Goulborn v Cowell (Valuation Officer): UTLC 17 Jul 2012

RATING – valuation – shop – compiled list inaccuracy – material change of circumstances – valuation officer making single alteration to list – effective date – held different effective dates applied – appeal allowed in part – decision set aside in part following application by respondent – further hearing held – original decision reversed – held originating proposal did not challenge effective date – appeal dismissed

Citations:

[2011] UKUT 417 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Rating

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.463429

Ebury v Church Council Of the Central Methodist Church: UTLC 17 Jul 2009

UTLC RATING – exemption – coffee shop and bookshop within part of church building used as a church hall and run by church volunteers – whether part of church hall and so exempt – held that it was – appeal dismissed – Local Government Finance Act 1988 Sch 5 para 11(1)(b).

Citations:

[2009] 138 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Rating

Updated: 22 May 2022; Ref: scu.373412

P.B. Groenveld BV v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees: ECJ 8 Nov 1979

A prohibited restriction on exports involved a national measure having discriminatory effect: ‘provision [i.e. Article 29 EC; now Article 35 TFEU] concerns the national measures which have as their specific object or effect the restriction of patterns of exports and thereby the establishment of a difference in treatment between the domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade in such a way as to provide a particular advantage for national production or for the domestic market of the State in question at the expense of the production or of the trade of other Member States. This is not so in the case of a prohibition like that in question which is applied objectively to the production of goods of a certain kind without drawing a distinction depending on whether such goods are intended for the national market or for export.’

Citations:

C-15/79, R-15/79, [1979] EUECJ R-15/79, [1979] ECR 3409

Links:

Bailii

Cited by:

CitedNorth Somerset District Council v Honda Motor Europe Ltd and Others QBD 2-Jul-2010
Delayed Rates Claims Service made them Defective
The council claimed that the defendants were liable for business rates. The defendants said that the notices were defective in not having been served ‘as soon as practicable’, and further that they should not be enforced since the delay had created . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, Rating

Updated: 21 May 2022; Ref: scu.132817

Home Office v Jackson (Valuation Officer): UTLC 19 Jul 2018

RATING – valuation – 2010 compiled list entry of large high-quality modern office building – building constructed in three blocks with bridge connections on certain floors – main space rate – comparables of similar quality but different location – whether adjustment required to comparables for location – method of adjustment – allowance claimed for quantum – allowance also claimed for fragmentation to reflect alleged disadvantages of the layout in three blocks – appeal allowed in part – rateable value determined at pounds 22,700,000

Citations:

[2018] UKUT 171 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Rating

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.620101

Wilson v South Kesteven District Council: CA 13 Jul 2000

When a distraint was being carried out, as the goods were being loaded onto the van, the debtor offered cash to satisfy the non-domestic rates liability. It was refused and the were goods taken and sold. He sought damages against the council for wrongful distraint.
Held: A distraint under the Act could only be halted at one of the two stages identified by the Regulations. Once the removal of goods began, the appellant had no right to buy off the distraint.

Citations:

Times 17-Oct-2000, Gazette 07-Sep-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 218

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Non-Domestic (Collection and Enforcement) (Local Lists) Regulations 1989 14

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Rating

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.90559

Regent Lion Properties Limited v Westminster City Council: CA 1990

An existing outline planning permission to develop land to include a parade of 12 shops in central London. In 1968 Pan American Airways Corporation took a sub-lease of the land and got planning permission to develop it as an air terminal for a period of 14 years, terminating (with an extension) on 31 March 1984. PanAm vacated the land in 1981 and paid unoccupied rates until 31 March 1984. The owner commenced work to return the land to its ‘shell condition’, as it was before PanAm’s occupation. On 30 March 1984 Westminster City Council issued a notice under the Health and Safety at Work Act etc 1974 requiring the company to cease work until specified remedial work had been carried out to remove brown asbestos. That work was completed on 21 May 1985. The Council levied an unoccupied rate for the period between 1 April 1984 and 25 December 1985. The magistrates’ court ordered the issue of a distress warrant against the company in respect of the unoccupied rates. The Divisional Court had held that the owners were exempt from liability for rates for the period between 1 April 1984 and 21 May 1985 by virtue of paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of Schedule 1 to the General Rate Act 1967 which provided: ‘No rates shall be payable under Part 1 of the Schedule in respect of a hereditament for, or for any part of the standard period beginning with the day following the end of, any period during which:
(a) the owner is prohibited by law from occupying their hereditament or allowing it to be occupied;
(b) the hereditament is kept vacant by reason of action taken by or on behalf of . . any local or public authority with a view to prohibiting the occupation of the hereditament or to acquiring it.’ After 21 May 1985 no exemption was due since implementation of the earlier planning permission was possible and occupation was not, therefore, prohibited by law. The rating authority appealed to the Court of Appeal in respect of the earlier period and the owner cross-appealed in respect of the subsequent period.
Held: There was no evidence to support the conclusion that by its notice the local authority was intending to prohibit the occupation of the hereditament within the meaning of paragraph 2(b). Therefore, the sole issue with regard to the earlier period was whether during that period the owner was ‘prohibited by law’ within the meaning of paragraph 2(a) from occupying or allowing the hereditament to be occupied. The argument for the rating authority was that the notice did not prohibit occupation. The Health and Safety at Work Act etc 1974 contained no power to prohibit occupation. The statutory powers were aimed at prohibiting an activity upon premises.
Having considered the Tower Hamlets case, Glidewell LJ expressed no doubt that the decision was correct. However, he did not consider that Tower Hamlets provided the answer to the instant case. He identified the question to be considered as follows: ‘Where the effect of a prohibition notice is proved to be that the hereditament may not be rateably occupied until some steps have been taken, is its occupation prohibited by law?’ and he answered: ‘The factual position here was that the planning permission for use as an air terminal expired on the 31 March 1984. Thereafter during the period at issue, there was no use of the hereditament for that purpose for over two years after PanAm vacated. In order that the hereditament might be occupied for some other commercial purpose, the respondent company needed to return it firstly to its original condition as a shell. It was the work necessary to put it in that condition which was prohibited by the notice. This, therefore, had the inevitable effect of preventing rateable occupation until both the remedial work to cure the asbestos problem and the subsequent refurbishment work had been carried out. Since that was the inevitable effect, in my judgment the effect of the notice was to prohibit by law the occupation of the premises until the remedial work had been completed. That was on the 21 May 1985. It followed that the owner was exempt from the unoccupied rate for the period between 1 April 1984 and 31 May 1985.’
As to the cross-appeal, however, it will be recalled that the removal of brown asbestos, ‘the remedial work’, was completed on 21 May 1985. The owner’s case was that, since there was no longer extant planning permission for the use of the property in its current condition, it was prohibited by law from occupying the property. Having considered the authorities, Glidewell LJ concluded: ‘In my judgment, the law does not prohibit an owner or occupier of property from using it for a particular purpose simply because planning permission for that use is necessary under the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 and has not been granted. Such a use becomes prohibited if, and only if, an enforcement notice is served and takes effect, or a stop notice is served, or if by other processes an injunction is granted against that particular use.’

Judges:

Glidewell LJ, Mann LJ and Sir Denys Buckley

Citations:

[1990] RA 121

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedPall Mall Investments (London) Ltd v Gloucester City Council Admn 8-Jul-2014
The land-owner appealed by case stated against an assessment to unoccupied, non-domestic rate demands. The land-owner said that they were unoccupied through dilapidations and therefore exempt. They said that the court had wrongly disregarded their . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.533874

Benham v United Kingdom: ECHR 8 Feb 1995

Legal Aid was wrongfully refused where a tax or fine defaulter was liable to imprisonment, and the lack of a proper means enquiry, made imprisonment of poll tax defaulter unlawful. A poll tax defaulter had been wrongly committed to prison by magistrates. The question was whether or not they had acted in excess of jurisdiction. If they had not, the detention was lawful under Article 5 (1) (b). English law distinguished between acts of a Magistrates court which were within its jurisdiction and those which were in excess of jurisdiction. The former were valid and effective unless or until they were overturned by a superior court, whereas the latter were null and void from the outset. The test for deciding whether or not magistrates acted within their jurisdiction was that laid down by the House of Lords in McC v Mullan. The third limb of that test was relevant here, namely that magistrates exceeded their jurisdiction when they made an order which had no foundation in law because of a failure to observe a statutory condition precedent.’ The proceedings for non-payment of the community charge were criminal: ‘the law concerning liability to pay the community charge and the procedure upon non-payment was of general application to all citizens, and that the proceedings in question were brought by a public authority under statutory powers of enforcement. In addition, the proceedings had some punitive elements. For example, the magistrates could only exercise their power of committal to prison on a finding of wilful refusal to pay or of culpable neglect. Finally, it is to be recalled that the applicant faced a relatively severe maximum penalty of three months’ imprisonment, and was in fact ordered to be detained for 30 days. Having regard to these factors, the Court concludes that B was ‘charged with a criminal offence’ for the purposes of Article 6(1) and (3). Accordingly, these two paragraphs of Article 6 are applicable.’

Citations:

Times 24-Jun-1996, Independent 08-Feb-1995, 19380/92, [1996] ECHR 22, [1996] 22 EHRR 293

Links:

Worldlii, Bailii

Statutes:

European Convention on Human Rights 6.1 6.3

Citing:

CitedMcC v Mullan; In re McC (A Minor) HL 1984
A statutory condition precluded magistrates from making the order they did unless a juvenile offender who was not legally represented had been refused legal aid, or had been informed of his right to apply for it but had refused or neglected to do . .

Cited by:

CitedMotorola Credit Corporation v Uzan and others (No 2) CA 12-Jun-2003
World-wide freezing orders had been made under the 1982 Act. The defendants were members of a Turkish family with substantial business interests in the telecommunications industry. In breach of orders made in the US some defendants had sought to . .
CitedHooper v United Kingdom ECHR 16-Nov-2004
The defendant had appeared in court on a charge of assault. The magistrate considered that he might be unruly and withoutmore bound him over to keep the peace. In the absence of any surety, he was committed to custody.
Held: The proceedings . .
CitedRegina v Parole Board ex parte Smith, Regina v Parole Board ex parte West (Conjoined Appeals) HL 27-Jan-2005
Each defendant challenged the way he had been treated on revocation of his parole licence, saying he should have been given the opportunity to make oral representations.
Held: The prisoners’ appeals were allowed.
Lord Bingham stated: . .
CitedGreenfield, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 16-Feb-2005
The appellant had been charged with and disciplined for a prison offence. He was refused legal assistance at his hearing, and it was accepted that the proceedings involved the determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of article 6 of the . .
CitedRegina (McCann and Others) v Manchester Crown Court CA 9-Mar-2001
Proceedings applying for an anti-social behaviour order, were properly civil proceedings, with civil standards of evidence, and the Human Rights Act provisions relating to criminal proceedings, were not applicable either. The section included acts . .
CitedClingham (formerly C (a minor)) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea; Regina v Crown Court at Manchester Ex parte McCann and Others HL 17-Oct-2002
The applicants had been made subject of anti-social behaviour orders. They challenged the basis upon which the orders had been made.
Held: The orders had no identifiable consequences which would make the process a criminal one. Civil standards . .
CitedBarnes (As Former Court Appointed Receiver) v The Eastenders Group and Another SC 8-May-2014
Costs of Wrongly Appointed Receiver
‘The contest in this case is about who should bear the costs and expenses of a receiver appointed under an order which ought not to have been made. The appellant, who is a former partner in a well known firm of accountants, was appointed to act as . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Legal Aid, Human Rights, Rating, Magistrates

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78332

Kirby v Hunslet Union Assessment Committee: HL 1906

The Act provided that the assessment of hereditaments was regulated on the principle that the rateable value was the rent which might be expected to be given for the hereditament alon
Held: The House disapproved a distinction based on whether the plant was a fixture, in the traditional land law sense. A factory’s assessment to poor rate must be based on the standing equipment of machinery in the factory, irrespective of whether or not it was affixed to the freehold so as to form part of it.
Held: The House disapproved a distinction based on whether the plant was a fixture, in the traditional land law sense. A factory’s assessment to poor rate must be based on the standing equipment of machinery in the factory, irrespective of whether or not it was affixed to the freehold so as to form part of it.
Lord Halsbury said that he would: ‘decline myself to enter into what I may call the original equities which might have guided this matter. It is, enough for me that a long series of decisions, for certainly half a century, have established the bald proposition, which is all I am insisting upon, namely’. that although the machinery may not be part of the freehold, it yet is to be taken into account, and in saying that, I do not want to muffle it in a phrase, but what I mean by that is, that to increase the amount of the rate which is exacted from the tenant you may enter into that question and form a judgment upon it, although, as a matter of fact, the machinery may hot be attached to the freehold.’

Judges:

Lord Macnaghten,Lord Halsbury

Citations:

[1906] AC 43

Statutes:

Parochial Assessment Act 1836

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Much CriticisedIceland Foods Ltd v Berry (Valuation Officer) SC 7-Mar-2018
Air System plant excluded from Rating value
The court was asked whether the services provided by a specialised air handling system, used in connection with refrigerated merchandise in the appellant’s retail store, are ‘manufacturing operations or trade processes’ for rating purposes.
CitedIceland Foods Ltd v Berry (Valuation Officer) CA 23-Nov-2016
The court was asked whether the air handling system used by Iceland Foods Limited in its retail store at Liverpool was plant or machinery ‘used or intended to be used in connection with services mainly or exclusively as part of manufacturing . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Rating

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.605769

Makro Properties Limited v Nuneaton and Bedworth BC: Admn 2012

A minor use will constitute rateable occupation for the purposes of liability to occupied rates.

Citations:

[2012] EWHC 2250 (Admin)

Statutes:

Local Government Finance Act 1988 43(6)

Citing:

CitedGage v Wren 1903
. .

Cited by:

CitedKenya Aid Programme v Sheffield City Council Admn 22-Jan-2013
The claimant challenged a decision that it was liable for non domestic rates in respect of some commercial units, on the basis that the use by the charity was not itself charitable.
Held: ‘there is no reason for limiting the ambit of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.567242

Wynn v Skegness UDC: 1967

Citations:

[1967] 1 WLR 52

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedKenya Aid Programme v Sheffield City Council Admn 22-Jan-2013
The claimant challenged a decision that it was liable for non domestic rates in respect of some commercial units, on the basis that the use by the charity was not itself charitable.
Held: ‘there is no reason for limiting the ambit of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.567241

Gage v Wren: 1903

Citations:

[1903] 67 JP 32

Cited by:

CitedMakro Properties Limited v Nuneaton and Bedworth BC Admn 2012
A minor use will constitute rateable occupation for the purposes of liability to occupied rates. . .
CitedKenya Aid Programme v Sheffield City Council Admn 22-Jan-2013
The claimant challenged a decision that it was liable for non domestic rates in respect of some commercial units, on the basis that the use by the charity was not itself charitable.
Held: ‘there is no reason for limiting the ambit of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Magistrates

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.567243

National Deposit Friendly Society Trustees v Skegness Urban District Council: HL 1959

The House considered the meaning of the phrase ‘the advancement of . . social welfare’ in the 1955 Act. Lord Denning said: ‘A person is commonly said to be engaged in ‘social welfare’ when he is engaged in doing good for others who are in need – in the sense that he does it, not for personal or private reasons – not because they are relatives or friends of his – but because they are members of the Community or of a portion of it who need help . . If a person is engaged in improving the conditions of life of others who are so placed as to be in need, he is engaged in ‘social welfare”.

Judges:

Lord Denning

Citations:

[1959] AC 293

Statutes:

Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedGuild v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 6-May-1992
The will left land for a sports centre to a local authority which no longer existed. If the gift was charitable, the gift would be applied cy pres, but if not it would fail and pass to the family and be subect to Inheritance Tax.
Held: A gift . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Local Government, Rating

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.273193

Broxtowe Borough Council v Birch: CA 1983

A sect of Christians, the Exclusive Brethren set up one building with a notice declaring that the word of god would be preached on Sundays. This was interpreted as that it was open for public worship and exempt from rating. A second building was erected, but the church’s doctrines had changed to prefer segregation from evil and the world outside. No notice board was placed outside the second building, and the notice board outside the first building was taken down. In the result there was no sign that the public had permission to enter either of them and attend religious worship there. A proposal by the rating authority to alter the valuation list by entering the buildings as rateable was dismissed by the local valuation court.
Held: The authority’s appeal succeeded. Slade LJ said that a meeting of persons which takes place on private premises cannot be said to be ‘public’ within the ordinary meaning of words unless members of the public, or of the particular section of the public most concerned, are given some notice that they will not be treated as trespassers or intruders if they seek to enter the premises and attend the meeting. The forms of notice, he said, could be many and various. In some cases even the exterior appearance of the building might be enough to indicate to members of the public that they will be welcome.

Judges:

Slade LJ

Citations:

[1983] 1 WLR 314

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedGallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints HL 30-Jul-2008
The House considered whether certain properties of the Church were subject to non-domestic rating. Various buildings were on the land, and the officer denied that some fell within the exemptions, and in particular whether the Temple itself was a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.272218

Hays Business Services Ltd v Raley (Valuation Officer): 1986

A warehouse was used for the storage of archival materials including documents, films and audio-magnetic tapes. For some items of a sensitive nature, there had been installed specialist items of plant, including heating plant, humidifiers, and fire-protection equipment which utilised Halon gas so as to extinguish fires without damaging the stored items. The Solicitor for the Inland Revenue, for the Valuation Officer, had conceded that the specialist heating and humidification equipment were non-rateable.
Held: The tribunal agreed in respect of the fire protection plant, which was not rateable because it was ‘on the hereditament primarily to protect the material that is stored there’. It added: ‘Even if it were to be found that this could only be done by the protection of the building and therefore that that was the main use of the equipment, it would nevertheless not be included within the schedule because it was there expressly for the purpose of the trade process being carried on.’

Judges:

Emlyn Jones FRICS

Citations:

[1986] 1 EGLR 226 (LT)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedIceland Foods Ltd v Berry (Valuation Officer) SC 7-Mar-2018
Air System plant excluded from Rating value
The court was asked whether the services provided by a specialised air handling system, used in connection with refrigerated merchandise in the appellant’s retail store, are ‘manufacturing operations or trade processes’ for rating purposes.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.605777

Assessor for Lothian Region v BP Oil Grangemouth Refinery Ltd: 1985

Lands Valuation Appeal Court – a marine terminal at a petrochemical works, used solely for the purpose of loading refined oil, was premises ‘used in an industrial or trade process’

Judges:

Lord Ross

Citations:

(1985) SLT 453

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Cited by:

CitedIceland Foods Ltd v Berry (Valuation Officer) SC 7-Mar-2018
Air System plant excluded from Rating value
The court was asked whether the services provided by a specialised air handling system, used in connection with refrigerated merchandise in the appellant’s retail store, are ‘manufacturing operations or trade processes’ for rating purposes.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.605776

Union Cold Storage Co Ltd v Bancroft: HL 1931

The House considered whether refrigeration equipment was for storage purposes or for the purposes of altering or adapting goods for sale.
Held: It was for storage purposes, although the refrigeration was described as being by means of an ‘elaborate process’ and it was accepted that a freezing process might alter the goods.

Judges:

Viscount Dunedin

Citations:

[1931] AC 446

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedIceland Foods Ltd v Berry (Valuation Officer) SC 7-Mar-2018
Air System plant excluded from Rating value
The court was asked whether the services provided by a specialised air handling system, used in connection with refrigerated merchandise in the appellant’s retail store, are ‘manufacturing operations or trade processes’ for rating purposes.
CitedIceland Foods Ltd v Berry (Valuation Officer) CA 23-Nov-2016
The court was asked whether the air handling system used by Iceland Foods Limited in its retail store at Liverpool was plant or machinery ‘used or intended to be used in connection with services mainly or exclusively as part of manufacturing . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.605775

Berry v St Marylebone Borough Council: CA 1957

The Theosophy Society sought exemption from rates as a charity.
Held: When assessing whether an organisation could receive relief against rates as a charity, the main objects should be exclusively concerned with those matters and ordinarily the court could look only to the organization’s written constitution.
Romer LJ said ‘In our opinion, when an organizational body has a written constitution, it is to that, and to that alone, to which the court should normally resort in order to ascertain its objects for the purpose of Section 8 of the Act. And as Lord Buckmaster pointed out in Macaulay -v- O’Donnell (1943) Chancery 435 note: Unless an English word or phrase has, in relation to the organization, a special meaning, evidence as to its meaning is not properly admissible. The House of Lords would not formally reject the affidavit which had been filed in Macaulay -v- O’Donnell, explaining the word ‘nucleus’ in the Society’s first object , and we are willing to take note of what theosophy is, and what theosophists believe, as stated by Mrs. Berry in her affidavit. It would, however, be going too far, in our opinion, to accept as admissible, in so far as it is directed to the question of construction, evidence of how theosophists explain the meaning of their objects . . the interpretation of the object is a matter for the court and not for members of the Society.’

Judges:

Romer LJ, Lord Evershed MR and Ormerod LJ

Citations:

[1958] Ch 406, [1957] 3 All ER 677

Statutes:

Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 8

Rating, Charity

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.464217

Thomas (Valuation Officer) v Whitney Aquatic Co Ltd: LT 1972

The ratepayers had a legal right to use a lake for sporting activities and to maintain a floating clubhouse on the lake. The clubhouse was made fast in a particular location upon the lake but it was moved in winter months to an island in the centre of the lake.
Held: The lake and clubhouse were rateable as part of the ratepayers hereditament. Rateable occupation was to be determined by a consideration of the ‘four tests of rateability referred to by the solicitor for the valuation officer, which were first propounded by Counsel in the John Laing case, and subsequently adopted by the House of Lords in London County Council v Wilkins.’ The tribunal considered the fact that the clubhouse was moved from the position in which it was used during the winter months, saying: ‘It remains for me therefore to consider what weight ought to be attached to the fact that the clubhouse is moored for the winter months each year – the actual months were not specified – to the island in the middle of the lake. Does this movement lead to the conclusion that contrary to Lord Denning’s words in the Field Place case, there is not such a degree of permanence that the chattel with the land can together be regarded as one unit of occupation? This question seems to me to be the same question as that which has been asked when the fourth ingredient of rateable occupation has been under consideration – ‘possession for not too transient a period’. There have been a number of cases where the period of time during which occupation has been maintained has been taken as the relevant factor. For example, in John Laing’s case, although the question of transience was not directly an issue, the temporary structures were in position for two years; in Wilkins’ case, for about 18 months – although one hut was moved once during a period of about 20 months and so must have spent a maximum of 10 months on one site. In both cases it was held that there was rateable occupation of the huts. Similarly in Hilleshog Sugar Beet Breeding Co Ltd v Wilkes parcels of land were occupied for 9-10 months in a year. This was held by the Lands Tribunal to be not too transient a period to establish a rateable occupation notwithstanding that in subsequent years the occupation passed on to the other land . . In Sir Robert McAlpine and Sons Ltd v Payne it was held by the Lands Tribunal that occupation for 6-7 months was not enough. In his decision, Sir Michael Rowe drew a distinction between occupation by a settler and that by a wayfarer. The distinction appears to have been taken from a passage in the judgment of Lush J in R v St Pancras Assessment Committee . . These authorities suggest to me, that although duration of occupation is an important factor in determining degrees of transience, the character of the occupation can also have a bearing on its permanent nature. The movement of the clubhouse in the present case to another place within the hereditament does not in my judgment disturb the permanent character of a link between occupation of the chattel and occupation of the rest of the hereditament.’

Judges:

JH Emlyn Jones Esq FRICS

Citations:

[1972] RA 49

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedReeves (Listing Officer) v Northrop Admn 6-Mar-2012
The respondent occupied a tugboat with his family as his home. The appellant authority had sought to charge council tax, saying that it was a dwelling. The boat was not a houseboat but a live-aboard seagoing vessel, registered in the Small Ships . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.451835

Arthur Bell and Sons v Assessor for Fife: 1985

Lord Avonside said, with reference to the estimation of the annual value of subjects under the 1956 Act, that it was notorious that one must take a building according to its use at the time of the valuation.

Judges:

Lord Avonside

Citations:

[1965] RA 535

Statutes:

Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act 1956

Cited by:

CitedMulti-Link Leisure Developments Ltd v Lanarkshire Council SC 17-Nov-2010
The parties disputed the effect of an option clause in a lease, and particularly whether, when fixing the price, potential for development was to be included. The clause required the ‘full market value’ to be paid. The tenant appealed.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Scotland, Rating

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.426443

Newcome v Mathew: 3 May 1832

A new mill erectad on the site of an ancient mill is exempt from tithes : but if it is built partly on the site of the ancient mill, and partly on a new site, it is not exempt. In a suit for tithes betwean a vicar and the occupier of a mill an old map of the parish, belonging to the lord of the manor, was not admiitted as evidence for the Defendant.

Citations:

[1832] EngR 565, (1832) 5 Sim 243, (1832) 58 ER 328

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Ecclesiastical, Rating

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.319512

Regina v James Saunders Randall And William Saunders: 20 Jan 1855

Stat, 5 and 6 w. 4, c. 50, s, 27, enacts that the highway rate shall be upon property rateable to the relief of the poor, ‘provided that the same rate shall also extend to such woods* mines, and quarries of stone, or other hereditaments, as have heretofore been usually rated to the highways.’ — Held, that mines not rateable to the relief of the poor, opened in a parish since the passing of that Act, are rateable to the highway rate, if mines of a similar description were before the Act usually rated to the highways in that parish.

Citations:

[1855] EngR 97, (1855) 4 El and Bl 564, (1855) 119 ER 207

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Rating

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.292019

Thomas Houghton Hodgson v The Local Board Of Health For The District Of Carlisle: 26 Jun 1857

Real property within the district of a local Board of health cannot be assessed to a district rate, unless there be some person having such an occupation as would make him liable to the poor rate in respect thereof.

Citations:

[1857] EngR 709, (1857) 8 El and Bl 116, (1857) 120 ER 43

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Rating

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.290455

Clement (VO) v Addis Ltd: HL 1988

The ratepayer complained that an enterprise zone set up near his property had depressed the value of his property which should have been reflected in a reduced rateable value. He appealed a decision that section 20 related only to physical changes affecting the property.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The critical factor was that the statutory word ‘state’, unaccompanied by any qualifying epithet such as ‘physical’, should ‘be given a wide construction, so as to include intangible as well as physical advantages and disadvantages’

Citations:

[1988] 1 WLR 301 (HL, [1988] RA 25

Statutes:

General Rate Act 1967 20

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromAddis Ltd v Clement (VO) CA 1987
The ratepayer challenged the rateable value of his business premises. A business park had been erected within an enterprise zone nearby. Because properties in the enterprise zone were subsidised, the rental value of his own premises was reduced. It . .

Cited by:

CitedChilton-Merryweather v Hunt and others CA 19-Sep-2008
The council tax payers sought to reduce the banding for his house saying that it was adversely affected in value by being located so close to the motorway as to be affected by noise.
Held: The House of Lords decision in Addis had been reversed . .
CitedR F Williams (Valuation Officer) v Scottish and Newcastle Retail Ltd Allied Domecq Retailing Ltd CA 15-Feb-2001
When assessing the ratable value of premises, the value had to be determined with respect to the actual use made, and the value of the building in that use. The fact that a building was in an area where with a different use a much greater return . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.276416

Regina v District Auditor No 3 Audit District of West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council ex parte West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council: 1986

Citations:

[1986] RVR 24

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedGibbs v Harding and others ChD 12-Jan-2007
The testatrix left a will anticipating making another. The court was asked whether a clause leaving her estate to ‘be taken over by the Diocese of Westminster to hold in trust for the Black community of Hackney’ was valid.
Held: The gift was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Trusts

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.247690

National Provincial Bank of England v United Electric Theatres: 1916

Judges:

Astbury J

Citations:

[1916] All ER 106

Cited by:

CitedRatford v Northavon District Council CA 1986
The reality of the agency of a receiver is reflected in the continuity, after the appointment of receivers, of the rateable occupation of the mortgagor through the agency of the receivers. The possession of an agent is to be attributed to that of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.198325

In re National Arms and Ammunition Co: CA 1885

‘If the company retains the possession of property which would be rateable in the hands of anyone else, it is only reasonable that it should be rateable in the hands of the company . . the true test is whether there has been a beneficial occupation within the ordinary meaning of those words in cases as to rating.’

Judges:

Bowen and Fry LJJ

Citations:

(1885) 28 Ch D 474

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

DisapprovedIn re Watson, Kipling and Co ChD 1883
An assessment for rates had been made after the liquidation of the company upon property occupied by the company. The court rejected the submission of counsel for the rating authority that: ‘where a liability is incurred during the winding-up, that . .

Cited by:

CitedKahn and Another v Commissioners of Inland Revenue; In re Toshoku Finance plc HL 20-Feb-2002
A company went into liquidation, being owed substantial sums by another company in the same group, but itself insolvent. A settlement did not include accrued interest, but was claimed to be taxed as if it had, and on an accruals basis. If so, was . .
AppliedIn re Blazer Fire Lighter Ltd 1895
The liquidator had closed the business and done nothing on the premises except to instal a caretaker to protect them from vandalism. That was sufficient to continue the company in rateable occupation. So the rates were an expense of the liquidation. . .
CitedIn re Nortel Companies and Others SC 24-Jul-2013
The court was asked as to the interrelationship of the statutory schemes relating to the protection of employees’ pensions and to corporate insolvency.
Held: Liabilities which arose from financial support directions or contribution notices . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Rating

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.190101

In re Blazer Fire Lighter Ltd: 1895

The liquidator had closed the business and done nothing on the premises except to instal a caretaker to protect them from vandalism. That was sufficient to continue the company in rateable occupation. So the rates were an expense of the liquidation.

Judges:

Vaughan-Williams J

Citations:

[1895] 1 Ch 402

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

AppliedIn re National Arms and Ammunition Co CA 1885
‘If the company retains the possession of property which would be rateable in the hands of anyone else, it is only reasonable that it should be rateable in the hands of the company . . the true test is whether there has been a beneficial occupation . .

Cited by:

CitedKahn and Another v Commissioners of Inland Revenue; In re Toshoku Finance plc HL 20-Feb-2002
A company went into liquidation, being owed substantial sums by another company in the same group, but itself insolvent. A settlement did not include accrued interest, but was claimed to be taxed as if it had, and on an accruals basis. If so, was . .
CitedIn re Nortel Companies and Others SC 24-Jul-2013
The court was asked as to the interrelationship of the statutory schemes relating to the protection of employees’ pensions and to corporate insolvency.
Held: Liabilities which arose from financial support directions or contribution notices . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Rating

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.190102

Russell v Coventry and Solihull Waste Disposal Co Ltd: CA 11 Jun 1998

For a site supplying several services including waste management and lesser electricity generation, the primary purpose governed its rating, and the site did not have the exemptions from commercial rates which were allowed to generator sites. An explanatory note may be referred to as an aid to construction where the statutory instrument to which it is attached is ambiguous.

Citations:

Times 11-Jun-1998, [1999] 1 WLR 2093

Statutes:

Gas and Electricity Industries (Rateable Values) (Amendment) Order 1990 (1990 No 804)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRegina v Montila and Others HL 25-Nov-2004
The defendants faced charges under the two Acts. They raised as a preliminary issue whether it is necessary for the Crown to prove that the property being converted was in fact the proceeds, in the case of the 1994 Act, of drug trafficking and, in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Utilities

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.88925

Glasgow Corporation v Johnstone and Others (orse Johnstons): HL 1965

A house lived in by a church officer was occupied for rating purposes by the church’s congregational board which employed him, and so was not liable for full rates. Lord Hodson said: ‘The distinction is usually shortly stated in this way: if the servant is given the privilege of residing in the house of the master as part of his emoluments the occupation is that of the servant. He is treated for occupation purposes as being in the same position as that of a tenant. If, on the other hand, the servant is genuinely obliged by his Master for the purposes of his master’s business or if it is necessary for the servant to reside in the house for the performance of his services the occupation will be that of the master.’

Judges:

Lord Reid, Lord Hodson

Citations:

[1965] 2 WLR 657, [1965] AC 609

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Citing:

AppliedFox v Dalby 1874
A militia sergeant occupied a house built expressly for accommodation of persons looking after the stores and which had been assigned to him by his commanding officer.
Held: The sergeant did not occupy the house as a tenant. Brett J said: . .

Cited by:

AppliedWragg and others v Surrey County Council CA 1-Feb-2008
The Council appealed against declarations given that the respondent tenants (wildlife rangers) were entitled to purchase the freehold of their homes under right-to-buy. The Council said that the tenancies were occupied in connection with their . .
CitedKenya Aid Programme v Sheffield City Council Admn 22-Jan-2013
The claimant challenged a decision that it was liable for non domestic rates in respect of some commercial units, on the basis that the use by the charity was not itself charitable.
Held: ‘there is no reason for limiting the ambit of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Housing, Charity

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.536772

JDE Plant Hire Limited v Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council: QBD 2000

The company appealed against liability orders made against it. It owned premises which were subdivided and let to other businesses which it contended were the ones in actual occupation, since it did not benefit from physical, non-transient occupation.
Held: The appeal failed. The magistrates had properly allowed for the restricted nature of the licences granted by the appellant. The decision in John Laing were that no physical occupation was required. The appellant’s business was to allow others to use he premises, and that they shared a common access. The company had had to retain physical control of the premises to perform its duties under the licences ithad granted. Once actual occupation had been established, it was inevitable that the company’s occupation should be found to be exclusive and beneficial and not transient.

Judges:

Tomlinson J

Citations:

[[2000] RA 471

Citing:

CitedHolywell Union v Halkin District Mines DrainageCo HL 1895
The landowner had granted to a drainage company an exclusive right of drainage though a tunnel and a watercourse in his land, with the right of placing works in the tunnel and the watercourse and of making other tunnels in connection therewith, . .
CitedJohn Laing and Son Ltd v Kingswood Assessment Committee KBD 1949
The appellant building contractors had been engaged by the Air Ministry to execute works at an aerodrome. They erected on the site, for the purpose of carrying out the contract, offices, garages, canteen for workmen and other structures. Although . .

Cited by:

CitedTallington Lakes Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v Grantham Magistrates Court Admn 25-Nov-2010
The company appealed against liability orders made against it for non-payment of domestic rates, saying that in each case it had not been the rateable occupier. The property had been subdivided and let to companies of which the appellant was a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.443326

The King v The Undertakers of The Aire and Calder Navigation: 12 Nov 1788

Where a navigation runs from A. to B, through several intervening parishes, and the tolls for the whole navigation are collected in those two parishes, they may be assessed to the poor-rates in those two parishes for the whole amount according to the proportion collected in each. The justices at the sessions are the proper judges of the equality of poor-rates ; and the Court of B. R. will not interfere upon the ground of their being unequal, unless the inequality be manifestly apparent on the rate.

Citations:

[1788] EngR 223, (1788) 2 TR 660, (1788) 100 ER 356

Links:

Commonlii

Rating

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.368523

The King v The Undertakers of The Aire and Calder Navigation: 1829

An Act of Parliament of the 9 and 10 W 3 gave to certain undertakers authority to make navigable the river Aire, and for that purpose to cleanse and scour the same, arid dig and cut the banks. By a subsequent Act, reciting that the legal estate and interest in the navigation of the said river and divers messuages, mills, warehouses, buildings, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, was vested in trustees, they were authorised by deed to sell and conveyin fee such messuages, mills, lands, or tenements belonging to the undertakers, or to convey in fee, by way of mortgage, as well the said navigation, as also all or any messuages, mills, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, being the property of the undertakers: Held, that the word ‘navigation’ in that Act imported an incorporeal hereditament ; and that it authorised the trustees to mortgage in fee that incorporeal hereditament ; and the first Act having given the undertakers an incorporeal hereditament only in the bed of the river, they were not rateable to the poor as occupiers or owners of the river Aire.

Citations:

[1829] EngR 231, (1829) 9 B and C 820, (1829) 109 ER 305

Links:

Commonlii

Rating

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.322099

The King v The Undertakers of The Aire And Calder Navigation (Case of The Hunslet Mills): 5 May 1832

The owners of mills in the township of H, in compensation for the loss of water occasioned to them within the township by an adjoining navigation, were allowed, by Act of Parliament, to take certain tolls at a lock situate on the line of navigation, but in a different township : Held, that they were not rateabl e at their mills in H. in respect of the tolls so taken.

Citations:

[1832] EngR 574, (1832) 3 B and Ad 533, (1832) 110 ER 193

Links:

Commonlii

Rating

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.319521

W and JB Eastwood Ltd v Herrod (VO): HL 1971

The House was asked whether buildings used for producing broiler chickens were agricultural buildings. They would be exempt had it been possible to say that they were used ‘solely’ in connection with the agricultural operations on the land together with which they were occupied, which was used for the production of barely which was converted into poultry food. Held; The key words were ‘used in connection with’. The ordinary usage of the English language suggested that the buildings must be subsidiary or ancillary to the agricultural operations, and that he did not foresee serious difficulty if the phrase was held to mean use consequential on or ancillary to the agricultural operations on the land which was occupied together with the buildings. The use of the buildings were in no sense ancillary to the agricultural operations on the land, as it was a large commercial enterprise in which the use of the land played a very minor part.

Judges:

Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Guest and Viscount Dilhorne.

Citations:

[1971] AC 160

Statutes:

Rating and Valuation (Apportionment) Act 1928 2(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedGallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints HL 30-Jul-2008
The House considered whether certain properties of the Church were subject to non-domestic rating. Various buildings were on the land, and the officer denied that some fell within the exemptions, and in particular whether the Temple itself was a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Agriculture

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.272219

Re Marriage Neave and Co: CA 1896

The court considered the liability for rates of a company’s receiver: ‘The argument that, because a receiver and manager is appointed, then ipso facto the company or persons carrying on business are turned out, is neither reasonable nor plausible. It is quite conceivable that these receivers might have performed all their duties without even seeing this property. They were to carry on business: they could have appointed a manager to carry on that business under them, to take his instructions from them. It might never be necessary for them to go near the property at all.’

Judges:

Rigby LJ

Citations:

[1896] 2 Ch 633

Cited by:

CitedRatford v Northavon District Council CA 1986
The reality of the agency of a receiver is reflected in the continuity, after the appointment of receivers, of the rateable occupation of the mortgagor through the agency of the receivers. The possession of an agent is to be attributed to that of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 09 May 2022; Ref: scu.198324

Gilbert v S Hickinbottom and Sons Ltd: CA 1956

A large industrial bakery comprised a number of buildings in two blocks separated by a street. The Lands Tribunal held, overruling the valuation officer, that they constituted a single hereditament.
Held: The valuer’s appeal failed. The application of the test was ‘a question of degree and therefore of fact’, and if the Lands Tribunal thought that it was one hereditament they must have had their reasons. Geographically contiguous spaces are normally to be treated as one hereditament and geographically separate spaces as distinct, but there remain ‘exceptional cases’ where their function required a different treatment.
Denning LJ gave as examples of the treatment of separate premises as one hereditament, the case where a road bisected a nobleman’s park, or agricultural land (in the days when agricultural land was rateable) or a golf course. The common feature of these cases, he thought, was that: ‘the two properties on either side of the road are so essentially one whole – by which I mean, so essential in use the one to another – that they should be regarded as one single hereditament.’
Morris LJ thought it undesirable to lay down general principles to govern what he regarded as a ‘common sense assessmen’. At best the closest that he came to indicating in what circumstances geographically separate spaces might be regarded as a single hereditament was in the following passage: ‘buildings which, though not actually enclosed together or actually contiguous, are very near together and are not separated by the presence of other buildings and are being put to one common use may be regarded as comprising one hereditament. There can be no doubt that ordinarily very great weight will be placed upon what may be termed the geographical test. But the question is always one of fact and degree.’
Parker LJ gave the guidance: ‘Whether or not premises in one occupation fall to be entered in the valuation list as one or more hereditaments depends upon a number of considerations. Without attempting an exhaustive list, the following considerations can be mentioned:
(1) Whether the premises are in more than one rating area. If so, they must be divided into at least the same number of hereditaments as the rating areas in which the premises are situated.
(2) Whether two or more parts of the premises are capable of being separately let. If not, then the premises must be entered as a single hereditament.
(3) Whether the premises form a single geographical unit.
(4) Whether though forming a single geographical unit the premises by their structure and layout consist of two or more separate parts.
(5) Whether the occupier finds it necessary or convenient to use the premises as a whole for one purpose, or whether he uses different parts of the premises for different purposes.
Whereas a consideration of questions (1) and (2) will in certain events conclude the matter one way or the other, the same does not, I think, result from a consideration of any one of the other questions alone. The conclusion, where the considerations of (1) and (2) are not decisive, must depend on the weight to be attached on the facts of each case to the other considerations. No doubt the most important of these other considerations is whether the premises form a geographical unit. Can they be ringed round on a map?’
Parker LJ cited University of Glasgow, and said of the geographical and functional tests: ‘[The geographical test] is so often decisive that it is a convenient starting point to the inquiry, but it is not decisive in all cases. Thus, though the premises may form a geographical unit, the manner in which different parts are used may justify the premises being treated as several hereditaments; cf North Eastern Railway Co v Guardians of York Union [1900] 1 QB 733, 739 per Channell J. The appellant’s contention, however, is that though the functional test may justify treating a geographical unit as two hereditaments, it is wholly inapplicable where the premises occupied are geographically and structurally separate. There is no doubt, I think, that in the latter case little weight will ordinarily be given to any functional connexion, but it is another thing to say that it is irrelevant. If, as is admitted, a functional connexion is a relevant consideration when considering a geographical and structural unit, I fail to see why as a matter of law it cannot be considered at all when there are separate geographical and structural units. Each case must be considered on its particular facts, due weight being given to the degree and nature of the separation on the one hand and the importance of the functional connexion on the other.’

Judges:

Denning LJ, Morris LJ, Parker LJ

Citations:

[1956] 2 QB 40

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

ApprovedUniversity of Glasgow v Assessor for Glasgow 1952
(Lands Valuation Appeal Court)
Held: Various buildings of the University which were physically separate from the main buildings, capable of being separately let and dispersed among buildings belonging to other proprietors, were properly . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 09 May 2022; Ref: scu.591255

Midlothian Assessor v Buccleuch Estates Ltd: 1962

(Lands Valuation Appeal Court) The landowner had several parcels of woodland and sawmills. They were on different sites, but worked together as a single business.
Lord Kilbrandon observed: ‘It has never yet been admitted that you can have a unit of valuation consisting of widely scattered heritable subjects connected only by some functional or commercial nexus, and I do not see why it should be. I do not think one is being merely old fashioned or obscurantist in insisting, in the conception of unum quid, on a fairly close physical relationship between what might be considered as parts of a commercial unit; one is, after all, attempting to value not a business but heritable subjects, and it may be that the precedents, which all insist on such a physical relationship, indicate a determination to preserve that essential distinction. . . Not only do I know of no precedent in valuation practice which could justify a functional approach to the problem such as is here sought to be made, but I am still of opinion that no such approach can in this case give a proper content to the whole words of the statute.’

Judges:

Lord Kilbrandon

Citations:

[1962] RA 257

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Citing:

CitedBank of Scotland v Assessor for Edinburgh 1890
(Lands Valuation Appeal Court) The court considered the rating applicable where several banks retained nearby properties for the occupation of its staff. There were three categories of residential premises: (i) dwellings which were in buildings . .

Cited by:

ApprovedFarmer and Another v Buxted Poultry Ltd HL 10-Mar-1993
Buildings which were in fact far apart, could not be treated as being ‘occupied together with’ as agricultural buildings for rating purposes. . .
CitedWoolway v Mazars SC 29-Jul-2015
The Court was asked how different storeys under common occupation in the same block are to be entered in the rating list for the purpose of non-domestic rating. In this case the firm’s two offices were in the same building, but the connection . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 09 May 2022; Ref: scu.591253

University of Glasgow v Assessor for Glasgow: 1952

(Lands Valuation Appeal Court)
Held: Various buildings of the University which were physically separate from the main buildings, capable of being separately let and dispersed among buildings belonging to other proprietors, were properly entered on the valuation roll as separate subjects.
Lord Keith, using the Bank of Scotland Case, treated the case as a geographical one: ‘The common enclosure in many cases supplies a useful basis, or test, for a unum quid entry. It is the reason why a villa with its garden ground, or a mansion house with its policies, and any ancillary buildings are entered as a unum quid. The geographical conception has never been lost sight of in making up entries in the Valuation Roll, and in the case of John Leng and Co v Assessor for Dundee Lord Sands took occasion twice to refer to ‘the ordinary geographical arrangement followed in making up the Valuation Roll’. There may be cases where geographical unity has to be departed from, as where premises within what would otherwise be a single entity are separately let, or lands or buildings within a common enclosure are used for separate purposes. It is not perhaps possible to lay down general rules for all cases. Something must depend on particular circumstances. But the broad general principles are as stated.’

Judges:

Lord Keith

Citations:

1952 SC 504

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Citing:

AppliedBank of Scotland v Assessor for Edinburgh 1890
(Lands Valuation Appeal Court) The court considered the rating applicable where several banks retained nearby properties for the occupation of its staff. There were three categories of residential premises: (i) dwellings which were in buildings . .

Cited by:

ApprovedGilbert v S Hickinbottom and Sons Ltd CA 1956
A large industrial bakery comprised a number of buildings in two blocks separated by a street. The Lands Tribunal held, overruling the valuation officer, that they constituted a single hereditament.
Held: The valuer’s appeal failed. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 09 May 2022; Ref: scu.591252

Bank of Scotland v Assessor for Edinburgh: 1891

(Lands Valuation Appeal Court) The Court considered the appropriate entry for property contiguous with a bank, but with no interconnection, the house being held for the occupation of bank employees.
Held: Lord Wellwood repeated his view that they fell to be separately valued.
Lord Kyllachy, said: ‘The test I think here is whether the houses in question are capable, not merely physically but, all conditions being considered, of being separately let, and having a separate rent or value attached to them. As regards the house occupied by the messenger, and which has no internal communication with the rest of the bank, I agree with the opinion of Lord Wellwood at the last court. I see no reason, at least none appears in the case, why, if the bank chose, this house should not be separately let to a suitable tenant, or assigned by way of pension to an old servant, or otherwise dealt with as a separate and independent dwelling.

Judges:

Lord Traynor, Lord Kyllachy

Citations:

(1891) 18 R 936

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Citing:

See AlsoBank of Scotland v Assessor for Edinburgh 1890
(Lands Valuation Appeal Court) The court considered the rating applicable where several banks retained nearby properties for the occupation of its staff. There were three categories of residential premises: (i) dwellings which were in buildings . .

Cited by:

CitedWoolway v Mazars SC 29-Jul-2015
The Court was asked how different storeys under common occupation in the same block are to be entered in the rating list for the purpose of non-domestic rating. In this case the firm’s two offices were in the same building, but the connection . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 09 May 2022; Ref: scu.591251

Burn Stewart Distillers plc v Lanarkshire Valuation Joint Board: 2001

(Lands Tribunal for Scotland) Premises under common occupation but situated on opposite sides of a main road constituted two hereditaments: ‘We consider that the emphasis on the geographical test is an aspect of recognition that lands and heritages are physical subjects. The underlying purpose is to provide a proper basis for a tax on property, not a tax on persons or businesses. Where the subjects share characteristics of function which, in a robust practical sense, support the use of a single term to describe the physical subjects, they can be treated as one unit. . . On the other hand, we are satisfied that the fact that certain heritable subjects function together as one business will, by itself, be insufficient to demonstrate that they are to be regarded as a unum quid in any physical sense. A ‘business’ is not a concept based on physical or heritable factors. Entry in the roll is based on identification of heritable subjects. The fact that one business may need to occupy two separate physical subjects does not change the character of the subjects. It is clear that undue emphasis on a business connection as evidence of functional connection between subjects could lead to a distinction for rating purposes between a business whose operating units were in close proximity and those whose operating units were, perhaps only slightly, more remote. There is no basis in legislation for such a distinction. We see no basis in fairness for it. We are not persuaded that there is a consistent practice which would lead to that result. If there is, we see no need to follow it . . In the present case there is a clear physical separation of the two subjects. They each have a clear curtilage and these curtilages are separated by a public road and pavements. . . Although, in a sense, little different from the interposition of a public road, the fact that the ratepayers do not have exclusive occupation of the land which provides their access to that public road and the intermittent presence at their gate of large, slow-moving vehicles belonging to another occupier, tends to enhance the impression of separation of the two subjects. A test based on appearance and impression may properly be treated as part of the geographical test. The two subjects have no unifying visual characteristics. There is nothing to indicate that they are operated together, far less that the physical presence of one is essential to the function of the other. . . Their physical characteristic as two distinct subjects is supported by the consideration that there is no real doubt that the subjects could be let separately.’

Citations:

[2001] RA 110

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Cited by:

CitedWoolway v Mazars SC 29-Jul-2015
The Court was asked how different storeys under common occupation in the same block are to be entered in the rating list for the purpose of non-domestic rating. In this case the firm’s two offices were in the same building, but the connection . .
Not approvedWoolway v Mazars SC 29-Jul-2015
The Court was asked how different storeys under common occupation in the same block are to be entered in the rating list for the purpose of non-domestic rating. In this case the firm’s two offices were in the same building, but the connection . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 09 May 2022; Ref: scu.591254

British Railways Board v Hopkins (Valuation Officer): LT 1981

Different storeys under common occupation as constituting a single hereditament, whether they were contiguous or not.

Citations:

[1981] RA 328

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedWoolway v Mazars SC 29-Jul-2015
The Court was asked how different storeys under common occupation in the same block are to be entered in the rating list for the purpose of non-domestic rating. In this case the firm’s two offices were in the same building, but the connection . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 09 May 2022; Ref: scu.591256

Bank of Scotland v Assessor for Edinburgh: 1890

(Lands Valuation Appeal Court) The court considered the rating applicable where several banks retained nearby properties for the occupation of its staff. There were three categories of residential premises: (i) dwellings which were in buildings separate from the bank’s offices; (ii) dwellings which were under the same roof as the commercial offices with internal communication between them; and (iii) dwellings which were under the same roof but with no internal communication between them, or none that was in use.
Held: In case (i) the dwellings fell to be valued separately while those in cases (ii) and (iii) were unum quid with the commercial offices. Lord Wellwood agreed with him on cases (i) and (ii), but not on case (iii) which he would have directed to be separately valued. However, the underlying principle applied by both judges was the same. They applied the geographical principle, distinguishing cases where the various bank buildings formed a continuous territorial block from cases where they did not. In those cases where the different buildings did not form a continuous territorial block, they could be treated as unum quid only where there was a necessary functional connection between them.
Lord Trayner said: ‘In the case of the Commercial Bank I think the assessor has gone wrong in including the messengers’ houses as part of the bank. These houses form no part of the bank buildings; they are separate houses in the adjoining street, no doubt sufficiently near to the bank to be convenient and suitable for the bank servants, but still no part of the bank buildings, and therefore no part of the unum quid. The assessor in support of the view he has adopted referred to the case of M’Jannet, 10 R 32, but I do not think that that case has any application here. It was decided in that case that the conservatory, stables, and outhouses connected with a dwelling-house were not to be separately valued, but were to be regarded and valued as a unum quid. I agree entirely with that decision. The different parts of the subject to be valued lay together, and were within the one enclosure; they were the different parts which together went to make up the establishment. But although the stables, for example, were held in that case to be part of the residence and to be so valued, it does not follow that stables are in every case to be valued as part of the residence to which they are an accessory. The stables of a gentleman in town are as much a convenience or accessory to his town residence as they are in the case of a country house. They are not, however, valued along with the town residence, although situated in the adjoining street or mews. They are not so connected – as they were in the case of a country mansion or residence – as to make it impossible or difficult to let them separately. In the same way the Commercial Bank could not well retain their bank premises, and let the part thereof devoted to official residence, but they could quite well and conveniently let the messengers’ houses in the street to persons entirely unconnected with the bank. I think these houses therefore should be separately entered and valued in the Valuation-roll.’
Lord Wellwood divided the residential buildings into three categories: ‘First – Those which are entirely detached from the bank buildings, as in the case of the messengers’ houses of the Commercial Bank of Scotland. I agree with Lord Trayner that the yearly value of those houses should be separately entered in the roll.
Second -The houses which form part of the main building, but have no internal communication with the business premises. I am of opinion that the yearly value of those dwelling-houses also should be separately entered. The fact that they form part of the same building with the business premises is not I think in this question material, and was not much relied on by the respondent. Structurally they are self-contained premises, and could be let separately if this were desired. The respondent relied mainly upon the consideration that the houses form necessary adjuncts to the bank premises, and together with them fell to be valued as a unum quid.
Dwelling-houses for bank officials connected with the bank premises are no doubt usual and useful additions to banking premises, but it is not indispensable that they should form part of the bank buildings, as is shewn in the case of the messengers’ houses of the Commercial Bank of Scotland. If, as is sometimes the case, it did not suit any of the officials to reside in the dwelling-houses, they could be let to a tenant with no more danger to the bank than if they were under a different roof. The case seems to me to be precisely the same as that with which we are familiar of the lower flat of a dwelling-house being converted into a shop with a separate entrance. The upper flats may or may not be occupied by the shopkeeper himself as a dwelling-house, but I take it that in any case the dwelling-house and the shop are valued separately.
Third – Dwelling-houses which are connected by internal communication with the business premises. In regard to those I have more doubt. ‘In their actual state’ they are at present connected with the business premises by an internal door of communication, which is used not merely as a convenient short cut by the occupant of the dwelling-house, but also by other bank officials and servants for the purpose of locking the outer door of the bank and other purposes. This means of communication could be easily cut off by building up or even locking the door. But that is not the present state of matters, and the question being doubtful, I am not prepared to differ from the opinion of Lord Trayner and the Valuation Committee as to those dwelling-houses.’

Judges:

Lord Trayner, Lord Wellwood

Citations:

(1890) 17 R 839

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Cited by:

See AlsoBank of Scotland v Assessor for Edinburgh 1891
(Lands Valuation Appeal Court) The Court considered the appropriate entry for property contiguous with a bank, but with no interconnection, the house being held for the occupation of bank employees.
Held: Lord Wellwood repeated his view that . .
AppliedUniversity of Glasgow v Assessor for Glasgow 1952
(Lands Valuation Appeal Court)
Held: Various buildings of the University which were physically separate from the main buildings, capable of being separately let and dispersed among buildings belonging to other proprietors, were properly . .
CitedMidlothian Assessor v Buccleuch Estates Ltd 1962
(Lands Valuation Appeal Court) The landowner had several parcels of woodland and sawmills. They were on different sites, but worked together as a single business.
Lord Kilbrandon observed: ‘It has never yet been admitted that you can have a . .
CitedWoolway v Mazars SC 29-Jul-2015
The Court was asked how different storeys under common occupation in the same block are to be entered in the rating list for the purpose of non-domestic rating. In this case the firm’s two offices were in the same building, but the connection . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 09 May 2022; Ref: scu.591250

Oxfam v Birmingham City District Council: HL 1976

The appellant charity had the relief of poverty as its main object, a recognised ‘charitable purpose’. It operated gift shops used for sorting and selling donated articles of clothing as well as selling products made in the developing world. All of the profits of such shops were devoted to the charity’s purposes.
Held: The appeal failed. The premises were not being ‘used for charitable purposes’. Not every lawful activity of a charity is necessarily charitable. The ‘charitable purposes’ of a charity are its objects.
Lord Cross of Chelsea said that a court must: ‘[draw] the line so as to exclude from relief user for the purpose of getting in, raising or earning money for the charity, as opposed to user for purposes directly related to the achievement of the objects of the charity’.
Lord Reid said that Oxfam, therefore, was entitled to rating relief in respect of premises which it occupies and which are not being used for the actual relief of poverty of distress, if the use which it makes of them is ‘wholly ancillary to’ or ‘directly facilitates’ the carrying out of its charitable object – the relief of poverty or distress. The nub of the problem was: ‘For my part, I agree with counsel on both sides that one cannot well draw a distinction between using premises to get in money by managing existing trust property and using them to raise fresh money.’

Judges:

Lord Reid, Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest

Citations:

[1976] AC 126

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedKenya Aid Programme v Sheffield City Council Admn 22-Jan-2013
The claimant challenged a decision that it was liable for non domestic rates in respect of some commercial units, on the basis that the use by the charity was not itself charitable.
Held: ‘there is no reason for limiting the ambit of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Charity

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.567240

Burke v Broomhead: Admn 2009

The court heard applications relating to the inclusion of the property in the valuation list, including an assertion that the tribunal had wrongly interpreted the valuation evidence presented to it in arriving at its decision. The claimant said that the tribunal had found that the dwelling was repairable at reasonable expense when the unchallenged evidence of experts proved otherwise. It was not disputed that the property was a hereditament.
Held: The judge noted that the applicant had not suggested that the property was incapable of beneficial occupation. Indeed, it had been for many years occupied beneficially by him.
HHJ Kirkham held that: ‘The Tribunal considered the evidence and concluded that the property should be entered in the Council’s Valuation List . . That . . is the short answer to this appeal.’ In dealing with questions of whether the likely cost of repair were economic or not, the tribunal had in fact gone further than it needed to in order to determine the matters which had been put in issue.

Judges:

Kirkham HHJ

Citations:

[2009] EWHC 1855 (Admin)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedWilson v Josephine Coll (Listing Officer) Admn 13-Oct-2011
The land owners challenged the re-appearance of their empty and disrepaired dweliinghouse in the valuation list. It had been exempt for twelve months. The appellanat said that the appeal property was not a hereditament as it was not in reasonable . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.545147

Tower Hamlets London Borough Council v St Katherine by the Tower Limited: QBD 1982

By section 34(4) of the 1939 Act, no building which required a means of escape from fire under section 34(1) ‘shall be occupied or let for occupation’ until the local authority had issued a certificate that the building had been provided with a means of escape in accordance with approved plans, but buildings belonging to the Port of London Authority were exempted. The Authority first owned Europe House but sold the freehold and leased back one floor for its own occupation from St Katherine’s predecessor in title. The Authority stayed in occupation of the 5th floor under its lease from St Katherine until 31 March 1979. When the Authority vacated the premises the owners realised that, if they were to occupy or permit another tenant to occupy the 5th floor, a certificate of compliance with the 1939 Act would be required. Plans were submitted to the Greater London Council and approved. A fire escape was installed, the work was completed and a tenant took occupation.
Tower Hamlets demanded rates of the owners, including the time after Port of London Authority had vacated and before the new tenant occupied the 5th floor. The 1967 Act placed a liability on owners to pay rates on unoccupied properties, but allowed an exemption that for unoccupied properties: ‘No rates shall be payable . . in respect of a hereditament for, or any part of the 3 months beginning with the day following the end of, any period during which (a) the owner is prohibited by law from occupying the hereditament or allowing it to be occupied.’
It was conceded that Europe House was a new building for section 34 of the 1939 Act and, in the absence of a means of escape certificate, there was a prohibition against the occupation of the 5th floor of the building, St Katherine claimed that it was exempted by paragraph 2(a) of Schedule 1 to the 1967 Act from paying the unoccupied rate.
Tower Hamlets argued that the prohibition contemplated by paragraph 2(a) was not a general prohibition arising from the application of section 34(4) but a specific prohibition directed at the property made by a court, local authority or other official or public body. For example, section 34(5) empowered the local authority to issue a prohibition against occupation to a defendant convicted of an offence of contravening the section. No such prohibition had been issued, and provided other examples of statutory prohibition notices that certain public authorities were empowered to serve. It was further argued that the owner of the premises which chooses not to put them into a compliant condition (within the three month period of grace) should not escape liability to pay the occupied rates that would have been due had he made the necessary alterations.
Held: Tower Hamlets’ appeal failed.
McCullough J rejected the need for a a prohibition notice issued by a public body for the exemption. On the face of it, paragraph 2(a) applied equally to prohibition of occupation without the certificate required by section 34(4), as to occupation prohibited by a notice issued under section 34(5). He considered whether there were countervailing factors which demanded a different construction of paragraph 2(a) or required the court to qualify the meaning of the word ‘owner’. There was force in the argument that it was unlikely to have been the intention of Parliament that a property owner should obtain the benefit of rates exemption by deliberately keeping his property in a condition in which it was incapable of occupation, the argument that Parliament intended the word ‘owner’ to be restricted to one who behaved in a reasonable way was unworkable. Formerly, the owner had been exempted from the payment of rates for an unoccupied property. The 1967 Act removed that exemption in general but, in a limited number of circumstances, maintained it. The purpose of paragraph 2(a) was to restrict the circumstances in which an owner could claim exemption from the payment of rates for an unoccupied property. However, the fact that the plain meaning of the words used in paragraph 2(a) would benefit an owner who chose to delay equipping his building with means of escape in case of fire was insufficient to justify a departure from them. It would be a greater violation of the words used in paragraph 2(a) to hold otherwise.

Judges:

McCullogh J

Citations:

[1982] RA 261

Statutes:

London Buildings Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 34, General Rate Act 1967

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedPall Mall Investments (London) Ltd v Gloucester City Council Admn 8-Jul-2014
The land-owner appealed by case stated against an assessment to unoccupied, non-domestic rate demands. The land-owner said that they were unoccupied through dilapidations and therefore exempt. They said that the court had wrongly disregarded their . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.533873

Westminster City Council v Haymarket Publishing Limited: CA 1981

The court was asked whether a statutory charge on the property under the General Rate Act wou ld have priority over a legal mortgage on the property existing when the charge came into being. It was argued that the charge would be only on the mortgagor-owner’s interest in the property i.e. on the equity of redemption.
Held: The argument failed. ‘charge on the land’ imposed for an unpaid surcharge was not confined to a charge on the owner’s interest in the premises when the charge arose, but extended to a charge on all the estates and interests in the premises existing when the charge arose. The rating authority’s charge would have priority over the bank’s interest as a mortgagee.
There cannot in general at least be two persons in different capacities in possession at the same time.

Citations:

[1981] 1 WLR 677, [1981] 2 All ER 555

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedBrighton and Hove City Council v Audus ChD 26-Feb-2009
The claimant was the proprietor of a fourth legal charge on a title. It sought a declaration that a second charge in favour of the defendant was void as a clog on the proprietor’s equity of redemption. An advance secured by a first charge, also in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Rating

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.304592

Cole v Police Constable 443A: 1937

A ‘place of public religious worship’ required only ‘congregational worship’, that is to say, the assembly of a congregation whose association is solely for the purpose of joining in worship and not because they have private links such as being members of the same family, school or college.

Judges:

Goddard J

Citations:

[1937] 1 KB 316

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedGallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints HL 30-Jul-2008
The House considered whether certain properties of the Church were subject to non-domestic rating. Various buildings were on the land, and the officer denied that some fell within the exemptions, and in particular whether the Temple itself was a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.272214

Kay v Burrows: HL 1931

The House considered whether premises (the greater part of which was used for the storage of rags awaiting processing, sorting or subsequent despatch) fell within the proviso to s.3(1) which excluded premises ‘primarily occupied and used [for the] purposes of storage’.
Held: A building is only used for storage if the purpose of keeping goods there is their storage as an end in itself: there is no such use for storage if the goods are kept there for some other purpose
A means to an end is not a purpose and end in itself.
Viscount Dunedin said: ‘storage in s. 3, sub-s. 1 (d), means storage as a purpose and end in itself, and that such storage as is merely a necessary and transitory incident of the manufacturing process which is being carried on does not fall within the definition. Accordingly in Burrows’ case I think the premises are not ‘primarily occupied and used for purposes of storage.’

Judges:

Viscount Dunedin

Citations:

[1931] AC 454

Statutes:

Rating and Valuation (Apportionment) Act 1928 3(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedSkipaway Ltd v The Environment Agency Admn 5-May-2006
The defendant appealed convictions for breaches of its waste management licence, in that waste had been stored outside the edges of the storage bays. The defendant said that the material had not yet been stored, and that it had been deposited by . .
CitedSkipaway Ltd v The Environment Agency Admn 5-May-2006
The defendant appealed convictions for breaches of its waste management licence, in that waste had been stored outside the edges of the storage bays. The defendant said that the material had not yet been stored, and that it had been deposited by . .
CitedBestway (Holdings) Ltd v Luff (Inspector of Taxes) ChD 4-Mar-1998
The taxpayer company operated a wholesale cash and carry business from a number of self-service supermarkets. The stores sold groceries, household goods, tobacco, confectionery and various kinds of alcohol. Although the buildings were not open to . .
CitedRevenue and Customs v Maco Door and Window Hardware (Uk) Ltd ChD 19-Jul-2006
The Revenue sought to disallow for industrial buildings allowance sums expended on warehouse premises which were to be used to store window products imported for use in other manufacturing processes.
Held: The Revenue’s appeal succeeded. ‘The . .
CitedImperial Tobacco Ltd v The Lord Advocate SC 12-Dec-2012
The claimant company said that the 2010 Act was outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament insofar as it severely restricted the capacity of those selling cigarettes to display them for sale. They suggested two faults. First, that the subject . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.241534

Regina v Assessment Committee of St Mary Abbotts, Kensington: CA 1891

A householder, wishing to object to the valuation listed for his property before the Committee sought to appear by his agent.
Held: He did not need to appear in person before the committee but could appoint another person to do so on his behalf. At common law a person who has a right to appear before a statutory Tribunal may appear by an agent, unless the statute says. Otherwise. the existence of a judicial function did not necessarily make the body to which it was entrusted ‘a court of law’; nor did it necessarily attract ‘the privileges’ enjoyed by a court in law.

Citations:

[1891] 1 QB 378

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Rating, Litigation Practice

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.472864

Addis Ltd v Clement (VO): CA 1987

The ratepayer challenged the rateable value of his business premises. A business park had been erected within an enterprise zone nearby. Because properties in the enterprise zone were subsidised, the rental value of his own premises was reduced. It was said that this should be allowed for in valuing the property under section 20. The Lands Tribunal had held that the presence of the enterprise zone were a change in the state of the locality and adopted the lower valuation. The valuation officer appealed, submitting that the valuation was only concerned with ‘physical factors, or at least factors which affect the physical use and enjoyment of the hereditament’, as distinct from ‘benefits or disbenefits that are merely financial or economic’. The ratepayers rejected ‘the distinction which counsel for the valuation officer still draws between physical and non-physical factors.
Held: The court recognised the dstinction raised by the valuation officer.
Woolf LJ said: ‘In general, and I emphasise the words ‘in general’, I accept the approach of counsel for the valuation officer that s 20(1)(b) is limited to physical factors or factors which affect the physical enjoyment of a hereditament. In broad terms the way s 20(1)(b) is intended to operate is that you value the hereditament and any building upon it as it exists at the date of proposal in the setting in which it is situated (with that setting having the actual characteristics of the locality as they would be observed at that date if the locality was to be inspected) on the basis of its 1973 value. For the purposes of carrying out that valuation, it is the economic climate, both local and national, of 1973 which has to be considered and not that at the date of the proposal except to the extent that alterations in the economic conditions result in changes in the locality which are capable of being observed ‘on the ground’ in the locality.’
However: ‘I should however emphasise that I do not accept counsel for the valuation officer’s submission that because a consideration is of a financial nature it cannot be considered as it exists at the date of the proposal because it is incapable of being converted into 1973 values. I would therefore regard it as perfectly appropriate in considering the quality of transport services as this could materially affect an assessment of the quality of the service. Likewise if the existence of a development zone affects the prosperity of an area in a manner which is manifest and can be observed, this should be taken into account. The features which demonstrate a change in prosperity in this way could be properly taken into account as part of the setting in which the valuation at 1973 values is to be made.’
Lord Woolf discussed what amounted to such physical factors: ‘new public sewers, the opening of a street market, no waiting restrictions on an adjacent highway or a change in the Heathrow flight path bringing aircraft directly overhead.’ As to the affect of localamenities: ‘ . . in relation to both amenities and facilities I do recognise that the effects of an area being designated as a development zone, as happens with a smokeless zone, can result in changes in the facilities and the amenities of the locality which can be taken into account.’
Sir George Waller discussed the language of the section dealing with local amenities: ‘In interpreting the section it is necessary to consider the matters which Parliament provided should be taken into consideration. Occupation would be part of the physical state and use would be associated with the physical state. Similarly transport services and other facilities in the locality, although not a physical part of the locality, would be associated physically with the locality. This would also apply to ‘other matters affecting the amenities of the locality’.’

Judges:

Woof LJ, Sir George Waller

Citations:

[1987] RA 1

Statutes:

General Rate Act 1967 20

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal fromClement (VO) v Addis Ltd HL 1988
The ratepayer complained that an enterprise zone set up near his property had depressed the value of his property which should have been reflected in a reduced rateable value. He appealed a decision that section 20 related only to physical changes . .
CitedChilton-Merryweather v Hunt and others CA 19-Sep-2008
The council tax payers sought to reduce the banding for his house saying that it was adversely affected in value by being located so close to the motorway as to be affected by noise.
Held: The House of Lords decision in Addis had been reversed . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.276415

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v Henning (Valuation Officer): HL 1964

The House was asked whether the Mormon Temple at Godstone was exempt from rates as a ‘place of public religious worship’.
Held: The words could not apply to places used for religious worship from which the public was excluded.
Lord Pearce said that Parliament was entitled to take the view that religious services which were open to the public provided a public benefit which justified the exemption. He explained that from 1601 churches of the Church of England were not subject to rates and that this exemption was extended by the Poor Rate Exemption Act 1833 to ‘any churches . . meetinghouses, or premises, or any part thereof that shall be exclusively appropriated to public religious worship’. He continued: ‘By the Act of 1833 the legislature was intending to extend the privileges of exemption enjoyed by the Anglican churches to similar places of worship belonging to other denominations. Since the Church of England worshipped with open doors and its worship was in that sense public, it is unlikely that the legislature intended by the word ‘public’ some more subjective meaning which would embrace in the phrase ‘public religious worship’ any congregational worship observed behind doors closed to the public.
I find it impossible, therefore, to hold that the words ‘places of public religious worship’ includes places which, though from the worshippers’ point of view they were public as opposed to domestic, yet in the more ordinary sense were not public since the public was excluded.
. . Furthermore, it is less likely on general grounds that Parliament intended to give exemption to religious services that exclude the public, since exemptions from rating, though not necessarily consistent, show a general pattern of intention to benefit those activities which are for the good of the general public. All religious services that open their doors to the public may, in an age of religious tolerance, claim to perform some spiritual service to the general public . . ‘

Judges:

Lord Pearce

Citations:

[1964] AC 420

Statutes:

Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 7(2)(a)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromChurch of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v Henning (Valuation Officer) CA 1962
The court was asked whether a Mormon Temple was a public place of worship. Lord Denning MR rejected an argument that the Temple was merely a church hall: ‘The short answer is that this temple is not a church hall, chapel hall nor a similar building. . .

Cited by:

CitedGallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints HL 30-Jul-2008
The House considered whether certain properties of the Church were subject to non-domestic rating. Various buildings were on the land, and the officer denied that some fell within the exemptions, and in particular whether the Temple itself was a . .
CitedThe Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v United Kingdom ECHR 4-Mar-2014
latterdayECHR0314
The claimant said that it had been wrongfully deprived of relief from business rates for its two temples. It asserted that it was a religion, and that the treatment was discriminatory. The government said that the refusal was on the basis alone that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Ecclesiastical

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.272215

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v Henning (Valuation Officer): CA 1962

The court was asked whether a Mormon Temple was a public place of worship. Lord Denning MR rejected an argument that the Temple was merely a church hall: ‘The short answer is that this temple is not a church hall, chapel hall nor a similar building. It is not in the least on the same footing as a church hall or chapel hall. It is a very sacred sanctuary, quite different from a building of that category.’ Donovan LJ said that the Temple was: ‘far too important in the life of the Mormon Church’ to be described as a building similar to a church hall or chapel hall.

Judges:

Lord Denning MR, Donovan and Pearson LJJ

Citations:

[1962] 1 WLR 1091

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal fromChurch of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v Henning (Valuation Officer) HL 1964
The House was asked whether the Mormon Temple at Godstone was exempt from rates as a ‘place of public religious worship’.
Held: The words could not apply to places used for religious worship from which the public was excluded.
Lord Pearce . .
CitedGallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints HL 30-Jul-2008
The House considered whether certain properties of the Church were subject to non-domestic rating. Various buildings were on the land, and the officer denied that some fell within the exemptions, and in particular whether the Temple itself was a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Ecclesiastical

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.272216

Nissan Motor Parts Centre Bv v Valuation Officer: LT 23 Jan 2006

LT RATING – valuation – 2000 rating list – large distribution warehouse on estate consisting of mainly bespoke properties – established tone – whether property suffering from disabilities so as to justify adjustments to basic tone value – held property satisfied requirements of occupier – appeal dismissed

Citations:

[2006] EWLands RA – 61 – 2004

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Rating

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.238406

John Menzies and Co v The Assessor for Edinburgh: 1937

When asking whether a structure on land was rateable, the court should ask first whether the subject structure belonged to a class or genus which was prima facie heritable. Scottish courts places great emphasis upon the general character of the structure for the purpose of its classification as either heritable or moveable.

Judges:

Lord Fleming, Lord Kilbrandon

Citations:

[1937] SC 784

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Citing:

CitedAnderson Grice and Co Ltd v Assessor for Angus 1962
If a thing is by its nature movable, the mere passage of time will not make it heritable even though it is never in fact moved. . .

Cited by:

CitedCinderella Rockerfellas Ltd v Rudd (Valuation Officer) CA 11-Apr-2003
The taxpayer appealed against a rating assessment on a barge permanently moored at a riverbank. He claimed that as a chattel, it should not be rated.
Held: The vessel was a chattel, but its occupation could be an occupation of the riverbed. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.181051

Felgate (Valuation Officer) v Lotus Leisure Enterprises Ltd: LT 2000

The Valuation Officeer had entered in the rating list a moored but floating restaurant ‘dock bed, floating restaurant, moorings and premises’. The Tribunal had to decide whether such rateable hereditament had been correctly identified. The vessel was a steel hull without propulsion or steering with a superstructure erected to contain the restaurant. It was permanently moored in position connected to the dock wall by three hawsers at the bow and two at the stern, each looped over bollards with two connections to the dock wall by steel hawsers. The vessel was connected to all main services. Access was by means of four wooden and steel gangways resting on rollers to allow for the vertical movement of the water in the dock. The vessel was permanently in position save that it was moved on two brief occasions every year.
Held: Whether it was rateable depends on whether it is on a piece of land and enjoyed with it with such a degree of permanence that the chattel and land can together be regarded as one unit of occupation. ‘Enjoyed with’ the land means no more than that the chattel, although not forming part of the realty, must have some real connection with the land on which it rests.

Citations:

[2000] RA 89

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedCinderella Rockerfellas Ltd v Rudd (Valuation Officer) CA 11-Apr-2003
The taxpayer appealed against a rating assessment on a barge permanently moored at a riverbank. He claimed that as a chattel, it should not be rated.
Held: The vessel was a chattel, but its occupation could be an occupation of the riverbed. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.181049

Edison First Power Ltd v The Secretary of State for Department of Environment Transport and the Regions: CA 12 Jul 2001

Judges:

Lord Justice Simon Brown, Mr Justice Dyson, Lord Justice May

Citations:

[2001] RA 229, [2001] EWCA Civ 1096

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromRegina (ex parte Edison First Power Limited v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport, Same v Central Valuation Officer Admn 31-Mar-2000
. .
See AlsoEdison First Power Ltd v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions CA 12-Jul-2001
. .

Cited by:

Appeal fromRegina v Central Valuation Officer and another ex parte Edison First Power Limited HL 10-Apr-2003
Powergen sold a property to Edison. Powergen had paid rates under a separate statutory rating regime, and paid an additional thirteen million pounds under an apportionment. Edison later complained that in being rated itself, the authorities had . .
CitedNorth Somerset District Council v Honda Motor Europe Ltd and Others QBD 2-Jul-2010
Delayed Rates Claims Service made them Defective
The council claimed that the defendants were liable for business rates. The defendants said that the notices were defective in not having been served ‘as soon as practicable’, and further that they should not be enforced since the delay had created . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.159955

Farmer and Another v Buxted Poultry Ltd: HL 10 Mar 1993

Buildings which were in fact far apart, could not be treated as being ‘occupied together with’ as agricultural buildings for rating purposes.

Judges:

Lord Slynn of Hadley

Citations:

Gazette 10-Mar-1993, [1993] AC 369

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

ApprovedMidlothian Assessor v Buccleuch Estates Ltd 1962
(Lands Valuation Appeal Court) The landowner had several parcels of woodland and sawmills. They were on different sites, but worked together as a single business.
Lord Kilbrandon observed: ‘It has never yet been admitted that you can have a . .

Cited by:

CitedWoolway v Mazars SC 29-Jul-2015
The Court was asked how different storeys under common occupation in the same block are to be entered in the rating list for the purpose of non-domestic rating. In this case the firm’s two offices were in the same building, but the connection . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Agriculture

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.80474

Regina v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex parte Cromer Ring Mill Ltd: 1982

Forbes J considered a suggestion that the lower tribiunal had taken into account irrelevant matters: ‘the case wholly supports the formulation in Professor de Smith’s book: ‘If the influence of irrelevant factors is established, it does not appear to be necessary to prove that they were the sole or even the dominant influence; it seems to be enough to prove that their influence was substantial”

Judges:

Forbes J

Citations:

[1982] 3 All ER 761, [1982] RVR 113

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRegina v Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex parte Owen CA 1985
The BBC is a creation of the Crown through the grant of a Charter in the exercise of the Royal Prerogative, and it exercises its functions under agreement with and licences from the Government. The court expressly declined to express a view on the . .
CitedMR, Regina (on The Application of) v The Secretary of State for The Home Department Admn 10-Mar-2017
The claimant challenged the use of the Royal Prerogative to withdraw his passport. He had as a youth been involved with a terrorist organisation, but said that he now regretted that and was no longer so involved. He had sought to set up a business, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Administrative, Rating

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.579650

In re International Marine Hydropathic Co: CA 1884

Where rates become due in respect of land occupied by a liquidator for the purpose of the winding up, the liquidator is liable to meet those rates.

Judges:

Baggallay LJ

Citations:

(1884) 28 Ch D 470

Cited by:

CitedIn re Nortel Companies and Others SC 24-Jul-2013
The court was asked as to the interrelationship of the statutory schemes relating to the protection of employees’ pensions and to corporate insolvency.
Held: Liabilities which arose from financial support directions or contribution notices . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Rating

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.537948

Smith v Seghill Overseers: 1875

The colliery owned 346 cottages which it kept for occupation by the colliers according to the discretion of the owners, who generall gave preference to married workers. A collier who was married but for whom a cottage could not be found was provided with an additional allowance for rent for alternative accomodation. It was not absolutely necessary for their work that an collier should occupy one of the cottages. Norent was paid, and but for the allowance there was no other variation in their terms. The terms of employment were on one week’s notice and no separate or additional notice was given to terminate the occupation when the employment terminated. Rates were paid by the owners without any accounting with the workers.
Held: The appellant colliers were occupiers of the cottages, and were entitled to have their m=names inserted in the rate book. Where a person who is in fact a servant is in part remunerated for his services by being allowed to occupy a house, then he is prima facie a tenant.
Mellor J said: ‘The residence must be ancillary and necessary to the performance of the servants duties; and unless he is required for that purpose to reside in the house, and not merely as an arbitrary regulation on the part of the master, I do not think he is prevented from occupying as a tenant. Then it appears that the appellants and other workmen are only entitled to occupy the houses during the time of their service at the colliery ; the occupation terminates at the time the service terminates. Still, appellants are tenants, though not tenants for any fixed time. They occupy as tenants at will as long as they reside in the houses by the arrangement between themselves and their masters. Then it appears that if there was no house for a married workmen, he had an allowance for house rent, but if there was a house empty, and the workman would not come into it, he had no allowance. An inference might possibly be drawn from this, that, as he was bound to reside if a house was offered him, upon pain of forfeiting his allowance, he resided in it upon compulsion, and therefore his occupation was that of a servant ; but I cannot assent to this, and in my opinion, those workmen who did reside in the houses resided in the character of tenants.’

Judges:

Mellor J

Citations:

(1875) LR 10 QB 422, 44 LJMC 114, 32 LT 859, 40 JP 228, 23 WR 745

Landlord and Tenant, Rating, Employment

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.536773

Regina v Wolverhampton Magistrates Court ex parte Mould: 1992

Kennedy LJ said: ‘the power to commit to prison [for a failure to pay local taxes] is plainly to be used as a weapon to extract payment rather than to punish’

Judges:

Kennedy LJ

Citations:

[1992] RA 309

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedChild Maintenance and Enforcement Commission v Gibbons; Same v Karoonian CA 30-Oct-2012
Non-resident parents in each case appealed against suspended orders of imprisonment for non-payment of child support. They argued that the procedures used were indistinguishable from those held to be human rights non-compliant in Mubarak.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Magistrates

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.509335

Regina v St Pancras Assessment Committee: 1877

Lush J said: ‘It is not easy to give an accurate and exhaustive definition of the word ‘occupier’. Occupation includes possession as its primary element, but it also includes something more. Legal possession does not of itself constitute an occupation. The owner of a vacant house is in possession, and may maintain trespass against anyone who invades it, but as long as he leaves it vacant he is not rateable for it as an occupier. If, however, he furnishes it, and keeps it ready for habitation whenever he pleases to go to it, he is an occupier, though he may well reside in it one day in a year.’ and ‘Thus a transient temporary holding of land is not enough to make the holding rateable. It must be an occupation which has in it a character of permanence; a holding as a settler not as a wayfarer’.

Judges:

Lush J

Citations:

[1877] 2 QBD 581

Rating

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.451844

Camden London Borough Council v Herwald: 1978

Occupation of part of a hereditament by someone who retains legal possession of the whole and whose occupation of the part fulfils the description in the rating list, amounts to rateable occupation of the whole.

Citations:

[1978] QB 626

Cited by:

CitedNorth Somerset District Council v Honda Motor Europe Ltd and Others QBD 2-Jul-2010
Delayed Rates Claims Service made them Defective
The council claimed that the defendants were liable for business rates. The defendants said that the notices were defective in not having been served ‘as soon as practicable’, and further that they should not be enforced since the delay had created . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.420226

Caffoor v Columbo Income Tax Commissioner: PC 1961

Taxation and rating decisions are sui generis. Lord Radcliffe said: ‘The critical thing is that the dispute which alone can be determined by any decision given in the course of these proceedings is limited to one subject only, the amount of the assessable income for the year in which the assessment is challenged. It is only the amount of that assessable income that is concluded by an agreement or by a decision on an appeal against it (see section 75). Although, of course, the process of arriving at the necessary decision is likely to involve consideration of questions of law, turning upon the construction of the Ordinance or of other statutes or upon the general law, and the tribunal will have to form its view on those questions, all these questions have to be treated as collateral or incidental to what is the only issue that is truly submitted to determination (cf Reg v Hutchings).’ and ‘It may be that the principles applied in these cases form a somewhat anomalous branch of the general law of estoppel per rem judicatam, and are not easily derived from or transferred to other branches of litigation in which such estoppels have to be considered; but in their Lordships opinion they are well established in their own field, and it is not by any means to be assumed that the result is one that should be regretted in the public interest.’

Judges:

Lord Radcliffe

Citations:

[1961] AC 584

Cited by:

CitedMatalan Retail Ltd v Revenue and Customs ChD 5-Aug-2009
The taxpayer imported swimwear for sale. The respondent had incorrectly indicated that such swimwear had one classification. The claimant sought to prevent the respondent reclassifying the goods, saying that they had made given binding tariff . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Commonwealth, Taxes Management, Rating

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.372324

The Company of Ironmongers v Naylor And Others: 1793

If an Act of Parliament impose a duty on ‘all houses and edifices whatsoever,’ with directions on non-payment to distrain, houses in the possession of a corporation, though unfinished, arid never occupied by any tenants whatsoever, are liable to the duty ; and the officers, on demand of payment made to, and refusal by, the corporation, may distrain as well the goods on the premises as elsewhere.

Citations:

[1793] EngR 1088, (1793) 2 Mod 185, (1793) 86 ER 1015 (B)

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Rating

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.357675

The Queen v The Inhabitants of St Marylebone: 29 May 1850

Stat. 35 G. 3, c. 73, renders the incoming and the outgoing tenant of premises in the parish of St. Marylebone liable respectively to the payment of the rates of the parish in proportion to the times of their occupation respectively. A. occupied a house in St. Marylebone for the latter part of a year, in respect of which the outgoing tenant was rated ; and A. paid the portion of the rate in respect of the time during which he occupied, but was not entered on the ratebook as occupier for any part of that time. Held, that he acquired a settlement under stat. 3 W. and M. c. 11, s. 6.

Citations:

[1850] EngR 590, (1850) 15 QB 399, (1850) 117 ER 510

Links:

Commonlii

Rating

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.297937

Commissioner of Valuation for Northern Ireland v Lurgan Borough Council: CANI 1968

The respondent local authority owned an indoor swimming pool. It claimed exemption from rates under section 2 of the 1854 Act saying that it was used exclusively for the purposes of a recreational charity under the Act of 1958.
Held: (By a majority) The ground of exemption was established. Lord MacDermott said: ‘Here, I think, there can be no doubt that in the construction, equipment and running of this hereditament the Council has provided facilities for recreation. The big question is – have these facilities been provided ‘in the interests of social welfare’? ‘Social welfare’ is a somewhat vague and uncertain expression. Taken by itself I still incline to the view I expressed in National Deposit Friendly Society Trustees v. Skegness Urban District Council, that it signifies something more than ‘social well-being’. In the present context, however, I do not think it necessary to speculate as to the precise distinction to be drawn between these two expressions as subsection (2) of section 1, though not exactly a definition, provides in effect, in my opinion, the essential elements which must be present if a state of social well-being is to amount to ‘social welfare’ as that expression is used in the section. These elements are to be drawn from paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2). By (a) the facilities must be provided with the object of improving the conditions of life for the persons for whom the facilities are primarily intended. To my mind the provision of the hereditament satisfies that requirement. The primary object, even if confined to the phraseology of the preamble to the Act of 1846, was clearly to improve the conditions of life of the inhabitants of the Borough of Lurgan and if, as I have held, this was done in a manner which enured for the benefit of the public at large, paragraph (a) would still be complied with. It is clear from the terms of the case stated that the hereditament was not only provided to improve the conditions of life for those for whom it was primarily intended, but that in fact it has done so. The full use which has been made of the hereditament since its inauguration is, I think, cogent evidence that it has filled a need in the life of the community and has added to the enjoyment of its members.
The second requirement to be satisfied is one or other of the subparagraphs of paragraph (b). Of these alternatives I am of opinion that subparagraph (i) does not apply so as to support the Council’s case. There is nothing in the case stated that I can see which shows that those benefited have need of the facilities provided by reason of any of the specific factors mentioned, ie. youth, age, infirmity or disablement, poverty or social and economic circumstances. But subparagraph (ii), on the views I have already expressed, is applicable for the facilities of the hereditament are available to the public at large.’

Judges:

Lord MacDermott LCJ

Citations:

[1968] NI 104

Statutes:

Valuation (Ireland) Amendment Act 1854 82

Jurisdiction:

Northern Ireland

Cited by:

CitedGuild v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 6-May-1992
The will left land for a sports centre to a local authority which no longer existed. If the gift was charitable, the gift would be applied cy pres, but if not it would fail and pass to the family and be subect to Inheritance Tax.
Held: A gift . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Charity

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.273194

Commissioner for Railways v Valuer-General: PC 1974

(New South Wales – Court of Appeal) The parties disputed the value of a property in the centre of Sydney beneath which there had been extensive excavations to a depth of 40 feet or more. The question was how the property was to be valued for rating purposes. The statute proceeded on the basis that it was a parcel of land that had to be valued. The Commissioner said that this meant land defined only by vertical boundaries – land usque ad coelum et ad inferos, in other words. The Valuer-General said that it was only possible to value as land that which had a recognisable connection with the surface. Otherwise it had to be valued as stratum, to which special provisions applied.
Held: The question that the Valuer-General’s argument gave rise to was whether there was a complete dichotomy between land and strata beneath it and, if so, what that dichotomy was. The statutory definition did not answer the question how, in the context of the legislation, layers defined by horizontal boundaries were to be treated. ‘It is in relation to this question’, he said, ‘that the Latin tag usque ad coelum et ad inferos has been introduced and given a prominent place in the argument.’ Lord Wilberforce said that it was unlikely that such a sweeping, unscientific and unpractical doctrine as that ‘land’ meant the whole of the space from the centre of the earth to the heavens would appeal to the common law mind.

Judges:

Lord Wilberforce

Citations:

[1974] 1 AC 328

Cited by:

CitedBernstein of Leigh (Baron) v Skyviews and General Ltd QBD 9-Feb-1977
The plaintiff complained that the defendant had flown over his and neighbouring properties and taken aerial photographs, and said that this was a gross invasion of his privacy, and that the defendant had invaded his airspace to do so. The plaintiff . .
CitedStar Energy Weald Basin Ltd and Another v Bocardo Sa SC 28-Jul-2010
The defendant had obtained a licence to extract oil from its land. In order to do so it had to drill out and deep under the Bocardo’s land. No damage at all was caused to B’s land at or near the surface. B claimed in trespass for damages. It now . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Rating

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.268226

Forrest v Overseers of Greenwich: 1858

The court was asked whether a landing stage by a river was part of the land. F. moored a barge in the Thames between high and low water mark : the moorings wera stationary, in the bed of the river; and the barge floated at high water and grounded at low water on the posts in the bed of the Thames by which it was moored, and which were in the parish of G. The barge was connected by a chain with stairs on the land, the soil of which was not the property or in the occupation of A, and which was at that point a common highway to the Thames. Moveable planks were laid from the shore on to the barge, and thence to another barge moored farther out in the Thames, and which always floated. By this means a pier was constructed which was permanently kept there and used for embarking in steam boats and landing from them ; and F, was remunerated by the parties so using ; and he had the sole controul of the pier. Held that he was rateable to the poor rate for G, as occupier of the land in the bed of the river.

Judges:

Lord Campbell

Citations:

[1858] XXI Victoria 890, [1858] EngR 249, (1858) 8 El and Bl 890, (1858) 120 ER 332

Links:

Commonlii

Cited by:

CitedChelsea Yacht and Boat Club Ltd v Pope CA 6-Apr-2000
The tenant sought to assert that he occupied a houseboat, the Dinty Moore, under a tenancy of a dwellinghouse under the 1988 Act. The claimant appealed a decision that it was.
Held: A house-boat, even though used as a dwelling, did not have . .
CitedCorey v Bristow HL 1877
The House considered the liability to be rated to the relief of the poor of the parish within which lay that part of the river where a derrick hulk was moored.
Held: Lord Hatherley said: ‘As Lord Campbell expressed it in one of the cases last . .
CitedReeves (Listing Officer) v Northrop CA 17-Apr-2013
The taxpayer had successfully challenged the entry of his houseboat in the rating list at the Valuation Tribunal, but this had been re-instated at first instance. He said that the boat, as a registered seagoing vessel was not a houseboat, and that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Rating

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.245801

Woodbury (Valuation Officer) v The Yard Arm Club Ltd: LT 1989

A vessel, The Hispaniola, was moored in the river to two steel piles called dolphins fore and aft, each embedded in the riverbed. The vessel was connected to the dolphins by steel horns which permitted it to rise and fall with the tide but prevented forward, rearward or lateral movement.
Held: But for the explicit provisions of the Act, the installation would have been rateable, even though the boat was a chattel.

Citations:

[1989] RA 381 (LT)

Statutes:

Port of London Act 1968 178(1)

Cited by:

Appeal fromWestminster City Council v Woodbury (Valuation Officer) and the Yard Arm Club Ltd CA 1-Nov-1992
A vessel, the Hispaniola was firmly fixed to moorings. The Council appealed a finding that it was exempt from inclusion in the rating list by the Act.
Held: The court found difficulty in the idea of lateral occupation by a chattel, or that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 28 April 2022; Ref: scu.181045

Smith’s Dock Co Ltd v Tynemouth Corporation: 1908

A floating dock fixed in position on a long-term basis over moorings on the riverbed could for rating purposes be treated as being in occupation of the mooring and the part of the riverbed in which it was situate.

Citations:

[1908] 1 KB 315

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedCinderella Rockerfellas Ltd v Rudd (Valuation Officer) CA 11-Apr-2003
The taxpayer appealed against a rating assessment on a barge permanently moored at a riverbank. He claimed that as a chattel, it should not be rated.
Held: The vessel was a chattel, but its occupation could be an occupation of the riverbed. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 28 April 2022; Ref: scu.181041

Anderson Grice and Co Ltd v Assessor for Angus: 1962

If a thing is by its nature movable, the mere passage of time will not make it heritable even though it is never in fact moved.

Citations:

[1962] RA 90

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedJohn Menzies and Co v The Assessor for Edinburgh 1937
When asking whether a structure on land was rateable, the court should ask first whether the subject structure belonged to a class or genus which was prima facie heritable. Scottish courts places great emphasis upon the general character of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 28 April 2022; Ref: scu.181052

Westminster City Council v Woodbury (Valuation Officer) and the Yard Arm Club Ltd: CA 1 Nov 1992

A vessel, the Hispaniola was firmly fixed to moorings. The Council appealed a finding that it was exempt from inclusion in the rating list by the Act.
Held: The court found difficulty in the idea of lateral occupation by a chattel, or that occupation by a chattel was the right test, but even if it did, the occupation of the land was exempted under the Act. Appeal dismissed.

Citations:

[1992] RA 1, [1992] RV 1, [1991] EGLR 173

Statutes:

Port of London Act 1968 178(1)

Citing:

Appeal fromWoodbury (Valuation Officer) v The Yard Arm Club Ltd LT 1989
A vessel, The Hispaniola, was moored in the river to two steel piles called dolphins fore and aft, each embedded in the riverbed. The vessel was connected to the dolphins by steel horns which permitted it to rise and fall with the tide but prevented . .

Cited by:

CitedCurzon Berkeley Ltd, Regina (on Application of) v Bliss (Valuation Officer, London Westminster Group Inland Revenue) Admn 19-Dec-2001
The appellant sought to challenge rating entries in the non-domestic rating list, by way of judicial review. The application was out of time, but proceeded as a substantial review. The applicant said the entries were incurably defective in that they . .
CitedChelsea Yacht and Boat Club Ltd v Pope CA 6-Apr-2000
The tenant sought to assert that he occupied a houseboat, the Dinty Moore, under a tenancy of a dwellinghouse under the 1988 Act. The claimant appealed a decision that it was.
Held: A house-boat, even though used as a dwelling, did not have . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating

Updated: 28 April 2022; Ref: scu.181046

Watson v Rhondda Cynon Taff County Borough Council: Admn 29 Oct 2001

The defendant owned houses subject to multiple lettings. Upon receipt of repairs enforcement notices from the authority, the use was discontinued, the notices withdrawn, and the property remained empty. They sought relief from payment of council tax. They claimed that the property remained empty as a consequence of the notice, and was therefore exempt.
Held: the particular notices had not prohibited occupation.

Judges:

Gibbs J

Citations:

Gazette 15-Nov-2001

Statutes:

Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) Order 1992 class G

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Housing, Rating

Updated: 28 April 2022; Ref: scu.166782