Libyan Investment Authority and Others v King and Others: CA 14 Dec 2020

whether the Court has power to permit the Claimants to amend so as to introduce new claims after the expiry of the limitation period – ‘In circumstances where the Court has struck out the entirety of the Claimants’ currently pleaded case, can the Court nevertheless subsequently permit new claims to be brought?’

Judges:

Lord Justice Nugee

Citations:

[2020] EWCA Civ 1690

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Limitation, Litigation Practice

Updated: 22 May 2022; Ref: scu.656771

Greater Glasgow Health Board v Baxter Clark and Paul: SCS 1990

Outer House Court of Session – Lord Clyde held (obiter) that the ordinary and natural meaning of the phrase ’caused as aforesaid’ included the distinct ingredient of causation by negligence: ‘The question is one of the interpretation of section 11(3) . . In my view . . the subsection looks for an awareness not only of the fact of loss having occurred, but the fact that it is a loss caused by negligence . . I do consider that the ordinary and natural meaning of the phrase [’caused as aforesaid’] involves an inclusion of the ingredient of causation by fault. The construction advocated by the defenders does not seem to me to give sufficient recognition to the presence of the critical three words. Indeed, if Parliament had intended what the defenders submit is the proper construction, the words could have been altogether omitted. Counsel for the defenders argued that it was necessary to refer to the fact that the loss was loss resulting from an act, neglect or default because it was with that that the section was concerned. As senior counsel for the defenders put it, the critical phrase was inserted to draw attention back to section 11(1) to show the kind of loss of which the creditor has to be aware without making awareness of the fact of causation an essential for the prescriptive period to start running. But the whole section is concerned with claims for reparation which involve damnum caused by injuria and it does not seem to me that the critical words could have been added simply as a reminder of that. They must be there for some purpose and they must be given some meaning. In accordance with the ordinary use of the language which is used, awareness of loss having occurred is not enough. What the subsection requires is awareness of loss caused by negligence having occurred.
Furthermore as senior counsel for the pursuers submitted, the logic of the scheme points to a requirement of knowledge that the right of action exists before the obligation is deemed to be enforceable and it would be illogical to omit one of the essential components of the right of action, namely the causation of the loss by fault. Even more compelling to my mind was his further submission that if it is only knowledge of the fact of loss, injury or damage having occurred which is intended, it is difficult to give much content to the reference to reasonable diligence. The more likely context for reasonable diligence is in the steps that may be taken after loss has been sustained to discover the cause of it . .’

Judges:

Lord Clyde

Citations:

1990 SC 237

Statutes:

Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Cited by:

CitedDavid T Morrison and Co Ltd (T/A Gael Home Interiors) v ICL Plastics Ltd and Another SCS 14-Mar-2013
Extra Division – Inner House – An explosion at the defenders’ neighbouring premises had damaged those of the pursuer. The defenders now appealed against a finding that the claim was out of time calculated from the time when it had sufficient . .
CitedDavid T Morrison and Co Ltd (T/A Gael Home Interiors) v ICL Plastics Ltd and Others SC 30-Jul-2014
The claimant sought damages after an explosion at the defender’s nearby premises damaged its shop. The defender said that the claim was out of time, and now appealed against a decision that time had not begun to run under the 1973 Act.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.552028

Tabarrok v E D C Lord and Co (A Firm): CA 14 Feb 1997

The appellant wanted to open a pizza restaurant. He and his partners acquired a company for the purpose, which was to take a lease of premises. They sought advice from the defendants who, they said, failed to advise them of the need to be aware of dilapidations and the risks of entering into possession before the lease was formally executed.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. When the claimant executed the guarantee he knew already of the risk of liability for dilapidations. The limitation period runs from when damage arises, in this case from the giving of the negligent advice to sign a guarantee. The requested addition of the new party did not arise from an earlier mistake but from the assignment to the plaintiff. The amendment should not be allowed.
Aldous LJ said: ‘Negligent advice which results in a person giving a security by way of a charge over property or a guarantee can cause damage even before the surety is called in or before the person comes to have to honour the guarantee. That can be demonstrated by taking a case which arose in argument, when a company guarantees the loans of another company. That guarantee would have to be disclosed in the company’s accounts as it would be a liability affecting the value of the shares. If the guarantee was entered into upon negligent advice, then the loans might well have to be paid and the guarantee honoured. Thus, the potential liability of the guarantor would be greater with consequent diminution of the value of the company. ‘
Schiemann LJ said: ‘A guarantor cannot be sued on the guarantee by the creditor until there has been default by the principal debtor. It does not follow that the guarantor has not got a right of action in tort against a solicitor who allegedly negligently advised him to enter into the guarantee prior to that time. He may prefer to wait and see whether he is in fact called upon to pay but, as it seems to me, he can sue his solicitor earlier. If he does the trial judge must do what he can to assess the chance of the surety being called upon to pay under the guarantee. If this is significant, then the judge will assess the damage on the basis of the degree of probability of the surety being held liable to pay a particular sum. ‘

Judges:

Hirst LJ, Aldous LJ, Schiemann LJ

Citations:

Times 14-Feb-1997, [1997] EWCA Civ 951

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedWelsh Development Agency v Redpath Dorman Long Ltd CA 4-Apr-1994
A new claim was not deemed to have been made until the pleading was actually amended for limitation purposes, and should not be allowed after the limitation period had expired. The date of the application for leave to amend was not at issue. The . .
CitedLep Air Services v Rolloswin Investments Ltd; Moschi v LEP Air Services HL 1973
The obligation of a guarantor under a contract ‘is not an obligation himself to pay a sum of money to the creditor, but an obligation to see to it that another person, the debtor, does something.’ When a repudiatory breach is accepted by the injured . .
CitedDW Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
A solicitor was instructed to prepare an agreement providing for the introduction of a new working director into an insurance broking business carried on by a company. His instructions called for the new director to enter into a restrictive covenant . .
CitedForster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .
CitedBaker v Ollard and Bentley CA 12-May-1982
The plaintiff and a Mr and Mrs Bodman agreed to buy a house. The plaintiff intended to live on the first floor and the Bodmans on the ground floor. The solicitor should have advised them to convey the freehold into their joint names and then to . .
CitedHancock Shipping Limited v Kowaski Heavy Industries CA 1992
Leave was sought by the plaintiffs to amend their points of claim in circumstances where it was common ground that the amendments would introduce new causes of action which, if brought in new proceedings, would have been statute-barred. Held . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Professional Negligence

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.89686

Rahman v Sterling Credit Ltd: CA 17 Oct 2000

A lender sought repossession of a property securing a loan from 1998. The borrower sought to assert that the loan was an extortionate credit bargain under the Act. The lender asserted that that claim was out of time.
Held: A claim under a statute was an action upon a specialty, and that accordingly the limitation period applicable was twelve years, and the order was to stand.

Judges:

Simon Brown and Mummery LJJ

Citations:

Times 17-Oct-2000, Gazette 17-Aug-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 222, [2001] 1 WLR 496

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Consumer Credit Act 1974, Limitation Act 1980

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedNolan v Wright ChD 26-Feb-2009
The defendant sought to re-open the question of whether the charge under which he might otherwise be liable was an extortionate credit bargain. The creditor said that that plea was time barred. The defendant argued that a finding that the agreement . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation, Consumer

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.85644

Lowsley and Another v Forbes (Trading As I E Design Services): HL 29 Jul 1998

The plaintiffs, with the leave of the court, had obtained garnishee and charging orders nisi against the debtor 11 and a half years after they had obtained a consent judgment.
Held: An application by the judgment debtor to set aside the orders on the ground that they were statute barred under section 24(1) should be refused. A judgment can be enforced after six years, but not any claim for interest on that judgment. Execution was not a fresh action and so was not caught by the statutory restriction. Execution has historically been treated other than as a separate action. s24(1) does not apply to proceedings by way of execution of a judgment in the same action: the expression ‘action upon any judgment’ in s24(1) means, as it did in s2(4) of the 1939 Act, bringing a ‘fresh action’ upon a judgment for another judgment. It did not include the execution of an existing judgment, which could proceed despite the expiration of more than 6 years from the judgment.

Judges:

Lord Lloyd of Berwick

Citations:

Times 24-Aug-1998, Gazette 16-Sep-1998, [1998] UKHL 34, [1998] 3 All ER 897, [1998] 3 WLR 501, [1999] 1 AC 329

Links:

House of Lords, Bailii

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 24(1) 24(2), Supreme Court of Judicature (1873) Amendment Act 1875

Citing:

Appeal fromLowsley and Another v Forbes CA 21-Mar-1996
The statutory time limit under the Limitation Act applied only to the right to take substantive proceedings and had nothing whatever to do with the procedural machinery for enforcing a judgment when one was obtained. The Act of 1875 brought about a . .
CitedW T Lamb and Sons v Rider CA 1948
The judge at first instance had rescinded the master’s order giving leave to the judgment creditor to proceed to levy execution although six years had passed since the judgment. On appeal the judgment creditor challenged the validity of the rule of . .
CitedBlack-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof Aschaffenburg AG HL 5-Mar-1975
Statute’s Mischief May be Inspected
The House considered limitations upon them in reading statements made in the Houses of Parliament when construing a statute.
Held: It is rare that a statute can be properly interpreted without knowing the legislative object. The courts may . .

Cited by:

CitedRidgeway Motors (Isleworth) Ltd v Alts Ltd CA 10-Feb-2005
The company appelaed a refusal of the judge to strike out a winding up petition. They said the petition was based upon a judgment which was now time barred. The petitioner replied that such a petition was not an action under the section.
Held: . .
CitedA v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
CitedHarding v Wealands HL 5-Jul-2006
Claim in UK for Accident in Australia
The claimant had been a passenger in a car driven by his now partner. They had an accident in New South Wales. The car was insured in Australia. He sought leave to sue in England and Wales because Australian law would limit the damages.
Held: . .
CitedYorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.83230

Green and Another v Wheatley: CA 19 May 1999

Where a garage had been built upon land, and allowed to stay there for over twenty years, title had been acquired by adverse possession, and a right of way which might previously have existed over the land, had also been lost.

Judges:

Stuart Smith LJ, Laws LJ, Jonathan Parker LJ

Citations:

Gazette 03-Jun-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 1442

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Limitation

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.81003

Clarke (Executor of the Will of Francis Bacon, Deceased) v Marlborough Fine Art (London) Ltd and Another: ChD 5 Jul 2001

Francis Bacon sold his paintings through the defendant agents for many years. The original contractual arrangement grew into a fiduciary one. The claimants asserted that the defendants were in breach of that fiduciary duty, the defendants asserted that the relationship remained contractual, and that it was now time barred.
Held: There may be a true constructive trust which would not be time barred, rather than a remedial constructive trust. The test was whether the trustee was a true trustee, whether of a constructive or an express trust. Nor was it clear that a court of equity would have time barred a claim in undue influence.

Judges:

Patten J

Citations:

Times 05-Jul-2001

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 36(1)(f)

Cited by:

CitedMcLaughlin and Others v Newall QBD 31-Jul-2009
The claimant asked the court to strike out the defence that the claimant had compromised his claim by agreement. The defendant had written letters critical of the claimants who were governors of a school which had disciplined his daughter a teacher . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Agency, Trusts, Limitation

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79197

C v Mirror Group Newspapers and Others: CA 21 Jun 1996

Husband and wife were involved in a custody dispute. The father made serious but false allegations to the press. She now claimed in defamation, but he relied upon limitation. She said the facts had only become known to her much later.
Held: ‘Facts relevant to cause’ referred to those facts necessary to be pleaded but not in rebuttal.

Judges:

Neill, Morritt, Pill LJJ

Citations:

Times 15-Jul-1996, [1996] EMLR 518, [1997] 1 FCR 556, [1996] 2 FLR 532, [1996] 4 All ER 511, [1996] Fam Law 671, [1996] EWCA Civ 1290, [1997] 1 WLR 131

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 32A

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedCollins v Brebner CA 19-Jun-1997
The defendant solicitor appealed refusal of an order to strike out the claim. The claimant alleged breach of trust. The claimant asserted a fraudulent witholding of information to suggest that any breach of trust had happened. The defendant said . .
CitedKhader v Aziz and Another QBD 31-Jul-2009
The defendant sought to strike out a claim in defamation. Acting on behalf of his client the solicitor defendant was said to have called a journalist and defamed the claimant. The words were denied.
Held: Assuming (which was denied) that the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation, Media, Limitation

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.78809

Cachia and Others v Faluyi: CA 11 Jul 2001

The words of the section had to be construed so as to make it compatible with the human rights convention. Accordingly the term ‘action’ in the Act was to be interpreted to mean an action where a writ was served. Children whose mother had been killed, had the human right to claim compensation for their loss of dependency. Whilst it was legitimate to impose certain restrictions on access to the courts, the effect of the words of the statute had not been considered or intended, and the court would read the section so as to make it compatible with the Act.

Citations:

Times 11-Jul-2001, Gazette 19-Jul-2001

Statutes:

Fatal Accidents Act 1976 2(3)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Personal Injury, Limitation, Human Rights

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.78816

Busby v Cooper; Busby v Abbey National plc; Busby v Lumby: CA 2 Apr 1996

The claimant sought damages after having bought a house after receiving an allegedly negligent report on the concrete. She had asked to be allowed to add a third party (the local authority who had passed the building) as a defendant, but the request was outside the primary limitation period and was refused and again on appeal. She now sought to appeal.
Held: Her appeal was allowed. It was within the court’s jurisdiction to try issues relationg to the primary facts which would decide how the limitation rules would be applied. Section 14(10(b) operated to extend the time limit provided in 14(4)(a), and therefore it was not necessary to issue a new set of proceedings. The joining of a third party after the initial limitation period had expired, remained possible. The claim was justiciable.

Citations:

Times 15-Apr-1996

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 14A(4)(a) 14A(4)(b)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

FollowedDavies v Reed Stock and Co Ltd 1984
. .
DistinguishedWelsh Development Agency v Redpath Dorman Long Ltd CA 4-Apr-1994
A new claim was not deemed to have been made until the pleading was actually amended for limitation purposes, and should not be allowed after the limitation period had expired. The date of the application for leave to amend was not at issue. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.78778

BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd v Chevron Shipping Company; Same v Chevron Tankers (Bermuda) Ltd; Same v Chevron Transport Corporation: OHCS 26 Jan 1999

Where an action had been delayed beyond the five year prescription period because of an error induced by the party sued, the prescriptive period did not restart until the party was disabused of its mistake.

Judges:

Lord Dawson

Citations:

Times 06-May-1999, [1999] ScotCS 31

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 6

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Cited by:

Appeal fromBP Exploration Operating Co Ltd v Chevron Shipping Company and Chevron Tankers (Bermuda) Ltd and Chevron Transport Corporation SCS 13-Apr-2000
. .
At Outer HouseBP Exploration Operating Co Ltd v Chevron Transport (Scotland) HL 18-Oct-2001
A ship owned by the defenders caused substantial damage whilst moored at the claimant’s docks. The claim was made against different members of the defendants as they asserted and denied responsibility. The last company asserted that the claim was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78533

Bowers v Kennedy: IHCS 28 Jun 2000

A landowner who had no alternative means of access to his land could not lose a right of way to it by a failure to use it. It was not a right of servitude, but rather an incident of the rights inherent as owner. The inapplicability of periods and rules of limitation in such cases was well established.

Citations:

Times 27-Jul-2000, [2000] ScotCS 178, [2000] ScotCS 179

Links:

Bailii, Bailii

Land, Limitation, Scotland

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78518

Batchelor v Marlow and Another: ChD 25 May 2000

The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement. If an easement was capable of arising by virtue of a deed of grant, it could also be acquired by prescription. This was such an easement. Use in the absence of planning permission did not vitiate the acquisition by prescription, since the use did not become unlawful until a planning enforcement notice had been served.

Citations:

Times 07-Jun-2000, Gazette 25-May-2000, Gazette 08-Jun-2000, (2001) 82 P and CR 36

Cited by:

CitedP and S Platt Ltd v Crouch and Another CA 25-Jul-2003
The claimant sought a declaration that certain easements had been included by implication in a conveyance of part of land to him.
Held: Since the easements were capable of subsisting at law, and existed as quasi-easements at the time, and did . .
Appeal fromBatchelor v Marlow and Another CA 12-Jul-2001
The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement acquired by prescription. At first instance the rights were recognised as an easement. The rights included parking during daylight hours during weekdays. The land-owner appealed on the ground that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Road Traffic, Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78277

Battersea Freehold and Leasehold Property Company Ltd v Wandsworth London Borough Council: ChD 2 Mar 2001

The tenant of the applicant had occupied land adjacent to the tenanted land and belonging to the council respondent for more than 12 years. The applicant sought to assert that he had acquired possessory title. The tenant had however shared the keys when requested.
Held: The claimants appeal failed. Even if the tenant’s use of the land had not been permissive, in order to establish adverse possession the claimant had to show that its tenant had intended to exclude the whole world at large from the disputed land; The sharing of the keys by the tenant indicated that he had not viewed himself as asserting exclusive possession, by excluding the world at large.

Judges:

Rimer J

Citations:

Gazette 17-May-2001

Land, Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78291

Batchelor v Marlow and Another: CA 12 Jul 2001

The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement acquired by prescription. At first instance the rights were recognised as an easement. The rights included parking during daylight hours during weekdays. The land-owner appealed on the ground that the extent of use claimed destroyed the owner’s ability to use the land, to the point where his ownership was illusory. The court agreed, and declared that there was no easement if it extended to that point.
Tuckey LJ asked: ‘Does an exclusive right to park six cars for 9.5 hours every day of the working week leave the plaintiff without any reasonable use of his land, whether for parking or anything else?’ and he gave the answer: ‘[The plaintiff’s] right to use his land is curtailed altogether for intermittent periods throughout the week. Such a restriction would, I think, make his ownership of the land illusory.’

Judges:

Henry LJ, Tuckey LJ, Kay LJ

Citations:

Gazette 12-Jul-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 1051, [2003] 1 WLR 764

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedLondon and Blenheim Estates Ltd v Ladbroke Retail Parks Ltd ChD 29-Jul-1992
A right to park was claimed as an easement.
Held: The question whether the right to park that had been claimed was consistent with the nature of an easement was one of degree: ‘A small coal shed in a large property is one thing. The exclusive . .
CitedDyce v Lady James Hay HL 1852
A claim was made for a prescriptive right for all the Queen’s subjects ‘to go at all times upon the . . appellant’s property . . for the purpose of recreation’.
Held: Leonards LC said that the right claimed was one that ‘cannot be maintained’ . .
CitedCopeland v Greenhalf ChD 1952
If a right claimed by way of an easement would effectively deprive the servient owner of any reasonable user of the area of land over which it is exercisable, than that right is not capable of being an easement. The rights asserted here were both . .
CitedBilkus v London Borough of Redbridge 1968
The court was asked to construe the terms of a covenant given by the council to the claimant. . .
CitedLondon and Blenheim Estates v Ladbroke Retail Parks Ltd CA 1-Jun-1993
The land-owner sold part of his land, granting easements over the retained land, and an agreement that, if further plots were purchased, similar easements would be granted. The agreement stated that the purchaser should have the right to give notice . .
Appeal fromBatchelor v Marlow and Another ChD 25-May-2000
The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement. If an easement was capable of arising by virtue of a deed of grant, it could also be acquired by prescription. This was such an easement. Use in the absence of planning permission did not vitiate . .

Cited by:

CitedMoncrieff and Another v Jamieson and others HL 17-Oct-2007
The parties disputed whether a right of way over a road included an implied right for the dominant owner to park on the servient tenement.
Held: The appeal failed. ‘The question is whether the ancillary right is necessary for the comfortable . .
CitedPolo Woods Foundation v Shelton-Agar and Another ChD 17-Jun-2009
The court considered whether the claimant had established a profit a prendre against the defendant neighbour’s land in the form of a right of pasturage, acquired either by lost modern grant or by prescription.
Held: The appeal succeeded, but . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78279

In re Lloyd; Lloyd v Lloyd: CA 1903

The court was asked as to a mortgagee’s entitlement to require the mortgagor to pay all arrears of interest as a condition of redemption, even if some of the arrears would be statute-barred if the mortgagee were seeking to recover them by action, or to retain all such arrears on accounting to the mortgagor for the proceeds of a sale by the mortgagee.
Held: The mortgagee was not affected by the limitation statute because it was not seeking to recover the interest by bringing an action.

Citations:

[1903] 1 Ch 385

Land, Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.277163

Holmes v Cowcher: ChD 1970

The court accepted the proposition put forward by counsel for the mortgagee that on an application by the mortgagor to redeem the mortgage, all the arrears of interest (amounting to almost 10 years) had to be paid as a condition of redemption, not just interest for the last 6 years.

Judges:

Stamp J

Citations:

[1970] 1 WLR 834

Cited by:

CitedYorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.277164

Poole Corporation v Moody: CA 1945

In relation to a power of sale, the subsection was treated by the Court solely as a provision which excluded the operation of section 2 in claims for equitable relief, without any mention of the possibility of it applying the section by analogy.

Judges:

Morton LJ

Citations:

[1945] KB 350

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1939 2(7)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedYorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.277165

Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim and Others (Number 9): ChD 29 Jul 1994

There were two foreign defendants who were each liable to the plaintiff.
Held: The English court had jurisdiction to allocate the damages between them. Execution should not be stayed because the plaintiff should be allowed to retain the opportunity to commence that part of the proceedings, ie execution, in such jurisdiction as he thought fit.

Judges:

Chadwick J

Citations:

Times 11-Oct-1994, [1994] CLY 3555

Statutes:

Civil Liability (Contributions) Act 1978, Civil Evidence Act 1968 2 4 6

Cited by:

CitedIS Innovative Software Ltd v Howes CA 19-Feb-2004
It was alleged that the defendant had backdated contracts of employment to a time when he had been employed by the claimant, and had induced staff to leave. The company appealed dismissal of its claim.
Held: The advantage of the court . .
CitedKuwait Oil Tanker Company Sak; Sitka Shipping Incorporated v Al Bader;Qabazard; Stafford and H Clarkson and Company Limited; Mccoy; Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and Others CA 28-May-1999
The defendants having been found to have acted dishonestly to the tune of pounds 130,000,000 sought a stay of execution pending an appeal. The judge had found that the appeal was arguable. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Evidence, Limitation

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.77850

Fowley Marine (Emsworth) Ltd v Gafford: 1968

A paper title owner of land is deemed to be in possession of the fee simple unless and until someone else acquires possession of it

Citations:

[1968] 2 QB 618

Cited by:

CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.267382

Brown v North British Steel Foundry Ltd: OHCS 1968

The 1954 Act passed on 4 June 1954 but was not to affect any action or proceeding if the cause of action arose before that date. The Lord Ordinary found that the pursuer who sought damages for pneumoconiosis did not begin to suffer from until 1955. But the pursuer contended that the injury had been done to his lungs by 1949 because he had been inhaling dangerous dust for some years before that and, as subsequent events showed, he was susceptible to pneumoconiosis in 1949. So the cause of action had arisen at that date. The First Division of the Court of Session rejected that argument.
Held: Lord President Clyde said that there was no cause of action in 1949 and added: ‘To create a cause of action, injuria and damnum are essential ingredients. In the present case there is no evidence of any injuries to the workman’s lungs in 1949. He had then merely a deposit of dust in his lungs, which might or might not subsequently create an injury. But, in addition, he had then sustained no damnum. He could not then have been awarded damages for any loss, because at that stage he had sustained no loss of wages and had suffered none of the discomforts and disabilities which, he avers, followed upon the onset of pneumoconiosis and which in fact flowed from the outbreak of that disease in 1955.’

Judges:

Lord President Clyde

Citations:

1968 SC 51

Statutes:

Law Reform (Limitation of Actions etc) Act 1954

Cited by:

CitedJohnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd; Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd; similar HL 17-Oct-2007
The claimant sought damages for the development of neural plaques, having been exposed to asbestos while working for the defendant. The presence of such plaques were symptomless, and would not themselves cause other asbestos related disease, but . .
CitedAXA General Insurance Ltd and Others v Lord Advocate and Others SCS 8-Jan-2010
The claimant sought to challenge the validity of the 2009 Act by judicial review. The Act would make their insured and themselves liable to very substantial unanticipated claims for damages for pleural plaques which would not previousl or otherwise . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Scotland, Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.260124

Aylott v West Ham Corporation: CA 1927

The plaintiff sought to recover a sum of money under a statute.

Judges:

Lord Hanworth MR

Citations:

[1927] 1 Ch 30

Cited by:

CitedHill (As Trustee In Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v Spread Trustee Company Ltd and Another CA 12-May-2006
The defendants sought relief for transactions entered into at an undervalue. The bankrupt had entered into charges and an assignment of a loan account in their favour before his bankruptcy, and the trustee had obtained an order for them to be set . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.244179

Watson-Towers Ltd v McPhail: 1986

The pursuer submitted a motion for summary judgment for the value of goods which had been supplied subject to a reservation of title clause. The pursuer’s evidence consisted of a letter from the defender making an offer expressed to be without prejudice but which attached a schedule listing the goods in its possession.
Held: The schedule was admissible because it was, on the true construction of the letter, not a ‘hypothetical admission or concession for the purpose of securing a settlement’ but a statement of fact.

Judges:

Lord Wylie

Citations:

1986 SLT 617

Cited by:

FollowedDaks Simpson Group plc v Kuiper 1994
The creditor sought summary judgment for an account for commissions earned. In a ‘without prejudice’ letter the defendant’s director said that he was prepared to accept that he had received such commissions in stated amounts.
Held: Lord . .
CitedBradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid HL 12-Jul-2006
Disapplication of Without Prejudice Rules
The House was asked whether a letter sent during without prejudice negotiations which acknowledged a debt was admissible to restart the limitation period. An advice centre, acting for the borrower had written, in answer to a claim by the lender for . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Scotland, Contract, Limitation

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.243123

Littlewood and George Wimpey and Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corporation: CA 1953

The words ‘liable to pay’ in s 3 carried their usual meaning as ‘responsible in law’.

Judges:

Singleton LJ

Citations:

[1953] 2 QB 501, [1953] 2 All ER 915, [1953] 3 WLR 553

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal fromWimpey (George) Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corporation HL 1954
A joint tortfeasor could escape liability in contribution proceedings if it had been unsuccessfully sued by the injured person in an action brought outside the relevant limitation period. Where a court has to decide between two competing cases, if . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Damages

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.238753

Wilkinson v Ancliff (BLT) Ltd: CA 1986

In order to be fixed with sufficient knowledge to start the limitation period running, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to have knowledge sufficient to enable his legal advisers to draft a fully and comprehensively particularised statement of claim.

Judges:

Slade LJ

Citations:

[1986] 1 WLR 1352

Cited by:

CitedHaward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.238774

Wolmershausen v Gullick: 1893

Claim for contribution between co-securities. Wright J reviewed the development of the entitlement to contribution from Justinian’s statement of it, through its application by the custom of the City of London in the time of Queen Elizabeth to the time of his judgment.

Judges:

Wright J

Citations:

[1893] 2 Ch 514

Cited by:

MentionedAer Lingus v Gildacroft Ltd and Another CA 17-Jan-2006
The claimant had been found liable to pay damages for personal injury, and now sought contribution from the defendants. The defendants said that they were out of time since the contribution action had been commenced more than 2 years after the . .
CitedWimpey (George) Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corporation HL 1954
A joint tortfeasor could escape liability in contribution proceedings if it had been unsuccessfully sued by the injured person in an action brought outside the relevant limitation period. Where a court has to decide between two competing cases, if . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Damages, Contract

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.238752

Phillips-Higgins v Harper: QBD 1954

A claim was made to recover monies due under a contract where the plaintiff had failed to realise that the balance was due to her, and by that mistake the action was concealed from her.
Held: Pearson J said: ‘But that is not sufficient. Probably provision (c) applies only where the mistake is an essential ingredient of the cause of action, so that the statement of claim sets out, or should set out, the mistake and its consequences and pray for relief from those consequences. In this case the statement of claim sets out that sums became due and that only a smaller amount of X pounds has been paid, and the prayer is for an account to ascertain the sums still due and for payment of them when so ascertained. This action is not for relief from the consequences of mistake within the meaning of section 26.’
When asking when a cause of action began under the section, the essential question was whether the action was for relief from the consequences of a mistake, an example of which was an action for the recovery of money paid in consequence of a mistake. The section was intended to be a narrow one, because any wider provision would have opened too wide a door of escape from the general principle of limitation.

Judges:

Pearson J

Citations:

[1954] 1 QB 411, [1954] 2 All ER 51

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1939 26

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
CitedTest Claimants In The Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Inland Revenue SC 23-May-2012
The European Court had found the UK to have unlawfully treated differently payment of franked dividends between subsidiaries of UK companies according to whether all the UK subsidiaries were themselves UK based, thus prejudicing European . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.236540

Smirk v Lyndale Developments Ltd: ChD 1975

The court considered the doctrine that a tenant acquiring title to land by adverse possession, did so on behalf of hs landlord.
Held: The cases demonstrated that ‘the law . . has got into something of a tangle’, but the doctrine, at least as summarised by Parke B, appeared to be ‘in accordance with justice and common sense’. If a tenant occupies land belonging to the landlord but not included in the demise, that land is presumed to be an addition to the land demised to the tenant, so that it becomes subject to the terms of the tenancy and must therefore be given up to the landlord when the tenancy ends. For there to be a surrender of an existing lease by operation of law because of the grant of a new lease,

Judges:

Pennycuick V-C

Citations:

[1975] Ch 321, [1975] 1 All ER 690

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedKingsmill v Millard 20-Jun-1855
Parke B set out the doctrine that a tenant acquiring adjoining land by adverse possession acquires it on behalf of his landlord: ‘It is laid down in all the cases – whether the inclosed land is part of the waste, or belongs to the landlord or a . .
ApprovedTabor v Godfrey 1895
Where a tenant occupies land adjacent to land demised to him by the landlord, he occupies it as additional to the tenancy, and subject to its terms. . .

Cited by:

CitedTower Hamlets v Barrett and Another CA 19-Jul-2005
The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been . .
Appeal fromSmirk v Lyndale Developments Ltd CA 2-Jan-1975
Judgment upheld . .
CitedTrustees In the Charity of Sir John Morden v Mayrick; Graham v Mayrick CA 12-Jan-2007
The claimant had owned tracts of land in London for very many years, but the title deeds had been lost. The defendant had purchased a part from a company who had in turn purchased from the claimants, but the parties disputed an adjacent strip of . .
CitedGraham and others v Mayrick ChD 23-Mar-2006
The claimants sought specific performance of a compromise agreement with the defendant after a dispute over a strip of land. The defendant appealed a finding that the claimants had shown satisfactory title.
Held: ‘It has long been established . .
CitedLong v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council ChD 20-Mar-1996
The parties had agreed for a lease, and the tenant entered possession, but no formal lease was executed. The tenant stopped paying rent in 1977 or 1984. He now claimed rectification of the registers to show him as proprietor. The landlord argued . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.228931

Kingsmill v Millard: 20 Jun 1855

Parke B set out the doctrine that a tenant acquiring adjoining land by adverse possession acquires it on behalf of his landlord: ‘It is laid down in all the cases – whether the inclosed land is part of the waste, or belongs to the landlord or a third person – that the presumption is, that the tenant has inclosed it for the benefit of his landlord unless he has done some act disclaiming the landlord’s title. . . The encroachment must be considered as annexed to the holding, unless it clearly appears that the tenant made it for his own benefit.’

Judges:

Parke B

Citations:

(1855) 11 Exch 313, (1855) 19 JP 661, (1855) 3 CLR 1022, 156 ER 849, [1855] EngR 616, (1855) 156 ER 849

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedSmirk v Lyndale Developments Ltd ChD 1975
The court considered the doctrine that a tenant acquiring title to land by adverse possession, did so on behalf of hs landlord.
Held: The cases demonstrated that ‘the law . . has got into something of a tangle’, but the doctrine, at least as . .
CitedTower Hamlets v Barrett and Another CA 19-Jul-2005
The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been . .
CitedChilds and Another v Vernon CA 16-Mar-2007
The parties disputed the boundary between their properties, alleging various trespasses. The judge ordered a single expert witness. The court had been unable to establish the line of the boundary from the conveyances or the Land Registry plans. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.228930

Re a Debtor: ChD 1997

The creditor appealed the decision to set aside a statutory demand as statute barred.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. Bankruptcy proceedings based on a statutory demand for moneys due under a previous default judgment constituted ‘an action upon a judgment’ within s24(1). Insolvency proceedings constituted a fresh action or proceeding newly brought, of the kind described in Lamb, rather than a proceeding under the judgment previously obtained. Bankruptcy proceedings were not, the judge held, a method of, nor were they akin to, enforcing or executing a judgment outside s24(1). As more than 6 years had elapsed since the default judgment became enforceable, bankruptcy proceedings based on it in the statutory demand would be statute barred by s24(1). It was held that the statutory demand had been rightly set aside by the district judge.

Judges:

Baker J

Citations:

[1997] Ch 310

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 24(1)

Cited by:

CitedRidgeway Motors (Isleworth) Ltd v Alts Ltd CA 10-Feb-2005
The company appelaed a refusal of the judge to strike out a winding up petition. They said the petition was based upon a judgment which was now time barred. The petitioner replied that such a petition was not an action under the section.
Held: . .
DisapprovedRidgeway Motors (Isleworth) Ltd v Altis ChD 21-May-2004
The company sought to strike out a winding up petition presented by the respondents, saying a winding up petition was by way of an action, and was barred by statute after six years.
Held: A winding up petition was not an action within the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Limitation

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.223039

Telfair Shipping Operation SA v Inersea Carriers SA, the Caroline P: 1984

A claim was made in contract based on an indemnity.
Held: The claim was not time-barred. Time normally begins to run against a claim on a general indemnity only from the moment when the liability of the indemnified is accepted by him or determined against him by the court, because, in the absence of a provision to the contrary, an indemnity cannot be called on by the indemnified unless and until the indemnified has paid the money in respect of which he claims the indemnity.

Judges:

Neill J

Citations:

[1985] 1 WLR 553, [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 266

Citing:

DistinguishedForster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .

Cited by:

CitedThe Law Society v Sephton and Co and others CA 13-Dec-2004
The Society appealed dismissal for limitation of its claim against the defendant firm of accountants arising from alleged fraud in approval of a solicitor’s accounts.
Held: The liability did not arise until the Society decided to make . .
MentionedAer Lingus v Gildacroft Ltd and Another CA 17-Jan-2006
The claimant had been found liable to pay damages for personal injury, and now sought contribution from the defendants. The defendants said that they were out of time since the contribution action had been commenced more than 2 years after the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Contract

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.221432

Westminster City Council v Clifford Culpin and partners: CA 18 Jun 1987

It was questionable whether plaintiffs should be allowed the benefit of the full limitation period with virtual impunity where the facts are known and there is no obstacle to the speedy institution and prosecution of claims.

Judges:

Kerr LJ

Citations:

Unreported, 18 June 1987, Transcript No 592 of 1987

Cited by:

DoubtedDepartment of Transport v Chris Smaller (Transport) Ltd HL 1989
An application had been made to strike out a claim for want of prosecution. The writ was not issued until the end of the relevant six year limitation period and then not served for a further nine months. The period of inexcusable delay after action . .
CitedGrovit and others v Doctor and others HL 24-Apr-1997
The plaintiff began a defamation action against seven defendants. Each had admitted publication but pleaded justification. The claims against the fourth to seventh defendants were dismissed by consent, and the third had gone into liquidation. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.214298

Mount Carmel Investments Limited v Peter Thurlow Limited: CA 1988

The court considered a defence to an assertion of adverse possession, that the plaintiff had given notice of his intention to recover the land: ‘no one, either lawyer or non-lawyer, would think that a householder ceases to be in possession of his house simply by reason of receiving a demand that he should quit.
On the owner’s argument time starts to run afresh by making a demand for possession. That is in flat contradiction to the long-recognised position and the statutory scheme where a squatter is in possession of another’s land. Unless the squatter vacates or gives a written acknowledgment to the owner, the owner has to issue his writ within the prescribed time limit. Otherwise he is barred, because by section 15(1) he is barred from bringing any action to recover the land after the expiration of the 12-year period.’
‘We do not accept that, in a case where one person is in possession of property, and another is not, the mere sending and receipt of a letter by which delivery up of possession is demanded, can have the effect in law for limitation purposes that the recipient of the letter ceases to be in possession and the sender of the letter acquires possession.’
‘If recovery of land is time-barred by adverse possession the right to recover mesne profits is lost, just as is the right to recover rent’

Judges:

Nicholl LJ

Citations:

[1988] 1 WLR 1078, [1988] 3 All ER 129

Statutes:

Land Registration Act 1925 15(1) 75(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

AppliedIn Re Jolly CA 1900
Mrs Jolly let a farm to her son who paid rent until 1881, but not thereafter, and her title to the farm was extinguished in 1893. She died in 1898. The question which arose was whether at her death any rent arrears remained due.
Held: The . .

Cited by:

CitedMarkfield Investments Ltd v Evans CA 9-Nov-2000
The claimants were paper owners of land occupied by the defendant. The claimant said the acquiescence had been interrupted by an abortive court action by the claimant’s predecessor in title.
Held: With regard to any particular action the . .
CitedCrown Estate Commissioners v Roberts and Another ChD 13-Jun-2008
The defendant claimed ownership as Lord Marcher of St Davids of historical rights in foreshores in Pembrokeshire. The claimants sought removal of his cautions against first registration.
Held: Lewison J explored the history of manorial . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.197882

Pulleyn v Hall Aggregates (Thames Valley) Ltd: 1993

Citations:

(1993) 65 P and CR 276

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton CA 19-Mar-1997
The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.195611

Purbrick v Hackney London Borough Council: ChD 26 Jun 2003

The property fell into disrepair. The claimant began to use it for storage, carrying out some refurbishment. He now claimed to own the property by adverse possession.
Held: Littledale was not to be followed unless the facts were strictly on all fours. He had done all that was possible to occupy and retain possession of the premises. He was not required to demonstrate that he had intended to claim ownership of the building but only that he intended to exclude the world. That he had done. ‘ . . . it is to some extent implicit in the present law of adverse possession that an owner of property who makes no use of it whatever should be expected to keep an eye on the property to ensure that adverse possession rights are not being clocked up. A period of 12 years is a long period during which to neglect a property completely.’

Judges:

Mr Justice Neuberger

Citations:

Gazette 10-Jul-2003, [2004] 1 P and CR 553

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedLittledale v Liverpool College CA 1900
The mere storage of items in a property was insufficient to demonstrate the necessary intention to dispossess the rightful owner. It was a mere exercise of the rights under an easement. Enclosure of land is not necessarily decisive. Lord Lindley MR . .

Cited by:

CitedTopplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.184716

Arnold v Central Electricity Generating Board: HL 22 Oct 1987

The plaintiff was widow and administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband. He had worked from April 1938 to April 1943 for a predecessor to the CEGB. He had been exposed to asbestos dust as a result of his employer’s negligence and breach of duty. In 1981 he began to suffer mesothelioma, a long-delayed result of his exposure, and he died in May 1982. Proceedings were issued in April 1984. It was agreed that any cause of action the deceased may have had was barred by section 21 of the 1939 Act one year after his employment had ceased, namely in April 1944. The issue was whether the 1963 Act or the 1975 Act revived the deceased’s cause of action.
Held: Any action time-barred before 4 June 1954 remained time-barred.
Lord Bridge thought it ‘beyond question that the Act of 1963 operated retrospectively, when the appropriate conditions were satisfied, to deprive a defendant of an accrued time bar in respect of a claim for damages for personal injuries in which the cause of action had accrued since 4 June 1954 and which had, therefore, been subject to the three year period of limitation introduced by the Act of 1954. This is the combined effect of the relevant provisions of sections 1, 6 and 15.’
Lord Bridge accepted that: ‘Consistently with the presumption that a statute affecting substantive rights is not to be construed as having retrospective operation unless it clearly appears to have been so intended, it seems to me entirely proper, in a case where some retrospective operation was clearly intended, equally to presume that the retrospective operation of the statute extends no further than is necessary to give effect either to its clear language or to its manifest purpose. Construing sections 2A to 2D of the Act of 1939 in the light of section 3 of the Act of 1975, I think that full effect is given both to the language and to the purposes of the legislation if it is held retrospectively applicable to all personal injury actions previously governed by the three year limitation period under the Act of 1954, whether as then enacted or as amended by the Act of 1963. Conversely, I can find nothing in the language or discernible purposes of the statute which leads clearly, let alone avoidably, to the conclusion that defendants previously entitled to rely on the accrued six year and one year time bars under the original Act of 1939 which the Act of 1963 left intact were intended to be deprived of those accrued rights by the Act of 1975.’

Judges:

Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Brightman, Lord Ackner and Lord Oliver of Aylmerton

Citations:

[1988] AC 228, Gazette 25-Nov-1987, [1987] 3 All ER 694, [1987] 3 WLR 1009

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1939 2A(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedYew Bon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Mara PC 7-Oct-1982
(Malaysia) In 1972 the appellants were injured by the respondent’s bus. At that time the local limitation period was 12 months. In 1974 the limitation period became three years. The appellants issued a writ in 1975. To succeed they would have to sue . .
CriticisedKnipe v British Railways Board CA 1972
The plaintiff was injured in 1948, but it later became more serious, and in 1970, having obtained leave under the 1963 Act, he issued proceedings. The defendants argued that his claim was statute-barred under section 2(1). The defendant appealed. . .

Cited by:

CitedNicholls v London Borough of Greenwich CA 3-Apr-2003
The claimant had been employed by the respondent, and earned a pension. She challenged legislation which appeared to operate retrospectively to reduce that pension. The respondent argued that the amount agreed to be paid exceeded the maximum . .
CitedMcDonnell v Congregation of Christian Brothers Trustees (Formerly Irish Christian Brothers) and others HL 4-Dec-2003
In 2000, the claimant sought damages for sexual abuse from before 1951. The issue was as to whether the limitation law which applied was that as at the date of the incidents, or that which applied as at the date when he would be deemed uner the . .
CitedBolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd CA 6-Feb-2006
The deceased had come into contact with asbestos when working on building sites for more than one contractor. The claimant here sought contribution from the defendants for the damages it had paid to his estate. The issue was as to liability on . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Constitutional, Limitation

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.180539

Swansea City Council v Glass: CA 1992

The defendant had failed himself to repair his property, and the Local Authority carried out the work itself under the 1957 Act. It sought to recover the associated costs from the defendant, but he said that their claim was time barred, being more than six years after the work had been concluded. The authority argued that it was not more than six years from when it had served the notices demanding payment.
Held: The notices were not the cause of action, but only a condition precedent to bringing an action. Accordingly time ran from the conclusion of the works, and the claim was out of time.
Taylor LJ said: ‘Section 10(4) provides expressly that where the local authority opts to take summary proceedings to recover their expenses, the limitation period runs from the date of service of the demand or, if there is an appeal, the date when the demand becomes operative. Again, by implication, since no such provision is applied to proceedings in the High Court or County Court, time in those proceedings does not run from the date when the demand is served or becomes operative. It will run from the accrual of the cause of action which, ex hypothesi, is a different time.
The rationale of the distinction between summary and other proceedings probably lies in the respective limitation periods. In summary proceedings the period is six months. If time were to run from the accrual of the cause of action, i.e. when the expenses were incurred, summary proceedings might often be statute-barred before they could be brought, especially where there was an appeal against the demand. In other proceedings, however, the limitation period of six years gives, or should give, the local authority ample time to sue even after an appeal against their demand. In my judgment, the expression, special to section 10(4), that time runs from service of the demand or when it becomes operative, is intended to distinguish summary proceedings from other proceedings. Inclusio unius, exclusio alterius. In other proceedings, time runs from the accrual of the cause of action, i.e. when the four elements identified above are complete. Thus, I conclude that the requirement to serve a demand is a procedural condition precedent to bringing proceedings. It is not part of the cause of action.
I am fortified in this view by consideration of what could result if the local authority were right. Upon their argument, the local authority could delay service of a demand indefinitely. Then, having served their demand long after the works were complete, they would have a further six years in which to take proceedings in the High Court or the county court.’
Taylor LJ also noted that: ”Although not on all fours with the present case, these decisions show that a cause of action may well accrue before, for procedural reasons, the plaintiff can bring proceedings. Where the cause of action arises from statute, the question as to what is merely procedural and what is an ‘inherent element’ in the cause of action is one of construction.’ It is a question of construction of the relevant instrument, whether statute, regulations, rules or contract, in each case as to whether there is such a difference.

Judges:

Taylor LJ

Citations:

[1992] 1 QB 844, [1992] CLY 2828, [1992] 2 All ER 680, [1992] 3 WLR 123

Statutes:

Housing Act 1957 10(4), Limitation Act 1980

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedCoburn v Colledge CA 1897
A solicitor commenced an action on June 12th, 1896 for his fees for work which had been completed on May 30th 1889.
Held: A period of limitation runs from the date on which the ingredients of the cause of action are complete. The statute of . .
CitedCentral Electricity Generating Board v Halifax Corporation HL 1963
Under the 1947 Act, the assets of electricity undertakings were transferred to to electricity boards. Property held by local authorities as authorised undertakers should, on vesting day, vest in the relevant board. A question arose as to whether . .
CitedSevcon Ltd v Lucas CAV Ltd HL 1986
A claim was brought for the infringement of a patent. It was brought after the specification had been published, but before the patent had been sealed.
Held: Time might run from a date before the plaintiff was entitled to sue. The cause of . .

Cited by:

CitedThe Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Amanullah Khan and The Wellcome Trust ChD 13-Jun-2001
The authority had served notices on the second defendant, requiring him to execute works to bring a property up to a habitable condition. Eventually the authority executed the works themselves, and sought repayment from him of the costs. He resisted . .
CitedLegal Services Commission v Henthorn CA 30-Nov-2011
The Commission sought to recover what it said were payments made on account to the respondent barrister, but only after many years had passed. The Commission argued that time only began to run once it requested repayment.
Held: The appeal . .
CitedHillingdon London Borough Council v ARC Ltd ChD 12-Jun-1997
The Council had taken possession of the company’s land under compulsory purchase powers, but the company delayed its claim for compensation, and the Council now said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The claim was indeed time barred. The . .
CitedRoyal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Khan and Wellcome Trust ChD 8-Jun-2001
. .
CitedRoyal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Khan and Another CA 16-Jan-2002
. .
CitedHowe v Motor Insurers’ Bureau QBD 22-Mar-2016
The claimant sought damages after a road traffic accident in France caused by a wheel spinning from a still unidentified lorry.
Held: Rejected . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Housing, Local Government

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.180520

Davis v Whitby: CA 1974

The court discussed the need for some system of acquisition of right by user.
Lord Denning MR said: ‘the long user as of right should by our law be given a lawful origin if that can be done.’
Stamp LJ said: ‘if long enjoyment of a right is shown, the court will strive to uphold the right by presuming that it had a lawful origin.’

Judges:

Lord Denning MR, Stamp LJ

Citations:

[1974] 1 Ch 186

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 40

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRoland Brandwood and others v Bakewell Management Ltd CA 30-Jan-2003
House owners had used vehicular access across a common to get to their houses for many years. The commons owner required them to purchase the right, and they replied that they had acquired the right by lost modern grant and/or by prescription.
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedInglorest Investments Ltd v Robert Campbell and Another CA 2-Apr-2004
The appellants appealed an order that property be part of the estate of the deceased. There had been an agreement to assign the reversion of the lease to the claimant. That was not completed, but he later acquired the freehold reversion. No written . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.179839

Walkley v Precision Forgings Ltd: HL 1979

The plaintiff tried to bring a second action in respect of an industrial injury claim outside the limitation period so as to overcome the likelihood that his first action, although timeous, would be dismissed for want of prosecution.
Held: He could not do so. He was not prejudiced by the primary limitation period since he had properly issued his initial claim within it; there was accordingly no discretion to be exercised under section 33 which by subsection (1)(a) postulates that the primary limitation provisions ‘prejudice the plaintiff’. The court may not exercise its power to disapply the ordinary time limit in a personal injury action under section 33 of the Limitation Act where the plaintiff had brought an action before the expiry of that limit and was bringing a second action in which the application under section 33 was being made.
Lord Diplock: ‘So, to entitle the court to give a direction under [section 33(1)], there must be some prejudice to the plaintiff and the cause of that prejudice must be the requirement under [section 11] that he should start his action before the expiry of the primary limitation period.
My Lords, in my opinion, once a plaintiff has started an action (the first action) within the primary limitation period it is only in the most exceptional circumstances that he would be able to bring himself within section 2D in respect of a second action brought to enforce the same cause of action. If the first action is still in existence, as it was in the instant case when the matter was before the Master or the judge, cadit quaestio; he has not be prevented from starting his action by section 2A or section 2B at all, so the provisions of those sections cannot have caused him any prejudice. Does it make any difference if the first action is no longer in existence at the time of the application under section 2D either because it has been struck out for want of prosecution or because it has been discontinued by the plaintiff of his own volition? In my view, it does not. These are self inflicted wounds. The provisions of section 2A caused him no prejudice at all; he was able to start his action. The only cause of the prejudice to him in the case of dismissal for want of prosecution is dilatoriness which took place after the action was started whether on his own part or on the part of his legal advisors. In the case of discontinuance the only cause of prejudice is his own act.
The only exception I have been able to think of where it might be proper to give a direction under section 2D, despite the fact that the plaintiff had previously started an action within the primary limitation period but had subsequently discontinued it, would be a case in which the plaintiff had been induced to discontinue by a misrepresentation or other improper conduct by the defendant; but there is no suggestion of this in the instant case.
I would allow the appeal upon the ground that Mr Walkley, having previously started an action for the same cause of action within the primary limitation period prescribed by [section 11], cannot bring himself within section 2A at all. Any application by him under that section would fail in limine.’ and ‘Despite the use of the phraseology ‘an action shall not be brought,’ it is trite law that technically the Limitation Act does not prevent the commencement of an action by the Plaintiff after the limitation period has expired. What it does is to provide the defendant with a cast-iron defence if he chooses to avail himself of it; which he may do either by pleading it or, in a case where the action is in indisputably statute-barred, by taking out a summons to have it dismissed as vexatious. For the sake of brevity, however, I shall speak of the effect of the expiry of a primary limitation period as preventing the starting of the action.’
HL Wilberforce L: ‘My Lords, as a matter of principle I have very great difficulty in understanding how in this case or indeed in any case that I can imagine where an action has been started within the normal limitation period, section 2D can be invoked at all. The section opens with the words:
‘(1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which- (a) the provisions of section 2A or 2B of this Act prejudice the plaintiff . .
The provisions of section 2A are those which require an action for personal injuries to be brought within three years. So subsection (1)(a) must be contemplating a case in which, because the three years have expired without an action being brought, section 2A applies to the prejudice of the plaintiff. But if the plaintiff has brought his action within the three years, how has he been prejudiced by section 2A? This I fail to understand. If this argument is sound, the respondent’s case fails in limine. He brought his first action within the normal limitation period, and if he has suffered any prejudice, it is by his own inaction and not by the operation of the Act. However, since the Court of Appeal did not decide the case on this argument, or, it seems, consider it, and since the provision is a new one, understanding of which may have to come with time, I will consider the appeal on the assumption that these initial words may apply to the case.’
Viscount Dilhorne: ‘In my opinion this appeal should be allowed for it cannot be said that it was the provisions of section 2A (that is to say, the imposition of the three year period after which an action such as this cannot be proceeded with without the directions of the court) which prejudiced the respondent when within that period he brought an action for damages for the same personal injuries and in respect of the same cause of action as in his second action. He was prejudiced by his delay in proceeding with the first action and by his discontinuance of that action, not by the provisions of section 2A.’

Judges:

Wilberforce Lord, Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Edmund-Davies and Lord Keith of Kinkel

Citations:

[1979] 1 WLR 606, [1979] 2 All ER 548

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1963

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedRegina v Dimsey; Regina v Allen CA 14-Jul-1999
A deeming section could create a taxation liability, even where the liability appeared to be duplicated. The clause under which the foreign income of a company came to be chargeable did not affect the existing liability to pay tax on the sums so . .
Appeal fromWalkley v Precision Forgings Ltd CA 1978
The plaintiff appealed the strict application of the limitation laws against his claim. He had been injured whilst working as a grinder. He began one claim which lapsed, and began a second claim outside the limitation period, requesting the court to . .
CitedFirman v Ellis CA 1978
Writs had been issued within the limitation period, but then allowed to lapse.
Held: Section 2D gave a wide discretion to the court which was not limited to a residual class of case or to exceptional cases.
Ormrod LJ said: ‘The appellants . .

Cited by:

CitedPiggott v Aulton (Deceased) CA 29-Jan-2003
The claimant had issued proceedings against the deceased after his death, but before a personal representative had been appointed. They later discontinued and re-issued against the person appointed by the court to defend the action. The defendant . .
CitedBarry Young (Deceased) v Western Power Distribution (South West) Plc CA 18-Jul-2003
The deceased had begun an action on becoming ill after exposure to asbestos by the defendant. He withdrew his action after receiving expert evidence that his illness was unrelated. A post-mortem examination showed this evidence to be mistaken. His . .
ExplainedDeerness v John R Keeble and Son (Brantham) Ltd HL 1983
The plaintiff suffered very serious injuries as a passenger in a car, and a writ was issued within the three-year period against the driver and the owner of the car whose insurers made a substantial interim payment. The writ was not served, nor . .
CitedForward v Hendricks CA 6-Dec-1996
. .
CitedShapland v Palmer CA 23-Mar-1999
The plaintiff’s car was struck by a company car driven by the defendant in the course of her employment and she sought damages. Her action, against the employer, was struck out as late under the 1980 Act. She then commenced an action against the . .
ExplainedThompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd HL 1981
The plaintiff’s solicitors, out of negligence, failed to issue a writ until one month after the limitation period had expired. The application to extend the period was rejected at first instance since he had an unanswerable claim against his . .
CitedMcevoy v AA Welding and Fabrication Ltd CA 15-Dec-1997
Where a first writ issued within the primary limitation period is itself ineffective (although not a nullity) through having been issued variously without consent against a company in liquidation.
Held: The Walkley principle does not apply to . .
CitedWhite v Glass CA 17-Feb-1989
The plaintiff had sued his club under its name, but it was an unincorporated association, and the action was stricken out as improperly constituted. The first writ issued within the primary limitation period but was ineffective. The defendant . .
DistinguishedRe Workvale Ltd (In Liquidation) CA 8-Apr-1992
A limited company was correctly restored to the register from dissolution so that its insurers could face an arguable claim. Where a first writ issued within the primary limitation period was ineffective (although not a nullity) through having been . .
CitedClay v Chamberlain QBD 2002
The claimant sought the judge’s discretion to disapply the rule in Walkley. The judge characterised the defendant’s conduct as ‘though not improper, sufficiently blameworthy to result in a situation which was at any rate analogous to an estoppel and . .
CitedHerbert George Snell and others v Robert Young and Co Limited and others CA 21-Nov-2002
The claimants had sought damages for poisoning from organophosphates used in sheep dipping. Evidence linking the injuries to the use of the chemicals had not been found, and the actions struck out as an abuse of process. The group litigation had . .
Confined to its factsJacqueline Adam v Rasal Ali CA 21-Feb-2006
The defendant sought damages against the defendant for personal injury from his alleged negligence. Her action was struck out and she recommenced the action. The defendant pleaded that she was out of time. The claimant said that the first action . .
DiscussedChappell v Cooper CA 1980
The plaintiff’s writ had not been served within the required time, and it had become too late to extend its validity. The plaintiff isued a second writ. The defendant argued limitation. Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to distinguish Walkley on the . .
CitedA v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
OverturnedHorton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .
DistinguishedRose v Express Welding Ltd CA 21-Jan-1986
. .
CitedHartley v Birmingham City District Council CA 1992
The writ was issued one day late; there had been early notification of the claim; and the defendant’s ability to defend the case was unaffected. The plaintiff asked the court to exercide its discretion to allow the claim t proceed.
Held: The . .
CitedMcDonnell and Another v Walker CA 24-Nov-2009
The defendant appealed against the disapplication of section 11 of the 1980 Act under section 33.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The defendant had not contributed significantly to the delay: ‘the defendant received claims quite different in . .
CitedAktas v Adepta CA 22-Oct-2010
The court was asked whether, when a claim was issued towards the very end of a limitation period, but was then not served, and the claim was struck out, CPR Part 7.5(1) gave a further four months in which it could be resurrected at the discretion of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.179321

Attorney General v Cocke: ChD 1988

Judges:

Harman J

Citations:

[1988] 1 Ch 414

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 21(3)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHenchley and Others v Thompson ChD 16-Feb-2017
The Claimants sought an order directing the Defendant to provide a full account of his dealings with the assets of the two trusts as a trustee or as a de facto trustee.
Held: The court has a discretion whether or not to make an order for an . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Trusts

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.608336

Reeves v Butcher: CA 1891

A five-year loan was granted by the plaintiff to the defendant under a written agreement, providing for a ‘power to call in the same at an earlier period in the events hereinafter mentioned’. The plaintiff agreed not to call in the money for the five years, if the defendant should regularly pay the interest. But it was also provided that the repayment of the loan could be accelerated in two circumstances. One arose if the borrower died before the expiration of the term, in which case it would be lawful ‘to call in the said principal sum upon giving to the executors or administrators six calendar months’ notice in writing’ of the intention to call in the loan. And the second was that if the borrower: ‘should make default in payment of any quarterly payment of interest as aforesaid for the period of twenty-one days next after the same should become payable, it should be lawful for [the creditor] immediately upon the expiration of such twenty-one days to call in and demand payment of the said principal sum and all interest then owing or accruing in respect thereof.’ The action to recover the loan was commenced more than six years after 21 days had run following the defaulting payment of a quarterly instalment of interest, but there was no demand prior to the service of the writ separate from the issue and service of that writ. So the issue before the court was whether in those circumstances the claim was time-barred, or whether it was saved from being time-barred by the absence of any formal demand prior to the issue of the writ.
Held: No such demand was necessary, and the claim was time barred.
Lindley LJ said: ‘The agreement is one reasonably easy to be understood. It provides for a loan for five years, subject to a provision that if default is made in punctual payment of interest, the principal shall be recoverable at once. Now, the Statute of Limitation (21 Jac. I, c. 16) enacts that such actions as therein mentioned including ‘all actions of debt grounded upon any lending or contract without specialty’ shall be brought ‘within six years next after the cause of such action or suit, and not after.’ This expression ’cause of action’ has been repeatedly the subject of decision, and it has been held particularly in Hemp v. Garland 4 QB 519, decided in 1843, that the cause of action arises at the time when the debt could first have been recovered by action. The right to bring an action may arise on various events, but it has always been held that the statute runs from the earliest time at which an action could be brought.’
Fry LJ said: ‘The agreement contains a stipulation that the lender shall not call in the principal sum for a period of five years, if the borrower should so long live, and should duly and regularly pay the interest. This implies a contract by the borrower that the principal debt should be paid at once on the death of the borrower, or on default in payment of interest. The subsequent provisions imply a contract by the lender not to enforce payment after the death of the borrower until the expiration of a six months’ notice, and a contract not to enforce payment of the capital for default in payment of interest until twenty-one days after such default, thus giving the borrower further time. Subject to the stipulations, the implied contract to pay the principal remained in force. The principal, therefore, became payable twenty days after the first quarterly instalment of interest became due, and from that time the statute of limitations began to run. If authority is wanted, Hemp v. Garland 4 QB 519 is in point.’
Lopes LJ said: ‘Now, when first had the plaintiff a cause of action? When default was made for twenty-one days in payment of an instalment of interest. Hemp v. Garland (1842) 62 R.R. 423, is in point.’

Judges:

Fry LJ, Lindley LJ, Lopes LJ

Citations:

[1891] 2 QB 509

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

ApprovedHemp v Garland, Administrator and Co 1843
The Defendant gave a warrant of attorney to secure a debt payable by instalments, the plaintiff to be at liberty, in case of any default, to have judgment and execution for the whole, as if all the periods for payment had expired. Held that, in an . .

Cited by:

CitedBMW Financial Service (GB) Ltd v Hart CA 10-Oct-2012
This appeal is concerned with a point of limitation arising out of a standard hire purchase contract concerning a car. The respondent had failed to maintain his payments, and theappelleants issued a termination notice. He was abroad fr a while, and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.605194

Re Pauling’s Settlement Trusts: ChD 1962

Family money had been placed into a trust to be managed by a bank. It was said that the bank had wrongly advanced money to the daughter allowing her to fritter away large parts of the capital
Held: The bank had misunderstood the power of advancement given, and was liable to replace nearly pounds 15,000 as having been expended in breach of trust for which they could be compelled to account.
Wilberforce J said: ‘The . . court has to consider all the circumstances in which the concurrence of the cestui que trust was given with a view to seeing whether it is fair and equitable that, having given his concurrence, he should afterwards turn round and sue the trustees; . . subject to this, it is not necessary that he should know that what he is concurring in is a breach of trust, provided that he fully understands what he is concurring in, and . . it is not necessary that he should himself have directly benefited by the breach of trust.’
Where a limitation period applies then it it is not open to the court to consider the question of laches.

Judges:

Wilberforce J

Citations:

[1962] 1 WLR 86

Statutes:

Trustee Act 1925

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal fromRe Pauling’s Settlement Trusts (No.1) CA 29-May-1963
Property had been placed in trust for the daughter of the family, fearing that she might fritter it away. The trust was managed by the bank. The judge had found that, having misunderstood the powers of advancement given, the bank was liable to repay . .
CitedPullan v Wilson and Others ChD 28-Jan-2014
The court was asked difficult questions concerning the reasonableness of the remuneration charged to a number of family trusts by a professional trustee.
Held: Excessive claims for fees had been made, and the trustees were ordered to repay . .
ConsideredGreen and others v Gaul and others CA 28-Jul-2006
The court considered the validity and effect of a compromise agreement reached to settle dispute in administration of estate. The time for making a claim against the executor of an estate begins to run from the time when the executor has paid the . .
CitedHenchley and Others v Thompson ChD 16-Feb-2017
The Claimants sought an order directing the Defendant to provide a full account of his dealings with the assets of the two trusts as a trustee or as a de facto trustee.
Held: The court has a discretion whether or not to make an order for an . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Trusts, Limitation

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.534162

Barnsley Brewery Co Ltd v RBNB: ChD 1997

Walker J noted that the traditional view of brewing (where source and quality of water was important), reflected the view of general beer drinkers who were conscious that beer from certain regions was particularly good, and said: ‘The traditional view is that the source and quality of water is important for brewing . . The traditional view may be of some importance here, as reflecting the view of the general public, including the generality of beer drinkers.’
Goodwill can be acquired by ‘de facto assumption’ or ‘adverse possession’. The relevant time for determining whether there has been a passing off can be the date when the passing off was first threatened.
On an application for an interim injunction in such a case the court may allow for the strengths of the parties’ respective cases.

Judges:

Robert Walker J

Citations:

[1997] FSR 462

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Intellectual Property, Limitation

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.526098

Mabro v Eagle, Star and British Dominions Insurance Co Ltd: CA 1932

Scrutton LJ said: ‘In my experience the Court has always refused to allow a party or a cause of action to be added where, if it were allowed, the defence of the Statute of Limitations would be defeated. The Court has never treated it as just to deprive a defendant of a legal defence.’

Judges:

Scrutton LJ

Citations:

[1932] 1 KB 485

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRoberts v Gill and Co Solicitors and Others SC 19-May-2010
The claimant beneficiary in the estate sought damages against solicitors who had acted for the claimant’s brother, the administrator, saying they had allowed him to take control of the assets in the estate. The will provided that property was to be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.415954

Hodsden v Harridge: 1714

Datt aur ard and stat. de 21 Jac. ca. 16 de Limit’ plead. Semble q; nest deins le stat. Ne dett pur escape ne dismes ne sur Stat. de Scandalum Magnaturn.

Citations:

[1714] EngR 286, (1714) 1 Sid 415, (1714) 82 ER 1189 (B)

Links:

Commonlii

Limitation

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.391109

Allen v England: 1862

The court considered a claim for land by adverse possession against the owner on paper. Erle CJ said: ‘It may be taken that the plaintiff had the beneficial occupation for more than twenty years, and if that will give him a title, I will give him leave to move. But, in my judgment, every time Cox put his foot on the land it was so far in his possession that the statute would begin to run from the time when he was last upon it.’

Judges:

Erle CJ

Citations:

[1862] EngR 1, (1862) 3 F and F 49, (1862) 176 ER 22

Links:

Commonlii

Cited by:

CitedZarb and Another v Parry and Another CA 15-Nov-2011
The parties disputed the position of the boundary between their neighbouring properties. The appellant Z had succeeded in establishing that the the boundary was as they decribed on paper, but the respondents had succeeded in their claim for adverse . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.286167

Hancock Shipping Limited v Kowaski Heavy Industries: CA 1992

Leave was sought by the plaintiffs to amend their points of claim in circumstances where it was common ground that the amendments would introduce new causes of action which, if brought in new proceedings, would have been statute-barred. Held Jurisdiction to reject a second claim as arising from the same or similar facts as a previous case arises if there is a sufficient overlap between the facts supporting the original claim and those supporting the new claim. The loss of an accrued defence of limitation is a relevant consideration when considering a requested amendment to the pleadings and there is a burden of persuasion on the applicant to satisfy the court of the justice of allowing an amendment having that effect.
Staughton LJ said: ‘In my judgment it is not helpful to speak of the burden of proof, but rather of the burden of persuasion. If the court concludes that it cannot decide whether or not it is just to allow the amendment, the party applying for leave must fail. … But the party making the application cannot be expected to adduce evidence on all points which might conceivably affect the justice of the case.’

Judges:

Staughton LJ, Kerr LJ

Citations:

[1992] 1 WLR 1025

Cited by:

CitedTabarrok v E D C Lord and Co (A Firm) CA 14-Feb-1997
The appellant wanted to open a pizza restaurant. He and his partners acquired a company for the purpose, which was to take a lease of premises. They sought advice from the defendants who, they said, failed to advise them of the need to be aware of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Limitation

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.271022

Kaufmann Brothers v Liverpool Corporation: KBD 1916

It was argued that a claim under the 1886 Act was a claim for ‘alleged neglect or default’ within the meaning of the 1893 Act, so that the claim was time-barred under that Act.
Held: The argument failed. The 1893 Act did not apply.
Lush J said: ‘In this case the police authority failed to fix the compensation to the satisfaction of the plaintiffs and they brought this action. It was an action to recover compensation under the statute; it was not brought to recover damages for any default on the part of the police authority; it was simply an action to recover such an amount as the county court judge might think right to allow as compensation for the damage done to the plaintiffs’ property’.

Judges:

Lush J, Rowlatt J

Citations:

[1916] 1 KB 860

Statutes:

Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, Riot (Damages) Act 1886

Cited by:

CitedBedfordshire Police Authority v Constable and others ComC 20-Jun-2008
The authority insured its primary liability for compensation under the 1886 Act through the claimants and the excess of liability through re-insurers. The parties sought clarification from the court of the respective liabilities of the insurance . .
CitedYarl’s Wood Immigration Ltd and Others v Bedfordshire Police Authority CA 23-Oct-2009
The claimant sought to recover the costs of damage to their centre following a riot, saying that under the 1886 Act, they were liable. It appealed against a ruling that they were unable to claim as a public authority, saying that the 1886 Act was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Police, Limitation

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.270266

Nelson v Rye and Another: ChD 5 Dec 1995

The claimant, a solo musician appointed the defendant to be his manager collecting the fees and royalties due to him and paying his expenses. Rye was to account to him annually for his net income after deducting his own commission. When the relationship came to an end the plaintiff claimed an account, and the question was whether the account should be limited to the six years before the issue of the writ or whether it should extend over the whole period of the relationship.
Held: Pure breach of trust were not subject to limitation but is so on an allegation of constructive trust. Millett LJ: ‘Accordingly, the defendant’s liability to account for more than six years before the issue of the writ in Nelson v Rye depended on whether he was, not merely a fiduciary (for every agent owes fiduciary duties to his principal), but a trustee, that is to say, on whether he owed fiduciary duties in relation to the money.
Whether he was in fact a trustee of the money may be open to doubt. Unless I have misunderstood the facts or they were very unusual it would appear that the defendant was entitled to pay receipts into his own account, mix them with his own money, use them for his own cash flow, deduct his own commission, and account for the balance to the plaintiff only at the end of the year. It is fundamental to the existence of a trust that the trustee is bound to keep the trust property separate from his own and apply it exclusively for the benefit of his beneficiary. Any right on the part of the defendant to mix the money which he received with his own and use it for his own cash flow would be inconsistent with the existence of a trust. So would a liability to account annually, for a trustee is obliged to account to his beneficiary and pay over the trust property on demand. The fact that the defendant was a fiduciary was irrelevant if he had no fiduciary or trust obligations in regard to the money. If this was the position, then the defendant was a fiduciary and subject to an equitable duty to account, but he was not a constructive trustee. His liability arose from his failure to account, not from his retention and use of the money for his own benefit, for this was something which he was entitled to do.
Unless the defendant was a trustee of the money which he received, however, the claim for an account was barred after six years. The fact that the defendant was a fiduciary did not make his failure to account a breach of fiduciary duty or make him liable to pay equitable compensation. His liability to account arose from his receipt of money in circumstances which made him an accounting party. It did not arise from any breach of duty, fiduciary or otherwise. The defendant was merely an accounting party who had failed to render an account.’

Judges:

Millett LJ

Citations:

Times 05-Dec-1995, [1996] 1 WLR 1378

Cited by:

CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
CitedGreen and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.84248

Gotha City v Sotheby’s and Another; Federal Republic of Germany v Same: QBD 9 Sep 1998

Limitation does not run in favour of a thief. A painting stolen during the war and dealt with by those knowing its true origin remained in the ownership of the original owner however long it had been held by someone who was not a purchaser in good faith. Moses J said: ‘In resolving the disputes as to foreign law, I must be guided by the following principles:
(1) when faced with conflicting evidence about foreign law, I must resolve differences in the same way as in the case of other conflicting evidence as to facts (Bumper Development Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1991] 1 WLR 1362 at 1368G);
(2) where the evidence conflicts I am bound to look at the effect of the foreign sources on which the experts rely as part of their evidence in order to evaluate and interpret that evidence and decide between the conflicting testimony (Bumper Corporation at 1369H ;
(3) I should not consider passages contained within foreign sources of law produced by the experts to which those experts have not themselves referred (Bumper Corporation at 1369D to G);
(4) it is not permissible to reject uncontradicted expert evidence unless it is patently absurd (Bumper Corporation at 1371B);
(5) In considering foreign sources of law I should adopt those foreign rules of construction of which the experts have given evidence (this principle underlies the principle that an English court must not conduct its own researches into foreign law);
(6) whilst an expert witness may give evidence as to his interpretation as to the meaning of a statute, it is not for the expert to interpret the meaning of a foreign document. His evidence will be limited to giving evidence as to the proper approach, according to the relevant foreign rules of construction to that document’.’

Judges:

Moses J

Citations:

Times 09-Oct-1998

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 4

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

See alsoCity of Gotha v Sotheby’s and Another CA 19-Jun-1997
An abandonment of privilege within discovery proceedings did not imply general waiver of same privilege; limited to instant proceedings. . .

Cited by:

See alsoCity of Gotha v Sotheby’s and Another CA 19-Jun-1997
An abandonment of privilege within discovery proceedings did not imply general waiver of same privilege; limited to instant proceedings. . .
CitedRachmaninoff and Others v Sotheby’s and Another QBD 1-Mar-2005
The defendant had offered for sale by auction recently discovered works of Rachmaninoff. The claimants, descendants of the composer asserted ownership through his estate. The defendants refused to identify the seller.
Held: The claim should . .
CitedIran v The Barakat Galleries Ltd QBD 29-Mar-2007
The claimant government sought the return to it of historical artefacts in the possession of the defendants. The defendant said the claimant could not establish title and that if it could the title under which the claim was made was punitive and not . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Torts – Other

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.80941

Regina v City of Sunderland ex parte Beresford: HL 13 Nov 2003

Land had been used as a park for many years. The council land owner refused to register it as a common, saying that by maintaining the park it had indicated that the use was by consent and licence, and that prescription did not apply.
Held: Qualifying user having been found, there was nothing in the material before the council to support the conclusion that such user had been otherwise than as of right within the meaning of section 22 of the 1965 Act. ‘The fact that the . . Council were willing for the land to be used as an area for informal sports and games, and provided some minimal facilities (now decaying) in the form of benches and a single hard cricket pitch, cannot be regarded as overt acts communicating permission to enter. Nor could the regular cutting of the grass, which was a natural action for any responsible landowner. To treat these acts as amounting to an implied licence, permission or consent would involve a fiction’ User can be as of right even though it is not adverse to the landowner’s interests.

Judges:

Lord Bingham of Cornhill Lord Hutton Lord Scott of Foscote Lord Rodger of Earlsferry Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe

Citations:

[2003] UKHL 60, Times 14-Nov-2003, [2003] 3 WLR 1306, [2004] 1 AC 889, [2004] 1 All ER 160, [2004] 2 P and CR 23, [2004] JPL 1106, [2003] NPC 139, [2003] 47 EGCS 155, [2004] 1 EGLR 94

Links:

House of Lords, Bailii

Statutes:

Commons Registration Act 1965 22, Open Spaces Act 1906

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromRegina (on the application of Beresford) v The City of Sunderland CA 26-Jul-2001
Local inhabitants requested the alteration of the Town and Village Green register to include land over which they claimed use as of right for more than twenty years. The difference between acquiescence, which would allow the claim, and tolerance or . .
CitedMills and Another v Silver and others CA 6-Jul-1990
A farm’s only vehicular access was over land which was only useable occasionally when dry. The defendants laid a stone track to facilitate constant access. At first instance it was held that the earlier use had been too intermittent to allow a . .
CitedRegina v Suffolk County Council Ex Parte Steed and Another CA 2-Aug-1996
Customary rights over land were not defeated by failure to register as common. ‘As of right’ meant that the right must be exercised in the belief that it is a right enjoyed by the inhabitants of the village to the exclusion of all other people. ‘it . .
CitedCumbernauld and Kilsyth District Council v Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd SCS 1992
(Inner House) When Cumbernauld town centre was built, a walkway was provided between the shopping centre and residential areas. It was used for many years, but then closed to prevent crime. The authority sought an interdict to keep it open as a . .
CitedCumbernauld and Kilsyth District Council v Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd HL 22-Jul-1993
A walkway had existed from the town centre to residential areas. When the land was acquired the defendant new owners sought to close the walkway. The authority asserted that a public right of way had been acquired.
Held: There was no need to . .
CitedAttorney-General v Poole 1938
Open space land had been conveyed to Poole Corporation ‘in fee simple to the intent that the same may for ever hereafter be preserved and used as an open space or as a pleasure or recreation ground for the public use.’
Held: There was no . .
CitedBridges v Mees ChD 1957
An overriding interest, namely an estate contract, was protected under s. 70(1) of the Act even though it could have been protected by a caution under s. 59. . .
CitedE R Ives Investments Ltd v High CA 14-Dec-1966
One exception to the requirement that an easement must be granted by a deed is that if permission to enjoy a right, capable of constituting an easement, is given by the landowner in terms likely to lead, and that do lead, the beneficiary of the . .
CitedGardner v Hodgson’s Kingston Brewery Co HL 1903
The party claiming a right of way through the yard of a neighbouring inn, and her predecessors in title, had for well over 40 years used the inn yard (the only means of access with carts and horses to her premises) and had paid the annual sum of 15 . .
CitedBurrows v Lang 1901
Discussing the book de legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae by Bracton, and its discussion of the meaning of ‘precario’ saying it was the same as de gratia, of grace, and in the context of a watercourse. The court asked ‘What is precarious?’ and . .
CitedNapier’s Trustees v Morrison 1851
Dealing with a public right of way, and holding that the defenders had possessed a road ‘by no trespass or tolerance, but as a public road’the court deprecated the citation in the Court of Session of authorities from England. He really wished, he . .
CitedSturges v Bridgman CA 1879
The character of the neighbourhood in which the plaintiff lives should, for the law of nuisance, include established features: ‘whether anything is a nuisance or not is a question to be determined, not merely by an abstract consideration of the . .
CitedMann v Brodie HL 1885
The court analysed the differences between Scottish and English land law with regard to rights acquired by prescription. Although in both countries a right of public way may be acquired by prescription, it was in England never practically necessary . .
CitedScottish Property Investment Company Building Society v Horne 1881
To warrant the remedy of summary ejection, the defender’s possession of premises has to be vicious, that is obtained by fraud or force, or precarious possession: ‘A precarious possession is a possession by tolerance merely.’ . .
CitedCumbernauld and Kilsyth District Council v Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd HL 22-Jul-1993
A walkway had existed from the town centre to residential areas. When the land was acquired the defendant new owners sought to close the walkway. The authority asserted that a public right of way had been acquired.
Held: There was no need to . .
CitedDalton v Henry Angus and Co HL 14-Jun-1881
The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some . .
CitedBeckett (Alfred F) v Lyons 1967
A claim was made that the inhabitants of the County Palatine of Durham had the right to take coal from the seashore.
Held: Dedication of a public right must be to the public at large or a sufficiently large section of the public at large and . .
CitedBritish Railways Board v Herrington HL 16-Feb-1972
Land-owner’s Possible Duty to Trespassers
The plaintiff, a child had gone through a fence onto the railway line, and been badly injured. The Board knew of the broken fence, but argued that they owed no duty to a trespasser.
Held: Whilst a land-owner owes no general duty of care to a . .
CitedHall v Beckenham Corporation 1949
A claim was made in nuisance against the local authority, the owner of a public park, in which members of the public flew noisy model aircraft.
Held: The local authority were not liable as the occupiers of the park for an alleged nuisance that . .
At First InstanceRegina v City of Sunderland, ex parte Beresford Admn 14-Nov-2000
A recreational area was claimed to be a common. The council considered that there was evidence, which it accepted, of an implied licence, thus enabling the inference to be drawn that the use by local inhabitants for statutory purposes had not been . .
CitedBritish Transport Commission v Westmorland County Council HL 1958
The question whether the statutory purposes for which the land is held are incompatible with its use by the public as a public highway is one of fact and to be determined on the basis of the facts as they are and can reasonably be foreseen to be. . .

Cited by:

CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council and others HL 24-May-2006
Application had been made to register as a town or village green an area of land which was largely a boggy marsh. The local authority resisted the application wanting to use the land instead for housing. It then rejected advice it received from a . .
CitedLewis, Regina (on The Application of) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council and Another SC 3-Mar-2010
The claimants sought to have land belonging to the council registered as a village green to prevent it being developed. They said that it had for more than twenty years been used by the community for various sports. The council replied that it had . .
CitedLondon Tara Hotel Ltd v Kensington Close Hotel Ltd ChD 1-Nov-2010
The defendant asserted that it had acquired the right to use a private access road over the claimant’s land. There had been a licence granted under which an earlier owner had been said to have used the land. The defendant claimed under the 1832 Act . .
CitedPaddico (267) Ltd v Kirklees Metropolitan Council and Others ChD 23-Jun-2011
The company sought the rectification of the register of village greens to remove an entry relating to its land, saying that the Council had not properly considered the need properly to identify the locality which was said to have enjoyed the rights . .
CitedBarkas v North Yorkshire County Council CA 23-Oct-2012
The court was asked: ‘When local inhabitants indulge in lawful sports and pastimes on a recreation ground which has been provided for that purpose by a local authority in the exercise of its statutory powers, do they do so ‘by right’ or ‘as of . .
CitedAdamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .
Not to be relied onBarkas, Regina (on The Application of) v North Yorkshire County Council and Scarborough Council Admn 20-Dec-2011
The claimants sought to have registered as a town or village green land in Whitby which had been provided as a playing field by the Local Authority since 1934. The inspector had found that the use had not been ‘as of right’ as required by the 2006 . .
OverruledBarkas, Regina (on The Application of ) v North Yorkshire County Council and Another SC 6-Mar-2014
The Court was asked as to the registration of a playing field as a ‘town or village green’. Local residents asserted that their use of the land, having been ‘as of right’ required the registration. They now appealed against rejection of that . .
CitedNewhaven Port and Properties Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v East Sussex County Council and Another SC 25-Feb-2015
The court was asked: ‘whether East Sussex County Council . . was wrong in law to decide to register an area . . known as West Beach at Newhaven . . as a village green pursuant to the provisions of the Commons Act 2006. The points of principle raised . .
CitedAdamson, Regina (on The Application of) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council CA 18-Feb-2020
Appropriation was not in sufficient form
The claimants had challenged an order supporting the decision of the Council to use their allotments for a new primary school, saying that the land had be appropriated as allotment land, and that therefore the consent of the minister was needed.
CitedBowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .
CitedLancashire County Council, Regina (on The Application of) v SSEFRA and Another SC 11-Dec-2019
Two appeals as to the circumstances in which the concept of ‘statutory incompatibility’ will defeat an application to register land as a town or village green where the land is held by a public authority for statutory purposes. In the first case, . .
CitedLancashire County Council, Regina (on The Application of) v SSEFRA and Another SC 11-Dec-2019
Two appeals as to the circumstances in which the concept of ‘statutory incompatibility’ will defeat an application to register land as a town or village green where the land is held by a public authority for statutory purposes. In the first case, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.187760

Amerada Hess and Others v C W Rome and Others: QBD 9 Mar 2000

The claimants had served proceedings on an agent who did not have authority to accept such service. They sought, out of time, leave to re-serve correctly, and also to add an additional cause of action which whilst now outside the limitation period arose out of the same facts.
Held: The first application was refused. The court could only so act if preconditions were met, particularly here that the claimant had acted promptly. He had not so acted, and the court had no discretion to allow the re-service. The application to amend was granted.

Citations:

Gazette 09-Mar-2000, Times 15-Mar-2000

Litigation Practice, Limitation

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.77778

Abbey National Plc v Sayer and Others: ChD 30 Aug 1999

Where a lender became aware that frauds might have been committed, but chose not to investigate past frauds, the limitation period could not later be extended to take up allegations of past misbehaviour. When the lender became aware of such cases, but instituted no system to investigate them until several years later, it had had constructive knowledge of them for limitation purposes.

Citations:

Times 30-Aug-1999

Limitation

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.77603

Central Electricity Generating Board v Halifax Corporation: HL 1963

Under the 1947 Act, the assets of electricity undertakings were transferred to to electricity boards. Property held by local authorities as authorised undertakers should, on vesting day, vest in the relevant board. A question arose as to whether certain monies had been held by the local authority and the question was referred to the minister, who decided that they had and so the appellant sought to recover the money.
Held: The cause of action accrued at the vesting date, more than six years before the action commenced, even though the appellants could not have proved the monies were held by the respondents as authorised undertakers until the minister had so decided. The minister’s decision and vesting notice did not create a new right of property or chose in action, but merely enabled a pre-existing right of action to be enforced. Albeit that the minister had to decide any dispute of fact relevant to the claim, the plaintiff could have issued proceedings for the recovery of the money at any time after 1 April 1948.
Lord Reid said: ‘No new right or liability came into existence at [the date of the minister’s decision]. It is quite clear, and it is now admitted by the appellants, that the effect of the minister’s decision was merely to prove that this sum had belonged to the appellants ever since the vesting date. It created no new right of property or chose in action: it merely enabled a pre-existing right to be enforced.
A number of cases were cited in argument. None was directly in point and I have found nothing in any of these cases which conflicts with the view that a cause of action can exist although one of the facts essential to the cause of action can only be proved otherwise than by evidence led in court and has not yet been proved when action is brought. If the appellants had begun an action within six years of the vesting date, and had applied to the minister for his decision when the respondents traversed their allegation that the sum sued for had been held or used by the respondents in their capacity of electricity undertakers, proceedings in the action could, if necessary, have been stayed to await the minister’s decision. But they did not do that and, in my judgment, this action is barred by section 2(1)(d) of the Limitation Act.’

Judges:

Lord Reid

Citations:

[1963] AC 785

Statutes:

Electricity Act 1947, Limitation Act 1939 2(1)(d)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Dissenting dicta approvedLeivers v Barber Walker and Co Ltd CA 1943
Goddard LJ (dissenting) said that section 2(1)(d) of the 1939 Act changed the former position altogether, leaving the provision for limitation as regards specialties to apply only to deeds and other documents under seal (or to claims other than for . .

Cited by:

CitedLegal Services Commission v Rasool CA 5-Mar-2008
The defendant had in 1993 obtained legal aid. Work was done but the certificate was then revoked. The Commission sought repayment of the sums paid on account to his solicitors. He replied that the claim was out of time. The Commission argued that . .
CitedLegal Services Commission v Henthorn QBD 4-Feb-2011
The claimant sought to recover overpayments said to have been made to the defendant barrister in the early 1990s. Interim payments on account had been made, but these were not followed by final accounts. The defendant, now retired, said that the . .
CitedLegal Services Commission v Henthorn CA 30-Nov-2011
The Commission sought to recover what it said were payments made on account to the respondent barrister, but only after many years had passed. The Commission argued that time only began to run once it requested repayment.
Held: The appeal . .
CitedSwansea City Council v Glass CA 1992
The defendant had failed himself to repair his property, and the Local Authority carried out the work itself under the 1957 Act. It sought to recover the associated costs from the defendant, but he said that their claim was time barred, being more . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Utilities

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.268785

Keech v Hall: 1778

The tenant resisted ejectment by the landlord’s mortgagee. His tenancy had been created after the mortgage.
Held: The mortgagee seeking ejectment did not first need to give a tenant a notice to quit. Mansfield CJ said: ‘Whoever wants to be secure when he takes a lease should inquire after and examine the title deeds.’ For time to run against a mortgagee and bar his right to recovery of the mortgaged land, the mortgagor must be in adverse possession of the land being in possession without any right and without the consent, express or implied, of his mortgagee.

Judges:

Mansfield CJ

Citations:

(1778) 1 Doug KB 21, [1775-1802] All ER Rep 116, [11778] 99 ER 17

Cited by:

CitedNational Westminster Bank Plc v Ashe (Trustee In Bankruptcy of Djabar Babai) CA 8-Feb-2008
The mortgagees had made no payments under the charge for more than twelve years, and had remained in possession throughout. They argued that the bank were prevented from now seeking to enforce the charge. The bank argued that the possession had not . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.264291

Regina v Oxfordshire County Council and Another, Ex Parte Sunningwell Parish Council: HL 25 Jun 1999

When setting out to establish that a piece of land has become a village green with rights of common, the tests are similar to those used in the law of prescription and adverse possession. Accordingly, there is no need to establish a belief in those using the rights asserted beyond that the use is as of right. ‘As of right’ does not require that the inhabitants should believe themselves to have a legal right. For prescription purposes under the Prescription Act 1832, the Rights of Way Act 1932 and the 1965 Act ‘as of right’ means nec vi, nec clam, nec precario, that is, ‘not by force, nor stealth, nor the licence of the owner’ The purpose of the 1965 Act was ‘to preserve and improve common land and town and village greens. ‘ ‘Any legal system must have rules of prescription which prevent the disturbance of long-established de facto enjoyment.’
Lord Hoffmann said: ‘Any legal system must have rules of prescription which prevent the disturbance of long-established de facto enjoyment.’
By way of explanation of the need for the long user to be without force, secrecy or permission and therefore ‘as of right’, Lord Hoffmann said: ‘The unifying element in these three vitiating circumstances was that each constituted a reason why it would not be reasonable to expect the owner to resist the exercise of the right – in the first case, because rights should not be acquired by the use of force, in the second, because the owner would not have known of the user and in the third, because he had consented to the user, but for a limited period.’

Judges:

Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hobhouse of Wood-borough, Lord Millett

Citations:

Times 25-Jun-1999, Gazette 21-Jul-1999, [1999] UKHL 28, [2000] 1 AC 335, [1999] 3 ALL ER 385, [1999] 3 WLR 160, [1999] NPC 74, (2000) 79 P and CR 199, [1999] 2 EGLR 94, [1999] 31 EG 85, [1999] BLGR 651, [2000] JPL 384, [1999] EG 91

Links:

House of Lords, Bailii

Statutes:

Commons Registration Act 1965 13(b), Rights of Way Act 1932

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromRegina v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council CA 24-Nov-1997
The Parish Council appealed against refusal of leave to seek judicial review of a decision to reject an application for certain land to be registered as a common. . .
At first instanceRegina v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council Admn 11-Jul-1996
The Parish Council sought judicial review of the county council’s decision to reject a regristation of land as a Common on the ground that the user of the land by the villagers had not been shown to be ‘as of right.’
Held: Leave to bring the . .
WrongJones v Bates CA 1938
The court considered whether there had been an act by the landowner sufficient to amount to a dedication a path as a public right of way. Scott LJ said that actual dedication was ‘often a pure legal fiction [which] put on the affirmant of the public . .

Cited by:

CitedRoland Brandwood and others v Bakewell Management Ltd CA 30-Jan-2003
House owners had used vehicular access across a common to get to their houses for many years. The commons owner required them to purchase the right, and they replied that they had acquired the right by lost modern grant and/or by prescription.
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedWhitmey, Regina (on the Application of) v the Commons Commissioners CA 21-Jul-2004
The applicant sought to leave to appeal against refusal of his challenge to the registration of land as a green.
Held: The 1965 Act did not limit the registration of greens to those which were registered by 3 January 1970. The Commons . .
CitedGodmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs CA 19-Dec-2005
The court considered whether a pathway had become a public highway.
Held: ‘The main question for the Court is whether sufficiency of evidence of an intention not to dedicate necessary to satisfy the proviso requires, as a matter of law, that . .
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council and others HL 24-May-2006
Application had been made to register as a town or village green an area of land which was largely a boggy marsh. The local authority resisted the application wanting to use the land instead for housing. It then rejected advice it received from a . .
CitedGodmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs HL 20-Jun-2007
The house was asked about whether continuous use of an apparent right of way by the public would create a public right of way after 20 years, and also whether a non overt act by a landowner was sufficient to prove his intention not to dedicate the . .
CitedOdey and Others v Barber ChD 29-Nov-2006
The claimants sought a declaration that they had two rights of way over a neighbour’s land. One was claimed by continuous use for twenty years, and the second was said to have been implied under the 1925 Act. No express grant was suggested. . .
CitedLewis, Regina (on The Application of) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council and Another SC 3-Mar-2010
The claimants sought to have land belonging to the council registered as a village green to prevent it being developed. They said that it had for more than twenty years been used by the community for various sports. The council replied that it had . .
CitedLondon Tara Hotel Ltd v Kensington Close Hotel Ltd ChD 1-Nov-2010
The defendant asserted that it had acquired the right to use a private access road over the claimant’s land. There had been a licence granted under which an earlier owner had been said to have used the land. The defendant claimed under the 1832 Act . .
CitedPaddico (267) Ltd v Kirklees Metropolitan Council and Others ChD 23-Jun-2011
The company sought the rectification of the register of village greens to remove an entry relating to its land, saying that the Council had not properly considered the need properly to identify the locality which was said to have enjoyed the rights . .
CitedAdamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .
CitedBarkas v North Yorkshire County Council CA 23-Oct-2012
The court was asked: ‘When local inhabitants indulge in lawful sports and pastimes on a recreation ground which has been provided for that purpose by a local authority in the exercise of its statutory powers, do they do so ‘by right’ or ‘as of . .
CitedBarkas, Regina (on The Application of ) v North Yorkshire County Council and Another SC 6-Mar-2014
The Court was asked as to the registration of a playing field as a ‘town or village green’. Local residents asserted that their use of the land, having been ‘as of right’ required the registration. They now appealed against rejection of that . .
CitedNewhaven Port and Properties Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v East Sussex County Council and Another SC 25-Feb-2015
The court was asked: ‘whether East Sussex County Council . . was wrong in law to decide to register an area . . known as West Beach at Newhaven . . as a village green pursuant to the provisions of the Commons Act 2006. The points of principle raised . .
CitedWinterburn and Another v Bennett and Another CA 25-May-2016
The court was asked as to the steps which an owner of land must take to prevent others, who were using the land without permission, acquiring rights over the land. The claimants here had ignored clear signs placed on the land which asserted the . .
CitedLynn Shellfish Ltd and Others v Loose and Another SC 13-Apr-2016
The court was asked as to the extent of an exclusive prescriptive right (ie an exclusive right obtained through a long period of use) to take cockles and mussels from a stretch of the foreshore on the east side of the Wash, on the west coast of . .
CitedLancashire County Council, Regina (on The Application of) v SSEFRA and Another SC 11-Dec-2019
Two appeals as to the circumstances in which the concept of ‘statutory incompatibility’ will defeat an application to register land as a town or village green where the land is held by a public authority for statutory purposes. In the first case, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.87505

Rosenberg v Cook: 1881

A squatter’s title is a freehold from day one of his possession.

Judges:

Sir George Jessel MR

Citations:

(1881) 8 QBD 162

Cited by:

CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.252431

Jessamine Investment Co v Schwartz: CA 1978

The tenants Mr and Mrs Levy did not know their landlord Mrs David’s address and had no means of paying the rent.
Held: They had acquired the title by adverse possession against their mesne landlord (Mrs David) – but that nevertheless their statutory tenancy had continued against the freeholder.
Sir John Pennycuick said that: ‘I should be very reluctant to introduce a substantive distinction in the application of a provision of the Limitation Act to registered and unregistered land respectively, based upon what is plainly a conveyancing device designed to adapt that provision to the former class of land.’
Stephenson LJ said: ‘Decisions of this court prevent us from deciding that Mrs Schwartz was not, from the receipt of the last payment of rent by Mrs David, ‘a person in whose favour the period of limitation can run,’ and so not ‘in adverse possession’ within section 10 (1) of the Act of 1939 . . ‘

Judges:

Sir John Pennycuick, Stephenson LJ

Citations:

[1978] QB 264

Landlord and Tenant, Limitation

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.252434

Coburn v Colledge: CA 1897

A solicitor commenced an action on June 12th, 1896 for his fees for work which had been completed on May 30th 1889.
Held: A period of limitation runs from the date on which the ingredients of the cause of action are complete. The statute of limitations began to run from the time the work was completed, not from the expiration of a month from the delivery of the bill of costs. The court accepted this definition of ’cause of action’: ‘Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court.’

Citations:

[1897] 1 QB 702

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHill (As Trustee In Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v Spread Trustee Company Ltd and Another CA 12-May-2006
The defendants sought relief for transactions entered into at an undervalue. The bankrupt had entered into charges and an assignment of a loan account in their favour before his bankruptcy, and the trustee had obtained an order for them to be set . .
CitedLegal Services Commission v Rasool CA 5-Mar-2008
The defendant had in 1993 obtained legal aid. Work was done but the certificate was then revoked. The Commission sought repayment of the sums paid on account to his solicitors. He replied that the claim was out of time. The Commission argued that . .
CitedLegal Services Commission v Henthorn QBD 4-Feb-2011
The claimant sought to recover overpayments said to have been made to the defendant barrister in the early 1990s. Interim payments on account had been made, but these were not followed by final accounts. The defendant, now retired, said that the . .
CitedLegal Services Commission v Henthorn CA 30-Nov-2011
The Commission sought to recover what it said were payments made on account to the respondent barrister, but only after many years had passed. The Commission argued that time only began to run once it requested repayment.
Held: The appeal . .
CitedSwansea City Council v Glass CA 1992
The defendant had failed himself to repair his property, and the Local Authority carried out the work itself under the 1957 Act. It sought to recover the associated costs from the defendant, but he said that their claim was time barred, being more . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Legal Professions

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.244184

Simpson v Norwest Holst Southern Ltd: CA 1980

The court considered the effect on limitation of a person taking steps to disguise the identity of a potential defendant.
Held: Where the employer’s identity had been ‘hidden’ under mere reference to a corporate group, the date of knowledge only came when the employee learned his employer’s actual name.

Citations:

[1980] 1 WLR 968

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980

Cited by:

CitedFarraj and Another v King’s Healthcare NHS Trust and Another QBD 26-May-2006
The claimants sought damages after the birth of their child with a severe hereditary disease which they said the defendant hospital had failed to diagnose after testing for that disease. The hospital sought a contribution from the company CSL who . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.242345

West Riding of Yorkshire County Council v Huddersfield Corporation: 1957

Where a statute enables the court to give relief in monetary or non-monetary form the court should look to see what is actually claimed.

Citations:

[1957] 1 QB 540

Cited by:

CitedHill (As Trustee In Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v Spread Trustee Company Ltd and Another CA 12-May-2006
The defendants sought relief for transactions entered into at an undervalue. The bankrupt had entered into charges and an assignment of a loan account in their favour before his bankruptcy, and the trustee had obtained an order for them to be set . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.244178

Surrendra Overseas Ltd v Government of Sri Lanka: 1977

A debtor can only be held to have acknowledged the claim if he has in effect admitted his legal liability to pay that which the plaintiff seeks to recover. An acknowledgement of part only of a debt cannot operate to acknowledge more.
Kerr J said: ‘What I draw from these authorities, and from the ordinary meaning of ‘acknowledges the claim,’ is that the debtor must acknowledge his indebtedness and legal liability to pay the claim in question. There is now no need to go further to seek for any implied promise to pay it. That artificiality has been swept away. But, taking the debtor’s statement as a whole, as it must be, he can only be held to have acknowledged the claim if he has in effect admitted his legal liability to pay that which the plaintiff seeks to recover. If he has denied liability, whether on the ground of what in pleader’s language is called ‘avoidance’, or on the ground of an alleged set off or cross-claim, then his statement does not amount to an acknowledgment of the creditor’s claim. Alternatively, if he contends that some existing set off or cross-claim reduces the creditor’s claim in part, then the statement, taken as a whole, can only amount to an acknowledgment of indebtedness for the balance. In effect, ‘acknowledges the claim’ means that the statement in question must be an admission of that indebtedness which the plaintiff seeks to recover notwithstanding the expiry of the period of limitation.’

Judges:

Kerr J

Citations:

[1977] 1 WLR 565

Cited by:

CitedBradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid HL 12-Jul-2006
Disapplication of Without Prejudice Rules
The House was asked whether a letter sent during without prejudice negotiations which acknowledged a debt was admissible to restart the limitation period. An advice centre, acting for the borrower had written, in answer to a claim by the lender for . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
AppliedNational Westminster Bank v Powney CA 1990
The limitation period has nothing to do with the procedural machinery of enforcing a judgment when one was obtained. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Contract

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.243128

Phillips v Rogers: 1945

The creditor argued that the limitation period was extended anew when the debtor wrote: ‘Re your correspondence re Mr C H Phillips claim $1300 which he is prepared to settle November 1st for $700. Please thank Mr Phillips for the kind offer. I have no idea where I am going to get $700 and meet your demands by November 1st unless I rob a bank and I really don’t think a case of this kind warrants such drastic action on my part. If Mr Phillips or yourself have any ideas how I can get that amount of money, honestly I shall be pleased to consider them.’

Citations:

[1945] 2 WWR 53

Cited by:

CitedBradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid HL 12-Jul-2006
Disapplication of Without Prejudice Rules
The House was asked whether a letter sent during without prejudice negotiations which acknowledged a debt was admissible to restart the limitation period. An advice centre, acting for the borrower had written, in answer to a claim by the lender for . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Commonwealth, Limitation, Contract

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.243122

Davies v Reed Stock and Co Ltd: 1984

Citations:

Unreported 1984

Cited by:

FollowedBusby v Cooper; Busby v Abbey National plc; Busby v Lumby CA 2-Apr-1996
The claimant sought damages after having bought a house after receiving an allegedly negligent report on the concrete. She had asked to be allowed to add a third party (the local authority who had passed the building) as a defendant, but the request . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Limitation

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.241759

Hendy v Milton Keynes Health Authority: 1992

A potential plaintiff may have sufficient knowledge of the damage suffered to set the limitation period running, if she appreciates ‘in general terms’ that her problem was capable of being attributed to the operation, even where particular facts of what specifically went wrong or how or where precise error was made is not known to her.

Judges:

Blofeld J

Citations:

[1992] 3 Med LR 114

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHaward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Negligence

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.238775

Jameson and Wyatt (Executors of the Estate of David Allen Jameson) v Central Electricity Generating Board and Babcock Energy Limited: 10 Mar 1995

The plaintiff claimed damages for mesothelioma. CEGB had provided a contractual indemnity in respect of damage or injury occurring before building works were taken over by a client in 1960. The question was whether a workman who died from mesothelioma well after 1960 but was exposed during the building work before 1960 had suffered damage or injury before 1960.
Held: The evidence did not establish even that minimal microscopic changes had occurred before 1960 and that the damage or injury occurred many years after the deceased had finished working.

Judges:

Tudor Evans J

Citations:

Unreported, 10 March 1995

Cited by:

Appeal fromJameson and Wyatt (Executors of the Estate of David Allen Jameson) v Central Electricity Generating Board and Babcock Energy Limited CA 13-Feb-1997
Executors may sue for a dependency claim despite a full and final settlement having been made by the deceased. . .
CitedBolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd CA 6-Feb-2006
The deceased had come into contact with asbestos when working on building sites for more than one contractor. The claimant here sought contribution from the defendants for the damages it had paid to his estate. The issue was as to liability on . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.238333

Habermehl v Attorney General: 1996

Land was granted for use as a school for the education of poor persons in accordance with the principles of the National Society. In 1876 the school had become a ‘provided school’ run by a School Board under the Education Act 1870. That meant that, by virtue of section 14(2) of the Act, no ‘religious catechism or religious formulary distinctive of any particular denomination’ could be taught in the school. Teaching could therefore no longer be in accordance with the Anglican principles of the National Society. Counsel agreed that Warrington J had decided that the purposes mentioned in the Act meant the purposes mentioned in the deed.
Held: A reverter had taken place in 1876.

Judges:

Rimer J

Citations:

[1996] EGCS 148

Citing:

AppliedAttorney General v Shadwell 1910
Land in Northholt was granted under the 1841 Act for use as a school. In 1907 the school was closed, another school having been opened by the local authority nearby. Thereafter the building was used only once a week for a Sunday school. The Board of . .

Cited by:

CitedFraser and Another v Canterbury Diocesan Board of Finance and others HL 27-Oct-2005
Land had been acquired by a deed under the 1841 Act, but had in 1995 ceased to be used as a school ‘for the education of children and adults of the labouring manufacturing and other poorer classes . . And for no other purpose ‘. Under the Act, the . .
ApprovedFraser and Another v Canterbury Diocesan Board Of Finance (No 1) CA 24-Nov-2000
A grant of land was made under the 1841 Act in 1872 (after the 1870 Act) and the school had in 1874 been transferred to a school board under section 23 of the 1870 Act. The school closed permanently in 1992. The issue was whether reverter had . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, limitation

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.231637

Watson v Fram Reinforced Concrete Co (Scotland) Ltd: HL 1960

A workman had been injured through the breaking of a defective part in the machine with which he was working. He brought an action of damages against his employers, and later convened as second defenders the manufacturers of the machine, who had supplied it to his employers, on averments that the accident had been caused by the fault of the manufacturers in that they failed to supply his employers with a machine which was safe for use by their servants. The machine had been supplied on 7 July 1955 and the accident had happened on 9 August 1956, but the manufacturers were not convened in the action until 25 March 1959.
Held: The three-year limitation period provided by section 6(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions andc.) Act 1954 ran from the date when the workman suffered the injury and that, accordingly, the action against the manufacturers was not time-barred. ‘a cause of action accrues as soon as a wrongful act has caused personal injury beyond what can be regarded as negligible.’
Lord Reid said: ‘The ground of any action based on negligence is a concurrence of duty and damage and I cannot see how there can be that concurrence unless the duty still exists and is breached when the damage occurs.’ and ‘It appears to me that default in the sense of breach of duty must persist after the act or neglect until the damage is suffered. The ground of any action based on negligence is the concurrence of breach of duty and damage, and I cannot see how there can be that concurrence unless the duty still exists and is breached when the damage occurs. Suppose that the damage occurred a year or two years after the manufacture and sale of the article: then undoubtedly the injured person can sue. But how could he sue if the manufacturer could say that his default had ceased a year before the injured person ever came near the dangerous article? Whatever be the true view with regard to the act or neglect, I think that the appellant is entitled to say that the respondents’ ‘default giving rise to the action’ existed at the time when he suffered his injuries.’
Lord Keith of Avonholm said: ‘Now this is a Donoghue v Stevenson type of case, and such a case undoubtedly introduces specialities into the law of negligence. But, on any view, I see difficulty in saying that there was negligence at the date of supply. At that date on the pursuer’s pleadings there was no reason why the manufacturers should have known of the dangerous state of the strut. It can hardly be expected that they had a legal duty to take it to pieces and inspect it before sending it out. Undoubtedly there was an act of carelessness on the part of some workman when the pin was welded to the strut and the manufacturers would be vicariously responsible for that carelessness. But can it be said that at either date there was an act of negligence in the legal sense? The manufacturers owed a duty to anyone who should handle the machine to take reasonable steps to see that it was safe. They owed a duty not to injure, but until someone was injured there was no breach of duty. Only then could it be said that an act of negligence had been committed. That, I think, necessarily follows from the judgment of this House in Donoghue v Stevenson.’ and ‘Applying the ratio of these decisions there was, in my opinion, no act, neglect or default within the meaning of the statute affecting the pursuer until he was injured. A fortiori there was no act, neglect or default giving rise to his action before that date. It was then for the first time that there arose a breach of duty which made its impact on the pursuer. Time, in my opinion, commenced to run against the pursuer under the statute from that date.’
Lord Denning said: ‘I think the true principle is contained simply in this: ‘You must not injure your neighbour by your fault.’ It is the doing of damage to him which, in my opinion, is the breach of duty giving rise to the action. It is no doubt correct to say, as Lord MacMillan did say (at p.71), that the manufacturer ‘is under a duty to take care in the manufacture of these articles.’ That is a duty which he owes to all those who may have occasion to use the article: and it is a duty which is broken at the time when he is negligent in making the article. But it is not a breach of duty to any particular individual. And it is not that breach of duty which gives rise to the action. There is another duty also to be considered: and that is the duty which Lord Atkin put in this wise (at p.44): ‘You must not injure your neighbour’: which I would expand so as to say that there is a duty on every man not to injure his neighbour by his want of reasonable care. This is a duty which he owes, not to the world at large, but to his neighbour. It is broken only when his neighbour is injured and not before. Then, and then only, is there a breach of duty giving rise to an action.’ and . . ‘The words ‘act, neglect or default’ are perhaps a little tautologous: for ‘act’ in legal terminology often includes an omission as well as an act of commission: and ‘default’ certainly includes ‘neglect’. But tautologous as they may be, the words are apt to cover all breaches of legal duty, no matter whether it be by leaving undone those things which we ought to have done, or by doing those things which we ought not to have done.’

Judges:

Lord Reid, Lord Keith of Avonholm, Lord Denning

Citations:

1960 SC 92, 1960 SC (HL) 92

Statutes:

Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954 6(1)(a)

Citing:

CitedGrant v Australian Knitting Mills PC 21-Oct-1935
(Australia) The Board considered how a duty of care may be established: ‘All that is necessary as a step to establish a tort of actionable negligence is define the precise relationship from which the duty to take care is deduced. It is, however, . .
CitedDonoghue (or M’Alister) v Stevenson HL 26-May-1932
Decomposed Snail in Ginger Beer Bottle – Liability
The appellant drank from a bottle of ginger beer manufactured by the defendant. She suffered injury when she found a half decomposed snail in the liquid. The glass was opaque and the snail could not be seen. The drink had been bought for her by a . .

Cited by:

CitedHamilton v Fife Health Board 1993
A child was born but with injuries incurred while in utero alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the doctors attending the mother. The parents sued the health board for loss of the child’s society. The Board argued the action to be . .
CitedMcTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd OHCS 31-May-2005
The pursuer sought damages after her husband’s death from lung cancer. She said that the defenders were negligent in having continued to sell him cigarettes knowing that they would cause this.
Held: The action failed. The plaintiff had not . .
CitedJohnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd; Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd; similar HL 17-Oct-2007
The claimant sought damages for the development of neural plaques, having been exposed to asbestos while working for the defendant. The presence of such plaques were symptomless, and would not themselves cause other asbestos related disease, but . .
CitedDavid T Morrison and Co Ltd (T/A Gael Home Interiors) v ICL Plastics Ltd and Others SC 30-Jul-2014
The claimant sought damages after an explosion at the defender’s nearby premises damaged its shop. The defender said that the claim was out of time, and now appealed against a decision that time had not begun to run under the 1973 Act.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Scotland, Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.226700

Sevcon Ltd v Lucas CAV Ltd: HL 1986

A claim was brought for the infringement of a patent. It was brought after the specification had been published, but before the patent had been sealed.
Held: Time might run from a date before the plaintiff was entitled to sue. The cause of action for infringement accrued at the date of the infringement even if that was before the date of sealing but the claim could not be enforced until the procedural requirement of sealing was met.
Lord McKay of Clashfern said: ‘If he were to institute proceedings for infringement before the patent for the invention was sealed, the procedural requirements of the proviso would not be satisfied but a statement of claim could not be struck out as disclosing no cause of action although it might be liable to be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court.’

Judges:

Lord McKay of Clashfern

Citations:

[1986] 1 WLR 462

Statutes:

Patents Act 1949 13(4)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedGreen and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
CitedLegal Services Commission v Rasool CA 5-Mar-2008
The defendant had in 1993 obtained legal aid. Work was done but the certificate was then revoked. The Commission sought repayment of the sums paid on account to his solicitors. He replied that the claim was out of time. The Commission argued that . .
CitedSwansea City Council v Glass CA 1992
The defendant had failed himself to repair his property, and the Local Authority carried out the work itself under the 1957 Act. It sought to recover the associated costs from the defendant, but he said that their claim was time barred, being more . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Intellectual Property, Limitation

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.223965

Carson v Howard Doris Limited: 1981

Whether it was equitable to allow an action to go ahead despite the expiry of the limitation period, depended upon three factors: ‘(1) the conduct of the pursuer since the accident and up to the time of his seeking the court’s authority to bring the action out of time, including any explanation for his not having brought the action timeously; (2) any likely prejudice to the pursuer if authority to bring the action out of time were not granted; and (3) any likely prejudice to the other party from granting authority to bring the action out of time’. Each case must depend upon its own facts. The court allowed the pursuer to convene the third party as a defender out of time as the pursuer had provided a reasonable explanation for his failure to direct the action against the third party timeously and he could have been prejudiced had he not been allowed to bring the action against the third party as he would have had no other remedy. There was minimal prejudice to the third party, who was already in the process and under the necessity of investigating the accident.
The power conferred by the section should be exercised sparingly and with restraint.

Judges:

Lord Ross

Citations:

1981 SC 278

Cited by:

AppliedWhyte v Walker 1983
The pursuer was injured in a road traffic accident on 8 July 1976 and raised an action on 19 June 1981 alleging that his original solicitors wrote to the defender on two occasions in 1977 claiming damages and that the defender had written on 5 . .
CitedDavid Lannigan v Glasgow City Council OHCS 12-Aug-2004
The pursuer said the teachers employed by the defendant had failed to identify that was dyslexic, leading him to suffer damage. The defenders said the claim was time barred, which the pursuer admitted, but then said that the claim ought to go ahead . .
CitedBowden v Poor Sisters of Nazareth and others and similar HL 21-May-2008
The appellants said they had suffered abuse while resident at children’s homes run by the respondents. The respondents denied the allegations and said that they were also out of time. The claims were brought many years after the events.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Scotland, Limitation

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.200277

McCabe v McLellan: IHCS 1994

An action of professional negligence was brought against two doctors for alleged negligence when the pursuer was a young child. He was 18 in 1986 and raised an action against the first defender within the triennium provided for in section 17(4) of the 1973 Act. When the action was raised he understood that the second defender had died but when he discovered that the second defender was, in fact, still alive he brought him into the action one month after the expiry of the triennium.
Held: ‘The discretion which is to be exercised under section 19A(1) has been said to be unfettered, and it is necessary to balance all the circumstances of the case and also the interests of all parties concerned . . It is for the pursuer to satisfy us that it would be equitable to allow him to proceed with his action . .’

Judges:

Lord President Hope

Citations:

1994 SC 87

Cited by:

CitedDavid Lannigan v Glasgow City Council OHCS 12-Aug-2004
The pursuer said the teachers employed by the defendant had failed to identify that was dyslexic, leading him to suffer damage. The defenders said the claim was time barred, which the pursuer admitted, but then said that the claim ought to go ahead . .
CitedBowden v Poor Sisters of Nazareth and others and similar HL 21-May-2008
The appellants said they had suffered abuse while resident at children’s homes run by the respondents. The respondents denied the allegations and said that they were also out of time. The claims were brought many years after the events.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Scotland, Limitation

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.200280

Barnes v Glenton: 1899

A contract debt had been then secured on land. The defendant pleaded limitation.
Held: The section, in not enlarging the period of recovery of a simple contract debt from 6 years to 12 years, was prohibitory and was enacted to limit existing limitation periods relating to the recovery of debts charged on land. The addition of the charge did not extend the period for recovery of the debt itself.

Judges:

ALSmith LJ

Citations:

[1899] 1 QB 885

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1874 8

Cited by:

CitedWilkinson and Another v West Bromwich Building Society CA 30-Jul-2004
The Society had repossessed and sold the mortgagors’ house in 1990. It knew then that there was a shortfall, but took no further recovery proceedings until 2002. What was the date from which the relevant limitation period began to run? Though the . .
CitedHopkinson and Others and Birmingham Mid-Shires Building Society v Tupper CA 30-Jan-1997
The plaintiffs appealed from an order striking out their claim for want of prosecution. The defendant’s property had been sold by the mortgagees, and the plaintiffs as assignees of their debt sought to recover the balance outstanding from the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.199716

Bryant v Foot: 1867

It is to be presumed from a period of 20 years’ user, and the lack of evidence inconsistent with there having been immemorial user or a lost modern grant, that a right which was within grant has been established. The apparent right should lie in grant, it should be capable of being created by an express grant made by deed. Cockburn CJ said that the fiction of lost modern grant, animus dedicandi and the like are ‘a bad and mischievous law, and one which is discreditable to us as a civilized and enlightened people.’ and ‘time immemorial’ had came to mean from before 1189.

Judges:

Cockburn CJ

Citations:

(1867) LR 2 QB 161

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedGodmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs HL 20-Jun-2007
The house was asked about whether continuous use of an apparent right of way by the public would create a public right of way after 20 years, and also whether a non overt act by a landowner was sufficient to prove his intention not to dedicate the . .
CitedLynn Shellfish Ltd and Others v Loose and Another SC 13-Apr-2016
The court was asked as to the extent of an exclusive prescriptive right (ie an exclusive right obtained through a long period of use) to take cockles and mussels from a stretch of the foreshore on the east side of the Wash, on the west coast of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.195477

Airdrie Magistrates v Lanark County Council: 1910

Lord Loreburn LC said: ‘But what the appellants say is this: Permit us to prove that these burns are sewers, and if we can prove that they are sewers, surely it cannot be an offence to pour sewage matter into the sewers. My Lords, that is merely asking leave to prove that they have . . committed in an aggravated degree the very offence with which they are charged.’

Judges:

Lord Loreburn LC

Citations:

[1910] AC 286

Statutes:

Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876 3

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Cited by:

AppliedGeorge Legge and Son Ltd v Wenlock Corporation HL 1938
The question was whether the status of a natural stream could be changed to that of a sewer by the unlawful discharge for a long period of sewage into the stream. The claimant asserted that a right by way of an easement could be acquired despite the . .
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Environment, Limitation, Scotland

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.195479

In Re Williams: 1886

The purpose of the section is to allow time to run against an administrator as from the intestate’s death, irrespective of whether a grant of administration has been obtained or not.

Citations:

(1886) 34 ChD 558

Statutes:

Real Property Limitation Acts of 1833 6

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedEarnshaw and Others v Hartley CA 31-Mar-1999
An administrator de son tort, who was also a beneficiary, held the estate property on trust, and so could not establish adverse possession against the estate during the period of trusteeship. He held a sufficient interest in the assets already. A . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Wills and Probate, Limitation, Land

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.190224

Agromet Motoimport Ltd v Maulden Engineering Co (Beds) Ltd: 1985

Time begins to run on the collection of an arbitration award, not from the date upon which the award is made or published, but from the date when the paying party is in breach of its implied obligation to pay the award.

Citations:

[1985] 2 All ER 436

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedGood Challenger Navegante S A v Metalexportimport SA CA 24-Nov-2003
The claimant sought to enforce an arbitration award made in 1983. Time might otherwise have expired, but the claimants relied on a fax which they said was an acknowledgement of the debt, and also upon a finding in a Romanian court which created an . .
CitedNational Ability Sa v Tinna Oils and Chemicals Ltd CA 11-Dec-2009
Implied promise to pay arbitral award
The parties disputed how limitation affects the enforcement of an arbitration award. More than six years had passed since the award had been made, and the defendant said it was out of time.
Held: A party can enforce an award either by ordinary . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Arbitration, Limitation

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.188225

Bentley v Bristol and Western Hospital Authority: 1991

Citations:

[1991] 2 Med LR 359

Cited by:

CitedRoberts vWinbow (3) CA 4-Dec-1998
The plaintiff was treated for depression by the defendant by prescription of drugs. She sufferred a reaction, but now claimed that the doctor’s slow reaction caused her to suffer lasting injury. The question on appeal was, if a plaintiff suffers . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.186439

Thompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd: HL 1981

The plaintiff’s solicitors, out of negligence, failed to issue a writ until one month after the limitation period had expired. The application to extend the period was rejected at first instance since he had an unanswerable claim against his solicitors.
Held: The discretion under the section arises notwithstanding a plaintiff’s solicitors’ perhaps far greater negligence in failing ever to have issued proceedings within the primary limitation period in the first place. This is an undoubted anomaly arising from the Walkley principle. The court’s discretion was unfettered. Disapplying the time limit will always prejudice a defendant, because he will lose his limitation defence.
Lord Diplock said: ‘The onus of showing that in the particular circumstances of the case it would be equitable to make an exception lies upon the plaintiff; but, subject to that, the Court’s discretion to make or refuse an order if it considers it equitable to do so is, in my view, unfettered. The conduct of the parties, as well as the prejudice one or other will suffer if the court does or does not make an order, are all to be put into the balance in order to see which way it falls.’ and
‘Walkley . . was a case in which the plaintiff had issued and served his writ within the primary limitation period; so section 11 had not affected him at all. No further steps were taken in the action within the primary limitation period and it was ripe to be dismissed for want of prosecution. In an attempt to avoid this fate a second writ founded on the same cause of action was issued by the plaintiff’s new solicitors. Considerable procedural manoeuvring by both parties followed, in the course of which application was made under section 33 to allow the action started by the second writ to proceed. This House took the view that, the plaintiff having brought within the primary limitation period an action for damages for the very negligence which constituted the cause of action alleged in the second writ, he had not been affected by section 2A [11] at all, let alone prejudiced by it.’
and ‘In Walkley . . the primary period of limitation had not expired when the plaintiff had started his action against the tortfeasor. That was the only reason why section [33] did not apply to his case’, (with emphasis added by me).’ and ‘It may seem anomalous that a defendant should be better off where, unknown to him, a writ has been issued but not served than he would be if the writ had not been issued at all ; but this is a consequence of the greater anomaly too well-established for this House to abolish that, for the purposes of a limitation period, an action is brought when a writ or other originating process is issued by the central office of the High Court and not when it is brought to the knowledge of the defendant by service upon him.’
Lord Oliver said: ‘My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Griffiths. I entirely agree with it and add a few words of my own only because a contrary view was taken by the majority of the Court of Appeal.
The argument in favour of the proposition that dilatoriness on the part of the plaintiff in issuing his writ is irrelevant until the period of limitation has expired rests upon the proposition that, since a defendant has no legal ground for complaint if the plaintiff issues his writ one day before the expiry of the period, it follows that he suffers no prejudice if the writ is not issued until two days later, save to the extent that, if the section is disapplied, he is deprived of his vested right to defeat the plaintiff’s claim on that point alone. In my opinion, this is a false point. A defendant is always likely to be prejudiced by the dilatoriness of a plaintiff in pursuing his claim. Witnesses’ memories may fade, records may be lost or destroyed, opportunities for inspection and report may be lost. The fact that the law permits a plaintiff within prescribed limits to disadvantage a defendant in this way does not mean that the defendant is not prejudiced. It merely means that he is not in a position to complain of whatever prejudice he suffers. Once a plaintiff allows the permitted time to elapse, the defendant is no longer subject to that disability, and in a situation in which the court is directed to consider all the circumstances of the case and to balance the prejudice to the parties, the fact that the claim has, as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to use the time allowed to him, become a thoroughly stale claim, cannot, in my judgment, be irrelevant. It is clear from the judge’s judgment that, because sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of s.33(3) of the Act of 1980 focus particular attention on the time elapsing after the expiry of the limitation period, he felt constrained to regard the time which had been allowed to pass prior to that date as something which had to be left wholly out of account. In my judgment, he was wrong to do so and that necessarily vitiated the exercise of his discretion. I, too, would allow the appeal.’

Judges:

Lord Diplock, Lord Elwyn-Jones, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Scarman and Lord Bridge of Harwich

Citations:

[1981] 1 WLR 744, [1981] 2 All ER 296

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 33, Limitation Act 1938 2D

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

ExplainedWalkley v Precision Forgings Ltd HL 1979
The plaintiff tried to bring a second action in respect of an industrial injury claim outside the limitation period so as to overcome the likelihood that his first action, although timeous, would be dismissed for want of prosecution.
Held: He . .

Cited by:

CitedBarry Young (Deceased) v Western Power Distribution (South West) Plc CA 18-Jul-2003
The deceased had begun an action on becoming ill after exposure to asbestos by the defendant. He withdrew his action after receiving expert evidence that his illness was unrelated. A post-mortem examination showed this evidence to be mistaken. His . .
CitedDavid Lannigan v Glasgow City Council OHCS 12-Aug-2004
The pursuer said the teachers employed by the defendant had failed to identify that was dyslexic, leading him to suffer damage. The defenders said the claim was time barred, which the pursuer admitted, but then said that the claim ought to go ahead . .
CitedJacqueline Adam v Rasal Ali CA 21-Feb-2006
The defendant sought damages against the defendant for personal injury from his alleged negligence. Her action was struck out and she recommenced the action. The defendant pleaded that she was out of time. The claimant said that the first action . .
CitedHorton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .
CitedBuckler v J F Finnegan Ltd CA 21-Jun-2004
The claimant sought damages for personal injuries after ingesting asbestos while employed as a joiner by the defendant. The defendant appealed an order allowing the claim to go ahead despite being out of time. . .
CitedMcDonnell and Another v Walker CA 24-Nov-2009
The defendant appealed against the disapplication of section 11 of the 1980 Act under section 33.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The defendant had not contributed significantly to the delay: ‘the defendant received claims quite different in . .
CitedBrady v Norman CA 9-Feb-2011
The claimant sought to have disapplied the limitation period in his defamation claim. The claimant said that in the case of Cain, the Steedman case had not been cited, and that the decisions were incompatible, and that Cain was to be prefered.
CitedCain v Francis CA 18-Dec-2008
The court was asked under what circumstances it should exercise its discretion to extend the limitation period under section 33.
Held: Lady Justice Smith said: ‘It appears to me that there is now a long line of authority to support the . .
CitedBrady v Norman CA 9-Feb-2011
The claimant sought to have disapplied the limitation period in his defamation claim. The claimant said that in the case of Cain, the Steedman case had not been cited, and that the decisions were incompatible, and that Cain was to be prefered.
CitedS v Suren and Another QBD 10-Sep-2004
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.185753

Tehidy Minerals Ltd v Norman: CA 1971

The fact that land had been requisitioned by the Ministry of Agriculture between 1941 and 1960 and the 20-odd years’ user relied on as having created the rights had preceded 1941 was a bar to a prescriptive claim to grazing rights under the Prescription Act 1832 but not at common law. Discussing Angus v Dalton, applying the doctrine of lost modern grant: ‘where there has been upwards of 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, such enjoyment having the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some reason . . the existence of such a grant is impossible, the law will adopt a legal fiction that such a grant was made, in spite of any direct evidence that no such grant was in fact made.’

Judges:

Buckley LJ

Citations:

[1971] 2 QB 528

Statutes:

Prescription Act 1832

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

ExplainedDalton v Henry Angus and Co HL 14-Jun-1881
The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some . .
CitedDalton v Henry Angus and Co 1877
Fry J said: ‘ . .I cannot imagine any case of acquiescence in which there is not shown to be in the servient owner: 1, a knowledge of the acts done; 2, a power in him to stop the acts or to sue in respect of them; and 3, an abstinence on his part . .
CitedDalton v Henry Angus and Co CA 1878
. .

Cited by:

CitedRoland Brandwood and others v Bakewell Management Ltd CA 30-Jan-2003
House owners had used vehicular access across a common to get to their houses for many years. The commons owner required them to purchase the right, and they replied that they had acquired the right by lost modern grant and/or by prescription.
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedOdey and Others v Barber ChD 29-Nov-2006
The claimants sought a declaration that they had two rights of way over a neighbour’s land. One was claimed by continuous use for twenty years, and the second was said to have been implied under the 1925 Act. No express grant was suggested. . .
CitedPolo Woods Foundation v Shelton-Agar and Another ChD 17-Jun-2009
The court considered whether the claimant had established a profit a prendre against the defendant neighbour’s land in the form of a right of pasturage, acquired either by lost modern grant or by prescription.
Held: The appeal succeeded, but . .
CitedLawrence and Another v Fen Tigers Ltd and Others QBD 4-Mar-2011
The claimants had complained that motor-cycle and other racing activities on neighbouring lands were a noise nuisance, but the court also considered that agents of the defendants had sought to intimidate the claimants into not pursuing their action. . .
CitedLynn Shellfish Ltd and Others v Loose and Another SC 13-Apr-2016
The court was asked as to the extent of an exclusive prescriptive right (ie an exclusive right obtained through a long period of use) to take cockles and mussels from a stretch of the foreshore on the east side of the Wash, on the west coast of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.179838

Thurrock Borough Council v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the Regions, and Another: QBD 3 Apr 2001

The land owner claimed continuous use for more than ten years, to establish a defence to enforcement proceedings. Such a defence was for the land owner to establish, and required him to show continuity during the period, allowing for exclusion of times when enforcement proceedings were not available. It was not appropriate to apply legal principles from the law relating to abandonment except when accrued rights were asserted.

Citations:

Times 03-Apr-2001

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning, Limitation

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.89893

KM v HM: 29 Oct 1992

Supreme Court of Canada – Limitation of actions – Torts – Assault and battery – Incest – Woman bringing action against father for damages for incest – Whether or not action limited by Limitations Act – Application of the reasonable discoverability principle – Whether or not incest a separate and distinct tort – Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 240, s. 45(1)(j), 47.
Limitation of actions – Equity – Fiduciary relationship – Parent/child – Woman bringing action against father for incest – Whether incest constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty by a parent – Whether limitation period applicable and whether the defence of laches applies.
Limitation of actions – Fraudulent concealment – Incest – Whether a limitation period in an incest action is postponed by defendant’s fraudulent concealment.

Judges:

La Forest, L’Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ

Citations:

(1992) 96 DLR (4th) 289, [1992] 3 SCR 6, 14 CCLT (2d) 1, AZ-92111111, EYB 1992-67549, JE 92-1644, [1992] SCJ No 85 (QL), 36 ACWS (3d) 466, 57 OAC 321

Links:

Canlii

Cited by:

CitedAIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co Solicitors SC 5-Nov-2014
Bank not to recover more than its losses
The court was asked as to the remedy available to the appellant bank against the respondent, a firm of solicitors, for breach of the solicitors’ custodial duties in respect of money entrusted to them for the purpose of completing a loan which was to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Commonwealth, Limitation, Equity, Trusts

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.554205

Glasper v Rodger: SCS 1996

First Division – Inner House – Lord President Hope said: ‘In our opinion the lack of awareness which requires to be established for the purposes of section 11(3) of the 1973 Act is a lack of awareness that a loss has occurred caused by an act, neglect or default which gives rise to an obligation to make reparation for it. We agree with Lord Clyde’s observation in Greater Glasgow Health Board v Baxter Clark and Paul 1992 SLT at page 40D that the subsection looks for an awareness not only of the fact of loss having occurred, but of the fact that it is a loss caused by negligence . . A party who is aware that he has sustained loss, injury and damage may reasonably be expected to take some steps to find out what has caused that loss. Failure to do this will call for an explanation, if the test of reasonable diligence to which section 11(3) refers is to be capable of being satisfied.’

Judges:

Lord President Hope

Citations:

1996 SLT 44

Statutes:

Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 11(3)

Cited by:

CitedDavid T Morrison and Co Ltd (T/A Gael Home Interiors) v ICL Plastics Ltd and Another SCS 14-Mar-2013
Extra Division – Inner House – An explosion at the defenders’ neighbouring premises had damaged those of the pursuer. The defenders now appealed against a finding that the claim was out of time calculated from the time when it had sufficient . .
CitedDavid T Morrison and Co Ltd (T/A Gael Home Interiors) v ICL Plastics Ltd and Others SC 30-Jul-2014
The claimant sought damages after an explosion at the defender’s nearby premises damaged its shop. The defender said that the claim was out of time, and now appealed against a decision that time had not begun to run under the 1973 Act.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.552025

Kirk Care Housing Association Ltd v Crerar and Partners: SCS 1996

Outer House – Lord Clyde reiterated his view, rejecting a challenge by counsel for the defenders, that section 11(3) was concerned only with awareness of loss, a matter of fact, and not with matters of legal liability.

Judges:

Lord Clyde

Citations:

1996 SLT 150

Statutes:

Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973

Cited by:

CitedDavid T Morrison and Co Ltd (T/A Gael Home Interiors) v ICL Plastics Ltd and Others SC 30-Jul-2014
The claimant sought damages after an explosion at the defender’s nearby premises damaged its shop. The defender said that the claim was out of time, and now appealed against a decision that time had not begun to run under the 1973 Act.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Scotland, Limitation

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.552029

Hilton v Sutton Steam Laundry: CA 1946

Citations:

[1946] KB 65

Cited by:

CitedRoberts v Gill and Co Solicitors and Others SC 19-May-2010
The claimant beneficiary in the estate sought damages against solicitors who had acted for the claimant’s brother, the administrator, saying they had allowed him to take control of the assets in the estate. The will provided that property was to be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.415960

Thomas v Thomas: 1855

When a father has entered upon the estate of his infant children the presumption is that he entered as their guardian and bailiff, and therefore the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run against the children until they attain twenty-one, and from that time at least a child has twenty years within which he may recover possession. Semble, entry by a stranger might not have this effect.
If the father retain possession after the children attain twenty-one such possession will be considered to be continued in the character in which he entered, so that an account will be directed, not from the filing of the bill, but, if necessary, from the time of entry.
In an adverse suit, in the nature of an ejectment suit, against a person in no fiduciary relation to the plaintiff, this account is only directed from the time of filing the bill.
If a wife concurs with her husband in mortgaging property over which. she has a power, the husband is primarily liable, unless the wife received the money for her separate use; and the Court will direct an inquiry as to this fact.

Citations:

[1855] EngR 42, (1855) 2 K and J 79, (1855) 69 ER 701

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Children, Limitation

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.291964

Moses v Lovegrove: CA 29 Apr 1952

The tenant had gone into possession under an oral agreement with a rent book. He ceased to pay rent or acknowledge the landlord’s right in 1938. In 1952 the landlord sought to recover possession, and now appealed a finding that the tenant had acquired the title to the property by adverse possession.
Held: A rent book did not constitute a tenancy agreement, or lease in writing. Evershed MR said: ‘The alleged lease in writing consisted of the rent book, which was put in evidence. The judge rejected the view that the rent book was such a lease in writing within the meaning of the Act, and I think he was entirely right in that conclusion.
The rent book is, I think, what it purports to be, and what it is called, a rent book, that is, a book containing acknowledgements for payment of weekly sums of rent, and containing also, in pursuance of the terms of the legislation, a reference to the conditions on which the tenant was holding his tenancy. I think that on the face of it, it was not intended to be, and is not, a contract for granting a tenancy, still less a lease creating an estate.’ and ‘The notion of adverse possession, which is enshrined now in section 10, is not new; the section is a statutory enactment of the law in regard to the matter as it had been laid down by the courts in interpreting the earlier Limitation Statutes.’
Romer LJ said: ‘The tenancy was quite obviously an oral weekly tenancy, with the result that time started to run by virtue of section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1939, from one week after the last payment of rent, which was on May 28, 1938.’ and
‘As no notice to quit was given, the tenant could not thereafter be said to be in immediate adverse possession in the ordinary sense, for he remained on under his contractual tenancy. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the Limitation Act, 1939, his tenancy ceased to exist, and therefore he is deemed to have remained on in adverse possession. Accordingly, the fact that for some purposes his contractual right remained in the absence of a notice to quit a writ for possession is irrelevant, as also is the precise date on which the lessor could properly have started proceedings in ejectment. The point is that after the expiration of one week from the date of the last payment of rent, the defendant is deemed to have had no contractual right to possession, and therefore to have been a trespasser or a squatter.
Why should he be regarded as being in possession by virtue of permission or grant of the owner merely because of the passing of the Rent Act of 1939?’ and
‘It seems to me that one can, in addition to looking at position and rights of the owner, legitimately look also at the position of the occupier for the purpose of seeing whether his occupation is adverse. In my opinion, if one looks to the position of the occupier and finds that his occupation, his right to occupation, is derived from the owner in the form of permission or agreement or grant, it is not adverse, but if it is not so derived, then it is adverse, even if the owner is, by legislation, prevented from bringing ejectment proceedings.’

Judges:

Sir Raymond Evershed MR, Birkett and Romer LJJ

Citations:

[1952] 2 QB 533, [1952] 1 The Times LR 1324

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1939 9(2) 10

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedWarren v Murray 1894
A person went into possession of land under a contract to grant him a lease for 99 years, but no lease was ever granted.
Held: In the absence of a lease he was no more that a tenant at will, which tenancy could be determined at any time, but . .
CitedIn re Joll Gathercole v Norfolk 1900
Collins LJ said: ‘At the end of the 12 years the possession of a tenant who has paid no rent becomes adverse during the whole time the adverse possession is validated by the statute, and it is not competent for the landlord to say that he still . .

Cited by:

CitedLong v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council ChD 29-Mar-1996
The landlord’s agents wrote to the proposed tenant offering a quarterly tenancy of the premises. The tenancy was to commence at a future date. The defendant endorsed the letter and returned it to say he would abide by the terms, and he was allowed . .
CitedGoomti Ramnarace v Harrypersad Lutchman PC 21-May-2001
(Trinidad and Tobago) The defendant had gone into possession of land by consent, and many years later declined to leave. The claimant said the period of her adverse possession was insufficient but she claimed a tenancy. The claimant asserted that . .
CitedLong v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council ChD 20-Mar-1996
The parties had agreed for a lease, and the tenant entered possession, but no formal lease was executed. The tenant stopped paying rent in 1977 or 1984. He now claimed rectification of the registers to show him as proprietor. The landlord argued . .
CitedHayward v Chaloner CA 1968
The alleged tenant (the rector of a parish) knew that rent should have been paid but had not paid it. ‘Only one of the previous rectors gave evidence. He was the Rev. Richard Phillips (dates) He knew the rectory cottages and said that the land . .
CitedLodge (T/A JD Lodge) v Wakefield Metropolitan Council CA 21-Mar-1995
The plaintiff had formerly been a tenant of the defendant under an informal tenancy. No rent had been paid since 1974. He claimed to have acquired the land by adverse possession. He gave evidence at trial that if he had been asked to pay rent at any . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Limitation

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.223190

Norman v Ali and Another, Norman v Aziz: CA 13 Jan 2000

The claimant sought damages following a road accident against an uninsured driver through the Motor Insurer’s Bureau. The Bureau later required him to issue proceedings also against the car owner on the ground that he had permitted the driving. At first it was held the limitation period was six years for such a claim, but on appeal it was held that the words referring to a personal injury action in the Act were wide, and it was only required that the damages claimed arose in respect of personal injuries. The limitation period was three years.

Citations:

Gazette 13-Jan-2000, Times 25-Feb-2000

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 11, Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1988

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Limitation, Road Traffic, Personal Injury

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.84333

Long v Tolchard and Sons Ltd: CA 5 Jan 2000

When a party requested a court to set aside the limitation period, he was under a high duty to disclose all relevant details. Where it turned out later that he had failed to disclose relevant aspects of his medical history, it was perfectly open to the court to revisit the original order and to re-instate the limitation period.

Citations:

Times 05-Jan-2000

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 33, 11

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Limitation, Personal Injury

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.83179

Hillingdon London Borough Council v ARC Ltd: ChD 12 Jun 1997

The Council had taken possession of the company’s land under compulsory purchase powers, but the company delayed its claim for compensation, and the Council now said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The claim was indeed time barred. The cause of action for an entry under a compulsory purchase arose at the date of entry even though compensation not yet assessed. The assumption that no limitation period began to run until the amount of compensation had been agreed was incorrect.

Judges:

Stanley Burnton QC J

Citations:

Times 25-Jun-1997, [1998] 1 WLR 174

Statutes:

Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 11, Limitation Act 1980 9

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedTurner v Midland Railway Company 1911
No limitation period is applicable until the amount of the compensation has been agreed or determined. . .
CitedSwansea City Council v Glass CA 1992
The defendant had failed himself to repair his property, and the Local Authority carried out the work itself under the 1957 Act. It sought to recover the associated costs from the defendant, but he said that their claim was time barred, being more . .

Cited by:

Appeal fromLondon Borough of Hillingdon v ARC Limited CA 7-Apr-1998
The company sought compensation for land taken under compulsory purchase powers by the defendants several years before. It now appealed against the defeat of its claim as time-barred.
Held: The appeal failed. The limitation period for a claim . .
CitedHalstead v Council of City of Manchester CA 23-Oct-1997
Land had been compulsorily purchased, and the compensation agreed, but after long delays in payment, not as to the calculation of interest.
Held: Interest would be payable from the date of entry. The limitation period arose only once the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.81379

Corbin v Penfold Metallising Co Ltd: CA 28 Apr 2000

The claimant was diagnosed as suffering from an industrial disease. He instructed solicitors promptly, but they failed to issue within the limitation period. The claimant applied for the time to be lengthened to allow him to claim. The court exercised their discretion in his favour. The failings of his solicitors should not be visited upon him. He had acted with proper speed, had employed solicitors to get on with it. The delay of nearly six months was not excessive.

Citations:

Gazette 28-Apr-2000, Times 02-May-2000, [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 247

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 33

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHorton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Legal Professions

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.79504

Companhia Eurpeia De Transportes Aeros Sa v British Aerospace Plc and Another: CA 12 Jan 1999

A third party is not to be allowed to revive a court action and to be joined in where this was really an attempt to avoid the rules on limitation. Action dismissed for failure to provide security might be revived but not for this purpose or in this case.

Citations:

Times 12-Jan-1999

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Limitation

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.79412

Re Gee and Co (Woolwich) Ltd: 1975

Company accounts can acknowledge the company’s liability for debts as at the date at which the accounts are drawn up even if they are not finalised and signed until after that date.

Citations:

[1975] Ch 52

Cited by:

CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Company

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.264081