract moving from Mr Hart was the obligation to make a series of periodical payments, plus the final balloon payment. In the ordinary way, therefore, BMW would have had to wait for each instalment to fall due before it could sue for that instalment. The payments due under clause 12 are not simply an accelerated payment. Other losses are also recoverable, and adjustments need to be made to the outstanding future payments of hire in order to produce a calculated rebate.’
Lord Justice Moore-Bick said: ‘ the right to recover the sum set out in clause 12 did not arise unless and until the hirer gave notice to terminate the contract. That was a right that he could choose to exercise or not, but unless he elected to do so, the contract continued in existence and instalments of hire would have fallen due at the stipulated intervals. Under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1980 time in a case of this kind runs from the date when the cause of action accrues. In this case, the cause of action to recover the amounts claimed under clause 12 did not accrue on the customer’s default alone, but only upon the election of the hirer to terminate the contract.’
Lord Justice Rix said: ‘ in this case there can be no right to sue for the clause 12 payments, that is to say for the full sum due upon an acceleration less any debits which should be credited, or plus any additional amounts which might be claimable, until a termination notice has been given or an acceptance of the repudiation has otherwise been communicated. In this case, the same termination notice was both the exercise of the right to terminate by notice, and also an acceptance of a repudiation, itself a matter referred to in clause 12. It is only upon the serving of such a notice or a communication of such an acceptance of a repudiation that the much greater amounts due under clause 12 become due. Before such a notice or acceptance of repudiation, the only amounts due are the outstanding instalments. Unlike the cases discussed in the jurisprudence, the mere failure to pay an instalment does not by itself, under the provisions of the relevant contract, accelerate the obligation to repay the whole amount outstanding.’

Rix, Moore-Bick, Lewison LJJ
[2012] EWCA Civ 1959
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 5
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedHemp v Garland, Administrator and Co 1843
The Defendant gave a warrant of attorney to secure a debt payable by instalments, the plaintiff to be at liberty, in case of any default, to have judgment and execution for the whole, as if all the periods for payment had expired. Held that, in an . .
CitedReeves v Butcher CA 1891
A five-year loan was granted by the plaintiff to the defendant under a written agreement, providing for a ‘power to call in the same at an earlier period in the events hereinafter mentioned’. The plaintiff agreed not to call in the money for the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Consumer, Limitation

Updated: 17 November 2021; Ref: scu.513713

Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others: CA 1 Dec 2000

A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title.
Held: The earlier occupiers had sought licences from the authority, and had submitted petitions. The letters and petitions constituted an acknowledgment of the authority’s title, and the claims for adverse possession failed.

Lord Justice Simon Brown Lord Justice Mummery And Lord Justice Latham
[2000] EWCA Civ 302, (2001) 33 HLR 43
Bailii
Land Registration Act 1925 75
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedEdgington v Clark 1963
All that is required to constitute an acknowledgement so as to defeat a claim under limitation, is that, as between himself and the paper title owner, the person in possession acknowledges that the paper title owner has the better title to the land. . .
CitedPowell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the . .
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedTimothy Ellis v London Borough of Lambeth CA 9-Jul-1999
A squatter claiming possession of land as against a local authority should not have his claim defeated because he had not completed a form which would lead to payment of community charge to the authority. His possession was not thereby made secret, . .
CitedJones v Bellgrove Properties Limited CA 1949
The court allowed the plaintiff to establish by evidence that his particular debt was included in the total sum acknowledged to be due to a number of creditors.
Lord Goddard CJ was satisfied that a lump sum in a balance sheet included the debt . .
CitedBrowne v Perry PC 14-Oct-1991
(Antigua and Barbuda) The parties disputed a claim for land by adverse possession.
Held: Any acknowledgement of a paper title must be in writing. Lord Templeman explained the rule against reliance upon oral acknowledgements in adverse . .

Cited by:
CitedAllen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Registered Land, Limitation

Updated: 17 November 2021; Ref: scu.147335

Chappell v Cooper: CA 1980

The plaintiff’s writ had not been served within the required time, and it had become too late to extend its validity. The plaintiff isued a second writ. The defendant argued limitation. Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to distinguish Walkley on the very narrow ground that there was no question of the first action having being struck out or discontinued.
Held: (Roskill LJ) ‘ . . I cannot accept the submission that [Walkley] is a decision only on the facts of that case. It seems to me plainly a decision on principle that if a plaintiff starts but then does not for any reason proceed with an action, whether it is because the plaintiff chooses not to serve or his solicitors fail to serve the writ timeously or because the action is subsequently struck out for want of prosecution, or because for good reason or bad the plaintiff or his solicitors give notice of discontinuance, it is not open to the plaintiff thereafter to seek to take advantage of the provisions of section [33] . . because as their Lordships have laid down (and we are of course bound by their decision) the cause of his prejudice is not the provisions of section [11], that is to say, the existence of the primary limitation period, but is the act or remission of himself or his solicitors in acting or failing to act as he or they have done in relation to their action.’

Roskill LJ, Ormrod LJ
[1980] 1 WLR 958, [1980] 2 All ER 463
England and Wales
Citing:
DiscussedWalkley v Precision Forgings Ltd HL 1979
The plaintiff tried to bring a second action in respect of an industrial injury claim outside the limitation period so as to overcome the likelihood that his first action, although timeous, would be dismissed for want of prosecution.
Held: He . .

Cited by:
CitedJacqueline Adam v Rasal Ali CA 21-Feb-2006
The defendant sought damages against the defendant for personal injury from his alleged negligence. Her action was struck out and she recommenced the action. The defendant pleaded that she was out of time. The claimant said that the first action . .
CitedHorton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Negligence

Updated: 16 November 2021; Ref: scu.240165

Cain v Francis: CA 18 Dec 2008

The court was asked under what circumstances it should exercise its discretion to extend the limitation period under section 33.
Held: Lady Justice Smith said: ‘It appears to me that there is now a long line of authority to support the proposition that, in a case where the defendant has had early notice of the claim, the accrual of a limitation defence should be regarded as a windfall and the prospect of its loss, by the exercise of the section 33 discretion, should be regarded as either no prejudice at all (see Firman v Ellis [1978] QB 886) or only a slight degree of prejudice: see Donovan v Gwent Toys Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 472. It is true that, in Thompson v Brown [1981] 1 WLR 744, Lord Diplock said that the accrual of the defence might be regarded as a windfall only where the delay in issuing proceedings was short. However, with great respect, it does not seem to me that the length of the delay can be, of itself, a deciding factor. It is whether the defendant has suffered any evidential or other forensic prejudice which should make the difference.’ and
‘In the exercise of the discretion, the basic question to be asked is whether it is fair and just in all the circumstances to expect the defendant to meet the claim on the merits, notwithstanding the delay in commencement. The length of the delay will be important, not so much for itself as to the effect it has had. To what extent has the defendant been disadvantaged in his investigation of the claim and/or the assembly of evidence, in respect of the issues of both liability and quantum? But it will also be important to consider the reasons for the delay. Thus, there may be some unfairness to the defendant due to the delay in issue but the delay may have arisen for so excusable a reason, that, looking at the matter in the round, on balance, it is fair and just that the action should proceed. On the other hand, the balance may go in the opposite direction, partly because the delay has caused procedural disadvantage and unfairness to the defendant and partly because the reasons for the delay (or its length) are not good ones.
Although the delay referred to in s.33(3) is the delay after the expiry of the primary limitation period, it will always be relevant to consider when the defendant knew that a claim was to be made against him and also the opportunities he has had to investigate the claim and collect evidence: see Donovan v Gwentoys Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 472. If, as here, a defendant has had early notification of a claim and every possible opportunity to investigate and to collect evidence, some delay after the expiry of three years will have had no prejudicial effect.’

Lady Justice Smith
[2008] EWCA Civ 1451, [2009] LS Law Medical 82, [2009] CP Rep 19, [2009] RTR 18, [2009] 2 All ER 579, [2009] 3 WLR 551, [2009] QB 754
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 33
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedThompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd HL 1981
The plaintiff’s solicitors, out of negligence, failed to issue a writ until one month after the limitation period had expired. The application to extend the period was rejected at first instance since he had an unanswerable claim against his . .
CitedHartley v Birmingham City District Council CA 1992
The writ was issued one day late; there had been early notification of the claim; and the defendant’s ability to defend the case was unaffected. The plaintiff asked the court to exercide its discretion to allow the claim t proceed.
Held: The . .

Cited by:
CitedCheltenham Borough Council v Laird QBD 15-Jun-2009
The council sought damages saying that their former chief executive had not disclosed her history of depressive illness when applying for her job.
Held: The replies were not dishonest as the form could have been misconstrued. The claim failed. . .
CitedMcDonnell and Another v Walker CA 24-Nov-2009
The defendant appealed against the disapplication of section 11 of the 1980 Act under section 33.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The defendant had not contributed significantly to the delay: ‘the defendant received claims quite different in . .
CitedBrady v Norman CA 9-Feb-2011
The claimant sought to have disapplied the limitation period in his defamation claim. The claimant said that in the case of Cain, the Steedman case had not been cited, and that the decisions were incompatible, and that Cain was to be prefered.
Limitation

Updated: 12 November 2021; Ref: scu.278947

Young v Downey: QBD 18 Dec 2019

Responsibility for IRA bombing fixed

The claimant sought a finding that the defendant had been responsible for a IRA bombing in 1982 which killed her father and three other soldiers and injured 31 others. He had been acquitted at a criminal trial.
Held: The limitation period was extended: ‘As was said in Carroll, the burden on the claimant is not necessarily a heavy one. She has sufficiently explained the reasons for the delay and pointed to the prejudice she will suffer if she is not permitted to have her claim adjudicated upon in the civil jurisdiction. The defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice to him in allowing the claim to proceed outside the primary limitation period. If the claim is not allowed to proceed, the defendant will avoid a determination on the evidence within this jurisdiction, having avoided adjudication in the criminal court due to an error on the part of the state. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, I do not believe that would be an equitable outcome. I therefore exercise the discretion under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the provisions of sections 11 and 12 and allow this claim to proceed (including insofar as it is brought for the benefit of the claimant’s mother).’
‘My analysis of the evidence presented to me leads me to find the following facts are established to the necessary standard:
i) The claimant’s father, Lance Corporal Jeffrey Young was unlawfully killed (as were the three other soldiers) by persons acting together in the name of the IRA.
ii) The deaths resulted from a deliberate, carefully planned attack on members of the military as they were on their way to carry out their ceremonial duties in the Changing of the Guard at Horse Guards.
iii) The explosion was caused by a radio-controlled improvised device in the boot of the Morris Marina, registered number LMD 657P, which had been designed and carefully assembled to kill and maim with the addition of nails as shrapnel.
iv) The car was bought at auction on 13 July 1982 by an Irishman, whom it can reasonably be inferred was one of the bomb conspirators.
v) The car is likely to have remained in the possession of the conspirators in the week leading up to the bombing, during which time the bomb was assembled in its boot.
vi) The car was parked in Portman Square between 17 and 18 July. It was then parked at the Royal Garden Hotel car park from 18 July until the morning of the bombing.
vii) The defendant’s fingerprints were on the tickets for both car parks.
viii) There can be no sensible explanation for the defendant’s fingerprints to be on the car parking tickets other than that he was responsible for moving the car between the car parks. It is probable that he was driving it on the morning of 20 July 2019.
ix) The defendant was a member of the IRA, as evidenced by his conviction in 1974.
x) In the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that the defendant was knowingly involved in the concerted plan to detonate the bomb in Hyde Park specifically targeted at the passing Guard.’

Yip J DBE
[2019] EWHC 3508 (QB)
Bailii, Judiciary
Limitation Act 1980 11 12, Fatal Accidents Act 1976
England and Wales

Torts – Other, Limitation

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.645998

Ofulue and Another v Bossert: HL 11 Mar 2009

The parties disputed ownership of land, one claiming adverse possession. In the course of negotations, the possessor made a without prejudice offer to purchase the paper owner’s title. The paper owner claimed that this was an acknowledgement under section 29.
Held: The letter should not be admitted. Any admission in the first letter could not be treated as a continuing acknowledgement, and it could not now be relied upon. The House emphasised the vital importance of the without prejudice system.
Lord Hope said: ‘Where a letter is written ‘without prejudice’ during negotiations with a view to a compromise, the protection that these words claim will be given to it unless the other party can show that there is a good reason for not doing so.’ and ‘The essence of it lies in the nature of the protection that is given to parties when they are attempting to negotiate a compromise. It is the ability to speak freely that indicates where the limits of the rule should lie. Far from being mechanistic, the rule is generous in its application. It recognises that unseen dangers may lurk behind things said or written during this period, and it removes the inhibiting effect that this may have in the interests of promoting attempts to achieve a settlement. It is not to be defeated by other considerations of public policy which may emerge later, such as those suggested in this case, that would deny them that protection.’
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry said: ‘it is that parties and their representatives who are trying to settle a dispute should be able to negotiate openly, without having to worry that what they say may be used against them subsequently, whether in their current dispute or in some different situation.’
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe agreed with Lord Rodger and said: ‘As a matter of principle I would not restrict the without prejudice rule unless justice clearly demands it. In England the rule has developed vigorously (more vigorously, probably, than in other common law jurisdictions, and more vigorously than some overseas scholars, notably J H Wigmore approved.)’

Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
[2009] UKHL 16, [2009] 2 WLR 749, [2009] 2 All ER 223, [2009] 11 EG 119, [2009] NPC 40, [2009] 1 WLR 718, [2009] 2 Cr App R 2, [2009] 1 AC 990
Bailii, Times, HL
Limitation Act 1980& 29(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedWhiffen v Hartwright 15-Apr-1848
The court refused to order the production of letters which had passed ‘without prejudice’. Lord Langdale MR observed that he ‘did not see how the plaintiff could get over this express agreement, though he did not agree, that the right of discovery . .
CitedWaldridge v Kennison 1794
A without prejudice admission that a document was in the handwriting of one of the parties was received in evidence because it was independent of the merits of the case. . .
CitedJones v Foxall CA 27-Mar-1852
Romilly MR deplored attempts to convert offers of compromise into admissions of acts prejudicial to the party making them, saying: ‘I find that the offers were in fact made without prejudice to the rights of the parties; and I shall, as far as I am . .
Appeal fromOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedHoghton v Hoghton CA 16-Apr-1852
When a person has made a large voluntary disposition the burden is thrown on the party benefitting to show that the disposition was made fairly and honestly and in full understanding of the nature and consequences of the transaction. Romilly MR . .
CitedIn Re Daintrey, Ex Parte Holt QBD 1893
The court was asked whether a letter could be admitted in evidence and relied upon as an act of bankruptcy. The letter was sent by the debtor to the creditor at a time when there was no dispute, headed ‘without prejudice’. It contained an offer of . .
CitedBradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid HL 12-Jul-2006
Disapplication of Without Prejudice Rules
The House was asked whether a letter sent during without prejudice negotiations which acknowledged a debt was admissible to restart the limitation period. An advice centre, acting for the borrower had written, in answer to a claim by the lender for . .
CitedTomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd CA 1969
Without prejudice material can be admitted if the issue is whether or not the negotiations resulted in an agreed settlement. Without considering the communications in question it would be impossible to decide whether there was a concluded settlement . .
CitedUnilever plc v Procter and Gamble Company CA 4-Nov-1999
The defendant’s negotiators had asserted in an expressly ‘without prejudice’ meeting, that the plaintiff was infringing its patent and they threatened to bring an action for infringement. The plaintiff sought to bring a threat action under section . .
LimitedMuller and Another v Linsley and Mortimer (A Firm) CA 8-Dec-1994
The plaintiff sued his former solicitors for professional negligence. The damages he sought to recover related to loss he suffered when dismissed as a director of a private company leading to a forced sale of his shares in the company. The plaintiff . .
CitedRush and Tomkins Ltd v Greater London Council HL 3-Nov-1988
The parties had entered into contracts for the construction of dwellings. The contractors sought payment. The council alleged shortcomings in the works. The principal parties had settled the dispute, but a sub-contractor now sought disclosure of the . .
CitedCutts v Head and Another CA 7-Dec-1983
There had been a trial of 35 days regarding rights of way over land, which had proved fruitless, and where some orders had been made without jurisdiction. The result had been inconclusive. The costs order was now appealed, the plaintiff complaining . .
CitedWhiffen v Hartwright 15-Apr-1848
The court refused to order the production of letters which had passed ‘without prejudice’. Lord Langdale MR observed that he ‘did not see how the plaintiff could get over this express agreement, though he did not agree, that the right of discovery . .

Cited by:
CitedKohli v Lit and Others ChD 13-Nov-2009
The claimant asserted that the other shareholders had acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to her within the company.
Held: The claimant was allowed to bring in without prejudice correspondence to contradict evidence by the defendant which . .
CitedOceanbulk Shipping and Trading Sa v TMT Asia Ltd CA 15-Feb-2010
The parties had settled their disagreement, but now disputed the interpretation of the settlement. The defendant sought to be allowed to give in evidence correspondence leading up to the settlement which had been conducted on a without prejudice . .
CitedOceanbulk Shipping and Trading Sa v TMT Asia Ltd and Others SC 27-Oct-2010
The court was asked whether facts which (a) are communicated between the parties in the course of without prejudice negotiations and (b) would, but for the without prejudice rule, be admissible as part of the factual matrix or surrounding . .
CitedBerkeley Square Holdings and Others v Lancer Property Asset Management Ltd and Others ChD 1-May-2020
Application by the Claimants to strike out parts of the Defence as an abuse of process and an application by the Defendants to amend their Defence. However, both applications turn on the question whether certain facts on which the Defendants seek to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice, Evidence

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.317966

In re Diplock’s estate: CA 1948

After considering a situation in which trust money had been applied in making alterations to the property of an innocent third party but had not added to the value of the property,
Held: The origin of the equitable rules of tracing were described: ‘the metaphysical approach of equity coupled with and encouraged by the far-reaching remedy of a declaration of charge that enabled equity to identify money in a mixed fund.’ and
‘In the absence of authority to the contrary, our conclusion is that as regards the Diplock money used in these cases it cannot be traced in any true sense; and, further, that even if this were not so, the only remedy available to equity, viz., that of a declaration of charge, would not produce an equitable result and is inapplicable accordingly’
and ‘In the case of adaptation of property of the volunteer by means of trust money, it by no means necessarily follows that the money can be said to be present in the adapted property. The beneficial owner of the trust money seeks to follow and recover that money and claims to use the machinery of a charge on the adapted property in order to enable him to do so. But in the first place the money may not be capable of being followed. In every true sense the money may have disappeared. …. The result may add not one penny to the value of the house. Indeed the alteration may well lower the value of the house. …. Can it be said that in such cases the trust money can be traced and extracted from the altered asset? Clearly not for the money will have disappeared leaving no monetary trace behind. ….’
As regards limitation, the 12 year period for enforcing a will trust runs from the date of the death, even though a personal representative is not bound to distribute within a year from death.

Lord Greene MR
[1948] Ch 465
England and Wales
Citing:
ExplainedSinclair v Brougham HL 1914
An insolvent building society had, outside its powers, run a banking business. The House considered the competing claims of the unadvanced shareholders of the building society’s intra vires business, members of the society who had not been granted . .

Cited by:
CitedAluminium Industrie Vaassen B V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd ChD 11-Feb-1975
The plaintiffs sold aluminium to the defendant and by a clause in the contract retained their title in the materials sold until payment was received. The purchaser went into insolvent receivership, and the seller sought recovery of the equipment and . .
CitedFoskett v McKeown and Others CA 27-Jun-1997
Various people had paid money with the promise of acquiring an interest in land in Portugal. The scheme was fraudulent. The funds had been used to purchase a life/investment policy. The policy was held in trust for the fraudster’s mother but he had . .
CitedFoskett v McKeown and Others HL 18-May-2000
A property developer using monies which he held on trust to carry out a development instead had mixed those monies with his own in his bank account, and subsequently used those mixed monies to pay premiums on a life assurance policy on his own life, . .
CitedGreen and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
Appeal fromMinistry of Health v Simpson; In re Diplock dec HL 1950
The will of Cable Diplock purported to make a gift to charity, and was distributed accordingly. The house however found the gift to be invalid.
Held: A personal remedy existed for the recovery of amounts wrongly paid in the distribution of an . .
CitedGomez and others v Vives CA 3-Oct-2008
The claimant appealed a finding that the court did not have jurisdiction over income payable to a trust governed by English law under which the claimant was beneficiary.
Held: The appeal failed in part. Because Article 5 is in derogation from . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.182265

A v Hoare: HL 30 Jan 2008

Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend the limitation period. The House was also asked as to whether the claimant’s personal characteristics could affect the finding of ‘significant injury’ under section 14(2).
Held: All claims for personal injuries, whether based in negligence or assault, are subject to the limitation periods provided for by section 11 of the 1980 Act which itself is subject to the discretion of the court provided by section 33 of the 1980 Act. Stubbings was wrongly decided, and the House should approve the decision in Letang. Section 14(2) set a test which was objective and not dependent on the personal characteristics of the claimant.
Lord Hoffmann discussed section 33 of the 1980 Act saying: ‘Section 33 enables the judge to look at the matter broadly and not have to decide the highly artificial question of whether knowledge which the claimant has in some sense suppressed counts as knowledge for the purposes of the Act . . The judge is expressly enjoined by subsection (3)(a) to have regard to the reasons for delay and in my opinion this requires him to give due weight to evidence, such as there was in this case, that the claimant was for practical purposes disabled from commencing proceedings by the psychological injuries which he had suffered.’
Lord Browne discussed the consequences of long delay: ‘Whether or not it will be possible for defendants to investigate these (allegations) sufficiently for there to be a reasonable prospect of a fair trial will depend upon a number of factors, not least when the complaint was first made and with what effect. If a complaint has been made and recorded, and more obviously still if the accused has been convicted of the abuse complained of, that will be one thing; if, however a complaint comes out of the blue with no apparent support for it (other perhaps than the alleged abuser has been accused or even convicted of similar abuse in the past), that would be another thing . .’

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carswell, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
[2008] UKHL 6, Times 31-Jan-2008, [2008] 2 WLR 311, Gazette 14-Feb-2008, [2008] 1 AC 844, (2008) 11 CCL Rep 249, [2008] 1 FCR 507, [2008] Fam Law 402, [2008] 1 FLR 771, (2008) 100 BMLR 1, [2008] 2 All ER 1
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 2 14(2) 33
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromC v Middlesbrough Council CA 21-Dec-2004
Damages were sought following sex abuse whilst in care. . .
Appeal fromCatholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) and Another v Young CA 14-Nov-2006
The claimant sought damages saying that he had been abused as a child whilst in the defendant’s care. The defendants appealed a finding that the claimant had not first known of his injury more than three years before begining his action.
Held: . .
See AlsoA v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
CitedPractice Statement (Judicial Precedent) HL 1966
The House gave guidance how it would treat an invitation to depart from a previous decision of the House. Such a course was possible, but the direction was not an ‘open sesame’ for a differently constituted committee to prefer their views to those . .
CitedBillings v Reed CA 1945
The plaintiff’s wife had been killed by a negligently piloted RAF aeroplane. It was argued that, although this was a war injury, the language of section 3(1) did not exclude a claim based on trespass to the person.
Held: Lord Greene MR said: . .
CitedKruber v Grzesiak 1963
The plaintiff had issued a writ claiming damages for personal injuries caused by negligent driving more than three years after the accident, and now wanted to amend the writ by adding a claim for trespass to the person based on the same facts. The . .
CitedLetang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .
OverruledStubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .
CitedTennero Ltd v Arnold QBD 6-Jul-2006
The court considered an application for permission to appeal. The Defendant had not attended the trial, but had applied by letter for an adjournment, which was refused. The trial proceeded and resulted in an order against the Defendant. He applied . .
CriticisedKR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 10-Jun-2003
The court considered an extension of the time for claiming damages for personal injuries after the claimants said they had been sexually abused as children in the care of the defendants.
Held: The test to be applied under section 14(2) was . .
CitedStingel v Clark 20-Jul-2006
Asutlii (High Court of Australia) Limitation of Actions – Appellant alleged respondent had raped and assaulted her in 1971 – Appellant alleged that she suffered post-traumatic stress disorder of delayed onset in . .
CitedJones v Secretary of State for Social Services; Jones v Hudson HL 1972
Unsatisfactory decisions of the highest court could cause uncertainty because lower courts tend to distinguish them on inadequate grounds.
One possible source of law is ‘informed professional opinion’. The word ‘final’ can denote different . .
CitedST v North Yorkshire County Council CA 14-Jul-1998
The court considered the liability of the respondent for sexual assaults committed by an employee teacher when taking students on school trips.
Held: The Local Authority was not vicariously liable for sexual assault committed by employee . .

Cited by:
CitedBowden v Poor Sisters of Nazareth and others and similar HL 21-May-2008
The appellants said they had suffered abuse while resident at children’s homes run by the respondents. The respondents denied the allegations and said that they were also out of time. The claims were brought many years after the events.
Held: . .
See AlsoA v Hoare QBD 8-Jul-2008
The claimant sought damages for her rape by the defendant. After his conviction and having served his sentence, the defendant won substantial sums on the lottery.
Held: The sums paid by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board were not paid by . .
CitedAdorian v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis CA 23-Jan-2009
The claimant received injuries when arrested. He was later convicted of resisting arrest. The defendant relied on section 329 of the 2003 Act. The claimant said that the force used against him was grossly disproportionate. The commissioner appealed . .
CitedMcDonnell and Another v Walker CA 24-Nov-2009
The defendant appealed against the disapplication of section 11 of the 1980 Act under section 33.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The defendant had not contributed significantly to the delay: ‘the defendant received claims quite different in . .
CitedRAR v GGC QBD 10-Aug-2012
rar_ggcQBD2012
The claimant alleged that the defendant, her stepfather, had sexually and otherwise assaulted her when she was a child. He had pleaded guilty to one charge in 1978, and now said that the claim was out of time. The claimant sought the extension of . .
CitedAdamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .
CitedKnauer v Ministry of Justice SC 24-Feb-2016
The court was asked: ‘whether the current approach to assessing the financial losses suffered by the dependant of a person who is wrongfully killed properly reflects the fundamental principle of full compensation, and if it does not whether we . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Torts – Other

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.264020

Cartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd: HL 1963

The plaintiffs were steel dressers who, in the course of their employment, had inhaled quantities of noxious dust which had caused them to suffer from pneumoconiosis. They issued proceedings on 1 October 1956 but were unable to show any breach of duty by their employers which contributed to their condition after 1 October 1950. The defendants pleaded that the claims were barred by the six year limitation period under section 2 of the 1939 Act.
Held: Lord Reid made it clear that he would have wished to hold ‘that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person has discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it if he took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances’. But the House unanimously held that the 1939 Act and established authority precluded it from so holding. Where a defendant sought to rely upon some damage as setting the limitation clock running, the damage referred to must be ‘real’ as distinct from minimal. The common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result.
Lord Pearce said: ‘It is for a judge or jury to decide whether a man has suffered any actionable harm and in borderline cases it is a question of degree.
It is a question of fact in each case whether a man has suffered material damage by any physical changes in his body. Evidence that those changes are not felt by him and may never be felt tells in favour of the damage coming within the principle of de minimis non curat lex. On the other hand evidence that in unusual exertion or at the onslaught of disease he may suffer from his hidden impairment tells in favour of the damage being substantial.’ and ‘The cause of action accrued when it reached a stage, whether known or unknown, at which a judge could properly give damages for the harm that had been done.’
Lord Reid: ‘If this were a matter governed by the common law I would hold that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person has discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it if he took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances. The common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result . . But the present question depends on statute, the Limitation Act, 1939, and section 26 of that Act appears to me to make it impossible to reach the result which I have indicated.’

Lord Reid, Lord Evershed MR, Lord Pearce
[1963] AC 758, [1963] 1 All ER 341
Limitation Act 1939 2
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromCartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd CA 1962
The court gave guidance on when an injury passes from being de minimis to being sufficiently significant to found a cause of action: ‘there is from the beginning some injury occurring from day to day, as each of the minute particles which enter the . .

Cited by:
CitedHatton v Messrs Chafes (A Firm) CA 13-Mar-2003
The defendant firm appealed against a refusal to strike out the claimant’s claim for professional negligence, asserting that the judge should have considered the limitation issue in the light of Khan v Falvey.
Held: By the time that the . .
CitedLagden v O’Connor HL 4-Dec-2003
The parties had been involved in a road traffic accident. The defendant drove into the claimant’s parked car. The claimant was unable to afford to hire a car pending repairs being completed, and arranged to hire a car on credit. He now sought . .
CitedMcDonnell v Congregation of Christian Brothers Trustees (Formerly Irish Christian Brothers) and others HL 4-Dec-2003
In 2000, the claimant sought damages for sexual abuse from before 1951. The issue was as to whether the limitation law which applied was that as at the date of the incidents, or that which applied as at the date when he would be deemed uner the . .
CitedThe Law Society v Sephton and Co and others CA 13-Dec-2004
The Society appealed dismissal for limitation of its claim against the defendant firm of accountants arising from alleged fraud in approval of a solicitor’s accounts.
Held: The liability did not arise until the Society decided to make . .
CitedRothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd and Another CA 26-Jan-2006
Each claimant sought damages after being exposed to asbestos dust. The defendants resisted saying that the injury alleged, the development of pleural plaques, was yet insufficient as damage to found a claim.
Held: (Smith LJ dissenting) The . .
CitedBolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd CA 6-Feb-2006
The deceased had come into contact with asbestos when working on building sites for more than one contractor. The claimant here sought contribution from the defendants for the damages it had paid to his estate. The issue was as to liability on . .
CitedHaward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
CitedA v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
MentionedLaw Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others HL 10-May-2006
A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from . .
CitedHorton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .
CitedJohnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd; Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd; similar HL 17-Oct-2007
The claimant sought damages for the development of neural plaques, having been exposed to asbestos while working for the defendant. The presence of such plaques were symptomless, and would not themselves cause other asbestos related disease, but . .
CitedAxa General Insurance Ltd and Others v Lord Advocate and Others SCS 8-Jan-2010
axaReSCS201
The claimant sought to challenge the validity of the 2009 Act by judicial review. The Act would make their insured and themselves liable to very substantial unanticipated claims for damages for pleural plaques which would not previousl or otherwise . .
CitedDryden and Others v Johnson Matthey Plc SC 21-Mar-2018
Sensitisation to salt can be personal injury
The claimants, had developed platinum salt sensitisation due to the defendant employer’s breach of health and safety regulations and common law duty, claimed a cause of action for personal injury. Platinum salt sensitisation is, in itself, an . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.179759

Dalton v Henry Angus and Co: HL 14 Jun 1881

The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some reason the existence of such a grant is impossible, the law will adopt a legal fiction that such a grant was made, in spite of any direct evidence that no such grant was in fact made. ‘. . the whole law of prescription and the whole law which governs the presumption or inference of a grant or covenant rest upon acquiescence. The courts and the judges have had recourse to various expedients for quieting the possession of persons in the exercise of rights which have not been resisted by the persons against whom they are exercised, but in all cases it appears to me that acquiescence and nothing else is the principle upon which these expedients rest.’
Lord Blackburn, delivering the principal speech on this point, regarded the interposition of an independent contractor as irrelevant, because of the nature of the duty: ‘Ever since Quarman v Burnett (1840) 6 M and W 499, [1840] EngR 182, it has been considered settled law that one employing another is not liable for his collateral negligence unless the relation of master and servant existed between them. So that a person employing a contractor to do work is not liable for the negligence of that contractor or his servants. On the other hand, a person causing something to be done, the doing of which casts on him a duty, cannot escape from the responsibility attaching on him of seeing that duty performed by delegating it to a contractor. He may bargain with the contractor that he shall perform the duty and stipulate for an indemnity from him if it is not performed, but he cannot thereby relieve himself from liability to those injured by the failure to perform it: Hole v Sittingbourne Railway Co (1861) 6 H and N 488, [1861] EngR 170; Pickard v Smith 10 CB (NS) 470, [1861] EngR 71, Tarry v Ashton (1876) 1 QBD 314.’
Fry J (asked to give his opinion to the house said: ‘But leaving such technical questions aside, I prefer to observe that, in my opinion, the whole law of prescription and the whole law which governs the presumption or inference of a grant or covenant rest upon acquiescence. The Courts and the Judges have had recourse to various expedients for quieting the possession of persons in the exercise of rights which have not been resisted by the persons against whom they are exercised, but in all cases it appears to me that acquiescence and nothing else is the principle upon which these expedients rest.’

Lord Selborne LC, Lord Blackburn, Fry J (advising)
(1881) 6 App Cas 740, [1881] UKHL 1
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
At first instanceDalton v Henry Angus and Co 1877
Fry J said: ‘ . .I cannot imagine any case of acquiescence in which there is not shown to be in the servient owner: 1, a knowledge of the acts done; 2, a power in him to stop the acts or to sue in respect of them; and 3, an abstinence on his part . .
Appeal fromDalton v Henry Angus and Co CA 1878
. .

Cited by:
CitedRegina v City of Sunderland ex parte Beresford HL 13-Nov-2003
Land had been used as a park for many years. The council land owner refused to register it as a common, saying that by maintaining the park it had indicated that the use was by consent and licence, and that prescription did not apply.
Held: . .
ExplainedTehidy Minerals Ltd v Norman CA 1971
The fact that land had been requisitioned by the Ministry of Agriculture between 1941 and 1960 and the 20-odd years’ user relied on as having created the rights had preceded 1941 was a bar to a prescriptive claim to grazing rights under the . .
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedHunter and Others v Canary Wharf Ltd HL 25-Apr-1997
The claimant, in a representative action complained that the works involved in the erection of the Canary Wharf tower constituted a nuisance in that the works created substantial clouds of dust and the building blocked her TV signals, so as to limit . .
CitedLawrence and Another v Fen Tigers Ltd and Others QBD 4-Mar-2011
The claimants had complained that motor-cycle and other racing activities on neighbouring lands were a noise nuisance, but the court also considered that agents of the defendants had sought to intimidate the claimants into not pursuing their action. . .
CitedWoodland v Essex County Council SC 23-Oct-2013
The claimant had been seriously injured in an accident during a swimming lesson. She sought to claim against the local authority, and now appealed against a finding that it was not responsible, having contracted out the provision of swimming . .
CitedWinterburn and Another v Bennett and Another CA 25-May-2016
The court was asked as to the steps which an owner of land must take to prevent others, who were using the land without permission, acquiring rights over the land. The claimants here had ignored clear signs placed on the land which asserted the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.187796

Bowling and Co Solicitors v Edehomo: ChD 2 Mar 2011

The court was asked ‘when an innocent vendor whose signature is forged on the documents for the conveyance of land suffers damage, for the purposes of limitation of an action arising from a solicitor’s breach of duty. Is it on the exchange of contracts, in which case the present claim is said to be time barred; or is it only on completion, in which case the claim was just commenced in time?’
Held: The loss was suffered on the exchange. It was at that time that she could have commenced proceedings.

Roth J
[2011] EWHC 393 (Ch)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 2
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedNouri v Marvi and Others CA 14-Oct-2010
The claimant was the registered owner of a leasehold flat, allowing the defendant to live in the flat while he was out abroad. The defendant first re-mortgaged the property in the claimant’s name, forging the claimant’s signature on the mortgage . .
CitedForster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .
CitedAhmed v Kendrick 1987
The effect of the passing of a beneficial interest by a fraudster owner of that interest to a third party is to sever the beneficial joint tenancy. . .
CitedNouri v Marvi and Others CA 14-Oct-2010
The claimant was the registered owner of a leasehold flat, allowing the defendant to live in the flat while he was out abroad. The defendant first re-mortgaged the property in the claimant’s name, forging the claimant’s signature on the mortgage . .
CitedBell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .
CitedEdwards v Lloyd’s TSB Bank plc ChD 2004
A contract in which one co-owner’s signature has been forged by the other is not a nullity but remains valid in relation to the fraudulent co-owner. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Contract

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.430246

Hopper and Another v Hopper: CA 12 Dec 2008

Appeals were made after an order declaring an account a between former partners in a wholesale fruit and vegetable business. The dispute related to the applicability of limitation to undrawn profit shares, and the doctrine of Laches.
Held: The judge had been entitled to find on the evidence that undrawn profits had been capitalised. There was no inequity in allowing the widow to draw the undrawn capitalised earnings of the business. Limitation did not apply and nor did the doctrine of laches. ‘When a partnership at will is dissolved by the death of a partner, the surviving partner or partners, and the personal representatives of the deceased partner, may all agree, solely for the purpose of the winding up, to continue the business of the former partnership in order best to maximise the value of its business and goodwill on sale or other realisation. If they do all so agree, their rights and obligations, including their shares of any profit from the continued trading, and the authority of each former partner to bind the others continue as before: 1890 Act s.38. The surviving partners and the personal representatives of the deceased partner put themselves at risk if they take that course. The surviving partners, and possibly the personal representatives, will be personally liable for any losses incurred in the continued trading, and any such losses will diminish their and the deceased’s respective partnership shares. ‘ The widow of the deceased partner was an outgoing partner for the purposes of section 42(1) of the 1890 Act, and the judge’s order was adjusted accordingly.

Thomas LJ, Moore-Bick LJ, Etherton LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 1417
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980, Partnership Act 1890 38 42(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBouche v Sproule 1887
Lord Bramwell discussed the capitalisation of undistributed profis within a partnership: ‘Where there is a partnership, whether an ordinary partnership or an incorporated partnership . . There the undivided profits of any period, a year or shorter . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Limitation, Equity

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.278673

Beaman v ARTS Ltd: CA 1949

The italian plaintiff had left Egland in 1935 leaving certain valuables with the defendants for safe keeping. During the war, the property was released to the authorities as alien property, who, informed by the defemdant that they were of no value, gave them to the Salvation Army. The plaintiff returned in 1946, and after discovering the history, began proceedings for conversion, saying that the action was not defeated by limitation for fraud.
Held: The actions of the defendants were not fraudulent as such sop that section 26(a) of the 1939 Act did not operate. However, the defendants had made no attempt to obtain the plaintiff’s instructions, before disposing of the property as a matter of their own convenience, and in breach of the duty of confidence accepted. Their failure to inform the plaintoff of what they had done did amount to a reckless ‘concealment by fraud’ with section 26(b), and the action could proceed.

Lord Greene
[1949] 1 KB 550, [1949] 1 All ER 465, 65 TLR 389, 93 Sol Jo 236
Limitation Act 1939 26(a) 26(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedThe Bulli Coal Mining Company v Patrick Hill Osbourne and Another PC 1899
(New South Wales) . .

Cited by:
CitedCave v Robinson Jarvis and Rolf (a Firm) HL 25-Apr-2002
An action for negligence against a solicitor was defended by saying that the claim was out of time. The claimant responded that the solicitor had not told him of the circumstances which would lead to the claim, and that deliberate concealment should . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.194819

Shore v Sedgwick Financial Services Ltd: CA 23 Jul 2008

The claimant said that the defendant had given him negligent advice on pensions, failing to say that he should stay within his occupational scheme. The defendant pleaded limitation.
Held: The claimant suffered damage when he made the transfer in April 1997. There was a clear distinction between transactions which give rise to pure contingent liabilities and transactions where the claimant has ‘obtained less than she should have got’. Accordingly the claim was time barred.
Dyson LJ referred to a submission by the claimant that he had not yet suffered the damage and said: ‘First, it is common ground that the benefits surrendered in the Avesta scheme were properly valued at andpound;637,507. Secondly, that sum was used to invest in the PFW scheme. The price paid for this investment was its then current market price. That price reflected the market perception of the risks inherent in the PFW scheme. The performance of the scheme was subject to the vagaries of the market and the investment skills of the managers of the fund as well as the amount drawn down as income by Mr Shore. The amount available for drawdown as income would depend on the figure at which the GAD rates were fixed triennially as well as the performance of the fund. Mr Soole submits that all these risks were reflected in the price that Mr Shore paid. It is, therefore, irrelevant that the PFW scheme was riskier than the Avesta scheme. To adopt the example suggested by Keene L.J. in the course of argument, if a person invests andpound;100 in shares rather than in Government bonds, he does not suffer any loss when he buys the shares, because when he pays andpound;100 for the shares, that is what they are worth in the market.’ He rejecte dthe submission saying: ‘It is Mr Shore’s case (assumed for present purposes to be established) that the PFW scheme was inferior to the Avesta scheme because it was riskier. It was inferior because Mr Shore wanted a secure scheme: he did not want to take risks. In other words, from Mr Shore’s point of view, it was less advantageous and caused him detriment. If he had wanted a more insecure income than that provided by the Avesta scheme, then he would have got what he wanted and would have suffered no detriment. In the event, however, he made a risky investment with an uncertain income stream instead of a safe investment with a fixed and certain income stream which is what he wanted.’
Dysn LJ continued: ‘Mr Shore obtained a bundle of rights which, from the outset, were less advantageous to him than the benefits that he enjoyed under the Avesta scheme. On the facts of this case, it was not necessary to wait to see what happened to determine whether Mr Shore was financially worse off in the PFW scheme than he would have been in the Avesta scheme.’ So far as the analogy with a share purchase was concerned he said: ‘In my judgment, an investor who wishes to place andpound;100 in a secure risk-free investment and, in reliance on negligent advice, purchases shares does suffer financial detriment on the acquisition of the shares despite the fact that he pays the market price for the shares. It is no answer to this investor’s complaint that he has been induced to buy a risky investment when he wanted a safe one to say that the risky investment was worth what he paid for it in the market. His complaint is that he did not want a risky investment. A claim for damages immediately upon the acquisition of the shares would succeed. The investor would at least be entitled to the difference between the cost of buying the Government bonds and the cost of buying and selling the shares.’

Dyson LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 863, [2008] PNLR 37, Times 12-Aug-2008
Bailii
Financial Services Act 1986
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedPegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
CitedAxa Insurance Ltd v Akther and Darby Solicitors and Others CA 12-Nov-2009
The court considered the application of the limitation period to answering when damage occurred when it arises under an unsecured contingent liability. The claimant insurance company had provided after the event litigation insurance policies to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Financial Services, Professional Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.271028

St Anselm Development Company Ltd v Slaughter and May: ChD 1 Feb 2013

The claimants appealed against rejection of their claim in negligence said to have been out of time. They had set out to sublet flats but their mistiming disallowed reclaiming of certain rents under the 1993 Act.
Held: The two flats were to be considered seperately, and on that basis the claim under the second had been timely, provided the period could be extended under section 14A.
In 1999 the claimant had realised that there was a problem, even if they did not then attribute it to negligence in the solicitors. They had reasonable cause then to start asking questions. Even though there had not yet been diclosure, the master had been correct that the claimant had no reasonable prospect establishing an extended limitation period.

David Richards J
[2013] EWHC 125 (Ch)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 14A, Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedKhan v R M Falvey and Co (a Firm) CA 22-Mar-2002
The claimant sought damages from his former solicitors for failing to act to avoid his case being struck out. The second action was itself delayed, and the defendants asserted that the cause of action occurred not when his claim was actually struck . .
CitedHaward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Professional Negligence

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.470707

Nolan v Wright: ChD 26 Feb 2009

The defendant sought to re-open the question of whether the charge under which he might otherwise be liable was an extortionate credit bargain. The creditor said that that plea was time barred. The defendant argued that a finding that the agreement amounted to an extortionate bargain would not be a substantive relief, and was therefore not subject to a time bar. The claimant had admitted leaving agreements to run unenforced to avoid arguments over whether the agreement was extortionate.
Held: The defendant was required under the rules to give notice to apply for such an order, and therefore ‘a claim to reopen a credit agreement as an extortionate credit bargain is an action upon a specialty to which in principle, and subject to section 9 (and the other provisions) of the 1980 Act, a limitation period of 12 years from the date of entry into the relevant credit agreement applies.’ It was clear that many of the defendant’s assertions were fanciful, and contradicted by his own contemporaneous and later documents. However there were similarly doubts about the claimants own case which required investigation at trial.

Hodge QC J
[2009] EWHC 305 (Ch)
Bailii
Consumer Credit Act 1974 137 138 139 140, Limitation Act 1980 8
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedCollin v Duke of Westminster CA 1985
In 1975 the tenant sought to exercise his right to purchase the freehold reversion of his property. The landlord argued that the rent payable precluded any such entitlement. Under the law as then understood, the landlord’s contention appeared . .
CitedHill (As Trustee In Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v Spread Trustee Company Ltd and Another CA 12-May-2006
The defendants sought relief for transactions entered into at an undervalue. The bankrupt had entered into charges and an assignment of a loan account in their favour before his bankruptcy, and the trustee had obtained an order for them to be set . .
CitedBray v Stuart A West and Co 1989
The court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction over legal professions are not proceedings founded on any cause of action, and so are not subject to the Limitation Act. . .
CitedParagon Finance plc v Nash etc CA 15-Oct-2001
The court was asked to consider whether there was any implied term limiting the power of a mortgagee to set interest rates under a variable rate mortgage.
Held: A loan arrangement which allowed a lender to vary the implied rate of interest, . .
CitedFirst National Bank Plc v Syed CA 1991
The court can exercise the supervisory jurisdiction over consumer contracts under the 1974 Act irrespective of any application made by a party. . .
CitedRe Priory Garage (Walthamstow) Limited ChD 2001
The court considered the relevance of a statutory limitation period in relation to applications to set aside transactions as being at an undervalue or as voidable preferences under section 238 to 241 of the 1986 Act. Applications to set aside . .
CitedRahman v Sterling Credit Ltd CA 17-Oct-2000
A lender sought repossession of a property securing a loan from 1998. The borrower sought to assert that the loan was an extortionate credit bargain under the Act. The lender asserted that that claim was out of time.
Held: A claim under a . .
CitedLetang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .
CitedNational Westminster Bank v Daniel CA 1993
The defence contained two contradictory grounds, and the defendant’s evidence again contradicted the defences. The plaintiff sought summary judgment.
Held: A judge, when considering whether a claim should be determined then or allowed to . .
CitedSwain v Hillman CA 21-Oct-1999
Strike out – Realistic Not Fanciful Chance Needed
The proper test for whether an action should be struck out under the new Rules was whether it had a realistic as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success. There was no justification for further attempts to explain the meaning of what are clear . .
CitedThree Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of The Bank of England HL 18-May-2000
The applicants alleged misfeasance against the Bank of England in respect of the regulation of a bank.
Held: The Bank could not be sued in negligence, but the tort of misfeasance required clear evidence of misdeeds. The action was now properly . .
CitedE D and F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel and Another CA 4-Apr-2003
The rules contained two occasions on which a court would consider dismissal of a claim as having ‘no real prospect’ of success.
Held: The only significant difference between CPR 24.2 and 13.3(1), is that under the first the overall burden of . .
CitedNationwide Building Society v Dunlop Haywards Ltd and Another ComC 14-Jun-2007
Claims in deceit with regard to valuations of commercial properties. . .
CitedExtraktionstechnik Gesellschaft fur Anlagenbau GmbH v Oskar CA 1984
Where there are unexplained features of both the claim and the defence which are disturbing because they bear the appearance of falsity and disreputable business dealings and questionable conduct, the Court should not make tentative assessments of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Contract, Consumer

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.304541

Dixon Coles and Gill (A Former Firm) v Baines, Bishop of Leeds and Another: CA 20 Jul 2021

Innocent Co-Trustee not Liable for Default

Proceedings were brought by former clients against their former solicitors. One of the partners stole money held in the firm’s client account on behalf of the claimants. The other two partners were entirely innocent of, and in no way implicated in, the frauds. Some of the losses sued for arose from transactions more than six years before the commencement of the proceedings. The issue on the appeal is whether the innocent partners, who are otherwise undoubtedly liable for the clients’ losses, can rely on a limitation defence in respect of those transactions, under section 21 of the Limitation Act 1980.
Held: The solicitors appeal succeeded: ‘A co-trustee is not to be treated as party or privy to another trustee’s fraudulent breaches of trust unless facts are alleged and proved which show the co-trustee to have been implicated in the frauds in some way, meeting the tests indicated in Thorne v Heard. It follows that DCG are not within the scope of section 21(1)(a) and they are entitled to rely on the six-year limitation period as a defence.’

Sir Timothy Lloyd
[2021] EWCA Civ 1097
Bailii, Judiciary
Limitation Act 1980 21
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedMoore v Knight ChD 18-Dec-1890
The court considered the liability of partners in a solicitors’ firm for embezzlement of client money by an employee of the firm. Once the true position became known, after many years, the client sued the surviving partners, who relied on . .
CitedThorne v Heard CA 24-Jan-1894
A first mortgagee, Heard, had sold property under the power of sale and had retained a solicitor, Searle, to act in relation to the sale. Searle received the proceeds of sale, satisfied the first mortgage debt, but retained the balance, falsely . .
CitedThorne v Heard HL 1895
Recovery was sought from the partners of a defaulting solicitor.
Lord Herschell LC disposed of the argument about concealment first, and then turned to section 8, saying: ‘My Lords, the only remaining question is, Did the statute apply? It is . .
CitedBlair v Bromley ChD 18-Nov-1846
Two solicitors having entered into partnership, each of them continued to attend to the business of his former clients, but on the partnership account; and one of the partners having proposed to invest a sum of money belonging to a client in a . .
CitedBlair v Bromley CA 3-Jul-1847
Held; . .
CitedDubai Aluminium Company Limited v Salaam and Others HL 5-Dec-2002
Partners Liable for Dishonest Act of Solicitor
A solicitor had been alleged to have acted dishonestly, having assisted in a fraudulent breach of trust by drafting certain documents. Contributions to the damages were sought from his partners.
Held: The acts complained of were so close to . .
Appeal fromLord Bishop of Leeds v Dixon Coles and Gill (A Firm) and Others ChD 28-Oct-2020
The claimants had been clients of the defendant solicitors former firmer. A partner of the defendants had stolen large sums of money in the names of the claimants from the firm’s client account. The defendants themselves were not said to have been . .
CitedHughes v Twisden ChD 1886
One partner in a firm of solicitors committed a fraud on a client by using deeds held on behalf of the client as security for a loan for his own benefit, the funds, so far as appeared, not passing through the firm’s accounts. The fraudulent partner . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Legal Professions, Limitation, Trusts, Company

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.666020

Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue and Another: HL 25 Oct 2006

The tax payer had overpaid Advance Corporation Tax under an error of law. It sought repayment. The revenue contended that the claim was time barred.
Held: The claim was in restitution, and the limitation period began to run from the date when the claimants discovered their mistake. The appellants had submitted that section 33 of the 1973 Act provided the second of only two remedies for recovery of tax paid under a mistake of law. The first remedy was said to be a common law right to recover tax unlawfully demanded, of which Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe said: ‘When parliament enacts a special regime providing special rights and remedies, that regime may (but does not always) supersede and displace common law rights and remedies (or more general statutory rights and remedies). Whether it has that effect is a question of statutory construction.’
Lord Hoffmann said: ‘The answer, at any rate for the moment, is that unlike civilian systems, English law has no general principle that to retain money paid without any legal basis (such as debt, gift, compromise, etc) is unjust enrichment. In the Woolwich case [1993] AC 70, 172 Lord Goff said that English law might have developed so as to recognise such a general principle – the condictio indebiti of civilian law – but had not done so. In England, the claimant has to prove that the circumstances in which the payment was made come within one of the categories which the law recognizes as sufficient to make retention by the recipient unjust. Lord Goff provided a list in the Woolwich case at pp 164-165 and the decision itself added another. [i.e. money paid by way of tax to a public body which was acting ultra vires]’

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
Times 26-Oct-2006, [2006] UKHL 49, [2007] 1 AC 558, [2006] BTC 781, [2007] Eu LR 226, [2007] 1 CMLR 14, [2006] STI 2386, [2006] 3 WLR 781, [2007] 1 All ER 449
Bailii, HL
Limitation Act 1980 32(1), Taxes Management Act 1973 33
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedMeadows v Grand Junction Waterworks Company 1905
. .
CitedWoolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (2) HL 20-Jul-1992
The society had set out to assert that regulations were unlawful in creating a double taxation. It paid money on account of the tax demanded. It won and recovered the sums paid, but the revenue refused to pay any interest accrued on the sums paid. . .
CitedHenderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd HL 25-Jul-1994
Lloyds Agents Owe Care Duty to Member; no Contract
Managing agents conducted the financial affairs of the Lloyds Names belonging to the syndicates under their charge. It was alleged that they managed these affairs with a lack of due careleading to enormous losses.
Held: The assumption of . .
CitedMarcic v Thames Water Utilities Limited HL 4-Dec-2003
The claimant’s house was regularly flooded by waters including also foul sewage from the respondent’s neighbouring premises. He sought damages and an injunction. The defendants sought to restrict the claimant to his statutory rights.
Held: The . .
CitedKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
CitedNational Provincial Bank Limited v Ainsworth HL 1965
The significance of the distinction between occupation and rights was that although the deserted wife was in actual occupation of the former matrimonial home, the quality of her rights was not such as to be capable of amounting to an overriding . .
CitedMetallgesellschaft Ltd and Others v Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another Hoechst Ag and Another v Same ECJ 8-Mar-2001
The British law which meant that non-resident parent companies of British based businesses were not able to recover interest on payments of advance corporation tax, was discriminatory against other European based companies. Accordingly the law was . .
At First InstanceDeutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue, HM Attorney General ChD 18-Jul-2003
The taxpayer sought to bring an action for restitution by the revenue of sums paid under a mistake of law. Under the Metallgesellschaft decision, rights of election for recovery of overpaid tax applied only between UK resident companies.
Held: . .
Appeal fromInland Revenue and Another v Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc CA 4-Feb-2005
The company sought repayment of excess advance corporation tax payments made under a mistake of law. The question was the extent of the effect of the ruling in Klienwort Benson, in particular whether it covered sums paid as taxation, and how the law . .

Cited by:
CitedTotal Network Sl v Customs and Excise Commissioners CA 31-Jan-2007
The defendants suspected a carousel VAT fraud. The defendants appealed a finding that there was a viable cause of action alleging a ‘conspiracy where the unlawful means alleged is a common law offence of cheating the public revenue’. The defendants . .
CitedAwoyomi v Radford and Another QBD 12-Jul-2007
The claimant sought damages from the defendant barristers who had represented her in criminal proceedings. They had not passed on to her the statement made by the judge in chambers that if she pleaded guilty he would not impose a sentence of . .
CitedSempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another HL 18-Jul-2007
The parties agreed that damages were payable in an action for restitution, but the sum depended upon to a calculation of interest. They disputed whether such interest should be calculated on a simple or compound basis. The company sought compound . .
CitedSomerville v Scottish Ministers HL 24-Oct-2007
The claimants complained of their segregation while in prison. Several preliminary questions were to be decided: whether damages might be payable for breach of a Convention Right; wheher the act of a prison governor was the act of the executive; . .
CitedTotal Network Sl v Revenue and Customs HL 12-Mar-2008
The House was asked whether an action for unlawful means conspiracy was available against a participant in a missing trader intra-community, or carousel, fraud. The company appealed a finding of liability saying that the VAT Act and Regulations . .
CitedFender (Administrator of FG Collier and Sons Ltd) v National Westminster Bank Plc ChD 26-Sep-2008
The administrator sought declarations as to whether to treat the bank as a secured or unsecured creditor.
Held: The court directed the Administrator to recognise the Bank as a secured creditor, as if the Deed of Release had never been . .
CitedMcE, Re; McE v Prison Service of Northern Ireland and Another HL 11-Mar-2009
Complaint was made that the prisoner’s privileged conversations with his solicitors had been intercepted by the police.
Held: The Act made explicit provisions allowing such interception and set out the appropriate safeguards. The interceptions . .
CitedKommune and Another v DEPFA Acs Bank ComC 4-Sep-2009
Local authorities in Denmark sought to recover sums paid to the defendant banks for swap trading, saying that the payments had been outwith their powers. . .
CitedChild Poverty Action Group, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary Of State for Work and Pensions CA 14-Oct-2009
CPAG appealed against a refusal of a declaration that the respondent could use only the 1992 Act to recover overpayment of benefits where there had been neither misrepresentation nor non-disclosure.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and the court . .
CitedThe Child Poverty Action Group v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions SC 8-Dec-2010
The Action Group had obtained a declaration that, where an overpayment of benefits had arisen due to a miscalculation by the officers of the Department, any process of recovering the overpayment must be by the Act, and that the Department could not . .
CitedTest Claimants In The Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Inland Revenue SC 23-May-2012
The European Court had found the UK to have unlawfully treated differently payment of franked dividends between subsidiaries of UK companies according to whether all the UK subsidiaries were themselves UK based, thus prejudicing European . .
CitedZurich Insurance Plc UK Branch v International Energy Group Ltd SC 20-May-2015
A claim had been made for mesothelioma following exposure to asbestos, but the claim arose in Guernsey. Acknowledging the acute difficultis particular to the evidence in such cases, the House of Lords, in Fairchild. had introduced the Special Rule . .
CitedMarine Trade Sa v Pioneer Freight Futures Co Ltd Bvi and Another ComC 29-Oct-2009
The parties stood to make substantial losses against each other under contracts for differences after the dramatic fall in the freight market in the financial turmoil of late 2008. . .
CitedLittlewoods Ltd and Others v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs SC 1-Nov-2017
The appellants had overpaid under a mistake of law very substantial sums in VAT over several years. The excess had been repaid, but with simple interest and not compound interest, which the now claimed (together with other taxpayers amounting to 17 . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Corporation Tax, Limitation, Equity, Taxes Management

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.245608

Al-Rawas v Hassan Khan and Co (A Firm) and Another: CA 1 Feb 2017

Counterclaim not exempt from limitation by right

The claimant firms of solicitors sought to recover their fees from their former clients. In answer the defendants sought to say that they should be allowed to counterclaim in negligence saying that as a counterclaim, section 35(3) of the 1980 Act operated to allow the counterclaim as of right.
Held: That was not the effect of the subsection.

Elias, Sharp LJJ, Green J
[2017] EWCA Civ 42, [2017] WLR(D) 64, [2017] PNLR 13, [2017] 1 WLR 2301
Bailii, WLRD
Limitation Act 1980 35(3)
England and Wales

Limitation

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.573865

Winterburn and Another v Bennett and Another: CA 25 May 2016

The court was asked as to the steps which an owner of land must take to prevent others, who were using the land without permission, acquiring rights over the land. The claimants here had ignored clear signs placed on the land which asserted the defendant’s ownership, using it exclusively as a car park for their shop customers.
Held: The claimants’ appeal against rejection of a claim to use for more than 20 years giving rise to a presumption of lost modern grant failed. The signs had been continually present, and now in the context of commons registration, the signs were enough to defeat the claim. ‘The situation which has arisen in the present case is commonplace. Many millions of people in this country own property. Most people do not seek confrontation, whether orally or in writing, and in many cases they may be concerned or even frightened of doing so. Most people do not have the means to bring legal proceedings. There is a social cost to confrontation and, unless absolutely necessary, the law of property should not require confrontation in order for people to retain and defend what is theirs. The erection and maintenance of an appropriate sign is a peaceful and inexpensive means of making clear that property is private and not to be used by others. I do not see why those who choose to ignore such signs should thereby be entitled to obtain legal rights over the land.’

Sharp, David Richards LJJ, Moylan J
[2016] EWCA Civ 482, [2016] WLR(D) 297
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedDalton v Henry Angus and Co HL 14-Jun-1881
The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some . .
CitedNewnham v Willison CA 1987
Kerr LJ considered the exercise of an easement over land (a sweep of a curve over a driveway) by force, saying: ‘In my view, what these authorities show is that there may be ‘vi’ – a forceful exercise of the user – in contrast to a user as of right . .
CitedRegina v Oxfordshire County Council and Another, Ex Parte Sunningwell Parish Council HL 25-Jun-1999
When setting out to establish that a piece of land has become a village green with rights of common, the tests are similar to those used in the law of prescription and adverse possession. Accordingly, there is no need to establish a belief in those . .
CitedTaylor v Betterment Properties (Weymouth) Ltd and Another CA 7-Mar-2012
The respondent owned farmland over which public rights of way were claimed. . .
CitedBarkas, Regina (on The Application of ) v North Yorkshire County Council and Another SC 6-Mar-2014
The Court was asked as to the registration of a playing field as a ‘town or village green’. Local residents asserted that their use of the land, having been ‘as of right’ required the registration. They now appealed against rejection of that . .
CitedEaton v The Swansea Waterworks Company 5-Jun-1851
Case for disturbing a watercourse which of right ought to flow into plaintiff’s close to irrigate it, On the trial it appeared that the watercourse was not ancient, but that the water had flowed in its present muree for more than twenty years, past . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.564718

Ministry of Defence v AB and Others: SC 14 Mar 2012

The respondent Ministry had, in 1958, conducted experimental atmospheric explosions of atomic weapons. The claimants had been obliged as servicemen to observe the explosions, and appealed against dismissal of their claims for radiation sickness under the 1980 Act. They said that they had only acquired the knowledge to found an action in 2007 on the issue of a scientific report from New Zealand, but they had issued the action before then.
Held: The servicemen’s appeals were dismissed (Lord Phillips, Lady Hale and Lord Kerr dissenting). The court should answer two questions. It should first identify just what knowledge was to be present to satisfy the test, and then what state of mind, assessed subjectively or objectively would amount to knowledge of it. Since a claimant must state that he believes that his assertions are true, it must be a legal impossibility to deny knowledge of the facts at that time. The inquiry required by section 14(1) was also retrospective. Once an expert had been consulted and his advice received, a claimant’s belief’s properly were characterised as ‘knowledge’ for the section. Once that knowledge arose there could be no open ended extension of the time within which an action must be brought. Evidential difficulties faced by a claimant were not to be counted as lack of knowledge.
The dissenting judges drew clear distinctions between knowledge and belief. A claimant’s subjective belief was not a sensible basis for deciding whether the claim is time-barred.

Lord Phillips, President, Lord Walker, Lady Hale, Lord Brown, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson
[2012] UKSC 9, [2012] 2 WLR 643, UKSC 2010/0247, [2012] 3 All ER 673, [2013] 1 AC 78, 125 BMLR 69, [2012] PIQR P13, [2012] WLR(D) 79, (2012) 125 BMLR 69, [2012] Med LR 306
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC
Limitation Act 1980 11(4) 14(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedDas v Ganju CA 31-Mar-1999
Where a personal injury action had been delayed for five years by bad advice from solicitors and counsel, the court’s discretion should be exercised to allow the plaintiff to proceed with her claim, not herself being responsible for the delay.
CitedA’Court v Cross 28-Nov-1825
Defendant being arrested on a debt more than six years old, said, ‘I know that I owe the money, but the bill I gave is on a threepenny receipt stamp, and I will never pay it.’ Held, not such an acknowledgment as would revive the debt agdinst a plea . .
CitedSmith v Central Asbestos Co Ltd; Central Asbestos Co Ltd v Dodd HL 1973
The House considered at what point an injured person was to be deemed to have become aware of his injury so as to start the limitation period.
Held: A majority rejected the proposition that knowledge of ‘material facts’ for section 1(3) . .
CitedChurch v Ministry of Defence QBD 23-Feb-1984
The 62 year old claimant sought damages after working in in the defendant’s dockyard and being exposed to asbestos. Pleural plaques were apparent on X-ray and the pleura would constrict the lung and induce breathlessness; and the asbestos must have . .
CitedSykes v Ministry of Defence QBD 19-Mar-1984
The claimant was exposed to asbestos whilst working for the defendant in the naval dockyard at Portsmouth, and sought damages having developed pleural plaques, but no further damage was expected, save ‘a slightly increased risk of developing a lung . .
CitedDavis v Ministry of Defence CA 26-Jul-1985
May LJ said: ‘Knowledge’ is an ordinary English word with a clear meaning to which one must give full effect; ‘reasonable belief’ or ‘suspicion’ is not enough. The relevant question merits repetition – ‘when did the appellant first know that his . .
CitedHalford v Brookes CA 1991
The plaintiff, the mother and administratrix of the estate of a 16 year old girl, alleged that her daughter had been murdered by one or both of the Defendants. The claim was for damages for battery. Rougier J at first instance had decided that: . .
CitedNash v Eli Lilly and Co CA 1993
The court considered whether a solicitor acting for a potential plaintiff was considered to be an expert for the purposes of the section.
Held: Purchas LJ said: ‘Of course as advice from a solicitor as to the legal consequences of the act or . .
CitedBroadley v Guy Clapham and Co CA 9-Sep-1993
The limitation period starts when a reasonable person would have sought medical help. Section 14(1)(b) requires that ‘one should look at the way the plaintiff puts his case, distil what he is complaining about and ask whether he had in broad terms . .
CitedWhitfield v North Durham Health Authority CA 1995
In 1987, and before the claim was issued in 1992 the claimant had issued a claim which had never been served. She sought to extend the limitation period arguing that she had not acquired the requisite knowledge until later,
Held: She had had . .
CitedSpargo v North Essex District Health Authority CA 13-Mar-1997
The test of ‘When a plaintiff became aware of the cause of an injury’ is a subjective test of what passed through plaintiff’s mind. ‘(1) the knowledge required to satisfy s14(1)(b) is a broad knowledge of the essence of the causally relevant act or . .
CitedSniezek v Bundy (Letchworth) Limited CA 7-Jul-2000
The claimant appealed against a finding that having once already issued a claim, a second claim was out of time, not accepting that she had had the knowledge effective to commence the limitation period.
Held: Judge LJ had ‘difficulty in . .
CitedAmin, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 16-Oct-2003
Prisoner’s death – need for full public enquiry
The deceased had been a young Asian prisoner. He was placed in a cell overnight with a prisoner known to be racist, extremely violent and mentally unstable. He was killed. The family sought an inquiry into the death.
Held: There had been a . .

Cited by:
CitedSiddiqui v University of Oxford QBD 5-Dec-2016
The University applied to have struck out the claim by the claimant for damages alleging negligence in its teaching leading to a lower class degree than he said he should have been awarded.
Held: Strike out on the basis that the claim was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.452130

Soar v Ashwell: CA 1893

Trustees under a will had entrusted the trust fund to a solicitor for investment. The solicitor exercised all of their administrative and investment powers for them and distributed part of the fund invested to the beneficiaries under the will but retained part in his own hands. Some 12 years later, the surviving trustee brought an action claiming an account of the money retained by the solicitor.
Held: The solicitor must be considered as having been in the position of an express trustee of such money with the consequence that lapse of time did not bar the action.
A de facto trustee is subject to the same duties as an actual trustee.
Lord Esher MR said: ‘If there is created in expressed terms, whether written or verbal, a trust, and a person is in terms nominated to be the trustee of that trust, a Court of Equity, upon proof of such facts, will not allow him to vouch a Statute of Limitations against a breach of that trust. Such a trust is in equity called an express trust. If the only relation which it is proved the defendant or person charged bears to the matter is a contractual relation, he is not in the view of equity a trustee at all, but only a contractor; and equity leaves the contractual relation to be determined by the common or statute law. If the breach of the legal relation relied on, whether such breach be by way of tort or contract, makes, in the view of a Court of Equity, the defendant a trustee for the plaintiff, the Court of Equity treats the defendant as a trustee become so by construction, and the trust is called a constructive trust; and against the breach which by construction creates the trust the Court of Equity allows Statutes of Limitation to be vouched.’
Lord Esher continued: ‘There was an express trust created, but Ashwell was not at any time nominated as a trustee of that trust. He was the solicitor of the nominated trustees. As such solicitor he was entrusted by the nominated trustees to take and have in his hands the trust money, with a direction on their behalf to deal with it according to the terms of the trust. Assume that he misappropriated that money to his own use, and that that was all; the misappropriation would at once of itself make him the holder of the money in trust for the rightful owner, but, if that were all, only a trustee by construction of a constructive trust. But the questions in this case are whether Ashwell was not, in view of a Court of Equity, a trustee of the money before the alleged breach by misappropriation, and, if he was, under which class of trust he was with regard to limitations. The moment the money was in his hands, he was in a fiduciary relation to the nominated trustees; he was a fiduciary agent of theirs; he held the money in trust to deal with it for them as directed by them; he was a trustee for them. He was therefore a trustee of the money before he committed, if he did commit, the alleged breach of trust, and was in possession of and had control over the money before he committed, if at all, the alleged breach of trust.
The cases seem to me to decide that, where a person has assumed, either with or without consent, to act as a trustee of money or other property, ie, to act in a fiduciary relation with regard to it, and has in consequence been in possession of or has exercised command or control over such money or property, a Court of Equity will impose upon him all the liabilities of an express trustee, and will class him with and will call him an express trustee of an express trust. The principal liability of such a trustee is that he must discharge himself by accounting to his cestui que trusts for all such money or property without regard to lapse of time.
There is another recognised state of circumstances in which a person not nominated a trustee may be bound to liability as if he were a nominated trustee, namely, where he has knowingly assisted a nominated trustee in a fraudulent and dishonest disposition of the trust property. Such a person will be treated by a Court of Equity as if he were an express trustee of an express trust. I am of opinion that the present case is within the description of that which is treated as and is called in equity an express trust, and that the inquiry as to the alleged breach cannot be stopped by the Statute of Limitations.
I am clearly convinced by the evidence that Ashwell became on receipt of the money a trustee of it, and that, as he has not been shewn to have accounted for it, the defendant, his executrix, is liable as such for a breach of trust by him. ‘
Bowen LJ said: ‘It has been established beyond doubt by authority binding on this Court that a person occupying a fiduciary relation, who has property deposited with him on the strength of such relation, is to be dealt with as an express, and not merely a constructive, trustee of such property. His possession of such property is never in virtue of any right of his own, but is coloured from the first by the trust and confidence in virtue of which he received it.’
Recognising that the authorities were irreconcilable, he identified three cases where a constructive trustee would be treated for limitation purposes like an express trustee, namely the case of de facto trustees, which was the case before the court; the case of a stranger to the trust knowingly assisting the fraud of a trustee; and the case of a stranger knowingly receiving trust property in breach of trust.
Kay LJ said: ‘The result seems to be that there are certain cases of what are, strictly speaking, constructive trusts, in which the Statute of Limitations cannot be set up as a defence. Amongst these are the case where a stranger to the trust has assumed to act and has acted as a trustee, and the case where a stranger has concurred with the trustee in committing a breach of trust, and has taken possession of the trust property, knowing that it was trust property, and has not duly discharged himself of it by handing it over to the proper trustees or to the persons absolutely entitled to it.
I think that the present case comes within one or both those categories. I think that Ashwell did assume to act and acted as trustee of the funds which he received, and that he has not duly discharged himself from the plaintiff’s share of those funds, and must therefore be treated as an express trustee.’

Lord Esher MR, Bowen LJ, Kay LJ
[1893] 2 QB 390
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
CitedPeconic Industrial Development Ltd v Lau Kwok FAI 27-Feb-2009
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. The limitation period for a claim in dishonest assistance is 6 years. For limitation purposes a distinction is to be made between two kinds of constructive trustees: those who are fiduciaries and those who are . .
CitedWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria QBD 8-Apr-2011
The claimant had been defrauded by a customer of the defendant bank. He brought a claim against the bank, saying that they knew or ought to have known of the fraudster’s activities, and were liable. The Bank denied that the UK courts had . .
CitedWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria SC 19-Feb-2014
Bank not liable for fraud of customer
The appellant sought to make the bank liable for a fraud committed by the Bank’s customer, the appellant saying that the Bank knew or ought to have known of the fraud. The court was asked whether a party liable only as a dishonest assistant was a . .
Dicta appliedIn re Gallard 1897
. .
Dicta appliedHeynes v Dixon 1900
. .
Dicta appliedIn re Eyre-Williams 1923
. .
CitedHenchley and Others v Thompson ChD 16-Feb-2017
The Claimants sought an order directing the Defendant to provide a full account of his dealings with the assets of the two trusts as a trustee or as a de facto trustee.
Held: The court has a discretion whether or not to make an order for an . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Trusts, Legal Professions

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.230273

A v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth: CA 12 Apr 2006

Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the National Lottery. They complained that the Limitation Act gave the court no discretion to extend the period for a claim as it would in claim in negligence.
Held: Stubbings v Webb was binding on the court, and that decision had been confirmed by the ECHR. The court was bound to apply the six year limitation period and the court had no discretion to extend it. The assaults were deliberate, not by way of negligence. Human Rights law should not be used to take away the rights now of defendants not to be sued.

Sir Anthony Clarke MR, Brooke LJ VP, Arden LJ
[2006] Fam Law 533, [2006] 2 FLR 727, [2006] 1 WLR 2320, [2006] 3 FCR 673, [2006] EWCA Civ 395, Times 28-Apr-2006, [2006] 1 WLR 2320
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 11(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBarras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co HL 17-Mar-1933
The court looked at the inference that a statute’s draughtsman could be assumed when using a phrase to rely on a known interpretation of that phrase.
Viscount Buckmaster said: ‘It has long been a well established principle to be applied in the . .
CitedRogers, Regina (on the Application of) v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust CA 12-Apr-2006
The claimant challenged the policy of her local health authority not to allow prescription to her of the drug Herceptin.
Held: The policy had not been settled upon lawfully and was to be set aside. On the one hand the PCT developed a policy . .
CitedKR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 12-Feb-2003
The respondent appealed decisions by the court to allow claims for personal injury out of time. The claims involved cases of sexual abuse inflicted by its employees going back over many years.
Held: The judge had misapplied the test laid down . .
CitedBillings v Reed CA 1945
The plaintiff’s wife had been killed by a negligently piloted RAF aeroplane. It was argued that, although this was a war injury, the language of section 3(1) did not exclude a claim based on trespass to the person.
Held: Lord Greene MR said: . .
CitedCartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd HL 1963
The plaintiffs were steel dressers who, in the course of their employment, had inhaled quantities of noxious dust which had caused them to suffer from pneumoconiosis. They issued proceedings on 1 October 1956 but were unable to show any breach of . .
CitedLowsley and Another v Forbes (Trading As I E Design Services) HL 29-Jul-1998
The plaintiffs, with the leave of the court, had obtained garnishee and charging orders nisi against the debtor 11 and a half years after they had obtained a consent judgment.
Held: An application by the judgment debtor to set aside the orders . .
CriticisedStubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .
CitedRegina v Chard HL 1983
The defendant appealed his conviction which had been obtained but based upon the evidence of a ‘super-grass’. His appeal failed, but the witness then withdrew his evidence. The matter was referred back to the court under the section, which then . .
CitedLetang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .
CitedFarrell v Alexander HL 24-Jun-1976
The House considered the construction of a consolidation Act.
Held: It is ordinarily both unnecessary and undesirable to construe a consolidation Act by reference to statutory antecedents, but it is permissible to do so in a case where the . .
CitedLong v Hepworth 1968
. .
CitedMaxwell v Murphy 1957
Sir Owen Dixon CJ said: ‘The general rule of the common law is that a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a . .
CitedMaxwell v Murphy 1957
Sir Owen Dixon CJ said: ‘The general rule of the common law is that a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a . .
CitedLaws and others v The Society of Lloyd’s CA 19-Dec-2003
The applicants sought to amend earlier pleadings to add a claim that their human rights had been infringed by the 1982 Act, which gave the respondents certain immunities.
Held: The Human Rights Act 1998 was not retrospective. At the time when . .
CitedRowe v Kingston-Upon-Hull City Council and Another CA 24-Jul-2003
The claimant sought damages for a breach of duty by his teachers which had happened before 1991. He argued that 3(1) of the HRA should affect the construction of section 14(1) of the 1980 Act. . .
CitedWalkley v Precision Forgings Ltd HL 1979
The plaintiff tried to bring a second action in respect of an industrial injury claim outside the limitation period so as to overcome the likelihood that his first action, although timeous, would be dismissed for want of prosecution.
Held: He . .
CitedYew Bon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Mara PC 7-Oct-1982
(Malaysia) In 1972 the appellants were injured by the respondent’s bus. At that time the local limitation period was 12 months. In 1974 the limitation period became three years. The appellants issued a writ in 1975. To succeed they would have to sue . .
CitedC v D QBD 23-Feb-2006
The claimant sought damages against the defendant and the school at which he was taught alleging that he had been sexually abused. The allegations were denied. . .
CitedAssicurazioni Generali Spa v Arab Insurance Group (BSC) CA 13-Nov-2002
Rehearing/Review – Little Difference on Appeal
The appellant asked the Court to reverse a decision on the facts reached in the lower court.
Held: The appeal failed (Majority decision). The court’s approach should be the same whether the case was dealt with as a rehearing or as a review. . .
CitedWong v Parkside Health NHS Trust and Another CA 16-Nov-2001
The claimant had sued her former employer for post-traumatic stress resulting from alleged harassment at her place of work. The claimant appealed against an order refusing damages. The court had held that outside the 1997 Act which was not in force . .
CitedRose v Plenty CA 7-Jul-1975
Contrary to his employers orders, a milkman allowed children to assist him in his milkround. One was injured, and sued the milkman’s employer.
Held: The milkman had not gone so far outside the activities for which he was employed for the . .

Cited by:
CitedKR and others v Royal and Sun Alliance Plc CA 3-Nov-2006
The insurer appealed findings of liability under the 1930 Act. Claims had been made for damages for child abuse in a residential home, whom they insured. The home had become insolvent, and the claimants had pursued the insurer.
Held: The . .
See AlsoA v Hoare HL 30-Jan-2008
Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Limitation, Human Rights

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.240356

Powell v McFarlane: ChD 1977

A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the owner of land with the paper title is deemed to be in possession of the land, as being the person with the prima facie right to possession. The law will thus, without reluctance, ascribe possession either to the paper owner or to the persons who can establish a title as claiming through the paper owner.
If the law is to attribute possession of land to a person who can establish no paper title to possession, he must be shown to have both factual possession and the requisite intention to possess (‘animus possidendi’).’ and
‘Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single [exclusive] possession, though there can be a single possession exercised by or on behalf of several persons jointly. Thus an owner of land and a person intruding on that land without his consent cannot be both in possession of the land at the same time. The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed . . Everything must depend on the particular circumstances, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so.’ and
‘The question of animus possidendi is, in my judgment, one of crucial importance in the present case. An owner or other person with a right to possession of land will be readily assumed to have the requisite intention to possess, unless the contrary is clearly proved. This, in my judgment, is why the slightest acts done by or on behalf of an owner in possession will be found to negative discontinuance of possession. The position, however, is quite different from a case where the question is whether a trespasser has acquired possession. In such a situation the courts will, in my judgment, require clear and affirmative evidence that the trespasser, claiming that he has acquired possession, not only had the requisite intention to possess, but made such intention clear to the world. If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made it perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner.’
Slade J said: ‘In view of the drastic results of a change of possession, however, a person seeking to dispossess an owner must, in my judgment, at least make his intention sufficiently clear so that the owner, if present at the land, would clearly appreciate that the claimant is not merely a persistent trespasser, but is actually seeking to dispossess him.’ and
‘What is really meant, in my judgment, is that the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow.’ and
‘Whether or not acts of possession done on parts of an area establish title to the whole area must, however, be a matter of degree. It is impossible to generalise with any precision as to what acts will or will not suffice to evidence factual possession.’

Slade J
(1977) 38 PandCR 452
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Cited by:
Approved ‘Remarkable’J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .
CitedTopplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
CitedLondon Borough of Lambeth v Blackburn CA 14-Jun-2001
The appellant had broken into an empty council owned flat, and subsequently occupied it. After twelve years the authority obtained a court order for possession. The court had held that the appellant had not had a sufficient animus possidendi since . .
CitedTower Hamlets v Barrett and Another CA 19-Jul-2005
The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been . .
CitedChapman and Another v Godinn Properties Ltd and others CA 27-Jun-2005
Dispute over right of way over land subject to claim for possessory title. ‘But each case must turn on its own facts. In a case of this nature, the court must ask itself what it is that would be expected of somebody in possession of land of this . .
CitedInglewood Investments Company Ltd v Baker CA 8-Nov-2002
The court considered a claim for the adverse possesion of land.
Held: Dyson LJ said: ‘to establish a claim of adverse possession for the requisite period of 12 years it is necessary to establish: (1) actual possession; (2) an intention to . .
CitedAllen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .
CitedGodmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs HL 20-Jun-2007
The house was asked about whether continuous use of an apparent right of way by the public would create a public right of way after 20 years, and also whether a non overt act by a landowner was sufficient to prove his intention not to dedicate the . .
CitedClear Channel United Kingdom Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 14-Oct-2004
The claimant sought a declaration that it had a tenancy for its occupation by an advertising station, and that it had protection under the 1954 Act. The defendant council said that only a licence had been granted.
Held: The grants included the . .
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedLodge (T/A JD Lodge) v Wakefield Metropolitan Council CA 21-Mar-1995
The plaintiff had formerly been a tenant of the defendant under an informal tenancy. No rent had been paid since 1974. He claimed to have acquired the land by adverse possession. He gave evidence at trial that if he had been asked to pay rent at any . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on the Application of) v The Land Registry (Peterborough Office) Admn 13-Feb-2009
The applicant sought judicial review of the cancellation of his application for first registration of land by adverse possession. The application had been rejected because a public right of way existed through it, and the claimant had not shown the . .
CitedThe Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
CitedWilson and Another v Grainger ChD 4-Dec-2009
The claimants appealed against a decision of the Adjudicator that they had not acquired a piece of their neighbour’s land by adverse possession, on the basis that their use had been by virtue of an oral licence. The judge had found the occupation to . .
CitedStar Energy Weald Basin Ltd and Another v Bocardo Sa SC 28-Jul-2010
The defendant had obtained a licence to extract oil from its land. In order to do so it had to drill out and deep under the Bocardo’s land. No damage at all was caused to B’s land at or near the surface. B claimed in trespass for damages. It now . .
CitedBalevents Ltd v Sartori ChD 29-Sep-2011
A strip of land had at one point been left aside for an anticipated road widening which never took place. The defendant had eventually obtained a registered possessory title to it. The claimant, owner of a neighbouring plot, now challenged that . .
CitedZarb and Another v Parry and Another CA 15-Nov-2011
The parties disputed the position of the boundary between their neighbouring properties. The appellant Z had succeeded in establishing that the the boundary was as they decribed on paper, but the respondents had succeeded in their claim for adverse . .
CitedChambers v London Borough of Havering CA 20-Dec-2011
The defendant appealed against an order for him to surrender possession of land he had claimed by adverse possession. The Council was the registered proprietor. The defendant said he had used the land since 1981 for dumping of motor vehicle parts. . .
CitedCity of London v Samede and Others QBD 18-Jan-2012
The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.182281

Tito v Wadell (No 2): ChD 1977

The liability to account for profits on breach of the self-dealing rule and the fair-dealing rule does not arise from a breach of duty at all. In his judgment such liability is the consequence of an equitable disability rather than of a breach of duty, such as a breach of trust by a trustee or, it appears, a breach of an analogous duty, such as the fiduciary obligations of a company director to his company. The claim for an account of profits is a claim for unjust enrichment, which may succeed, even in the absence of the commission of any wrong, such as a breach of trust or of fiduciary duty or the misuse or misapplication of any of the assets of the beneficiary of the duty. the fair-dealing rule was not confined to trustees, but ‘to many others, such as agents, solicitors and company directors’. It would be anomalous if the limitation applied to trustees, but not to others subject to the same rule. ‘A possible line of escape from the anomaly would be to treat agents, solicitors and the rest as constructive trustees for this purpose, so that all would be subject to the six years period: but I should be reluctant to resort to such artificiality unless driven to it.’

Sir Robert Megarry VC
[1977] 1 Ch 107
Limitation Act 1939 19(2)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedDEG-Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v Koshy and Other (No 3); Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (in receivership) v Same (No 3) CA 28-Jul-2003
The company sought to recover damages from a director who had acted dishonestly, by concealing a financial interest in a different company which had made loans to the claimant company. He replied that the claim was out of time. At first instance the . .
CitedBhullar and Another v McArdle CA 10-Apr-2001
The defendant had registered a caution against the claimant’s land at the Land Registry. The claimant sought its removal and now appealed an order for rectification of the register against him. The parties had reached oral agreements as to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.187427

Nouri v Marvi and Others: CA 14 Oct 2010

The claimant was the registered owner of a leasehold flat, allowing the defendant to live in the flat while he was out abroad. The defendant first re-mortgaged the property in the claimant’s name, forging the claimant’s signature on the mortgage deed, and then, on 2 April 2001, sold the flat to himself, posing as the claimant in instructing solicitors as vendor and instructing other solicitors to act in his own name as the purchaser. Exchange of contracts and completion were simultaneous, and the defendant forged the claimant’s signature on the transfer. On 4 July 2001, using the transfer, the defendant obtained registration of the flat in his own name and he subsequently sold it to an unconnected third party.
On 2 July 2007, the claimant commenced proceedings against the defendant and also the solicitors who had acted for the defendant when he had impersonated the claimant. The action began more than six years after exchange and completion, but less than six years after registration. The limitation issue was whether the claimant suffered damage only on registration or already on 2 April 2001.
Held: The appeal failed. The claim against the solicitors was statute-barred because the claimant suffered actual damage on completion of the sale and was not simply exposed to the contingent loss of his title which would depend on whether Mr Marvi applied for registration as proprietor based on the forged transfer. From 2 April 2001, there was a blot on Mr Nouri’s title that significantly decreased the marketable value of the property.
Patten LJ said: ‘There was no valuation evidence before the judge directed to this issue but Mr Jones [Counsel for Mr Nouri] accepts that had a potential purchaser been told of the forged transfer in the period prior to registration of Mr Marvi’s title, this would undoubtedly have led to a diminution in the price he would have been willing to pay. Although the contract and the transfer to Mr Marvi were of no legal effect, they did expose any purchaser to the risk of possible litigation even if that risk was more apparent than real. This is the point taken in the respondent’s notice.
On this basis there will have been a diminution in the open market value of the Flat following completion on 2nd April 2001. Mr Jones contests this conclusion because it proceeds, he says, on a false assumption: i.e. that a potential purchaser would have been made aware of the difficulties caused by the forged transfer. He submits that there was no realistic possibility of Mr Nouri having discovered the fraud before registration on 4th July and therefore no question of his being under any obligation to disclose those matters to a potential purchaser. The facts were that he remained in ignorance of the fraud until much later.
I do not accept this analysis. It is well established that a cause of action in tort can accrue for the purposes of the Limitation Act without the claimant being aware of it. The decisions of the House of Lords in Cartledge v E. Jopling and Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758 and Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd v Oscar Faber and Partners [1983] 2 AC 1 led to limited changes to the Act to provide alternative time limits of three years running from the date of knowledge. These are now contained in ss.11 and 14A of the 1980 Act.
In this case Mr Nouri was not assisted by s.14A because he had the requisite knowledge of the fraudulent sale to Mr Marvi by 2002. But the provision of these alternative time periods to address the problem of lack of knowledge has left intact the principle that time will run under s.2 even if the claimant is unaware of the circumstances which have led to it. The existence of actual damage for these purposes does not therefore depend on the claimant’s state of knowledge in relation to the breach of duty or its consequences but on whether the breach has in fact caused actual loss.
For this purpose the correct hypothesis must be to ask whether Mr Nouri could have maintained an action for damages against [the solicitors] following completion of the sale to Mr Marvi. That requires one to assume that he was aware of the breach and to assess the impact of that on his property or other assets as at that date. Consistently with this hypothesis, any diminution in the value of the Flat attributable to the breach has to be determined on the basis that Mr Nouri was aware of the forged transfer and was under a corresponding duty to alert a purchaser to that problem. The Flat was unsaleable without such disclosure. It must therefore follow that its open market value was what a purchaser would pay for it with knowledge of the forged transfer. There was therefore actual damage suffered by Mr Nouri as of 2nd April 2001.’

Rix, Patten LJJ, Sir Mark Waller
[2010] EWCA Civ 1107, [2011] CP Rep 6, [2010] 50 EG 64, [2010] 42 EG 105, [2011] PNLR 7
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 2
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBowling and Co Solicitors v Edehomo ChD 2-Mar-2011
The court was asked ‘when an innocent vendor whose signature is forged on the documents for the conveyance of land suffers damage, for the purposes of limitation of an action arising from a solicitor’s breach of duty. Is it on the exchange of . .
CitedBowling and Co Solicitors v Edehomo ChD 2-Mar-2011
The court was asked ‘when an innocent vendor whose signature is forged on the documents for the conveyance of land suffers damage, for the purposes of limitation of an action arising from a solicitor’s breach of duty. Is it on the exchange of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Land

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.425251

Duke of Brunswick v Harmer: QBD 2 Nov 1849

brunswick_harmerQBD1849

On 19 September 1830 an article was published in the Weekly Dispatch. The limitation period for libel was six years. The article defamed the Duke of Brunswick. Seventeen years after its publication an agent of the Duke purchased a back number containing the article from the Weekly Dispatch’s office. Another copy was obtained from the British Museum. The Duke sued on those two publications. The defendant contended that the cause of action was time barred, relying on the original publication date.
Held: The delivery of a copy of the newspaper to the plaintiff’s agent constituted a separate publication in respect of which suit could be brought, and it was not necessary to tell the jury, in estimating the damages as to such matter, to take into consideration the fact that the only publication proved had been the sale to the agent: ‘The defendant, who, on the application of a stranger, delivers to him the writing which libels a third person, publishes the libellous matter to him, though he may have been sent for the purpose of procuring the work by that third person. So far as in him lies, he lowers the reputation of the principal in the mind of the agent, which, although that of an agent, is as capable of being affected by the assertions as if he were a stranger. The act is complete by the delivery: and its legal character is not altered, either by the plaintiff’s procurement or by the subsequent handing over of the writing to him.’

Coleridge J
(1849) 14 QB 185, [1849] EngR 915, (1849) 117 ER 75
Commonlii
Cited by:
CitedLoutchansky v The Times Newspapers Ltd and Others (Nos 2 to 5) CA 5-Dec-2001
Two actions for defamation were brought by the claimant against the defendant. The publication reported in detail allegations made against the claimant of criminal activities including money-laundering on a vast scale. They admitted the defamatory . .
CitedGutnick v Dow Jones 10-Dec-2002
(High Court of Australia) The Court rejected a challenge, in the context of Internet libel, to the applicability of such established principles as that vouchsafed in Duke of Brunswick: ‘It was suggested that the World Wide Web was different from . .
No longer Good lawDow Jones and Co Inc v Jameel CA 3-Feb-2005
Presumption of Damage in Defamation is rebuttable
The defendant complained that the presumption in English law that the victim of a libel had suffered damage was incompatible with his right to a fair trial. They said the statements complained of were repetitions of statements made by US . .
MentionedSteinberg v Pritchard Englefield (A Firm) and Another CA 3-Mar-2005
The defendant appealed dismissal of his defence to an action in defamation.
Held: The court proceeded in his absence, discerning two grounds of appeal from the papers. He had suggested that he awaited pro bono representation but was by . .
CitedBerezovsky v Forbes Inc and Michaels; Glouchkov v Same HL 16-May-2000
Plaintiffs who lived in Russia sought damages for defamation against an American magazine with a small distribution in England. Both plaintiffs had real connections with and reputations in England. A judgment in Russia would do nothing to repair the . .
See AlsoThe Duke Of Brunswick v Harmer 21-Jun-1850
If JH and MY be registered at the stamp office as ‘the sole proprietors’ of a newspaper, ‘that is to say, the said JH as legal owner as mortgagee, and MY as owner of the equity of redemption,’ this is sufficient to fix JH as a proprietor of the . .
CitedTimes Newspapers Ltd (Nos. 1 And 2) v The United Kingdom ECHR 10-Mar-2009
The applicant alleged that the rule under United Kingdom law whereby each time material is downloaded from the Internet a new cause of action in libel proceedings accrued (‘the Internet publication rule’) constituted an unjustifiable and . .
OutmodedGregoire v GP Putnam’s Sons 1948
(New York Court of Appeals) A book had been placed on sale in 1941, but was still being reprinted and sold in 1946.
Held: The rule in Duke of Brunswick v Harmer was formulated ‘in an era which long antedated the modern process of mass . .
CitedFlood v Times Newspapers Ltd QBD 2-Oct-2009
The defendant had published a story in its newspaper. At that time it attracted Reynolds qualified privilege. After the circumstances changed, the paper offered an updating item. That offer was rejected as inadequate.
Held: The qualified . .
MentionedHays Plc v Hartley QBD 17-May-2010
hays_hartleyQBD10
Mr Hartley operated a news agency, and provided to the publisher of the Sunday Mirror, MGN Ltd, allegations of racism that had been levelled at the claimant company by former employees. The allegations were reported in an article headed ”KKK . .
CitedReed Elsevier Uk Ltd (T/A Lexisnexis) and Another v Bewry CA 30-Oct-2014
Appeal from a decision granting the claimant’s application made pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the limitation period in his proceedings for libel and dismissing the defendants’ application to strike out the claimant’s . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation, Limitation, Damages

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.181216

Maga v The Trustees of The Birmingham Archdiocese of The Roman Catholic Church: CA 16 Mar 2010

The claimant appealed against rejection of his claim for damages after alleging sexual abuse by a catholic priest. The judge had found the church not vicariously liable for the injuries, and that the archdiocese had not been under a duty further to pursue the investigation of the reports received by them at the time. The respondent appealed saying that the judge had incorrectly found the claimant to lack capacity.
Held: The judge had misdescribed the test for capacity, however, ‘on the question of whether section 28(1) applied . . the issue is certainly not one of discretion; nor is it an issue of primary fact. It is a matter of judgment, and one which is primarily for the first instance tribunal. There may, in an Aristotelian sense, be only one right answer to the question whether a claimant was able to conduct the litigation, but in this imperfect world, it must, in some cases, be an issue on which reasonable and fully informed Judges could differ. In such cases, and this is, in my view, such a one, an appellate court should not interfere with the Judge’s conclusion unless he has relied on irrelevant evidence, ignored relevant evidence, or misunderstood some evidence.’ The claimant was correctly found to lack capacity.
As to the vicarious liability of the archdiocese, the priest had not sought to draw the claimant within his ‘priestly activities’. This issue ‘although very much fact-dependant, is ultimately one of law rather than of inference from facts . .’ and ‘there are a number of factors, which, when taken together, persuade me that there was a sufficiently close connection between Father Clonan’s employment as priest at the Church and the abuse which he inflicted on the claimant to render it fair and just to impose vicarious liability for the abuse on his employer, the Archdiocese.’ Nevertheless, it was part of his duty to evangelise and befriend non-catholics. The claimant being 12, and the position of the priest in charge of youth activities also gave him special responsibilities. The claimant’s appeal succeeded.
As to the church’s duty to take the investigation further, the initial response was in accordance with standards and expectations at the time. The allegation whilst gross was not of the most serious, and it had been put to the priest who had denied it. However, having once been warned, the senior priest came under a duty to keep a closer eye on the priest. Had he done so further assaults would not have taken place. The church was liable for the acts of its senior priest. Applying the test from Caparo, the judge had been wrong to find no duty of care in the Archdiocese.

Lord Neuberger MR, Longmore LJ, Smith LJ
[2010] EWCA Civ 256, [2010] PTSR 1618, [2010] 1 WLR 1441
Bailii, Times
Limitation Act 1980 28(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedKirby v Leather CA 1965
The plaintiff crashed into a van whilst riding his moped and suffered serious brain damage. An inquiry as to a party’s competence to conduct a case had to focus on his capacity to conduct the proceedings. In this case the plaintiff ‘was not capable . .
MentionedST v North Yorkshire County Council CA 14-Jul-1998
The court considered the liability of the respondent for sexual assaults committed by an employee teacher when taking students on school trips.
Held: The Local Authority was not vicariously liable for sexual assault committed by employee . .
AuthoritativeLister and Others v Hesley Hall Ltd HL 3-May-2001
A school board employed staff to manage a residential school for vulnerable children. The staff committed sexual abuse of the children. The school denied vicarious liability for the acts of the teachers.
Held: ‘Vicarious liability is legal . .
CitedLloyd v Grace, Smith and Co HL 1912
Mrs Lloyd delivered the title deeds of her cottages at Ellesmere Port to the solicitors’ managing clerk, who defrauded her.
Held: Vicarious liability can extend to fraudulent acts or omissions if those were carried out in the course of the . .
CitedCaparo Industries Plc v Dickman and others HL 8-Feb-1990
Limitation of Loss from Negligent Mis-statement
The plaintiffs sought damages from accountants for negligence. They had acquired shares in a target company and, relying upon the published and audited accounts which overstated the company’s earnings, they purchased further shares.
Held: The . .
CitedLindsay v Wood QBD 16-Nov-2006
The claimant suffered severe brain injury in a crash. The parties sought guidance form the court as to his legal capacity.
Held: The fact that a party may be particularly susceptible to exploitation was a relevant element when considering his . .
CitedBernard v The Attorney General of Jamaica PC 7-Oct-2004
PC (Jamaica) The claimant had been queuing for some time to make an overseas phone call at the Post Office. Eventually his turn came, he picked up the phone and dialled. Suddenly a man intervened, announced . .
AppliedJacobi v Griffiths 17-Jun-1999
(Canadian Supreme Court) The process for determining when a non-authorised act by an employee is so connected to the employer’s enterprise that liability should be imposed involved two steps: 1. Firstly a court should determine whether there are . .
CitedMasterman-Lister v Brutton and Co and Another (2) CA 16-Jan-2003
The claimant had been funded for a personal injury claim under legal aid. He appealed against a decision that he was not a ‘patient’ and that he had been fully capable of managing and administering his affairs for many years. He lost. The . .
CitedDubai Aluminium Company Limited v Salaam and Others HL 5-Dec-2002
Partners Liable for Dishonest Act of Solicitor
A solicitor had been alleged to have acted dishonestly, having assisted in a fraudulent breach of trust by drafting certain documents. Contributions to the damages were sought from his partners.
Held: The acts complained of were so close to . .
CitedBazley v Curry 17-Jun-1999
(Canadian Supreme Court) The court considerd the doctrine of vicarious liability: ‘The policy purposes underlying the imposition of vicarious liability on employers are served only where the wrong is so connected with the employment that it can be . .
Appeal fromMaga v The Trustees of The Birmingham Archdiocese of The Roman Catholic Church QBD 22-Apr-2009
There was a sufficiently close connection between the employment of a priest at the church and the abuse which he inflicted on the claimant to render it fair and just to impose vicarious liability for the abuse on his employer, the Archdiocese. . .

Cited by:
CitedCoulson v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd QBD 21-Dec-2011
coulson_NIQBD2011
The claimant had been employed by the defendant as editor of a newspaper. On leaving they entered into an agreement which the claimant said required the defendant to pay his legal costs in any action arising regarding his editorship. The defendant . .
CitedThe Catholic Child Welfare Society and Others v Various Claimants and The Institute of The Brothers of The Christian Schools and Others SC 21-Nov-2012
Law of vicarious liability is on the move
Former children at the children’s homes had sought damages for sexual and physical abuse. The court heard arguments as to the vicarious liability of the Society for abuse caused by a parish priest visiting the school. The Court of Appeal had found . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Vicarious Liability, Limitation

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.402951

Parker and Another v SJ Berwin and Co and Another: QBD 17 Dec 2008

The claimants sought damages from their former solicitors. They set out to purchase a football club, expending substantial sums for the purpose, relying on the defendants’ promised provision of service in finding and arranging the funding. They said that the defendants made no progress, the opportunity was lost, and their money wasted. After a dilatory action, the claimants sought permission to amend their particulars out of time to add several new claims.
Held: Some amendments were allowed since they arose from the same facts, and others were rejected as having no prospect of success. However, it was not open to the Claimants to ‘rely on the CCC Films principle in the present case. There is no presumption that their wasted expenditure is recoverable in full. To recover any of that expenditure they must establish that there was a real and substantial chance of the expenditure being recovered, as would be usual in cases of this nature, and as they themselves initially acknowledged and pleaded.’

Hamblen J
[2008] EWHC 3017 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedCobbold v London Borough of Greenwich CA 9-Aug-1999
The tenant had sought an order against the council landlord for failure to repair her dwelling. The defendant appealed refusal of leave to amend the pleadings in anticipation of the trial, now due to start on the following day.
Held: Leave was . .
CitedFinlan v Winfield ChD 2007
Blackburne J said that when considering an application to amend particulars of claim outside the limitation period: ‘the court should not confine itself to a comparison of the new cause of action with the existing cause of action at the highest . .
CitedSmith v Henniker-Major and Co CA 22-Jul-2002
The claimant appealed the strike-out of his claim for professional negligence against the respondent solicitors. He claimed that the solicitors had acted in breach of their duty, and he then called a company meeting. Only he attended. He mistakenly . .
CitedSwain v Hillman CA 21-Oct-1999
Strike out – Realistic Not Fanciful Chance Needed
The proper test for whether an action should be struck out under the new Rules was whether it had a realistic as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success. There was no justification for further attempts to explain the meaning of what are clear . .
CitedIndependents’ Advantage Insurance Company Ltd v Cook and Another CA 24-Jul-2003
‘The power of the court to strike out a statement of case under CPR 3.4(2)(a) – and the related power to give summary judgment under CPR 24.2 – has an important place in the disposal of claims in accordance with the Civil Procedural Rules. The . .
Not appliedCCC Films (London) Ltd v Impact Quadrant Films Ltd 1984
The claimants purchased a licence to promote three films, but the defendant lost the film prints and CCC could not therefore promote them. After their claim for loss of profit failed in the absence of evidence, they claimed for the expenditure they . .
CitedAllied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons and Simmons CA 12-May-1995
Lost chance claim – not mere speculative claim
Solicitors failed to advise the plaintiffs sufficiently in a property transaction. A warranty against liability for a former tenant’s obligations under leases had not been obtained. The trial judge held that, on a balance of probabilities, there was . .
CitedLaw Society of England and Wales and others v Shah and others ChD 30-Nov-2007
Solicitor firms had been made bankrupt leaving a shortfall after thefts from client accounts of over 12 million pounds. The thief had diappeared, and the other partners were now discharged form bankruptcy. The Law Society accepted that it could not . .
CitedCullinane v British ‘Rema’ Manufacturing Co Ltd CA 1954
The court considered the possibility of a claim in breach of contract for damages for both capital loss and loss of profit.
Lord Evershed MR said: ‘It seems to me, as a matter of principle, that the full claim of damages in the form in which . .
CitedAnglia Television v Oliver Reed CA 1971
The television company had agreed with the actor defendant for him to appear in a production. He breached the contract. The company sought both loss of profits and for the expense incurred. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether such . .
CitedSouth Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd etc HL 24-Jun-1996
Limits of Damages for Negligent Valuations
Damages for negligent valuations are limited to the foreseeable consequences of advice, and do not include losses arising from a general fall in values. Valuation is seldom an exact science, and within a band of figures valuers may differ without . .
CitedL Albert and Son v Armstrong Rubber Co 1949
(United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit) A purchaser of machines designed to recondition rubber sought damages for breach of contract, namely, the cost of the foundation on which the machines were placed. However, the purchaser did not prove . .
CitedFilobake Ltd v Rondo Ltd and Another CA 11-May-2005
Unsuitability of baking equipment installation. A claimant in a breach of contract claim has a choice whether to claim loss of profits or wasted expenditure. . .
CitedGaloo Ltd and Others v Bright Grahame Murray CA 21-Dec-1993
It is for the Court to decide whether the breach of duty was the cause of a loss or simply the occasion for it by the application of common sense. A breach of contract, to found recovery, must be shown to have been ‘an ‘effective’ or ‘dominant’ . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Litigation Practice, Limitation

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.278861

Heath v Pugh: CA 1881

The freeholder charged the land in 1856. He remained in possession, and did not make any payments or give any acknowledgment of the mortgagee’s title. In 1870 the mortgagee presented a bill for foreclosure, and in 1874 a bill of redemption or foreclosure was granted, with foreclosure being made absolute in 1877, and possession sought in 1878.
Held: The action was not barred under the 1833 Act though brought more than 20 years after any acknowledgment. It is in the nature of the mortgage transaction that the mortgagor remains in possession, and is entitled to receive the rents from it. His possession is as of right and is not a wrong. A mortgagee taking possession is not entitled to recover rents paid to the mortgagor before he has taken possession. A mortgagor in possession of the mortgaged land is to be treated as being in possession with the consent of the mortgagee, unless the mortgagee has terminated the consent and there is then evidence to show that the mortgagor was a trespasser on the mortgaged land.

Lord Selbourne LC
(1881) 6 QBD 345, [1881] 50 LJQB 473, [1881] 44 LT 327, [1881] 29 WR 904
Real Property Limitation Act 1833
Cited by:
CitedNational Westminster Bank Plc v Ashe (Trustee In Bankruptcy of Djabar Babai) CA 8-Feb-2008
The mortgagees had made no payments under the charge for more than twelve years, and had remained in possession throughout. They argued that the bank were prevented from now seeking to enforce the charge. The bank argued that the possession had not . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.264290

National Ability Sa v Tinna Oils and Chemicals Ltd: CA 11 Dec 2009

Implied promise to pay arbitral award

The parties disputed how limitation affects the enforcement of an arbitration award. More than six years had passed since the award had been made, and the defendant said it was out of time.
Held: A party can enforce an award either by ordinary action as an action founded upon the implied promise to pay the award, or in the same manner as a judgment is a statutory process. ‘There is a clear distinction between an arbitration award and a judgment. An arbitration agreement is in essence enforceable because of the implied contractual promise to pay an arbitration award contained in the arbitration agreement; all measures of enforcement essentially rest upon the contract. The provisions of s.26 of the 1950 Act and s.66 of the 1996 Act must be seen in that context. They are simply procedural provisions enabling the award made in consensual arbitral proceedings to be enforced.’

[2009] EWCA Civ 1330, Times 24-Dec-2009, [2010] CP Rep 18, [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222, [2009] 2 CLC 982, [2010] 2 All ER 899
Bailii
Arbitration Act 1950 26, Arbitration Act 1996 66, Limitation Act 1980 24
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRe Boks and Co v Peters, Rushton and Co Ltd CA 1919
The alternative procedure for seeking enforcement of an arbitrator’s award is by an action upon the award. The procedure is to be used only in ‘reasonably clear cases’. . .
CitedMiddlemiss and Gould v Hartley Corporation Pty Ltd CA 1972
The defendant challenged enforcement of an arbitration award.
Held: The challenge had not been made in time, and the award was final and conclusive. Lord Denning MR said that an arbitration award is like a final judgment which should be . .
CitedHall and Woodhouse Ltd v Panorama Hotel Properties Ltd 1974
. .
CitedAgromet Motoimport Ltd v Maulden Engineering Co (Beds) Ltd 1985
Time begins to run on the collection of an arbitration award, not from the date upon which the award is made or published, but from the date when the paying party is in breach of its implied obligation to pay the award. . .
CitedGood Challenger Navegante S A v Metalexportimport SA CA 24-Nov-2003
The claimant sought to enforce an arbitration award made in 1983. Time might otherwise have expired, but the claimants relied on a fax which they said was an acknowledgement of the debt, and also upon a finding in a Romanian court which created an . .
CitedLowsley and Another v Forbes CA 21-Mar-1996
The statutory time limit under the Limitation Act applied only to the right to take substantive proceedings and had nothing whatever to do with the procedural machinery for enforcing a judgment when one was obtained. The Act of 1875 brought about a . .
CitedEx Parte Caucasian Trading Corporation: Bankruptcy Petition CA 1896
A proceeding in bankruptcy was based upon an order to enforce an ordinary civil arbitration award. Under the 1889 Act it was possible to obtain an order in the High Court of England for the enforcement of such an order and all that was held was that . .
CitedNational Westminster Bank v Powney CA 1990
The limitation period has nothing to do with the procedural machinery of enforcing a judgment when one was obtained. . .
CitedErskine, Regina v; Regina v Williams CACD 14-Jul-2009
The defendants had been separately convicted of murder several years ago. They sought the quashing of the convictions and substitution of convictions for manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility.
Held: The appeal of Erskine . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Arbitration, Limitation

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.383834

Linfood Cash and Carry v Thomson: EAT 1989

One employee had informed his employer that a fellow employee had stolen two books of credit notes. He refused to allow his identity to be disclosed for fear of reprisals. The Tribunal had held that the dismissal was unfair because although the employers had a genuine belief in the employee’s guilt they had no reasonable ground for that belief and had not carried out as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in all the circumstances; and in particular considered that in the absence of any corroborative evidence, a most stringent enquiry should have been made by management to ascertain that the informant was not actuated by improper motives.
Held: The employer’s appeal was dismissed. Wood P said that when assessing credibility: ‘the tribunal must not substitute their own view for the view of the employer, and thus they should be putting to themselves the question – could this employer acting reasonably and fairly in these circumstances properly accept the facts and opinions which it did? The evidence given is that given during the disciplinary procedures and not that which is given before the Tribunal. If a Tribunal is to say that this employer could not reasonably have accepted a witness as truthful, it seems to us that this decision must be based on logical and substantial grounds – good reasons.’
The court set out a checklist to be used in assessing the reliability of an anonymous informant witness. ‘We have been told by both sides that there seems to be no decision of this court giving guidance upon appropriate procedures for an employer to adopt where informants are involved. It is obvious that from whichever side of industry one looks it is important that dishonesty and lack of trust should, where possible, be eliminated, but a careful balance must be maintained between the desirability to protect informants who are genuinely in fear, and providing a fair hearing of issues for employees who are accused of misconduct. We are told that there is no clear guidance to be found from ACAS publications, and the lay members of this court have given me the benefit of their wide experience.
Every case must depend upon its own facts, and circumstances may vary widely – indeed with further experience other aspects may demonstrate themselves – but we hope that the following comments may prove to be of assistance:

    1. The information given by the informant should be reduced into writing in one or more statements. Initially these statements should be taken without regard to the fact that in those cases where anonymity is to be preserved, it may subsequently prove to be necessary to omit or erase certain parts of the statements before submission to others – in order to prevent identification.
    2. In taking statements the following seem important:
    (a) date, time and place of each or any observation or incident;
    (b) the opportunity and ability to observe clearly and with accuracy;
    (c) the circumstantial evidence such as knowledge of a system, or the reason for the presence of the informer and why certain small details are memorable;
    (d) whether the informant has suffered at the hands of the accused or has any other reason to fabricate, whether from personal grudge or any other reason or principle.

3. Further investigation can then take place either to confirm or undermine the information given. Corroboration is clearly desirable.
4. Tactful inquiries may well be thought suitable and advisable into the character and background of the informant or any other information which may tend to add or detract from the value of the information.
5. If the informant is prepared to attend a disciplinary hearing, no problem with arise, but if, as in the present case, the employer is satisfied that the fear is genuine then a decision will need to be made whether or not to continue with the disciplinary process.
6. If it is to continue, then it seems to us desirable that at each stage of those procedures the member of management responsible for that hearing should himself interview the informant and satisfy himself that weight is to be given to the information.
7. The written statement of the informant – if necessary with omissions to avoid identification – should be made available to the employee and his representatives.
8. If the employee or his representative raises any particular and relevant issue which should be put to the informant, then it may be desirable to adjourn for the chairman to make further inquiries of that informant.
9. Although it is always desirable for notes to be taken during disciplinary procedures, it seems to us to be particularly important that full and careful notes should be taken in these cases.
10. Although not peculiar to cases where informants have been the cause for the initiation of an investigation, it seems to us important that if evidence from an investigating officer is to be taken at a hearing it should, where possible, be prepared in a written form.
‘This case also appears to highlight the problems facing a Tribunal when considering credibility. As Mr O’Hara confirmed to us, the tribunal must not substitute their own view for the view of the employer, and thus they should be putting to themselves the question – could this employer acting reasonably and fairly in these circumstances properly accept the facts and opinions which it did? The evidence is that given during the disciplinary procedures and not that which is given before the Tribunal.
If a Tribunal is to say that this employer could not reasonably have accepted a witness as truthful, it seems to us that that decision must be based upon logical and substantial grounds – good reasons. Instances might be – that the witness was a bare faced liar, who must have given that impression to the employer at the relevant time; that the witness was clearly biased – provided that such a bias should have been clear at the relevant time; that documents available at the relevant time clearly showed the witness to be inaccurate and that such documentary evidence was ignored by the employer.
However, there could be other less obvious situations where mere vagueness and uncertainty would not be sufficient, and it should never be forgotten that cross-examination by experienced advocates may produce a picture not made evident during the disciplinary procedures. For the Tribunal merely to prefer one witness to another might well not be sufficient as this could be to substitute their own view. The employers have the peculiar advantage over the Tribunal of having an intimate knowledge of the geography, the nature and workings of the business and the various members of the staff.’

Wood P
[1989] IRLR 235, [1989] ICR 518
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBritish Home Stores Ltd v Burchell EAT 1978
B had been dismissed for allegedly being involved with a number of other employees in acts of dishonesty relating to staff purchases. She had denied the abuse. The tribunal had found the dismissal unfair in the methods used to decide to dismiss her. . .

Cited by:
MentionedHussain v Elonex Plc CA 17-Mar-1999
The claimant appealed against a finding that he had not been unfairly dismissed. He said that the procedure adopted had been unfair, since he had not had opportunity to see the statements provided to his employer by independent witnesses of the . .
MentionedRegina (S) v Brent London Borough Council and Others Regina (T) v Brent and Others Regina (P) v Oxfordshire County Council’s Exclusion Appeals Panel and Another CA 17-May-2002
Three pupils appealed their exclusion from school for violent or threatening behaviour.
Held: The statute imposed clear obligations on the appeal panel to act independently, and to consider both the individual circumstances of the child and . .
CitedWest Coast Trains Ltd v Murphy EAT 4-Apr-2006
EAT The claimant, a service manager employed on the respondents’ trains, was dismissed on conduct grounds for having sworn at and been threatening towards a customer. She claimed she had been unfairly dismissed . .
CitedRamsey, Hamblet and Treweeke v Walker Snack Foods Ltd, D McDonnell EAT 13-Feb-2004
Three employees appealed decisions that they had not been unfairly dismissed. The employer had suspected them of involvement in a scam involving the diversion of prize-winning crisp packets. Informants had insisted on remaining anonymous. The . .
CitedAsda Stores Ltd v Thompson and others EAT 11-Oct-2001
. .
Cited2 Care v Ababio EAT 20-Oct-1999
. .
CitedTNT Express UK Ltd v McConnell EAT 25-Nov-1994
. .
CitedBoys and Girls Welfare Society v McDonald EAT 18-Oct-1995
. .
CitedSigns and Labels Ltd v Wallace EAT 22-Jan-1996
. .
CitedAinsworth and others v Whitbread Plc EAT 17-Dec-1997
. .
CitedLouies v Coventry Hood and Seating Co EAT 1990
An employer’s dismissal procedure need not be prima facie unfair if the employee was not permitted to know the contents of statements on which the employer would rely in taking a decision to dismiss or confirm a previous dismissal. Wood J said: ‘It . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Employment

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.267933

J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another: HL 4 Jul 2002

The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had overstayed the expiration of a grazing tenancy, and been asked to leave but had not been dispossessed.
Held: The claimant’s appeal was allowed. The issue was only whether or not the claimant had been in actual possession of the land – had the defendant squatter dispossessed the paper owner by going into ordinary possession of the land for the requisite period without the owner’s consent? Older cases relating to an idea of ‘non-adverse possession’ should not be followed. Actual possession for one own or another’s benefit was required. The intention needed was to possess, not necessarily to ‘own’ the land. The only question after the 1833 Act was whether the squatter had been in possession in the ordinary sense of that word for the requisite period without the consent of the owner. The requirement that the land is in the possession of a person in whose favour time can run is not directed to the nature of the possession, but to the capacity of the squatter or other person in possession of the land.
An offer to purchase the paper owner’s interest need not defeat a claim (Ocean Estates).
Lord Hope of Craighead discussed the claim under Human Rights. That question: ‘….is not an easy one, as one would have expected the law – in the context of a statutory regime where compensation is not available – to lean in favour of the protection of a registered proprietor against the actions of persons who cannot show a competing title on the register. Fortunately…….a much more rigorous regime has now been enacted in Schedule 6 to the 2002 Act. Its effect will be to make it much harder for a squatter who is in possession of registered land to obtain title against the wishes of the proprietor. The unfairness in the old regime which this case has demonstrated lies not in the absence of compensation, although that is an important factor, but in the lack of safeguards against oversight or inadvertence on the part of the registered proprietor.’

Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Hutton
Times 05-Jul-2002, [2002] UKHL 30, [2002] 3 All ER 865, [2002] 3 WLR 221, [2003] 1 AC 419, [2002] NPC 92, [2002] HRLR 34, [2003] 1 P and CR 10, [2002] 28 EGCS 129, [2002] 2 P and CR DG22
House of Lords, Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15 Sch 1 para 1 Sch 1 para 8, European Convention on Human Rights 1
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved ‘Remarkable’Powell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the . .
DisapprovedLittledale v Liverpool College CA 1900
The mere storage of items in a property was insufficient to demonstrate the necessary intention to dispossess the rightful owner. It was a mere exercise of the rights under an easement. Enclosure of land is not necessarily decisive. Lord Lindley MR . .
DisapprovedLeigh v Jack CA 1879
The plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Mr Leigh) had laid out part of his estate as proposed streets to be known as Grundy Street and Napier Place. He conveyed to the defendant certain land described as being ‘bounded by’ Grundy Street and Napier . .
CitedOcean Estates Ltd v Pinder HL 1969
The court asked whether the sufficiency of adverse possession might be qualified either by the intentions of the paper owner or the squatter’s willingness to pay for their occupation if asked. Lord Diplock: ‘Where questions of title to land arise in . .
Appeal fromJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Caroline Graham and Another CA 6-Feb-2001
Where a tenant under a grazing license had stayed over after the end of the tenancy, and had been refused a renewed licence, and had continued to graze the land for over twelve years, the mere overstaying was not enough to evidence an animus . .
At first instanceJ A Pye and Another v Graham and Another ChD 14-Mar-2000
The fact alone of being prepared to take a licence of land would not defeat an application for adverse possession, but a request for a licence would be relevant. The adverse possession commenced from the time when the licence expired, given that a . .

Cited by:
Appealed toJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v South Gloucestershire District Council and Others CA 29-Mar-2001
Where there was an agreement between an applicant and the planning authority under section 106 of the new Act, with respect the undertaking of work in return for the grant of planning permission, there was no requirement for there to be a direct . .
CitedTopplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
CitedTower Hamlets v Barrett and Another CA 19-Jul-2005
The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been . .
CitedChapman and Another v Godinn Properties Ltd and others CA 27-Jun-2005
Dispute over right of way over land subject to claim for possessory title. ‘But each case must turn on its own facts. In a case of this nature, the court must ask itself what it is that would be expected of somebody in possession of land of this . .
At House of LordsJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Nov-2005
The claimants had been the registered proprietors of land, they lost it through the adverse possession of former tenants holding over. They claimed that the law had dispossessed them of their lawful rights.
Held: The cumulative effect of the . .
CitedInglewood Investments Company Ltd v Baker CA 8-Nov-2002
The court considered a claim for the adverse possesion of land.
Held: Dyson LJ said: ‘to establish a claim of adverse possession for the requisite period of 12 years it is necessary to establish: (1) actual possession; (2) an intention to . .
CitedAllen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .
CitedGodmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs HL 20-Jun-2007
The house was asked about whether continuous use of an apparent right of way by the public would create a public right of way after 20 years, and also whether a non overt act by a landowner was sufficient to prove his intention not to dedicate the . .
CitedClear Channel United Kingdom Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 14-Oct-2004
The claimant sought a declaration that it had a tenancy for its occupation by an advertising station, and that it had protection under the 1954 Act. The defendant council said that only a licence had been granted.
Held: The grants included the . .
CitedJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 30-Aug-2007
UK Advers Possession Law – Not Compliant
The claimant had said that the UK law which allowed it to lose land by virtue of twelve year’s occupation by a squatter, interfered with its right to ownership of property.
Held: The UK law on adverse possession did comply with the Convention. . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedNational Westminster Bank Plc v Ashe (Trustee In Bankruptcy of Djabar Babai) CA 8-Feb-2008
The mortgagees had made no payments under the charge for more than twelve years, and had remained in possession throughout. They argued that the bank were prevented from now seeking to enforce the charge. The bank argued that the possession had not . .
CitedRoberts v Crown Estate Commissioners CA 20-Feb-2008
The commissioners sought to claim title to a foreshore by adverse possession. The claimant asserted that he had acquired title in his capacity of Lord Marcher of Magor which had owned the bed of the estuary since the Norman Conquest, and that the . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedJohn Laing Construction Ltd v Amber Pass Ltd ChD 7-Apr-2004
The landlord resisted the exercise of a break clause saying that the entire premises had not been vacated. The difference was as to whether mere vacation was enough, or whether the tenant had to do some further positive act. The tenant had left . .
CitedJones v London Borough of Merton CA 16-Jun-2008
The court was asked ‘If a former secure tenant of a dwelling-house who has become a ‘tolerated trespasser’ in it decides to cease to occupy it, does his liability to pay mesne profits to his former landlord in respect of the dwelling-house cease . .
CitedLancashire County Council v Buchanan Admn 7-Nov-2007
The defendant estate agent was prosecuted for misdescribing the ability of his client to convey good title to the land offered. The seller did not initially have a registered possessory title to part of the land.
Held: The agent’s appeal . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on the Application of) v The Land Registry (Peterborough Office) Admn 13-Feb-2009
The applicant sought judicial review of the cancellation of his application for first registration of land by adverse possession. The application had been rejected because a public right of way existed through it, and the claimant had not shown the . .
CitedClarence House Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc CA 8-Dec-2009
The defendant tenants, anticipating that the landlord might delay or refuse consent to a subletting entered into a ‘virtual assignment’ of the lease, an assignment in everything but the deed and with no registration. The lease contained a standard . .
CitedBaxter v Mannion ChD 18-Mar-2010
B appealed against an order for rectification against him of the land register returning ownership to M. B had obtained registration with possessory title, claiming to have kept horses on the field for many years in adverse possession of it. M had . .
CitedWilson and Another v Grainger ChD 4-Dec-2009
The claimants appealed against a decision of the Adjudicator that they had not acquired a piece of their neighbour’s land by adverse possession, on the basis that their use had been by virtue of an oral licence. The judge had found the occupation to . .
CitedThe Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
CitedStar Energy Weald Basin Ltd and Another v Bocardo Sa SC 28-Jul-2010
The defendant had obtained a licence to extract oil from its land. In order to do so it had to drill out and deep under the Bocardo’s land. No damage at all was caused to B’s land at or near the surface. B claimed in trespass for damages. It now . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on The Application of) v Land Registry (Peterborough Office) and Another CA 10-Mar-2010
The appellant had lived in a caravan on the verge of a byway and had been here for more than twelve years. He appealed against rejection of his request for possessory title. He said that there was no support in law for the maxim that adverse . .
CitedBalevents Ltd v Sartori ChD 29-Sep-2011
A strip of land had at one point been left aside for an anticipated road widening which never took place. The defendant had eventually obtained a registered possessory title to it. The claimant, owner of a neighbouring plot, now challenged that . .
CitedZarb and Another v Parry and Another CA 15-Nov-2011
The parties disputed the position of the boundary between their neighbouring properties. The appellant Z had succeeded in establishing that the the boundary was as they decribed on paper, but the respondents had succeeded in their claim for adverse . .
CitedChambers v London Borough of Havering CA 20-Dec-2011
The defendant appealed against an order for him to surrender possession of land he had claimed by adverse possession. The Council was the registered proprietor. The defendant said he had used the land since 1981 for dumping of motor vehicle parts. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.174187

Adelson and Another v Associated Newspapers Ltd: QBD 19 Dec 2007

Applications were launched with in defamation proceedings to seek to recover damages for parties who had not previously been part of the proceedings.
Held: The amendments were refused. The new claimants were now out of time, and it was clear that they had taken steps before the limitation period had expired, but chose to pursue a different and failed approach. Moreover, ‘I accept that Parliament, following the recommendations of the Neill Committee, decided to put in place a more flexible regime, in the sense that the much reduced period of limitation should be balanced by a broader discretion on the court’s part to extend the period, having regard to what is perceived to be ‘equitable’ in all the circumstances of the case. But genuine libel claims must still be pursued with vigour: that is the most important policy consideration underlying the legislative change.’

Eady J
[2007] EWHC 3028 (QB)
Bailii
Defamation Act 1996
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedD and L Caterers Ltd v D’Ajou 1945
Damages in favour of a corporate body in defamation cases are limited to financial damage. . .
CitedGrovit and others v Doctor and others HL 24-Apr-1997
The plaintiff began a defamation action against seven defendants. Each had admitted publication but pleaded justification. The claims against the fourth to seventh defendants were dismissed by consent, and the third had gone into liquidation. The . .
CitedSteedman, Clohosy, Smith, Kiernan, Newman, Creevy, Anderson v The British Broadcasting Corporation CA 23-Oct-2001
The claimants had issued defamation proceedings. The defendant said they were out of time, having begun the action more than one year after the alleged publication, but accepted that they had not been prejudiced in their defence. The court refused . .
CitedHartley v Birmingham City District Council CA 1992
The writ was issued one day late; there had been early notification of the claim; and the defendant’s ability to defend the case was unaffected. The plaintiff asked the court to exercide its discretion to allow the claim t proceed.
Held: The . .
See AlsoAdelson and Another v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 1-May-2007
. .
See AlsoAdelson and Another v Associated Newspapers Ltd CA 9-Jul-2007
The claimant sought to add the name of a further claimant. The defendant objected, saying that it was after the expiry of the limitation period.
Held: The claimant was seeking to use the rules for substitution of parties to add a party. In . .

Cited by:
See AlsoAdelson and Another v Associated Newspapers QBD 19-Feb-2008
Complaint was made that an article was defamatory of the owner of Manchester United. The defendant now argued that the game was not worth the candle. The costs vastly exceeded any possible recovery, and it had openly offered vindication, and that . .
CitedBewry v Reed Elseveir (UK) Ltd and Another QBD 10-Oct-2013
The claimant had begin proceedings against the defendant legal publishers, saying that their summary of a cash had brought was defamatory. He now sought leave to extend the limitation period for his claim, and the defendants argued that, given the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation, Damages, Limitation

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.263254

Birmingham City Council v Abdulla and Others: SC 24 Oct 2012

Former employees wished to argue that they had been discriminated against whilst employed by the Council. Being out of time for Employment Tribunal Proceedings, they sought to bring their cases in the ordinary courts. The Council now appealed against the refusal to strike out the claims on the basis that they could more conveniently have been heard by the tribunals.
Held: The appeal failed (Wilson, Hale, Rogers LL majority, Sumption and Carnwath LL dissenting). The fact that the six months limit in the Tribunal had never allowed an extension by discretion, was enough to imply a recognition of the alternative jurisdiction available to claimants. Save for any other element of abuse, it could never be said that a case could be more conveniently disposed of where that disposal would be an inevitable dismissal without consideration of the merits or justice of the case.
Lord Sumption (dissenting) said that a decision in favour of the claimants would frustrate the underlying purposes of the 1970 Act. The availability of the limitation defence was of particular significance for employers. The notion of ‘convenience’ under section 2(3) was much wider than the mere efficient distribution of business. The fact that a claim in the tribunal would be out of time was highly relevant, but not conclusive.

Lady Hale, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath
[2012] UKSC 47, [2013] IRLR 38, [2012] ICR 1419, [2012] Eq LR 1147, [2012] WLR(D) 294
Bailii, Bailii Summary
Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998 1(2)(a), Equal Pay Act 1970 2(3)
England and Wales
Citing:
At first instanceAbdulla and Others v Birmingham City Council QBD 17-Dec-2010
The defendant applied for an order declaring that the claim would better be brought in an employment tribunal and that accordingly the County court should decline jurisdiction.
Held: The application was dismissed: ‘ I reject the submission by . .
Appeal fromBirmingham City Council v Abdulla and Others CA 29-Nov-2011
The Council appealed against an order dismissing its application for the claimants’ claims under equal pay legislation to be struck out for want of jurisdiction. The claims had been brought in the High Court rather than te hEmployment Tribunal, thus . .
CitedSpiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd, The Spiliada HL 1986
Forum Non Conveniens Restated
The House reviewed the authorities on the principle of forum non conveniens and restated how to apply the principle where the defendant seeks a stay of proceedings on the ground that there is another more appropriate forum.
Held: ‘In the . .
CitedAshby and Others v Birmingham City Council QBD 3-Mar-2011
The claimants appealed against the strike out of their claims for damages for breach of contract on imposing changes in employment contract and conditions. The County Court had accepted the Council’s arguments on the construction and application of . .
CitedLitster and Others v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Co Ltd HL 16-Mar-1989
The twelve applicants had been unfairly dismissed by the transferor immediately before the transfer, and for a reason connected with the transfer under section 8(1). The question was whether the liability for unfair dismissal compensation . .
CitedDelaney v Staples HL 15-Apr-1992
The claimant had been dismissed but had been given no payment in lieu of notice. She claimed to the Industrial Tribunal that this was an unlawful deduction from her wages and that therefore the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction.
Held: The . .
CitedLevez etc v T H Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd (No 2) EAT 1-Oct-1999
The restriction on the awards of compensation for sex discrimination to payments in respect of a period of two years prior to the claim was unlawful. Claims of other natures were not so limited, and this could not be supported, since it was in . .
CitedPreston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others; Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank plc ECJ 16-May-2000
ECJ Social policy – Men and women – Equal pay – Membership of an occupational pension scheme – Part-time workers – Exclusion – National procedural rules – Principle of effectiveness – Principle of equivalence. . .
CitedPreston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others, Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank Plc (No 2) HL 8-Feb-2001
Part-time workers claimed that they had been unlawfully excluded from occupational pension schemes because membership was dependent on an employee working a minimum number of hours per week and that that was discriminatory because a considerably . .
CitedRadakovits v Abbey National Plc CA 17-Nov-2009
The Tribunal had considered the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. It heard evidence, and considered that there was no jurisdiction. This was despite the fact that, at an earlier stage, the employer had said that it would not contest . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Discrimination, Limitation

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.465179

Smith v Clay: 10 May 1767

Long Delay in Application Debarred Remedy

Review was sought of a decree pronounced some thirty or forty years before. The defect was apparent on the face of the record.
Held: The review was barred by the length of time elapsed.
Lord Camden LC applied the doctrine of laches, saying: ‘A Court of Equity has always refused its aid to stale demands, where a party has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this Court into activity, but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the Court is passive, and does nothing.’ Equity would not countenance laches beyond the period for which a legal remedy had been limited by statute, and that where the legal right had been barred, the equitable right to the same thing was also barred: ”Expedit reipublicae ut sit finis litium’, is a maxim that has prevailed in this court at all times, without the help of parliament.
But, as the Court has no legislative authority, it could not properly define the time of bar, by a positive rule, to an hour, a minute, or a year; it was governed by circumstances.
But as often as parliament had limited the time of actions and remedies, to a certain period, in legal proceedings, a Court in Chancery adopted that rule, and applied to similar cases in equity.
For when the Legislature had fixed the time at law, it would have been preposterous for equity (which, by its own proper authority, always maintained a limitation), to countenance laches beyond the period, that law had been confined to by parliament.
And therefore in all cases where the legal right has been barred by parliament, the equitable right to the same thing has been concluded by the same bar.’

Lord Camden LC
[1767] EngR 55, (1767) 3 Bro CC 646, (1767) 29 ER 743
Commonlii
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoSmith v Clay 10-May-1767
Bill of review for error apparent will not lie after twenty years from the making of the decree. The time runs from the decree, not from the inrolment. . .

Cited by:
CitedAdamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Administrative, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.374834

OB v Aventis Pasteur SA: HL 11 Jun 2008

The claimant had been vaccinated with a HIB vaccine. He was severely injured and it was said that the vaccine was the cause, and a claim made under the 1987 Act. Originally the claim was made against a UK company, but it should have been against that company’s parent company. When the correct company was to be substituted, it said the claim was out of time. The House was asked where proceedings are commenced aganst someone wrongly identified as the producer ‘is it consistent with article 11 for the court to be able to say that the proceedings shall count as having been instituted against the real producer and amended accordingly? ‘
Held: There must be a further reference to the ECJ. It was not completely clear whether the ECJ had decided that provided a national court had due and proper regard to the Directive, it was permissible for that national court to treat proceedings against one company as if they were proceedings against another.

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond
[2008] UKHL 34
Bailii, HL
Council Directive 85/374/EEC 11, Consumer Protection Act 1987 35
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoHorne-Roberts (a Child) v Smithkline Beecham plc and Another CA 18-Dec-2001
The court has a power to order substitution of a party though the limitation period, and even the ‘long stop’ limitation period had expired. The claimant child sought damages after a vaccination. The batch had been attributed to the wrong . .
At ECJDeclan O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd, formerly Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd, Sanofi Pasteur SA ECJ 9-Feb-2006
ECJ Directive 85/374/EEC – Liability for defective products – Definition of -putting into circulation- of the product – Supply by the producer to a wholly owned subsidiary. . .
At QBDO’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd QBD 20-Oct-2006
The claimant sought damages under the 1967 Act asserting injury from a drug sold by the defendant. Proceedings had been mistakenly commenced against Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd within the limitation period, but outside the limitation period, it was . .
CitedSkov AEG v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S ECJ 10-Jan-2006
ECJ Directive 85/374/EEC – Liability for defective products – Liability of the supplier of a defective product.
The class of persons liable against whom an injured person is entitled to bring an action under . .
CitedSrl CILFIT v Ministero Della Sanita ECJ 6-Oct-1982
ECJ The obligation to refer to the Court of Justice questions concerning the interpretation of the EEC Treaty and of measures adopted by the community institutions which the third paragraph of article 177 of the . .
CitedCountryside Alliance and others, Regina (on the Application of) v Attorney General and Another HL 28-Nov-2007
The appellants said that the 2004 Act infringed their rights under articles 8 11 and 14 and Art 1 of protocol 1.
Held: Article 8 protected the right to private and family life. Its purpose was to protect individuals from unjustified intrusion . .
At CAO’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
The claimant had made a mistake in naming the defendant company, but had intended the company which it now requested the court to substitute as defendant. The limitation period had expired.
Held: The substitution was necessary to decide the . .
Appeal fromO’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
Whether two applications for leave to appeal between the same parties should be heard together. . .

Cited by:
See AlsoO’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
The claimant had made a mistake in naming the defendant company, but had intended the company which it now requested the court to substitute as defendant. The limitation period had expired.
Held: The substitution was necessary to decide the . .
See AlsoO’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
Whether two applications for leave to appeal between the same parties should be heard together. . .
At HLAventis Pasteur v O’Byrne (Environment And Consumers) ECJ 2-Dec-2009
Europa Directive 85/374/EEC – Liability for defective products Articles 3 and 11 Mistake in the classification of ‘producer’ Judicial proceedings – Application for substitution of the producer for the original . .
At HLO’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa SC 26-May-2010
The claimant wished to claim damages after suffering serious injury as a child having been vaccinated with a drug manufactured by a defendant (APMSD). The defendant had relied on a defence saying that the limitation period under the Directive was 10 . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, Limitation, Personal Injury

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.268809

Forster v Outred and Co: CA 1981

A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for payment was made, but when she signed the mortgage deed.
Held: The cause of action was complete when the mother relied on the solicitor’s negligent advice and acted to her detriment by signing the deed. ‘Actual damage suffered’ so as to give rise to a claim in tort, and to begin the limitation period, is any detriment, liability or loss capable of assessment in money terms and includes liability which may arise on a contingency.
Dunn LJ said: ‘As soon as she executed the mortgage the plaintiff not only became liable under its express terms but also – and more importantly – the value of the equity of redemption of her property was reduced. Before she executed the mortgage deed she owned the property free from incumbrances; thereafter she became the owner of a property subject to a mortgage. That, in my view, was a quantifiable loss and as from that date her cause of action against her solicitor was complete. The actual quantum of damages would, of course, depend on events between that date and the date when the damages had finally to be assessed, but the cause of action was complete when she executed the mortgage, without proof of special damage.’
Stephenson LJ asked: ‘What is meant by actual damage? Mr Stuart-Smith says that it is any detriment, liability or loss capable of assessment in money terms and it includes liabilities which may arise on a contingency, particularly a contingency over which the plaintiff has no control; things like loss of earning capacity, loss of a chance or bargain, loss of profit, losses incurred from onerous provisions or covenants in leases. They are all illustrations of a kind of loss which is meant by ‘actual’ damage. It was also suggested in argument, and I would accept it, that ‘actual’ is really used in contrast to ‘presumed’ or ‘assumed.’ Whereas damage is presumed in trespass and libel, it is not presumed in negligence and has to be proved. There has to be some actual damage.’
He concluded: ‘Although there is no more direct authority than those cases among those which have been cited to us, I would accept Mr. Stuart-Smith’s statement of the law and would conclude that, on the facts of this case, the plaintiff has suffered actual damage through the negligence of her solicitors by entering into the mortgage deed, the effect of which has been to encumber her interest in her freehold estate with this legal charge and subject her to a liability which may, according to matters completely outside her control, mature into financial loss – as indeed it did. It seems to me that the plaintiff did suffer actual damage in those ways; and subject to that liability and with that encumbrance on the mortgage property was then entitled to claim damages, not, I would think, an indemnity and probably not a declaration, for the alleged negligence of the solicitor which she alleges caused her that damage. In those circumstances her cause of action was complete on February 8, 1973, and the writ which she issued on March 25, 1980, was issued too late to come within the six years’ period of limitation.’

Stephenson LJ, Dunn LJ
[1982] 1 WLR 86
England and Wales
Cited by:
ApprovedNykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
CitedHatton v Messrs Chafes (A Firm) CA 13-Mar-2003
The defendant firm appealed against a refusal to strike out the claimant’s claim for professional negligence, asserting that the judge should have considered the limitation issue in the light of Khan v Falvey.
Held: By the time that the . .
ConsideredUBAF Ltd v European American Banking Corporation CA 1984
The defendant invited the plaintiff to take part in a syndicated loan. The defendant’s assistant secretary signed a letter to the plaintiff making representations, now claimed to be fraudulent. The defendant succeeded at first instance arguing that . .
CitedDaniels v Thompson CA 18-Mar-2004
The executor brought an action against the solicitor who had advised his client in connection with the transfer of her house in which she was to continue to live, saying he should have advised her that the gift would not protect her from Inheritance . .
AppliedMilton v Walker and Stanger 1981
The plaintiff instructed her solicitor to prepare documents and advise on a gift from P’s uncle to P and her cousin W in the proportions 2/3:1/3. P and W agreed that, should the farm be sold, the costs and capital gains tax (CGT) arising there from . .
CitedBaker v Ollard and Bentley CA 12-May-1982
The plaintiff and a Mr and Mrs Bodman agreed to buy a house. The plaintiff intended to live on the first floor and the Bodmans on the ground floor. The solicitor should have advised them to convey the freehold into their joint names and then to . .
CitedD W Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
The company took in a new director and shareholder, and relied upon their solicitors to draft a covenant to restrain him competing within a set time of leaving the company. The covenant turned out to be ineffective. The defendant solicitors replied . .
CitedBell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .
CitedKnapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc and Another CA 30-Oct-1997
A claim in negligence was brought against insurance brokers for failing to advise the claimant of certain matters with the result that an insurance policy entered into by the claimant was voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The claimant . .
FollowedD W Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
The company took in a new director and shareholder, and relied upon their solicitors to draft a covenant to restrain him competing within a set time of leaving the company. The covenant turned out to be ineffective. The defendant solicitors replied . .
CitedThe Law Society v Sephton and Co and others CA 13-Dec-2004
The Society appealed dismissal for limitation of its claim against the defendant firm of accountants arising from alleged fraud in approval of a solicitor’s accounts.
Held: The liability did not arise until the Society decided to make . .
DistinguishedTelfair Shipping Operation SA v Inersea Carriers SA, the Caroline P 1984
A claim was made in contract based on an indemnity.
Held: The claim was not time-barred. Time normally begins to run against a claim on a general indemnity only from the moment when the liability of the indemnified is accepted by him or . .
CitedRobert Mark Gordon v J B Wheatley and Co (a Firm) CA 24-May-2000
The defendant solicitors had negligently advised the claimant in connection with a mortgage scheme he operated for customers. His case was that the defendants had negligently failed to advise him to register under s3 of the 1986 Act. The claimant . .
CitedPirelli General Cable Works v Oscar Faber and Partners HL 2-Jan-1983
The plaintiff asked the defendant consulting engineer to design an extension to their factory in 1969. Not later than in April 1970, cracks developed in the chimney. In 1977 the cause of the damage was discovered. It arose from design faults in the . .
CitedAbbott and Another v Will Gannon and Smith Ltd CA 2-Mar-2005
The claimant had employed the defendants to design refurbishment works for their hotel. The work was said to be negligent, and the claimant sought damages. The defendant argued as a preliminary point that the claim was time barred. The question was . .
CitedIqbal v Legal Services Commission CA 10-May-2005
The claimant had been a partner in a firm of solicitors. They came to be suspected by the respondent of overclaiming legal aid payments and sums were withheld. For this and other reasons the practice folded, and the claimant became insolvent. He . .
CitedHaward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
RejectedWardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia 1992
(High Court of Australia) A claim was based on a statutory trade indemnity scheme. The insurers claimed damages from Wardley, on the basis that its alleged deceit induced them to grant an indemnity, which was subsequently called on.
Held: . .
CitedLaw Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others HL 10-May-2006
A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from . .
CitedFirst National Comercial Bank plc v Humberts CA 27-Jan-1995
The plaintiff loaned money on the basis of a negligent survey by the defendant. The borrower subsequently defaulted, and the lender issued a writ. The defendant said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The court allowed the plaintiff’s . .
CitedWatkins and Another v Jones Maidment Wilson (A Firm) CA 4-Mar-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence by the defendant solicitors in advising them to agree to a postponment of a completion. The defendants raised as a preliminary issue the question of limitation. The claimant said that the limitation . .
CitedTabarrok v E D C Lord and Co (A Firm) CA 14-Feb-1997
The appellant wanted to open a pizza restaurant. He and his partners acquired a company for the purpose, which was to take a lease of premises. They sought advice from the defendants who, they said, failed to advise them of the need to be aware of . .
CitedPegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
CitedBowling and Co Solicitors v Edehomo ChD 2-Mar-2011
The court was asked ‘when an innocent vendor whose signature is forged on the documents for the conveyance of land suffers damage, for the purposes of limitation of an action arising from a solicitor’s breach of duty. Is it on the exchange of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Damages, Professional Negligence

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.179760

Pegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another: ChD 11 Nov 2008

The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
Held: The defence in fact was that the claimant had both brought the claim too early because no tax liability had yet arisen, and too late because the arrangement had been set up several years before. Any contract breach took place when the breach occurred and that was time barred. In negligence, time ran from the time when any actual damage occurred, and ‘where the client has engaged professionals in connection with a transaction to secure for him some property or rights, and because of the negligence of those professionals, the client acquires less valuable property or rights than he would have done if he had been given correct advice, he suffers damage at the time of the transaction, even if the property or rights are worth no less than he actually paid for them.’ The damage occurred on the purchase of the shares, and the claim was time barred.

Lewison J
[2008] EWHC 2720 (Ch)
Bailii
Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 164A, Finance Act 1997, Finance Act 1993, Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedForster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .
CitedWatkins and Another v Jones Maidment Wilson (A Firm) CA 4-Mar-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence by the defendant solicitors in advising them to agree to a postponment of a completion. The defendants raised as a preliminary issue the question of limitation. The claimant said that the limitation . .
CitedDoncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd and Others v The Bolton Pharmaceutical Company 100 Ltd CA 26-May-2006
Appeals were made against interlocutory injunctions for alleged trade mark infringement.
Held: The court should hesitate about making a final decision for summary judgment without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the . .
CitedNykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
CitedBaker v Ollard and Bentley CA 12-May-1982
The plaintiff and a Mr and Mrs Bodman agreed to buy a house. The plaintiff intended to live on the first floor and the Bodmans on the ground floor. The solicitor should have advised them to convey the freehold into their joint names and then to . .
CitedKnapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc and Another CA 30-Oct-1997
A claim in negligence was brought against insurance brokers for failing to advise the claimant of certain matters with the result that an insurance policy entered into by the claimant was voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The claimant . .
CitedE D and F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel and Another CA 4-Apr-2003
The rules contained two occasions on which a court would consider dismissal of a claim as having ‘no real prospect’ of success.
Held: The only significant difference between CPR 24.2 and 13.3(1), is that under the first the overall burden of . .
CitedSwain v Hillman CA 21-Oct-1999
Strike out – Realistic Not Fanciful Chance Needed
The proper test for whether an action should be struck out under the new Rules was whether it had a realistic as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success. There was no justification for further attempts to explain the meaning of what are clear . .
CitedThe Royal Brompton Hospital National Health Service Trust v Hammond and Others (No 5) CA 11-Apr-2001
When looking at an application to strike out a claim, the normal ‘balance of probabilities’ standard of proof did not apply. It was the court’s task to assess whether, even if supplemented by evidence at trial, the claimant’s claim was bound to fail . .
CitedUBAF Ltd v European American Banking Corporation CA 1984
The defendant invited the plaintiff to take part in a syndicated loan. The defendant’s assistant secretary signed a letter to the plaintiff making representations, now claimed to be fraudulent. The defendant succeeded at first instance arguing that . .
CitedDW Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
A solicitor was instructed to prepare an agreement providing for the introduction of a new working director into an insurance broking business carried on by a company. His instructions called for the new director to enter into a restrictive covenant . .
CitedBell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .
CitedLaw Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others HL 10-May-2006
A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from . .
CitedWatts and Co v Morrow CA 30-Jul-1991
The plaintiff had bought a house on the faith of the defendant’s report that there were only limited defects requiring repair. In fact the defects were much more extensive. The defendant surveyor appealed against an award of damages after his . .
CitedNykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
CitedSouth Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd etc HL 24-Jun-1996
Limits of Damages for Negligent Valuations
Damages for negligent valuations are limited to the foreseeable consequences of advice, and do not include losses arising from a general fall in values. Valuation is seldom an exact science, and within a band of figures valuers may differ without . .
CitedR P Howard Ltd and Witchell v Woodman Matthews and Co (a firm) 1983
The solicitor defendant knew that the company was a family company effectively run by Mr Witchell from whom they received their instructions. The question raised was as to the duty of the solicitor to company and director.
Held: There is no . .
CitedFirst National Comercial Bank plc v Humberts CA 27-Jan-1995
The plaintiff loaned money on the basis of a negligent survey by the defendant. The borrower subsequently defaulted, and the lender issued a writ. The defendant said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The court allowed the plaintiff’s . .
CitedCoulthard, Ashton Shuttleworth, and Dawes v Neville Russell (a Firm) CA 27-Nov-1997
Auditors who were in a position to advise a company’s directors as to the legality of them making loan payments to a shell company which was acquiring there shares had a duty so to advise. The directors of a company sued them for failing to warn . .
CitedShore v Sedgwick Financial Services Ltd CA 23-Jul-2008
The claimant said that the defendant had given him negligent advice on pensions, failing to say that he should stay within his occupational scheme. The defendant pleaded limitation.
Held: The claimant suffered damage when he made the transfer . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.277737

Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran: CA 13 Feb 1989

The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and using the land for their own purposes. The evidence was that the Plaintiff, the owner of the paper title, had no immediate use for the land but intended in due course to dedicate it for the purposes of a road diversion. Accordingly, the use made of the disputed land by the Defendants did not interfere with the proposed future use to which the true owner intended to devote the land.
Held: The Defendant had established a title by adverse possession, and the fact that the acts of ownership relied upon to establish his claim to adverse possession were not inconsistent with the use to which the true owner intended to put the land in the future was irrelevant. ‘Possession of land would never be ‘adverse’ within the meaning of the Act if it is enjoyed under a lawful title. If, therefore, a person occupies or uses land by licence of the owner with the paper title, and his licence has not been duly determined, he can not be treated as having been in ‘adverse possession’ as against the owner with the paper title.’
Nourse LJ said: ‘The essential difference between prescription and limitation is that in the former case title can be acquired only be possession as of right. That is the antithesis of what is required for limitation, which perhaps can be described as possession as of wrong. It can readily be understood that with prescription the intention of the true owner may be of decisive importance, it being impossible to presume a grant by someone whose intention is shown to have been against it. But with limitation it is the intention of the squatter which is decisive. He must intend to possess the land to the exclusion of all the world, including the true owner, while the intention of the latter is, with one exception, entirely beside the point. In order that title to land may be acquired by limitation, (1) the true owner must either (a) have been dispossessed, or (b) have discontinued his possession, of the land; and (2) the squatter must have been in adverse possession of it for the statutory period before action brought . .’ Hoffmann LJ said that what is required is ‘not an intention to own or even an intention to acquire ownership but an intention to possess.’
Slade LJ referred to Powell v MacFarlane and said: ‘I agree with the judge that ‘what is required for this purpose is not an intention to own or even an intention to acquire ownership but an intention to possess’ – that is to say, an intention for the time being to possess the land to the exclusion of all other persons, including the owner with the paper title. No authorities cited to us establish the contrary proposition.’

Slade LJ, Nourse LJ, Butler-Sloss LJ
[1990] 1 Ch 623, [1989] EWCA Civ 11, [1990] Ch 632, [1989] 2 All ER 255
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15
England and Wales
Citing:
DisapprovedLeigh v Jack CA 1879
The plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Mr Leigh) had laid out part of his estate as proposed streets to be known as Grundy Street and Napier Place. He conveyed to the defendant certain land described as being ‘bounded by’ Grundy Street and Napier . .
CitedWallis’s Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd CA 10-Jul-1974
A strip of land between a holiday camp and a garage had been conveyed as an intended roadway. It had not been fenced. A plot of land was sold by the previous farmer to the garage. Later the plaintiffs bought the farm, excluding the roadway, and the . .
CitedIn Re Daintrey, Ex Parte Holt QBD 1893
The court was asked whether a letter could be admitted in evidence and relied upon as an act of bankruptcy. The letter was sent by the debtor to the creditor at a time when there was no dispute, headed ‘without prejudice’. It contained an offer of . .
CitedSouth Shropshire District Council v Amos CA 1986
Lord Justice Parker said that the use of the words ‘without prejudice’ prima facie meant that a letter was intended to be a part of negotiation. A letter which purported to initiate some sort of negotiation (‘an opening shot’) is not necessarily . .
CitedRains v Buxton 1880
rains_buxtonChD1880
Fry J said: ‘The difference between dispossession and the discontinuance of possession might be expressed in this way: the one is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession, the other case is where the person in possession . .
CitedRush and Tomkins Ltd v Greater London Council HL 3-Nov-1988
The parties had entered into contracts for the construction of dwellings. The contractors sought payment. The council alleged shortcomings in the works. The principal parties had settled the dispute, but a sub-contractor now sought disclosure of the . .
CitedTreloar v Nute CA 1976
The judge in the County Court had rejected a claim to adverse possession by a defendant who together with his father had done a number of acts, some more trivial than others, in and around a disputed gully and adjacent land leading eventually to the . .
CitedPowell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the . .

Cited by:
ApprovedRhondda Cynon Taff Borough Council v Watkins CA 12-Feb-2003
Land had been purchased compulsorily, but the respondent unlawfully returned to possession in 1966, and now claimed title by adverse possession. The Council executed a vesting deed poll in 1988. The Council asserted that he could not be in adverse . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton CA 19-Mar-1997
The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton CA 19-Mar-1997
The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar . .
CitedTopplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
CitedChapman and Another v Godinn Properties Ltd and others CA 27-Jun-2005
Dispute over right of way over land subject to claim for possessory title. ‘But each case must turn on its own facts. In a case of this nature, the court must ask itself what it is that would be expected of somebody in possession of land of this . .
CitedAllen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .
CitedLong v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council ChD 20-Mar-1996
The parties had agreed for a lease, and the tenant entered possession, but no formal lease was executed. The tenant stopped paying rent in 1977 or 1984. He now claimed rectification of the registers to show him as proprietor. The landlord argued . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedSze To Chun Keung v Kung Kwok Wai David and Lam Chak Man Estate Limited PC 27-Jun-1997
(Hong Kong) The respondents were registered owners of land occupied by the appellant who claim title by adverse possession after entry in 1955. Subsequently the claim resided with the Crown.
Held: ‘on the facts as pleaded, the land has been . .
CitedWilliams v Hull ChD 19-Nov-2009
The parties had bought a house together, but disputed the shares on which it was held. The appeal was on the basis that a without prejudice letter had been redacte and then wrongly admitted as not in fact without prejudice, an as an unambiguous . .
CitedThe Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
CitedCity of London v Samede and Others QBD 18-Jan-2012
The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.259373

Coad v Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Health Authority: CA 17 Jul 1996

A nurse suffered a back injury in 1983 in the course of her employment. She left the employment of the health authority in either 1990 or 1991. The judge had accepted her evidence that she did not know that she had a right of action against her employers until she left in 1991.
Held: The court should apply a subjective test of the reasons for delay in bringing an action when asked to disallow the three year limitation period. Ignorance of the law which might allow a claim was a reason for disapplying the limitation law. The court is engaged in a subjective inquiry in the sense of ascertaining what the claimant knew and what reasons in fact acted upon his mind. Having once satisfied itself as to the genuineness of the claimant’s reasons, in performing the overall exercise of deciding whether or not it is equitable to exercise the section 33 discretion in favour of the claimant, the court must consider whether or not, in all the circumstances, the reason or reasons advanced by the claimant are sufficient to be given real or decisive weight.
Lord Justice Ward said: ‘The court is required to conduct an inquiry into two factual situations. The first is the length of the delay; the second is the reason for delay on the part of the plaintiff. To add ‘on the part of the plaintiff’ indicates that it is a subjective inquiry in which the court is there engaged.’ and ‘Having found what the reason is, the court must decide whether it is a good or bad reason or, in the language of Russell LJ in Halford v Brooks [1991] 1 WLR 428, whether the plaintiff is culpable or not.’
As to whether a judge’s decision should be overturned: ‘The test is whether or not the learned judge was so plainly wrong that his decision exceeded the ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible.’

Ward, Judge, Rose LJJ
Times 30-Jul-1996, Gazette 17-Jul-1996, [1997] 8 Med LR 154, [1997] 1 WLR 189
Limitation Act 1980 33(3)(a)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedHalford v Brooks CA 1991
The defendant had been tried for murder. The plaintiff now sought civil damages. The defendant replied that the case was brought out of time, and now appealed against the court’s extension of the time limit on the basis that the plaintiff had not . .

Cited by:
CitedMcHugh v Gray QBD 27-Jul-2006
. .
CitedSkerratt v Linfax Ltd (T/A Go Karting for Fun) CA 6-May-2003
. .
CitedBuckler v J F Finnegan Ltd CA 21-Jun-2004
The claimant sought damages for personal injuries after ingesting asbestos while employed as a joiner by the defendant. The defendant appealed an order allowing the claim to go ahead despite being out of time. . .
CitedRiddell v Wessex Regional Hospital Authority and Another CA 12-Dec-1996
. .
CitedDale v Michelin Tyre Plc CA 3-Mar-1999
. .
CitedA v Hoare QBD 8-Jul-2008
The claimant sought damages for her rape by the defendant. After his conviction and having served his sentence, the defendant won substantial sums on the lottery.
Held: The sums paid by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board were not paid by . .
CitedBurke v Ashe Construction Ltd CA 23-May-2003
. .
CitedGriffin and others v Clwyd Health Authority and others CA 14-May-2001
. .
CitedKR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 12-Feb-2003
The respondent appealed decisions by the court to allow claims for personal injury out of time. The claims involved cases of sexual abuse inflicted by its employees going back over many years.
Held: The judge had misapplied the test laid down . .
CitedReed Elsevier Uk Ltd (T/A Lexisnexis) and Another v Bewry CA 30-Oct-2014
Appeal from a decision granting the claimant’s application made pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the limitation period in his proceedings for libel and dismissing the defendants’ application to strike out the claimant’s . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.79241

Phillips and Others v Vaughan: LRA 4 Mar 2016

LRA Application to close registered title by documentary title owners/ first registration of possessory title based on adverse possession/ Whether factual and mental elements of adverse possession established/ Whether the occupation was with consent/ Whether witness statements made by their apparent author/ whether a witness offered an inducement to give evidence/ Whether a further adjournment of proceedings to facilitate a third opportunity to obtain handwriting evidence should be grant

[2016] EWLandRA 2014 – 0497
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15 17, Land Registration Act 2002 11(7)

Registered Land, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.564466

Massey and Another v Boulden and Another: CA 14 Nov 2002

The claimants said they had acquired a right of way by vehicle over land, a village green, having driven over it for more than forty years. It was responded that the act of driving over the land other than on a track had been an unlawful act, and as such could not be the basis for acquiring a right by prescription.
Held: Under the 1988 Act, such driving was a criminal offence, even though as a penal statute it must be interpreted restrictively. The common land fell within the statute. However the 2000 Act and 2002 Regulations would now create the right to purchase such a right of way.

Simon Brown, Mantell, Sedley LJJ
Times 27-Nov-2002, Gazette 23-Jan-2003, [2002] EWCA Civ 1634, [2003] 2 All ER 87, [2003] 1 WLR 1792, [2003] P and CR 355
Bailii
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 68, Road Traffic Act 1988 34(1), Vehicular Access Across Common and Other Land (England) Regulations 2002 (2002 No 1711)
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedHanning and Others v Top Deck Travel Group Ltd CA 9-Jun-1993
The owner of a common appealed a finding that the neighbouring land owner had acquired by prescription a right of way across the common to use a track for commercial vehicles (buses) to get to the property (the bus depot).
Held: An easement . .

Cited by:
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedWall v Collins and Another CA 17-May-2007
Properties, when leasehold, had acquired rights of way by prescription over neighbouring land. The freehold interests were acquired, and the claimant now appealed a decision that the right of way acquired under his lease had disappeared.
Held: . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.178288

Ezekiel v Orakpo: CA 16 Sep 1996

A charging order was made in 1982 to secure pounds 20,000 under a judgment given in 1979. The judgment creditor did not seek to enforce the charging order until almost 12 years had elapsed since the making of the charging order. An order for possession was made so as to enforce the order. The debtor tendered a sum sufficient to pay the principal debt but not interest on it. The parties appealed a finding that the creditor was entitled to interest, but only for six years.
Held: The creditor was entitled to interest not limited to six years. A charging order carries a charge to secure interest, whether or not interest is specifically mentioned. Enforcement of a foreign currency judgment by means of a charging order required the judgment debt first to be converted to Sterling before completion of the enforcement by the making of the charging order. Enforcement of a judgment debt by means of a charging order under the Charging Orders Act 1979 is completed when the charging order is made final.
Millett LJ said that, for a judgement to carry judgment interest it is not necessary to say so specifically. Therefore it is also not necessary to mention interest in any Charging Order carrying the judgement into effect for such interest to be added to the security. He continued:-
‘Section 3(4) of the Charging Orders Act 1979 provides that the Charging Order takes effect as an equitable charge created by the judgment debtor by writing under his hand. It must therefore be given the same effect unless the Act itself provides otherwise as would an equitable charge on the land in question to secure a stated principle sum but with no mention of interest. Such a charge would carry interest even though there were no words allowing interest on the charge itself. That was decided at first instance in re Drax… which was followed . . in Stoker v Elwell . . The defendant invited us to over rule Stoker . . and re Drax although they have stood unchallenged for nearly a century.
His submission was founded on the well established principle that a Charging Order cannot be given except for an ascertained sum . . It is clear Law for example that a Charging Order cannot be made for untaxed costs. In the present case, of course, the costs were taxed. But it is said by parity of reasoning that it cannot be made to secure future interest since the amount of such interest cannot be ascertained in advance. However, the Charging Orders Act 1979 itself entitles the Court to make a Charging Order for monies due or to become due, and it appears to me that future interest at an ascertained rate (albeit a variable rate) from the date of judgment to the date of payment is an ascertained or at least an ascertainable sum for the purpose of the rule in question.
So far as the costs of enforcing the security are concerned, it is of course perfectly true that at the date of the Charging Order, or indeed subsequently, it was quite impossible to ascertain them. The Judge came to the conclusion that the Charging Order must, by the provisions of the statute, be given the same effect as if it were an equitable charge under hand only. If it were, the chargee would have the right in equity to add the costs of enforcing the security to the security. He considered that that should be implied into the Charging Order by virtue of section 3(4). I agree with him and do not think it necessary to add anything further on the matter.’

Millett LJ
Times 16-Sep-1996, [1997] 1 WLR 340
Judgments Act 1938 17
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromEzekiel v Orakpo ChD 4-Nov-1994
The claimant had obtained a charging order to secure a judgment debt, but took no steps to enforce it for more than twelve years. The chargee denied that it could any longer be enforced, and also that the order carried interest when interest had not . .
See AlsoEzekiel v Orakpo CA 1977
A lease had been forfeited for non payment of rent. The lessor then took proceedings for possession. The tenant claimed that the action was invalid because a receiving order had been made against him in the meantime.
Held: The Court rejected . .

Cited by:
CitedCarnegie v Glessen and Others CA 1-Mar-2005
A dispute had been settled by imposition of a charging order against property expressed in a foreign currency. The claimant now said such an order was not possible, and had been made by mistake correctable under the slip rule.
Held: The Master . .
AppliedYorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.80429

Legal Services Commission v Henthorn: QBD 4 Feb 2011

lsc_henthornQBD11

The claimant sought to recover overpayments said to have been made to the defendant barrister in the early 1990s. Interim payments on account had been made, but these were not followed by final accounts. The defendant, now retired, said that the claims were defeated by limitation and laches and were an abuse of process because of long delay by the claimant.
Held: The case of Rasool was on point and settled it that the relation between the lawyer and his client under the legal aid system remained the same despite the funding arrangement under legal aid. Under that arrangement the claimant could have begun its claim, time ran from the date that the work under the certificate was actually completed and all but two of the claims were time barred.
The claimant also claimed in restitution. However, ‘the exclusive remedy available to the LSC is that provided for by regulation 100(8)’ and no restitutionary claim could arise on the basis of the claims pleaded, and if it were available it would now be defeated by laches and limitation. Similarly the claimant had been unreasonable or unfair in its use of its powers in this way. The claim for abuse of process succeeded.
‘the Regulations gave the LSC full powers to obtain all necessary information and also provided strict time limits for the assessment process. What regrettably occurred throughout the 1990s was a culture of acquiescence in which the LSC did not seek regular reports on stale cases, did not exercise its powers of discharge when cases went to sleep and were not reported on, did not ensure that bills that were lodged for taxation outside the three month period permitted by the RSC were subject to penalties so as to discourage such delays and did not require solicitors who delayed in lodging bills of costs to lodge them under threat of discharge and consequent non-payment. In any event, it is not possible to identify the ingredients of the relevant cause of action by reference to the relaxed way in which the regulations were implemented.’

Anthony Thornton QC J
[2010] EWHC 3329 (QB)
Bailii
Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989, Limitation Act 1980
Citing:
CitedCoburn v Colledge CA 1897
A solicitor commenced an action on June 12th, 1896 for his fees for work which had been completed on May 30th 1889.
Held: A period of limitation runs from the date on which the ingredients of the cause of action are complete. The statute of . .
CitedLondon Borough of Hillingdon v ARC Limited CA 7-Apr-1998
The company sought compensation for land taken under compulsory purchase powers by the defendants several years before. It now appealed against the defeat of its claim as time-barred.
Held: The appeal failed. The limitation period for a claim . .
CitedLegal Services Commission v Rasool CA 5-Mar-2008
The defendant had in 1993 obtained legal aid. Work was done but the certificate was then revoked. The Commission sought repayment of the sums paid on account to his solicitors. He replied that the claim was out of time. The Commission argued that . .
CitedLeivers v Barber Walker and Co Ltd CA 1943
Goddard LJ (dissenting) said that section 2(1)(d) of the 1939 Act changed the former position altogether, leaving the provision for limitation as regards specialties to apply only to deeds and other documents under seal (or to claims other than for . .
CitedCentral Electricity Generating Board v Halifax Corporation HL 1963
Under the 1947 Act, the assets of electricity undertakings were transferred to to electricity boards. Property held by local authorities as authorised undertakers should, on vesting day, vest in the relevant board. A question arose as to whether . .
CitedThe Child Poverty Action Group v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions SC 8-Dec-2010
The Action Group had obtained a declaration that, where an overpayment of benefits had arisen due to a miscalculation by the officers of the Department, any process of recovering the overpayment must be by the Act, and that the Department could not . .
CitedChild Poverty Action Group, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary Of State for Work and Pensions CA 14-Oct-2009
CPAG appealed against a refusal of a declaration that the respondent could use only the 1992 Act to recover overpayment of benefits where there had been neither misrepresentation nor non-disclosure.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and the court . .
CitedDoherty and others v Birmingham City Council HL 30-Jul-2008
The House was asked ‘whether a local authority can obtain a summary order for possession against an occupier of a site which it owns and has been used for many years as a gipsy and travellers’ caravan site. His licence to occupy the site has come to . .
CitedBarber v London Borough of Croydon CA 11-Feb-2010
The tenant who suffered learning and behavioural difficulties appealed against an order for possession of his council flat. He had become aggressive with the caretaker. The council sought possession, and he defended the claim saying that the council . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromLegal Services Commission v Henthorn CA 30-Nov-2011
The Commission sought to recover what it said were payments made on account to the respondent barrister, but only after many years had passed. The Commission argued that time only began to run once it requested repayment.
Held: The appeal . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Legal Professions, Equity, Limitation, Legal Aid

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.428706

Gotham v Doodes: CA 25 Jul 2006

The former bankrupt resisted sale of his property by the trustee, saying that enforcement was barred by limitation. He and his wife bought the property in early 1988, and he was made bankrupt in October 1988. He was dischaged from bankruptcy in October 1991. In December 1990 the court answered an application for the sale of the property by the trustee with a charging order made absolute in May 1992. In 2004, the trustee again applied for possession and sale. The defendant pleaded limitation.
Held: A charge imposed under s313 of the 1986 Act secured a future obligation, and until the obligation became a present one, no right to receive the sum secured arose. Therefore time ran from the date of the order for sale, not from the date of the charge.

[2006] EWCA Civ 1080, Times 14-Aug-2006, [2007] 1 WLR 86
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 20(1), Insolvency Act 1986 313, Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 14
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedHornsey Local Board v Monarch Investment Building Society CA 1889
The local authority had incurred expense in paving a street. They were entitled to apportion those expenses amongst the owners of the properties fronting onto that street and summarily to recover from the respective owners the amounts so . .
Appeal fromDoodes v Gotham, Perry ChD 17-Nov-2005
The trustee in bankruptcy had taken a charge on the property in 1992 to support the bankruptcy in 1988. He sought to enforce it in 2005. The chargor appealed an order which denied he was protected by limitation.
Held: The appeal succeeded. . .
CitedRe Citro, Lloyds Bank plc v Byrne and Byrne, Abbey National plc v Moss and others and Barclays Bank plc v Hendricks CA 1991
Trustees in bankruptcy of bankrupt husbands successfully appealed for the removal of provisos delaying the operation of orders for sale made under s30 in respect of each husband’s matrimonial home for the benefit of that husband’s wife who had been . .
CitedMidland Bank plc v Pike 1988
. .
CitedFarran v Beresford HL 1843
The House considered the nature of scire facias, and in particular whether scire facias created a new right, or whether it only operated as a continuation of the original judgment. ‘The present right to receive the same’ was understood by Tindal . .
CitedEarle v Bellingham 24-Jul-1857
The right to receive legacies charged on a reversionary legacy payable under the will of another was not a present right to receive them until the reversionary legacy fell into possession on the death of the life tenant. . .
CitedGreen and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
CitedWilkinson and Another v West Bromwich Building Society CA 30-Jul-2004
The Society had repossessed and sold the mortgagors’ house in 1990. It knew then that there was a shortfall, but took no further recovery proceedings until 2002. What was the date from which the relevant limitation period began to run? Though the . .
CitedSwiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd 1979
A subjective test was applied as to whether the court could find an intention to interfere with contractual relations. . .
CitedSwiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd CA 1981
An equitable charge is created when property is expressly or constructively made liable to the discharge of a debt or some other obligation, and the charge confers on the chargee a right of realisation by judicial process such as a sale order. . .
CitedRe Owen 1894
Legacies were charged on land after the death of the life tenant. The life tenant died in 1880. It was not suggested that time ran from the death of the testator in 1854. . .

Cited by:
CitedYorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.243398

Yorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another: CA 24 Oct 2008

The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order by normal means is not barred by section 20(1), and unlike the position under a legal mortgage, the creditor’s rights are not barred after 12 years because the holder of a charging order does not have a right to possession such that time can run against it under section 15, and extinction of title cannot therefore occur under section 17. There was no need to distinguish between legal and equitable mortgages and Ezekiel v Orakpo was binding. The defendant’s argument failed.

[2008] EWCA Civ 1156
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 20(1)20(5) 24, Charging Orders Act 1979 1(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedEzekiel v Orakpo CA 16-Sep-1996
A charging order was made in 1982 to secure pounds 20,000 under a judgment given in 1979. The judgment creditor did not seek to enforce the charging order until almost 12 years had elapsed since the making of the charging order. An order for . .
CitedNational Westminster Bank Plc v Ashe (Trustee In Bankruptcy of Djabar Babai) CA 8-Feb-2008
The mortgagees had made no payments under the charge for more than twelve years, and had remained in possession throughout. They argued that the bank were prevented from now seeking to enforce the charge. The bank argued that the possession had not . .
CitedEdmunds v Waugh 1866
. .
CitedHolmes v Cowcher ChD 1970
The court accepted the proposition put forward by counsel for the mortgagee that on an application by the mortgagor to redeem the mortgage, all the arrears of interest (amounting to almost 10 years) had to be paid as a condition of redemption, not . .
CitedLowsley and Another v Forbes (Trading As I E Design Services) HL 29-Jul-1998
The plaintiffs, with the leave of the court, had obtained garnishee and charging orders nisi against the debtor 11 and a half years after they had obtained a consent judgment.
Held: An application by the judgment debtor to set aside the orders . .
CitedHughes v Kelly 1843
(Ireland) . .
CitedPoole Corporation v Moody CA 1945
In relation to a power of sale, the subsection was treated by the Court solely as a provision which excluded the operation of section 2 in claims for equitable relief, without any mention of the possibility of it applying the section by analogy. . .
CitedGotham v Doodes CA 25-Jul-2006
The former bankrupt resisted sale of his property by the trustee, saying that enforcement was barred by limitation. He and his wife bought the property in early 1988, and he was made bankrupt in October 1988. He was dischaged from bankruptcy in . .
CitedDesnousse v London Borough of Newham and others CA 17-May-2006
The occupier had been granted a temporary licence by the authority under the homelessness provisions whilst it made its assessment. The assessment concluded that she had become homeless intentionally, and therefore terminated the licence and set out . .
CitedCroydon Unique Ltd v Wright and Crombie, and Crombie Intervenors CA 29-Jul-1999
The beneficiary of a charging order had standing to intervene in proceedings leading to the forfeiture of a lease even several years after the lease had been forfeit. It was an interest derived from the lessee’s interest and a proper basis. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Land

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.277146

DEG-Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v Koshy and Other (No 3); Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (in receivership) v Same (No 3): CA 28 Jul 2003

The company sought to recover damages from a director who had acted dishonestly, by concealing a financial interest in a different company which had made loans to the claimant company. He replied that the claim was out of time. At first instance the first defendant had been found dishonest through non-disclosure, and that section 21 of the 1980 Act applied to leave the claim not out of time.
Held: The authorities suggested that when looking at fiduciaries, a six year period would apply unless excluded under 21(1)(a) or (b). A claim for an account from someone acting as a trustee was such, since it was a claim against his personal liability for his own acts as director, and if fraud was established his case would fall within 21(1)(a), but not (b).
Mummery LJ said that: ‘For limitation purposes the two classes of trust and/or fiduciary duty are treated differently. The first class of case arising from the breach of a pre-existing duty is, or is treated by analogy, as an action by the beneficiary for breach of trust falling within section 21(1) of the 1980 Act. This means that there is no limitation period for the cases falling within section 21(1)(a) or (b); but that there is a six-year limitation period for cases falling with s21(3).’

Mummery, Hale, Carnwath LJJ
[2003] EWCA Civ 1048, Times 09-Sep-2003, [2004] 1 BCLC 131
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 21(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromDeg-Deutsch Investitions Und Entwicklungsgesellschaft Mbh v Koshy (No 3) Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Same (No 3) ChD 26-Oct-2001
A claim against a company director which alleged a misapplication of company assets involving a fraudulent, or dishonest breach of trust, was not subject to a limitation period. A company was alleged to have fraudulently hidden certain profits. The . .
CitedCompanhia De Seguros Imperio v Heath (REBX) Ltd and Others CA 20-Jul-2000
Although a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, as a claim in equity, was not subject to the same limitation periods imposed by the Act as claims in tort or contract, a court exercising an equitable jurisdiction should apply similar periods under the . .
CitedFurs Ltd v Tomkies 1936
(High Court of Australia) ‘the inflexible rule that, except under the authority of a provision in the articles of association, no director shall obtain for himself a profit by means of a transaction in which he is concerned on behalf of the company . .
CitedRegal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver HL 20-Feb-1942
Directors Liability for Actions Ouside the Company
Regal negotiated for the purchase of two cinemas in Hastings. There were five directors on the board, including Mr Gulliver, the chairman. Regal incorporated a subsidiary, Hastings Amalgamated Cinemas Ltd, with a share capital of 5,000 pounds. There . .
CitedTito v Wadell (No 2) ChD 1977
The liability to account for profits on breach of the self-dealing rule and the fair-dealing rule does not arise from a breach of duty at all. In his judgment such liability is the consequence of an equitable disability rather than of a breach of . .
CitedMovitex v Bulfield ChD 1988
The court considered a company’s articles of association which excused a director taking an interest in a contract with the company. The court treated the general exclusion of the self-dealing rule in the Articles as subject to the duty of the . .
CitedGuinness plc v Saunders CA 1988
. .
CitedKelly v Cooper and Another PC 25-Nov-1992
There was a dispute between a client and an estate agent in Bermuda. The client sued the estate agent for damages for breach of duty in failing to disclose material information to him and for putting himself in a position where his duty and his . .
CitedIn Re Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd: Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd v Fitzgerald ChD 2-Mar-1995
A sole company director must still have company meetings before entering into a contract even if only he will be present. When a director’s claim to the validity of a contract or arrangement depends upon his disclosure of it at a meeting, he must . .
CitedKnox v Gye HL 1872
A court will, by analogy, apply a statutory limitation period if the remedy in equity, specific performance, is ‘correspondent to the remedy at law’ and where ‘the suit in equity corresponds with an action at law’. Lord Westbury said: ‘For where the . .
CitedIn Re Sharpe 1892
The misapplication of company money in the form of ultra vires payments of interest to shareholders was treated as a breach of trust by the directors. . .
CitedRe Lands Allotment Company CA 1894
A limited company is not a trustee of its funds, but their beneficial owner. However, the fiduciary character of the duties of its directors mean that they are treated as if they were trustees of those funds of the company which are in their hands . .
CitedTaylor v Davies PC 19-Dec-1919
(Ontario) An assignee for the benefit of creditors conveyed mortgaged property to the mortgagee in satisfaction of part of the debt due to him. The mortgagee was also one of the inspectors required by the Canadian legislation to supervise the . .
CitedClarkson v Davies PC 1923
In a case involving fraud, referring to Taylor v Davies, Lord Justice Clerk said that: ‘it was there laid down that there is a distinction between a trust which arises before the occurrence of the transaction impeached and cases which arises only by . .
CitedMothew (T/a Stapley and Co) v Bristol and West Building Society CA 24-Jul-1996
The solicitor, acting in a land purchase transaction for his lay client and the plaintiff, had unwittingly misled the claimant by telling the claimant that the purchasers were providing the balance of the purchase price themselves without recourse . .
CitedParagon Finance Plc (Formerly Known As National Home Loans Corporation Plc v D B Thakerar and Co (a Firm); Ranga and Co (a Firm) and Sterling Financial Services Limited CA 21-Jul-1998
Where an action had been begun on basis of allegations of negligence and breach of trust, new allegations of fraud where quite separate new causes of claim, and went beyond amendments and were disallowed outside the relevant limitation period. . .
CitedBairstow and Others v Queens Moat Houses plc CA 17-May-2001
The court considered the liability of directors for an unlawfully paid dividend.
Held: Robert Walker LJ: ‘The prospect of the former directors being able to obtain contribution from innocent recipients of unlawful dividends was debated . .
CitedJ J Harrison v Harrison 2002
A company director, having concealed relevant information from the board, obtained company property at a substantial undervalue. . .
CitedIn re H and R (Minors) (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) HL 14-Dec-1995
Evidence allowed – Care Application after Abuse
Children had made allegations of serious sexual abuse against their step-father. He was acquitted at trial, but the local authority went ahead with care proceedings. The parents appealed against a finding that a likely risk to the children had still . .
CitedArmitage v Nurse; etc CA 19-Mar-1997
A clause in a trust deed may validly excuse trustees from personal liability for even gross negligence. The trustee was exempted from liability for loss or damage ‘unless such loss or damage shall be caused by his own actual fraud’.
Held: The . .
CitedBrickenden v London Loan and Savings Co PC 10-May-1934
In order to establish breach of the fiduciary dealing rules, the company does not have to prove that it would not have entered into the transaction if there had been compliance by the director with the fiduciary-dealing rules and he had made . .
CitedGross v Lewis Hillman Ltd CA 1970
Where there has been no misdirection on an issue of fact by the trial judge the presumption is that his conclusion on issues of fact is correct. The Court of Appeal will only reverse the trial judge on an issue of fact when it is convinced that his . .
CitedArmagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (‘The Ocean Frost’) CA 1985
Proof of corruption not needed for bribe
In establishing that money was paid as an improper inducement or bribe, proof of corruptness or a corrupt motive was unnecessary.
When a court looks at a decision of a judge at first instance, the court stressed the need to look at the . .
See AlsoGwembe Valley Development Company Ltd v Koshy and others CA 3-Dec-2002
Second application further to amend court order . .

Cited by:
CitedNewgate Stud Company, Newgate Stud Farm Llc v Penfold, Penfold Bloodstock Limited ChD 21-Dec-2004
The claimants sought damages from the defendant. He had been employed to manage their horse-racing activities, and it was alleged that he had made secret profits. The defendant denied any dishonesty, saying all matters were known to the deceased . .
CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
CitedBerezovsky v Abramovich ComC 22-May-2008
Applications were made to amend pleadings and for consequential orders. The claimant sought damages of $4.3 billion alleging breach of trust. The claimant sought to add claims which the defendant said were out of time.
Held: The proposed . .
CitedGreen and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
CitedWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria SC 19-Feb-2014
Bank not liable for fraud of customer
The appellant sought to make the bank liable for a fraud committed by the Bank’s customer, the appellant saying that the Bank knew or ought to have known of the fraud. The court was asked whether a party liable only as a dishonest assistant was a . .
CitedHalton International Inc Another v Guernroy Ltd CA 27-Jun-2006
The parties had been involved in investing in an airline to secure its future, but it was now said that one party had broken the shareholders’ or voting agreement in not allowing further investments on a pari passu basis. The defendants argued that . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Trusts, Limitation, Equity

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.186028

Brady v Norman: QBD 26 May 2010

The claimant appealed against refusal of the Master to extend the 12 month limitation period in his proposed defamation claim. The allegations related to a dispute at an Aslef barbecue, and later of forgery. The claimant was a former General Secretary of the union, and the defendant the current General Secretary. Earlier allegations had been litigated, but the claimant said that more serious defamations had subsequently come to light.
Held: The appeal failed.
The master had properly considered the various elements, and looked at it, as he should, ‘in the round’: ‘In deciding whether to disapply the limitation period, it was certainly legitimate to weigh up (as he did) whether there remained any need for further vindication, having regard to all that had taken place, and to set that consideration alongside Mr Norman’s loss of the limitation defence and the prospect for him of being vexed, yet again, with litigation over the circumstances of the dismissal five or six years on.’

Eady J
[2010] EWHC 1215 (QB)
Bailii
Defamation Act 1996
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedG v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) HL 25-Apr-1985
The House asked when a decision, on the facts, of a first instance court is so wrong as to allow it to be overturned on appeal.
Held: The epithet ‘wrong’ is to be applied to the substance of the decision made by the lower court. ‘Certainly it . .
CitedLonzim Plc and Others v Sprague QBD 11-Nov-2009
The court asked whether any damages recovered by the claimant might be so small as to be totally disproportionate to the very high costs that any libel action involves.
Held: Tugendhat J said: ‘It is not enough for a claimant to say that a . .
CitedDow Jones and Co Inc v Jameel CA 3-Feb-2005
Presumption of Damage in Defamation is rebuttable
The defendant complained that the presumption in English law that the victim of a libel had suffered damage was incompatible with his right to a fair trial. They said the statements complained of were repetitions of statements made by US . .
CitedSteedman, Clohosy, Smith, Kiernan, Newman, Creevy, Anderson v The British Broadcasting Corporation CA 23-Oct-2001
The claimants had issued defamation proceedings. The defendant said they were out of time, having begun the action more than one year after the alleged publication, but accepted that they had not been prejudiced in their defence. The court refused . .

Cited by:
CitedThornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD 16-Jun-2010
The claimant said that a review of her book was defamatory and a malicious falsehood. The defendant now sought summary judgment or a ruling as to the meaning of the words complained of.
Held: The application for summary judgment succeeded. The . .
Appeal fromBrady v Norman CA 9-Feb-2011
The claimant sought to have disapplied the limitation period in his defamation claim. The claimant said that in the case of Cain, the Steedman case had not been cited, and that the decisions were incompatible, and that Cain was to be prefered.
CitedBewry v Reed Elseveir (UK) Ltd and Another QBD 10-Oct-2013
The claimant had begin proceedings against the defendant legal publishers, saying that their summary of a cash had brought was defamatory. He now sought leave to extend the limitation period for his claim, and the defendants argued that, given the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.416135

Phelps v Mayor and Burgesses London Borough of Hillingdon: CA 4 Nov 1998

The plaintiff claimed damages for the negligent failure of an educational psychologist employed by a local authority to identify that the plaintiff was dyslexic.
Held: An educational psychologist has no duty of care to a child, as opposed to her employer, in failing to diagnose dyslexia which was not an injury but a congenital condition: (Evans LJ) ‘dyslexia is not itself an injury and I do not see how failure to ameliorate or mitigate its effects can be an injury.’ No economic loss damages occurred until the psychologist adopted a particular duty to the child.

Stuart-Smith LJ
Times 09-Nov-1998, Gazette 25-Nov-1998, [1998] EWCA Ci84699 1686, [1999] 1 WLR 500, [1998] ELR 38
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromPhelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council QBD 10-Oct-1997
An educational psychologist has a professional duty of care to a child when asked to assess for that child for dyslexia, even though the report may be for the local authority. . .
DistinguishedX (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council; M (A Minor) and Another v Newham London Borough Council; Etc HL 29-Jun-1995
Liability in Damages on Statute Breach to be Clear
Damages were to be awarded against a Local Authority for breach of statutory duty in a care case only if the statute was clear that damages were capable of being awarded. in the ordinary case a breach of statutory duty does not, by itself, give rise . .
CitedHenderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd HL 25-Jul-1994
Lloyds Agents Owe Care Duty to Member; no Contract
Managing agents conducted the financial affairs of the Lloyds Names belonging to the syndicates under their charge. It was alleged that they managed these affairs with a lack of due careleading to enormous losses.
Held: The assumption of . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromPhelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council; Anderton v Clwyd County Council; Gower v Bromley London Borough Council; Jarvis v Hampshire County Council HL 28-Jul-2000
The plaintiffs each complained of negligent decisions in his or her education made by the defendant local authorities. In three of them the Court of Appeal had struck out the plaintiff’s claim and in only one had it been allowed to proceed.
CitedAdams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council HL 17-Jun-2004
A attended the defendant’s schools between 1977 and 1988. He had always experienced difficulties with reading and writing and as an adult found those difficulties to be an impediment in his employment. He believed them to be the cause of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Education, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.145165

Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria: SC 19 Feb 2014

Bank not liable for fraud of customer

The appellant sought to make the bank liable for a fraud committed by the Bank’s customer, the appellant saying that the Bank knew or ought to have known of the fraud. The court was asked whether a party liable only as a dishonest assistant was a trustee, and subject to the exception which would extend the limitation period.
Held: The bank’s appeal succeeded. The definition of ‘trustee’ in section 21 of the 1980 Act did not apply to include someone deemed to be a trustee for acting as a dishonest assistant or knowing recipient within a fraudulent scheme. He could only be a consructive trustee.

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, Lord Hughes
[2014] UKSC 10, 16 ITELR 740, [2014] WLR(D) 88, [2014] 2 All ER 489, [2014] 2 WLR 355, [2014] WTLR 873, UKSC 2012/0113
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC
Limitation Act 1980 21(1)(a)
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria QBD 8-Apr-2011
The claimant had been defrauded by a customer of the defendant bank. He brought a claim against the bank, saying that they knew or ought to have known of the fraudster’s activities, and were liable. The Bank denied that the UK courts had . .
See AlsoWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria QBD 24-Jan-2012
The claimant asserted involvement by the defendant bank in a fraud perpetrated against him. Jurisdiction had already been admitted for one trust , and now the claimant sought to add two further claims.
Held: ‘None of the gateways to English . .
See AlsoCentral Bank of Nigeria v Williams CA 3-Apr-2012
The claimant alleged that he had been defrauded and accused the appellant of involvement in the fraud. The Bank appealed against a finding that the claim against it was not time limited.
Held: The appeal failed. The action was by a beneficiary . .
See AlsoWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria CA 2-Jul-2013
The claimant appealed against an order dis-allowing service on it out of the jurisdiction.
Held: Dr Williams’ appeal in respect of the Nigerian law claim was allowed but rejected in respect of the trust claim and the contract claim. . .
CitedBeckford v Wade PC 1805
(Jamaica) The board was concerned with the application of the English statutes of limitation, which were held to apply in Jamaica subject to a Jamaican statute excepting (among other people) trustees. Sir William Grant MR said: ‘The question then . .
CitedHovenden v Lord Annesley 1806
Referring to a judgment of Lord Macclesfield on the application of statutory limitation by analogy to claims against trustees for breach of trust, he continued: ‘Now I take it that the position which has been laid down, ‘that trust and fraud are not . .
CitedParagon Finance Plc (Formerly Known As National Home Loans Corporation Plc v D B Thakerar and Co (a Firm); Ranga and Co (a Firm) and Sterling Financial Services Limited CA 21-Jul-1998
Where an action had been begun on basis of allegations of negligence and breach of trust, new allegations of fraud where quite separate new causes of claim, and went beyond amendments and were disallowed outside the relevant limitation period. . .
CitedSelangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3) ChD 1968
The expressions ‘constructive trust’ and ‘constructive trustee’ are ‘nothing more than a formula for equitable relief. It is the actual control of assets belonging beneficially to a company which causes the law to treat directors as analogous to . .
CitedBonney v Ridgard 3-Dec-1784
A purchaser of leasehold premises from an executor need not (in general) see to the application of the purchase money, nor need there be any recital in such an assignment of the purpose for which it is sold ; but if on the face of the assignment it . .
CitedWilson v Moore 22-Mar-1834
Merchants who, by the direction of an executor, their commercial correspondent, applied a fund, which they knew to be part of the testator’s assets, in satisfaction of advances made by them, in the course of trade, to relieve the embarrasments of . .
CitedBarnes v Addy 1874
A stranger to a trust can be liable in equity for assisting in a breach of trust, even though he received no trust property.
Lord Selborne said: ‘Now in this case we have to deal with certain persons who are trustees, and with certain other . .
CitedSoar v Ashwell CA 1893
Trustees under a will had entrusted the trust fund to a solicitor for investment. The solicitor exercised all of their administrative and investment powers for them and distributed part of the fund invested to the beneficiaries under the will but . .
CitedIn re Gallard 1897
. .
CitedIn re Eyre-Williams 1923
. .
CitedHeynes v Dixon 1900
. .
CitedIn re Jane Davies 1891
An action brought by a residuary legatee against an executor for the administration of the testator’s estate is an action for a legacy.
An executor, qua executor, is not an express trustee. . .
CitedIn re Lacy; Royal General Theatrical Fund Association v Kydd 1899
Equity prevents trustees from raising limitation against their beneficiaries.
An executor, qua executor, is not an express trustee. . .
CitedTaylor v Davies PC 19-Dec-1919
(Ontario) An assignee for the benefit of creditors conveyed mortgaged property to the mortgagee in satisfaction of part of the debt due to him. The mortgagee was also one of the inspectors required by the Canadian legislation to supervise the . .
CitedClarkson v Davies PC 1923
In a case involving fraud, referring to Taylor v Davies, Lord Justice Clerk said that: ‘it was there laid down that there is a distinction between a trust which arises before the occurrence of the transaction impeached and cases which arises only by . .
CitedRoyal Brunei Airlines SDN BHD v Tan PC 24-May-1995
(Brunei) The defendants were a one-man company, BLT, and the one man, Mr Tan. A dishonest third party to a breach of trust was liable to make good a resulting loss even though he had received no trust property. The test of knowledge was an objective . .
CitedDeg-Deutsch Investitions Und Entwicklungsgesellschaft Mbh v Koshy (No 3) Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Same (No 3) ChD 26-Oct-2001
A claim against a company director which alleged a misapplication of company assets involving a fraudulent, or dishonest breach of trust, was not subject to a limitation period. A company was alleged to have fraudulently hidden certain profits. The . .
CitedDEG-Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v Koshy and Other (No 3); Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (in receivership) v Same (No 3) CA 28-Jul-2003
The company sought to recover damages from a director who had acted dishonestly, by concealing a financial interest in a different company which had made loans to the claimant company. He replied that the claim was out of time. At first instance the . .
CitedHalton International Inc (Holding) and Another v Guernroy Ltd ChD 9-Sep-2005
Parties had entered into a shareholders’ agreement as to voting arrengemets within a company. Thay disputed whether votes had been used in reach of that agreement, particularly as to the issue of new shares and their allotment, but the court now . .
CitedHalton International Inc Another v Guernroy Ltd CA 27-Jun-2006
The parties had been involved in investing in an airline to secure its future, but it was now said that one party had broken the shareholders’ or voting agreement in not allowing further investments on a pari passu basis. The defendants argued that . .
CitedCattley and Another v Pollard and Another ChD 7-Dec-2006
The first defendant solicitor misappropriated money from an estate he was administering. The beneficiaries later commenced proceedings against his wife, alleging knowing assistance. She said that that claim was out of time. The claimant responded . .
CitedPeconic Industrial Development Ltd v Lau Kwok FAI 27-Feb-2009
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. The limitation period for a claim in dishonest assistance is 6 years. For limitation purposes a distinction is to be made between two kinds of constructive trustees: those who are fiduciaries and those who are . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Banking, Torts – Other, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.521993

Regina v City of Sunderland ex parte Beresford: HL 13 Nov 2003

Land had been used as a park for many years. The council land owner refused to register it as a common, saying that by maintaining the park it had indicated that the use was by consent and licence, and that prescription did not apply.
Held: Qualifying user having been found, there was nothing in the material before the council to support the conclusion that such user had been otherwise than as of right within the meaning of section 22 of the 1965 Act. ‘The fact that the . . Council were willing for the land to be used as an area for informal sports and games, and provided some minimal facilities (now decaying) in the form of benches and a single hard cricket pitch, cannot be regarded as overt acts communicating permission to enter. Nor could the regular cutting of the grass, which was a natural action for any responsible landowner. To treat these acts as amounting to an implied licence, permission or consent would involve a fiction’ User can be as of right even though it is not adverse to the landowner’s interests.

Lord Bingham of Cornhill Lord Hutton Lord Scott of Foscote Lord Rodger of Earlsferry Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe
[2003] UKHL 60, Times 14-Nov-2003, [2003] 3 WLR 1306, [2004] 1 AC 889, [2004] 1 All ER 160, [2004] 2 P and CR 23, [2004] JPL 1106, [2003] NPC 139, [2003] 47 EGCS 155, [2004] 1 EGLR 94
House of Lords, Bailii
Commons Registration Act 1965 22, Open Spaces Act 1906
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromRegina (on the application of Beresford) v The City of Sunderland CA 26-Jul-2001
Local inhabitants requested the alteration of the Town and Village Green register to include land over which they claimed use as of right for more than twenty years. The difference between acquiescence, which would allow the claim, and tolerance or . .
CitedMills and Another v Silver and others CA 1991
A farm’s only vehicular access was over land which was only useable occasionally when dry. The defendants laid a stone track to facilitate constant access. At first instance it was held that the earlier use had been too intermittent to allow a . .
CitedRegina v Suffolk County Council Ex Parte Steed and Another CA 2-Aug-1996
Customary rights over land were not defeated by failure to register as common. ‘As of right’ meant that the right must be exercised in the belief that it is a right enjoyed by the inhabitants of the village to the exclusion of all other people. ‘it . .
CitedCumbernauld and Kilsyth District Council v Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd SCS 1992
(Inner House) When Cumbernauld town centre was built, a walkway was provided between the shopping centre and residential areas. It was used for many years, but then closed to prevent crime. The authority sought an interdict to keep it open as a . .
CitedCumbernauld and Kilsyth District Council v Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd HL 22-Jul-1993
A walkway had existed from the town centre to residential areas. When the land was acquired the defendant new owners sought to close the walkway. The authority asserted that a public right of way had been acquired.
Held: There was no need to . .
CitedAttorney-General v Poole 1938
Open space land had been conveyed to Poole Corporation ‘in fee simple to the intent that the same may for ever hereafter be preserved and used as an open space or as a pleasure or recreation ground for the public use.’
Held: There was no . .
CitedBridges v Mees ChD 1957
An overriding interest, namely an estate contract, was protected under s. 70(1) of the Act even though it could have been protected by a caution under s. 59. . .
CitedE R Ives Investments Ltd v High CA 14-Dec-1966
One exception to the requirement that an easement must be granted by a deed is that if permission to enjoy a right, capable of constituting an easement, is given by the landowner in terms likely to lead, and that do lead, the beneficiary of the . .
CitedGardner v Hodgson’s Kingston Brewery Co HL 1903
The party claiming a right of way through the yard of a neighbouring inn, and her predecessors in title, had for well over 40 years used the inn yard (the only means of access with carts and horses to her premises) and had paid the annual sum of 15 . .
CitedBurrows v Lang 1901
Discussing the book de legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae by Bracton, and its discussion of the meaning of ‘precario’ saying it was the same as de gratia, of grace, and in the context of a watercourse. The court asked ‘What is precarious?’ and . .
CitedNapier’s Trustees v Morrison 1851
Dealing with a public right of way, and holding that the defenders had possessed a road ‘by no trespass or tolerance, but as a public road’the court deprecated the citation in the Court of Session of authorities from England. He really wished, he . .
CitedSturges v Bridgman CA 1879
The character of the neighbourhood in which the plaintiff lives should, for the law of nuisance, include established features: ‘whether anything is a nuisance or not is a question to be determined, not merely by an abstract consideration of the . .
CitedMann v Brodie HL 1885
The court analysed the differences between Scottish and English land law with regard to rights acquired by prescription. Although in both countries a right of public way may be acquired by prescription, it was in England never practically necessary . .
CitedScottish Property Investment Company Building Society v Horne 1881
To warrant the remedy of summary ejection, the defender’s possession of premises has to be vicious, that is obtained by fraud or force, or precarious possession: ‘A precarious possession is a possession by tolerance merely.’ . .
CitedCumbernauld and Kilsyth District Council v Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd HL 22-Jul-1993
A walkway had existed from the town centre to residential areas. When the land was acquired the defendant new owners sought to close the walkway. The authority asserted that a public right of way had been acquired.
Held: There was no need to . .
CitedDalton v Henry Angus and Co HL 14-Jun-1881
The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some . .
CitedBeckett (Alfred F) v Lyons 1967
A claim was made that the inhabitants of the County Palatine of Durham had the right to take coal from the seashore.
Held: Dedication of a public right must be to the public at large or a sufficiently large section of the public at large and . .
CitedBritish Railways Board v Herrington HL 16-Feb-1972
Land-owner’s Possible Duty to Trespassers
The plaintiff, a child had gone through a fence onto the railway line, and been badly injured. The Board knew of the broken fence, but argued that they owed no duty to a trespasser.
Held: Whilst a land-owner owes no general duty of care to a . .
CitedHall v Beckenham Corporation 1949
A claim was made in nuisance against the local authority, the owner of a public park, in which members of the public flew noisy model aircraft.
Held: The local authority were not liable as the occupiers of the park for an alleged nuisance that . .
At First InstanceRegina v City of Sunderland, ex parte Beresford Admn 14-Nov-2000
A recreational area was claimed to be a common. The council considered that there was evidence, which it accepted, of an implied licence, thus enabling the inference to be drawn that the use by local inhabitants for statutory purposes had not been . .

Cited by:
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council and others HL 24-May-2006
Application had been made to register as a town or village green an area of land which was largely a boggy marsh. The local authority resisted the application wanting to use the land instead for housing. It then rejected advice it received from a . .
CitedLewis, Regina (on The Application of) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council and Another SC 3-Mar-2010
The claimants sought to have land belonging to the council registered as a village green to prevent it being developed. They said that it had for more than twenty years been used by the community for various sports. The council replied that it had . .
CitedLondon Tara Hotel Ltd v Kensington Close Hotel Ltd ChD 1-Nov-2010
The defendant asserted that it had acquired the right to use a private access road over the claimant’s land. There had been a licence granted under which an earlier owner had been said to have used the land. The defendant claimed under the 1832 Act . .
CitedPaddico (267) Ltd v Kirklees Metropolitan Council and Others ChD 23-Jun-2011
The company sought the rectification of the register of village greens to remove an entry relating to its land, saying that the Council had not properly considered the need properly to identify the locality which was said to have enjoyed the rights . .
CitedBarkas v North Yorkshire County Council CA 23-Oct-2012
The court was asked: ‘When local inhabitants indulge in lawful sports and pastimes on a recreation ground which has been provided for that purpose by a local authority in the exercise of its statutory powers, do they do so ‘by right’ or ‘as of . .
CitedAdamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .
Not to be relied onBarkas, Regina (on The Application of) v North Yorkshire County Council and Scarborough Council Admn 20-Dec-2011
The claimants sought to have registered as a town or village green land in Whitby which had been provided as a playing field by the Local Authority since 1934. The inspector had found that the use had not been ‘as of right’ as required by the 2006 . .
OverruledBarkas, Regina (on The Application of ) v North Yorkshire County Council and Another SC 6-Mar-2014
The Court was asked as to the registration of a playing field as a ‘town or village green’. Local residents asserted that their use of the land, having been ‘as of right’ required the registration. They now appealed against rejection of that . .
CitedNewhaven Port and Properties Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v East Sussex County Council and Another SC 25-Feb-2015
The court was asked: ‘whether East Sussex County Council . . was wrong in law to decide to register an area . . known as West Beach at Newhaven . . as a village green pursuant to the provisions of the Commons Act 2006. The points of principle raised . .
CitedAdamson, Regina (on The Application of) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council CA 18-Feb-2020
Appropriation was not in sufficient form
The claimants had challenged an order supporting the decision of the Council to use their allotments for a new primary school, saying that the land had be appropriated as allotment land, and that therefore the consent of the minister was needed.
Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.187760

Bradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid: HL 12 Jul 2006

Disapplication of Without Prejudice Rules

The House was asked whether a letter sent during without prejudice negotiations which acknowledged a debt was admissible to restart the limitation period. An advice centre, acting for the borrower had written, in answer to a claim by the lender for the sum still due after the sale of the mortgaged property fell short of the debt, that the respondent was not in a position to pay ‘the outstanding balance, owed to you.’
Held: The letter was sufficient to constitute an admission. The lender’s appeal was allowed. ‘the without prejudice rule has no application to apparently open communications, such as those here, designed only to discuss the repayment of an admitted liability rather than to negotiate and compromise a disputed liability.’
Lord Hoffmann said: ‘This limitation on the scope of the without prejudice rule, confining it to admissions which can be construed as made hypothetically rather than without qualification, is not limited to the use of these admissions as acknowledgements under section 29(5) or its Scottish equivalent. It is entirely general. As such . . it goes too far. There is nothing in the modern English authorities to encourage a dissection of correspondence or, still worse, conversations, to ascertain whether admissions of fact were made hypothetically or without qualification.’ and ‘the without prejudice rule, so far as it is based upon general public policy and not upon some agreement of the parties, does not apply at all to the use of a statement as an acknowledgement for the purposes of section 29(5).’
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood said: ‘In my opinion the without prejudice rule has no application to apparently open communications, such as those here, designed only to discuss the repayment of an admitted liability rather than to negotiate and compromise a disputed liability. I find it impossible to regard the correspondence here as constituting ‘negotiations genuinely aimed at settlement’ (Lord Griffiths in Rush and Tompkins v GLC [1989] AC 1280 at 1299) or ‘an attempt to compromise actual or impending litigation’ (Sir Robert Megarry V-C in Chocoladenfabriken Lindt and Sprungli AG v Nestle Co Ltd. [1978] RPC 287). Nor does the underlying public policy justification for the rule appear to have any application in circumstances such as these. That justification, as Oliver LJ observed in Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 at 306 ‘essentially rests on the desirability of preventing statements or offers made in the course of negotiations for settlement being brought before the court of trial as admissions on the question of liability’. No ‘statements or offers’ were made here with a view to settling a dispute. Since the debt was admitted, there was no dispute. As Mr Fenwick aptly put it in argument, Mr Rashid was simply asking for a concession; he was not giving one.’
Lord Mance said: ‘The existence of a dispute and of an attempt to compromise it are at the heart of the rule whereby evidence may be excluded (or disclosure of material precluded) as ‘without prejudice’ . . the rule does not of course depend upon disputants already being engaged in litigation. But there must as a matter of law be a real dispute capable of settlement in the sense of compromise (rather than in the sense of simple payment or satisfaction).’

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, Lord Mance
[2006] 1 WLR 2066, Times 14-Jul-2006, [2006] UKHL 37, [2006] 4 All ER 705, [2006] 29 EG 132, [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 951
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 29(5)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSpencer v Hemmerde HL 1922
A barrister borrowed 1,000 pounds for two months in 1910 but did not repay it. In 1915 the creditor pressed for payment and the debtor wrote to acknowledge the debt but asked for more time. The creditor ‘stayed his hand’. When proceedings were . .
Appeal fromBradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid CA 22-Jul-2005
The claimant sought recovery of a shortfall having sold the defendant’s house for a sum insufficient to clear the mortgage debt, and produced two letters which they claimed acknowledged the debt and restarted the limitation period running. The . .
CitedDaks Simpson Group plc v Kuiper 1994
The creditor sought summary judgment for an account for commissions earned. In a ‘without prejudice’ letter the defendant’s director said that he was prepared to accept that he had received such commissions in stated amounts.
Held: Lord . .
CitedWatson-Towers Ltd v McPhail 1986
The pursuer submitted a motion for summary judgment for the value of goods which had been supplied subject to a reservation of title clause. The pursuer’s evidence consisted of a letter from the defender making an offer expressed to be without . .
CitedTurner v Railton 1796
Evidence was admitted that the defendant’s former attorney had admitted the debt claimed and made an offer on the defendant’s behalf to pay a certain sum on account. Lord Kenyon said: ‘Concessions made for the purpose of settling the business for . .
CitedKirschbaum v ‘Our Voices’ Publishing Co 1971
(Ontario High Court) The court was asked whether discovery of letters written without prejudice should be permitted so that the parties might explore the question whether they contained admissions of fact which could be taken into account at the . .
CitedDungate v Dungate CA 1965
A claim was made against the widow and administratrix of the deceased’s estate by his surviving brother. The widow wrote to the creditor: ‘Keep a check on totals and amounts I owe you and we will have account now and then . . .Sorry I cannot do you . .
CitedPhillips v Rogers 1945
The creditor argued that the limitation period was extended anew when the debtor wrote: ‘Re your correspondence re Mr C H Phillips claim $1300 which he is prepared to settle November 1st for $700. Please thank Mr Phillips for the kind offer. I have . .
CitedIn Re Daintrey, Ex Parte Holt QBD 1893
The court was asked whether a letter could be admitted in evidence and relied upon as an act of bankruptcy. The letter was sent by the debtor to the creditor at a time when there was no dispute, headed ‘without prejudice’. It contained an offer of . .
CitedSubramaniam v Director of Public Prosecutions PC 1956
(Malaysia) The defendant sought to advance a defence of duress under a section of the Penal Code of the Federated Malay States which provided that, with certain exceptions, ‘nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it . .
CitedUnilever plc v Procter and Gamble Company CA 4-Nov-1999
The defendant’s negotiators had asserted in an expressly ‘without prejudice’ meeting, that the plaintiff was infringing its patent and they threatened to bring an action for infringement. The plaintiff sought to bring a threat action under section . .
CitedMuller and Another v Linsley and Mortimer (A Firm) CA 8-Dec-1994
The plaintiff sued his former solicitors for professional negligence. The damages he sought to recover related to loss he suffered when dismissed as a director of a private company leading to a forced sale of his shares in the company. The plaintiff . .
CitedSurrendra Overseas Ltd v Government of Sri Lanka 1977
A debtor can only be held to have acknowledged the claim if he has in effect admitted his legal liability to pay that which the plaintiff seeks to recover. An acknowledgement of part only of a debt cannot operate to acknowledge more.
Kerr J . .
CitedChocoladefabriken Lindt and Sprungli AG and another v The Nestle Co Ltd 1978
Megarry V-C said that the mere failure to use the expression ‘without prejudice’ is not decisive of whether the letter is such. The question is whether the letters were written in an attempt to compromise actual or pending litigation and, if so, . .
CitedCutts v Head and Another CA 7-Dec-1983
There had been a trial of 35 days regarding rights of way over land, which had proved fruitless, and where some orders had been made without jurisdiction. The result had been inconclusive. The costs order was now appealed, the plaintiff complaining . .
CitedSavings and Investment Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v Fincken CA 14-Nov-2003
Parties to litigation had made without prejudice disclosures. One party sought to give evidence contradicting the dsclosure, and the other now applied for leave to amend based upon the without prejudice statements to be admitted to demonstrate the . .
CitedJones v Foxall CA 27-Mar-1852
Romilly MR deplored attempts to convert offers of compromise into admissions of acts prejudicial to the party making them, saying: ‘I find that the offers were in fact made without prejudice to the rights of the parties; and I shall, as far as I am . .
CitedRichardson v Quercus Limited IHCS 24-Dec-1998
The pursuer owned a flat on the second and top floors of a building damaged by renovation works carried out by the defenders to the basement and ground floor of the same building. He relied on a letter by the defenders’ loss adjusters confirming . .
CitedKapeller v Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van Suid-Afrika Bpk 1964
(South Africa) A clear admission by an insurer of liability in the course of without prejudice negotiations about quantum was sufficient to restart the limitation period. . .
CitedGood v Parry CA 1963
A letter discussed first the writer’s proposed purchase of the house (offering andpound;1,350 subject to contract), and continued: ‘The question of outstanding rent can be settled as a separate agreement as soon as you present your account.’
CitedRatten v The Queen PC 1-Jul-1971
Res Gestae to admit circumstances of complaint
(Victoria) Evidence had been admitted under the res gestae rule, that a woman making a telephone call was in a hysterical state.
Held: It was properly used. Where a statement is made either by the victim of an attack or by a bystander, which . .
CitedWest Bromwich Building Society v Wilkinson HL 30-Jun-2005
The Society had taken possession of a property in 1989. It located the defendants many years later and sought payment of the excess after deduction of the proceeds of sale, and for interest. The borrowers claimed the debt was expired by limitation . .
CitedThomson v Austen 1823
Evidence of an admitted cross-debt was in part excluded: ‘We also think that the evidence which was refused was not indicative of any intention to make a compromise, for if it had been so, he would have offered some concession, some sacrifice for . .
CitedRush and Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council and Another HL 1988
Use of ‘Without Prejudice Save as to Costs”
A sub-contractor sought payment from the appellants under a construction contract for additional expenses incurred through disruption and delay. The appellants said they were liable to pay the costs, and were entitled to re-imbursement from the . .
CitedFoakes v Beer HL 16-May-1884
Mrs Beer had obtained judgment against Dr Foakes for andpound;2,090 19s. He asked for time to pay and they agreed with him, acknowledging the debt, and paying part immediately and undertaking to pay the balance over a period of time. In . .
CitedD and C Builders Ltd v Rees CA 1966
The plaintiff builders had been chasing payment of their undisputed invoice. Knowing that the builders were in financial difficulties, the defendant offered rather less, saying that if it was not accepted, she would pay nothing. She made the payment . .
CitedCory v Bretton 1830
The provision in a letter that it was ‘not to be used in prejudice of my rights . . .’ was read as meaning that an apparent acknowledgement of indebtedness in the same letter was ‘clearly a conditional statement’. . .
CitedIn re River Steamer Company 1871
A without prejudice letter was written by a person claiming adverse possession of land to the paper owner offering to purchase the land. The paper owner said this was an acknowledgment of his title.
Held: The letter was written in the context . .
CitedOliver v Nautilus Steam Shipping Co Ltd 1903
Where an employee was injured at work, but by an outside person, section 6 of the 1897 Act provides that the worker could ‘at his option, proceed, either at law against that person to recover damages, or against his employer for compensation under . .
CitedUnsworth v Elder Dempster Lines Ltd HL 1940
Shippers of cargo on a chartered ship brought an action against the shipowners for damage caused to the cargo by bad stowage, for which the shipowners were responsible. The cargo was shipped under charterers’ bills of lading, so that the contract of . .
CitedCook v Swinfen 1966
. .
CitedIn re Brisbane City Council and White 1981
The use of the the phrase ‘without prejudice’ was ‘futile’ in the context of an originating process. . .

Cited by:
CitedAmwell View School v Dogherty EAT 15-Sep-2006
amwell_dogherty
The claimant had secretly recorded the disciplinary hearings and also the deliberations of the disciplinary panel after their retirement. The tribunal had at a case management hearing admitted the recordings as evidence, and the defendant appealed, . .
CitedFramlington Group Ltd and Another v Barnetson CA 24-May-2007
The defendant had sought an order requiring the claimant to remove from a witness statement elements referring to without prejudice discussions between the parties before litigation began.
Held: The defendant’s appeal succeeded. The test for . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert HL 11-Mar-2009
The parties disputed ownership of land, one claiming adverse possession. In the course of negotations, the possessor made a without prejudice offer to purchase the paper owner’s title. The paper owner claimed that this was an acknowledgement under . .
CitedWilliams v Hull ChD 19-Nov-2009
The parties had bought a house together, but disputed the shares on which it was held. The appeal was on the basis that a without prejudice letter had been redacte and then wrongly admitted as not in fact without prejudice, an as an unambiguous . .
AppliedShepherd Construction Ltd v Berners (BVI) Ltd and Another TCC 25-Mar-2010
The defendants sought a release from an asset freezing order, saying that there was no good reason to anticipate any dissipation of assets. An action between the parties had been settled on terms, but the defendant had not met payments. The . .
CitedAvonwick Holdings Ltd v Webinvest Ltd and Another ChD 10-Oct-2014
Application by the claimant that certain correspondence between the parties and their solicitors in April-May 2014 should be admissible as evidence, notwithstanding that most of it was headed ‘without prejudice and subject to contract’. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.243079

Regina v Oxfordshire County Council and Another, Ex Parte Sunningwell Parish Council: HL 25 Jun 1999

When setting out to establish that a piece of land has become a village green with rights of common, the tests are similar to those used in the law of prescription and adverse possession. Accordingly, there is no need to establish a belief in those using the rights asserted beyond that the use is as of right. ‘As of right’ does not require that the inhabitants should believe themselves to have a legal right. For prescription purposes under the Prescription Act 1832, the Rights of Way Act 1932 and the 1965 Act ‘as of right’ means nec vi, nec clam, nec precario, that is, ‘not by force, nor stealth, nor the licence of the owner’ The purpose of the 1965 Act was ‘to preserve and improve common land and town and village greens. ‘ ‘Any legal system must have rules of prescription which prevent the disturbance of long-established de facto enjoyment.’
Lord Hoffmann said: ‘Any legal system must have rules of prescription which prevent the disturbance of long-established de facto enjoyment.’
By way of explanation of the need for the long user to be without force, secrecy or permission and therefore ‘as of right’, Lord Hoffmann said: ‘The unifying element in these three vitiating circumstances was that each constituted a reason why it would not be reasonable to expect the owner to resist the exercise of the right – in the first case, because rights should not be acquired by the use of force, in the second, because the owner would not have known of the user and in the third, because he had consented to the user, but for a limited period.’

Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hobhouse of Wood-borough, Lord Millett
Times 25-Jun-1999, Gazette 21-Jul-1999, [1999] UKHL 28, [2000] 1 AC 335, [1999] 3 ALL ER 385, [1999] 3 WLR 160, [1999] NPC 74, (2000) 79 P and CR 199, [1999] 2 EGLR 94, [1999] 31 EG 85, [1999] BLGR 651, [2000] JPL 384, [1999] EG 91
House of Lords, Bailii
Commons Registration Act 1965 13(b), Rights of Way Act 1932
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromRegina v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council CA 24-Nov-1997
The Parish Council appealed against refusal of leave to seek judicial review of a decision to reject an application for certain land to be registered as a common. . .
At first instanceRegina v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council Admn 11-Jul-1996
The Parish Council sought judicial review of the county council’s decision to reject a regristation of land as a Common on the ground that the user of the land by the villagers had not been shown to be ‘as of right.’
Held: Leave to bring the . .
WrongJones v Bates CA 1938
The court considered whether there had been an act by the landowner sufficient to amount to a dedication a path as a public right of way. Scott LJ said that actual dedication was ‘often a pure legal fiction [which] put on the affirmant of the public . .

Cited by:
CitedRoland Brandwood and others v Bakewell Management Ltd CA 30-Jan-2003
House owners had used vehicular access across a common to get to their houses for many years. The commons owner required them to purchase the right, and they replied that they had acquired the right by lost modern grant and/or by prescription.
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedWhitmey, Regina (on the Application of) v the Commons Commissioners CA 21-Jul-2004
The applicant sought to leave to appeal against refusal of his challenge to the registration of land as a green.
Held: The 1965 Act did not limit the registration of greens to those which were registered by 3 January 1970. The Commons . .
CitedGodmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs CA 19-Dec-2005
The court considered whether a pathway had become a public highway.
Held: ‘The main question for the Court is whether sufficiency of evidence of an intention not to dedicate necessary to satisfy the proviso requires, as a matter of law, that . .
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council and others HL 24-May-2006
Application had been made to register as a town or village green an area of land which was largely a boggy marsh. The local authority resisted the application wanting to use the land instead for housing. It then rejected advice it received from a . .
CitedGodmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs HL 20-Jun-2007
The house was asked about whether continuous use of an apparent right of way by the public would create a public right of way after 20 years, and also whether a non overt act by a landowner was sufficient to prove his intention not to dedicate the . .
CitedOdey and Others v Barber ChD 29-Nov-2006
The claimants sought a declaration that they had two rights of way over a neighbour’s land. One was claimed by continuous use for twenty years, and the second was said to have been implied under the 1925 Act. No express grant was suggested. . .
CitedLewis, Regina (on The Application of) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council and Another SC 3-Mar-2010
The claimants sought to have land belonging to the council registered as a village green to prevent it being developed. They said that it had for more than twenty years been used by the community for various sports. The council replied that it had . .
CitedLondon Tara Hotel Ltd v Kensington Close Hotel Ltd ChD 1-Nov-2010
The defendant asserted that it had acquired the right to use a private access road over the claimant’s land. There had been a licence granted under which an earlier owner had been said to have used the land. The defendant claimed under the 1832 Act . .
CitedPaddico (267) Ltd v Kirklees Metropolitan Council and Others ChD 23-Jun-2011
The company sought the rectification of the register of village greens to remove an entry relating to its land, saying that the Council had not properly considered the need properly to identify the locality which was said to have enjoyed the rights . .
CitedAdamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .
CitedBarkas v North Yorkshire County Council CA 23-Oct-2012
The court was asked: ‘When local inhabitants indulge in lawful sports and pastimes on a recreation ground which has been provided for that purpose by a local authority in the exercise of its statutory powers, do they do so ‘by right’ or ‘as of . .
CitedBarkas, Regina (on The Application of ) v North Yorkshire County Council and Another SC 6-Mar-2014
The Court was asked as to the registration of a playing field as a ‘town or village green’. Local residents asserted that their use of the land, having been ‘as of right’ required the registration. They now appealed against rejection of that . .
CitedNewhaven Port and Properties Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v East Sussex County Council and Another SC 25-Feb-2015
The court was asked: ‘whether East Sussex County Council . . was wrong in law to decide to register an area . . known as West Beach at Newhaven . . as a village green pursuant to the provisions of the Commons Act 2006. The points of principle raised . .
CitedWinterburn and Another v Bennett and Another CA 25-May-2016
The court was asked as to the steps which an owner of land must take to prevent others, who were using the land without permission, acquiring rights over the land. The claimants here had ignored clear signs placed on the land which asserted the . .
CitedLynn Shellfish Ltd and Others v Loose and Another SC 13-Apr-2016
The court was asked as to the extent of an exclusive prescriptive right (ie an exclusive right obtained through a long period of use) to take cockles and mussels from a stretch of the foreshore on the east side of the Wash, on the west coast of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.87505

Aventis Pasteur v O’Byrne (Environment And Consumers): ECJ 2 Dec 2009

Europa Directive 85/374/EEC – Liability for defective products Articles 3 and 11 Mistake in the classification of ‘producer’ Judicial proceedings – Application for substitution of the producer for the original defendant Expiry of the limitation period.
(Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice) The claimant sought damages after consuming a defective medicine supplied by the company. In his action, he sought to amend his pleadings to name the company, having sued the wrong party.
Held: The action was for a claim having its origins in European law which would not give the same discretion as would be given in an English court to add a party after the expiration of the limitation period. However, here the proper defendant was a wholly owned subsidiary of the party named in the original proceedings, and the defendant must have known this, and the court was free, using article 3(3) of the Directive, to treat the actual defendant as the producer liable at law.
‘Article 11 of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, which allows the substitution of one defendant for another during proceedings, from being applied in a way which permits a ‘producer’, within the meaning of Article 3 of that directive, to be sued, after the expiry of the period prescribed by that article, as defendant in proceedings brought within that period against another person.’

V Skouris, P and Judges A. Tizzano, J. N. Cunha Rodrigues, K. Lenaerts, E. Levits, C. W. A. Timmermans, A. Rosas, A Borg Barthet, M. Ilesic, J. Malenovsk}, U. Lohmus, AO Caoimh and J-J Kasel
C-358/08, [2009] EUECJ C-358/08, Times 09-Dec-2009
Bailii
Consumer Protection Act 1987, Directive 85/374 3(3)
European
Citing:
At ECJ (1)Declan O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd, formerly Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd, Sanofi Pasteur SA ECJ 9-Feb-2006
ECJ Directive 85/374/EEC – Liability for defective products – Definition of -putting into circulation- of the product – Supply by the producer to a wholly owned subsidiary. . .
At HLOB v Aventis Pasteur SA HL 11-Jun-2008
The claimant had been vaccinated with a HIB vaccine. He was severely injured and it was said that the vaccine was the cause, and a claim made under the 1987 Act. Originally the claim was made against a UK company, but it should have been against . .
See AlsoO’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd QBD 20-Oct-2006
The claimant sought damages under the 1967 Act asserting injury from a drug sold by the defendant. Proceedings had been mistakenly commenced against Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd within the limitation period, but outside the limitation period, it was . .
At CAO’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
The claimant had made a mistake in naming the defendant company, but had intended the company which it now requested the court to substitute as defendant. The limitation period had expired.
Held: The substitution was necessary to decide the . .
At CA (2)O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
Whether two applications for leave to appeal between the same parties should be heard together. . .

Cited by:
At ECJ (2)O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa SC 26-May-2010
The claimant wished to claim damages after suffering serious injury as a child having been vaccinated with a drug manufactured by a defendant (APMSD). The defendant had relied on a defence saying that the limitation period under the Directive was 10 . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Consumer, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.384094

Watkins and Another v Jones Maidment Wilson (A Firm): CA 4 Mar 2008

The claimants alleged professional negligence by the defendant solicitors in advising them to agree to a postponment of a completion. The defendants raised as a preliminary issue the question of limitation. The claimant said that the limitation period did not commence until the damage became more than contingent.
Held: The claimant’s appeal failed. Arden LJ said: ‘If the advice had not been negligent, the claimant would have had the chance of negotiating a better agreement. That chance was an asset with a measurable value. Its absence meant that there was an immediate loss.’

Arden LJ, Longmore LJ, Thomas LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 134, [2008] PNLR 23, [2008] I EGLR 149
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 3
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedNykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
CitedLaw Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others HL 10-May-2006
A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from . .
CitedForster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .
CitedKnapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc and Another CA 30-Oct-1997
A claim in negligence was brought against insurance brokers for failing to advise the claimant of certain matters with the result that an insurance policy entered into by the claimant was voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The claimant . .
CitedD W Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
The company took in a new director and shareholder, and relied upon their solicitors to draft a covenant to restrain him competing within a set time of leaving the company. The covenant turned out to be ineffective. The defendant solicitors replied . .
CitedBell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .
CitedAnthony McCarroll v Statham Gill Davies (A Firm) CA 1-Apr-2003
The claimant said his solicitors had failed to protect his interests in a partnership agreement into which he subsequently entered. The agreement contained less favourable terms than those which should have been agreed and he claimed damages . .
CitedBrunsden v Humphrey CA 1884
The defendant had negligently caused damage to a cab driver and his vehicle in the same accident. The cab driver obtained damages for the damage to his vehicle.
Held: He was not disentitled from bringing fresh proceedings for damages for . .
CitedHamlin and Another v Edwin Evans (A Firm) CA 15-Jul-1996
The plaintiffs had discovered that the defendant surveyors had negligently failed to observe that there was dry rot but did not start proceedings until other negligence was discovered more than six years later.
Held: Although the negligent . .

Cited by:
CitedPegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
CitedAxa Insurance Ltd v Akther and Darby Solicitors and Others CA 12-Nov-2009
The court considered the application of the limitation period to answering when damage occurred when it arises under an unsecured contingent liability. The claimant insurance company had provided after the event litigation insurance policies to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.266079

Law Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others: HL 10 May 2006

A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from the accountants. The accountants pleaded limitation.
Held: The Law Society faced a contingent liability on the fund, but that was insufficient to start the limitation period. Damage was an essential part of a claim for negligence, and the damages was not suffered until the Society received a claim.
Lord Scott said: ‘a cause of action in tort did not accrue in the Law Society’s favour against Sephtons until the Law Society first received a claim on the Compensation Fund from a Payne and Co client whose money had been misappropriated.’ The limitation period began at that point, and the claim could continue.

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Mance
[2006] UKHL 22, Times 11-May-2006, [2006] 2 AC 543, [2006] 2 WLR 1091
Bailii, House of Lords
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedLaw Society v KPMG Peat Marwick and Others CA 29-Jun-2000
The respondent accountants had certified accounts for a firm of solicitors whose dishonest defaults later lead to substantial claims on the compensation fund set up by the claimants.
Held: The Law Society who collected funds from the . .
Appeal fromThe Law Society v Sephton and Co and others CA 13-Dec-2004
The Society appealed dismissal for limitation of its claim against the defendant firm of accountants arising from alleged fraud in approval of a solicitor’s accounts.
Held: The liability did not arise until the Society decided to make . .
At First InstanceThe Law Society v Sephton and Co and others ChD 2004
The Law Society claimed in negligence against the defendant firm of accountants who had wrongly certified the accounts of a firm of solicitors. The Society sought to recover the payments it had made from its compensation fund. The defendant pleaded . .
MentionedCartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd HL 1963
The plaintiffs were steel dressers who, in the course of their employment, had inhaled quantities of noxious dust which had caused them to suffer from pneumoconiosis. They issued proceedings on 1 October 1956 but were unable to show any breach of . .
ApprovedWardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia 1992
(High Court of Australia) A claim was based on a statutory trade indemnity scheme. The insurers claimed damages from Wardley, on the basis that its alleged deceit induced them to grant an indemnity, which was subsequently called on.
Held: . .
CitedForster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .
CitedBell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .
CitedD W Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
The company took in a new director and shareholder, and relied upon their solicitors to draft a covenant to restrain him competing within a set time of leaving the company. The covenant turned out to be ineffective. The defendant solicitors replied . .
CitedNykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
CitedKnapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc and Another CA 30-Oct-1997
A claim in negligence was brought against insurance brokers for failing to advise the claimant of certain matters with the result that an insurance policy entered into by the claimant was voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The claimant . .
HelpfulFirst National Comercial Bank plc v Humberts CA 27-Jan-1995
The plaintiff loaned money on the basis of a negligent survey by the defendant. The borrower subsequently defaulted, and the lender issued a writ. The defendant said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The court allowed the plaintiff’s . .
CitedSouthern Railway of Peru Ltd v Owen HL 21-Jun-1956
When drawing up accounts where the company faces contingent laibilities and provision has to be made, the principles upon which such provisions are made does not depend upon (Lord Radcliffe) ‘any exact analysis of the legal form of the relevant . .
CitedClonard Developments Limited v Humberts (a Firm) CA 15-Jan-1999
A judge was right to acknowledge that a party’s expert witness might be biased, and assess accordingly. Where a surveyor’s valuation was negligent there was still no liability where the plaintiff did not show it had relied upon the valuation. . .
CitedHaward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
CitedClonard Developments Limited v Humberts (a Firm) CA 15-Jan-1999
A judge was right to acknowledge that a party’s expert witness might be biased, and assess accordingly. Where a surveyor’s valuation was negligent there was still no liability where the plaintiff did not show it had relied upon the valuation. . .

Cited by:
CitedWatkins and Another v Jones Maidment Wilson (A Firm) CA 4-Mar-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence by the defendant solicitors in advising them to agree to a postponment of a completion. The defendants raised as a preliminary issue the question of limitation. The claimant said that the limitation . .
CitedPegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
CitedAxa Insurance Ltd v Akther and Darby Solicitors and Others CA 12-Nov-2009
The court considered the application of the limitation period to answering when damage occurred when it arises under an unsecured contingent liability. The claimant insurance company had provided after the event litigation insurance policies to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Professional Negligence

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.241654

Brickfield Properties Ltd v Newton: CA 1971

Court’s Investigation of Construction Claims

The court heard an application to amend pleadings to add a claim about negligent supervision of a construction. Sachs LJ said: ‘Where there are found in completed buildings serious defects of the type here under review the facts relating to design, execution and superintendence are inextricably entangled until such time as the court succeeds in elucidating the position through evidence. The design has inevitably to be closely examined even if the only claim relates to superintendence, and all the more so if the designs are, as is further alleged here, experimental or such as need amplification in the construction progresses. The architect is under a continuing duty to check that his design will work in practice and to correct any errors as they emerge. It savours of the ridiculous for the architect to be able to say, as it was here suggested to him that he could say: ‘true, my design was faulty, but, of course, I saw to it that the contractors followed it faithfully’ and be enabled on that ground to succeed in the action.
The same, or substantially the same set of facts, falls to be investigated in relation to the design claim and the superintendence claim. The plans and specifications and ancillary documents are relevant to the superintendence claim as well as to the designer claim: hence the inability of the defendant to allege prejudice with regard to the preparation of his defence if this appeal is allowed. Accordingly, the ‘new cause of action’ falls within the ambit of RSC Ord. 20 r. 5(5), and it is one which the court has jurisdiction to permit to be pursued’.

Sachs LJ, Edmund Davies LJ
[1971] 1 WLR 862, [1971] 3 All ER 328
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRoberts v Gill and Co Solicitors and Others SC 19-May-2010
The claimant beneficiary in the estate sought damages against solicitors who had acted for the claimant’s brother, the administrator, saying they had allowed him to take control of the assets in the estate. The will provided that property was to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Construction

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.415957

Musurus Bey v Gadban: CA 1894

Musurus Bey had been the accredited Ambassador of the Sultan of Turkey in London for some thirty years prior to his recall in December 1885. He wound up his official and personal business and in February 1886 he returned to Turkey where he lived until his death in 1890. In 1892 his executors brought proceedings against the defendants who sought to counterclaim in debt for money lent by them to Musurus Bey in 1873 while he was Ambassador in London and which, it was alleged, had never been repaid.
Held: The counterclaim was not statute barred. The wrongdoer may be entitled to diplomatic immunity at the time of the tort. No cause of action could accrue against a debtor during such period as he enjoyed diplomatic immunity, though an envoy’s immunity from suit and legal process in respect of acts done in his private capacity endures only so long as he is ‘en poste’ and for a sufficient time thereafter to enable him to wind up his affairs

AL Smith and Davey LJJ
[1894] 2 QB 352
England and Wales

Contract, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.561222

Joan Cuadrench More v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij Nv: ECJ 22 Nov 2012

Air transport – Compensation and assistance to passengers – Denied boarding and cancellation or long delays of flights – Period allowed for commencing proceedings
After cancellation of his flight in December 2005 the claimant brought proceedings against the airline in Spain in February 2009 seeking compensation under Regulation 261. The limitation period under Spanish law was ten years. Under the Convention is two years. The Court was asked to decide whether article 35 of the Montreal Convention or the Spanish law of limitation applied.
Held: The time limit for bringing a claim under Regulation 261 was a matter for national Spanish law, because the provisions for compensation contained in the Regulation fall outside the terms of the Convention. Regulation 261 provides a system of standardised and immediate redress for the inconvenience caused by delay and cancellation of flights which operates at an earlier stage than the Convention and is independent of it.

R. Silva de Lapuerta
C-139/11, [2012] EUECJ C-139/11, [2013] 2 All ER (Comm) 1152
Bailii
European
Cited by:
CitedDawson v Thomson Airways Ltd CA 19-Jun-2014
The claimant’s flight had been delayed for six hours. The airline said that the claim having been made outside the two year period applicable under the Montreal convention, no compensation was payable.
Held: The claimant’s appeal failed. ‘We . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Transport, Consumer, Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.465996

RB Policies at Lloyd’s v Butler: 1949

A car insured by the plaintiffs had been stolen by an unknown person in June 1940. In January 1947 the car was found in the possession of the defendant who it seems had ‘given good consideration for it without knowledge that it was a stolen car’. It had passed to him ‘an innocent purchaser, through a line of intermediate purchasers’ during the previous seven years.
Held: Time begins to run against the owner of a stolen chattel from the date of the theft, even though the owner does not know the identity of the thief or the whereabouts of the chattel.
Streatfeild J discussed the 1939 Act, saying: ‘The section was inserted to protect a plaintiff who was ignorant of his right of action in the special case of fraudulent concealment, and to overcome the difficulty that time would otherwise have been running against him, unknown to himself. But for the section, time would have run against him from the accrual of his right of action, for it is to be noted that the section, even in the case of fraudulent concealment, does not say that the cause of action shall not accrue until the fraud is discovered, but simply that ‘time shall not begin to run’ until that event.
It is to be noted that s 26 is the only provision in the Limitation Act 1939, in which a special exception of that nature is made. Nowhere is it to be found that where a person, who otherwise has a perfect cause of action, cannot pursue it because the defendant is unknown, time does not run. And it seems to me, therefore, that prima facie as soon as there is a cause of action (as there clearly was in the present case the moment the motor car was stolen) time begins to run notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff is ignorant of the identity of the defendant. . . It was, no doubt, a misfortune to the plaintiffs that they could not find a defendant whose name they could insert in a writ; but every other ingredient of the cause of action was present. The motor car had, in fact, been converted. A statement of claim could have been drawn without any difficulty; the only item missing being the name of the defendant.’
. . And ‘Can it be said, therefore, that the cause of action being otherwise complete, the ignorance of the owner of the car of the identity of the person against whom he could bring an action was of itself sufficient to prevent the accrual of that cause of action? I think not, and I agree with the argument of Mr Jackson. If that were so it would lead to appalling results. As Mr Jackson suggested to me, if his watch were stolen, and he discovered it years later, in the pocket of a wholly innocent person who had bought it many years before, it would follow that, if the plaintiffs are right, he could bring an action for the recovery of his watch merely because he had not known who was the original thief. I cannot think that that is the policy of the Act, or that to construe its words in favour of the plaintiffs’ argument would harmonize with the intention of the legislature’

Streatfeild J
[1950] 1 KB 76, [1949] 2 All ER 226
Limitation Act 1939 26
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedAdamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.539583

Jones v Bellgrove Properties Limited: CA 1949

The court allowed the plaintiff to establish by evidence that his particular debt was included in the total sum acknowledged to be due to a number of creditors.
Lord Goddard CJ was satisfied that a lump sum in a balance sheet included the debt in question. The balance sheets of the defendant contained the statement, ‘to sundry creditors pounds 7,638 6s. 10d’. The defendant in that case owed the plaintiff pounds 1,807, which was the balance of moneys that had been lent to him. This debt did not accrue within six years of an action brought by the plaintiff to recover the debt. The plaintiff argued that the defendants made an acknowledgement of the debt in its balance sheet. Evidence was given at the hearing that a firm of chartered accountants had signed the balance sheets for various years and that the debt of pounds 1,807 owed by the defendant to the plaintiff was included in the sum of pounds 7,638 6s. 10d. The Court held that there was an acknowledgement of the debt in the balance sheet.

Lord Goddard CJ
[1949] 2 KB 700, [1949] 1 All ER 498
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Insolvency

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.187456

Brady v Norman: CA 9 Feb 2011

The claimant sought to have disapplied the limitation period in his defamation claim. The claimant said that in the case of Cain, the Steedman case had not been cited, and that the decisions were incompatible, and that Cain was to be prefered.
Held: The appeal failed. The two cases could be reconciled. Considerations in defamation actions were rather different from those in personal injury proceedings, and the two cases represented differing manifestations of the application of the same principles to be derived from the different circumstances to which adjacent sections of the 1980 Act are applicable. ‘The policy behind the much shorter limitation period is clear. The defamatory impact of libel or slander is likely to be transient and Parliament evidently intended that a claimant should assert and pursue his need for vindication speedily.’

Sir Roget Thomas P, Smith, Aikens LJJ
[2011] EWCA Civ 107, [2011] WLR (D) 40, [2011] EMLR 16, [2011] CP Rep 23
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 2, Defamation Act 1996
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedThompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd HL 1981
The plaintiff’s solicitors, out of negligence, failed to issue a writ until one month after the limitation period had expired. The application to extend the period was rejected at first instance since he had an unanswerable claim against his . .
CitedHartley v Birmingham City District Council CA 1992
The writ was issued one day late; there had been early notification of the claim; and the defendant’s ability to defend the case was unaffected. The plaintiff asked the court to exercide its discretion to allow the claim t proceed.
Held: The . .
CitedSteedman, Clohosy, Smith, Kiernan, Newman, Creevy, Anderson v The British Broadcasting Corporation CA 23-Oct-2001
The claimants had issued defamation proceedings. The defendant said they were out of time, having begun the action more than one year after the alleged publication, but accepted that they had not been prejudiced in their defence. The court refused . .
CitedCain v Francis CA 18-Dec-2008
The court was asked under what circumstances it should exercise its discretion to extend the limitation period under section 33.
Held: Lady Justice Smith said: ‘It appears to me that there is now a long line of authority to support the . .
CitedThompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd HL 1981
The plaintiff’s solicitors, out of negligence, failed to issue a writ until one month after the limitation period had expired. The application to extend the period was rejected at first instance since he had an unanswerable claim against his . .
Appeal fromBrady v Norman QBD 26-May-2010
The claimant appealed against refusal of the Master to extend the 12 month limitation period in his proposed defamation claim. The allegations related to a dispute at an Aslef barbecue, and later of forgery. The claimant was a former General . .
CitedLonzim Plc and Others v Sprague QBD 11-Nov-2009
The court asked whether any damages recovered by the claimant might be so small as to be totally disproportionate to the very high costs that any libel action involves.
Held: Tugendhat J said: ‘It is not enough for a claimant to say that a . .

Cited by:
CitedReed Elsevier Uk Ltd (T/A Lexisnexis) and Another v Bewry CA 30-Oct-2014
Appeal from a decision granting the claimant’s application made pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the limitation period in his proceedings for libel and dismissing the defendants’ application to strike out the claimant’s . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation, Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.428526

Test Claimants In The Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Inland Revenue: SC 23 May 2012

The European Court had found the UK to have unlawfully treated differently payment of franked dividends between subsidiaries of UK companies according to whether all the UK subsidiaries were themselves UK based, thus prejudicing European subsidiaries, breach of EU Treaty guarantees of freedom of establishment and of movement of capital. The court was now asked as to the calculation of damages. Two remedies might be available: a demand for repayment of tax unlawfully demanded (under Woolwich), or for tax paid under a mistake of law (under DMG). The first would be time barred. The limit had been relaxed under the 1980 Act for the second. The Court of Appeal had found the Woolwich type remedy the appropriate one. The taxpayer appealed.
Held: As to whether Parliament had the right to amend the law in a way which disallowed access to both types of claims, the principle issue, a reference was made back to the European Court. The claimants’ appeal were dismissed on the issues of the application of section 32(1)(c) of the 1980 Act applied to their claims, and as to the significance of the difference between tax paid under demand or on filing a tax return.
The appeal succeeded in arguing that section 33 can be given an interpretation which conforms with EU law by not construing it as impliedly setting itself up as an exclusive provision. The common law claim in unjust enrichment remains available to the appellants. The appeal on this issue was allowed.
Lord Hope said: ‘I would hold that Parliament could not lawfully curtail without notice the extended limitation period under section 32(1)(c) of the Limitation Act 1980 for the mistake cause of action by section 320 FA 2004.’

Lord Hope, Deputy President, Lord Walker, Lord Brown, Lord Clarke, Lord Dyson, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed
[2012] UKSC 19, [2012] WLR(D) 161, [2012] STC 1362, [2012] 2 WLR 1149, [2012] 3 All ER 909, [2012] BTC 312, [2012] 2 AC 337, [2012] Bus LR 1033, [2012] STI 1707, UKSC 2010/0085
Bailii, SC, SC Summary
Limitation Act 1980 32(1)(c), Finance Act 2007 107
England and Wales
Citing:
At First InstanceTest Claimants In the FII Group Litigation v HM Revenue and Customs ChD 27-Nov-2008
The claimants were companies with parent companies in the UK and other subsidiaries not so resident, both in the EU and outside. They complained of the differences in treatment under corporation tax of the payment of dividends between the . .
Appeal fromFranked Investment Group Litigation Test Claimants v Inland Revenue and Another CA 23-Feb-2010
. .
CitedAmministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v Spa San Giorgio ECJ 9-Nov-1983
ECJ Questions submitted for a preliminary ruling – reference to the court – right of every national court – stage of the proceedings before the national court – nature of the decision to be given by the national . .
CitedACF Chemiefarma v Commission ECJ 15-Jul-1970
ECJ 1. The provisional character conferred by article 9(3) of Regulation no 17 on steps taken by national authorities in connexion with the implementation of article 85 of the EEC Treaty cannot call in question . .
CitedWoolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (2) HL 20-Jul-1992
The society had set out to assert that regulations were unlawful in creating a double taxation. It paid money on account of the tax demanded. It won and recovered the sums paid, but the revenue refused to pay any interest accrued on the sums paid. . .
At ECJTest Claimants In The FII Group Litigation v CIR ECJ 12-Dec-2006
ECJ (Opinion of Geelhoed AG) Interpretation of Articles 43 and 56 EC and Articles 4(1) and 6 of Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent . .
CitedBrooksbank v Smith 24-Feb-1836
In this case, trustees under a will, who were solicitors, had by mistake transferred stock to a person not entitled. Baron Alderson said, this being under circumstances of mistake, it appeared clear to him that the Plaintiffs were entitled to . .
CitedBaker v Courage and Co 1910
The plaintiff had owned a public house. On selling the leasehold to the defendants brewers, they had overpaid him by andpound;1,000. He deposited a sum at interest with the defendants. When he came to withdraw the last of the deposit (by coincidence . .
CitedPhillips-Higgins v Harper QBD 1954
A claim was made to recover monies due under a contract where the plaintiff had failed to realise that the balance was due to her, and by that mistake the action was concealed from her.
Held: Pearson J said: ‘But that is not sufficient. . .
CitedMarleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA ECJ 13-Nov-1990
Sympathetic construction of national legislation
LMA OVIEDO sought a declaration that the contracts setting up Commercial International were void (a nullity) since they had been drawn up in order to defraud creditors. Commercial International relied on an EC . .
CitedBrasserie du Pecheur v Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and others (4) ECJ 5-Mar-1996
Member states may be liable to individuals for their failure to implement EU laws. The right of individuals to rely on directly applicable provisions of the EC Treaty before national courts is not sufficient in itself to ensure full and complete . .
CitedMorgan Guaranty v Lothian Regional Council SCS 1-Dec-1994
. .
CitedHM Treasury v Ahmed and Others SC 27-Jan-2010
The claimants objected to orders made freezing their assets under the 2006 Order, after being included in the Consolidated List of suspected members of terrorist organisations.
Held: The orders could not stand. Such orders were made by the . .
CitedDeutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue and Another HL 25-Oct-2006
The tax payer had overpaid Advance Corporation Tax under an error of law. It sought repayment. The revenue contended that the claim was time barred.
Held: The claim was in restitution, and the limitation period began to run from the date when . .
CitedBoake Allen Ltd and others v HM Revenue and Customs CA 31-Jan-2006
The claimant companies had paid corporation tax under rules which had later been found to be discriminatory. They now sought repayment by virtue of double taxation agreements with the countries in which the parent companies were based.
Held: . .
CitedKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
CitedNEC Semi-Conductors Limited and Other Test Claimants v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue ChD 24-Nov-2003
UK companies were subsidiaries of companies resident abroad, and complained that they were unable to make group income elections.
Held: The prohibition infringed non-discrimination provisions of double taxation agreements – non-discrimination . .

Cited by:
CitedRevenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies SC 11-Apr-2017
Certain investment trust companies (ITCs) sought refunds of VAT paid on the supply of investment management services. EU law however clarified that they were not due. Refunds were restricted by the Commissioners both as to the amounts and limitation . .
CitedLittlewoods Ltd and Others v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs SC 1-Nov-2017
The appellants had overpaid under a mistake of law very substantial sums in VAT over several years. The excess had been repaid, but with simple interest and not compound interest, which the now claimed (together with other taxpayers amounting to 17 . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, Corporation Tax, Limitation, Taxes Management, Damages

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.459618

National Westminster Bank Plc v Ashe (Trustee In Bankruptcy of Djabar Babai): CA 8 Feb 2008

The mortgagees had made no payments under the charge for more than twelve years, and had remained in possession throughout. They argued that the bank were prevented from now seeking to enforce the charge. The bank argued that the possession had not been adverse. The court had declared that the bank could not proceed.
Held: The bank’s appeal failed. The bank’s right of possession first accrued when the legal charge took effect. Any payment restarted the limitation period. The Bank had an immediate right of action to possession of the Property as soon as the legal charge was executed. Its initial right of action to possession of the Property was not dependent on the termination of a permission granted by the Bank for Mr and Mrs Babai to be in possession of the Property. ‘it does not necessarily follow from the Bank’s non-enforcement of its right to possession, or its lack of objection to, or tolerance of, Mr and Mrs Babai’s possession that the Bank was impliedly granting them permission to remain in possession of the Property so as to prevent them from being in adverse possession within paragraph 8 of Schedule 1. The Bank was simply not doing anything to enforce its right of action. ‘
‘In summary, the Bank had a right of action. More than 12 years passed since it accrued afresh . Mr and Mrs Babai’s continued possession of the Property with the apparent leave and licence of the Bank did not prevent them from being persons against whom the Bank’s right of action to recover the Property arose on the granting of the legal charge, which right is treated as having accrued afresh when a payment in respect of it was made. Nor did it prevent Mr and Mrs Babai from being persons in whose favour time can run under the 1980 Act. According to the ruling in Pye their possession was ‘adverse possession’ within paragraph 8. ‘

Mummery LJ, Hughes LJ, David Richards J
[2008] EWCA Civ 55, [2008] 1 WLR 710, [2008] 2 P and CR 10, [2008] BPIR 1, [2008] 7 EG 143, [2008] NPC 14, [2008] 1 EGLR 123
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15 17
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedFour-Maids Ltd v Dudley Marshall (Properties) Ltd 1957
A mortgagee may under common law go into possession before the ink is dry on the mortgage unless there is something in the contract, express or by implication, whereby he has contracted himself out of that right. He has the right because he has a . .
CitedNational Westminster Bank plc v Skelton (Note) 1993
The court distinguished a claim by the mortgagee for possession from a claim on the mortgagor’s personal covenant to pay what was due. A claim for a set-off is merely a sub-species of counterclaim. The court will not readily imply a term into a . .
CitedKeech v Hall 1778
The tenant resisted ejectment by the landlord’s mortgagee. His tenancy had been created after the mortgage.
Held: The mortgagee seeking ejectment did not first need to give a tenant a notice to quit. Mansfield CJ said: ‘Whoever wants to be . .
CitedJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
CitedRhodes v Allied Dunbar Pension Services Ltd CA 1989
The intermediate tenant had charged the lease to the bank, which appointed receivers. Both the sub rent and the head rent fell into arrears. The head landlord then served a notice direct on the subtenant requiring him to pay the rent direct to the . .
CitedHeath v Pugh CA 1881
The freeholder charged the land in 1856. He remained in possession, and did not make any payments or give any acknowledgment of the mortgagee’s title. In 1870 the mortgagee presented a bill for foreclosure, and in 1874 a bill of redemption or . .

Cited by:
CitedYorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.264269

Rains v Buxton: 1880

rains_buxtonChD1880

Fry J said: ‘The difference between dispossession and the discontinuance of possession might be expressed in this way: the one is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession, the other case is where the person in possession goes out and is followed in by others.’ A defendant to a claim for adverse possession does not escape it by proving that he had not known of the acts relied upon against him nor by proving that that omission was not attributable to some negligence or default on his part.

Fry J
[1880] 14 ChD 537
Cited by:
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.259703

KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another: CA 12 Feb 2003

The respondent appealed decisions by the court to allow claims for personal injury out of time. The claims involved cases of sexual abuse inflicted by its employees going back over many years.
Held: The judge had misapplied the test laid down in Stebbings. The court of appeal had not previously considered how to apply its section 33 discretion to cases involving continuing psychological damage. Each case had to be assessed individually, but the length of time allowed to pass before an application was made was a significant factor. Once the court had used its discretion to extend the time allowed before the limitation period, it should be more cautious about leniency in any following period. The question was whether the claims could still be tried fairly as against the defendant. Such allegations were easy to make and difficult to refute, and the judge must bear in mind the possibility of exaggeration for financial gain. ‘The overall question is one of equity, namely, whether it would be ‘equitable’ to disapply the limitation provisions having regard to the balance of potential prejudice weighed with regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those specifically mentioned in s 33(3).’

Lord Justice Auld, Lord Justice Waller, Lord Justice Mantell
Times 17-Feb-2003, [2003] EWCA Civ 85, [2003] QB 1441, [2003] Fam Law 482, [2004] 2 All ER 716, [2003] 1 FLR 1203, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep Med 175, [2003] 3 WLR 107, [2003] 1 FCR 385
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 14 33
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedStubbings v Webb CA 1992
The claimant sought damages for having been raped. The defendant said the claim was out of time. . .
CitedStubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .
CitedCoad v Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Health Authority CA 17-Jul-1996
A nurse suffered a back injury in 1983 in the course of her employment. She left the employment of the health authority in either 1990 or 1991. The judge had accepted her evidence that she did not know that she had a right of action against her . .
CitedSeymour v Williams CA 1995
The plaintiff issued proceedings against her father and mother, alleging physical and sexual abuse against her father and want of parental care against her mother. The claim against the father was in trespass, but that against her mother was in . .

Cited by:
CitedAdams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council HL 17-Jun-2004
A attended the defendant’s schools between 1977 and 1988. He had always experienced difficulties with reading and writing and as an adult found those difficulties to be an impediment in his employment. He believed them to be the cause of the . .
CitedA v Hoare QBD 14-Oct-2005
The defendant had been convicted and sentenced for the attempted rape of the claimant. He had subsequently won a substantial sum on the lottery, and she now sought damages. He replied that the action was statute barred being now 16 years old. The . .
See AlsoRowlands and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Royal and Sun Alliance Plc CA 24-Mar-2003
. .
See AlsoDK, KR, CGE, DHM, PS, RM, DJ, GOM v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd (In Liquidation) and Royal and Sun Alliance PLC CA 22-May-2003
. .
CitedJacqueline Adam v Rasal Ali CA 21-Feb-2006
The defendant sought damages against the defendant for personal injury from his alleged negligence. Her action was struck out and she recommenced the action. The defendant pleaded that she was out of time. The claimant said that the first action . .
CitedA v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
CitedCatholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) and Another v Young CA 14-Nov-2006
The claimant sought damages saying that he had been abused as a child whilst in the defendant’s care. The defendants appealed a finding that the claimant had not first known of his injury more than three years before begining his action.
Held: . .
Not followedMcCoubrey v Ministry of Defence CA 24-Jan-2007
The defendant appealed a decision allowing a claim to proceed more than ten years after it had been suffered. The claimant’s hearing had been damaged after an officer threw a thunderflash into his trench on an exercise.
Held: The defendant’s . .
CitedPierce v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council QBD 13-Dec-2007
The claimant sought damages, saying that the local authority had failed to protect him when he was a child against abuse by his parents.
Held: The claimant had been known to the authority since he was a young child, and they owed him a duty of . .
CitedBuckler v J F Finnegan Ltd CA 21-Jun-2004
The claimant sought damages for personal injuries after ingesting asbestos while employed as a joiner by the defendant. The defendant appealed an order allowing the claim to go ahead despite being out of time. . .
CitedBA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for The Home Department and Others SC 26-Nov-2009
The court was asked whether the expression ‘an asylum claim, or a human rights claim’ in section 92(4)(a) of the 2002 Act includes any second or subsequent claim that the asylum seeker may make, or only a second or subsequent claim which has been . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.179082

Donald v Rutherford: IHCS 1984

A pedestrian was injured in a road traffic accident on 3 November 1975 but only raised an action on 13 February 1981. The failure to raise a timeous action was attributable to the fault of his former solicitors.
Held: He was allowed to proceed out of time as he had misdirected himself on a material matter of fact. The words ‘it seems equitable’ in section 19A(1) meant and could only mean that the discretion thereby conferred upon the court was unfettered: ‘In the present case it would appear clear enough that no personal blame can properly be laid on the shoulders of the respondent himself, but he is answerable for the acts of his agents. Their failure to serve the ‘protective writ’ was the cause of the failure to proceed within the triennium, and their responsibility to the respondent for that failure and consequent liability in damages would, at least so far as pleadings and admitted correspondence disclose, appear to be beyond dispute.’ Lord Dunpark: ‘I regard the fact that no blame can be attached to the pursuer for his solicitors’ failure to raise his action timeously as cancelled out by the fact that neither the defender nor his insurance company contributed in any way to that failure. The sole fault for that failure was that of the pursuer’s solicitors who, for this purpose, are his alter ego.’

Lord Cameron, Lord Dunpark
1984 SLT 70
Limitation Act 1980 19A(1)
Scotland
Cited by:
CitedDavid Lannigan v Glasgow City Council OHCS 12-Aug-2004
The pursuer said the teachers employed by the defendant had failed to identify that was dyslexic, leading him to suffer damage. The defenders said the claim was time barred, which the pursuer admitted, but then said that the claim ought to go ahead . .
ApprovedForsyth v A F Stoddard and Co Ltd OHCS 1985
An action for damages by an employee against his employer was raised 48 days after the expiry of the triennium due to an oversight by an assistant with the pursuer’s solicitors. The sheriff refused to allow the action to be brought, the Sheriff . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.200278

Roberts v Gill and Co Solicitors and Others: SC 19 May 2010

The claimant beneficiary in the estate sought damages against solicitors who had acted for the claimant’s brother, the administrator, saying they had allowed him to take control of the assets in the estate. The will provided that property was to be transferred only if the claimant’s brother paid all the Inheritance Tax. It was transferred without that tax having been paid. The events were now several years outside the limitation period. The claim was framed as a duty by the solicitors to the claimant personally.
Held: The claimant’s appeal was dismissed. The claimant had to succeed not only in applying to alter his claim to make it on behalf of the estate, but also to add the administrator, his brother to the claim. If he had to do the latter, could he do so after commencing the action, and outside the limitation period. The claimant did not show either that he need not add the brother, nor that he could do so after commencing the claim.
A party could be added after the commencement of an action only where this was necessary in order to determine the original litigation, and the action against the brother was not such.
Here the proposed addition of a party and amendments were for a new action. That new action would be out of time.
Lord Clarke and Lord Hope dissented in part in allowing that the brother could have been added as a party after the action had been commenced to avoid injustice, but there were no such special circumstances in this case.

Lord Hope, Deputy President, Lord Rodger, Lord Walker, Lord Collins, Lord Clarke
[2010] WLR (D) 130, [2010] UKSC 22, [2010] PNLR 30, [2010] WTLR 1223, [2010] 2 WLR 1227, [2011] AC 240
WLRD, Bailii, SC, SC Summ, Bailii Summary
Limitation Act 1980 35, Civil Procedure Rules 19.5
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedWeldon v Neal CA 1887
An amendment to pleadings should not be allowed so as to allow a plaintiff to set up a cause of action which would otherwise be barred by the Statutes of Limitation. . .
Appeal fromRoberts v Gill and Co and Another CA 15-Jul-2008
The claimant sought damages in negligence against solicitors who had advised the executors in an estate of which he was a beneficiary. He now sought to amend his claim to make a claim in his personal and in derivative capacities. Sums had been paid . .
CitedSpokes v Grosvenor and West End Railway Terminus Hotel Co Ltd CA 1897
The court discussed the joinder of the company in a derivative action. A L Smith LJ said: ‘That in the circumstances of this case the company are necessary parties to the suit I do not doubt, for without the company being made a party to the action . .
CitedYorkshire Regional Health Authority v Fairclough Building Ltd and Another CA 16-Nov-1995
The substitution of a successor party to a claim does not constitute a new claim for limitation purposes. Millett LJ considered the objects of the 1980 Act: ‘The 1980 Act was enacted in order to implement the recommendations of the Twenty-First . .
CitedPerforming Right Society Limited v London Theatre of Varieties Limited HL 1924
The parties, the plaintiff who was the equitable assignee of performing rights and the infringing defendant, joined specific issue on the absence of the legal owner of the rights.
Held: His absence was critical. PRS failed to obtain a . .
CitedMabro v Eagle, Star and British Dominions Insurance Co Ltd CA 1932
Scrutton LJ said: ‘In my experience the Court has always refused to allow a party or a cause of action to be added where, if it were allowed, the defence of the Statute of Limitations would be defeated. The Court has never treated it as just to . .
CitedHaq v Singh and Another CA 25-May-2001
The claimant had been made bankrupt, and when she sued the defendant, was challenged as to her standing. She obtained an assignment of the right of action from her trustee in bankruptcy. She then sought to amend her pleadings under the rule. It was . .
CitedHarmer v Armstrong CA 1934
The court considered the position where the assignor of a contract was required to attend court as a party when the assignee sought to enforce the debt.
Held: A beneficiary under a bare trust could bring proceedings in his own name and, where . .
CitedRoyal Brunei Airlines SDN BHD v Tan PC 24-May-1995
(Brunei) The defendants were a one-man company, BLT, and the one man, Mr Tan. A dishonest third party to a breach of trust was liable to make good a resulting loss even though he had received no trust property. The test of knowledge was an objective . .
CitedHayim v Citibank NA PC 1987
(Hong Kong) The plaintiffs were the testator’s sons, who were beneficiaries under his American will. He also executed a Hong Kong will under which the residue of his property outside the United States was to be held on trust for sale on the trusts . .
CitedLiff v Peasley CA 1980
The court will not add a person as a defendant to an existing action if the claim was already statute-barred and he wished to rely on that defence, and if the court allows such addition ex parte it will not, on objection allow the addition to stand. . .
CitedOates v Consolidated Capital Services Pty Ltd 3-Jul-2009
Austlii (Supreme Court of New South Wales – Court of Appeal) CORPORATIONS – derivative action – sections 236 and 237 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – meaning of ‘proceedings on behalf of a company’ – whether using a . .
CitedCooke v Gill CCP 11-Jan-1873
What constitutes a cause of action is ‘every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed.’ . .
CitedIngall v Moran CA 1944
The plaintiff had issued a writ in 1942 as administrator of his deceased son’s estate. However, he did not take out letters of administration until the November. It was said that proceedings instituted by an applicant who at the time had no standing . .
CitedSmith v Henniker-Major and Co CA 22-Jul-2002
The claimant appealed the strike-out of his claim for professional negligence against the respondent solicitors. He claimed that the solicitors had acted in breach of their duty, and he then called a company meeting. Only he attended. He mistakenly . .
CitedWallersteiner v Moir (No 2) CA 1975
The court was asked whether Moir would be entitled to legal aid to bring a derivative action on behalf of a company against its majority shareholder.
Held: A minority shareholder bringing a derivative action on behalf of a company could obtain . .
CitedHilton v Sutton Steam Laundry CA 1946
. .
CitedBrickfield Properties Ltd v Newton CA 1971
Court’s Investigation of Construction Claims
The court heard an application to amend pleadings to add a claim about negligent supervision of a construction. Sachs LJ said: ‘Where there are found in completed buildings serious defects of the type here under review the facts relating to design, . .
CitedLucy v W T Henleys Telegraph Works Co Ltd (ICI Ltd, third party) 1970
Megaw LJ discussed the application of O 15 r 1(4): ‘Paragraph (2) of that rule provides that a court may allow a party to amend the writ ‘after any period of limitation current at the date of the issue of the writ has expired’ but this is expressly . .
CitedBurns v Campbell 1951
An action commenced by a plaintiff in a representative capacity which the plaintiff does not in fact possess is a nullity, and, further, that it makes no difference that the claim made in such an action is a claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts . .
CitedFinnegan v Cementation Co Ltd CA 1953
The plaintiff had obtained Letters of Administration in Southern Ireland only but sought to bring an action under the Fatal Accidents Act in England. There were two separate bases upon which the plaintiff (the widow of a workman killed in a work . .
CitedDavies v Elsby Brothers Ltd CA 1961
The writ was issued within the limitation period for the claim against ‘Elsby Brothers (a firm)’. In fact, the firm’s business had been taken over by Elsby Brothers Ltd before the proceedings had been issued. By the time the plaintiff applied for . .
CitedLetang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .
CitedChatsworth Investments Ltd v Cussins (Contractors) Ltd CA 1969
. .
CitedBraniff v Holland and Hannen and Cubitts (Southern) Ltd CA 1969
Widgery LJ said: ‘Again, I think that it would only complicate matters if I attempted to deal with the facts, but one thing is perfectly clear, namely, that in the view of Megaw J. the fact that in certain cases under Order 20 rule 5, amendments . .
CitedBickley v Dorrington 12-Nov-1737
A bill was brought by creditors, and by one of the residuary legatees of the testator, against his executors, the other residuary legatee, and the former partner of the testator to recover from the former partner money owing to the estate.
CitedAlsager v Rowley 16-Mar-1802
Lord Eldon LC said: ‘The established rule of the Court is certainly . . that in ordinary cases a debtor to the estate cannot be made a party to a bill against the executor: but there must be, as the cases express it, collusion or insolvency. That . .
CitedBowsher v Watkins CA 16-Feb-1830
Residuary legatees brought suit against the estate executors and a surviving partner of the testator for an account. It was argued that there were no special circumstances justifying the action by legatees.
Held: Collusion between the executor . .
CitedDavies v Davies CA 12-Jun-1837
Residuary legatees filed a bill against the executor and the surviving partner of the testator for an account of partnership transactions.
Held: In the absence of a charge of fraud or collusion, there were no special circumstances justifying . .
CitedBarker v Birch 19-Jul-1847
There may be circumstances under which the Court will, at the suit of universal legatees under a will, direct an account against a debtor to the testator’s estate, without collusion being established between the debtor and the personal . .
CitedIn re Field 1971
The plaintiff had an order for maintenance against the deceased’s estate. She brought proceedings in her own name against an insurance company which had wrongly paid a claim to the widow and not to the estate. The insurer sought a strike out. The . .
CitedMilne v Milne; Travis v Milne 29-May-1851
A suit by parties beneficially interested in the estate of a deceased partner could not be maintained against both his executors and surviving partners, in the absence of special circumstances; but collusion was not the only ground for such a suit; . .
CitedYeatman v Yeatman 1877
An action was brought by a residuary legatee against her mother-in-law’s executors and another member of the family, who it was alleged, had failed to account for partnership monies to the mother-in-law.
Held: A beneficiary of a trust could . .
CitedBradstock Trustee Services Ltd v Nabarro Nathanson ChD 1995
The plaintiffs were trustees of an occupational pension scheme. It began professional negligence proceedings to recover an expected surplus paid to the employer by the solicitors whose advice had been acted on. The anticipated costs were . .
CitedMorrison v Morrison’s Executors 1912
Lord Skerrington said: ‘A decree in such an action would be res judicata, provided always that the whole trustees and beneficiaries had been called as defenders.’ . .
CitedArmour v Glasgow Royal Infirmary 1909
Lord Ordinary, Lord Skerrington said that in the ordinary case the action could be brought only at the instance of the trustees. But the testamentary trustees had been called as defenders, and concurred with the Infirmary in maintaining that the . .
CitedRae v Meek HL 1889
The beneficiaries under a trust created by a marriage contract sued a trustee for having lost trust money which had been lent on the security of unfinished houses in a building speculation. The trustee was held liable to restore the trust fund. The . .
CitedKonamaneni v Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) Limited ChD 20-Dec-2001
The claimants founded their action on the assertion that the defendants had been corrupt in obtaining contracts in India. The defendants argued that the English courts had no jurisdiction. The claimants held various small shareholdings in a company . .
CitedE M Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith and Co 1904
Where an equitable assignee sues a third party, the assignor must be joined as a defendant. The Plaintiff as the equitable owner of a patent was given liberty to amend its pleading by joining the legal owner, (failing which the Plaintiff’s case . .
CitedIn Re Selectmove Ltd CA 21-Dec-1993
Promisse to Pay Tax due is not Consideration
The company appealed against an order for its winding up, saying that the debt was disputed, an accomodation having been reached with the Revenue.
Held: The court declined to regard a promise to the Revenue by a company to pay its existing . .
CitedNurcombe v Nurcombe CA 1985
The court discussed a minority shareholder’s action to enforce the company’s claim as a derivative claim. Browne-Wilkinson LJ said that such an action, where a courts in equity permitted a person interested to bring an action to enforce the . .
CitedVandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corp. of New York PC 1933
The plaintiff was injured in a motor accident. He failed in a direct claim against the insurers of the negligent defendant driver. The insurance was effected by the father (Mr Berry) of the negligent driver and provided that an indemnity would be . .
CitedWilliam Brandt’s Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co HL 1905
The court was asked whether instructions given by the bank’s customer to purchasers of rubber to make payment to its bank directly, amounted to an equitable assignment of debts, so that the bank could sue for their recovery. The bank sued the . .
CitedWeddell v JA Pearce and Major 1988
A cause of action in negligence was assigned in February 1986. The writ was issued by the assignee alone on 2 May 1986, at which time no notice of the assignment had been given to the defendants. It was argued that the action was a nullity.
CitedRobinson v Unicos Property Corpn Ltd CA 1962
The plaintiff sought an additional averment (unsuccessfully objected to as constituting the addition of a new cause of action) to plead that the first plaintiff sued as equitable assignee of the benefit of a contract made with the defendant (the . .
CitedCentral Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corpn (The Aiolos) CA 1983
Where an insurer indemnifies the assured, he is entitled to exercise, through subrogation, any claim the assured may have against the person who caused the losses. Absent an assignment of the claim, it belongs to the assured and the insurer does not . .
CitedRed Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA and Others PC 21-Jul-1994
Lex loci delicti (the law of the jurisdiction in which the act complained of took place) can exceptionally be used when the lex fori (the jurisdiction formally assigned) gives no remedy. In the case of a claim under a foreign tort, the double . .
CitedRed Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA and Others 1993
Hong Kong . .
CitedWilliam Brandt’s Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co HL 1905
The court was asked whether instructions given by the bank’s customer to purchasers of rubber to make payment to its bank directly, amounted to an equitable assignment of debts, so that the bank could sue for their recovery. The bank sued the . .
CitedThree Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of Bank of England CA 6-Dec-1994
Equitable assignors of a deposit cannot pursue a claim for recovery of the assigned debt without joining in the assignee as a party, though it can sue in its own name. . .
CitedWelsh Development Agency v Redpath Dorman Long Ltd CA 4-Apr-1994
A new claim was not deemed to have been made until the pleading was actually amended for limitation purposes, and should not be allowed after the limitation period had expired. The date of the application for leave to amend was not at issue. The . .

Cited by:
CitedNML Capital Ltd v Argentina SC 6-Jul-2011
The respondent had issued bonds but in 2001 had declared a moratorium on paying them. The appellant hedge fund later bought the bonds, heavily discounted. Judgment was obtained in New York, which the appellants now sought to enforce against assets . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.415923

Ministry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians: SC 12 May 2016

Iraqi citizens claimed to have suffered unlawful detention and/or physical maltreatment from British armed forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. The claims were brought in tort in England against the Ministry of Defence, but the torts were governed by Iraqi law. Under the 1984 Act where a claim is brought in England but governed by foreign law, the English courts are to apply the foreign law of limitation. In many of these cases the action was begun more than three years after the relevant claimant became aware of the injury and the person who caused it, and was therefore time-barred under article 232 of the Iraqi Civil Code.
Held: The appeal failed.
‘The real question is whether it is legally relevant when the claimants have brought proceedings in England what impediments might have prevented similar proceedings in Iraq. The judge, as I have observed, regarded that as depending on the territorial ambit of article 435 as a matter of Iraqi law. On that footing it is obvious that a procedural time-bar arising under Iraqi law applied only in Iraq. But in my opinion, this was not a question of Iraqi law but of English law. In English proceedings, the relevant law is the Foreign Limitation Periods Act. Where the cause of action is governed by a foreign law, the Act requires an English court to ascertain the relevant rules of the foreign law of limitation and then to apply it to proceedings in England. Because the foreign law of limitation will have been designed for foreign proceedings, that necessarily involves a process of transposition. There may be facts which the foreign law of limitation would treat as relevant to foreign proceedings but which are irrelevant to proceedings in England.’
and ‘ The claimants’ submission, if accepted, would mean that there was no limitation period at all affecting the present proceedings in England, by reason of a consideration (CPA Order 17) which had no relevance to English proceedings because it has no application outside Iraq and has never impeded resort to the English court. The main argument advanced in support of it was that an English court applying the Act of 1984 must give effect to the whole of the relevant Iraqi law of limitation, and not just to part of it. This point was reinforced by reference to section 2 of the Act of 1984. Section 2(1) disapplies the relevant foreign law of limitation so far as its application would conflict with English public policy, and section 2(3) disapplies it so far as it suspends the running of time on account of ‘the absence of a party to the action or proceedings from any specified jurisdiction or country’. The point made is that where the Act disapplies some part of the foreign law of limitation, it does so expressly, thereby impliedly excluding its disapplication in any other circumstances. I reject the submission because it assumes that because the Iraqi law of limitation would treat certain facts as relevant to Iraqi proceedings, to treat those facts as irrelevant to English proceedings involves disapplying part of Iraqi law. It does not. It simply involves applying the same principles of Iraqi law to different facts. The facts relevant to proceedings in England are not necessarily the same as those which would be relevant to proceedings in Iraq.’

Lord Neuberger, President, Lady Hale, Deputy President, Lord Mance, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed
[2016] UKSC 25, [2016] 1 WLR 2001, [2016] WLR(D) 261, UKSC 2015/0126
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC, SC Summary
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984
England and Wales
Citing:
At QBDIraqi Civilian Litigation v Ministry of Defence QBD 26-Jan-2015
The court considered limitation issues as an interim issue in this claim and particularly as it was affected by Iraqi law.
Held: The effective period of CPA 17 ended on 31 December 2008. No claim had been brought relating to any alleged act or . .
Appeal from CAMinistry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians CA 9-Dec-2015
‘This appeal raises a short but elusive point concerning the manner in which the English Court applies a foreign law relating to limitation when required to do so by section 1 of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984’ . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

International, Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.563387