Lee-Parker v Izzett (1): ChD 1971

Money expended by a tenant on discharging his landlord’s covenants will in appropriate circumstances operate as a partial or a complete discharge so as to furnish a defence of set-off at law to a claim for unpaid rent. Justice Goff discussed the case of Taylor v Beal: ‘I do not think this is bound up with technical rules of set off. It is an ancient common law right. I therefore declare that so far as the repairs are within the express or implied covenants of the landlord, the third and fourth defendants are entitled to recoup themselves out of future rents and defend any action for payment thereof. It does not follow however that the full amount expended by the third and fourth defendants on such repairs can properly be treated as payment of rent. It is a question of fact in every case whether and to what extent the expenditure was proper.
For the sake of avoiding misunderstanding I must add that of course the Taylor v Beal right can only be exercised when and so far as the landlord is in breach and any necessary notice must have been given to him.’

Goff J
[1971] 1 WLR 1688, [1971] 3 All ER 1099
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBeall v Smith CA 6-Dec-1873
Lord Justice James discussed the practice in the Court of Chancery on claims brought by people without mental capacity: ‘The law of the Court of Chancery undoubtedly is that in certain cases where there is a person of unsound mind, not so found by . .

Cited by:
CitedSmith v Muscat CA 10-Jul-2003
The tenant was sued by his landlord for arrears of rent, but sought an equitable set-off for damages for disrepair accruing under the previous landlord.
Held: If the entitlement to recover arrears of rent passes from assignor to assignee, and . .
CitedAndrews and Another v Brewer and Another CA 17-Feb-1997
Tenants challenged an order for possession, saying the form of notice was defective. The date specified in the notice was clearly a clerical error. It provided that the tenancy would commence on 29 May 1993 and end on 28 May 1993, on the face of it, . .
CitedGraham v Pitkin PC 9-Mar-1992
A delay in completion was not challenged by a notice to complete; mere delay may itself be repudiatory. Specific performance was considered. As to Lee-Parker v Izzett, the Board doubted the finding that there was no contract in that case, because . .
CitedThe Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Ubah CA 21-Mar-1996
The respondent mortgagee had obtained an order for possession against the mortgagor freeholder, referred to in the judgment as ‘the Chief’, who had, prior to the mortgage, granted a tenancy to the appellant.
Held: The landlord’s retention of a . .
CitedEdlington Properties Limited v J H Fenner and Co Limited CA 22-Mar-2006
The landlord had assigned the reversion of the lease. There was an outstanding dispute with the tenant defendant who owed arrears of rent, but sought to set these off against a claim for damages for the landlord’s failure to construct the factory in . .
CitedBritish Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Marine Management (UK) Ltd ChD 19-Dec-1978
Money expended by a tenant on discharging his landlord’s covenants will in appropriate circumstances operate as a partial or a complete discharge so as to furnish a defence at law to a claim for unpaid rent; and where the tenant has suffered damage . .
See AlsoLee-Parker v Izzett (2) 1972
A contract was exchanged subject to ‘the purchaser obtaining a satisfactory mortgage’.
Held: A contract which is said to be conditional, but where the condition is not expressed clearly or is too imprecise as in this case, may be void for . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Equity

Updated: 05 December 2021; Ref: scu.185861

Roadchef (Employee Benefits Trustees) Ltd v Hill and Another: ChD 29 Jan 2014

Challenge to share transfer.

Proudman J
[2014] EWHC 109 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedEclairs Group Ltd and Glengary Overseas Ltd v JKX Oil and Gas Plc SC 2-Dec-2015
Company Director not Trustee but is Fiduciary
The Court was asked about an alleged ‘corporate raid’, an attempt to exploit a minority shareholding in a company to obtain effective management or voting control without paying what other shareholders would regard as a proper price.
Held: The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Company

Updated: 29 November 2021; Ref: scu.520825

In re Re Rose, Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company Limited v Rose: ChD 1949

The testator handed a transfer of the relevant shares to the donee, Mr Hook, together with the relevant certificates. The transfer had not been registered by the date of his death.
Held: Equity will not compel an imperfect gift to be completed. Nevertheless, the testator had done everything in his power to divest himself of the shares in question to Mr Hook. He had executed a transfer. It was not suggested that the transfer was not in accordance with the company’s regulations. He had handed that transfer together with the certificates to Mr Hook. There was nothing else the testator could do. Mr Hook’s legal title would not be perfected until the directors passed the transfer for registration, but that was not an act which the testator had to do, it was an act which depended on the discretion of the directors. The gift was effective

Jenkins J
[1949] Ch 78
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedPennington and Another v Waine, Crampton and others CA 4-Mar-2002
The deceased had made a gift of shares. She had executed a transfer, and acting upon the promise, the donee had agreed to become a director which he could only do if he also became a shareholder. The transfer was delivered to the deceased’s agent, . .
ApprovedIn re Rose, Rose v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1952
The deceased had executed instruments of transfer and delivered them with the relevant certificates to the transferees.
Held: The transfers were transferred the whole of the deceased’s title both legal and equitable in the shares and all . .
CitedMascall v Mascall CA 13-Jun-1984
The question was whether a gift of land was completely constituted by delivery of the land certificate
Held: Equity will not come to the aid of a volunteer. Therefore, if a donee needs to get an order from a court of equity in order to . .
CitedPennington and Another v Waine, Crampton and others CA 4-Mar-2002
The deceased had made a gift of shares. She had executed a transfer, and acting upon the promise, the donee had agreed to become a director which he could only do if he also became a shareholder. The transfer was delivered to the deceased’s agent, . .
CitedBurnett’s Trustee v Grainger and Another HL 4-Mar-2004
A flat was sold, but before the purchasers registered the transfer, the seller was sequestrated, and his trustee registered his own interest as trustee. The buyer complained that the trustee was unjustly enriched.
Held: The Act defined the . .
Appeal fromIn re Rose, Rose v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1952
The deceased had executed instruments of transfer and delivered them with the relevant certificates to the transferees.
Held: The transfers were transferred the whole of the deceased’s title both legal and equitable in the shares and all . .
MentionedZeital and Another v Kaye and Others CA 5-Mar-2010
The deceased had held an apartment through beneficial interests in shares in a limited company. He died intestate. The parties disputed the ownership of the two shares. The company had been put into a members’ liquidation, and the company liquidator . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Wills and Probate, Equity

Updated: 17 November 2021; Ref: scu.183412

Commission for the New Towns v Cooper (Great Britain) Ltd, (Formerly Coopind UK Ltd): CA 4 Mar 1995

The trial judge had dismissed a claim for rectification on the basis that the defendant hoped and suspected, but did not know, of the relevant mistake by the plaintiff.
Held: Rectification was ordered because the defendant had sought to mislead the plaintiff into making the relevant mistake, the plaintiff had in fact made it, and this was sufficiently unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant to render it liable to rectification. The deliberate attempt to hide the other’s mistake made the contract unenforceable. An offer and acceptance of a land contract may not be by letter. Rectification may in certain circumstances be ordered, where there has been no common mistake, but one party has proceeded on a base which the other knew to be mistaken. Where A intends B to be mistaken as to the construction of a contract and diverts B’s attention from discovering the mistake by making false and misleading statements and B makes the mistake which A intends, then suspicion and not actual knowledge of the mistake is enough for rectification to be granted.
Stuart-Smith LJ said: ‘[W]here a false representation is made for the purpose of inducing the other party to adopt a certain course of conduct and the representation is such as to influence a person behaving reasonably to adopt that course of conduct, the court should infer, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the representation did have that effect.’ and
‘In the case of unilateral mistake, that is to say where only one party is mistaken as to the meaning of the contract, rectification is not ordinarily appropriate. This follows from the ordinary rule that it is the objective intention of the parties which determines the construction of the contract and not the subjective intention of one of them. Also, it would generally be inequitable to compel the other party to execute a contract, which he had no intention of making, simply to accord with the mistaken interpretation of the other party: see Olympia Sauna Shipping Co SA v Shinwa Kaiun Kaisha Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyds Rep. 364, 371 per Bingham J. But the court will intervene if there are ‘additional circumstances that render unconscionable reliance on the document by the party who has intended that it should have effect according to its terms:’ Spry, Equitable Remedies, 4th ed. (1990), p.599. The debate in this case turns on what amounts to unconscionable conduct.’

Stuart-Smith LJ, Evans LJ, Farquharson LJ
Times 04-Mar-1995, Independent 15-Mar-1995, [1995] 2 All ER 929, [1995] Ch 259, [1995] 26 EG 129
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 2
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedWell Barn Shoot Limited and Well Barn Farming Limited v Shackleton and Another CA 22-Jan-2003
The defendants had been tenant farmers of the plaintiff company which retained shooting rights over the land when part was sold to the defendants. The defendant object to the use of a roadway by the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to repurchase the . .
CitedGeorge Wimpey UK Ltd v VI Construction Ltd CA 3-Feb-2005
A land purchase contract had been rectified by the judge for unilateral mistake. A factor had been dropped from a formula for calculating the price.
Held: The judge’s conclusion that the circumstances existed to allow a rectification was . .
CitedRoyal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2); Barclays Bank plc v Harris; Midland Bank plc v Wallace, etc HL 11-Oct-2001
Wives had charged the family homes to secure their husband’s business borrowings, and now resisted possession orders, claiming undue influence.
Held: Undue influence is an equitable protection created to undo the effect of excess influence of . .
CitedColes and Others v William Hill Organisation Ltd ChD 18-Mar-1998
When agreeing an extension of an existing lease, the new lease by mistake included a break clause which had been intended by neither party. The tenant’s solicitors noticed the error in their client’s favour but did not mention it. The landlord only . .
CitedNorth Eastern Properties Ltd v Coleman and Another CA 19-Mar-2010
The appellants challenged specific performance orders obliging them to complete the purchase of apartments, saying that the contracts had not complied with the 1989 Act, and that their repudiation of the contracts had been accepted. The contracts . .
CitedDaventry District Council v Daventry and District Housing Ltd CA 13-Oct-2011
The appellant challenged refusal of rectification of its agreement with the defendant. They asserted either mutual or unilateral mistake. The parties had agreed for the transfer of housing stock and management staff to the respondents. The claimant . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Contract, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.79287

In re Diplock’s estate: CA 1948

After considering a situation in which trust money had been applied in making alterations to the property of an innocent third party but had not added to the value of the property,
Held: The origin of the equitable rules of tracing were described: ‘the metaphysical approach of equity coupled with and encouraged by the far-reaching remedy of a declaration of charge that enabled equity to identify money in a mixed fund.’ and
‘In the absence of authority to the contrary, our conclusion is that as regards the Diplock money used in these cases it cannot be traced in any true sense; and, further, that even if this were not so, the only remedy available to equity, viz., that of a declaration of charge, would not produce an equitable result and is inapplicable accordingly’
and ‘In the case of adaptation of property of the volunteer by means of trust money, it by no means necessarily follows that the money can be said to be present in the adapted property. The beneficial owner of the trust money seeks to follow and recover that money and claims to use the machinery of a charge on the adapted property in order to enable him to do so. But in the first place the money may not be capable of being followed. In every true sense the money may have disappeared. …. The result may add not one penny to the value of the house. Indeed the alteration may well lower the value of the house. …. Can it be said that in such cases the trust money can be traced and extracted from the altered asset? Clearly not for the money will have disappeared leaving no monetary trace behind. ….’
As regards limitation, the 12 year period for enforcing a will trust runs from the date of the death, even though a personal representative is not bound to distribute within a year from death.

Lord Greene MR
[1948] Ch 465
England and Wales
Citing:
ExplainedSinclair v Brougham HL 1914
An insolvent building society had, outside its powers, run a banking business. The House considered the competing claims of the unadvanced shareholders of the building society’s intra vires business, members of the society who had not been granted . .

Cited by:
CitedAluminium Industrie Vaassen B V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd ChD 11-Feb-1975
The plaintiffs sold aluminium to the defendant and by a clause in the contract retained their title in the materials sold until payment was received. The purchaser went into insolvent receivership, and the seller sought recovery of the equipment and . .
CitedFoskett v McKeown and Others CA 27-Jun-1997
Various people had paid money with the promise of acquiring an interest in land in Portugal. The scheme was fraudulent. The funds had been used to purchase a life/investment policy. The policy was held in trust for the fraudster’s mother but he had . .
CitedFoskett v McKeown and Others HL 18-May-2000
A property developer using monies which he held on trust to carry out a development instead had mixed those monies with his own in his bank account, and subsequently used those mixed monies to pay premiums on a life assurance policy on his own life, . .
CitedGreen and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
Appeal fromMinistry of Health v Simpson; In re Diplock dec HL 1950
The will of Cable Diplock purported to make a gift to charity, and was distributed accordingly. The house however found the gift to be invalid.
Held: A personal remedy existed for the recovery of amounts wrongly paid in the distribution of an . .
CitedGomez and others v Vives CA 3-Oct-2008
The claimant appealed a finding that the court did not have jurisdiction over income payable to a trust governed by English law under which the claimant was beneficiary.
Held: The appeal failed in part. Because Article 5 is in derogation from . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.182265

Harries and Others v Church Commissioners for England and Another: ChD 25 Oct 1991

Trustees Investing using Wider Considerations

The applicant sought a declaration that the Commissioners were obliged to have regard to the object of promoting the Christian faith and not to act in a manner which would be incompatible with that object when managing the assets of which they were trustees. The plaintiffs said that the commissioners, in making investment decisions, attached overriding importance to financial considerations, and that they were only prepared to take non-financial considerations into account to the extent that they did not significantly jeopardise or interfere with accepted investment principles.
Held: The declarations sought were refused. The Church Commissioners were entitled to take ethical considerations into account in forming an investment policy provided there was no risk of detriment to the Trust funds. Ethical investments putting financial return at risk were not open to trustees. Investments should aim for the best return, and be chosen only not to conflict with any express aims of the charity, and should not be used to make moral statements. Trustees must find balance neither bringing their charity into disrepute, nor failing to act with prudence. Such considerations could be allowed provided they did not adversely affect the return.
When property was held by trustees for the purpose of generating money, then prima facie, the purposes of the trust were best served by the trustees seeking to obtain the best return which was consistent with commercial prudence and in most cases, the best interests of the charity required that the trustees’ choice of investments be made solely on the basis of well-established investment criteria. The circumstances in which charity trustees were bound or entitled to make financially disadvantageous investment decisions for ethical considerations were extremely limited and there was no evidence that such circumstances existed in the case before the court. The declaration was refused.
Donald Nicholls VC said: ‘the law is not so cynical as to require trustees to behave in a fashion which would bring them or their charity into disrepute . . on the other hand, trustees must act prudently. They must not use property held by them for investment purposes as a means for making moral statements at the expense of the charity of which they are trustees.’

Sir Donald Nicholls VC
Gazette 11-Nov-1991, [1992] 1 WLR 1241, [1992] 2 All ER 300, [1991] 135 SJLB 180, Times 30-Oct-1991, Independent 29-Oct-1991
England and Wales

Trusts, Equity, Charity

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.81250

Vadim Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Limited: PC 27 Mar 2003

PC (Isle of Man) The petitioner sought disclosure of trust documents, as a beneficiary. Disclosure had been refused as he had not been a named beneficiary.
Held: Times had moved on, and trust documents had taken more and more indirect ways of conferring benefits. The settlements were badly drafted, but that should not be used to excuse a court fulfilling its duties. The right to seek disclosure did not depend upon a fixed and transmissible beneficial interest. The object of a discretion may have similar rights, and the right was not dependant upon establishing a proprietary interest, but the remedy would be in equity and subject to the court’s discretion. A beneficiary of a discretionary trust has a non-assignable and non-transmissible interest in the trust, and has no entitlement as of right to any trust documents or other information relating to the trust in the possession or control of the trustees.

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Hutton, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe
Times 29-Mar-2003, [2003] UKPC 26, Gazette 05-Jun-2003, [2003] 2 AC 709, (2002-03) 5 ITELR 715, [2003] 3 All ER 76, [2003] 2 WLR 1442, [2003] Pens LR 145, [2003] WTLR 565
PC, Bailii, PC
Citing:
CitedMcPhail v Doulton (on appeal from In re Baden’s Deed Trusts) HL 6-May-1970
The settlor asked whether the test for validity, in point of certainty of objects, is the same for trusts and powers, or whether the test for trusts is more demanding.
Held: The test is the same. The context was a provision, held to be a . .
CitedIn re Manisty’s Settlement ChD 1974
The court contrasted the exercise by trustees of an intermediate power with the exercise of a wide special power.
Held: A wide power, whether special or intermediate, does not negative or prohibit a sensible approach by trustees to the . .
CitedO’Rourke v Darbishire HL 1920
Sir Joseph Whitworth had died in 1887. In 1884 he had made a will appointing three executors and leaving his residuary estate to charity. By a codicil made in 1885 he altered his will to leave his ultimate residue to his executors for their own . .
CitedIn re Londonderry’s Settlement; Peat v Lady Walsh CA 3-Nov-1964
The Court considered limitations on the right to disclosure of trust documents, and in particuar the need to protect confidentiality in communications between trustees as to the exercise of their dispositive discretions, and in communications made . .

Cited by:
CitedFranses v Al Assad and others ChD 26-Oct-2007
The claimant had obtained a freezing order over the proceeds of sale of a property held by solicitors. The claimant was liquidator of a company, and an allegation of wrongful trading had been made against the sole director and defendant. The . .
CitedBreakspear and others v Ackland and Another ChD 19-Feb-2008
Beneficiaries sought disclosure of a wishes letter provided by the settlor to the trustees in a family discretionary trust.
Held: The confidentiality in the letter was, in the absence of some express term by the settlor, in the trustees, and . .
CitedDawson-Damer and Others v Taylor Wessing Llp and Others ChD 6-Aug-2015
The clamants sought orders under the 1998 Act for disclosure of documents about them by the defendant solicitors and others. The defendants said that the request would require the consideration of a very large number of documents, considering in . .
CitedTN, MA and AA (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 24-Jun-2015
The appellants, children from Afghanistan whose asylum claims had been rejected, challenged the sufficiency of the appellate process, and the respondents obligations for family tracing.
Held: The appeals failed. An applicant could not claim, . .
CitedRoyal National Lifeboat Institution and Others v Headley and Another ChD 28-Jul-2016
Beneficiaries’ right to information from estate
The claimant charities sought payment of interests under the will following the dropping of two life interests. They now requested various documents forming accounts of the estate.
Held: The charities were entitled to some but not to all of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Commonwealth, Trusts, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.180352

Heath v Kelly and Another: ChD 24 Jul 2009

The defendant and the deceased had purchased a house as joint tenants in equity. The claimant sought to enforce an agreement for the sale of the defendant’s half share. Payment having been made. The defendant argued that the agreement was uncertain and unenforceable.
Held: The agreement appeared to have been made under a misapprehension as to the legal position. The mistake appeared to have been created by the party seeking to rely on it, and equity could refuse specific performance of the contract. The claimant had also delayed her action. Specific performance was refused. Declaration as to interests accordingly.

Purle QC J
[2009] EWHC 1908 (Ch), [2009] Fam Law 1044, [2010] 1 FLR 610, [2009] 2 P and CR DG21
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedGreat Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd CA 14-Oct-2002
The parties contracted for the hire of a ship. They were each under a mistaken impression as to its position, and a penalty became payable. The hirer claimed that the equitable doctrine of mutual mistake should forgive him liability.
Held: . .
CitedMilward v Earl Thanet CA 1801
Lord Alvanley MR said: ‘a party cannot call upon a Court of Equity for specific performance, unless he has shewn himself ready, desirous, prompt, and eager.’ . .
CitedP and O Nedlloyd Bv v Arab Metals Co and others CA 13-Dec-2006
An order for specific performance had been refused in a disputed contract for carriage. The claimant argued that normal limitation periods should not be applied by analogy.
Held: Because there was no corresponding legal remedy the remedy in . .
CitedWilliams v Greatrex CA 1956
A purchaser agreed to buy land to be laid out in building plots. On payment of a deposit and giving notice, the purchaser was to be entitled to enter onto a particular plot in order to build on it. The arrangement met with difficulties, with the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Contract, Equity

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.361469

Ketteringham and Another v Hardy: ChD 3 Feb 2011

Two partners had together bought several properties for development, and now disputed the interests in one of them. One partneer had dies, and the refusal of development permission and the fall in property values left the land in negative equity. The court was asked to find that a partnership existed and that the estate was liable to contribute to the losses.
Held: No partnership existed. The matter was to be resolved according to the principles of equitable accounting. The real question to be determined is whether it was the common intention of the parties that Nick Ketteringham would contribute to the liability under the mortgage in the event that the net proceeds of sale were less than the sum outstanding under the mortgage. No such common contention had been expressed, and therefore the estate could not be held liable to contribute.

Behrens J
[2011] EWHC 162 (Ch), [2011] WTLR 1367
Bailii
Partnership Act 1890 24
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedClarke v Harlowe ChD 12-Aug-2005
A house was bought in the joint names of the parties. It was in bad condition. An express declaration of trust said they held as beneficial joint tenants. One tenants was earning much more than the other. He paid all the mortgage instalments. Very . .
CitedWilcox v Tait CA 13-Dec-2006
The court considered the principles of equitable accounting as between co-owners of land.
Held: The question of whether there is a liability to account depends on the intention of the parties. Jonathan Parker LJ said: ‘Moreover, it is in any . .
CitedFrench v Styring 8-May-1857
A and B were joint owners of a race horse, and had agreed that A should keep and train and have the general management of the horse, conveying him to and entering him for the different races ; that 35s. per week should be allowed for his keep ; and . .
CitedJaenicke v Schulz 1924
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Trusts, Equity

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.428427

Hosking v Marathon Asset Management Llp: ChD 5 Oct 2016

Loss of agent’s share for breach within LLP

The court was asked whether the principle that a fiduciary (in particular, an agent) who acts in breach of his fiduciary duties can lose his right to remuneration, is capable of applying to profit share of a partner in a partnership or a member of a limited liability partnership.
Held: The profit share of a partner or LLP member can potentially be subject to forfeiture. A partner or LLP member is an agent the mere fact that someone is a partner or LLP member as well as an agent should not preclude the operation of a principle which affects agents more generally.

Newey J
[2016] EWHC 2418 (Ch), [2016] WLR(D) 501, [2017] Ch 157, [2017] 2 WLR 746,
Bailii, WLRD
Arbitration Act 1996, Partnership Act 1890, Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, Limited Liability Partnership Regulations 2001
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedAndrews v Ramsay 1903
The plaintiff asked the defendant estate agents to find a purchaser for his property at a price of pounds 2,500 and if one such was found the agents’ fee would be pounds 50. A purchaser, one Clutterbuck, at pounds 2,100 was found. He paid the agents . .
CitedKeppel v Wheeler CA 1927
The plaintiff engaged the defendant estate agents to sell a property, instructing them to market it at 6,500 pounds but that he would accept 6,000 pounds. The plaintiff accepted an offer of 6,150 pounds ‘subject to contract’. Before exchange, . .
CitedImageview Management Ltd v Jack CA 13-Feb-2009
The appellant company acted for the respondent footballer in placing him with a football club. The respondent said that he had also taken a payment from the club, nominally for arranging a work permit. The respondent said this was improper. The . .
CitedBank of Ireland and Another v Jaffery and Another ChD 23-May-2012
Claim for breach of fiduciary duty brought by the Bank against one of its erstwhile senior executives.
Held: Vos J concluded that forfeiture of agency fees would be disproportionate and inequitable for breach of an employment or agency . .
CitedDunne v English CA 1874
A partner had made a secret profit from the sale of partnership property.
Held: The other partner sought and obtained relief ‘substantially in accordance with the first and second paragraphs of the prayer of the bill’, which had sought ‘a . .
CitedHelmore v Smith 1886
The relationship between partners is of a fiduciary nature.
Bacon V-C said: ‘If fiduciary relation means anything I cannot conceive a stronger case of fiduciary relation than that which exists between partners. Their mutual confidence is the . .
CitedHilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a Firm) CA 22-May-2002
The firm of solicitors acted for both parties in a conveyancing transaction, in a situation when they were permitted to do so. The firm had previously acted for one party in a case where he had been convicted of a crime. The other party said the . .
CitedAvrahami and Others v Biran and Others ChD 25-Jun-2013
Management fees were to be forfeited for breach of a fiduciary duty by an agent. . .
CitedPremium Real Estate Ltd v Stevens 6-Mar-2009
Supreme Court of New Zealand – The court was asked as to the forfeiture of remuneration by an agent for breach of fiduciary duty.
Held: In relation to remoteness of damage, it was observed that the question of foreseeability in common law . .
CitedF and C Alternative Investments (Holdings) Ltd v Barthelemy and Another (No 2) ChD 14-Jul-2011
The court was asked as to the fiduciary obligations owed by members of the board of a limited liability company.
Held: Sales J said that: ‘there is nothing in the Act to qualify the usual fiduciary obligations which an agent owes his principal . .
CitedErikson v Carr 1945
New South Wales – an individual was alleged to have disentitled himself to commission as a result of a breach of duty.
Held: Though the legal rights of the parties would depend on the jury’s conclusions as to, among other things, ‘whether it . .
CitedOlson v Gullo 1994
(Court of Appeal for Ontario) A Mr Olson and a Mr Gullo had formed a partnership to develop a tract of land. Mr Gullo nevertheless bought and sold part of the land for his own account at a substantial profit which he planned to pocket. The trial . .
CitedZahid v M Young Legal Associates Ltd and others CA 16-May-2006
Is it possible for a person to be a partner in a firm, and thus liable jointly with the other partners to creditors of the firm, even if his agreement with them is not that he should be entitled to participate in its profits but that he should be . .
CitedZahid v M Young Legal Associates Ltd and others CA 16-May-2006
Is it possible for a person to be a partner in a firm, and thus liable jointly with the other partners to creditors of the firm, even if his agreement with them is not that he should be entitled to participate in its profits but that he should be . .
CitedReinhard v Ondra Llp and Others ChD 14-Jan-2015
The parties disputed whether the claimant had become a member of the defendant limited liability partnership.
Warren J said: ‘the ‘share’ of a member [of an LLP] is the totality of the contractual or statutory rights and obligations of that . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Agency, Equity, Company

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.569924

Reeve v Lisle and others: HL 1902

In 1896 the plaintiffs agreed to lend andpound;5,000 to the defendant to be secured by a ship mortgage (executed later), requiring that if at any time during the period of two years the plaintiffs should elect to enter into partnership with the defendant, they would relieve the defendant of liability for payment of the mortgage money, and would transfer the ship, free of the mortgage, so that it could form part of the capital of the partnership. The plaintiffs did not go into partnership, but nor was the loan repaid. A further mortgage was executed, as additional security, in June 1898. In July they made a further agreement, which, after referring to the existing mortgages, the fact that the monies were outstanding and a request from the defendant for further time for payment, gave the plaintiffs a right, for five years, to enter into partnership with the defendant, in which case the same consequences would follow as had been agreed in the April 1896 agreement. In February 1900 the plaintiffs sought to exercise the right to enter into partnership with the defendant. The defendant resisted, on the basis that the right granted by the July 1898 agreement was in the nature of a clog on the right to redeem the mortgage made in June of that year. The House was asked whether the mortgage of June 1898 and the agreement of July 1898 were, in reality, one and the same transaction.
Held: It said no. The parties to a mortgage may, by a separate, independent transaction validly agree to give the mortgagee an option over the mortgaged property, and thus may have the effect of depriving the mortgagor of his right to redeem.
Lord Macnaghten said: ‘Notwithstanding the very able and ingenious argument by [counsel for the appellant] to prove that the purpose of this document [the July 1898 agreement] was really consolidation and rearrangement of the mortgages, in my opinion it was nothing of the kind.’
Lord Lindley said: ‘In point of fact, the real transaction was not taking a mortgage security for 5000l. or getting a better security than they had. The real transaction [in July 1898] was that the mortgagees were bargaining for a share in the partnership on certain terms.’

Lord Macnaghten, Lord Lindley
[1902] AC 461
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromReeve v Lisle and others CA 1902
The parties had entered into a series of agreements for loans, and partnerships. The defendants resisted a request by the plaintiff to be allowed, under the agreement, into partnership on a failure to repay the loan.
Held: The appeal . .

Cited by:
CitedJones v Morgan CA 28-Jun-2001
The claimant appealed against an order refusing him enforcement an agreement for the purchase of a one half share in a property. The judge had found the agreement to be unconscionable.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The judge had wrongly . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.443247

Imageview Management Ltd v Jack: CA 13 Feb 2009

The appellant company acted for the respondent footballer in placing him with a football club. The respondent said that he had also taken a payment from the club, nominally for arranging a work permit. The respondent said this was improper. The agent now appealed.
Held: The side deal was and act within the agency and should have been disclosed. This was not an honest breach of contract. This was a secret profit and a breach of fiduciary duty because of the conflict of interest. Not only was the secret payment to be paid across, but no further agency fees were payable.
Jacob LJ said: ‘The law imposes on agents high standards. Footballers’ agents are not exempt from these. An agent’s own personal interests come entirely second to the interest of his client. If you undertake to act for a man you must act 100%, body and soul, for him. You must act as if you were him. You must not allow your own interest to get in the way without telling him. An undisclosed but realistic possibility of a conflict of interest is a breach of your duty of good faith to your client.’ and ‘I accept [counsel for the agent’s] submission that there can be cases of harmless collaterality. And that there can be cases where there is just an honest breach of contract such as Keppel’s case [1927] 1 KB 577. But this is simply not such a case. This is a case of a secret profit obtained because Mr Berry/Imageview was Mr Jack’s agent. And there was a breach of a fiduciary duty because of a real conflict of interest. That in itself would be enough, but there is more: the profit was not only greater than the work done but was related to the very contract which was being negotiated for Mr Jack. Once a conflict of interest is shown, as Atkin LJ said in the last passage quoted, the right to remuneration goes’.
and ‘The policy reason runs as follows. We are here concerned not with merely damages such as those for a tort or breach of contract but with what the remedy should be when the agent has betrayed the trust reposed in him – notions of equity and conscience are brought into play. Necessarily such a betrayal may not come to light. If all the agent has to pay if and when he is found out are damages the temptation to betray the trust reposed in him is all the greater. So the strict rule is there as a real deterrent to betrayal. As Scrutton LJ said in Rhodes’s case 29 Com Cas 19, 28, ‘The more that principle is enforced, the better for the honesty of commercial transactions”.

Mummery LJ, Dyson LJ, Jacob LJ
[2009] EWCA Civ 63, [2009] WLR (D) 56, [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 921, [2009] 2 All ER 666, [2009] 1 BCLC 724, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 436, [2009] Bus LR 1034
Bailii, Times, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSalomons v Pender 21-Apr-1865
When a person who purports to act as an agent is not in a position to say to his principal, ‘I have been acting as your agent, and I have done my duty by you,’ he is not entitled to recover any commission from that principal.
Bramwell B said: . .
CitedHippisley v Knee Bros CA 1903
The defendant auctioneers were employed by the plaintiff to sell some goods. The payment was to be percentage commission with a minimum of andpound;20, certain fixed amounts and ‘all out of pocket’ expenses, particularly advertising. The sale . .
CitedBoston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co v Ansell CA 1888
An employer having dismissed an employee (its managing director) later learnt of the employee’s fraud.
Held: The employer was allowed to rely upon that fraud to justify the dismissal. Where an agent is in wrongful repudiation of his contract . .
CitedAndrews v Ramsay 1903
The plaintiff asked the defendant estate agents to find a purchaser for his property at a price of pounds 2,500 and if one such was found the agents’ fee would be pounds 50. A purchaser, one Clutterbuck, at pounds 2,100 was found. He paid the agents . .
CitedNitedals Taenstikfabrik v Bruster 1906
Commission was allowed for an agent despite an alleged breach of duty. Neville J discussed Andrews v Ramsay saying its doctrine: ‘does not apply to the case of an agency where the transactions in question are separable’ . .
CitedStubbs v Slater 1910
A deposit by guarantors who had agreed ‘to assign to [the Bank] their certificates of shares in [PPL] by way of deposit’, together with endorsed transfers in blank, would create an equitable mortgage with an implied power of sale. Neville J . .
CitedRhodes v Macalister CA 1923
The plaintiff agent acted to find a seller of mineral rights for the defendant principal. He told his principal that the properties could be purchased for from andpound;8,000 to andpound;10,000. If the agent could find a seller at below . .
CitedKeppel v Wheeler CA 1927
The plaintiff engaged the defendant estate agents to sell a property, instructing them to market it at 6,500 pounds but that he would accept 6,000 pounds. The plaintiff accepted an offer of 6,150 pounds ‘subject to contract’. Before exchange, . .
CitedO’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Limited CA 1985
The claimant alleged undue influence. As a young singer he had entered into a management agreement with the defendant which he said were prejudicial and unfair. The defendant argued that the ‘doctrine of restitutio in integrum applied only to the . .
CitedDalkia Utilities Services Plc v Celtech International Ltd ComC 27-Jan-2006
The Court was asked to decide (i) which, if either, of the two parties to a 15 year agreement lawfully terminated it; (ii) whether, if one of them did so, it was by giving notice under a contractual termination clause or by way of acceptance of the . .
CitedPhipps v Boardman HL 3-Nov-1966
A trustee has a duty to exploit any available opportunity for the trust. ‘Rules of equity have to be applied to such a great diversity of circumstances that they can be stated only in the most general terms and applied with particular attention to . .
CitedRobinson Scammel v Ansell 1985
. .
CitedKelly v Cooper and Another PC 25-Nov-1992
There was a dispute between a client and an estate agent in Bermuda. The client sued the estate agent for damages for breach of duty in failing to disclose material information to him and for putting himself in a position where his duty and his . .
CitedWarman International Ltd v Dwyer 1995
(High Court of Australia) A fiduciary diverted a business in breach of his fiduciary duty.
Held: ‘The outcome in cases of this kind will depend upon a number of factors. They include the nature of the property, the relevant powers and . .
CitedMurad and Another v Al Saraj and Another CA 29-Jul-2005
An account of profits is available without proof of loss, and the onus is upon the defaulting party to show that profits are not ones for which he should account . .

Cited by:
CitedAvrahami and Others v Biran and Others ChD 25-Jun-2013
Management fees were to be forfeited for breach of a fiduciary duty by an agent. . .
CitedHosking v Marathon Asset Management Llp ChD 5-Oct-2016
Loss of agent’s share for breach within LLP
The court was asked whether the principle that a fiduciary (in particular, an agent) who acts in breach of his fiduciary duties can lose his right to remuneration, is capable of applying to profit share of a partner in a partnership or a member of a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Agency, Equity

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.282631

G and C Kreglinger v The New Patagonian Meat and Cold Storage Company: HL 20 Nov 1913

Mortgagor’s collateral dvantage is not a clog

The appellant woolbrokers had lent the respondent andpound;10,000 with a floating charge over its undertaking. The loan agreement provided that, for five years, the appellants would have first refusal over all sheepskins sold by the company. The company paid off the loan, but the appellants claimed that they were entitled to continue to exercise their right of first refusal.
Held: The right of first refusal not part of the mortgage transaction; but was a collateral contract entered into as a condition of the company obtaining the loan. The appellants could therefore entitled to enforce it. Whilst courts are loathe to interfere with freedom of contract, they will intervene where evidence showed that terms imposed by a mortgagee are unconscientious. To do so, the courts will consider both the form and substance of the transaction.
Lord Parker of Waddington discussed the survival of the rule against a clog on an equity of redemption, saying that it was not objectionable for a mortgage to confer a collateral advantage upon a mortgagee: ‘The last of the usury laws was repealed in 1854, and thenceforward there was, in my opinion, no intelligent reason why mortgages to secure loans should be on any different footing from other mortgages. In particular, there was no reason why the old rule against a mortgagee being able to stipulate for a collateral advantage should be maintained in any form or with any modification. Borrowers of money were fully protected from oppression by the pains always taken by the Court of Chancery to see that the bargain between borrower and lender was not unconscionable. Unfortunately, at the time when the last of the usury laws was repealed, the origin of the rule appears to have been more or less forgotten, and the cases decided since such repeal exhibit an extraordinary diversity of judicial opinion on the subject. It is little wonder that, with the existence in the authorities of so many contradictory theories, persons desiring to repudiate a fair and reasonable bargain have attempted to obtain the assistance of the Court in that behalf. My Lords, to one who, like myself, has always admired the way in which the Court of Chancery succeeded in supplementing our common law system in accordance with the exigencies of a growing civilization, it is satisfactory to find, as I have found on analysing the cases in question, that no such attempt has yet been successful. In every case in which a stipulation by a mortgagee for a collateral advantage has, since the repeal of the usury laws, been held invalid, the stipulation has been open to objection, either (1) because it was unconscionable, or (2) because it was in the nature of a penal clause clogging the equity arising on failure to exercise a contractual right to redeem, or (3) because it was in the nature of a condition repugnant as well to the contractual as to the equitable right.’ and
‘The nature of the equitable right [to redeem] is so well known that, upon a mortgage in the usual form to secure a money payment on a certain day, it must be taken to be a term of the real bargain between the parties that the property shall remain redeemable in equity after failure to exercise the contractual right. Any fetter or clog imposed by the instrument of mortgage on this equitable right may properly be regarded as a repugnant condition and as such invalid. There are, however, repugnant conditions which cannot be regarded as mere penalties intended to deter the exercise of the equitable right which arises when the time for the exercise of the contractual right has gone by, but which are repugnant to the contractual right itself. A condition to the effect that if the contractual right is not exercised by the time specified the mortgagee shall have the option of purchasing the mortgaged property may properly be regarded as a penal clause. It is repugnant only to the equity and not to the contractual right itself. But a condition that the mortgagee is to have such an option for a period which begins before the time for the exercise of the equitable right has arrived, or which reserves to the mortgagee any interest in the property after the exercise of the contractual right, is inconsistent not only with the equity but with the contractual right itself, and might, I think, be held invalid for repugnancy even in a Court of Law.’
As to the doctrine of precedent: ‘To follow previous authorities, so far as they lay down principles, is essential if the law is to be preserved from becoming unsettled and vague. In this respect previous decisions of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction are more binding in a system of jurisprudence such as ours than in systems where the paramount authority is that of a code. When a previous case has not laid down any principle, but has merely decided that a particular set of facts illustrates an existing rule, there are few more fertile sources of fallacy than to search in it for what is simply resemblances in circumstances, and to erect a previous decision into a governing precedent merely on this account. To look for anything except the principle established or recognized by previous decisions is really to weaken and not to strengthen the importance of precedent. The consideration of cases which turn on particular facts may often be useful for edification, but it can rarely yield authoritative guidance.’ The evolving nature of the equitable jurisdiction is ‘to mould the rules which they apply in accordance with the exigencies at the time’.
Lord Parker explained the decision in Bradley v Carritt: ‘The real question, in my opinion, was whether it [the clause in question] was inconsistent with or repugnant to the contractual right of the mortgagee [quaere, mortgagor] to have his property restored unfettered if he paid the money secured with interest as provided in the agreement, and the consequential equitable right to have the property so restored if he paid his money with interest and costs at any time. On this point there was room for a difference of opinion . . There is really no difficulty in the decision itself. It is merely to the effect that the case was within the principles of Noakes v Rice. Lords Macnaghten, Davey, and Robertson all thought that if the stipulations in question were binding after redemption the mortgagor would not get back his property intact; in other words, that the stipulation was repugnant both to the contractual right and the equity.’
Lord Mersey agreeing, said that the equitable doctrine prohibiting the imposition of a clog on the mortgagor’s right to redeem is ‘like an unruly dog, which, if not securely chained to its own kennel, is prone to wander into places where it ought not to be’.
Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor, said: ‘the other and wider principle remains unshaken, that it is the essence of a mortgage that in the eye of a Court of Equity it should be a mere security for money, and that no bargain can be validly made which will prevent the mortgagor from redeeming on payment of what is due, including principal, interest and costs. He may stipulate that he will not pay off his debt, and so redeem the mortgage, for a fixed period. But whenever the right to redeem arises out of the doctrine of equity, he is precluded from fettering it. This principle has become an integral part of our system of jurisprudence and must be faithfully adhered to.’
The issue for decision was: ‘What was the true character of the transaction? Did the appellants make a bargain such that the right to redeem was cut down, or did they simply stipulate for a collateral undertaking, outside and clear of the mortgage, which would give them an exclusive option of purchase of the sheepskins of the respondents. The question is in my opinion not whether the two contracts were made at the same moment and evidenced by the same instrument, but whether they were in substance a single and undivided contract or two distinct contracts.’ The agreement for a right to purchase the respondent’s sheepskins was a collateral bargain ‘the entering into which was a preliminary and separable condition of the loan’.

Viscount Haldane, Lord Parker
[1914] AC 25, [1913] UKHL 1
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedNoakes and Co Ltd v Rice HL 17-Dec-1901
Rule Against Clog on equity of Redemption
A mortgage of a leasehold public house contained a covenant with the mortgagee, a brewery, that the mortgagor and his successors in title would not, during the continuance of the leasehold term and whether or not any money should be owing on the . .
ExplainedBradley v Carritt HL 11-May-1903
Shares in a tea company had been mortgaged to secure a loan from a broker on terms that the mortgagor would seek to ensure that the mortgagee should thereafter have sale of the company’s teas. The mortgage contained a covenant that, if the company . .

Cited by:
CitedRegina v Naviede CACD 21-Mar-1997
The defendant appealed from his conviction for dishonesty. He said that he should have allowed hi to represent himself as to certain aspect of his case, but to have legal representation for others.
Held: The judge was right to reject such a . .
AppliedCityland and Property (Holdings) Ltd v Dabrah 1968
The mortgage secured a debt of pounds 2,900 owing by the mortgagor to the mortgagee. The mortgagor covenanted to pay the mortgagee pounds 4,553 by monthly instalments over a six year period. The return to the mortgagee was in the form of a premium . .
CitedBrighton and Hove City Council v Audus ChD 26-Feb-2009
The claimant was the proprietor of a fourth legal charge on a title. It sought a declaration that a second charge in favour of the defendant was void as a clog on the proprietor’s equity of redemption. An advance secured by a first charge, also in . .
CitedWarnborough Ltd v Garmite Ltd CA 5-Nov-2003
Warnborough (W) sold real property to Garmite (G), leaving the purchase price outstanding but secured by a mortgage in favour of W. G also granted W an option to repurchase the property. The issue was whether the option to repurchase was ‘a clog on . .
CitedWarnborough Ltd v Garmite Ltd ChD 12-Jan-2006
The claimant sought specific performance under a contract for sale of two leasehold properties. The defendant claimed inter alia that the agreement worked as a clog on the equity of the properties. . .
CitedJones v Morgan CA 28-Jun-2001
The claimant appealed against an order refusing him enforcement an agreement for the purchase of a one half share in a property. The judge had found the agreement to be unconscionable.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The judge had wrongly . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Constitutional, Contract, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.189952

Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA v Shipping Corporation of India (The Kanchenjunga): HL 1990

A ship was caught in harbour when an air raid broke out. The master took the ship to sea where it suffered damage.
Held: The shipowners were protected by a war risks clause in the charterparty agreement. As to waiver by election, Lord Goff of Chieveley said: ‘In the present case, we are concerned with an election which may arise in the context of a binding contract, when a state of affairs comes into existence in which one party becomes entitled, either under the terms of the contract or by the general law, to exercise a right, and he has to decide whether or not to do so. His decision, being a matter of choice for him, is called in law an election. Characteristically, this state of affairs arises where the other party has repudiated the contract or has otherwise committed a breach of the contract which entitles the innocent party to bring it to an end, or has made a tender of performance which does not conform to the terms of the contract. .
In all cases, he has in the end to make his election, not as a matter of obligation, but in the sense that, if he does not do so, the time may come when the law takes the decision out of his hands, either by holding him to have elected not to exercise the right which has become available to him, or sometimes by holding him to have elected to exercise it. Instances of this phenomenon are to be found in s. 35 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. In particular, where with knowledge of the relevant facts a party has acted in a manner which is consistent only with his having chosen one of the two alternative and inconsistent courses of action then open to him – for example, to determine a contract or alternatively to affirm it – he is held to have made his election accordingly . . perhaps because a party who elects not to exercise a right which has become available to him is abandoning that right, he will only be held to have done so if he has so communicated his election to the other party in clear and unequivocal terms Moreover, it does not require consideration to support it, and so it is to be distinguished from an express or implied agreement, such as a variation of the relevant contract, which traditionally requires consideration to render it binding in English Law.’

Lord Goff of Chieveley
Times 19-Feb-1990, [1990] CLY 4077, [1990] 1 Lloyds Rep 391
Sale of Goods Act 1979 35
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedOliver Ashworth (Holdings) Limited v Ballard (Kent) Limited CA 18-Mar-1999
In order for the landlord to claim double rent where a tenant held over unlawfully after the tenancy was determined, the landlord must not do anything to indicate that the lease might be continuing, for example by denying the validity of break . .
CitedPeregrine Systems Ltd v Steria Ltd CA 14-Mar-2005
The claimant provided computer software to the defendants. The defendants appealed dismissal of their defences arguing that the system had failed.
Held: No repudiatory breach was established, and moreover Steria had elected to affirm the . .
CitedStocznia Gdynia Sa v Gearbulk Holdings Ltd CA 13-Feb-2009
Orders were placed for the construction of ships. They were not delivered. The buyer, the defendant, cancelled the orders. The defendants sought the loss of profit. The claimants said they were entitled only to the repayment of instalments. The . .
CitedWheatley, Smith As Executors of Henry Thomas Cadbury-Brown v King LRA 30-Nov-2011
LRA Estoppel – Exercise of options – whether defect waived – ‘The Kanchenjunga’ [1990] Lloyds Law Reports 391 – Peyman v Lanjani [1985] 1 Ch 457, HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v AXA Corporate Solutions . .
ExplainedTele2 International Card Company Sa and others v Post Office Ltd CA 21-Jan-2009
Appeal against rejection of claim for novation of contract.
Held: Aikens LJ summarised the analysis by Lord Goff of the principles of affirmation by election in Kanchenjunga as follows: ‘i) If a contract gives a party a right to terminate upon . .
CitedForce India Formula One Team Ltd v 1 Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd and Others ChD 21-Mar-2012
The claimants alleged misuse by the defendants of confidential information.
Held: Arnold J said: ‘Confidential information is not property, however, even though businessmen often deal with confidential information as if it were property and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insurance, Contract, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.188152

FHR European Ventures Llp and Others v Cedar Capital Partners Llc: SC 16 Jul 2014

Approprietary remedy against Fraudulent Agent

The Court was asked whether a bribe or secret commission received by an agent is held by the agent on trust for his principal, or whether the principal merely has a claim for equitable compensation in a sum equal to the value of the bribe or commission.
Held: The appeal failed. An agent receiving a secret commission in breach of his fiduciary duties to his principal, held that commission or bribe in trust for that principal, and a proprietary remedy was available in respect of it.
There had been conflicting decisions and much academic discussion over the years as to the availability of the remedy requested. Where an agent acquires a benefit which came to his notice as a result of his fiduciary position, or pursuant to an opportunity which results from his fiduciary position, the general equitable rule (‘the Rule’) is that he is to be treated as having acquired the benefit on behalf of his principal, so it is beneficially owned by the principal. How did the rule apply where the bribe was taken by an agent in breach of his fiduciary duty.

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath, Lord Toulson, Lord Hodge, Lord Collins
[2014] UKSC 45, [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 471, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 425, [2014] WTLR 1135, [2014] 4 All ER 79, [2015] 1 AC 250, [2014] Lloyd’s Rep FC 617, [2014] 3 WLR 535, [2014] WLR(D) 317, [2014] 2 BCLC 145, [2015] 1 P and CR DG1, UKSC 2013/0049
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC, SC Summary, SC Video
England and Wales
Citing:
At ChDFHR European Ventures Llp and Others v Mankarious and Others ChD 5-Sep-2011
The claimants sought return of what it said were secret commissions earned by the defendants when working as their agents, and the defendants counterclaimed saying that the commissions had been known to the claimants and that additional sums were . .
Appeal fromFHR European Ventures Llp and Others v Mankarious and Others CA 29-Jan-2013
The defendants had taken a secret commission when acting for the claimant. They had succeeded in their action and had an order in their favour, but had been refused a proprietary remedy for the sum received.
Held: The appeal was allowed, and a . .
CitedKeech v Sandford ChD 1726
Trustee’s Renewed Lease also Within Trust
A landlord refused to renew a lease to a trustee for the benefit of a minor. The trustee then took a new lease for his own benefit. The new lease had not formed part of the original trust property; the minor could not have acquired the new lease . .
CitedCarter, Esq v Sir William Henry Palmer, Bart 17-Mar-1842
The employment of counsel as confidential legal adviser disables him from purchasing for his own benefit charges on his client’s etates, without his permission ; and although the confidential employment ceases, the disability continues as long as . .
CitedBowes v The City Of Toronto PC 15-Feb-1858
The mayor of a city who bought discounted debentures issued by the city was in the same position as an agent vis-a-vis the city, and was to be treated as holding the debentures on trust for the city. . .
CitedDunne v English CA 1874
A partner had made a secret profit from the sale of partnership property.
Held: The other partner sought and obtained relief ‘substantially in accordance with the first and second paragraphs of the prayer of the bill’, which had sought ‘a . .
CitedBagnall v Carlton CA 1877
Agents for a prospective company who made secret profits out of a contract made by the company were held to be ‘trustees for the company’ of those profits . .
CitedCook v Deeks and Hinds PC 23-Feb-1916
Company Directors not free to prefer Own Interests
Deeks and Hinds were the directors of a construction company. They negotiated a lucrative construction contract with the Canadian Pacific Railway. During the negotiations, they decided to enter into the contract personally, on their own behalves, . .
CitedRegal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver HL 20-Feb-1942
Directors Liability for Actions Ouside the Company
Regal negotiated for the purchase of two cinemas in Hastings. There were five directors on the board, including Mr Gulliver, the chairman. Regal incorporated a subsidiary, Hastings Amalgamated Cinemas Ltd, with a share capital of 5,000 pounds. There . .
CitedPhipps v Boardman ChD 1964
Agents of certain trustees had purchased shares, in circumstances where they only had that opportunity because they were agents.
Held: The shares were held beneficially for the trust. . .
CitedMothew (T/a Stapley and Co) v Bristol and West Building Society CA 24-Jul-1996
The solicitor, acting in a land purchase transaction for his lay client and the plaintiff, had unwittingly misled the claimant by telling the claimant that the purchasers were providing the balance of the purchase price themselves without recourse . .
CitedBhullar and others v Bhullar and Another CA 31-Mar-2003
The claimants were 50% shareholders in a property investment company and sought relief alleging prejudicial conduct of the company’s affairs. After a falling out, two directors purchased property adjacent to a company property but in their own . .
CitedBarker v Harrison 16-Apr-1846
A vendor’s agent had secretly negotiated a sub-sale of part of the property from the purchaser at an advantageous price.
Held: that asset was held on trust for the vendor. . .
CitedFawcett v Whitehouse 21-Dec-1829
The defendant, intending to enter into a partnership with the plaintiffs, negotiated for the grant by a landlord of a lease to the partnership. The landlord paid the defendant andpound;12,000 for persuading the partnership to accept the lease.
CitedSugden v Crossland 18-Feb-1856
A sum of money paid to a trustee to persuade him to retire in favour of the payee was to be ‘treated as a part of the trust fund’. . .
CitedIn re Morvah Consols Tin Mining Co, McKay’s Case CA 1875
A company bought a mine, and shares in the vendor were promised to the company’s secretary.
Held: The shares were held by him for the company beneficially. . .
CitedIn re Western of Canada Oil, Lands and Works Co, Carling, Hespeler, and Walsh’s Cases CA 1875
Shares which had been transferred by a person to individuals to induce them to become directors of a company and to agree that the company would buy land from the person, were held by the individuals on trust for the company. . .
CitedIn re Caerphilly Colliery Co, Pearson’s Case CA 1877
A company director, had received shares from the promoters and then acted for the company in its purchase of a colliery from the promoters.
Held: The shares were held on trust for the company. . .
CitedNant-y-glo and Blaina Ironworks Co v Grave 1878
Shares in a company had been given by a promoter to the defendant to induce him to become a director.
Held: They belonged to the company. . .
CitedEden v Ridsdale Railway Lamp and Lighting Co Ltd CA 1889
The company was held to be entitled as against a director to shares which he had secretly received from a person with whom the company was negotiating. . .
CitedMartin v Lowry (HM Inspector of Taxes) KBD 15-Jun-1925
The taxpayer had other business, but purchased a substantial quantity of cloth and resold it. He said this was not by way of trade. The Revenue said that he had used all the standard trade practices, and it was taxable as such.
Held: The . .
CitedMartin v Lowry (HM Inspector of Taxes) CA 1926
The appellant purchased the entire stock of government surplus aircraft linen. He had another main business and had intended to resell it immediately. When that failed to promise a profit he set out to sell and sold the material over several months . .
CitedWilliams v Barton 1927
A trustee, who recommended that his co-trustees use stockbrokers who gave him a commission, held the commission on trust for the trust. . .
CitedTyrrell v The Bank Of London And Sir J v Shelley And Others HL 27-Feb-1862
A solicitor retained to act for a company in the course of formation secretly arranged to benefit from his prospective client’s anticipated acquisition of a building called the ‘Hall of Commerce’ by obtaining from the owner a 50% beneficial interest . .
CitedMetropolitan Bank v Heiron CA 1880
A claim brought by a company against a director was time-barred: the claim was to recover a bribe paid by a third party to induce the director to influence the company to negotiate a favourable settlement with the third party. The bank failed in its . .
CitedLister and Co v Stubbs CA 1890
It was alleged by the plaintiffs that their foreman had received secret commissions which he had invested in land and other investments. They sought interlocutory relief to prevent him dealing with the land and requiring him to bring the other . .
CitedIn re North Australian Territory Co, Archer’s case CA 1892
A bribe had been paid to an agent. . .
CitedDiplock And Others v Blackburn 19-Jul-1811
If the master of a ship in a foreign port, from the state of the exchange, receives a premum for a bill drawn upon England on account of the ship, this belongs to his owner, although there may have been a usage for masters of shps to apprapriate . .
CitedThe Attorney General of Hong Kong v Reid and Reid And Marc Molloy Co PC 1-Nov-1993
(New Zealand) The Board considered the power to recover property owned by a public official found to have taken bribes.
Held: The bribes received by the policeman were held on trust for his principal, and so they could be traced into . .
CitedKak Loui Chan v Zacharia 1984
(High Court of Australia) The fundamental rule that obliged fiduciaries to account for personal benefit or gain had two separate themes: ‘The variations between more precise formulations of the principle governing the liability to account are . .
CitedFyffes Group Ltd v Templeman and others ComC 22-May-2000
The claimants alleged that over a five year period from 1992 to 1996 their employee Mr Simon Templeman, the first defendant, took bribes amounting to over US $1.4 million from or with the connivance of the second to seventh defendants. The essential . .
CitedDaraydan Holdings Limited, Cairn Estates Limited and Others v Solland International Limited and Others ChD 26-Mar-2004
The court was asked whether Lister and Co v Stubbs 45 ChD 1, a decision of the Court of Appeal, was binding on him or whether he could apply the Privy Council’s decision in Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid
Held: On the facts of the case . .
CitedSinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd and Others CA 29-Mar-2011
The appellant challenged a decision that it was not entitled to a proprietary interest in the proceeds of sale of some shares which had been acquired with the proceeds of a breach of trust. Specifically, the claims gave rise to (i) an issue as to . .
CitedGrimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) 21-Feb-2012
Federal Court of Australia
CORPORATIONS – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9 – ‘director’ – ‘officer’ – de facto director – no single test for determining whether a person is such – assuming or performing the functions of a director of the . .

Cited by:
CitedAIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co Solicitors SC 5-Nov-2014
Bank not to recover more than its losses
The court was asked as to the remedy available to the appellant bank against the respondent, a firm of solicitors, for breach of the solicitors’ custodial duties in respect of money entrusted to them for the purpose of completing a loan which was to . .
CitedBailey and Another v Angove’s Pty Ltd SC 27-Jul-2016
The defendant had agreed to act as the claimant’s agent and distributor of the claimant’s wines in the UK. It acted both as agent and also bought wines on its own account. When the defendant went into litigation the parties disputed the right of the . .
CitedCrown Prosecution Service v Aquila Advisory Ltd SC 3-Nov-2021
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Agency, Equity, Torts – Other

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.534405

Phipps v Boardman: HL 3 Nov 1966

A trustee has a duty to exploit any available opportunity for the trust. ‘Rules of equity have to be applied to such a great diversity of circumstances that they can be stated only in the most general terms and applied with particular attention to the exact circumstances of each case. The relevant rule for the decision of this case is the fundamental rule of equity that a person in a fiduciary capacity must not make a profit out of his trust, which is part of the wider rule that a trustee must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict.’
‘The whole of the law is laid down in the fundamental principle exemplified in Lord Cranworth’s statement [in Aberdeen Railway Co v. Blaikie]. But it is applicable, like so many equitable principles which may affect a conscience, however innocent, to such a diversity of different cases that the observations of judges and even in your Lordships’ House in cases where this great principle is being applied must be regarded as applicable only to the particular facts of the particular case in question and not regarded as a new and slightly different formulation of the legal principle so well settled.’ and ‘The phrase ‘possibly may conflict’ requires consideration. In my view it means that the reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case would think that there was a real sensible possibility of conflict; not that you could imagine some situation arising which might, in some conceivable possibility in events not contemplated as real sensible possibilities by any reasonable person, result in conflict.’
The court considered the circumstances under which information has been acquired which impose a duty of confidence: ‘The true test is to determine in what circumstances the information has been acquired. If it has been acquired in such circumstances that it would be a breach of confidence to disclose it to another then courts of equity will restrain the recipient from communicating it to another. In such cases such confidential information is often and for many years has been described as the property of the donor, the books of authority are full of such references: knowledge of secret processes, ‘know-how’, confidential information as to the prospects of a company or of someone’s intention or the expected results of some horse race based on stable or other confidential information. But in the end the real truth is that it is not property in any normal sense but equity will restrain its transmission to another if in breach of some confidential relationship.’
Lord Upjohn said: ‘In general, information is not property at all. It is normally open to all who have eyes to read and ears to hear. The true test is to determine in what circumstances the information has been acquired. If it has been acquired in such circumstances that it would be a breach of confidence to disclose it to another, then courts of equity will restrain the recipient from communicating it to another. In such cases such confidential information is often and for many years has been described as the property of the donor, the books of authority are full of such references; knowledge of secret processes, ‘know-how’, confidential information as to the prospects of a company or of someone’s intention or the expected results of some horse race based on stable or other confidential information. But in the end the real truth is that it is not property in any normal sense, but equity will restrain its transmission to another if in breach of some confidential relationship’.

Lord Upjohn, Lord Hodson
[1966] 3 All ER 721, [1967] 2 AC 46, [1966] UKHL 2
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBray v Ford HL 1896
An appellate court’s power to order a new trial is conditional on ‘some substantial wrong or miscarriage’ being established.
Lord Hershell said: ‘It is an inflexible rule of the court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position, such as . .
Appeal fromPhipps v Boardman CA 1965
Affirmed . .
At first instancePhipps v Boardman ChD 1964
Agents of certain trustees had purchased shares, in circumstances where they only had that opportunity because they were agents.
Held: The shares were held beneficially for the trust. . .

Cited by:
CitedBhullar and others v Bhullar and Another CA 31-Mar-2003
The claimants were 50% shareholders in a property investment company and sought relief alleging prejudicial conduct of the company’s affairs. After a falling out, two directors purchased property adjacent to a company property but in their own . .
CitedNew Zealand Netherlands Society ‘Oranje’ Inc v Laurentuis Cornelis Kuys PC 1963
(New Zealand) The scope of a fiduciary duty may be modified by a course of dealing by the person to whom the duty is owed. ‘The obligation not to profit from a position of trust, or, as it sometimes relevant to put it, not to allow a conflict to . .
CitedCrown Dilmun, Dilmun Investments Limited v Nicholas Sutton, Fulham River Projects Limited ChD 23-Jan-2004
There was a contract for the sale of Craven Cottage football stadium, conditional upon the grant of non-onerous planning permissions. It was claimed that the contract had been obtained by the defendant employee in breach of his fiduciary duties to . .
CitedDouglas and others v Hello! Ltd and others (No 3) CA 18-May-2005
The principal claimants sold the rights to take photographs of their wedding to a co-claimant magazine (OK). Persons acting on behalf of the defendants took unauthorised photographs which the defendants published. The claimants had retained joint . .
CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
CitedRatiu, Karmel, Regent House Properties Ltd v Conway CA 22-Nov-2005
The claimant sought damages for defamation. The defendant through their company had accused him acting in such a way as to allow a conflict of interest to arise. They said that he had been invited to act on a proposed purchase but had used the . .
CitedImageview Management Ltd v Jack CA 13-Feb-2009
The appellant company acted for the respondent footballer in placing him with a football club. The respondent said that he had also taken a payment from the club, nominally for arranging a work permit. The respondent said this was improper. The . .
CitedO’Donnell v Shanahan and Another CA 22-Jul-2009
The claimant appealed against dismissal of her petition for an order for the defendants to purchase her shares at a fair value, saying that they had acted unfairly toward her. Her co-directors had acquired, for another company of which they were . .
CitedGray v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Another; Coogan v Same ChD 25-Feb-2011
The claimants said that agents of the defendant had unlawfully accessed their mobile phone systems. The court was now asked whether the agent (M) could rely on the privilege against self incrimination, and otherwise as to the progress of the case. . .
CitedPhillips v Mulcaire SC 24-May-2012
The claimant worked as personal assistant to a well known public relations company. She alleged that the defendant had intercepted telephone message given by and left for her. The court was asked first as to whether the information amounted to . .
CitedHalton International Inc (Holding) and Another v Guernroy Ltd ChD 9-Sep-2005
Parties had entered into a shareholders’ agreement as to voting arrengemets within a company. Thay disputed whether votes had been used in reach of that agreement, particularly as to the issue of new shares and their allotment, but the court now . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Trusts, Information

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.180410

Geldof Metaalconstructie Nv v Simon Carves Ltd: CA 11 Jun 2010

The parties contracted for the supply and installation of pressure vessels by Geldof (G) for a building constructed by Simon Carves (SC). The contract contained a clause denying the remedy of set-off. G sued for the sale price, and SC now sought an equitable set off of damages for repudiation. The judge had put the question as that it was for SCL to show that there was an ‘inseparable connection’ between claim and counterclaim, and that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the former to be enforced without regard to the latter. He did not find that connection.
Held: The appeal against summary judgment denying the right of set off succeeded. The court examined in depth the development of the law of equitable set off and concluded: ‘I would underline Lord Denning’s test, freed of any reference to the concept of impeachment, as the best restatement of the test, and the one most frequently referred to and applied, namely: ‘cross-claims . . so closely connected with [the plaintiff’s] demands that it would be manifestly unjust to allow him to enforce payment without taking into account the cross-claim’.’ (‘the Nanfri’)
In this case, two contracts were involved.

Maurice Kay VP CA, Rix, Patten LJJ
[2010] EWCA Civ 667, [2010] CILL 2880, [2010] 4 All ER 847, [2011] Bus LR D61, 130 Con LR 37
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBim Kemi v Blackburn Chemicals Ltd CA 3-Apr-2001
The question was the degree of connection which must be shown between (1) a claim for unliquidated damages for breach of a contract and (2) a cross-claim for unliquidated damages for breach of a different contract between the same parties, in order . .
CitedHanak v Green CA 1958
A builder was sued for his failure to complete the works he had contracted for. The buider sought a set-off against that claim of three of his one claims. One, under the contract, was for losses from the defendant’s refusal to allow his workmen . .
CitedBankes v Jarvis 1903
The plaintiff was his son’s agent. The son purchased a veterinary surgeon’s practice from the defendant, agreeing to pay the rent and indemnify the defendant against liability under a lease of premises from which the practice was carried on. The son . .
CitedAries Tanker Corp v Total Transport Ltd; The Aries HL 1977
Claims for freight charges are an exception to the general rule that all claims between parties must be resolved in one action. A claim for freight cannot be a claim ‘on the same grounds’ as a counter-claim for loss or damage arising out of the . .
FollowedFederal Commerce Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc; (The ‘Nanfri’) CA 1978
The court considered whether claim as against a shipowner could be set off against sums due under a time charter hire.
Held: Save for any contractual provision to the contrary a tenant is entitled to deduct from the rent payable, so as to . .
CitedLeon Corporation v Atlantic Lines and Navigation Co Inc (‘The Leon’) 1985
The court discussed the application of the equitable doctrine of set-off. Justice Hobhouse said: ‘Equitable principles derive from a sense of what justice and fairness demand. This does not mean that equitable set-off has been reduced to an exercise . .
CitedFederal Commerce Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc (The Nanfri) HL 1979
The charterers of three ships on time charter had made deductions from time charter hire payments which the shipowners regarded as unjustified. In retaliation the shipowners purported to revoke the authority of the Charterers (to be implied under . .
CitedDole Dried Fruit and Nut Co v Trustin Kerwood Ltd CA 1990
The defendant had an exclusive distributorship agency for the plaintiff in England. Under that agreement, the plaintiff sold its prunes and raisins to the defendant under separate contracts of sale. The plaintiff claimed the price of goods sold . .
CitedGovernment of Newfoundland v Newfoundland Railway PC 7-Feb-1888
A railway company and its assignees brought action the Government. Under the contract the company was to build a railway subsidised by the government. The railway was not completed. The parties disputed whether the contract was ‘entire’ and no part . .
CitedRawson v Samuel 15-Apr-1841
Cottenham LC said: ‘We speak familiarly of equitable set-off as distinguished from set-off at law, but it will be found that this equitable set-off exists in cases where the party seeking the benefit of it can show some equitable ground for being . .
CitedModern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd v Gilbert Ash (Northern) Ltd HL 1974
The court considered how to construe a clause in a contract which excluded a remedy provided by law. Lord Diplock said: ‘It is, of course, open to parties to a contract . . to exclude by express agreement a remedy for its breach which would . .
CitedEsso Petroleum Company Ltd v Milton CA 5-Feb-1997
A direct debit arrangement is tantamount to a payment by cash and so precludes the use of the defence of set-off for non-payment. . .
CitedEsso Petroleum Company Ltd v Mardon CA 6-Feb-1976
Statements had been made by employees of Esso in the course of pre-contractual negotiations with Mr Mardon, the prospective tenant of a petrol station. The statements related to the potential throughput of the station. Mr Mardon was persuaded by the . .
CitedStocznia Gdynia Sa v Gearbulk Holdings Ltd CA 13-Feb-2009
Orders were placed for the construction of ships. They were not delivered. The buyer, the defendant, cancelled the orders. The defendants sought the loss of profit. The claimants said they were entitled only to the repayment of instalments. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Equity

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.416737

Duncan Fox and Co v North and South Wales Bank: HL 1880

The case concerned a claim by an indorser of a bill of exchange that he was subrogated to securities provided by the acceptor to the holder of the bill. The court identified three kinds of cases in which rights of subrogation had been recognised and where suretyship principles apply: (1) where there is an agreement creating the relationship of principal and surety to which the creditor is a party; (2) where there is an agreement creating the relationship of principal and surety to which the creditor is not a party; and (3) where there is no agreement but that there is nevertheless a primary and secondary liability of two persons, the debt being ‘as between the two, that of one of those persons only, and not equally of both, so that the other, if he should be compelled to pay it, would be entitled to reimbursement from the person by whom (as between the two) it ought to have been paid’.
Lord Selborne LC did not however restrict the categories of cases in which the remedy of subrogation might be available so much as identify situations that were broadly analogous to those of the case before it.

Lord Selborne LC
(1880) 6 AC 1, [1874-80] All ER Rep Ext 1406
England and Wales

Equity, Banking

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.181984

Armstrong v Onyearu and Another: CA 11 Apr 2017

Exoneration of partner’s equity on insolvency

The court considered the equity of exoneration, where property jointly owned by A and B is charged to secure the debts of B only, A is or may be entitled to a charge over B’s share of the property to the extent that B’s debts are paid out of A’s share.
Held: The trustee’s appeal failed. The equity of exoneration was part of the relief generally made available to sureties against a principal debtor, subject to exceptions supported by evidence that a contrary intention existed or where it could be inferred from the circumstances that the equity should not apply. It had in the past been applied to family units outside marriage.

Vos Ch, David Richards LJJ, Sir Patrick Elias
[2017] EWCA Civ 268, [2017] WLR(D) 271,
Bailii, WLRD
Married Women’s Property Act 1882
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedPaget v Paget CA 1898
The plaintiff wife was ‘a lady of fortune’, with the bulk of her property settled on her for life for her separate use without power of anticipation. They ‘moved in good society and, large as their income was, they lived far beyond it.’ They were . .
CitedGee v Liddell ChD 1913
A co-mortgagor has an ‘interest in [and] a charge upon the estate of the principal debtor’. An equity of exoneration was applied as between brothers.
An equity of exoneration operates in the nature of ‘a charge upon the estate of the principal . .
CitedRe a debtor (No 24 of 1971), ex parte Marley (J) v Trustee of the property of the debtor ChD 1976
The court will look to the realities of the relationship between the mortgagors and will not be governed by the terms of the mortgage instrument if they do not accord with the actual facts.
Held: the court accepted that an equity of . .
Citedin Re Berry (a bankrupt) 1978
A married couple opened a joint bank account. H’s business fell into difficulties and overdraft facilities were arranged, secured by a mortgage over their jointly-owned house. The account was used both for the husband’s business and for household . .
CitedParsons v McBain 5-Apr-2001
Federal Court of Australia – BANKRUPTCY – constructive trust – transfer of property to beneficiary – whether void as against trustee in bankruptcy
EQUITY – equity of exoneration – how defeated
TRUSTS – ‘common intention constructive . .
CitedDay v Shaw and Another ChD 17-Jan-2014
Mr and Mrs Shaw had granted a second charge over their jointly-owned matrimonial home to secure the personal guarantee given by their daughter and by Mr Shaw in respect of a bank loan to a company (Avon). Their daughter and Mr Shaw were the . .
ApprovedHall v Hall ChD 1911
An equity of exoneration in favour of a wife arises ‘at the time she charges her estate’. The doctrine of exoneration is based on an inference in each case from all the facts of that particular case. Where one co-habitee joins in granting a charge . .
CitedIn Re Pittortou (a bankrupt) ChD 1985
H and W charged the property to secure the H’s overdrawn bank account. The account was used both for his business and for payment of expenses relating to the matrimonial home. H was adjudicated bankrupt. W sought her equity to be exonerated from H’s . .
CitedCadlock v Dunn and Another ChD 13-May-2015
The equity of exoneration could be applied for a wife who had charged her beneficial half share of the matrimonial property to secure a loan to her husband to enable him to re-acquire his half share from his trustee in bankruptcy. The wife obtained . .
CitedGraham-York v York and Others CA 10-Feb-2015
The claimant challenged a possession order made in respect of the house she occupied, alleging a constructive trust in her favour. The house had been occupied by the unmarried co-habiting couple for nearly 25 years before the death of one of them. . .
CitedRe Chawda (in bankruptcy) 2014
Mr Chawda and his wife jointly owned a residential property which they charged to secure a loan, part of which refinanced the original purchase loan. The case concerned the balance of about 78,000 pounds. Mr Chawda and his brother carried on . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Equity

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.581738

Celador Radio Ltd v Rancho Steak House Ltd (Equitable Interpleader – Enforcement): QBD 16 Feb 2018

Equitable Interpleader

Equitable Interpleader – Enforcement – controlled goods – interpleader – equity – common law – Civil Procedure – Rules of Supreme Court – title to goods – third party – Writ – High Court Enforcement Officers

Victoria McCloud M
[2018] EWHC 219 (QB)
Bailii
Civil Procedure Rules 85.4 85.5, Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedReading v The London School Board 1886
Wills J said: ‘All the common law statutes as to interpleader are now repealed and the right to that class of relief is regulated by Order LVII, by which the old practice of the Court of Chancery is modified’. . .
CitedEx parte Mersey Docks and Harbour Board 1899
AL Smith LJ said: ‘The matter [ie, of interpleader] now depends upon the provisions of Order LVII, r.1’ . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Equity

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.605165

In re Rose, Rose v Inland Revenue Commissioners: CA 1952

The deceased had executed instruments of transfer and delivered them with the relevant certificates to the transferees.
Held: The transfers were transferred the whole of the deceased’s title both legal and equitable in the shares and all advantages attached to the shares as from the date on which the transfers were executed and delivered subject, as regards the legal title, to the provisions of the articles as to registration and the directors’ discretionary power to refuse registration. A transfer under seal in the form appropriate under the company’s regulations, coupled with delivery of the transfer and certificate to the transferee, does suffice, as between transferor and transferee, to constitute the transferee the beneficial owner of the share, and the circumstance that the transferee must do a further act in the form of applying for and obtaining registration in order to get in and perfect his legal title, having been equipped by the transferor with all that is necessary to enable him to do so, does not prevent the transfer from operating, in accordance with its terms as between the transferor and transferee, and making the transferee the beneficial owner. Milroy v Lord did not prevent the imposition of a trust as a matter of law if the gift was complete but the donor retained the subject-matter.

Evershed MR L, Jenkins LJ
[1952] 1 Ch 499, [1952] EWCA Civ 4, [1952] 1 All ER 1217, [1952] 1 TLR 1577, (1952) 31 ATC 138, [1952] TR 175
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
DistinguishedMilroy v Lord CA 26-Jul-1862
The donor executed a transfer of 50 shares. The shares were only transferable by entry in the books of the bank. No such transfer was ever made. The defendant had a power of attorney authorising him to transfer the donor’s shares and after the deed . .
ApprovedIn re Re Rose, Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company Limited v Rose ChD 1949
The testator handed a transfer of the relevant shares to the donee, Mr Hook, together with the relevant certificates. The transfer had not been registered by the date of his death.
Held: Equity will not compel an imperfect gift to be . .
Appeal fromIn re Re Rose, Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company Limited v Rose ChD 1949
The testator handed a transfer of the relevant shares to the donee, Mr Hook, together with the relevant certificates. The transfer had not been registered by the date of his death.
Held: Equity will not compel an imperfect gift to be . .

Cited by:
DistinguishedThe Trustee of the Property of Jan Yngve Pehrsson, a bankrupt v Madeleine von Greyerz PC 16-Jun-1999
PC (Gibraltar) The mere appointment of trustees of shares without the delivery to the trustees of forms of transfer did not give rise to a trust.
Held: A gift was intended to take effect by a transfer of . .
CitedScribes West Ltd v Relsa Anstalt and others CA 20-Dec-2004
The claimant challenged the forfeiture of its lease by a freeholder which had acquired the registered freehold title but had not yet registered its ownership. The second defendant had forfeited the lease by peacable re-entry for arrears of rent, and . .
MentionedZeital and Another v Kaye and Others CA 5-Mar-2010
The deceased had held an apartment through beneficial interests in shares in a limited company. He died intestate. The parties disputed the ownership of the two shares. The company had been put into a members’ liquidation, and the company liquidator . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.183420

York Buildings Co v Mackenzie: SCS 8 Mar 1793

Purchase by Common Agent at Auction Voidable

The defendant was the ‘common agent’ for the sale of the assets of an insolvent partnership and purchased some of the assets at a judicial auction.
Held: The purchase was voidable, even though it was made at a sale by auction.
Who bears the Expense of a Ranking and Sale? – Election of the Common Agent. – Can the Common Agent be a Purchaser? – Expense of an interim Warrant. The Common agent in a ranking is disqualified from purchasing at the judicial sale carried on under his direction.

Lord Cranworth
3 Paton 378, (1795) 3 ER 432
Commonlii
Scotland
Cited by:
CitedNewgate Stud Company, Newgate Stud Farm Llc v Penfold, Penfold Bloodstock Limited ChD 21-Dec-2004
The claimants sought damages from the defendant. He had been employed to manage their horse-racing activities, and it was alleged that he had made secret profits. The defendant denied any dishonesty, saying all matters were known to the deceased . .
At Court of SessionThe Governor And Company of Undertakers For Raising Thames Water In York Buildings v Alexander Mackenzie, Writer, To The Signet PC 15-May-1795
Who bears the Expense of a Ranking and Sale? – Election of the Common Agent. – Can the Common Agent be a Purchaser? – Expense of an interim Warrant. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Insolvency

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.220725

Re I (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008): FD 12 Apr 2016

The court considered questions arising on applications for use of the equitable doctrine of rectification in cases of mistake at IVF Clinics.

Sir James Munby
[2016] EWHC 791 (Fam), [2016] Fam Law 678, [2017] 1 FLR 998
Bailii, Judiciary
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008
England and Wales

Health Professions, Children, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.562140

Dillwyn v Llewelyn: ChD 12 Jul 1862

The father thought he had given his younger son land in Wales, in signing a memorandum and presenting it to him ‘for the purpose of furnishing himself with a dwelling-house’. The memorandum was not by deed. The son built his home on the land. When the father died, the elder son disputed his brother’s title.
Held: The Master of the Rolls said younger son was entitled to a life interest. Lord Westbury LC allowed the younger son’s appeal, saying: ‘About the rules of the Court there can be no controversy. A voluntary agreement will not be completed or assisted by a Court of Equity, in cases of mere gift. If anything be wanting to complete the title of the donee, a Court of Equity will not assist him in obtaining it; for a mere donee can have no right to claim more than he has received. But the subsequent acts of the donor may give the donee that right or ground of claim which he did not acquire from the original gift . . so if A puts B in possession of a piece of land, and tells him, ‘I give it to you that you may build a house on it,’ and B on the strength of that promise, with the knowledge of A, expends a large sum of money in building a house accordingly, I cannot doubt that the donee acquires a right from the subsequent transaction to call on the donor to perform that contract and complete the imperfect donation which was made. The case is somewhat analogous to that of verbal agreement not binding originally for the want of the memorandum in writing signed by the party to be charged, but which becomes binding by virtue of the subsequent part performance.’ The Lord Chancellor awarded the younger son the fee simple since ‘no one builds a house for his own life only.’

The Lord Chancellor Lord Westbury
[1862] EWHC Ch J67, [1862] 45 ER 1284, (1862) 4 De GF and J 517, [1862] EngR 908, (1862) 4 De G F and J 517, (1862) 45 ER 1285
Bailii, Commonlii
Cited by:
CitedYeoman’s Row Management Ltd and Another v Cobbe HL 30-Jul-2008
The parties agreed in principle for the sale of land with potential development value. Considerable sums were spent, and permission achieved, but the owner then sought to renegotiate the deal.
Held: The appeal succeeded in part. The finding . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Equity, Estoppel

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.245427

Crabb v Arun District Council: CA 23 Jul 1975

The plaintiff was led to believe that he would acquire a right of access to his land. In reliance on that belief he sold off part of his land, leaving the remainder landlocked.
Held: His claim to have raised an equity was upheld. The plaintiff should have a right of access without payment.
Scarman LJ said: ‘There being no grant, no enforceable contract, no licence, I would analyse the minimum equity to do justice to the plaintiff as a right either to an easement or to a licence on terms to be agreed. I do not think it is necessary to go further than that. . . If there is no agreement as to terms, if agreement fails to be obtained, the court can, in my judgment, and must, determine in these proceedings upon what terms the plaintiff should be put to enable him to have the benefit of the equitable right which he is held to have.’
The court should approach the task cautiously to achieve ‘the minimum equity to do justice to the plaintiff.’

Denning MR, Lawton LJ, Scarman LJ
[1976] Ch 179, [1975] 3 All ER 865, [1975] EWCA Civ 7
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CriticisedRamsden v Dyson HL 1866
The Vice-Chancellor had held that two tenants of Sir John Ramsden, the owner of a large estate near Huddersfield, were entitled to long leases of plots on the estate. They ostensibly held the plots as tenants at will only, but they had spent their . .

Cited by:
CitedJennings v Rice, Wilson, Marsh, Norris, Norris, and Reed CA 22-Feb-2002
The claimant asserted a proprietary estoppel against the respondents. He had worked for the deceased over many years, for little payment, and doing more and more for her. Though he still worked full time at first, he came to spend nights at the . .
CitedWilson v Truelove ChD 25-Mar-2003
The claimants requested a declaration that an option to repurchase land was void under the 1964 Act.
Held: The option to repurchase land was prima facie void. The right arose on the coming into existence of the agreement, or at the latest on . .
CitedSledmore v Dalby CA 8-Feb-1996
The plaintiff sought possession of a house. She had owned it with her late husband. The defendant lived in and had done much work on the house, but the deceased left it all to the plaintiff and the defendant’s wife who had since also died. She . .
ApprovedOrgee v Orgee CA 5-Nov-1997
The defendant had claimed an agricultural tenancy under a proprietary estoppel. His claim succeeded at first instance. The judge found it had been clearly understood that he would continue to farm the land on the basis of an agricultural tenancy, as . .
CitedParker v Parker ChD 24-Jul-2003
Lord Macclesfield claimed a right to occupy a castle. The owners claimed that he had only a mere tenancy at will. The exact rooms in the castle which had been occupied had varied over time.
Held: The applicant was entitled to reasonable . .
CitedWillis v Hoare 1999
Auld LJ said of Crabb: there ‘could be no doubt as to the nature and extent of the remedy required to give effect to [the] equity’. Of JT Developments ‘the nature and terms of the equity were readily identifiable’. Auld LJ said: ‘There may be . .
CitedYaxley v Gotts and Another CA 24-Jun-1999
Oral Agreement Creating Proprietory Estoppel
The defendant offered to give to the Plaintiff, a builder, the ground floor of a property in return for converting the house, and then managing it. They were friends, and the oral offer was accepted. The property was then actually bought in the name . .
CitedGrant v Edwards and Edwards CA 24-Mar-1986
A couple were not married but lived together in Vincent Farmhouse in which the plaintiff claimed a beneficial interest on separation. The female partner was told by the male partner that the only reason for not acquiring the property in joint names . .
CitedWormall v Wormall CA 25-Nov-2004
The father had allowed his daughter to run her business from the family farm. The mother and father came to divorce, and the father required vacanat possession of the farm so that he could sell it to satisfy his liabilities in the ancillary relief . .
CitedStrover and Another v Strover and Another ChD 10-May-2005
Insurance policies had been taken out by the partners in a firm. The surviving family of one and the remaining partners contested ownership. The policy was held in part for the benefit of the family. The premiums had been paid from partnership . .
CitedVan Laethem v Brooker and Another ChD 12-Jul-2005
The claimant asserted an interest in several properties by virtue of a common intention constructive trust or by proprietary estoppel. The parties had been engaged to be married.
Held: ‘A [constructive] trust arises in connection with the . .
CitedStack v Dowden HL 25-Apr-2007
The parties had cohabited for a long time, in a home bought by Ms Dowden. After the breakdown of the relationship, Mr Stack claimed an equal interest in the second family home, which they had bought in joint names. The House was asked whether, when . .
CitedThe Picture Warehouse Ltd v Cornhill Investments Ltd QBD 23-Jan-2008
The tenant appealed against a decision that provision for parking should not be included in the new tenancy granted to him under the Act. The original lease had been intended to be varied to move the tenant to allow some rebuilding, and new parking . .
CitedLondon Borough of Bexley v Maison Maurice Ltd ChD 15-Dec-2006
The council had taken land by compulsory purchase in order to construct a dual carriageway. It then claimed that it had left undedicated a strip .5 metre wide as a ransom strip to prevent the defendant restoring access to the road.
Held: The . .
CitedYeoman’s Row Management Ltd and Another v Cobbe HL 30-Jul-2008
The parties agreed in principle for the sale of land with potential development value. Considerable sums were spent, and permission achieved, but the owner then sought to renegotiate the deal.
Held: The appeal succeeded in part. The finding . .
CitedGill v Woodall and Others ChD 5-Oct-2009
The claimant challenged her late mother’s will which had left the entire estate to a charity. She asserted lack of knowledge and approval and coercion, and also an estoppel. The will included a note explaining that no gift had been made because she . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Land

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.183817

Halifax Building Society v Thomas and Another: CA 29 Jun 1995

Defrauded Mortgagee cannot take surplus on sale

A Building Society cannot keep any excess proceeds of sale of a house mortgaged to it by fraud. Policy was against unjust enrichment and will not allow a lender to take a profit from a fraudulent borrower.
Peter Gibson LJ said: ‘I remain wholly unpersuaded that in the circumstances of the present case the law should accord a restitutionary remedy to a secured creditor who has elected not to avoid the mortgage but to affirm it and has received full satisfaction thereunder. To my mind there is an inconsistency between a person being such a creditor and yet claiming more than that to which he is contractually entitled and which he has already fully recovered. Once the creditor has so elected and recovered in full, I do not see why the law should come to his aid to allow him to make a further claim. In re Simms; Ex parte Trustee [1934] Ch. 1 this court refused to allow a trustee in bankruptcy, who had elected to treat a receiver as a tortfeasor for converting to his own use the chattels of a bankrupt, to recover the profits made by the receiver as money had and received. The authority of that case is weakened by the reliance by this court on the now exploded implied promise theory, but I note that it is still cited in textbooks: see, for example, Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed. (1994), vol. 1, p. 1437, para. 29-052) and it serves to illustrate that not every action for an account of profits from a wrongdoer, even where there has been use of the plaintiff’s property, will be allowed, and that it may be barred when there has been an election for another remedy.
Further I am not satisfied that in the circumstances of the present case it would be right to treat the unjust enrichment of Mr. Thomas as having been gained ‘at the expense of’ the society, even allowing for the possibility of an extended meaning for those words to apply to cases of non-subtractive restitution for a wrong. There is no decided authority that comes anywhere near to covering the present circumstances. I do not overlook the fact that the policy of law is to view with disfavour a wrongdoer benefiting from his wrong, the more so when the wrong amounts to fraud, but it cannot be suggested that there is a universally applicable principle that in every case there will be restitution of benefit from a wrong. As Professor Birks says (An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, p. 24): ‘there are some circumstances in which enrichment by wrongdoing has to be given up. That is, the wrong itself is not always in itself a sufficient factor to call for restitution.’ On the facts of the present case, in my judgment, the fraud is not in itself a sufficient factor to allow the society to require Mr. Thomas to account to it.’
Glidewell LJ said: ‘The proposition that a wrongdoer should not be allowed to profit from his wrongs has an obvious attraction. The further proposition, that the victim or intended victim of the wrongdoing, who has in the event suffered no loss, is entitled to retain or recover the amount of the profit is less obviously persuasive.’ and
‘In order to succeed in this appeal, Mr. Waters is required to establish that the second proposition is correct, and that English law provides a mechanism by which it can be given effect. Despite his able argument, I cannot discern that there is any such general established principle. Indeed, Mr. Waters has to concede that there is no English authority upon which he can rely to establish his right to succeed either in the law of restitution, under the head of unjust enrichment, or in the law of constructive trusts. The sole American decision which appears to be directly in point, that of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Board (1920) 268 F. 575, is not sufficiently persuasive to secure a visa for admission into English jurisprudence. Like Judge Maddocks, in the passage from his judgment quoted by Peter Gibson L.J., I cannot conclude that the principle for which Mr. Waters contends is at present established as part of our law.’

Glidewell LJ, Glidewell LJ
Independent 04-Aug-1995, Times 04-Jul-1995, [1996] Ch 217, [1995] EWCA Civ 21, [1995] 4 All ER 673, [1996] 2 WLR 63
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedDavid Macdonald v Geoffrey Myerson, John Callaghan, Derek A H Law CA 26-Jan-2001
The claimant had been involved in mortgage frauds, using the defendant firm of solicitors. He claimed an account following sales of the properties. At the time of the sales, the first defendant knew of the false identities used. The defendants . .
CitedHM Attorney General v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd third Party intervening) HL 3-Aug-2000
Restitutionary Claim against Pofits from Breach
The author had written his book in breach of his duty of confidence. Having signed the Official Secrets Act, he accepted a contractual private law duty. After conviction as a spy, the publication of the book was in breach of the undertaking by not . .
CitedDevenish Nutrition Ltd and others v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) and others ChD 19-Oct-2007
The claimant sought damages for the losses it had suffered as a result of price fixing by the defendant companies in the vitamin market. The European Commission had already fined the defendant for its involvement.
Held: In an action for breach . .
CitedDevenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Sa (France) and others CA 14-Oct-2008
The defendant had been involved in price fixing arrangements, and the claimant sought damages for breach of its proprietary rights. The claimant appealed refusal of an award an account of profits for what was akin to a breach of statutory duty.
Equity, Damages

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.81150

Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council: HL 22 May 1996

Simple interest only on rate swap damages

The bank had paid money to the local authority under a contract which turned out to be ultra vires and void. The question was whether, in addition to ordering the repayment of the money to the bank on unjust enrichment principles, the court could also award compound interest. It was clear law that the court had power to do so in the case of a breach of trust.
Held: Simple interest only was payable on a debt payable for an interest rate swap agreement which had been avoided as ultra vires the council’s powers. The failure of the swap agreement did not place the authority under any fiduciary duty to the claimants. A finding to that effect would create equitable interests with uncertain consequences for others. Accordingly simple interest only was payable. Parliament had made its intentions clear and it was not for the courts to create new situations in which compound interest would be awarded. ‘Although it is difficult to find clear authority for the proposition, when property has been obtained by fraud equity imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient: the property is recoverable and traceable in equity.’ An innocent recipient of property wrongfully obtained does not become a constructive trustee of it until receipt of knowledge of the claim in equity of the true owner.
HL Lord Goff said: ‘Claims in restitution are founded upon a principle of justice, being designed to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant: see Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548. Long ago, in Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, Lord Mansfield C.J. said that the gist of the action for money had and received is that ‘the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money’. It would be strange indeed if the courts lacked jurisdiction in such a case to ensure that justice could be fully achieved by means of an award of compound interest, where it is appropriate to make such an award, despite the fact that the jurisdiction to award such interest is itself said to rest upon the demands of justice. I am glad not to be forced to hold that English law is so inadequate as to be incapable of achieving such a result. In my opinion the jurisdiction should now be made available, as justice requires, in cases of restitution, to ensure that full justice can be done. The seed is there, but the growth has hitherto been confined within a small area. That growth should now be permitted to spread naturally elsewhere within this newly recognised branch of the law. No genetic engineering is required, only that the warm sun of judicial creativity should exercise its benign influence rather than remain hidden behind the dark clouds of legal history.’
Lord Browne-Wilkinson said (obiter): ‘The argument for a resulting trust was said to be supported by the case of a thief who steals a bag of coins. At law those coins remain traceable only so long as they are kept separate: as soon as they are mixed with other coins or paid into a mixed bank account they cease to be traceable at law. Can it really be the case, it is asked, that in such circumstances the thief cannot be required to disgorge the property which, in equity, represents the stolen coins? Moneys can only be traced in equity if there has been at some stage a breach of fiduciary duty, i.e. if either before the theft there was an equitable proprietary interest (e.g. the coins were stolen trust moneys) or such interest arises under a resulting trust at the time of the theft or the mixing of the moneys. Therefore, it is said, a resulting trust must arise either at the time of the theft or when the moneys are subsequently mixed. Unless this is the law, there will be no right to recover the assets representing the stolen moneys once the moneys have become mixed.
I agree that the stolen moneys are traceable in equity. But the proprietary interest which equity is enforcing in such circumstances arises under a constructive, not a resulting, trust. Although it is difficult to find clear authority for the proposition, when property is obtained by fraud equity imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient: the property is recoverable and traceable in equity. Thus, an infant who has obtained property by fraud is bound in equity to restore it: Stocks v. Wilson [1913] 2 K.B. 235, 244; R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill [1914] 3 K.B. 607. Moneys stolen from a bank account can be traced in equity: Bankers Trust Co. v. Shapira [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1274, 1282C-E: see also McCormick v. Grogan (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 82, 97′.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained the differences between institutional and remedial constructive trusts: ‘Under an institutional constructive trust, the trust arises by operation of law as from the date of the circumstances which give rise to it: the function of the court is merely to declare that such trust has arisen in the past. The consequences that flow from such trust having arisen (including the possibly unfair consequences to third parties who in the interim have received the trust property) are also determined by rules of law, not under a discretion. A remedial constructive trust, as I understand it, is different. It is a judicial remedy giving rise to an enforceable equitable obligation: the extent to which it operates retrospectively to the prejudice of third parties lies in the discretion of the court.’

Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Goff, Lord Woolf
Times 30-May-1996, [1996] 2 All ER 961, [1996] 2 AC 669, [1996] UKHL 12, [1996] 2 WLR 802, [1996] 5 Bank LR 341
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromWestdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council CA 30-Dec-1993
A bank paid money to a local authority under an interest rate swap agreement, which was held later to be outside the local authority’s powers.
Held: The local authority was to repay the money paid to it for an ultra vires purpose (a swap . .
CitedBurdick v Garrick HL 1870
In the courts of Chancery, the statute of limitations would not apply when the person in a confidential relationship had got the property into his hands. A court presumes against the party against whom relief is sought that he has made that profit . .
CitedWallersteiner v Moir (No 2) CA 1975
The court was asked whether Moir would be entitled to legal aid to bring a derivative action on behalf of a company against its majority shareholder.
Held: A minority shareholder bringing a derivative action on behalf of a company could obtain . .
AppliedHazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council HL 1991
Swap deals outwith Council powers
The authority entered into interest rate swap deals to protect itself against adverse money market movements. They began to lose substantial amounts when interest rates rose, and the district auditor sought a declaration that the contracts were . .

Cited by:
CitedSmithkline Beecham Plc Glaxosmithkline UK Ltd and Another v Apotex Europe Ltd and others (No 2) CA 23-May-2006
The parties to the action had given cross undertakings to support the grant of an interim injunction. A third party subsequently applied to be joined, and now sought to take advantage of the cross undertakings to claim the losses incurred through . .
CitedIslamic Republic of Pakistan v Zardari and others ComC 6-Oct-2006
The claimant alleged that the defendants had funded the purchase of various properties by secret and unlawful commissions taken by them whilst in power in Pakistan. They sought to recover the proceeds. They now sought permission to serve proceedings . .
CitedStack v Dowden HL 25-Apr-2007
The parties had cohabited for a long time, in a home bought by Ms Dowden. After the breakdown of the relationship, Mr Stack claimed an equal interest in the second family home, which they had bought in joint names. The House was asked whether, when . .
CitedBryce Ashworth v Newnote Ltd CA 27-Jul-2007
The appellant challenged a refusal to set aside a statutory demand, in respect of his director’s loan account with the respondent company, saying the court should have accepted other accounts to set off against that debt.
Held: A statutory . .
CitedSempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another HL 18-Jul-2007
The parties agreed that damages were payable in an action for restitution, but the sum depended upon to a calculation of interest. They disputed whether such interest should be calculated on a simple or compound basis. The company sought compound . .
CitedKommune and Another v DEPFA Acs Bank ComC 4-Sep-2009
Local authorities in Denmark sought to recover sums paid to the defendant banks for swap trading, saying that the payments had been outwith their powers. . .
CitedClarence House Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc CA 8-Dec-2009
The defendant tenants, anticipating that the landlord might delay or refuse consent to a subletting entered into a ‘virtual assignment’ of the lease, an assignment in everything but the deed and with no registration. The lease contained a standard . .
CitedTwentieth Century Fox Film Corp and Others v Harris and Others ChD 5-Feb-2013
The court was asked whether a copyright owner has a proprietary claim to money derived from infringement of the copyright.
Held: He did not. No such argument could be shown to have suceeded before. . .
CitedPindell v AirAsia CA 2011
Tomlinson LJ drew attention to the danger of attempting to draw parallels between an aircraft operating (dry) lease and some other more commonly litigated superficially similar instruments such as time charters of ships, where the legal incidents . .
CitedOlympic Airlines Sa v ACG Acquisition XX Llc CA 17-Apr-2013
The parties disputed their mutual obligations under aircraft leasing agreements. The insolvent airline said that in signing to accept the condition of the aircraft on delivery, it had not created an estoppel against itself when the aircraft later . .
CitedBailey and Another v Angove’s Pty Ltd SC 27-Jul-2016
The defendant had agreed to act as the claimant’s agent and distributor of the claimant’s wines in the UK. It acted both as agent and also bought wines on its own account. When the defendant went into litigation the parties disputed the right of the . .
CitedFilby v Mortgage Express (No 2) Limited CA 22-Jun-2004
Mr and Mrs Filby’s matrimonial home was charged to the Halifax. They also had an unsecured loan with the Midland Bank. Mr Filby sought to remortgage the matrimonial home with Mortgage Express. The mortgage advance was paid to solicitors who used . .
CitedAkers and Others v Samba Financial Group SC 1-Feb-2017
Saad Investments was a Cayman Islands company in liquidation. The liquidator brought an action here, but the defendant sought a stay saying that another forum was clearly more appropriate. Shares in Saudi banks were said to be held in trust for the . .
Obiter comments doubtedShalson and others v Russo and others ChD 11-Jul-2003
Rimer J doubted obiter comments of Lord Brown-Wilkinson: ‘I do not find that an easy passage. As to the first paragraph, a thief ordinarily acquires no property in what he steals and cannot give a title to it even to a good faith purchaser: both the . .
CitedScott v Bridge and Others ChD 25-Nov-2020
Claim to recover money and property said to have been transferred by the claimant to the defendants or one or more of them. The money concerned came from a bank account belonging to the claimant. The property concerned consisted of two . .
CitedPrudential Assurance Company Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 25-Jul-2018
PAC sought to recover excess advance corporation tax paid under a UK system contrary to EU law. It was now agreed that some was repayable but now the quantum. Five issues separated the parties.
Issue I: does EU law require the tax credit to be . .
CitedFetch.AI Ltd and Another v Persons Unknown Category A and Others ComC 15-Jul-2021
Cryptocurrency Action
The claimants sought damages and other remedies saying that the unknown defendants had obtained access to the private key guarding their crypto currency assets, and then sold them at an undervalue, acquiring substantial profits for themselves in . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Banking, Local Government, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.90405

Walsh v Lonsdale: CA 1882

Lonsdale purported to grant to Walsh a seven year lease with rent payable in advance. The lease was not embodied in a deed, and when Walsh went into possession, an annual tenancy with rent payable in arrear was created. Walsh did not pay in advance, Lonsdale issued an execution against the premises, and Walsh sought damages.
Held: Equity, as embodied in the maxim ‘equity regards as done what ought to be done’, required that the lease should take effect on the terms originally intended. ‘He [Walsh] holds, therefore, under the same terms in equity as if a lease had been granted . . He cannot complain of the exercise by the landlord of the same rights as the landlord would have had if a lease had been granted.’ This was: ‘a case in which both parties admit that relief is capable of being given by specific performance.’

Sir George Jessel MR
[1882] 21 ChD 9
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedPadgham and another v Rochelle and another ChD 1-Aug-2002
The testator occupied farmland and buildings. He was helped in maintaining the farm by his son, but gave the land to his grandchildren by his will. The son claimed to have been granted an informal written agricultural tenancy by his father before . .
CitedIngram and Palmer-Tomkinson (Executors of the Estate of Lady Jane Lindsay Morgan Ingram Deceased) v Commissioners of Inland Revenue CA 28-Jul-1997
The deceased had first conveyed property to her solicitor. Leases back were then created in her favour, and then the freeholds were conveyed at her direction to her children and grandchildren. They were potentially exempt transfers.
Held: . .
CitedHarris v Kent and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The claimant said the defendant had failed to complete his promise to arrange for the issue of shares in a company in return for a loan. The defendant denied the contract.
Held: It had been agreed to treat the claimant as a fifty per cent . .
CitedFoster v Reeves CA 1892
An agreement was made on May 12 1890 for a tenancy for three years to commence on June 24 1890 and thereafter from year to year until determined. The landlord sued to recover rent after the tenant had given up possession. The tenant argued that no . .
CitedLong v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council ChD 20-Mar-1996
The parties had agreed for a lease, and the tenant entered possession, but no formal lease was executed. The tenant stopped paying rent in 1977 or 1984. He now claimed rectification of the registers to show him as proprietor. The landlord argued . .
CitedTruro Diocesan Board of Finance Ltd v Foley CA 22-Oct-2008
The tenant appealed against a decision that a deed he had entered into with the claimant did not operate to give him the status of a protected or statutory tenancy.
Held: The tenant had had a full Rent Act tenancy. The Board claimed . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Equity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.181811

Aluminium Industrie Vaassen B V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd: CA 16 Jan 1976

The seller sold aluminium to the defendant, but included a clause under which they retained title in the materials sold, even if mixed in with manufactured goods, until they had been paid for the metal. The defendants appealed a finding that the receivers held the proceeds of sale of the manufactured goods on trust for the plaintiffs.
Held: The appeal failed. The intention of the clause was to secure for as long as possible payment of the purchase price of the aluminium. There had to be read into the contract a duty on the defendant to act under the fiduciary relationship of principal and agent, bailor and bailee, as was contemplated in the clause. The plaintiffs could trace the proceeds of the sub-sales, and recover them.

Megaw, Roskill and Goff L.JJ
[1976] 1 WLR 676
lip
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re Hallett’s Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett CA 1880
Where a trustee of a policy used money received from others to make payment of premiums on an insurance policy, they would be entitled to a lien on the policy. Where an asset was acquired exclusively with trust money, the beneficiary could either . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Company, Equity, Agency

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.174733

In Re Ritson: ChD 1898

Romer J
[1898] 1 Ch 667
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromIn Re Ritson, Ritson v Ritson CA 1899
The joint debts of a partnership are payable out of the joint assets if sufficient even though secured on the separate property of one partner.
Chitty LJ said of a deceased partner that his ‘interest in the joint assets [of the partnership] . .
CitedHighbury Pension Fund Management Company and Another v Zirfin Investments Ltd and Others ChD 14-Feb-2013
The court was asked: ‘a) Does the doctrine of marshalling permit the marshalling of securities held over property that does not belong to the common debtor? In particular, is a creditor of a guarantor entitled to marshal (or be subrogated to) . .
CitedMcLean and Another v Trustees of The Bankruptcy Estate of Dent and Others ChD 26-Oct-2016
Marshalling your Dogs Equitably
Application by the joint administrators of a partnership affording the opportunity to consider the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over a dog.
Held: The equitable principle of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Company

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.570480

Thomas Bates and Sons Ltd v Wyndham’s Lingerie Ltd: CA 21 Nov 1980

An application was made for rectification of a rent review clause in a lease. When executing the lease, the tenants’ officer, Mr Avon, noticed that the rent review clause in the lease drafted by the landlords was defective in not including a provision in default of agreement. The trial judge held that the conduct of Mr Avon, who had not given evidence, amounted to sharp practice.
Held: The tenants knew of the omission and of the landlords’ mistake. When establishing the right to rectification of a document, the claimant does not have to meet more than the civil standard of balance of probabilities, but convincing proof is required to counteract the cogent evidence of the parties’ intention displayed by the instrument.
Referring to Riverlake, Buckley LJ said: ‘Undoubtedly I think in any such case the conduct of the defendant must be such as to make it inequitable that he should be allowed to object to the rectification of the document. If this necessarily implies some measure of ‘sharp practice’, so be it; but for my part I think that the doctrine is one which depends more on the equity of the position. The graver the character of the conduct involved, no doubt the heavier the burden of proof may be; but, in my view, the conduct must be such as to affect the conscience of the party who has suppressed the fact that he has recognised the presence of a mistake.
For this doctrine – that is to say the doctrine of A Roberts v Leicestershire County Council – to apply I think it must be shown: first, that one party A erroneously believed that the document sought to be rectified contained a particular term or provision, or possibly did not contain a particular term or provision which, mistakenly, it did contain; secondly, that the other party B was aware of the omission or the inclusion and that it was due to a mistake on the part of A; thirdly, that B has omitted to draw the mistake to the notice of A. And I think there must be a fourth element involved, namely, that the mistake must be one calculated to benefit B. If these requirements are satisfied, the court may regard it as inequitable to allow B to resist rectification to give effect to A’s intention on the ground that the mistake was not, at the time of execution of the document, a mutual mistake.’
As to the burden of proof: ‘The standard of proof required in an action of rectification to establish the common intention of the parties is, in my view, the civil standard of balance of probability. But as the alleged common intention ex hypothesi contradicts the written instrument, convincing proof is required in order to counteract the cogent evidence of the parties’ intention displayed by the instrument itself. It is not, I think, the standard of proof which is high, so differing from the normal civil standard, but the evidential requirement needed to counteract the inherent probability that the written instrument truly represents the parties’ intention because it is a document signed by the parties. The standard of proof is no different in a case of so-called unilateral mistake such as the present.’

Buckley LJ, Brightman LJ
[1981] 1 WLR 505, [1980] EWCA Civ 3, [1981] 1 All ER 1077
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedA Roberts and Co Ltd v Leicestershire County Council ChD 1961
The court considered the circumstances required for rectification of a contract after a unilateral mistake. Pennycuick J said: ‘a party is entitled to rectification of a contract upon proof that he believed a particular term to be included in the . .
CitedRiverlate Properties Ltd v Paul CA 1974
A lessor sought to have the lease rectified against the tenant, saying the tenant had sufficient knowledge of the error in the lease to permit that remedy.
Held: The tenant had no such knowledge as would have brought the doctrine into play. In . .

Cited by:
CitedAMP (UK) Plc and Another v Barker and Others ChD 8-Dec-2000
The claimants were interested under a pension scheme. Alterations had been made, which the said had been in error, and they sought rectification to remove a link between early leaver benefits and incapacity benefits. The defendant trustees agreed . .
ApprovedGeorge Wimpey UK Ltd v VI Construction Ltd CA 3-Feb-2005
A land purchase contract had been rectified by the judge for unilateral mistake. A factor had been dropped from a formula for calculating the price.
Held: The judge’s conclusion that the circumstances existed to allow a rectification was . .
CitedLittman, Young v Aspen Oil (Broking) Ltd ChD 1-Jul-2005
The tenant sought to exercise a break clause in the lease. The landlord said that the exercise of the right was subject to the tenant having first complied with the terms of the lease.
Held: There was an obvious mistake in the clause which . .
CitedLittman and Another v Aspen Oil (Broking) Ltd CA 19-Dec-2005
A lease had been granted with a break clause, which the tenant exercised. The Landlord said it had not complied with its obligations and was not free to exercise that clause. The clause had included the word ‘landlord’ where it should have read . .
CitedConnolly Ltd v Bellway Homes Ltd ChD 23-Apr-2007
connolly_bellwayChD2007
The claimant sought rectification of a contract for the sale of land, or damages in deceit. They said that it had been agreed that the price would be adjusted to reflect any change in values. The formula inserted made no great sense mathematically, . .
CitedDaventry District Council v Daventry and District Housing Ltd CA 13-Oct-2011
The appellant challenged refusal of rectification of its agreement with the defendant. They asserted either mutual or unilateral mistake. The parties had agreed for the transfer of housing stock and management staff to the respondents. The claimant . .
CitedFSHC Group Holdings Ltd v Glas Trust Corporation Ltd CA 31-Jul-2019
Rectification – Chartbrook not followed
Opportunity for an appellate court to clarify the correct test to apply in deciding whether the written terms of a contract may be rectified because of a common mistake.
Held: The appeal failed. The judge was right to conclude that an . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Landlord and Tenant, Contract

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.184572

AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co Solicitors: SC 5 Nov 2014

Bank not to recover more than its losses

The court was asked as to the remedy available to the appellant bank against the respondent, a firm of solicitors, for breach of the solicitors’ custodial duties in respect of money entrusted to them for the purpose of completing a loan which was to be secured by a first charge over the borrowers’ property. The solicitors had acted for both the bank and the borrowers. The bank appealed against rejection of its claim to be entitled to recover the entire sum it had paid, asserting a breach of trust, notwithstanding that its actual losses were rather less.
Held: The bank’s appeal failed. It was entitled to recompense only for the actual loss suffered. Payment of the amount claimed would be penal and retrograde.
Lord Toulson said: ‘The purpose of a restitutionary order is to replace a loss to the trust fund which the trustee has brought about. To say that there has been a loss to the trust fund in the present case of pounds 2.5m by reason of the solicitors’ conduct, when most of that sum would have been lost if the solicitors had applied the trust fund in the way that the bank had instructed them to do, is to adopt an artificial and unrealistic view of the facts.’
and: ‘in circumstances such as those in Target Holdings the extent of equitable compensation should be the same as if damages for breach of contract were sought at common law. That is not because there should be a departure in such a case from the basic equitable principles applicable to a breach of trust, whether by a solicitor or anyone else . . Rather, the fact that the trust was part of the machinery for the performance of a contract is relevant as a fact in looking at what loss the bank suffered by reason of the breach of trust, because it would be artificial and unreal to look at the trust in isolation from the obligations for which it was brought into being. I do not believe that this requires any departure from proper principles.’
Lord Reed concluded: ‘Some of the typical obligations of the trustee of a fund are strict: for example, the duty to distribute the fund in accordance with the purposes of the trust. Others are obligations of reasonable care: for example, the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in the management of the fund. Since these equitable obligations relate to a fund held for trust purposes, the trustee’s liability for a breach of trust will, again putting the matter broadly, depend upon its effect upon the fund: the measure of compensation will generally be based upon the diminution in the value of the fund caused by the trustee’s default.’
and: ‘The result of the appeal was undoubtedly correct. The mortgage advance had been paid out prematurely and to the wrong person, with the consequence that at that point the trustee did not have the charges which he ought to have had. That deficiency was however remedied when the charges were obtained some weeks later. The assets under the control of the trustee were then exactly what they ought to have been. There was nothing missing from the trust fund, and therefore no basis for a claim for restoration. For the same reason, there was no basis for a claim to compensation by the mortgagee.’

Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Wilson, Lord Reed, Lord Toulson
[2014] UKSC 58, [2014] 3 WLR 1367, [2014] WLR(D) 466, UKSC 2013/0052, [2015] AC 1503
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary
Judicature Act 1873
England and Wales
Citing:
At ChDAIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co (A Firm) ChD 23-Jan-2012
The claimant bank sought damages from the defendant solicitors, saying that they had paid on mortgage advance moneys but failed to deliver as promised and required, a first mortgage over the property purchased. The solicitors had failed to discharge . .
CitedTarget Holdings Ltd v Redferns (A Firm) and Another HL 21-Jul-1995
The defendant solicitors had acted for a purchaser, Crowngate, which had agreed to buy a property from a company called Mirage for andpound;775,000. Crowngate had arranged however that the property would first be passed through a chain of two . .
At CAAIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co Solicitors CA 8-Feb-2013
The defendant firm of solicitors had acted for the claimants under instructions to secure a first charge over the secured property. They failed to secure the discharge of the existing first charge, causing losses. AIB asserted breach of trust.
CitedCaffrey v Darby 1801
A fiduciary has a strict duty to account; equity imposes stringent liability on a fiduciary as a deterrent – pour encourager les autres. Lord Eldon LC said: ‘It would be very dangerous, though no fraud could be imputed to the trustees, and no kind . .
CitedNocton v Lord Ashburton HL 1914
The defendant solicitor had persuaded his client to release a charge, thus advancing the solicitor’s own subsequent charge on the same property. The action was started in the Chancery Division of the High Court. The statement of claim alleged fraud . .
CitedCanson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton and Co 21-Nov-1991
Canlii Supreme Court of Canada – Canada – Damages — Breach of fiduciary duty — Solicitor preparing conveyance not advising purchasers of secret profit made on a flip — On agreed facts, purchasers fully . .
CitedLibertarian Investments Ltd v Hall 6-Nov-2013
(Hong Kong) A trustee owes a duty to hold trust funds and apply them for the purposes of the trust (a stewardship or custodial duty). He is bound to answer for his stewardship when called on by the beneficiary to do so. If for any reason he . .
CitedBartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (Nos 1 and 2) ChD 1980
A claim was made against a trustee for compensation for losses incurred during the administration of the trust.
Held: For a court to order an account by a trustee on the basis of wilful default, and make the defendant liable not only for . .
CitedAgricultural Land Management Ltd v Jackson (No 2) 2-May-2014
(Supreme Court of Western Australia) Equity – Fiduciary duties – Whether mere existence of conflict is actionable – Whether a breach of conflict rule requires a fiduciary actually to act in a position of conflict and pursue or prefer a personal . .
CitedMothew (T/a Stapley and Co) v Bristol and West Building Society CA 24-Jul-1996
The solicitor, acting in a land purchase transaction for his lay client and the plaintiff, had unwittingly misled the claimant by telling the claimant that the purchasers were providing the balance of the purchase price themselves without recourse . .
CitedEx parte Adamson; In re Collie CA 1878
The Court of Chancery never entertained a suit for damages occasioned by fraudulent conduct or for breach of trust, and that the suit was always for ‘an equitable debt, or liability in the nature of a debt’. . .
CitedLivingstone v Rawyards Coal Co HL 13-Feb-1880
Damages or removal of coal under land
User damages were awarded for the unauthorised removal of coal from beneath the appellant’s land, even though the site was too small for the appellant to have mined the coal himself. The appellant was also awarded damages for the damage done to the . .
CitedMagnus v Queensland National Bank 1888
A custodial bank was liable to restore trust funds merely because it dissipated the trust funds in a manner which was not authorised. Lord Halsbury LC said: ‘we are not at liberty to speculate whether the same result might not have followed whether . .
CitedBank of New Zealand v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd 1999
New Zealand Court of Appeal – Gault J said: ‘Recent cases show a trend in favour of analysis by reference to the scope of the duty, and enquire as to the risks against which there was a duty to protect the plaintiff. In South Australia Asset . .
CitedKelly v Cooper and Cooper Trading As Cooper Associates (A Firm) Co PC 19-Oct-1992
Bermuda – The fiduciary obligations imposed on an agent will depend on the express and implied terms of the contract. Although an agent is, in the absence of contractual provision, in breach of his fiduciary duties if he acts for another who is in . .
CitedHodgkinson v Simms 30-Sep-1994
Supreme Court of Canada – Fiduciary duty — Non-disclosure — Damages — Financial adviser — Client insisting that adviser not be involved in promoting — Adviser not disclosing involvement in projects — Client investing in projects suggested by . .
CitedCadbury Schweppes v FBI Foods 28-Jan-1999
Supreme Court of Canada – Commercial law – Confidential information – Breach of confidence – -Remedies – Manufacturer using confidential information obtained under licensing agreement to manufacture competing product – Whether permanent injunction . .
CitedFHR European Ventures Llp and Others v Cedar Capital Partners Llc SC 16-Jul-2014
Approprietary remedy against Fraudulent Agent
The Court was asked whether a bribe or secret commission received by an agent is held by the agent on trust for his principal, or whether the principal merely has a claim for equitable compensation in a sum equal to the value of the bribe or . .
CitedKM v HM 29-Oct-1992
Supreme Court of Canada – Limitation of actions – Torts – Assault and battery – Incest – Woman bringing action against father for damages for incest – Whether or not action limited by Limitations Act – Application of the reasonable discoverability . .
CitedBreen v Williams 6-Sep-1996
High Court of Australia – Medicine – Doctor/patient relationship – Medical records – Patient’s right to access – Contractual right – Doctor’s duty to act in patient’s ‘best interests’ with utmost good faith and loyalty – Patient’s proprietary right . .
CitedMaguire v Makaronis 25-Jun-1997
High Court of Australia – Equity – Fiduciary duties – Solicitor and client relationship – Mortgage by clients in favour of solicitors – Ascertainment of particular fiduciary duties.
Equity – Equitable remedies – Rescission – Relevance of . .
CitedYouyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher 3-Apr-2003
High Court of Australia – Trusts – Express trust – Money received by firm of solicitors to be held for a specific purpose and in accordance with specific conditions – Misapplication of funds by firm – Breach of express trust – Liability of firm as . .
CitedPilmer v Duke Group Ltd 3-Apr-2003
High Court of Australia – Trusts – Express trust – Money received by firm of solicitors to be held for a specific purpose and in accordance with specific conditions – Misapplication of funds by firm – Breach of express trust – Liability of firm as . .
CitedAmaltal Corpn Ltd v Maruha Corpn 20-Feb-2007
Supreme Court of New Zealand – Blanchard J said that even in a commercial relationship, there might be aspects which engaged fiduciary obligations: ‘That is because in the nature of that particular aspect of the relationship one party is entitled to . .
CitedPremium Real Estate Ltd v Stevens 6-Mar-2009
Supreme Court of New Zealand – The court was asked as to the forfeiture of remuneration by an agent for breach of fiduciary duty.
Held: In relation to remoteness of damage, it was observed that the question of foreseeability in common law . .
CitedAkai Holdings Ltd v Kasikornbank PCL 8-Nov-2010
Court of Final Appeal – Hong Kong – Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury NPJ said: ‘the notion that equitable compensation is assessed on a somewhat different basis from common law damages is clearly right (albeit that the difference can be overstated)’ and . .

Cited by:
CitedPurrunsing v A’Court and Co (A Firm) and Another ChD 14-Apr-2016
The claimant had paid money for a property, but the seller was a fraudster and no money or title was recovered. The claimant sued both his conveyancers and the solicitors who had acted for the fraudster, in each case innocently. The defendants each . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Damages, Legal Professions

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.538296

Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commissioners: HL 24 Nov 1966

The taxpayer made a gift of shares to a trust set up to fund a medical professorship. The shares were in a private company, and an option was given for their repurchase once a certain level of dividends had been attributed to them. He was assessed to substantial surcharges on them on the basis that the arrangement was a settlement under which he retained an interest and of which he had not divested himself absolutely.
Lord Upjohn said: ‘If A intends to give away all his beneficial interest in a piece of property and thinks he has done so but, by some mistake or accident or failure to comply with the requirements of the law, he has failed to do so, either wholly or partially, there will, by operation of law, be a resulting trust for him of the beneficial interest of which he had failed effectually to dispose. If the beneficial interest was in A and he fails to give it away effectively to another or others or on charitable trusts it must remain in him’

Lord Reid, Lord Pearce, Lord Upjohn, Lord Donovan, Lord Wilberforce
[1966] UKHL 3, [1967] 2 AC 291, [1966] UKHL TC – 43 – 519
Bailii, Bailii
Income Tax Act 1952 411 415, Law of Property Act 1925 53
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedOughtred v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 4-Nov-1959
The taxpayer and her son owned through a trust the entire beneficial interest in the shares of a company. She agreed to transfer other shares to him in return for his interest in the shares subject to the trust, releasing the trust. The Revenue . .
CitedGrey and Another (Hunter’s Nominees) v Inland Revenue Commissioners; Orse Gray v IRC HL 2-Nov-1959
The House considered whether certain instruments which were presented for adjudication to stamp duty under section 13 of the Stamp Act 1891, are or are not chargeable with ad valorem duty.
Held: The word ‘disposition’ is to be given its . .
CitedAttorney General v Brown 1849
. .

Cited by:
See AlsoRe Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) ChD 17-Jul-1973
The court considered the requirement that a proposed beneficiary must establish some positive act on the part of the person creating the trust for that person to be bound by the trust asserted. Megarry J said: ‘(1) If a transaction fails to make any . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Income Tax

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.248562

Highbury Pension Fund Management Company and Another v Zirfin Investments Management Ltd and Others: CA 3 Oct 2013

Lewison LJ discussed the operation of the principle of marshalling: ‘One consequence of the application of the principle is that if the first mortgagee with more than one security satisfies his debt out of the property over which the second mortgagee has his only security, the second mortgagee is entitled to stand pro tanto in the place of the first mortgagee in relation to the property over which the second mortgagee has no legal security . . It is in this sense that we can say that the second mortgagee is in effect subrogated to the rights of the first mortgagee.’ and ‘the way in which the original principle in its classic form is framed fastens on the conduct and conscience of the doubly secured creditor. It is the fact that he has the choice which fund to resort to and the power at law to disappoint the singly secured creditor which brings the equity into play.’
Riker, Lewison LJJ, Silber J
[2013] EWCA Civ 1283, [2014] 1 P andCR 13, [2014] 1 All ER 674, [2014] 1 BCLC 118, [2014] 1 CH 359, [2014] 2 WLR 1129
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromMcLean and Another v Trustees of The Bankruptcy Estate of Dent and Others ChD 26-Oct-2016
Marshalling your Dogs Equitably
Application by the joint administrators of a partnership affording the opportunity to consider the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over a dog.
Held: The equitable principle of . .

Cited by:
CitedHighbury Pension Fund Management Company and Another v Zirfin Investments Ltd and Others ChD 14-Feb-2013
The court was asked: ‘a) Does the doctrine of marshalling permit the marshalling of securities held over property that does not belong to the common debtor? In particular, is a creditor of a guarantor entitled to marshal (or be subrogated to) . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 September 2021; Ref: scu.517451

Letterstedt v Broers: PC 22 Mar 1884

(Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope) Lack of harmony may be of itself a good reason for a trustee to resign or be dismissed. Lord Blackburn approved a passage in Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, s 1289: ‘But in cases of positive misconduct, courts of equity have no difficulty in interposing to remove trustees who have abused their trust; it is not indeed every mistake or neglect of duty, or inaccuracy of conduct of trustees, which will induce courts of equity to adopt such a course. But the acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust property or to shew a want of honesty, or a want of proper capacity to execute the duties, or a want of reasonable fidelity.’
. . and ‘It seems to their Lordships that the jurisdiction which a court of equity has no difficulty in exercising under the circumstances indicated by Story is merely ancillary to its principal duty, to see that the trusts are properly executed. This duty is constantly being performed by the substitution of new trustees in the place of original trustees for a variety of reasons in non-contentious cases. And therefore, though it should appear that the charges of misconduct were either not made out, or were greatly exaggerated, so that the trustee was justified in resisting them, and the court might consider that in awarding costs, yet if satisfied that the continuance of the trustee would prevent the trusts being properly executed, the trustee might be removed. It must always be borne in mind that trustees exist for the benefit of those to whom the creator of the trust has given the trust estate.’
The court set out the principles underlying a decision to remove a trustee. Lord Blackburn said: ‘The whole of the matters which have been complained of, and the whole that, if this judgment stands, may yet have to be done by the Board, are matters which they had to do, as having accepted the burthen of carrying out the trusts which on the true construction of the will were imposed upon them, and so become trustees. What they had to do as executors merely, such as paying debts, collecting assets, andc., have long ago been over, and by the terms of the compromise the plaintiff cannot now say they have not been done properly. There may be some peculiarity in the Dutch Colonial law, which made it proper to make the prayer in the way in which it was done to remove them from the office of executor; if so, it has not been brought to their Lordships’ notice; the whole case has been argued here, and, as far as their Lordships can perceive, in the Court below, as depending on the principles which should guide an English Court of Equity when called upon to remove old trustees and substitute new ones. It is not disputed that there is a jurisdiction ‘in cases requiring such a remedy,’ as is said in Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, s. 1287, but there is very little to be found to guide us in saying what are the cases requiring such a remedy; so little that their Lordships are compelled to have recourse to general principles.
Story says, s. 1289, ‘But in cases of positive misconduct, Courts of Equity have no difficulty in interposing to remove trustees who have abused their trust; it is not indeed every mistake or neglect of duty, or inaccuracy of conduct of trustees, which will induce Courts of Equity to adopt such a course. But the acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust property or to shew a want of honesty, or a want of proper capacity to execute the duties, or a want of reasonable fidelity’
It seems to their Lordships that the jurisdiction which a Court of Equity has no difficulty in exercising under the circumstances indicated by Story is merely ancillary to its principal duty, to see that the trusts are properly executed. This duty is constantly being performed by the substitution of new trustees in the place of original trustees for a variety of reasons in non-contentious cases. And therefore, though it should appear that the charges of misconduct were either not made out, or were greatly exaggerated, so that the trustee was justified in resisting them, and the Court might consider that in awarding costs, yet if satisfied that the continuance of the trustee would prevent the trusts being properly executed, the trustee might be removed. It must always be borne in mind that trustees exist for the benefit of those to whom the creator of the trust has given the trust estate. The reason why there is so little to be found in the books on this subject is probably that suggested by Mr. Davey in his argument. As soon as all questions of character are as far settled as the nature of the case admits, if it appears clear that the continuance of the trustee would be detrimental to the execution of the trusts, even if for no other reason than that human infirmity would prevent those beneficially interested, or those who act for them, from working in harmony with the trustee, and if there is no reason to the contrary from the intentions of the framer of the trust to give this trustee a benefit or otherwise, the trustee is always advised by his own counsel to resign, and does so. If, without any reasonable ground, he refused to do so, it seems to their Lordships that the Court might think it proper to remove him; but cases involving the necessity of deciding this, if they ever arise, do so without getting reported. It is to be lamented that the case was not considered in this light by the parties in the Court below, for, as far as their Lordships can see, the Board would have little or no profit from continuing to be trustees, and as such coming into continual conflict with the appellant and her legal advisers, and would probably have been glad to resign, and get out of an onerous and disagreeable position. But the case was not so treated.
In exercising so delicate a jurisdiction as that of removing trustees, their Lordships do not venture to lay down any general rule beyond the very broad principle above enunciated, that their main guide must be the welfare of the beneficiaries.’ He referred to cases in which there was a conflict between trustee and beneficiary and continued: ‘As soon as all questions of character are as far settled as the nature of the case admits, if it appears clear that the continuance of the trustee would be detrimental to the execution of the trusts, even if for no other reason than that human infirmity would prevent those beneficially interested, or those who act for them, from working in harmony with the trustee, and if there is no reason to the contrary from the intentions of the framer of the trust to give this trustee a benefit or otherwise, the trustee is always advised by his own counsel to resign, and does so. If, without any reasonable ground, he refused to do so, it seems to their Lordships that the Court might think it proper to remove him; but cases involving the necessity of deciding this, if they ever arise, do so without getting reported.’
However: ‘It is quite true that friction or hostility between trustees and the immediate possessor of the trust estate is not of itself a reason for the removal of the trustees. But where the hostility is grounded on the mode in which the trust has been administered, where it has been caused wholly or partially by substantial overcharges against the trust estate, it is certainly not to be disregarded.’
Lord Blackburn
[1884] UKPC 1, (1884) 9 App Cas 371, [1884] UKPC 18, [1884] UKLawRpAC 12
Bailii, Bailii, Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedCharman v Charman CA 20-Dec-2005
The court considered orders to third parties abroad to produce docments for use in ancillary relief proceedings. The husband had built up considerable assets within an offshore discretionary trust. The court was asked whether these were family . .
CitedThe Thomas and Agnes Carvel Foundation v Carvel and Another ChD 11-Jun-2007
The husband and wife had made mutual wills in the US with an express agreement not to make later alterations or dispositions without the agreement of the other or at all after the first death. The wife survived, but having lost the first will made a . .
CitedJones and others v Firkin-Flood ChD 17-Oct-2008
The trustees had contracted to sell shares in a private company held within the estate. A family member now claimed that they were held in trust after a settlement of a possible challenge to the will based in lack of testamentary capacity and undue . .
CitedGreen and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
CitedKershaw v Micklethwaite and Others ChD 12-Feb-2010
Application by the claimant, Mr Kershaw, for some or all of the defendants to be removed as executors of the Will of Mr Kershaw’s mother. . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.247442

Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council; Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Sandwell Borough Council: ChD 23 Feb 1993

A bank, having made payment under an void interest rate swap agreement to a local authority, was entitled to recover the payments made under the equitable doctrine of restitution. It would be wrong to allow the local authorities to enjoy an unjust enrichment. There had been no effective consideration given by the local authorities. ‘The application of the principle is subject to the requirement that the courts should not grant a remedy which amounts to the direct or indirect enforcement of a contract which the law requires to be treated as ineffective.’
Hobhouse J
Independent 25-Feb-1993, Times 23-Feb-1993, [1994] 4 All ER 890
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromWestdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council CA 30-Dec-1993
A bank paid money to a local authority under an interest rate swap agreement, which was held later to be outside the local authority’s powers.
Held: The local authority was to repay the money paid to it for an ultra vires purpose (a swap . .
CitedYaxley v Gotts and Another CA 24-Jun-1999
Oral Agreement Creating Proprietory Estoppel
The defendant offered to give to the Plaintiff, a builder, the ground floor of a property in return for converting the house, and then managing it. They were friends, and the oral offer was accepted. The property was then actually bought in the name . .
CitedKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
CitedAspect Contracts (Asbetos) Ltd v Higgins Construction Plc SC 17-Jun-2015
Aspect had claimed the return of funds paid by it to the appellant Higgins under an adjudication award in a construction contract disute. The claimant had been asked to prpare asbestos surveys and reports on maisonettes which Higgins was to acquire . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.90409

Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Birmingham City Council: CA 20 May 1996

No defence of unjust enrichment was available to defend a claim on a failed interest rate swap agreement.
Times 20-May-1996, [1997] QB 380
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
CitedRevenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies SC 11-Apr-2017
Certain investment trust companies (ITCs) sought refunds of VAT paid on the supply of investment management services. EU law however clarified that they were not due. Refunds were restricted by the Commissioners both as to the amounts and limitation . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.82811

Noakes and Co Ltd v Rice: HL 17 Dec 1901

Rule Against Clog on equity of Redemption

A mortgage of a leasehold public house contained a covenant with the mortgagee, a brewery, that the mortgagor and his successors in title would not, during the continuance of the leasehold term and whether or not any money should be owing on the security of the mortgage, sell malt liquor in the public house other that that purchased from the brewery.
Held: The covenant was not enforceable after redemption of the charge.
Lord MacNaghten said of the rule preventing a clog on the equity of redemption of a mortgage: ‘Redemption is of the very nature and essence of a mortgage, as mortgages are regarded in equity. It is inherent in the thing itself. And it is, I think, as firmly settled now as it ever was in former times that equity will not permit any device or contrivance designed or calculated to prevent or impede redemption. It follows as a necessary consequence that, when the money secured by a mortgage of land is paid off, the land itself and the owner of the land in the use and enjoyment of it must be as free and unfettered to all intents and purposes as if the land had never been made the subject of the security.’
Lord Lindley said: ‘My Lords, I agree in thinking that the covenant contained in this mortgage, and by which the mortgagees have attempted to convert the house mortgaged from a free public-house into a tied public-house even after redemption, is invalid. I see no answer to the objection taken to it that upon payment off of the mortgage money the mortgagor cannot get back what he mortgaged, namely, a free public-house.’
Earl of Halsbury LC, Lord MacNaghten, Lord Lindley
[1902] AC 24, [1901] UKHL 3
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedG and C Kreglinger v The New Patagonian Meat and Cold Storage Company HL 20-Nov-1913
Mortgagor’s collateral dvantage is not a clog
The appellant woolbrokers had lent the respondent andpound;10,000 with a floating charge over its undertaking. The loan agreement provided that, for five years, the appellants would have first refusal over all sheepskins sold by the company. The . .
CitedJones v Morgan CA 28-Jun-2001
The claimant appealed against an order refusing him enforcement an agreement for the purchase of a one half share in a property. The judge had found the agreement to be unconscionable.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The judge had wrongly . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 04 August 2021; Ref: scu.443246

Gavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd: SC 18 Apr 2018

The court was asked as to use of the solicitor’s equitable lien, whereby equity provided security for the recovery by solicitors of their agreed charges for the successful conduct of litigation, out of the fruits of that litigation. It is a judge-made remedy, motivated not by any fondness for solicitors as fellow lawyers or even as officers of the court, but rather because it promotes access to justice. Specifically it enables solicitors to offer litigation services on credit to clients who, although they have a meritorious case, lack the financial resources to pay up front for its pursuit. It is called a solicitor’s lien because solicitors used to have a virtual monopoly on the pursuit of litigation in the higher courts. The solicitors had taken on personal injury claimants on a conditional fee basis. The appellant insurance company had settled the claims directly with the clients, depriving the solicitors of their costs.
Held: Appeal dismissed (though on differing grounds)
‘ the equity depends upon the solicitor having a claim for his charges against the client, that there must be something in the nature of a fund against which equity can recognise that his claim extends (which is usually a debt owed by the defendant to the solicitor’s client which owes its existence, at least in part, to the solicitor’s services to the client) and that for equity to intervene there must be something sufficiently affecting the conscience of the payer, either in the form of collusion to cheat the solicitor or notice (or, I would add knowledge) of the solicitor’s claim against, or interest in, the fund.’
Lady Hale, President, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Briggs
[2018] UKSC 21, [2018] RTR 22, [2018] 2 Costs LR 347, [2018] PNLR 24, [2018] 3 All ER 273, [2018] 1 WLR 2052, [2018] WLR(D) 241
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, Supreme Court, SC Summary, SC Summary Video, SC 2018 0205 am video, SC 2018 0205 pm video, SC 20180202 am Video, SC 2018 02 06 pm video
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromGavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd CA 2-Dec-2015
Appeal by Edmondson against an Order dismissing Edmondson’s claim against Haven in respect of Haven’s conduct in settling on an inclusive basis personal injury claims directly with six clients of Edmondson with whom Edmondson had concluded . .
CitedWelsh v Hole 6-Nov-1779
The plaintiff obtained judgment for pounds 20 and costs in a civil claim for assault, but then compromised the claim for a direct payment by the defendant of pounds 10. There was no collusion to defeat the solicitor’s right to payment of his bill. . .
CitedRead v Dupper 13-Jun-1795
The defendant’s solicitor paid the plaintiff direct, after notice of the plaintiff’s solicitor’s interest, and had to pay again. Lord Kenyon began:
‘The principle by which this application is to be decided was settled long ago, namely that the . .
CitedOrmerod v Tate 13-May-1801
An attorney has a lien upon a sum awarded in favour of his client, as well as if recovered by judgment: and if after notice to the defendant the latter pay it over to the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s attorney may compel a repayment of it to himself, . .
CitedEx Parte Bryant 12-Aug-1815
Person arrested on his return from proving a debt at Guildhall, discharged with costs of application.
Though an order be made on a petition in bankruptcy, directing costs to be paid to the Petitioner personally, this does not take away the . .
ApprovedKhans Solicitor (A Firm) v Chifuntwe and Another CA 8-May-2013
C instructed the claimants to bring proceedings. They compromised those proceedings, the defendant agreeing to pay C’s costs. A bill was submitted but before it was paid C withdrew his instructions from his solicitors and accepted the defendant’s . .
CitedIn re the Estate of Fuld, decd (No. 4) 1968
The solicitor sought to exercise a lien for his costs over money paid direct to his client.
Held: The solicitor’s right exists over both the amount of a judgment in favour of the client, and the amount of an order for costs in favour of the . .
CitedGould v Davis 1831
. .
CitedIn Re Moss 2-Jun-1866
Lord Romilly MR said: ‘I think it of great importance to preserve the lien of solicitors. That is the real security for solicitors engaged in business. It is also beneficial to the suitors. It would frequently happen, but for the lien which . .
CitedBarker v St Quintin, Esq 22-Jan-1844
A solicitor’s the equitable lien operates by way of security or charge.
Baron Parke said: ‘The lien which an attorney is said to have on a judgment (which is, perhaps, an incorrect expression) is merely a claim to the equitable interference of . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 18 July 2021; Ref: scu.608733

First National Bank Plc v Thompson: CA 25 Jul 1995

A charge executed before a purchase was ‘fed’ by a subsequent purchase and had priority. ‘Feeding the estoppel’ doctrine may apply to charges on registered land. The estoppel was fed by a later purchase without a clear recital of the title in the charge.
Ind Summary 31-Jul-1995, Times 25-Jul-1995, Gazette 15-Sep-1995
Land Registration Act 1925
England and Wales

Updated: 07 June 2021; Ref: scu.80559

In re a Debtor (No 1 of 1987), ex parte the Royal Bank of Scotland: CA 1989

A statutory demand as served showed an incorrectly calculated sum owed and was in the wrong form.
Held: The application to set the demand aside was refused. A statutory demand should not be set aside for a mere technicality.
Lord Justice Nicholls said: ‘The question arising on this appeal concerns the exercise by the court of its power to set aside a statutory demand ‘on other grounds’ within sub-paragraph (d) [of rule 6.5(4)] In my view, the right approach to paragraph (4) of rule 6.5 is this. Under the Act, a statutory demand which is not complied with founds the consequence that the debtor is regarded as being unable to pay the debt in question or, if the debt is not immediately payable, as having no reasonable prospect of being able to pay the debt when it becomes due. That consequence, in turn, founds the ability of the creditor to present a bankruptcy petition because, under section 268(1), in the absence of an unsatisfied return to execution or other process, a debtor’s inability to pay the debt in question is established if, but only if, the appropriate statutory demand has been served and not complied with. When therefore the rules provide, as does rule 6.5(4)(d), for the court to have a residual discretion to set aside a statutory demand, the circumstances which normally will be required before a court can be satisfied that the demand ‘ought’ to be set aside, are circumstances which would make it unjust for the statutory demand to give rise to those consequences in the particular case. The court’s intervention is called for to prevent that injustice.’
and ‘When therefore the rules provide, as does rule 6.5(4)(d), for the court to have a residual discretion to set aside a statutory demand, the circumstances which normally will be required before a court can be satisfied that the demand ‘ought’ to be set aside, are circumstances which would make it unjust for the statutory demand to give rise to those consequences in the particular case. The court’s intervention is called for to prevent that injustice.
This approach to sub-paragraph (d) is in line with the particular grounds specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of rule 6.5(4). Normally it would be unjust that an individual should be regarded as unable to pay a debt if the debt is disputed on substantial grounds: sub-paragraph (b). Likewise, if the debtor has a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand which equals or exceeds the amount of the debt: sub-paragraph (a). Again, if the creditor is fully secured: sub-paragraph (c).’

and ‘Nevertheless, applying the approach which I have indicated above as the correct approach to these statutory provisions, in my view it by no means follows from the existence of these defects that this statutory demand ought to be set aside. The court will exercise its discretion on whether or not to set aside a statutory demand, having regard to all the circumstances. That must require a court to have regard to all the circumstances as they are at the time of the hearing before the court. There may be cases where the terms of the statutory demand are so confusing or so misleading that, having regard to all the circumstances, justice requires that the demand should not be allowed to stand. There will be other cases where, despite such defects in the contents of the statutory demand, those defects have not prejudiced and will not prejudice the debtor in any way, and to set aside the statutory demand in such a case would serve no useful purpose. For example a debtor may be wholly unable to pay a debt which is immediately payable, either out of his own resources, or with financial assistance from others. In such a case the only practical consequence of setting aside a statutory demand would be that the creditor would immediately serve a revised statutory demand, which also and inevitably would not be complied with. In such a case the need for a further statutory demand would serve only to increase costs. Such a course would not be in the interests of anyone.’ and
‘In these circumstances I am in no doubt that, despite the mistakes in this statutory demand and the use strictly of the incorrect form, and despite the debtor not being aware of the precise amount of the debt when the demand was served on him, justice does not require that this statutory demand should be set aside. I can see no injustice in the consequences which flow from non-compliance with a statutory demand being permitted to flow in this case, despite the existence of those features.’
Lord Justice Nicholls
[1989] 1 WLR 271, [1989] 2 All ER 46
Insolvency Rules 1986 (1986 No 1925) 6.1 6.5(4)(d), Police Act 1996 2
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedCoulter v Chief Constable of Dorset Police CA 8-Oct-2004
The appellant had failed in his action against the police and been ordered to pay the costs. A statutory demand was issued in the name of the respondent, but as the new chief constable had no deed of assignment, he was only equitable assignee.
CitedTS and S Global Ltd v Fithian-Franks and others ChD 18-Jun-2007
Appeal against setting aside of statutory demand disputed as to amount of liability under contract.
Held: The guarantors’ liability under the guarantee was immediately payable by them, without the need for a demand, before service of the . .
CitedRemblance v Octagon Assets Ltd CA 17-Jun-2009
A statutory demand was served against the guarantor of the lease after rent arrears arose. He applied for the demand to be set aside, and now appealed against its refusal. He said that the court would have set aside such a demand against the tenant, . .
CitedBudge v AH Budge (Contractors) Ltd CA 1997
When being asked to set aside a statutory demand, and exercising the statutory discretion, the real question is whether the applicant can show ‘a substantial reason comparable to the sort of reason one sees in paras (a), (b) and (c) of r 6.5(4), why . .
CitedWhite v Davenham Trust Ltd ChD 1-Nov-2010
. .
CitedMahon and Another v FBN Bank (UK) Ltd ChD 6-Jun-2011
The claimants appealed against a refusal to set aside a statutory demand. . .
CitedWhite v Davenham Trust Ltd CA 28-Jun-2011
Appeal against order reinstating statutory demand. . .
CitedMoore (T/A James Moore Earth Moving) v Inland Revenue ChNI 5-Dec-2001
Appeal against conditional setting aside of statutory demand. . .
CitedOwo-Samson v Barclays Bank Plc, Boyden CA 21-May-2003
The appellant challenged a formal statutory demand which had led to his bankruptcy. The demand had included the anticipated cost of realising the charged property, and also had been inflated to allow for extra costs of dealing the appellant who was . .
CitedShaw and Another v MFP Foundations and Piling Ltd ChD 6-Jan-2010
The defendants appealed against a refusal to set aside statutory demands adjudicated due under the 1996 Act. They said that the judge had accepted that he was bound by MFO and that it was on all fours, but he had not followed it.
Held: The . .
CitedAllen v Burke Construction Ltd ChNI 25-May-2010
. .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 02 June 2021; Ref: scu.220020

Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid and Others: PC 24 Nov 1993

Principalhas proprietary interest in Trust assets

Bribes were taken by an employee, a crown prosecutor in Hong Kong, in a fraud on his employer. He then invested the proceeds in the purchase of property in New Zealand. The property had increased in value. The employer sought repayment of the bribes received from the properties purchased.
Held: The employer had a proprietary interest both in the bribe and in the asset substituted for it. Thus the property belonged in equity to the employer. The first stage in the analysis was the decision that the bribe itself was trust property. The second stage in the analysis was simply the application of the process of tracing the value of the bribe into the asset that had been substituted for it. A fiduciary office holder who accepted a bribe holds both the original sum, and any increase in its value, on a constructive trust for the person to whom he owed that fiduciary duty. Bribery is an evil practice which threatens the foundations of any civilised society. It corrupts not only the recipient but the giver of the bribe. ‘property acquired by a trustee innocently but in breach of trust and the property from time to time representing the same belong in equity to the cestui que trust and not to the trustee personally’:
Lord Templeman Lrd Goff. Lord Lowry, Lord Lloyd, Sir Thomas Eichelbaum
Gazette 26-Jan-1994, Independent 24-Nov-1993, Times 12-Nov-1993, [1994] 1 AC 324, [1993] UKPC 2, [1994] 1 All ER 1
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Wrongly decidedLister and Co v Stubbs CA 1890
It was alleged by the plaintiffs that their foreman had received secret commissions which he had invested in land and other investments. They sought interlocutory relief to prevent him dealing with the land and requiring him to bring the other . .

Cited by:
CitedTesco Stores Limited v Pook, Pook, Universal Projects (UK) Limited ChD 14-Apr-2003
A trustee in breach of his duty has a duty to disclose that breach. It was alleged that the defendants, including a director of the claimant, had submitted false invoices to the claimants, and purchased property with the resulting profits.
CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
CitedIslamic Republic of Pakistan v Zardari and others ComC 6-Oct-2006
The claimant alleged that the defendants had funded the purchase of various properties by secret and unlawful commissions taken by them whilst in power in Pakistan. They sought to recover the proceeds. They now sought permission to serve proceedings . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 02 June 2021; Ref: scu.77944

Gossip v Wright: HL 1869

The House considered the right to redeem a mortgage. Kindersley VC said: ‘There is no doubt that the broad rule is this: that the Court will not allow the right of redemption in any way ‘to be hampered or crippled in that which the parties intended to be a security either by any contemporaneous instrument with the deed in question, or by anything which this Court would regard as a simultaneous arrangement or part of the same transaction.’ The rule in comparatively recent times was. unsettled by certain decisions in the Court of Chancery in England which seem to have misled the learned Judges in the Full Court. But it is now firmly established by the House of Lords that the old rule still prevails and that equity will not permit any device or contrivance being part of the mortgage transaction or contemporaneous with it to prevent or impede redemption. The learned Counsel on behalf of the Respondents admitted as he was bound to admit that a mortgage cannot be made irredeemable. That is plainly forbidden. Is there any difference between forbidding re demption and permitting it, if the permission be a mere pretence? Here the provision for redemp tion is nugatory. The incumbrance on the lease the subject of the mortgage according to the letter of the bargain falls to be discharged before the lease terminates, but at a time when it is on the very point of expiring when redemption can be of no advantage to the mortgagor even if he should be so fortunate as to get his deeds back before the actual termination of the lease. For all practical purposes this mortgage is irredeem able. It was obviously meant to be irredeemable. It was made irredeemable in and by the mortgage itself.’
Kindersley VC
[1869] 32 LJ Ch 653, [1869] WR 1137
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedFairclough v The Swan Brewery Company Ltd PC 17-May-1912
. .
CitedBrighton and Hove City Council v Audus ChD 26-Feb-2009
The claimant was the proprietor of a fourth legal charge on a title. It sought a declaration that a second charge in favour of the defendant was void as a clog on the proprietor’s equity of redemption. An advance secured by a first charge, also in . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 June 2021; Ref: scu.304591

McLean and Another v Trustees of The Bankruptcy Estate of Dent and Others: ChD 26 Oct 2016

Marshalling your Dogs Equitably

Application by the joint administrators of a partnership affording the opportunity to consider the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over a dog.
Held: The equitable principle of marshalling did appear to apply as between the bank and M. The bank had been able resort to two securities in support of its lending to the partnership: first the agricultural charge over partnership assets (including the dog), and secondly third party legal charges over the farms.
Norris J
[2016] EWHC 2650 (Ch), [2017] Ch 422, [2017] BPIR 164, [2017] 3 WLR 198, [2017] WLR(D) 157
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn Re Ritson, Ritson v Ritson CA 1899
The joint debts of a partnership are payable out of the joint assets if sufficient even though secured on the separate property of one partner.
Chitty LJ said of a deceased partner that his ‘interest in the joint assets [of the partnership] . .
CitedIn Re Ritson ChD 1898
. .

Cited by:
Appeal fromHighbury Pension Fund Management Company and Another v Zirfin Investments Management Ltd and Others CA 3-Oct-2013
4
Lewison LJ discussed the operation of the principle of marshalling: ‘One consequence of the application of the principle is that if the first mortgagee with more than one security satisfies his debt out of the property over which the second . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 May 2021; Ref: scu.570475

Chetwynd v Allen: 1899

A lender M advanced pounds 1,200 to pay off an existing mortgage held by T over a property owned by the plaintiff. M made the advance on the basis of certain misleading representations and non-disclosures by the plaintiff’s husband. M was told that he would receive a transfer of T’s mortgage. pounds 1,000 of the advance was applied in reduction of T’s mortgage. T’s mortgage was secured over two properties. The plaintiff was subrogated to the prior mortgage because otherwise the wife would have been unjustly enriched by the discharge of the debt which it secured.
Held: The charge on both properties to the extent of pounds 1,000 was kept alive in equity in favour of M, so far as that could be done without prejudicing T or the plaintiff, with whom M did not deal. T was not prejudiced as the balance of his mortgage debt had priority over M’s charge. The plaintiff was not prejudiced so long as no extra costs were thrown on the mortgaged properties by reason of the original mortgage debt being divided between T and M.
Romer J
[1899] 1 Ch 353
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBank of Cyprus UK Ltd v Menelaou SC 4-Nov-2015
The bank customers, now appellants, redeemed a mortgage over their property, and the property was transferred to family members, who in turn borrowed from the same lender. A bank employee simply changed the name on the mortgage. This was ineffective . .
CitedLowick Rose Llp v Swynson Ltd and Another SC 11-Apr-2017
Losses arose from the misvaluation of a company before its purchase. The respondent had funded the purchase, relying upon a valuation by the predecessor of the appellant firm of accountants. Further advances had been made when the true situation was . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 May 2021; Ref: scu.592219

Highbury Pension Fund Management Company and Another v Zirfin Investments Ltd and Others: ChD 14 Feb 2013

The court was asked: ‘a) Does the doctrine of marshalling permit the marshalling of securities held over property that does not belong to the common debtor? In particular, is a creditor of a guarantor entitled to marshal (or be subrogated to) securities which have been granted to another creditor of the guarantor by the primary debtor liable under the guaranteed debt?
b) Does the answer depend in any way on the rights which the guarantor has as against the holder of the guarantee or as against the primary debtor?
c) Does any such claim to marshalling or subrogation take precedence over prohibitions contained in the Restraint Order, either as of right or by virtue of the exercise of some discretion of the Crown Court?’
Held: The equitable principle applied. Lady Morrison may claim the proceeds of the assets subject to the Agricultural Charge by the application of the principle of marshalling, and is entitled to prove as an unsecured creditor in the administration for any shortfall.
Norris J said: ‘The principle of marshalling is an equitable principle. In its classic form it applies where two creditors are owed debts by the same debtor, one of whom can enforce his claim against more than one security but the other can resort to only one. In those circumstances the principle gives the second creditor a right in equity to require that the first creditor be treated as having satisfied himself as far as possible out of the security to which the latter has no claim.’
Norris J
[2013] EWHC 238 (Ch), [2013] WLR(D) 71, [2014] 2 WLR 1129, [2014] 1 CH 359
Bailii, WLRD
Agricultural Credits Act 1928, Partnership Act 1890 39
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedHighbury Pension Fund Management Company and Another v Zirfin Investments Management Ltd and Others CA 3-Oct-2013
4
Lewison LJ discussed the operation of the principle of marshalling: ‘One consequence of the application of the principle is that if the first mortgagee with more than one security satisfies his debt out of the property over which the second . .
CitedIn Re Ritson ChD 1898
. .
CitedIn Re Ritson, Ritson v Ritson CA 1899
The joint debts of a partnership are payable out of the joint assets if sufficient even though secured on the separate property of one partner.
Chitty LJ said of a deceased partner that his ‘interest in the joint assets [of the partnership] . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 April 2021; Ref: scu.470996

AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co Solicitors: CA 8 Feb 2013

The defendant firm of solicitors had acted for the claimants under instructions to secure a first charge over the secured property. They failed to secure the discharge of the existing first charge, causing losses. AIB asserted breach of trust.
Held: The bank’s appeal failed. However, the judge was wrong to treat the breach of trust as limited to that part of the mortgage advance which was paid to the borrowers instead of being used to discharge their liability to Barclays on the second account. the solicitors had no authority to release any part of the funds advanced by the bank unless and until they had a redemption statement from Barclays coupled with an appropriate undertaking which enabled them to be sure that they would be able on completion to register the bank’s charge as a first charge over the property.
Where the breach of trust occurred in the context of a commercial transaction such as the present, Target Holdings established that equitable principles of compensation ‘although not employing precisely the same rules of causation and remoteness as the common law, do have the capacity to recognise what loss the beneficiary has actually suffered from the breach of trust and to base the compensation recoverable on a proper causal connection between the breach and the eventual loss’.
Given the law, and, on the facts, Patten LJ said: ‘If one asks as at the date of trial and with the benefit of hindsight what loss AIB has suffered then the answer is that it has enjoyed less security for its loan than would have been the case had there been no breach of trust. If [the solicitors] had obtained from Barclays a proper redemption statement, coupled with an undertaking to apply the sums specified in the statement in satisfaction of the existing mortgage, then the transaction would have proceeded to complete and AIB could have obtained a first legal mortgage over the Sondhis’ property. But although that did not happen, AIB did obtain a valid mortgage from the Sondhis which they were eventually able to register as a second charge and use to recover part of their loan from the proceeds of the security in priority to the Sondhis’ other creditors. Even had there been no such mortgage they would have been subrogated to Barclays’ first charge insofar as they discharged part of the Sondhis’ indebtedness by the payment of the andpound;1.2m. In my view all of these are matters to be taken into account in considering what loss has ultimately been caused by the solicitors’ breach of trust. In the light of the judge’s findings it is not open to AIB to contend that but for the breach of trust it simply would have asked for its money back.’
Arden, Sullivan and Patten LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 45
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromAIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co (A Firm) ChD 23-Jan-2012
The claimant bank sought damages from the defendant solicitors, saying that they had paid on mortgage advance moneys but failed to deliver as promised and required, a first mortgage over the property purchased. The solicitors had failed to discharge . .
CitedTarget Holdings Ltd v Redferns (A Firm) and Another HL 21-Jul-1995
The defendant solicitors had acted for a purchaser, Crowngate, which had agreed to buy a property from a company called Mirage for andpound;775,000. Crowngate had arranged however that the property would first be passed through a chain of two . .

Cited by:
At CAAIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co Solicitors SC 5-Nov-2014
Bank not to recover more than its losses
The court was asked as to the remedy available to the appellant bank against the respondent, a firm of solicitors, for breach of the solicitors’ custodial duties in respect of money entrusted to them for the purpose of completing a loan which was to . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 April 2021; Ref: scu.470899

Kilmer v The British Columbia Orchard Lands Limited: PC 26 Feb 1913

British Columbia
Lord Moulton
[1913] UKPC 10
Bailii
Canada
Citing:
ApprovedIn re Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co; Ex parte Hulse CA 1873
The Court of Appeal in chancery heard an appeal from the Master of the Rolls from his refusal of the Master of the Rolls to make a declaration in the winding up of the purchaser company. The purchaser had sought a direction that if the balance of . .

Cited by:
CitedCavendish Square Holding Bv v Talal El Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis SC 4-Nov-2015
The court reconsidered the law relating to penalty clauses in contracts. The first appeal, Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi, raised the issue in relation to two clauses in a substantial commercial contract. The second appeal, . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 April 2021; Ref: scu.467453

Swindle, Fillmore, Cox, Rowett v Harrison and Harrison: CA 25 Mar 1997

Negligence short of fraud gave no right to damages for non-disclosure.
Evans LJ
Times 17-Apr-1997, [1997] PNLR 641, [1997] EWCA Civ 1339, [1997] 4 All ER 705
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedHalton International Inc (Holding) and Another v Guernroy Ltd ChD 9-Sep-2005
Parties had entered into a shareholders’ agreement as to voting arrengemets within a company. Thay disputed whether votes had been used in reach of that agreement, particularly as to the issue of new shares and their allotment, but the court now . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 April 2021; Ref: scu.141735

Pappadakis v Pappadakis: ChD 19 Jan 2000

Where a party sought rectification of a contract to supply into the contract an element without which the contract was intrinsically invalid, that application could only succeed if there was clear and convincing evidence that the parties had intended another effect, and precisely what that effect was. Here an assignment to unidentified trustees which was ineffective because of the uncertainty could not be repaired since the evidence required was not available.
Times 19-Jan-2000
England and Wales

Updated: 15 April 2021; Ref: scu.84560

Neville and Another v Wilson and Others: CA 4 Apr 1996

A parole agreement by all the shareholders in a company, to liquidate it, created a constructive trust. That a specifically enforceable agreement to assign an interest in property, created an equitable interest in the assignee, was unquestionably correct. A trust deed governed by s53(2) is not subject to the requirement to be in writing.
Lord Justice Nourse, Lord Justice Rose and Lord Justice Aldous
Times 04-Apr-1996, [1997] Ch 14
Law of Property Act 1925 53(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedLondon and South Western Railway Co v Gomm CA 1882
A grant was given to repurchase property, but was void at common law for the uncertainty of the triggering event.
Held: The ‘right’ to ‘take away’ the claimants’ estate or interest in the farm was immediately vested in the grantee of the right . .

Cited by:
CitedSlater v Simm ChD 27-Apr-2007
The deceased and her partner did not marry but owned three properties together. They could not agree on the interpretation of the documents setting out their interests, and whether they had been varied.
Held: The court set out the various . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 April 2021; Ref: scu.84261

In Re Duxbury’s Settlement Trusts: CA 21 Nov 1994

The Public trustee appealed against an order which had recognised his appointment under the 1959 trust, but had held that because of the explicit prohibition in the trust instrument against a trustee acting alone, he could not act.
Held: Powers under a trust deed were satisfactorily exerciseable by the Public Trustee acting alone despite the trust deed’s express requirement that no trustee shall act alone. The powers given under the Act inevitably included this power: ‘It would be idle to appoint a trustee who was unable to act. Appointment and action were for this purpose inseparable.’ It was futile to distinguish between a power to appoint a sole trustee and the power of that trustee to act alone.
Nourse LJ, Henry LJ, Sir John Megaw
Times 19-Dec-1994, Gazette 16-Dec-1994, Ind Summary 06-Feb-1995, [1995] 1 WLR 425, [1994] EWCA Civ 21
Bailii
Public Trustee Act 1906 5(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re Moxon 1916
Under the statutory power of appointing new trustees out of court, the public trustee could be appointed and act even though the instrument might require a minimum of two trustees to act. The section was ‘not merely by way of addition o the . .
CitedMettoy Pension Trustees v Evans ChD 1990
Where a trustee acts under a discretion given to him by the terms of the trust the court will interfere with his action if it is clear that he would not have so acted as he did had he not failed to take into account considerations which he ought to . .
CitedRe Hastings-Bass; Hastings v Inland Revenue CA 14-Mar-1974
Trustees of a settlement had exercised their power of advancement under the section, in order to save estate duty by transferring investments to be held on the trusts of a later settlement. However the actual effect of the advancement was that the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 April 2021; Ref: scu.81858

Connaught Restaurants Ltd v Indoor Leisure Ltd: CA 17 Sep 1993

The lease provided the tenant would pay the rent ‘without any deduction’.
Held: The words ‘without any deductions’ in a lease were ambiguous and were insufficient to exclude the tenant’s right to claim a set off. Clear words are needed before the court will impute to the parties an intention to exclude the equitable rights of set-off.
Gazette 16-Feb-1994, Independent 17-Sep-1993, Times 27-Jul-1993, [1994] 1 WLR 501
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBritish Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Marine Management (UK) Ltd ChD 19-Dec-1978
Money expended by a tenant on discharging his landlord’s covenants will in appropriate circumstances operate as a partial or a complete discharge so as to furnish a defence at law to a claim for unpaid rent; and where the tenant has suffered damage . .
DisapprovedFamous Army Stores v Meehan 1993
. .

Cited by:
CitedEdlington Properties Limited v J H Fenner and Co Limited CA 22-Mar-2006
The landlord had assigned the reversion of the lease. There was an outstanding dispute with the tenant defendant who owed arrears of rent, but sought to set these off against a claim for damages for the landlord’s failure to construct the factory in . .
CitedMarubeni Corporation v Sea Containers Ltd ComC 17-May-1995
Procedure – set-off – contract for supply of containers – construction of contract – clear words to exclude right of set-off – equitable set-off – abatement – defective containers. The words ‘without deduction’ have been held in the context of a . .
CitedBOC Group Plc v Centeon Llc and Centeon Bio-Services Inc CA 29-Apr-1999
The court was asked whether a clause in a share sale agreement setting out the payment obligation worked to preclude the purchaser from exercising a right of set-off when the time comes to pay a later instalment of the price.
Held: The appeal . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 April 2021; Ref: scu.79441

Cheese v Thomas: CA 24 Aug 1993

A transaction entered into was manifestly disadvantageous to him. After a finding of undue influence, losses on the sale of a property are to be shared by both parties, so as to restore the parties to their original positions as near as might be.
Lord Nicholls Vice Chancellor
Independent 30-Aug-1993, Times 24-Aug-1993, [1994] 1 WLR 129
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedVale v Armstrong, Armstrong ChD 21-May-2004
The claimant sought to set aside a transfer of his house to the defendants made at an undervalue and under an enduring power of attorney, who had charged it to raise money for their business. He had received independent advice.
Held: The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 April 2021; Ref: scu.79002

AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co (A Firm): ChD 23 Jan 2012

The claimant bank sought damages from the defendant solicitors, saying that they had paid on mortgage advance moneys but failed to deliver as promised and required, a first mortgage over the property purchased. The solicitors had failed to discharge an existing first charge (to Barclays). The parties now disputed whether the sum due to the bank was the entire sum loaned, or only the net sum lost after the sale.
Held: The solicitors had acted in good faith, but in breach of trust.
Prima facie the bank was entitled to reconstitution of the trust fund by repayment of the amount wrongly paid away. As to the bank’s alternative claim for equitable compensation or damages, he said that where the breach consisted of failure to discharge a prior mortgage, with the result that the bank’s interest had been postponed to the Barclays charge, the bank was entitled to equitable compensation for the additional amounts due to Barclays for which Barclays had security in priority to the bank. The solicitors were therefore liable to the bank for the additional amount ultimately obtained by Barclays by reason of its prior security.
The court analysed the breach of trust: ‘ In the present case, . . . what the defendant’s instructions authorised them to do with the funds paid to them was to pay to Barclays (or to its account) such sum as was required to procure a release of its charge, and pay the balance to the borrowers or to their order. Had they complied with their instructions they would have paid (taking all the figures in round terms) andpound;1.5m to Barclays and andpound;1.8m to the borrowers. In the event they paid andpound;1.2m to Barclays and andpound;2.1m to the borrowers. In my judgment, in so doing they committed a breach of trust in so far as payment was made contrary to the authority they had been given.
It does not however in my judgment necessarily follow that the whole of the payment of andpound;3.3m was made in breach of trust. The difference between what the defendant did and what it ought to have done if it had complied with its instructions was the andpound;300,000 that should have been paid to Barclays but was instead paid to the borrowers. That in my judgment was the extent of the breach of trust committed. It was not a breach of trust to pay andpound;1.2m to Barclays; that payment was made as partial performance of the authority and obligation to discharge Barclays’ secured debt. It was not a breach of trust to pay andpound;1.8m to the borrowers, as that was the sum to which they were entitled. The breach consisted of the failure to retain an additional andpound;300,000 and apply that to the discharge of the Barclays debt.’
David Cooke HHJ
[2012] EWHC 35 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedCook v The Mortgage Business Plc CA 24-Jan-2012
cook_mbpCA2012
The land owners sought relief from possession orders made under mortgages given in equity release schemes: ‘If the purchaser raises all or part of the purchase price on mortgage, and then defaults, the issue arises whether the mortgagee’s right to . .
Appeal fromAIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co Solicitors CA 8-Feb-2013
The defendant firm of solicitors had acted for the claimants under instructions to secure a first charge over the secured property. They failed to secure the discharge of the existing first charge, causing losses. AIB asserted breach of trust.
At ChDAIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co Solicitors SC 5-Nov-2014
Bank not to recover more than its losses
The court was asked as to the remedy available to the appellant bank against the respondent, a firm of solicitors, for breach of the solicitors’ custodial duties in respect of money entrusted to them for the purpose of completing a loan which was to . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 March 2021; Ref: scu.450453

The Manchester Ship Canal Company Ltd v Vauxhall Motors Ltd: CA 17 May 2018

Lewison, Floyd, David Richards LJJ
[2018] EWCA Civ 1100, [2018] WLR(D) 304, [2019] Ch 331, [2018] 2 P and CR 18, [2019] 2 WLR 330
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromGeneral Motors UK Ltd v The Manchester Ship Canal Company Ltd ChD 30-Nov-2016
The claimants had had a long standing licence to discharge water in the defendant’s canal. Having failed to pay the license fee, the licence was revoked. The claimants sought relief from forfeiture.
Held: Granted . .

Cited by:
At CAThe Manchester Ship Canal Company Ltd v Vauxhall Motors Ltd SC 23-Oct-2019
Limits on relief from forfeiture of land
In the context of land, equitable relief is only available for forfeiture of property rights, as opposed to a right to possession under a contract. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 13 March 2021; Ref: scu.616330

Venture North Sea Gas Ltd v Nuon Exploration and Production UK Ltd: Comc 10 Feb 2010

Application for specific performance of contract.
Gross J
[2010] EWHC 204 (Comm)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedYewbelle Ltd v London Green Developments Ltd, Knightsbridge Green Limited ChD 8-Dec-2006
The court considered what were the obligations undertaken by a party contracting to use reasonable endeavours.
Held: The question is one of substance, not form, to be determined objectively. Lewison J said: ‘the essence of the obligation . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 February 2021; Ref: scu.396727

Bank of Credit and Commerce International Sa (In Liquidation) (No 8): CA 2 Oct 1996

Not all debts which were eligible for proof in bankruptcy were also eligible for a set off.
Rose Ljexplained the doctrine of equitable marshallling, saying: ‘The doctrine of marshalling applies where there are two creditors of the same debtor, each owed a different debt, one creditor (A) having two or more securities for the debt due to him and the other (B) having only one. B has the right to have the two securities marshalled so that both he and A are paid so far as possible. Thus if a debtor has two estates (Blackacre and Whiteacre) and mortgages both to A and afterwards mortgages Whiteacre only to B, B can have the two mortgages marshalled so that Blackacre can be made available to him if A chooses to enforce his security against Whiteacre. For the doctrine to apply there must be two debts owed by the same debtor to two different creditors.’
. . and ‘[Marshalling] is never allowed to delay or defeat the creditor with several securities in the collection of his debt and the enforcement of his securities. He is allowed to realise his securities as he pleases’.
Rose LJ
Gazette 02-Oct-1996, [1996] Ch 245, [1996] 2 BCLC 254, [1996] 2 WLR 631, [1996] 2 All ER 121
Insolvency Rules 1986 4.90
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedSzepietowski v The National Crime Agency SC 23-Oct-2013
S owned several propertie in charge to the bank, but the Agency said that each had been acquired with the proceeds of criminal activity. The parties had settled the claim by the grant of a second charge in favour of the Agency. However when that . .
CitedLB Holdings Intermediate 2 Ltd, The Joint Administrators of v Lehman Brothers International (Europe), The Joint Administrators of and Others SC 17-May-2017
In the course of the insolvent administration of the bank, substantial additional sums were received. Parties appealed against some orders made on the application to court for directions as to what was to be done with the surplus.
Held: The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 February 2021; Ref: scu.78144

In Re the Estate of Ronald Ernest Chittock (Deceased); Chittock v Stevens and Others: ChD 5 Apr 2000

A widow had thought that she was to receive the bulk of her husband’s estate by survivorship, but discovered, only out of time and after the six months limit, that this was not the case. She applied for leave to apply out of time to rectify the will, saying that the revocation of the necessary provision was an error.
Held: The application should be decided on similar principles to applications for an extension of time under the Inheritance etc Act. The failure to proceed arose from a fundamental mistake as to the value of the estate. The beneficiaries had operated under the same misapprehension, and had not therefore acted to their detriment because of the delay. Leave was given.
David Donaldson QC
Times 05-Apr-2000, (2000) 1 WTLR 643
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, Administration of Justice Act 1975 4
England and Wales
Citing:
DistinguishedEscritt v Escritt 1981
. .
CitedIn re Salmon (Deceased) 1981
The time limit under the 1975 Act is ‘a substantive provision laid down in the Act itself and is not a mere procedural time limit imposed by rules of court which will be treated with the indulgence appropriate to procedural rules. The burden on the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 February 2021; Ref: scu.82244

El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd: CA 2 Dec 1993

The court was asked whether, for the purposes of establishing a company’s liability under the knowing receipt head of constructive trust, the knowledge of one of its directors can be treated as having been the knowledge of the company.
Held: The company was fixed with the knowledge of its part-time chairman and a non-executive director, because he had acted as its directing mind and will for the particular purpose of arranging its receipt of the tainted funds. It was sufficient that the director had management and control so far as the receipt of the fraud was concerned, having made arrangements for the receipt and disposal of the money, even though he had no general managerial responsibility in the company.
Hoffmann LJ set out the ingredients of knowing receipt: ‘For this purpose the plaintiff must show, first a disposal of his assets in breach of fiduciary duty; secondly, the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff; and thirdly, knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets are traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty.’
When asking who was the controlling mind of a company, the relevant test is to find the person who had management and control in relation to the act or omission in point. The formal position or status as a director is relevant but not decisive. A ‘pragmatic’ approach is necessary: ‘Decided cases show that, in regard to the requisite status and authority, the formal position, as regulated by the company’s articles of association, service contracts and so forth, though highly relevant, may not be decisive. Here Millett J adopted a pragmatic approach. In my view he was right to do so, although it has led me, with diffidence, to a conclusion different from his own’ and ‘ . . different persons may for different purposes satisfy the requirements of being the company’s directing mind and will. ‘ The court considered the ingredients of the tort of ‘knowing receipt’: ‘For this purpose the plaintiff must show, first, a disposal of his assets in breach of fiduciary duty; secondly, the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff; and thirdly, knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets he received are traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty.’ (Hoffmann LJ)
Nourse LJ said: ‘The doctrine attributes to the company the mind and will of the natural person or persons who manage and control its actions. At that point, in the words of Millett J ([1993] 3 ALL ER 717 at 740): ‘Their minds are its mind; their intention its intention; their knowledge its knowledge.’ It is important to emphasise that management and control is not something to be considered generally or in the round. It is necessary to identify the natural person or persons having management and control in relation to the act or omission in point. This was well put by Eveleigh J in . . R v Andrews Weatherfoil Ltd . .
Decided cases show that, in regard to the requisite status and authority, the formal position, as regulated by the company’s articles of association, service contracts and so forth, though highly relevant, may not be decisive. Here Millett J adopted a pragmatic approach. In my view he was right to do so, although it has led me, with diffidence, to a conclusion different from his own.’
Nourse, Rose, Hoffmann LJJ
Times 03-Jan-1994, [1994] 2 All ER 685, [1993] EWCA Civ 4, [1994] BCC 143, [1994] 1 BCLC 464
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromEl Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc and Another ChD 3-Jan-1993
A non active director may still be company’s ‘directing mind’. The doctrine of attributing the actions of individuals to a company is that ‘Their minds are its mind; their intention its intention; their knowledge its knowledge.’
Tracing was no . .
CitedLennard’s Carrying Company Limited v Asiatic Petroleum Company Limited HL 1915
The House was asked as to when the acts of an individual became those of his employer under section 502 (‘any loss or damage happening without (the ship owner’s) actual fault or privity’).
Held: Viscount Haldane LC said: ‘It must be upon the . .
CitedRegina v Andrews-Weatherfoil Ltd CACD 1972
For so long as it is possible for persons concerned in a single offence to be tried separately, it is inevitable that the verdicts returned by the two juries will on occasion appear to be inconsistent with one another. Eveleigh J: ‘It is necessary . .

Cited by:
AppliedBank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd and Another v Akindele CA 22-Jun-2000
The test of whether a person who received funds held them on constructive trust, was not whether he himself was dishonest, but rather whether he had knowledge of circumstances which made it unconscionable to hold on to the money received. In respect . .
CitedCrown Dilmun, Dilmun Investments Limited v Nicholas Sutton, Fulham River Projects Limited ChD 23-Jan-2004
There was a contract for the sale of Craven Cottage football stadium, conditional upon the grant of non-onerous planning permissions. It was claimed that the contract had been obtained by the defendant employee in breach of his fiduciary duties to . .
CitedMahonia Limited v JP Morgan Chase Bankwest Lb Ag QBD 3-Aug-2004
The Claimant claimed on a letter of credit issued by the Defendant on behalf of Enron Ltd, who asserted it was not liable to pay there having been unlawful behaviour by Enron Ltd. Swap agreements had been entered into, and the defendant said the . .
CitedFassihim, Liddiardrams, International Ltd, Isograph Ltd v Item Software (UK) Ltd CA 30-Sep-2004
The first defendant (F) had been employed by a company involved in a distribution agreement. He had sought to set up a competing arrangement whilst a director of the claimant, and diverted a contract to his new company.
Held: A company . .
See AlsoEl Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc ChD 1995
The tracing of assets into the hands of a third party depends upon a notional charge. There are no inflexible rules. The essential elements of ‘knowing receipt’ are: ‘For this purpose the plaintiff must show, first, a disposal of his assets in . .
CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
CitedKR and others v Royal and Sun Alliance Plc CA 3-Nov-2006
The insurer appealed findings of liability under the 1930 Act. Claims had been made for damages for child abuse in a residential home, whom they insured. The home had become insolvent, and the claimants had pursued the insurer.
Held: The . .
CitedCharter Plc and Another v City Index Ltd and others ChD 12-Oct-2006
An employee of the claimant had fraudulently spent several million pounds of the claimant’s money on personal bets through the defendant company. The claimant said that the defendants knew the origin of the funds and were liable to repay them. . .
CitedJetivia Sa and Another v Bilta (UK) Ltd and Others SC 22-Apr-2015
The liquidators of Bilta had brought proceedings against former directors and the appellant alleging that they were party to an unlawful means conspiracy which had damaged the company by engaging in a carousel fraud with carbon credits. On the . .
CitedAkers and Others v Samba Financial Group SC 1-Feb-2017
Saad Investments was a Cayman Islands company in liquidation. The liquidator brought an action here, but the defendant sought a stay saying that another forum was clearly more appropriate. Shares in Saudi banks were said to be held in trust for the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 February 2021; Ref: scu.262615

Rose v AIB Group (UK) plc and Another: ChD 9 Jun 2003

The bank had received and paid substantial sums from the company before the petition for insolvency had been presented, and had discharged the director’s charge on his house. The liquidator sought restitution under the Act. The bank replied that it had acted already in such a way as to put its own position at risk, and that the claim in restitution should be denied.
Held: The court was required to try to achieve equal payment pari passsu of the debts. The bank was entitled to an order validating payments it had made prior to presentation. For payments made subsequently, the defence of restitution might be available according to the facts of the case allowing for good and bad faith. Here the alleged change of position resulted form the bank’s own act, not on any assessment of the validity of the credits.
Nicholas Warren QC
Times 08-Jul-2003, Gazette 31-Jul-2003
Insolvency Act 1986 127
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedDextra Bank and Trust Company Limited v Bank of Jamaica PC 26-Nov-2001
(Jamaica) A cheque was drawn which was used as part a complex financial arrangement intended to purchase foreign currency to work around Jamaica’s foreign exchange control regulations. It was asserted that by presenting the cheque used in the . .
CitedBank of Ireland v Hollicourt (Contracts) Limited CA 20-Oct-2000
A bank continued to pay on cheques presented to it against the company’s bank account even after the presentation of a petition for bankruptcy. The liquidator sought recovery of the amounts paid from the bank as well as the payees. It was held that . .
CitedRe S A and D Wright Ltd, Denney v John Hudson and Co Ltd CA 1992
Fox LJ said: ‘A disposition carried out in good faith in the ordinary course of business at a time when the parties were unaware that a petition had been presented would usually be validated by the court unless there is ground for thinking that the . .
CitedIn re Gray’s Inn Construction Co Ltd CA 1980
After the presentation of a petition for the winding up of the company moneys were paid in and out of the company’s bank account which was overdrawn. The liquidator issued a summons for a declaration that the amounts credited and/or debited to the . .
CitedLipkin Gorman (a Firm) v Karpnale Ltd HL 6-Jun-1991
The plaintiff firm of solicitors sought to recover money which had been stolen from them by a partner, and then gambled away with the defendant. He had purchased their gaming chips, and the plaintiff argued that these, being gambling debts, were . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 February 2021; Ref: scu.184532

El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc and Another: ChD 3 Jan 1993

A non active director may still be company’s ‘directing mind’. The doctrine of attributing the actions of individuals to a company is that ‘Their minds are its mind; their intention its intention; their knowledge its knowledge.’
Tracing was no longer available at common law because funds received had become mixed with others, but the remedy remained available in equity.
Millett J
Times 03-Jan-1993, [1993] 3 All ER 717
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedShalson v Russo ChD 11-Jul-2003
The claimant sought recovery of substantial sums he had advanced by way of loan, where the loan was induced by fraud. He sought to trace the funds into, inter alia, a motor yacht which it had been used to purchase.
Held: The transaction was . .
Appeal fromEl Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd CA 2-Dec-1993
The court was asked whether, for the purposes of establishing a company’s liability under the knowing receipt head of constructive trust, the knowledge of one of its directors can be treated as having been the knowledge of the company.
Held: . .
CitedJetivia Sa and Another v Bilta (UK) Ltd and Others SC 22-Apr-2015
The liquidators of Bilta had brought proceedings against former directors and the appellant alleging that they were party to an unlawful means conspiracy which had damaged the company by engaging in a carousel fraud with carbon credits. On the . .
See AlsoEl Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc ChD 1995
The tracing of assets into the hands of a third party depends upon a notional charge. There are no inflexible rules. The essential elements of ‘knowing receipt’ are: ‘For this purpose the plaintiff must show, first, a disposal of his assets in . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 February 2021; Ref: scu.80281

Joscelyne v Nissen: CA 1970

A father entered into a written contract with his daughter by which he transferred to her his car hire business in return for her agreement to pay him a pension and discharge certain expenses. In their discussions it had been agreed between them that these expenses should include the father’s gas, electricity and coal bills and the cost of home help. The court considered an application for rectification. At first instance, the court held that the signed contract did not on its proper interpretation provide for payment of these expenses, but rectification was granted. The daughter appealed, contending that as a matter of law the remedy of rectification was not available to the father in the absence of an antecedent concluded contract.
Held: The daughter’s contention as rejected. Rose v Pim did not assert or reinstate the view that an antecedent complete concluded contract was required for rectification. It only showed that prior accord on a term or meaning of a phrase to be used must have been outwardly expressed or communicated between the parties. The burden of proof on the party asking for rectification is high.
A contractual document could only be rectified in order to bring it into conformity with a contract that already existed before the document was executed and which the document failed accurately to record as a result of a mutual mistake.
Buckley LJ, Russell LJ
[1970] 2 QB 86
England and Wales
Citing:
ExplainedFrederick E Rose (London) Limited v William H Pim Junior and Co Limited 1953
The plaintiffs, who were London merchants, had been asked by Egyptian buyers to supply ‘feveroles’. Not knowing what this term meant, they asked the defendants’ representative, who responded that ‘feveroles’ meant horsebeans. Relying on this . .
ApprovedCrane v Hegeman-Harris Co Inc ChD 1939
A continuing common intention of the parties to a document alone will not suffice to justify rectification. For rectification to be appropriate, there must be convincing proof that the concluded instrument does not represent the common intention of . .
CitedLovell and Christmas Ltd v Wall CA 1911
The written contract contained a restrictive covenant limiting the defendant’s freedom to carry on the business of a ‘provision merchant’ other than on behalf of the plaintiff company. On the facts found, the parties in their discussions before the . .

Cited by:
CitedAMP (UK) Plc and Another v Barker and Others ChD 8-Dec-2000
The claimants were interested under a pension scheme. Alterations had been made, which the said had been in error, and they sought rectification to remove a link between early leaver benefits and incapacity benefits. The defendant trustees agreed . .
CitedPegler Ltd v Wang (UK) Ltd TCC 25-Feb-2000
Standard Conract – Wide Exclusions, Apply 1977 Act
The claimant had acquired a computer system from the defendant, which had failed. It was admitted that the contract had been broken, and the court set out to decide the issue of damages.
Held: Even though Wang had been ready to amend one or . .
CitedOun v Ahmad ChD 19-Mar-2008
The parties agreed in writing for the sale of leasehold property to the claimant. One document had been signed, but later one said that it had not included an aportionment. Another document then set out the apportionment. When the defendant refused . .
CitedFSHC Group Holdings Ltd v Glas Trust Corporation Ltd CA 31-Jul-2019
Rectification – Chartbrook not followed
Opportunity for an appellate court to clarify the correct test to apply in deciding whether the written terms of a contract may be rectified because of a common mistake.
Held: The appeal failed. The judge was right to conclude that an . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 February 2021; Ref: scu.184577

Kensington International Ltd v Republic of the Congo: ComC 13 Jul 2007

[2007] EWHC 1632 (Comm)
Bailii
Citing:
See AlsoKensington International Ltd v Republic of Congo and Another ComC 20-Jul-2006
The claimant sought leave to cross examine an officer of the defendant in connection with his affidavit sworn in search order proceedings. The case had a history of deceit and dishonest oral evidence.
Held: Though such an order would be . .
See AlsoKensington International Ltd v Republic of the Congo; Glencore Energy UK Limited, Sphynx UK Limited, Sphynx (BDA) Limited, Africa Oil and Gas Corporation, Cotrade SA (Third Parties) ComC 28-Nov-2005
The claimant had taken an assignment of debts owed by the defendant, and obtained judgment in US$121m. They sought to enforce the judgment and obtained third party debt orders against the parties listed.
Held: Officers in the third party . .
See AlsoKensington International Ltd v Republic of The Congo ComC 16-Apr-2003
. .
See AlsoKensington International Ltd v Republic of the Congo CA 13-May-2003
The claimant had obtained judgment against the defendant for US$60m, and had sought a Mareva injunction against the defendant republic’s assets and against the assets of companies through which it operated in the UK. The claimant now appealed . .
See AlsoKensington International Ltd and Another v Republic Of the Congo ComC 26-May-2006
. .
See AlsoKensington International Ltd v Republic of Congo and Another ComC 20-Jul-2006
The claimant sought leave to cross examine an officer of the defendant in connection with his affidavit sworn in search order proceedings. The case had a history of deceit and dishonest oral evidence.
Held: Though such an order would be . .

Cited by:
See AlsoKensington International Ltd v Republic of Congo CA 7-Nov-2007
The defendants appealed against orders requiring them to disclose documents in an action regarding the payment of bribes, saying that the requirement effectively required them to incriminate themselves.
Held: The appeal failed. The public . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 03 February 2021; Ref: scu.258166

Rowallan Group Ltd v Edgehill Portfolio No 1 Ltd: ChD 19 Jan 2007

When striking out a claim for rectification of a contract on the basis of a unilateral mistake: ‘the remedy of rectification for unilateral mistake is a drastic remedy, for it has the result of imposing on the defendant to the claim a contract which he did not, and did not intend to, make. Accordingly the conditions for the grant of such relief must be strictly satisfied.’
Lightman J
[2007] EWHC 32 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedConnolly Ltd v Bellway Homes Ltd ChD 23-Apr-2007
connolly_bellwayChD2007
The claimant sought rectification of a contract for the sale of land, or damages in deceit. They said that it had been agreed that the price would be adjusted to reflect any change in values. The formula inserted made no great sense mathematically, . .
CitedConnolly Ltd v Bellway Homes Ltd ChD 23-Apr-2007
connolly_bellwayChD2007
The claimant sought rectification of a contract for the sale of land, or damages in deceit. They said that it had been agreed that the price would be adjusted to reflect any change in values. The formula inserted made no great sense mathematically, . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 February 2021; Ref: scu.248253

Williams v Hensman: 10 Jun 1861

A fund of money was bequeathed on trust to be invested so as to generate an income payable to A ‘the principal to go to her children at her death’.
Held: The will created a joint tenancy. The court set out three ways in which a joint tenancy may be severed. Where joint tenants indicated by their conduct that they treated their interests separately, the fact that they did not understand that their interests had been joint did not prevent such behaviour acting to sever the tenancy.
Sir William Page Wood VC
[1861] 1 John and Hem 546, [1861] 30 LJ CH 878, [1861] 5 LT 203, [1861] 7 Jur NS 771, [1861] 70 ER 862, [1861] EWHC Ch J51
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
FollowedBurgess v Rawnsley CA 15-Apr-1975
. .
CitedBarton v Morris 1985
A couple lived together as man and wife and bought a property for use as a guest house business to be run as a partnership. The conveyance executed by both of them included an express declaration that they held the property upon trust for themselves . .
CitedRe Palmer (A Deceased Debtor), Palmer v Palmer CA 6-Apr-1994
Property had been conveyed to the deceased and the appellant, his widow, to be held as joint tenants. The deceased dies whilst under investigation for defalcations as a solicitor, and an insolvency administration order was obtained in the estate. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 January 2021; Ref: scu.238854

Barraclough v Mell and others: ChD 1 Dec 2005

Moneys due under a will had been misdistributed. The correct beneficiary sought repayment. The executor sought to rely upon a trustee exemption clause.
Held: the tustee exemption clause was effective to protect the executor as such. She had acted mistakenly and negligently, but honestly. However, in her additional capacity as an overpaid beneficiary, she was liable to repay the sums. Also the rule against double portions applied to require repayment by one recipient of a mispayment.
[2005] EWHC B17 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedAllcard v Skinner CA 1887
allcard_skinnerCA1887
The donor had parted with almost all her property. She now sought to have the transaction set aside for undue influence.
Held: Where a wife has entered into a gratuitous transaction with her husband, the burden was on the husband as donee to . .
CitedArmitage v Nurse; etc CA 19-Mar-1997
A clause in a trust deed may validly excuse trustees from personal liability for even gross negligence. The trustee was exempted from liability for loss or damage ‘unless such loss or damage shall be caused by his own actual fraud’.
Held: The . .
CitedIn re Pollock; Pollock v Worrall 1885
An example of a gift which is made under a special consideration is where the gift satisfies a particular moral duty identified in the will. . .
CitedIn re Vaux CA 1939
The term ‘portion’ has a ‘qualitative significance’ as well as purely quantitative significance. As to the doctrine of ademption: (Sir Wilfrid Greene MR) ‘The rule against double portions rests upon two hypotheses; first of all, that under the will . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 January 2021; Ref: scu.236337

Potter v Potter: PC 22 Jul 2004

PC (New Zealand) The parties’ relationship failed. They had bought a house together and entered into a trust deed.
Held: ‘Defeasible interests in land are certainly conceptually possible. In England such interests may, for example, be created under the School Sites Acts. And, subject always to the rule against perpetuities, private trusts may create beneficial interests subject to defeasance on the occurrence, or non-occurrence, of specified events. But defeasance conditions in private trusts are invariably express conditions.’ In this case the claimant sought an implied condition. The breakdown of the relationship was no reason to vary the express trusts created.
Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond
[2004] UKPC 41
Bailii, PC
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBarclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd; etc HL 31-Oct-1968
R Ltd were in serious financial difficulties. The company’s overdraft with the appellant bank was almost twice its permitted limit. The company sought a loan of 1 million pounds from a financier, who was willing to lend the company that sum provided . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 13 January 2021; Ref: scu.200080

Bristol and West Building Society v Henning: CA 2 Apr 1985

[1985] CLY 2950, [1985] 2 All ER 606, [1985] EWCA Civ 6, [1985] 1 WLR 778
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
AppliedEquity and Law Home Loans Ltd v Prestidge CA 1992
A house was bought in the name of one partner in an unmarried couple. It was subject to a mortgage, and the non-owner contributed a capital sum. The landowner later remortgaged for a larger sum, but without the partner’s consent. The landowner then . .
CitedScott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd and Others SC 22-Oct-2014
The appellant challenged a sale and rent back transaction. He said that the proposed purchaser had misrepresented the transaction to them. The Court was asked s whether the home owners had interests whose priority was protected by virtue of section . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 January 2021; Ref: scu.187402

Government of Newfoundland v Newfoundland Railway: PC 7 Feb 1888

A railway company and its assignees brought action the Government. Under the contract the company was to build a railway subsidised by the government. The railway was not completed. The parties disputed whether the contract was ‘entire’ and no part of the subsidy was payable unless the railway as a whole was completed. The company succeeded on that. The government counterclaimed for the non-completion, and sought a set off from the subsidies.
Held: The Board emphasised the intertwined nature of the obligations, and said that it ‘had no hesitation in saying that in this contract the claims for subsidy and for non-construction ought to be set against one another.’ The set-off could not be made as against the assignees: that once notice of the assignment of the debt had been given, ‘the debt or claim is so severed from the rest of the contract that the assignee may hold it free from any counter-claim in respect of other terms of the same contract.’ However it distinguished between a set-off properly allowable under the contract itself, which bound an assignee of a debt due under that contract, and a cross-claim which might ‘arise from any fresh transaction freely entered into by [the government] after notice of assignment by the company.’ In the first case, ‘It would be a lamentable thing if it were found to be the law that a party to a contract may assign a portion of it, perhaps a beneficial portion, so that the assignee shall take the benefit, wholly discharged of any counter-claim by the other party in respect of the rest of the contract, which may be burdensome. There is no universal rule that claims arising out of the same contract may be set against one another in all circumstances . . Unliquidated damages may be set off as between the original parties, and also against an assignee if flowing out of and inseparably connected with dealings and transactions which also give rise to the subject of the assignment.’
Lord Hobhouse
(1888) 13 App Cas 199, [1888] UKPC 7
Bailii
Canada
Cited by:
CitedSmith v Muscat CA 10-Jul-2003
The tenant was sued by his landlord for arrears of rent, but sought an equitable set-off for damages for disrepair accruing under the previous landlord.
Held: If the entitlement to recover arrears of rent passes from assignor to assignee, and . .
CitedEdlington Properties Limited v J H Fenner and Co Limited CA 22-Mar-2006
The landlord had assigned the reversion of the lease. There was an outstanding dispute with the tenant defendant who owed arrears of rent, but sought to set these off against a claim for damages for the landlord’s failure to construct the factory in . .
CitedGeldof Metaalconstructie Nv v Simon Carves Ltd CA 11-Jun-2010
The parties contracted for the supply and installation of pressure vessels by Geldof (G) for a building constructed by Simon Carves (SC). The contract contained a clause denying the remedy of set-off. G sued for the sale price, and SC now sought an . .
CitedDole Dried Fruit and Nut Co v Trustin Kerwood Ltd CA 1990
The defendant had an exclusive distributorship agency for the plaintiff in England. Under that agreement, the plaintiff sold its prunes and raisins to the defendant under separate contracts of sale. The plaintiff claimed the price of goods sold . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 January 2021; Ref: scu.185867

Wilson v Truelove: ChD 25 Mar 2003

The claimants requested a declaration that an option to repurchase land was void under the 1964 Act.
Held: The option to repurchase land was prima facie void. The right arose on the coming into existence of the agreement, or at the latest on the original purchase. The defendants sought assistance in equity under an estoppel by convention. The fact that the defendant’s right arose under statute did not prevent equity overriding that right. To establish an estoppel generally it was necessary to identify some unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant. None was shown here. To establish an estoppel by convention, there was no requirement for unconscionable behaviour, but it was necessary to show some common mistake as to the meaning of the contract, followed by a course of conduct establishing reliance upon that conventional interpretation. That was absent here. The parties were merely mistaken.
Simon Berry QC
Times 21-Feb-2003, Gazette 13-Mar-2003, Gazette 10-Apr-2003, [2003] EWHC 750 (Ch), [2003] 23 EG 136, [2003] 2 EGLR 63, [2003] 10 EG 164, [2003] WTLR 609
Bailii
Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964 9(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedAdams v Lindsell KBD 5-Jun-1818
No Contract by Post until Acceptance Received
The defendant sent his offer of wool for sale to the plaintiff by post. The plaintiff’s acceptance was at first misdirected. Before receiving the reply the defendant had sold the wool elsewhere, but this was only after he would have received the . .
CitedCrabb v Arun District Council CA 23-Jul-1975
The plaintiff was led to believe that he would acquire a right of access to his land. In reliance on that belief he sold off part of his land, leaving the remainder landlocked.
Held: His claim to have raised an equity was upheld. The plaintiff . .
CitedAmalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd (in Liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd CA 1982
The court explained the nature of an estoppel by convention.
Lord Denning MR said: ‘The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with cases. That is why I have not gone . .
CitedKeen v Holland CA 1984
Oliver LJ rejected a submission that, where parties were shown to have a common view about the legal effect of a contract into which they had entered and it was established that one of them would not, to the other’s knowledge, have entered into it . .
CitedShah v Shah CA 10-Apr-2001
The court was asked as to the enforceability of a document under the terms of which the defendants were to make a payment of pounds 1.5 million to the claimant. The document was described as a deed and provided for each defendant to sign in the . .

Cited by:
CitedTaylor v Couch ChD 1-Mar-2012
The case raised the question of law involving the application of the rule against perpetuities to what, on the claimant’s case, is a right of pre-emption created before the coming into force in 2010 of the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009.’ . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 January 2021; Ref: scu.180367

Mothew (T/a Stapley and Co) v Bristol and West Building Society: CA 24 Jul 1996

The solicitor, acting in a land purchase transaction for his lay client and the plaintiff, had unwittingly misled the claimant by telling the claimant that the purchasers were providing the balance of the purchase price themselves without recourse to further borrowing when he knew that they were using an overdraft to obtain further funding. The plaintiff claimed in breach of trust.
Held: A claim for damages for a solicitor’s failure to disclose the existence of a 2nd mortgage must show that damage flowed from the failure alleged.
Millett LJ said: ‘A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary.’
He is not subject to fiduciary obligations because he is a fiduciary; it is because he is subject to them that he is a fiduciary: ‘A fiduciary who acts for two principals with potentially conflicting interests without the informed consent of both is in breach of the obligation of undivided loyalty; he puts himself in a position where his duty to one principal may conflict with his duty to another . . This is sometimes described as ‘the double employment rule.” and
‘Finally, the fiduciary must take care not to find himself in a position where there is an actual conflict of duty so that he cannot fulfil his obligations to one principal without failing in his obligations to the other . . If he does, he may have no alternative but to cease to act for at least one and preferably both. The fact that he cannot fulfil his obligations to one principal without being in breach of his obligations to the other will not absolve him from liability.’
As to breach of the duty: ‘Breach of fiduciary obligation, therefore, connotes disloyalty or infidelity. Mere incompetence is not enough. A servant who loyally does his incompetent best for his master is not unfaithful and is not guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty.’
If the trustee has benefited from the breach, the court will order him to account for it on the application of the beneficiary. Millett LJ described such relief as ‘primarily restitutionary or restorative rather than compensatory’.
Millett LJ
Times 02-Aug-1996, [1996] EWCA Civ 533, [1998] Ch 1, [1997] 2 WLR 436, [1996] 4 All ER 698
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBirmingham Midshires Building Society v Infields (A Firm) TCC 20-May-1999
The defendant solicitors had acted for the lenders and borrower in a mortgage transaction. The claimant sought repayment of the entire loan, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, in having preferred the interests of one client over those of another. . .
CitedArklow Investments Ltd and Another v Maclean and Others PC 1-Dec-1999
PC (New Zealand) Land was offered for sale. A potential buyer, the appellant was approached by a merchant bank with a proposal for finance. When he sought finance elsewhere, a company associated with the bank . .
CitedDEG-Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v Koshy and Other (No 3); Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (in receivership) v Same (No 3) CA 28-Jul-2003
The company sought to recover damages from a director who had acted dishonestly, by concealing a financial interest in a different company which had made loans to the claimant company. He replied that the claim was out of time. At first instance the . .
CitedThe Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Goldberg, Mcavoy ChD 26-Nov-2003
The Secretary of State sought a disqualification order. The director argued that one shoul not be made in the absence of some breach of legal duty, some dishonesty should be shown.
Held: The answer was a mixture of fact and law. A breach of . .
CitedMarks and Spencer plc v Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (A Firm) ChD 2-Jun-2004
The claimant sought an injunction preventing the respondent form of solicitors acting for a client in a bid for the claimant, saying that the firm was continuing to act for it, and that a conflict of interest arose.
Held: Though the . .
CitedMarks and Spencer Group Plc and Another v Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer CA 3-Jun-2004
The defendant firm of solicitors sought leave to appeal against an injunction requiring them not to act for a client in making a bid to take over the business of the claimant, a former client of the firm.
Held: Leave was refused. The appeal . .
CitedNewgate Stud Company, Newgate Stud Farm Llc v Penfold, Penfold Bloodstock Limited ChD 21-Dec-2004
The claimants sought damages from the defendant. He had been employed to manage their horse-racing activities, and it was alleged that he had made secret profits. The defendant denied any dishonesty, saying all matters were known to the deceased . .
CitedHilton v Barker Booth and Eastwood HL 3-Feb-2005
The claimant had instructed the defendant solicitors to act for him, where he was to contract with another client of the same solicitor in a land development. The solicitor failed to disclose that the other client had convictions for dishonesty, and . .
CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
CitedRatiu, Karmel, Regent House Properties Ltd v Conway CA 22-Nov-2005
The claimant sought damages for defamation. The defendant through their company had accused him acting in such a way as to allow a conflict of interest to arise. They said that he had been invited to act on a proposed purchase but had used the . .
CitedLloyds TSB Bank Plc v Markandan and Uddin (A Firm) ChD 14-Oct-2010
The claimant sought damages saying that the defendant firm of solicitors had failed to deal properly with a conveyance having paid across the mortgage funds to a non-existent firm of solicitors and without obtaining the appropriate documents at all. . .
CitedBarnes and Another v Black Horse Ltd QBD 31-May-2011
barnes_blackQBD11
The claimants sought repayment by the bank of sums paid to them for Payment Protection Insurance policies sold to them in connection with loans made by the bank. The Bank now resisted an application for leave to amend the particulars of the . .
CitedCook v The Mortgage Business Plc CA 24-Jan-2012
cook_mbpCA2012
The land owners sought relief from possession orders made under mortgages given in equity release schemes: ‘If the purchaser raises all or part of the purchase price on mortgage, and then defaults, the issue arises whether the mortgagee’s right to . .
CitedPortman Building Society v Hamlyn Taylor Neck (a Firm) CA 22-Apr-1998
The mortgage advance had been against an express requirement that the client use the property as his private residence. After the client defaulted, the appellant lender discovered that the solicitors acting for themselves and the lay client had . .
CitedMortgage Express v Abensons Solicitors (A Firm) ChD 20-Apr-2012
The claimant lender sought damages against the defendant solicitors alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by them in acting for them on mortgage advances. The defendants now argued that the allowance of an amendment to add the allegation . .
CitedLeeds and Holbeck Building Society v Arthur and Cole ChD 2001
A claim for breach of fiduciary duty by a solicitor as against his lender client, required that it be found that the solicitor ‘did not disclose matters which he admittedly ought to have done to the claimant, intentionally and consciously, knowing . .
CitedFHR European Ventures Llp and Others v Cedar Capital Partners Llc SC 16-Jul-2014
Approprietary remedy against Fraudulent Agent
The Court was asked whether a bribe or secret commission received by an agent is held by the agent on trust for his principal, or whether the principal merely has a claim for equitable compensation in a sum equal to the value of the bribe or . .
CitedAIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler and Co Solicitors SC 5-Nov-2014
Bank not to recover more than its losses
The court was asked as to the remedy available to the appellant bank against the respondent, a firm of solicitors, for breach of the solicitors’ custodial duties in respect of money entrusted to them for the purpose of completing a loan which was to . .
CitedHalton International Inc (Holding) and Another v Guernroy Ltd ChD 9-Sep-2005
Parties had entered into a shareholders’ agreement as to voting arrengemets within a company. Thay disputed whether votes had been used in reach of that agreement, particularly as to the issue of new shares and their allotment, but the court now . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 December 2020; Ref: scu.140400

Goss and others v Laurence George Chilcott As Liquidator of Central Acceptance Limited (In Liquidation): PC 23 May 1996

(New Zealand) Mr and Mrs Goss, had been granted a loan by the claimant finance company under a mortgage instrument that had been avoided by the claimant because it had been fraudulently altered by Mr Haddon, an employee of the claimant, without the claimant’s authority. Mr Haddon was the brother of Mrs Goss. The advance from the claimant having been made available to Mr and Mrs Goss, it was as agreed between them and Mr Haddon in fact received by Mr Haddon. Mr and Mrs Goss took no security from Mr Haddon. Mr Haddon was unable to repay the advance. Mr and Mrs Goss argued that their inability to recover the money from Mr Haddon constituted a defence of change of position to the claimant’s action for restitution of the money paid for a consideration that had totally failed.
Held: The loan remained repayable despite the unenforceability of the mortgage instrument under which it was secured. The defence failed because Mr and Mrs Goss knew that the money lent would have to be repaid to the claimant and, in paying it to Mr Haddon, they had taken the risk that the loss would fall on them.
Lord Goff said: ‘From the beginning, the Defendants were under an obligation to repay the advance once it had been paid to them or to their order; and this obligation was of course unaffected by the fact that they had allowed the money to be paid over to Mr Haddon. The effect of the alteration of the mortgage instrument was that their contractual obligation to repay the money was discharged; but they had nevertheless been enriched by the receipt of the money, and prima facie were liable in restitution to restore it. They had however allowed the money to be paid over to Mr Haddon in circumstances in which, as they well knew, the money would nevertheless have to be repaid to the company. They had, therefore, in allowing the money to be paid to Mr Haddon, deliberately taken the risk that he would be unable to repay the money, in which event they themselves would have to repay it without recourse to him. Since any action by them against Mr Haddon would now be fruitless they are seeking, by invoking the defence of change of position, to shift that loss onto the company. This, in their Lordships’ opinion, they cannot do. The fact that they cannot now obtain reimbursement from Mr Haddon does not, in the circumstances of the present case, render it inequitable for them to be required to make restitution to the company in respect of the enrichment which they have received at the company’s expense.’
Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Cooke of Thorndon
Gazette 12-Jun-1996, Times 06-Jun-1996, [1996] UKPC 17, [1996] AC 788
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedDavidson, Public Officer, &Amp;C v Cooper And Another 6-Jul-1844
. .
[1844] EngR 748, (1844) 13 M and W 343, (1844) 153 ER 142
CitedFibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd HL 15-Jun-1942
A contract for the supply by the respondents of special machinery to be manufactured by them was treated as an ordinary contract for the sale of goods. It began valid, but suffered frustration by the outbreak of war.
Held: Lord Wright restated . .
[1943] AC 32, [1942] UKHL 4
CitedDavid Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia 7-Oct-1992
(High Court of Australia ) Restitution – Money paid under mistake – Mistake of law – Right to recover – Unjust enrichment – Defences – Change of position. . .
(1992) 175 CLR 353

Cited by:
CitedKommune and Another v DEPFA Acs Bank ComC 4-Sep-2009
Local authorities in Denmark sought to recover sums paid to the defendant banks for swap trading, saying that the payments had been outwith their powers. . .
[2009] EWHC 2227 (Comm)

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 December 2020; Ref: scu.80939

Eagle Trust Plc v SBC Securities Ltd; Same v Sbci Bank Corporation Investment Banking Ltd: ChD 28 Sep 1994

A financial adviser was not liable in negligence for the allegedly negligent selection of sub-underwriters. On the issue of knowing receipt in a claim for restitution, ‘What the decision in Belmont (No 2) . . shows most clearly is that in a ‘knowing receipt’ case it is only necessary to show that the defendant knew that the monies paid to him were trust monies and of circumstances which made the payment a misapplication of them. Unlike a ‘knowing assistance’ case it is not necessary, and never had been necessary, to show that the defendant was in any sense a participator in the fraud.’
Vinelott J
Independent 28-Sep-1994, [1993] 1 WLR 484
Citing:
CitedBelmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2) 1980
It had been alleged that there had been a conspiracy involving the company giving unlawful financial assistance for the purchase of its own shares.
Held: Dishonesty is not a necessary ingredient of liability in an allegation of a ‘knowing . .
[1980] 1 All ER 392

Cited by:
ApprovedBank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd and Another v Akindele CA 22-Jun-2000
The test of whether a person who received funds held them on constructive trust, was not whether he himself was dishonest, but rather whether he had knowledge of circumstances which made it unconscionable to hold on to the money received. In respect . .
Times 22-Jun-00, Gazette 29-Jun-00, [2001] Ch 437, [2000] EWCA Civ 502, [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 292, [2000] 4 All ER 221, (1999-2000) 2 ITELR 788, [2000] 3 WLR 1423, [2000] WTLR 1049, [2000] BCC 968
CitedCriterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties and others CA 18-Dec-2002
The parties came together in a limited partnership to develop property. The appeal was against a refusal to grant summary judgment on a claim that one party had been induced to enter the contract by a fraudulent misrepresentation.
Held: In . .
[2002] EWCA Civ 1783, [2003] 1 WLR 218
CitedCriterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties Llc and others ChD 27-Mar-2002
Criterion sought to set aside a shareholders agreement. Their partner had said they were concerned that another party was taking Criterion over and that this would put at risk their working relationships. The agreement sought to add a poison pill to . .
[2002] EWHC 496 (Ch)

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 December 2020; Ref: scu.80209

Don King Productions Inc v Warren and Others: ChD 13 Apr 1998

Where partnership terms required benefit of all contracts to be assigned to the partnership, this included unassignable personal contracts which were to be held in trust for partnership, unless stated otherwise.
Lightman J said: ‘The existence of an obligation binding the conscience of the person vested with the legal ownership is the hallmark of a trust.’ and ‘in principle I can see no objection to a party to contracts involving skill and confidence or containing non-assignment provisions from becoming trustee of the benefit of being the contracting party as well as the benefit of the rights conferred. I can see no reason why the law should limit the parties’ freedom of contract to creating trusts of the fruits of such contracts received by the assignor or to creating an accounting relationship between the parties in respect of the fruits.’
Lightman J
Times 13-Apr-1998, Gazette 13-May-1998, [2000] Ch 291, [1998] 2 All ER 608
Citing:
See AlsoDon King Productions Inc v Warren King and Another (No 2) ChD 18-Jun-1998
An application for a Mareva injunction made ex parte was exceptionally justified when a partner failed to explain unaccounted for receipts after a full opportunity had been given, and there was no logical or innocent basis for the concealment of . .
Times 18-Jun-98
CitedVandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corp. of New York PC 1933
The plaintiff was injured in a motor accident. He failed in a direct claim against the insurers of the negligent defendant driver. The insurance was effected by the father (Mr Berry) of the negligent driver and provided that an indemnity would be . .
[1933] AC 70
CitedTarget Holdings Ltd v Redferns (A Firm) and Another HL 21-Jul-1995
The defendant solicitors had acted for a purchaser, Crowngate, which had agreed to buy a property from a company called Mirage for andpound;775,000. Crowngate had arranged however that the property would first be passed through a chain of two . .
Gazette 06-Sep-95, Times 21-Jul-95, Independent 10-Aug-95, [1996] 1 AC 421, [1995] UKHL 10, [1995] 3 All ER 785

Cited by:
See AlsoDon King Productions Inc v Warren King and Another (No 2) ChD 18-Jun-1998
An application for a Mareva injunction made ex parte was exceptionally justified when a partner failed to explain unaccounted for receipts after a full opportunity had been given, and there was no logical or innocent basis for the concealment of . .
Times 18-Jun-98
Appeal fromDon King Productions Inc v Warren; Roberts; Centurion Promotions Limited (Formerly Sports Network Limited); Sports Network Usa, Inc; Time Warner Entertainment Company, Lp and Sport International, Inc CA 19-Nov-1998
Contracts between the members of a firm and third parties, and which were subject to the partnership contract, but which were expressed to be personal and incapable of assignment, were still held on trust for the partnership, and renewals made . .
Times 09-Feb-99, [1998] EWCA Civ 1794, [2000] Ch 291, [2000] 1 BCLC 607, [1999] EMLR 402, [1999] 1 Lloyds Rep 588, [1999] 3 WLR 276, [1999] 2 All ER 218
CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
[2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch)
CitedBarbados Trust Company Ltd v Bank of Zambia and Another CA 27-Feb-2007
The creditor had assigned the debt, but without first giving the debtor defendant the necessary notice. A challenge was made to the ability of the assignee to bring the action, saying that the deed of trust appointed to circumvent the reluctance of . .
[2007] EWCA Civ 148, [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 495

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 December 2020; Ref: scu.80091

Corporacion Nacional Del Cobre: ChD 13 Dec 1996

No defence of contributory negligence was to be allowed against a claim involving an allegation of corruption by means of bribery. The defendants had bribed one of the plaintiff’s employees. The plaintiff claimed restitution, and an account from the defendants as constructive trustees for profits. The defendants wanted to assert that there was an equivalent to contributory negligence within the law of equity. There was no proper reason for distinguishing deceit by bribery from other forms of deceit. There had to be something to have put the plaintiff on notice of the deceit, and that was absent here.
Gazette 13-Dec-1996

Updated: 17 December 2020; Ref: scu.79515

Brinks Ltd v AbuSaleh and Others (No 3): ChD 23 Oct 1995

A person must know of the existence of an obligation of trust to be liable as an accessory to an act in breach of that trust. A person cannot be liable for dishonest assistance in a breach of trust unless he knows of the existence of the trust or at least the facts giving rise to the trust.
Rimer J
Times 23-Oct-1995, [1996] CLC 133
Citing:
See AlsoBrinks Ltd and Another v AbuSaleh and Others ChD 6-Mar-1995
A delay in issuing Order 14 proceedings is not in itself relevant. . .
Ind Summary 06-Mar-95

Cited by:
Not approvedBarlow Clowes International Ltd and Another v Eurotrust International Ltd and others PC 10-Oct-2005
(Court of Appeal of the Isle of Man) Defendants appealed a finding of dishonest assistance in the activities of Barlow Clowes.
Held: The judge had been able to reach the conclusions on the basis of the evidence. The appeal of the deemster . .
[2005] UKPC 37, [2006] 1 WLR 1476, [2006] 1 All ER 333, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 225, [2005] WTLR 1453

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 December 2020; Ref: scu.78584

Re Woodstock (a bankrupt): ChD 19 Nov 1979

Walton J drew attention in his judgment to the need for the courts, in considering how the equity of exoneration should work as between a husband and a wife, to take into account the relationship which husbands and wives bear, or ought to bear, to one another in their family affairs in current times. The guide that Victorian cases can provide to the inferences which should be drawn from the dealings with one another of husbands and wives today is often not very valuable.
As to the case of Hall v Hall: ‘I do not think I have to go into the interesting question whether that case is now good law in view of completely changed social conditions. It appears to me that that case was decided in the days when the wife did nothing except sit at home and run the household and boss the servants about, and the husband was expected to be, and indeed was, the provider. Times have now changed, and I am very far from that if that case were to be heard on precisely the same facts tomorrow, the decision would necessarily be the same.’ ‘
Walton J
Unrported,19 November 1979
Citing:
CitedHall v Hall ChD 1911
An equity of exoneration in favour of a wife arises ‘at the time she charges her estate’. The doctrine of exoneration is based on an inference in each case from all the facts of that particular case. Where one co-habitee joins in granting a charge . .
[1911] 1 Ch 487

Cited by:
CitedIn Re Pittortou (a bankrupt) ChD 1985
H and W charged the property to secure the H’s overdrawn bank account. The account was used both for his business and for payment of expenses relating to the matrimonial home. H was adjudicated bankrupt. W sought her equity to be exonerated from H’s . .
[1985] All ER 285
CitedDay v Shaw and Another ChD 17-Jan-2014
Mr and Mrs Shaw had granted a second charge over their jointly-owned matrimonial home to secure the personal guarantee given by their daughter and by Mr Shaw in respect of a bank loan to a company (Avon). Their daughter and Mr Shaw were the . .
[2014] EWHC 36 (Ch)

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 December 2020; Ref: scu.567253

Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Citibank Savings Ltd: 1995

(New South Wales) Mr and Mrs P owned and controlled W Ltd. W Ltd borrowed monies from Citibank which took security for repayment in the form of a charge over the home of Mr and Mrs P and also a charge over the home of the parents of Mr P. On the face of the documents, Mr and Mrs P and the parents of Mr P were co-sureties for the debt of W Ltd. W Ltd defaulted and Mr and Mrs P were made bankrupt. Their trustee in bankruptcy sold their home and repaid the debt to Citibank. The trustee then claimed an equal contribution from Mr P’s parents on the basis that they were co-sureties with Mr and Mrs P and that the default position was that the co-sureties were equally liable to contribute to the payment of the debt.
Held: The claim by the trustee in bankruptcy was dismissed. Mr P’s parents had entered into the charge at the request of Mr and Mrs P and therefore Mr and Mrs P were liable to indemnify Mr P’s parents and, accordingly, were not entitled to claim a contribution from them. A right of contribution may not arise where two persons borrow money but that money is applied for the purposes of only one of them, or if one guarantor enjoys the whole benefit of the guarantee in another capacity to the exclusion of his co-surety.
In considering whether common intention is essential to rebut contribution, Bryson J said: ‘The position taken by the plaintiff’s counsel before me was to the effect that the prima facie right of contribution can only be rebutted if a common intention to the contrary is clearly proved by evidence of some agreement or arrangement. No doubt it is very usual that rebuttal takes that form, but in my opinion it is not necessary that there should be a common intention or a bilateral arrangement, and it is not necessary that there should be any expression of an intention or arrangement, as circumstances can occur in which an intended outcome is so clear and obvious that it must be imputed to the parties that they intended it. Quite apart from any intention held by the parties or imputed to them, circumstances can occur in which, without there being any expression of intention or actual advertence to the subject of contribution, it is clear that equity does not require that an obligation to make contribution should be imposed on a party. The court should not lose sight of the origin of the right to contribution in the equitable principle that equity is equality, or forget that facts may exist in which it is not appropriate to treat parties under a common liability as in an equal position, or in which some other equitable principle ought to be given effect.’
Bryson J
[1999] BPIR 754, (1995) 38 NSWLR 116
Cited by:
CitedDay v Shaw and Another ChD 17-Jan-2014
Mr and Mrs Shaw had granted a second charge over their jointly-owned matrimonial home to secure the personal guarantee given by their daughter and by Mr Shaw in respect of a bank loan to a company (Avon). Their daughter and Mr Shaw were the . .
[2014] EWHC 36 (Ch)

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 December 2020; Ref: scu.567255

In Re Wallis and Simmonds (Builders) Ltd: ChD 1974

The deposit of title documents, without more, gives rise to an inference that the deposit was intended by the parties to operate as creating an equitable charge or mortgage over the property whose title document is deposited. In logic there could be no distinction between deposits to secure a first and third party indebtedness.
Templeman J said: ‘But in my judgment this is a contractual lien – it is said to be a contractual lien – and that makes all the difference. It is also a contractual charge; true it is that the charge arises by presumption, but it does not arise by operation of law. What the court does is to say: `We shall not compel the parties to write down in so many words what the effect of the deposit of title deeds is; we shall simply assume that when they contract, and although they probably do not know the consequences, the person who takes the title deeds contracts not only to retain them but also to have an equitable charge on the land.’ The presumption reads into the contract the charge which is implied. If that is right, the charge was created by the company and is therefore registrable under s95.’
Templeman J
[1974] 1 WLR 391, [1974] 1 All ER 561, [1974] AC 467
Cited by:
CitedUnited Bank of Kuwait Plc v Sahib and Others CA 2-Feb-1996
The bank appealed against a decision that the simple deposit of deeds with a bank did not take effect as an equitable charge.
Held: Depositing deeds with a bank is not sufficient to create a charge over them. The old law as to the creation of . .
Times 13-Feb-96, [1997] Ch 107, [1996] EWCA Civ 1308, [1996] 3 WLR 372, [1996] 3 All ER 215

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 December 2020; Ref: scu.434815

Craythorne v Swinburne: 1789

[1789] EngR 449, (1789-1817) 2 Ves Jun Supp 363, (1789) 34 ER 1133 (E)
Commonlii
Cited by:
See AlsoCraythorne v Swinburne 23-Jul-1807
No contribution in favour of one Surety against another : his engagement, according to the bond, and parol evidence, which was held admissible, being, not as Co-surety, but, without the privity of the other, as a distinct collatteral secnrity, . .
[1807] EngR 343, (1807) 14 Ves Jun 160, (1807) 33 ER 482

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 December 2020; Ref: scu.366080

Pryor v Pryor: CA 29 Apr 1864

Parents having a power of appointing an estate to all or any of their children appointed it absolutely to two of their sons, upon the understanding that the appointments should resettle the estate upon certain trusts for the benefit of all the children then living during their respective lives, and subject thereto for the benefit of the children of the sons. This resettlement was made by a contemporaneous deed. Held, that the transaction could not be supported by analogy to the common case of an appointment to a daughter in contemplation of her marriage, accompanied by a contemporaneous settlement of the appointed fund, but that the appointment was void in equity, as made upon a bargain for the benefit of persons not objects of the power,
Knight Bruce LJ
[1864] EngR 412, (1864) 3 De G J and S 205, (1864) 46 ER 353
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedEclairs Group Ltd and Glengary Overseas Ltd v JKX Oil and Gas Plc SC 2-Dec-2015
Company Director not Trustee but is Fiduciary
The Court was asked about an alleged ‘corporate raid’, an attempt to exploit a minority shareholding in a company to obtain effective management or voting control without paying what other shareholders would regard as a proper price.
Held: The . .
[2015] UKSC 71, [2015] WLR(D) 497, [2016] 2 All ER (Comm) 413, [2016] 3 All ER 641, [2016] BCC 79, [2015] BUS LR 1395, [2016] 1 BCLC 1, UKSC 2014/0179

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 December 2020; Ref: scu.282126

Lupton v White: 19 Dec 1808

Whatever alteration of form any property may undergo, the true owner is entitled to seize it in its new shape if he can prove the identity of the original material.
(1808) 15 Ves 442, [1808] EngR 429, (1808) 15 Ves Jun 432, (1808) 33 ER 817
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedFoskett v McKeown and Others HL 18-May-2000
A property developer using monies which he held on trust to carry out a development instead had mixed those monies with his own in his bank account, and subsequently used those mixed monies to pay premiums on a life assurance policy on his own life, . .
Times 24-May-00, Gazette 08-Jun-00, [2000] UKHL 29, [2000] 3 All ER 97, [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 627, [2001] 1 AC 102, [2000] WTLR 667, (1999-2000) 2 ITELR 711, [2000] 2 WLR 1299
CitedIndian Oil Corporation v Greenstone Shipping SA 1988
A ship had on board some oil of the shipowners and it was mixed with oil, the property of the receivers, and transported to India. The mixture could not be separated for practical purposes and the question was how much of the oil were the receivers . .
[1988] QB 345, [1987] 3 All ER 893

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 December 2020; Ref: scu.220693

Plowright v Lambert: 1885

The courts of equity have recognised that a fiduciary relationship can exist ‘in almost every shape’.
Field J
(1885) 52 LT 646
Cited by:
CitedHedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd HL 28-May-1963
Banker’s Liability for Negligent Reference
The appellants were advertising agents. They were liable themselves for advertising space taken for a client, and had sought a financial reference from the defendant bankers to the client. The reference was negligent, but the bankers denied any . .
[1964] AC 465, [1963] 2 All ER 575, [1963] UKHL 4, [1963] 1 Lloyds Rep 485, [1963] 3 WLR 101

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 December 2020; Ref: scu.216364

Classic International Pty Ltd v Lagos: 2002

(New South Wales Supreme Court) ‘I am satisfied that both parties believed that the agreement for lease would validly take effect according to its terms and that had they known of the substantial variation which the Retail Leases Act 1994 would impose upon the agreement, they would not have entered into it’ and ’42. I do not need to consider the vexed question of whether the mistake in the present case is one of fact or one of law. As to whether, in the law of Australia, the doctrine of common ‘mistake applies to’ a mistake of law, I need do no more that set out the following passage from Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract 8th Aust Ed., para 12.8: ‘Operative mistake traditionally has been confined to mistakes of fact and not of law. This distinction has always been blurred and has been notoriously difficult to apply. It appears that equity did not draw a clear line between mistakes of fact and law. If there was such a rule, it was often honoured in the breach. In Western Australia the law/fact distinction has been abolished by legislation (with certain safeguards). The whole question has now almost certainly been laid to rest by the decision of the High Court in David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank (1992) 175 CLR 353. In that case the distinction between mistake of law and mistake of fact was rejected in the light of a very considerable body of judicial and academic criticism of the distinction. . . . the rule precluding recovery of moneys paid under a mistake of law should be held not to form part of the law in Australia.’
Palmer J
[2002] NSWSC 115
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedMargaret Brennan v Bolt Burdon, London Borough of Islington, Leigh Day and Co QBD 30-Oct-2003
The claimant had sought relief for the injury to her health suffered by condition of her flat. The legal advisers had settled the matter, thinking that the claim had not been timeously served. The defendant appealed an order that the compromise was . .
[2003] EWHC 2493 (QB), Times 07-Nov-03, [2004] 1 WLR 1240

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 December 2020; Ref: scu.187292

Pankhania v The London Borough of Hackney: ChD 2002

A brochure listing properties to be sold at auction decribed the property as being subject to a terminable licence. In fact it was a secure tenancy. The question arose as to whether a misrepresentation of law could found a cause of action.
Held: ‘I have concluded that the ‘misrepresentation of law’ rule has not survived the decision in Klienwort Benson Ltd. Its historical origin is as an off-shoot of the ‘mistake of law’ rule, created by analogy with it, and the two are logically inter-dependent. Both are grounded in the maxim ‘ignorantia juris non excusat’, a tag whose dubious utility would have been enhanced, had it gone on to explain who was not excused and from what. As it stands, it means no more than that ignorance of the general law does not excuse anyone from compliance with it, a proposition with which criminal lawyers are familiar. In translation, it has become distorted and amplified meaning, in such expressions as ‘everyone’ is taken to know the Law’, from which follow two further propositions (underpinning the ‘mistake of law’ and ‘misrepresentation of law’ rules respectively) (i) ‘ as you are taken to know the law, it is your fault if you are mistaken as to it, even if I have misrepresented it to you, and because of that you should have no relief’. Those two propositions bear little relation to, and do not follow logically from, the maxim ‘ignorantia juris non excusat’, but save for its Latin roots, no basis for the ‘misrepresentation of law’ rule is to be found, as Lane L.J. remarked in Andre. The distinction between fact and law in the context of relief from misrepresentation has no more underlying principle to it than it does in the context of relief from mistake. Indeed, when the principles of mistake and misrepresentation are set side by side, there is a stronger case for granting relief against a party who has induced a mistaken belief as to law in another, than against one who has merely made the same mistake himself. The rules of the common law should, so far as possible, be congruent with one another, and based on coherent principle. The survival of the ‘misrepresentation of law’ rule following the demise of the ‘mistake of law’ rule would be more than a quixotic anachronism. Its demise rids this area of the law of a series of distinctions, such as the ‘private rights’ exception, whose principal function has been to distinguish the ‘mistake of law’ rule, and confine it to a very narrow compass, albeit not to extinguish it completely.’
Rex Tedd QC
[2002] EWHC 2441 (Ch)
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedKleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
Gazette 18-Nov-98, Gazette 10-Feb-99, Times 30-Oct-98, [1998] UKHL 38, [1999] 2 AC 349, [1998] 4 All ER 513, [1998] 3 WLR 1095, [1998] Lloyds Rep Bank 387
CitedStreet v Mountford HL 6-Mar-1985
When a licence is really a tenancy
The document signed by the occupier stated that she understood that she had been given a licence, and that she understood that she had not been granted a tenancy protected under the Rent Acts. Exclusive occupation was in fact granted.
Held: . .
[1985] 1 EGLR 128, [1985] 2 All ER 289, [1985] 2 WLR 877, [1985] AC 809, [1985] UKHL 4

Cited by:
CitedMargaret Brennan v Bolt Burdon, London Borough of Islington, Leigh Day and Co QBD 30-Oct-2003
The claimant had sought relief for the injury to her health suffered by condition of her flat. The legal advisers had settled the matter, thinking that the claim had not been timeously served. The defendant appealed an order that the compromise was . .
[2003] EWHC 2493 (QB), Times 07-Nov-03, [2004] 1 WLR 1240
CitedBrennan v Bolt Burdon and Others, London Borough of Islington, Leigh Day and Co CA 29-Jul-2004
The claimant sought damages for injury alleged to have been suffered as tenant of a house after being subjected to carbon monoxide poisoning, and also from her former solicitors for their delay in her claim. The effective question was whether the . .
[2004] EWCA Civ 1017, Times 27-Aug-04, [2005] QB 303, [2004] 3 WLR 1321

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 December 2020; Ref: scu.187291

Equity and Law Home Loans Ltd v Prestridge and Another: CA 15 Jan 1992

The Building Society chargee was entitled to possession because the charge was signed, but only to extent of the knowledge of the person signing charge. A woman partner had charged the house originally, but her partner had then unlawfully re-mortgaged it without her knowledge. Her interests did not have precedence up to the value of the original loan.
Gazette 15-Jan-1992

Updated: 14 December 2020; Ref: scu.80359

Collins v Jones and Others: ChD 3 Feb 2000

A unilateral document could not be rectified to make it into something which it was not intended to be at the time it was executed, even if the alteration would give better effect to the general intention of the parties. The choice of different means to achieve the same object was not to be allowed by rectification.
Times 03-Feb-2000

Updated: 14 December 2020; Ref: scu.79281

Nant-y-glo and Blaina Ironworks Co v Grave: 1878

Shares in a company had been given by a promoter to the defendant to induce him to become a director.
Held: They belonged to the company.
Sir James Bacon V-C
(1878) 12 Ch D 738
Cited by:
CitedFHR European Ventures Llp and Others v Cedar Capital Partners Llc SC 16-Jul-2014
Approprietary remedy against Fraudulent Agent
The Court was asked whether a bribe or secret commission received by an agent is held by the agent on trust for his principal, or whether the principal merely has a claim for equitable compensation in a sum equal to the value of the bribe or . .
[2014] UKSC 45, [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 471, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 425, [2014] WTLR 1135, [2014] 4 All ER 79, [2015] 1 AC 250, [2014] Lloyd’s Rep FC 617, [2014] 3 WLR 535, [2014] WLR(D) 317, [2014] 2 BCLC 145, [2015] 1 P and CR DG1, UKSC 2013/0049

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 December 2020; Ref: scu.551506

Lord Cranstown v Johnston: 1796

Lord Cranstown was the absentee owner of a valuable estate in a Caribbean island, but he owed the defendant Johnston a modest amount of money. Johnston sued for the money to be brought in the local court, whose laws permitted a form of substituted service. He nailed the writ on a post and on the courthouse door. Thus, as Johnston had intended all along, Lord Cranstown received no actual notice of the proceedings. Judgment was given by default, the estate was put up for auction to satisfy the judgment, and Johnston, who was the only bidder, acquired the property for the amount of the debt, which was far less than the value of the estate. From beginning to end Johnston uttered no false representation to anyone, nor did he violate any law of the island, nor did he owe any contractual obligation to Lord Cranstown; but he did know that he was going behind Lord Cranstown’s back in getting the estate for a pittance. Lord Cranstown brought suit in England to recover the estate.
Held: Although he would not question the jurisdiction of the foreign court, or the regularity of its proceedings, and although he would not presume that the local laws would set aside the transaction, it was a fraud all the same according to English rules of equity, and that the defendant Johnston must restore the estate upon being repaid the original debt and expenses.
Arden MR
(1796) 3 Ves 170
England and Wales
Cited by:

  • Cited – R Griggs Group Ltd and others v Evans and others (No 2) ChD 12-May-2004
    A logo had been created for the claimants, by an independent sub-contractor. They sought assignment of their legal title, but, knowing of the claimant’s interest the copyright was assigned to a third party out of the jurisdiction. The claimant . .
    [2004] EWHC 1088 (Ch), Times 27-May-04, [2005] Ch 153, [2004] FSR 939

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 December 2020; Ref: scu.199521