Regina v Braintree District Council ex parte Halls: Admn 2 Jul 1999

Where a local authority had sold a property to a tenant, and the tenant later came back to request the release from one of the covenants given on the sale, the council was free to charge an appropriate sum for that release. It was not a covenant within the deed entitling the council to make a charge, but simply that the covenant restricting the use of the plot to one private dwelling-house was entirely valid.

Judges:

Jackson J

Citations:

Times 21-Jul-1999, [1999] EWHC Admin 626

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 Part V Sch 6 Par 6

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appealed toRegina v Braintree District Council, ex parte Malcolm William Halls CA 1-Mar-2000
When selling a house to its tenant under the right to buy legislation, the council had imposed a restrictive covenant preventing the new owner developing the land by further building. The purchaser later approached the council for its release so as . .
CitedPadfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food HL 14-Feb-1968
Exercise of Ministerial Discretion
The Minister had power to direct an investigation in respect of any complaint as to the operation of any marketing scheme for agricultural produce. Milk producers complained about the price paid by the milk marketing board for their milk when . .
CitedCongreve v Secretary of State for the Home Office CA 1976
The appellant had bought his television licence when the charge was andpound;12 although the minister had already announced that it would later be increased to andpound;18. The Home Office wrote to those who had purchased their licence before the . .
CitedBromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council HL 17-Dec-1981
Councillors’ Duties replace Election Promises
Bromley complained of a supplementary precept issued by the respondent to implement a commitment, contained in an election manifesto for the election in May 1979, upon which the majority on the GLC had been elected.
Held: In making choices of . .
CitedNorglen Ltd (In Liquidation) v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd and Others; Circuit Systems Ltd (In Liquidation) and Another v Zuken-Redac HL 1-Dec-1997
An assignment of a cause of action by a company in liquidation was valid, even though the dominant purpose was to avoid having to give security for costs, and to get legal aid. In dismissing the argument that the transactions were a device to defeat . .
CitedBarclays Bank Plc v Hendricks and Another ChD 3-Nov-1995
The wife was co-owner of the family home. Her husband owed money to the bank. He separated from his wife and left the matrimonial home moving to another house owned by the wife. The bank obtained a charging order absolute against the husband’s . .
CitedCouncil of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service HL 22-Nov-1984
Exercise of Prerogative Power is Reviewable
The House considered an executive decision made pursuant to powers conferred by a prerogative order. The Minister had ordered employees at GCHQ not to be members of trades unions.
Held: The exercise of a prerogative power of a public nature . .
CitedRegina v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind HL 7-Feb-1991
The Home Secretary had issued directives to the BBC and IBA prohibiting the broadcasting of speech by representatives of proscribed terrorist organisations. The applicant journalists challenged the legality of the directives on the ground that they . .

Cited by:

Appeal fromRegina v Braintree District Council, ex parte Malcolm William Halls CA 1-Mar-2000
When selling a house to its tenant under the right to buy legislation, the council had imposed a restrictive covenant preventing the new owner developing the land by further building. The purchaser later approached the council for its release so as . .
CitedCala Homes (South) Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another CA 27-May-2011
The respondent had circularised local authorities to say that when assessing future local housing needs a proper material consideration was the proposed Localism Bill which would lead to the replacement of ‘Regional Spatial Strategies’ on which such . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Local Government, Land

Updated: 25 May 2022; Ref: scu.85140

Regina v Norfolk County Council ex parte Perry: Admn 19 Dec 1996

The period of twenty years required to establish a common under the Act was the period up to the date of the application.

Judges:

Dyson J

Citations:

[1996] EWHC Admin 385, (1996) 74 PandCR 1

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Commons Registration Act 1965

Citing:

CitedNew Windsor Corporation v Mellor CA 1975
The respondent had obtained registration of land, Bachelors’ Acre, a grassed area of land in New Windsor, now used as a car park in the register of town and village greens under the Act as a customary green. It had been used for archery in mediaeval . .
PreferredRegina v Suffolk County Council Ex Parte Steed and Steed Admn 1995
Judicial review was sought of the Council’s decision to refuse to register a park as a Town or Village Green.
Held: Carnwath J looked at the procedure to be followed by a council receiving an application for registration of commons right: ‘it . .

Cited by:

CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council and others HL 24-May-2006
Application had been made to register as a town or village green an area of land which was largely a boggy marsh. The local authority resisted the application wanting to use the land instead for housing. It then rejected advice it received from a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 25 May 2022; Ref: scu.136933

Wandsworth London Borough Council v Railtrack plc: CA 30 Jul 2001

Where the defendant land-owner was aware of a nuisance on his land, and had both the reasonable opportunity, and the means to abate it, he had a duty to abate the nuisance. It did not matter that the nuisance may have its creation in the acts of others. Here a railway bridge came to house many pigeons, encouraged, perhaps, by some local residents. The Local Authority sought to recover and was granted, the cost of controlling the mess created by the pigeons. They constituted a nuisance, and the cost of resolving the nuisance fell on the respondent land owner.

Judges:

Kennedy LJ, Chadwick LJ, Rougier J

Citations:

Times 02-Aug-2001, Gazette 27-Sep-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 1236

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromWandsworth London Borough Council v Railtrack plc QBD 2-Nov-2000
The defendant owned a bridge which attracted large numbers of feral pigeons. Although the owner was not at fault, they were held liable to contribute to the local authority’s costs of steps taken, by surfacing the bridge to deal with the nuisance. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Nuisance, Land

Updated: 25 May 2022; Ref: scu.136156

Jones v Morgan: CA 28 Jun 2001

The claimant appealed against an order refusing him enforcement an agreement for the purchase of a one half share in a property. The judge had found the agreement to be unconscionable.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The judge had wrongly attributed to the claimant an understanding of the amendments to the standard document for which there had been no evidence given. The doctrine that a mortgagee could not extract, under his charge, any collateral contract to purchase or stipulate for an option to purchase, any part of an interest in the mortgaged property, survived in English law but, that doctrine, against allowing anything to act as a clog on the equity of redemption, no longer serves a useful purpose in English law, and would be better if excised.
As to the former rule against a clog on the equity of a redemption, Chadwick LJ summarised the principles: ‘ (i) there is a rule that a mortgagee cannot as a term of the mortgage enter into a contract to purchase, or stipulate for an option to purchase, any part of or interest in the mortgaged property; (ii) the foundation of the rule is that a contract to purchase, or an option to purchase, any part of or interest in the mortgaged property, is repugnant to or inconsistent with the transaction of mortgage of which it forms part, and so must be rejected; (iii) the reason why the contract or option to purchase is repugnant to or inconsistent with the mortgage transaction is that it cannot stand with the contractual proviso for redemption or with the equitable right to redeem – the proviso for redemption (and, where the contractual date for redemption is past, the equitable right to redeem) requires the mortgagee to reconvey the mortgaged property to the mortgagor in the state in which it had been conveyed to him at the time of the mortgage; and (iv) it is essential, in any case to which the rule is said to apply, to consider whether or not the transaction is, in substance, a transaction of mortgage.’
Lord Phillips MR said: ‘the doctrine of a clog on the equity of redemption is, so it seems to me, an appendix to our law which no longer serves a useful purpose and would be better excised.’

Judges:

Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR, Pill LJ, Chadwick LJ

Citations:

Times 24-Jul-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 995, (2001) 82 P and CR DG20, [2001] NPC 104, [2001] Lloyds Rep Bank 323, [2002] 1 EGLR 125

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedPao On and Others v Lau Yiu Long and Others PC 9-Apr-1979
(Hong Kong) The board was asked whether a contract of guarantee had been obtained by duress.
Held: Lord Scarman said: ‘Duress, whatever form it takes, is a coercion of the will so as to vitiate consent. Their Lordships agree with the . .
CitedUniverse Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation HL 1-Apr-1981
A ship belonging to the appellants had been blacked by the defendant union. Negotiations to clear the threat resulted in payment by the appellants to a welfare fund of the defendant. The company sought its refund saying that it had been paid under . .
CitedG and C Kreglinger v The New Patagonian Meat and Cold Storage Company HL 20-Nov-1913
Mortgagor’s collateral dvantage is not a clog
The appellant woolbrokers had lent the respondent andpound;10,000 with a floating charge over its undertaking. The loan agreement provided that, for five years, the appellants would have first refusal over all sheepskins sold by the company. The . .
CitedCredit Lyonnais Bank Nederland Nv v Burch CA 20-Jun-1996
The defendant had charged her property to secure her employer’s debt. When the bank sought repossession, she said that the charge had been affected by the undue influence and that the terms of the charge were so harsh and inconscionable that a court . .
CitedCTN Cash and Carry v Gallaher CA 15-Feb-1993
The buyer paid a sum demanded by the seller who threatened otherwise to withdraw the credit facilities it provided to the buyer. The sum was not in fact due, but the demand had been made honestly. The buyer said the agreement was voidable for . .
CitedAlec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil Ltd QBD 1983
To establish that a contract was unconscionable, a party had to have made an unconscientious use of its superior position or superior bargaining power to the detriment of someone suffering from some special disability or disadvantage. This weakness . .
CitedNoakes and Co Ltd v Rice HL 17-Dec-1901
Rule Against Clog on equity of Redemption
A mortgage of a leasehold public house contained a covenant with the mortgagee, a brewery, that the mortgagor and his successors in title would not, during the continuance of the leasehold term and whether or not any money should be owing on the . .
CitedReeve v Lisle and others CA 1902
The parties had entered into a series of agreements for loans, and partnerships. The defendants resisted a request by the plaintiff to be allowed, under the agreement, into partnership on a failure to repay the loan.
Held: The appeal . .
CitedReeve v Lisle and others HL 1902
In 1896 the plaintiffs agreed to lend andpound;5,000 to the defendant to be secured by a ship mortgage (executed later), requiring that if at any time during the period of two years the plaintiffs should elect to enter into partnership with the . .
CitedBradley v Carritt HL 11-May-1903
Shares in a tea company had been mortgaged to secure a loan from a broker on terms that the mortgagor would seek to ensure that the mortgagee should thereafter have sale of the company’s teas. The mortgage contained a covenant that, if the company . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Equity, Contract, Banking

Updated: 25 May 2022; Ref: scu.136162

Delaware Mansions Limited, Flecksun Limited v The Lord Mayor and Citizens of The City of Westminster: CA 21 Jul 1999

A number of blocks of mansion flats in Maida Vale were damaged by the root action of a plane tree for which the council were responsible. The freehold in the blocks, known as Delaware Mansions, was sold by the Church Commissioners to the second appellants in 1990 for andpound;1. . The flats were subject to long leases and the first appellant company had been formed to act as the maintenance and service company for the tenants, who owned the company. The second appellant company was formed as a wholly owned subsidiary of the first appellant company.
In 1989, there were reports of cracking in parts of the structure of the blocks and engineers were instructed on behalf of the first appellants. The engineers submitted a brief report and this was followed by further investigation. At a time after the second appellants had become freeholders, the appellants’ expert opinion was disclosed to the council. The engineers believed, as the judge put it, that ‘either the tree should be felled or the property should be underpinned’. The cost of remedial work if the tree had been felled was very small and, it is common ground, can be ignored for present purposes. The removal of the tree would have ended the nuisance. Thr court was asked whether the Council was liable in uisance.

Judges:

Beldam, Pill, Thorpe LJJ

Citations:

[1999] EWCA Civ 1903, 68 Con LR 172, (2000) 32 HLR 664, [2000] BLR 1, [1999] 46 EG 194, [1999] 3 EGLR 68

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal fromDelaware Mansions Limited and others v Lord Mayor and Citizens of the City of Westminster HL 25-Oct-2001
The landowner claimed damages for works necessary to remediate damage to his land after encroachment of tree roots onto his property.
Held: The issue had not been properly settled in English law. The problem was to be resolved by applying a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Negligence, Nuisance

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.135827

Ronald and John Popely and Another v D G Scott (Kent County Council): Admn 21 Dec 2000

This was an appeal by way of case stated. The appellants were alleged to have offered timeshare contracts without notification of cancellation rights. A director claimed he was unfit to attend, but the trial proceeded in his absence. He had, the day before, attended a conference with counsel.
Held: Given the medical evidence before them, the magistrates should undoubtedly have allowed an adjournment. The schemes had been constructed so that the purchaser bought shares in a company rather than simply a timeshare. However the magistrates were correct to conclude that this was a timeshare agreement dressed as a share agreement. The magistrates had not effectively considered the opinions of counsel obtained by the respondent and which were capable of establishing a due diligence defence.

Judges:

Lord Justice Rose And The Hon Mrs Justice Rafferty

Citations:

[2000] EWHC Admin 441

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Timeshare Act 1992, Magistrates Courts Act 1980 8 11

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedRegina v Bolton Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Merna; Regina v Richmond Justices, ex parte Haines 1991
The divisional court should intervene where a defendant has been deprived of a fair opportunity to present his case because of his own unavoidable absence. . .
CitedRegina v Chippenham Justices ex parte Harris QBD 28-Jan-1994
. .
CitedRegina v Birmingham City Magistrates’ Court ex parte David Frank Booth Admn 12-May-1999
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Magistrates, Consumer, Land

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.135629

Fraser and Another v Canterbury Diocesan Board Of Finance (No 1): CA 24 Nov 2000

A grant of land was made under the 1841 Act in 1872 (after the 1870 Act) and the school had in 1874 been transferred to a school board under section 23 of the 1870 Act. The school closed permanently in 1992. The issue was whether reverter had occurred in 1874, with the result that the claim of those interested under the reverter had long since become statute barred. The original grant under the 1841 Act followed the National Society standard form.

Judges:

Lord Justice Peter Gibson Lord Justice Mummery Lord Justice Latham

Citations:

Times 09-Jan-2001, Gazette 25-Jan-2001, [2001] Ch 669, [2000] EWCA Civ 460

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

School Sites Act 1841

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

DisapprovedMarchant and Others v Onslow ChD 12-Nov-1993
School site reverts to original grantors when land is not part of an estate. . .
Appeal fromFraser and Another v Canterbury Diocesan Board of Finance ChD 22-Feb-2000
Where land had been acquired under the Act on trusts related specifically to the provision of education in accordance with a specified religion, the abandonment by the school of that purpose meant that the land reverted immediately to the original . .
ApprovedHabermehl v Attorney General 1996
Land was granted for use as a school for the education of poor persons in accordance with the principles of the National Society. In 1876 the school had become a ‘provided school’ run by a School Board under the Education Act 1870. That meant that, . .

Cited by:

CitedRector of Wrington and The Bath and Wells Diocesan Board of Finance v Jenkinson and Others ChD 26-Feb-2002
Land having been conveyed under the Act, and it no longer being needed as a school, it had to be decided to whom the land reverted.
Held: The tracing of beneficiaries had to be in the basis under section 2, that the land had never been so . .
See AlsoFraser and Another v Canterbury Diocesan Board of Finance and Another Chd 14-May-2003
The claimants sought to assert that land acquired under the 1841 Act reverted to them on its ceasing to be used for the purposes of a school. Lewison J summarised the evidence: ‘An analysis of the school registers for 1931 to 1947 shows that the . .
CitedFraser and Another v Canterbury Diocesan Board of Finance and others HL 27-Oct-2005
Land had been acquired by a deed under the 1841 Act, but had in 1995 ceased to be used as a school ‘for the education of children and adults of the labouring manufacturing and other poorer classes . . And for no other purpose ‘. Under the Act, the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Education, Land, Limitation, Land

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.135660

Markfield Investments Ltd v Evans: CA 9 Nov 2000

The claimants were paper owners of land occupied by the defendant. The claimant said the acquiescence had been interrupted by an abortive court action by the claimant’s predecessor in title.
Held: With regard to any particular action the relevant time, and the only relevant time, for consideration of adverse possession is that which has expired before such action is brought. A letter and separate action could not found a claim. Appeal dismissed.

Judges:

Lord Justice Simon Brown Lord Justice Mummery And Lord Justice Latham

Citations:

[2000] EWCA Civ 281, [2001] 1 WLR 1321

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedMount Carmel Investments Limited v Peter Thurlow Limited CA 1988
The court considered a defence to an assertion of adverse possession, that the plaintiff had given notice of his intention to recover the land: ‘no one, either lawyer or non-lawyer, would think that a householder ceases to be in possession of his . .
CitedSt Marylebone Property Co Ltd v Fairweather HL 16-Apr-1962
To defeat a defence of adverse possession, the plaintiff must succeed in an action which itself had been commenced within the twelve year period. A squatter does not succeed to the title that he has disturbed: by sufficiently long adverse possession . .

Cited by:

CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.135672

J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Caroline Graham and Another: CA 6 Feb 2001

Where a tenant under a grazing license had stayed over after the end of the tenancy, and had been refused a renewed licence, and had continued to graze the land for over twelve years, the mere overstaying was not enough to evidence an animus possidendi, an intention to assert an interest contrary to that of the owner. The original relationship had envisaged continued use until the land would receive planning permission. The claim for possession by the original owners succeeded.
Mummery LJ said that Article 1 did not impinge on the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act 1980, which did not deprive a person of his possessions or interfere with his peaceful enjoyment of them but only deprived a person of his right of access to the courts for the purpose of recovering property if he had delayed the institution of his legal proceedings for 12 years or more after being dispossessed by another. The extinction of the applicants’ title was not a deprivation of possessions nor a confiscatory measure for which payment of compensation would be appropriate, but a logical and pragmatic consequence of the barring of the right to bring an action after the expiration of the limitation period. Any deprivation was justified in the public interest, the conditions laid down in the 1980 Act being reasonably required to avoid the risk of injustice in the adjudication of stale claims and as ensuring certainty of title: those conditions were not disproportionate, the period of 12 years being reasonable and not imposing an excessively difficult burden on the landowner.
Lord Justice Keene started from the assumption that limitation periods were in principle not incompatible with the Convention and that the process whereby a person would be barred from enforcing rights by the passage of time was clearly acknowledged by the Convention. This position obtained, in his view, even though limitation periods both limited the right of access to the courts and in some circumstances had the effect of depriving persons of property rights, whether real or personal, or of damages: there was thus nothing inherently incompatible as between the 1980 Act and Article 1 of the Protocol.

Judges:

Mummery, Keene LJJ, Sir Martin Nourse

Citations:

Gazette 22-Feb-2001, Times 13-Feb-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 117, [2001] Ch 804, [2001] 2 WLR 1293, (2001) 82 P and CR DG1, [2001] 18 EG 176, [2001] 2 EGLR 69, (2001) 82 P and CR 23, [2001] HRLR 27, [2001] 7 EGCS 161, [2001] NPC 29

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 15 38 Sch 8 paras 1 and 8, European Convention on Human Rights 1

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromJ A Pye and Another v Graham and Another ChD 14-Mar-2000
The fact alone of being prepared to take a licence of land would not defeat an application for adverse possession, but a request for a licence would be relevant. The adverse possession commenced from the time when the licence expired, given that a . .

Cited by:

Appeal fromJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
CitedMalekshad v Howard De Walden Estates Limited CA 23-May-2001
The applicant sought the leasehold enfranchisement of two leasehold properties. They were contained in separate leases, but the property had been treated as one for some time. A part of one property extended under part of the other. The claim was . .
CitedJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another CA 6-Feb-2001
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused. . .
At Court of AppealJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Nov-2005
The claimants had been the registered proprietors of land, they lost it through the adverse possession of former tenants holding over. They claimed that the law had dispossessed them of their lawful rights.
Held: The cumulative effect of the . .
CitedMann Aviation Group (Engineering) Ltd v Longmint Aviation Ltd and Another ChD 19-Aug-2011
Administrators of the claimant company asserted that the company had held informal leases of two hangars owned by the defendant, and also complained of their transfer at an undervalue. The first defendant said that the occupations were under license . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation, Human Rights

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.135590

Rodway v Landy: CA 4 Apr 2001

Two doctors in partnership held and occupied premises under a trust of land. After the break up of the partnership and practice into two, they sought to decide what was to happen to the premises. Rules would prevent the sale of the property. The building leant itself to a division under which one party could practice from one part, and the other from the other. The judge ordered accordingly, with additional conditions. On appeal the court confirmed the order. The Act allowed the trustees to restrict occupation of some parts of the land subject to the trust, by one or more beneficiaries. The court could also order the beneficiaries to contribute to the costs of the adaptation.

Citations:

Times 18-Apr-2001, Gazette 01-Jun-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 471

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 13(1) 14

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Trusts, Land

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.135512

Dear v Reeves: CA 1 Mar 2001

A right of pre-emption granted over land was property. It had value and was capable of assignment, and was therefore a chose in action. As such it was vested the trustee in bankruptcy on the insolvency of the owner of the right. It may be difficult to value, and might not become exercisable, but it remained property.

Citations:

Times 22-Mar-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 277

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Insolvency Act 1986 436

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Insolvency

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.135547

Trevelyan (On Behalf Of Himself and The Ramblers Association) v The Secretary of State for The Environment, Transport and The Regions: CA 23 Feb 2001

An inspector, determining an application to remove a public bridleway from the definitive map, and where there was evidence only of use by foot, was right to start from the presumption that, if a right of way was shown on the definitive map, it was correctly registered. Nevertheless, where there had been no evidence to support the registration, it could be treated as registered in error. Correction of the register was possible by ordering deletion of the bridleway, subject to substitution by a footpath.

Judges:

Lord Phillips MR, Simon Brown LJ, Longmore LJ

Citations:

Times 15-Mar-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 266, [2001] 2 PLR 45, [2001] 1 WLR 1264, [2001] NPC 41, [2001] 3 All ER 166

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 53 Sch 15

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromJohn Trevelyan (Suing on Behalf of Himself and All Other Members of Ramblers Association) v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions Admn 24-Jan-2000
An inspector determining an application to remove a public bridleway from the definitive map, where there was evidence only of use by foot, was right to start from the presumption that, if a right of way was shown on the definitive map, it was . .

Cited by:

Appealed toJohn Trevelyan (Suing on Behalf of Himself and All Other Members of Ramblers Association) v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions Admn 24-Jan-2000
An inspector determining an application to remove a public bridleway from the definitive map, where there was evidence only of use by foot, was right to start from the presumption that, if a right of way was shown on the definitive map, it was . .
CitedErnstbrunner v Manchester City Council and Another Admn 16-Dec-2009
The appellant challenged by case stated a refusal of the Crown Court to order removal of a gate which he said obstructed a public footpath. The land-owner had persuaded the magistrates that the gate was not on the line of the footpath. The claimant . .
CitedKotarski and Another v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Admn 13-May-2010
The applicant sought to challenge an enquiry resulting in the confirmation of of a public right of way across his land. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.135554

Johnston v O’Neill: HL 14 Jul 1911

An exclusive right was claimed to the eel-fishing over the whole of Lough Neagh, a large navigable non-tidal inland lough in Ireland by the holders of a long lease, who were in right of a title to the fishings conferred by the Crown in 1661. The title of the Crown had been previously affirmed in certain inquisitions. The claimants and their authors produced some leases of the fishings in the lough, and proved occasional payments made in respect thereof at various dates since the date of the Crown grant. It was proved in defence, and not disputed, that the public had for centuries fished for eels habitually and continuously in the lough as of right. Judgment in favour of the lessees was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ireland (Sir S. Walker, L.C., Fitzgibbon and Holmes, L.JJ). The defendants appealed.
Held: Held that the public cannot prescribe a right of fishing in inland non-tidal waters, and ( diss. the Lord Chancellor, Lords Shaw and Robson) that the claimants had sufficiently established their title to the exclusive enjoyment of the fishings notwithstanding the continuous practice of fishing by the public.
Per Lord Macnaghten-‘The Crown is not of common right entitled to the soil or waters of an inland non-tidal lake. No right can exist in the public to fish in the waters of an inland non-tidal lake.’
Per Lord Dunedin-‘The public cannot have a right to the fishing in question. The Crown may have had a right to it when it granted the patent. The only competitor to the Crown and its patentee must be some other private owner or owners, corporation or quasi-corporation.’

Judges:

Lord Chancellor (Loreburn), the Earl of Halsbury, Lords Ashbourne, Macnaghten, Dunedin, Shaw, and Robson

Citations:

[1911] UKHL 638

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Agriculture

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.619210

Palliser v Revenue and Customs Re Wedderburn Road: UTLC 16 Mar 2018

Inheritance Tax – valuation under s160 Inheritance Tax Act 1984 – maisonette – whether hope value for extension to be taken into account – analysis of comparables – value of appellant’s undivided share determined at pounds 1,603,930 – appeal allowed in part

Citations:

[2018] UKUT 71 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Inheritance Tax Act 1984 160

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Inheritance Tax

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.606889

In Re Section 14, (D) of The Land Compensation Act 1961: UTLC 8 Mar 2018

COMPENSATION – compulsory purchase – preliminary issue – ransom value – scheme highway – whether section 14(5)(d) of the Land Compensation Act 1961 engaged so as to prevent the assumption of planning permission – determined not so engaged

Citations:

[2018] UKUT 62 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Land Compensation Act 1961

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.606887

Drummond and Another v Bastow and Others Re Cedar Lawn: UTLC 9 Mar 2018

Restrictive Covenant – Modification : Costs – – garden land with planning consent for additional residential dwelling – restriction preventing construction of more than one house per plot – building scheme – whether covenant secures practical benefits of substantial value or advantage – held it did not – exercise of discretion – application under ground (aa) allowed – Law of Property Act 1925 s.84(1)(aa)

Citations:

[2018] UKUT 8 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 84(1)(aa)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.606886

Holden, Re Ash Lodge: UTLC 19 Jan 2018

UTLC Restrictive Covenant – Discharge – residential garage converted and used as a dog-grooming parlour – restrictions preventing business use and advertising – whether restrictions obsolete – whether any injury to beneficiaries – Tribunal’s discretion to order modification with conditions – s84, Law of Property Act 1925

Citations:

[2018] UKUT 21 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 84

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.603251

Chand v Calmore Area Housing Association Ltd: LT 25 Jul 2008

LT LANDLORD AND TENANT- Service Charges – Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 as amended ss 18 and 19 – Housing Act 1988 ss 13 and 14 – Assured non-shorthold periodic tenancy -whether the landlord’s ability (subject to any reference to a Rent Assessment Committee) to serve a yearly notice of increase of rent (which included a service charge) brought the payments for services within s.18(1) of the 1985 Act.

Citations:

[2008] EWLands LRX – 170 – 2007

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 22 May 2022; Ref: scu.278606

Rowley and Another v Secretary of State for Transport Local Government and the Regions: Admn 24 May 2002

The inspector after holding an inquiry had confirmed the decision of the county council to make an order modifying the definitive map by the inclusion of a footpath over the objectors’ land.
Held: The decision by the Secretary of State (through the inspector) to confirm the county council’s order was made contrary to law. He quashed the confirmation of the order ‘with the consequence that the modification of the definitive plan and statement resulting from that confirmation shall not take effect.’

Judges:

Elias J

Citations:

[2002] EWHC 1040 (Admin), [2003] 2 PandCR 27

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHicks Developments Ltd v Chaplin and others ChD 5-Feb-2007
The defendants had succeeded in an application before the Land Registry adjudicator for a strip of land adjoining their property to be registered in their name after a finding that they had successfully established a claim by adverse possession. The . .
CitedJones v Welsh Assembly Government Admn 15-Dec-2008
The County Council had made an order under section 53, establishing a footpath over the claimant’s land. The land owner now appealed. The court had previously quashed the inspector’s decision on the basis that he had not allowed for the interruption . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 22 May 2022; Ref: scu.172262

Applegarth v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and Regions: Admn 28 Jun 2001

The landowner challenged an order under the 1981 Act.
Held: the inspector’s decision was upheld.
However, a different inspector at an earlier inquiry had concluded that the modifying order should not be confirmed. That decision had been challenged by the county council before Carnwath J who had made an order by consent quashing the decision so that the question of confirmation of the order therefore fell to be redetermined by the Secretary of State. The objector and the county council had agreed to proceed before the second inspector by way of written representations rather than by public inquiry. Munby J referred to the relief which he had jurisdiction to grant. He said: ‘I should make clear the nature of the court’s function. [The objector] does not have a right to ‘appeal’ to the High Court. Paragraph 12 of Schedule 15 to the 1981 Act gives him, as a ‘person aggrieved’ a right to ‘make an application to the High Court’. The effect of paragraphs 12(2) and 12(3) is that I cannot interfere, whatever my own view of the merits of [the objector’s] contentions might be, unless I am ‘satisfied’ either (i) that the modification order made by [the council] on x. is not within the powers of sections 53 and 54 of the Act or (ii) that [the objector’s] interests have been ‘substantially prejudiced’ by a failure to comply with the requirements of Schedule 15. Even if I am so satisfied my only power is to ‘quash’ the modification order in whole or part. It follows that I have no power to grant [the objector] any declaration or other relief.’

Judges:

Munby J

Citations:

[2001] EWHC Admin 487

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedJones v Welsh Assembly Government Admn 15-Dec-2008
The County Council had made an order under section 53, establishing a footpath over the claimant’s land. The land owner now appealed. The court had previously quashed the inspector’s decision on the basis that he had not allowed for the interruption . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 22 May 2022; Ref: scu.140340

Greene v Chelsea Borough Council: CA 1954

Lord Denning MR said: ‘Knowledge or notice of the danger is only a defence when the plaintiff is free to act upon that knowledge or notice so as to avoid the danger’.

Judges:

Lord Denning MR

Citations:

[1954] 2 QBD 127

Cited by:

CitedRoles v Nathan CA 15-May-1963
Two chimney sweeps were overcome by fumes, and died in the basement of the Manchester Assembly Rooms. Whilst occupied working in flues (against advice), a boiler had been lit.
Held: (Majority – Pearson LJ dissenting) The land-owner’s appeal . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Land, Negligence

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.568158

Woolls v Powling: CA 9 Mar 1999

A plan attached to a conveyance for identification purposes only’ could still be used, when clear, to determine just where the boundary lay. If the transfer is clear, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to clarify the precise boundary.
The combined expressions used in a conveyance to import a plan ‘for identification purposes only’ and ‘more particularly identified on’ were used. The judge had admitted extrinsic evidence, that is oral evidence, as to discussions between the parties regarding the boundary wall prior to the conveyance.
Held: the appeal was allowed. The plan did not conflict with the description of the property in the conveyance and so the judge had been in error in admitting this extrinsic evidence.

Citations:

Times 09-Mar-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 751

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedGrigsby v Melville CA 6-Jul-1973
The seller had owned two adjoing properties. He sold one off to the plaintiff, describing it in the conveyance as ‘all that dwellinghouse’. A cellar under the part sold off had access only from the retained property, but contained supports for the . .
CitedScarfe v Adams CA 1981
Transfer deeds for a sale of land did not define the boundary but referred to a plan which was held to be too small to show a precise boundary. The only other element of the parcels clause was that it was land adjoining Pyle Manor and that it was . .

Cited by:

CitedPennock and Another v Hodgson CA 27-Jul-2010
In a boundary dispute, the judge had found a boundary, locating it by reference to physical features not mentioned in the unambigous conveyance.
Held: The judge had reiterated but not relied upon the statement as to the subjective views of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.90598

United Bank of Kuwait Plc v Sahib and Others: CA 2 Feb 1996

The bank appealed against a decision that the simple deposit of deeds with a bank did not take effect as an equitable charge.
Held: Depositing deeds with a bank is not sufficient to create a charge over them. The old law as to the creation of an equitable mortgage by deposit of deeds had been akin to part performance, and was therefore equally inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1989 Act. The rule was in essence that the deposit implied that contract had been created: ‘The deposit by way of security is treated both as prima facie evidence of a contract to mortgage, and as part performance of that contract.’ Phillips LJ said: ‘The clear intent of section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 is to introduce certainty in relation to contracts for the disposition of interests in land where uncertainty existed before. Section 2(5) contains a list of contracts expressly excluded from the operation of the section. I can see no basis for implying a further exclusion in respect of contracts for the grant of a mortgage which are secured by a deposit of title deeds.’

Judges:

Peter Gibson, Leggatt, Phillips LJJ

Citations:

Times 13-Feb-1996, [1997] Ch 107, [1996] EWCA Civ 1308, [1996] 3 WLR 372, [1996] 3 All ER 215

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 2, Statute of Frauds 1677 4, Law of Property Act 1925 40

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromUnited Bank of Kuwait Plc v Sahib and Others ChD 24-Jun-1994
The customer had deposited title deeds with the bank as security for a loan, but no deed of charge had been executed.
Held: The mere deposit of title deeds does not create an equitable charge without more. The 1989 Act operated as a statutory . .
CitedDearle v Hall 1828
. .
CitedRussel v Russel 16-May-1783
. .
CitedRussel v Russel 16-May-1783
. .
CitedIn Re Wallis and Simmonds (Builders) Ltd ChD 1974
The deposit of title documents, without more, gives rise to an inference that the deposit was intended by the parties to operate as creating an equitable charge or mortgage over the property whose title document is deposited. In logic there could be . .
CitedSteadman v Steadman HL 1976
A mere payment of a sum of money might amount to an act of part performance, as might the act of a purchaser instructing solicitors to prepare and submit a draft conveyance or transfer, so as to leave asituation capable of enforcement in equity. . .
CitedIn Re Alton Corporation 1985
Sir Robert Megarry V-C, said in relation to a loan accompanied by the deposit of title deeds: ‘I have to remember that the basis of an equitable mortgage is the making of an agreement to create a mortgage, with the deposit of the land certificate . .
CitedMaddison v Alderson HL 1883
The requirement of the doctrine of part performance is that the acts of part performance relied upon must be ‘referable’ to the contract sued on. The principle underlying the doctrine of part performance was expressed by Lord Selborne: ‘In a suit . .
CitedIn Re Beetham, Ex parte Broderick QBD 1886
The Court considered whether certain facts were sufficient to establish an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Cave J said: ‘The law on the subject . . forms a branch of the equitable doctrine of the specific performance of oral contracts . .
CitedE R Ives Investments Ltd v High CA 14-Dec-1966
One exception to the requirement that an easement must be granted by a deed is that if permission to enjoy a right, capable of constituting an easement, is given by the landowner in terms likely to lead, and that do lead, the beneficiary of the . .
CitedHodgson v Marks CA 12-Mar-1971
The plaintiff had transferred her house to her lodger, expressing it to be for her love and affection for him. The judge at first instance had held that the true intention of the plaintiff had been that she would continue to live there as before and . .
CitedWhite and others v Vandervell Trustees Ltd. (No. 2), Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) CA 3-Jul-1974
Lord Denning MR described the modern practice concerning pleadings: ‘It is sufficient for the pleader to state the material facts. He need not state the legal result. If, for convenience, he does so, he is not bound by, or limited to, what he has . .
CitedSpiro v Glencrown Properties Ltd and Another ChD 1991
The court considered the nature of an option to buy land. Hoffman J said: ‘The granting of the option imposes no obligation upon the purchaser and an obligation upon the vendor which is contingent upon the exercise of the option. When the option is . .
CitedAshburn Anstalt v Arnold (2) CA 25-Feb-1988
Various leases of properties had been granted. Legal and General occupied the property under an arrangement under which they paid no rent. The landlord sought possession, saying that the agreements were licences not tenancies because of the absence . .

Cited by:

CitedYaxley v Gotts and Another CA 24-Jun-1999
Oral Agreement Creating Proprietory Estoppel
The defendant offered to give to the Plaintiff, a builder, the ground floor of a property in return for converting the house, and then managing it. They were friends, and the oral offer was accepted. The property was then actually bought in the name . .
CitedJones and Another v Forest Fencing Limited CA 21-Nov-2001
The sellers of and disputed an order as to whether electrical equipment at the site hd been included in the contract.
Held: ‘the answer to the question ‘what meaning should be given to the words used in the memorandum’ cannot, I think, be a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Banking

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.90067

Selby District Council v Samuel Smith Old Brewery Ltd: CA 15 Jun 2000

The council conveyed land to the brewery, with an option to re-purchase it. On exercising the option, the brewery asserted rights over the land, by way of easement acquired during its ownership. These were rejected by the court. The intention of the option, was that the land should be reconveyed in the same condition. The Law Society contract condition was not intended to disregard any connection between the fictional and actual conveyance, which in any event were to be deemed to have occurred on the same day. The court had regard to the circumstances existing at the time of the bargain to infer the common intention that the parties were to be restored to their previous positions, and accordingly held that the rights reserved were only the established easements at the date of the grant.

Citations:

Gazette 15-Jun-2000, (2000) 80 P and CR 466, [2000] EWCA Civ 182

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedP and S Platt Ltd v Crouch and Another CA 25-Jul-2003
The claimant sought a declaration that certain easements had been included by implication in a conveyance of part of land to him.
Held: Since the easements were capable of subsisting at law, and existed as quasi-easements at the time, and did . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.89163

Secured Residential Funding plc v Douglas Goldberg Hendeles and Co (a Firm): CA 19 Apr 2000

Two linked companies were in business from the same premises lending money on mortgage. A loan from one company was made but supported only by documentation in the name of the other. The error was noticed, but new documents not prepared until after completion. In possession proceedings, the lender had to show that the money had been advanced by its associate as its agent. The operative date was the date on which the mortgage advance was made, not on completion.

Citations:

Times 26-Apr-2000, Gazette 25-May-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 144

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Agency, Land, Legal Professions

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.89148

Solartrack Plc v London Development Agency: UTLC 26 Jul 2012

COMPENSATION – compulsory purchase – disturbance – claim for temporary loss of profits, extinguishment of goodwill and consequential losses – whether compensation to be based on extinguishment or cost of notional relocation – whether claimant company would have been profitable in absence of CPO and if so to what extent – compensation awarded pounds 72,500.

Citations:

[2012] UKUT 158 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.463434

Coudrier and Others v Secretary of State for Transport: UTLC 1 Apr 2010

COMPENSATION – compulsory purchase – tubes of subsoil acquired for Channel Tunnel Rail Link – determination of compensation where no communication possible with claimants or where claimants have agreed compensation but not completed conveyance – held nominal amount of pounds 50 payable as no market for acquired property

Citations:

[2010] UKUT 92 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.415013

Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Burrows and Simms: CA 1990

The conclusive character of the definitive map and statement is not intended to preclude the duty of the local authority to modify them where proper. If evidence came to light to show that a mistake had been made in drawing up the definitive map, then such a mistake could be corrected in either of the three ways envisaged in Section 53(3)(c) of the 1981 Act. The objective of these provisions was to ensure that the definitive map provided as accurate a picture as possible of the relevant rights of way.
Purchas LJ said: ‘It would, in my judgment, be strange indeed if the detailed and extensive provisions of section 53 were to be inhibited in important or material respects from achieving an accurate up-to-date record. This would be particularly so if, notwithstanding the discovery of new evidence, an error which had been detected on the definitive map or in the statement would nevertheless be perpetuated.’
He sought to reconcile sections 53 and 56, saying that section 56 applies generally, but not such as to inhibit a review under section 53: ‘There is no difficulty in reconciling sections 53 and 56 of the Act 1981 once the comparatively restricted purpose of the legislation as a whole is understood, namely the preparation and maintenance of an authoritative record in the form of a definitive map and statement . . Parliament never removed the duty to revise and keep the record up to date so that not only changes caused by supervening events . . These should be taken into account in order to produce the most reliable evidence that can be achieved.’
Glidewell LJ said: ‘There are two alternative ways in which the deletion and downgrading provisions in section 53(3) may be reconciled with the provisions of section 56. The first is that adopted by Taylor J in Rubinstein’s case, 57 P and CR 111, namely by treating section 56 as pre-eminent and as limiting the operation of section 53(3). The alternative course is to interpret section 56 as not applying to the review process in section 53 at all so that the review starts from what is shown in the definitive map, but does not for its purposes treat the definitive map as conclusive. For all other purposes within the limits laid down by section 56(1) the definitive map is conclusive. In particular it is conclusive evidence in any dispute that may arise between a landowner . . and . .[users] . .’

Judges:

Glidewell LJ, Purchas LJ

Citations:

[1991] 2 QB 354, [1990] 3 All ER 490

Statutes:

Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 56

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

OverruledRubinstein v Secretary of State for the Environment 1987
Because of the conclusive nature of inclusion of a right of way on the definitive map as at the relevant date, Section 53(3)(c)(iii) could only involve consideration of evidence relating to matters after the relevant date, for example the physical . .

Cited by:

CitedKotarski and Another v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Admn 13-May-2010
The applicant sought to challenge an enquiry resulting in the confirmation of of a public right of way across his land. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.392870

Fisher v Walker, Cooper v Walker: 16 Jun 1862

The defendant occupied a house adjoining to a public street, with a cellar belonging to it, which cellar had existed before the defendant had anything in the house, The mouth of this cellar opened into the footway of the street by a trap door. During the day this trap door was open, but at night it was closed by a flap, which slightly projected above the footway, and it had so projected as long as living memory went back, The plaintiff, coming along the footway at night, stumbled over this flap, fell, and sustained injury, for which he brought an action.
Held: that the jury ought to draw the conclusion that the cellar flap had existed as long as the street, and that the dedication of the way to the public was with the cellar flap in it, and subject to its being continued there; and, therefore, that the defendant was not liable, as the maintenance of such an ancient cellar flap was not unlawful.

Citations:

[1862] EngR 814 (A), (1862) 2 B and S 770

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Personal Injury

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.286980

Parochial Church Council of the Parish Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Warwickshire v Wallbank: ChD 5 Feb 2007

The defendants, had been found liable as owners of land which made them lay rectors of the local parish church, were called upon to contribute to the costs of repair of the church. They argued that the duty extended only to keeping it wind and watertight.
Held: The duty was a duty to keep the church in proper repair.

Judges:

Lewison J

Citations:

Times 21-Feb-2007

Statutes:

Chancel Repairs Act 1932 2(3)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedWise v Metcalfe 1829
The responsibility of a lay rector to his church was to keep it into substantial repair but without ornament. . .
CitedPell v Addison 1860
Extent of lay rector’s duty of repair of the parish church. . .
See AlsoParochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, Warwickshire v Wallbank and another HL 26-Jun-2003
Parish Councils are Hybrid Public Authorities
The owners of glebe land were called upon as lay rectors to contribute to the cost of repairs to the local church. They argued that the claim was unlawful by section 6 of the 1998 Act as an act by a public authority incompatible with a Convention . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.253500

Peskett v Portsmouth City Council: CA 25 Jun 2002

The defendant had land across which a path ran. It had a right angled turn, and users cutting across wore away the land causing a dip, where the claimant tripped and fell. She claimed damages. The council accepted that the short cut was regularly taken, but said there had been no previous incidents or complaints, and appealed a finding of 50% liability for contributory negligence.
Held: The judge had been entitled to apportion liability as he had. The council had not been free to assume users would always succeed in avoiding the dangers. All such cases fall to be determined on their own facts.

Judges:

Lords Justice Pill and Potter

Citations:

Gazette 04-Jul-2002, [2002] EWCA Civ 1175

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Occupiers Liabilities Acts 1957, Occupiers Liabilities Acts 1984

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Personal Injury

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.217313

Conservators of the River Thames v Smeed Dean and Co: CA 1897

The erection of a lock or pound lock otherwise than for the maintenance or improvement of navigation would be ultra vires by a Navigation Authority and in all likelihood a nuisance. Chitty LJ said: ‘The Conservators are a statutory body brought into existence for the purpose of preserving, improving and maintaining the navigation of the River Thames . . but the powers granted to them by the 1894 Act are all subservient thereto and except for these purposes no powers are granted to them at all.’ The court discussed the meaning of the word ‘bed’ as to the bed of the river. ‘bed’ in the context of a tidal and non-tidal river meant: ‘. . the soil or ground which is covered by water in the ordinary course of nature – the ground over which the water flows or on which it lies.’

Judges:

Chitty LJ, Smith LJ

Citations:

[1897] 2 QB 334

Statutes:

Thames Conservancy Act 1894

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRowland v The Environment Agency ChD 19-Dec-2002
Public rights of Navigation have since time immemorial at common law existed over the Thames including (unless and until extinguished or ceasing to be exercisable) Hedsor Water. The claimant sought a declaration that rights of navigation over that . .
CitedJones, Regina (on the Application Of) v The Environment Agency Admn 13-Jul-2005
The Environment Agency sought to persuade the claimants that they must pay for licences for their moorings for craft on the Thames. The boat owners said that they had placed poles in the banks for many years, and that because the moorings were not . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Utilities

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.187537

Hector v Lyons: 1988

The appellant contracted to buy a house but used his under-aged son’s name. He sought specific performance when the vendor failed to complete.
Held: Since he was neither the purchaser nor the purchaser’s agent, specific performance was refused. In unilateral mistake case goods are sold by V, to P, believing P to be X. P may fraudulently represent that he is X. In a face to face sale, the fact that V mistakes the identity of X does not render the contract void for mistake. It is a unilateral mistake as to a quality of the purchaser; only in cases where the identity of the purchaser is of direct and important materiality in inducing the vendor to enter into the contract is a mistake of that kind capable of avoiding the contract. Those principles have no application where the contract is wholly in writing. The identity of the parties is established by the names put in the contract. Once there, the court’s only task is to identify who they are. ‘In the present case the deputy judge has found as a fact that the party named in the written contract was Mr. Hector junior. It follows, in my judgment, that in the absence of rectification, which has not been claimed, or Mr. Cogley’s alternative argument based on agency the only person who can enforce that contract is the party to it, namely Mr. Hector junior.’

Judges:

Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C

Citations:

(1988) 58 PandCR 156

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedLewis v Averay CA 22-Jul-1971
A private seller had parted with his car in return for a worthless cheque to a rogue who persuaded him that he was the well-known actor who played Robin Hood on television, and who sold it on to the defendant.
Held: ‘When two parties have come . .
CitedKing’s Norton Metal Co Ltd v Edridge Merrett and Co Ltd CA 1879
A crook ordered some brass rivet wire from a metal manufacturer. On his stationery he represented falsely that he was in business in a big way, running a large factory and having several depots and agencies. The manufacturer supplied the goods but . .

Cited by:

CitedNorman Hudson v Shogun Finance Ltd CA 28-Jun-2001
A rogue had purchased a car, using a false name to obtain finance. He had then sold it to the defendant. The finance company claimed the car back.
Held: The dealer had not taken all the steps he might have done to check the identity of the . .
CitedShogun Finance Limited v Hudson HL 19-Nov-2003
Thief acquired no title and could not sell
A purchaser used a stolen driving licence to obtain credit for and purchase a car. He then purported to sell it to the respondent, and then disappeared. The finance company sought return of the car.
Held: (Lords Nicholls and Millett . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Equity, Contract

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.188421

Margaret Ribee v Michael Norrie: CA 22 Nov 2000

An owner of a property let to tenants was liable to a neighbour injured after a fire in the property, where the fire arose in circumstances which the owner had power, through the making of rules to prevent. The damage arose from a tenant smoking in a communal area. The test was whether the owner had the right to debar such behaviour. Since he did, he must be treated as the occupier of the land for this purpose and was therefore liable to the neighbour.

Citations:

Times 22-Nov-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 275, [2001] L and TR 23

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedLMS International Ltd and others v Styrene Packaging and Insulation Ltd and others TCC 30-Sep-2005
The claimants sought damages after their premises were destroyed when a fire started in the defendants neighbouring premises which contained substantial volumes of styrofoam. They alleged this was an unnatural use of the land.
Held: To . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Land, Personal Injury

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.88772

Regina v Somerset County Council Ex Parte Fewings and Others: CA 22 Mar 1995

The local authority had accepted the argument that stag hunting was cruel and had banned it from the land it owned in the Quantocks. The ban was challenged.
Held: The ban was unlawful. The decision had been reached on moral, and not on administrative grounds. The purposes it sought to implement were not within the purposes for which the land was held, and so was invalid. As to section 120: ‘At first sight this section has little to do with the present case, since we are not dealing with the acquisition of land but with the management or use of land which the County Council acquired over 70 years ago. But the County Council is a principal council within the statutory definition; we have been referred to no statutory provision or rule of law more closely in point; any other provision, unless more specific, would be bound to require powers to be exercised for the public good; and it seems perhaps reasonable to accept that the purposes for which land may be required are or may often be those to which the land should be applied after acquisition.’ Section 120(1)(b) was the statutory authority for the power of a council to manage its land and accordingly set out the criteria by which the land was to be managed. Sir Thomas Bingham MR emphasised that it was critical to distinguish between the legal position of the private landowner and that of a landowning local authority:- ‘To the famous question asked by the owner of the vineyard (‘Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own? St Matthew, chapter 20 verse 15) the modern answer would be clear: ‘Yes, subject to such regulatory and other constraints as the law imposes’ but if the same question were posed by a local authority the answer would be different. It would be: ‘No, it is not lawful for you to do anything save what the law expressly or impliedly authorises. You enjoy no unfettered discretions. There are legal limits to every power you have.’
and ‘The point is often made that unelected, unrepresentative judges have no business to be deciding questions of potentially far reaching social concern which are more properly the preserve of elected representatives at a national or local level….The court has no role whatever as an arbiter between those who condemn hunting as barbaric and cruel and those who support it as a traditional country sport…..This is of course a question on which most people hold views one way or the other. But our personal views are wholly irrelevant to the drier and more technical question which the court is obliged to answer. That is whether the County Council acted lawfully in making the decision it did on the grounds it did.’
Swinton Thomas LJ:- ‘Whereas the provisions of Section 120(1)(b) of the Act of 1972 are entirely apt to a decision to acquire land, they are, in my judgment singularly inapt to decisions taken in relation to management of land, and this causes difficulty in resolving the question that arises on this appeal.’

Judges:

Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Simon Brown LJ

Citations:

Gazette 26-Apr-1995, Times 23-Mar-1995, Independent 22-Mar-1995, [1995] 1 WLR 1037, [1995] EWCA Civ 24, (1995) 7 Admin LR 761, [1995] 3 All ER 20

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Local Government Act 1972 120(1)(b), Open Spaces Act 1906 10, Countryside Act 1968 11

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromRegina v Somerset County Council ex parte Fewings and Others QBD 10-Feb-1994
A Local Authority could include ethical considerations in making a decision to ban hunting over land which it owned if the power which it sought to use was in the Act. . .

Cited by:

CitedBath and North East Somerset Council v HM Attorney General, The Treasury Solicitor (Bona Vacantia) ChD 31-Jul-2002
Land was conveyed to the Council’s predecessor on condition that it be left available for use for sports and similar recreations, and left as an open space. It was now sought to develop the land as a home for a football club. The Council sought . .
CitedRegina on the Application of Dart Harbour and Navigation Authority v the Secretary of State for Transport Local Government and the Regions QBD 26-Jun-2003
Captain Wyatt owned land near the harbour and wanted to moor his boat by it. The Harbour authority said he needed a licence. The Harbour authority requested him to move the boat as a danger to navigation. The Captain sought a judicial review of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Local Government, Land, Animals

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.88074

Regina v Lands Tribunal, Ex Parte Jafton Properties Ltd: COL 31 Jul 2000

After a tribunal application, the applicant submitted his costs for taxation. After the hearing there was further correspondence about the decision, resulting in the applicant formally objecting to the taxation. He suggested that the correspondence after the award meant that taxation had not been concluded. It was held that he was out of time. The taxation award had all the elements necessary to make it final, and the President’s refusal of extension of time was not irrational or unreasonable. The reasons were succinct, but correct.

Judges:

Langley J

Citations:

Gazette 31-Aug-2000, [2000] EWHC Admin 384

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Lands Tribunal Rules 1996 (1996 No 1022) 52

Costs, Administrative, Land

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.87117

Re Palmer (A Deceased Debtor), Palmer v Palmer: CA 6 Apr 1994

Property had been conveyed to the deceased and the appellant, his widow, to be held as joint tenants. The deceased dies whilst under investigation for defalcations as a solicitor, and an insolvency administration order was obtained in the estate. The wife argued that by the doctrine of survivorship the house was already hers. The administrator said that the effect of the order was backdated so as to have severed the joint tenancy before the death, and that therefore the deceased’s interest passed into the administration.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The rule that a judicial act takes effect from the first moment of the day on which it is made is not universal. ‘the time has come to say the fiction should have no place when the true facts are known, at least in cases where the court’s jurisdiction is concerned. . . The respondent’s submission in the present case is that the insolvency administration order which was made on the 17th August 1991 is deemed by paragraph 12 of the 1986 Order (Sch.1 Part II) to take effect for the purposes of the vesting of property in the trustee as if it had been made on 22 November 1990, the date of Mr Palmer’s death. To this statutory fiction, it is submitted, must be added the common law fiction that the Order was made at the earliest moment of that day, and therefore whilst Mr Palmer was alive.’ The submission failed.

Judges:

Balcomve LJ, Evans LJ, Roch LJ

Citations:

Independent 06-Apr-1994, [1994] EWCA Civ 15

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Insolvency Act 1986 421

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromIn Re Palmer, Deceased (A Debtor) ChD 25-Mar-1994
The court considered the effect of the doctrine of relation back on a property of which the bankrupt was formerly a joint tenant where the bankrupt had died after the act of bankruptcy but before adjudication.
Held: A deceased’s share in . .
CitedWilliams v Hensman 10-Jun-1861
A fund of money was bequeathed on trust to be invested so as to generate an income payable to A ‘the principal to go to her children at her death’.
Held: The will created a joint tenancy. The court set out three ways in which a joint tenancy . .
CitedBurgess v Rawnsley CA 15-Apr-1975
. .
CitedWright v Mills 1859
A judgment was signed when the Court’s offices opened at 11 am but the defendant had died at 9.30 the same morning. The Court held that the judgment was regular, applying the rule that judicial acts, being acts of the Crown, have precedence over . .
CitedEdwards v Regina CExc 1854
The process of execution in respect of a Crown debt prevailed over the transfer of the personal estate of a bankrupt to an official assignee which took place earlier on the same day. Significantly, the Court’s judgment added that even if the . .
CitedShelley’s case; Wolfe v Shelley 1581
If it is possible to do so, every word in a deed must be given effect. A judgment and the process known as recovery were effective even though the defendant had died in the early morning of the day on which, after his death, the court orders were . .
CitedClarke v Bradlaugh CA 1881
The defendant had sat and voted in parliament without taking the statutory oath. The writ was issued on the same day. The defendant argued that since the writ was deemed to have been issued at the start of the day, the events on which the claim was . .
CitedClarke v Bradlaugh CA 1881
The defendant had sat and voted in parliament without taking the statutory oath. The writ was issued on the same day. The defendant argued that since the writ was deemed to have been issued at the start of the day, the events on which the claim was . .
CitedRe Seaford Dec’d CA 1968
A decree of divorce was made absolute by the court on the same day as, but some hours later than, the husband respondent had died. The court considered the general rule that a judicial act takes effect at the start of the day on which it is made. . .
CitedTabernacle Permanent Building Society v Knight 1892
The court considered (obiter) it’s lack of jurisdiction to make an order directing arbitrators to state their award in the form of a special case, at a time when the award had already been published earlier on the same day and the arbitrators . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Land

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.85849

Rahman v Sterling Credit Ltd: CA 17 Oct 2000

A lender sought repossession of a property securing a loan from 1998. The borrower sought to assert that the loan was an extortionate credit bargain under the Act. The lender asserted that that claim was out of time.
Held: A claim under a statute was an action upon a specialty, and that accordingly the limitation period applicable was twelve years, and the order was to stand.

Judges:

Simon Brown and Mummery LJJ

Citations:

Times 17-Oct-2000, Gazette 17-Aug-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 222, [2001] 1 WLR 496

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Consumer Credit Act 1974, Limitation Act 1980

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedNolan v Wright ChD 26-Feb-2009
The defendant sought to re-open the question of whether the charge under which he might otherwise be liable was an extortionate credit bargain. The creditor said that that plea was time barred. The defendant argued that a finding that the agreement . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation, Consumer

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.85644

Oldham Borough Council v Attorney General: CA 28 Jul 1992

The cy-pres doctrine could be allowed to be applied to allow the sale of land if such an action would remain within the purpose of the original charitable gift.

Judges:

Dillon, Russell, Farquharson LJJ

Citations:

Gazette 28-Oct-1992, [1992] EWCA Civ 21, [1993] Ch 210, [1993] 2 WLR 224, [1993] 2 All ER 432

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Charities Act 1960 13

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Charity, Land

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.84438

Parochial Church Council of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote With Billesby, Warwickshire and Another: ChD 7 Feb 2000

A lay rector could be liable for the physical upkeep of the chancel of the church by virtue of the Act, and such liability was not removed by the new Human Rights Act. Such liability could exist whether or not he had notice of the liability when purchasing land which had been part of the rectorship, and whether or not he was a lay or spiritual rector. Such an imposition may well not be capable of being set aside under the new Act when it comes into force. The law relating to chancel repairs did not involve a deprivation of possessions. The liability to repair the chancel is one of the incidents of ownership of land allotted under the inclosure award in lieu of tithe or other rectorial property. It is an unusual incident not amounting to a charge on the land, not limited to the value of the land and in imposing a personal liability on the owner of the land, but it cannot be distinguished from the liability which would attach to the owner of land which is purchased subject to a mortgage, restrictive covenant or other incumbrance created by a predecessor in title.

Judges:

Ferris J

Citations:

Gazette 28-Apr-2000, Times 30-Mar-2000

Statutes:

Chancel Repairs Act 1932 5, Human Rights Act 1998 5

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedAttorney-General v Dean and Chapter of Ripon Cathedral ChD 1945
Uthwatt J said: ‘The law is one, but jurisdiction as to its enforcement is divided between the ecclesiastical courts and the temporal courts’ . .

Cited by:

Appeal fromWallbank and Wallbank v Parochial Church Council of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote With Billesley, Warwickshire CA 17-May-2001
The defendant owned land subject to an inclosure award of 1743, in exchange for other land which had made the owner a lay rector. The land was subject to the burden of a duty to maintain the chancel of the parish church. The defendants had been . .
At first instanceParochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, Warwickshire v Wallbank and another HL 26-Jun-2003
Parish Councils are Hybrid Public Authorities
The owners of glebe land were called upon as lay rectors to contribute to the cost of repairs to the local church. They argued that the claim was unlawful by section 6 of the 1998 Act as an act by a public authority incompatible with a Convention . .
CitedRegina v Kansal (2) HL 29-Nov-2001
The prosecutor had lead and relied at trial on evidence obtained by compulsory questioning under the 1986 Act.
Held: In doing so the prosecutor was acting to give effect to section 433.
The decision in Lambert to disallow retrospective . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Land, Ecclesiastical

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.84588

Morrells of Oxford Ltd v Oxford United Football Club Ltd and Others: CA 21 Jul 2000

A covenant on the sale of land for a public house provided that the vendor should not permit the building of licensed premises within half a mile.
Held: The covenant operated personally only. The covenants which might be implied by the section to bind successors in title also, could not be implied where the commercial context suggested that such an implication would be inconsistent with the purport of the instrument. The words which might be implied under the section, would not be implied against the commercial sense of the transaction, nor inconsistently with the purport of the covenant. The effect of section 79(1) is to convert a promise in a covenant from one which is made by the covenantor into one in which, all other things being equal, equitable remedies are available against an extended class of persons.
Robert Walker LJ said: ‘My tentative view, therefore, coinciding, I think, with the judge’s, is that section 79, where it applies, and subject always to any contrary intention, extends the number of persons whose acts or omissions are within the reach of the covenant in the sense of making equitable remedies available, provided that the other conditions for equity’s intervention are satisfied. Where a restrictive covenant is expressed in the active voice, and section 79 applies, its normal effect is not to turn ‘A covenants with X that A will not build’ into ‘A and B covenant with X that A will not build’. Rather it is that ‘A (on behalf of himself and B) covenants with X that A (or, as the circumstances may require, B) will not build’. ‘

Judges:

Schiemann, Wallker LJJ, Sir Donald Waterhouse

Citations:

Times 15-Aug-2000, Gazette 31-Aug-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 226, [2001] Ch 459

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 79(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromMorrells of Oxford Ltd v Oxford United Football Club and Others ChD 22-Jun-2000
Land was sold by the authority for a public house, and the authority covenanted not to permit sales of alcohol within a half mile. They later sold land for a football stadium within that area and from where alcohol would be sold. The covenant was . .
CitedOceanic Village Ltd v United Attractions Ltd, Shirayama ChD 9-Dec-1999
The tenant sought an injunction against its neighbour and landlord to prevent it letting an adjoining property without a restriction similar to the one in its own lease. The claimants sought reassurance from the defendant tenants of the adjoining . .

Cited by:

Appealed toMorrells of Oxford Ltd v Oxford United Football Club and Others ChD 22-Jun-2000
Land was sold by the authority for a public house, and the authority covenanted not to permit sales of alcohol within a half mile. They later sold land for a football stadium within that area and from where alcohol would be sold. The covenant was . .
CitedCGIS City Plaza Shares 1 Ltd and Another v Britel Fund Trustees Ltd ChD 13-Jun-2012
The claimants asserted a right of light either by prescription or under lost modern grant. The defendants argued that alterations in the windows arrangements meant that any prescription period was restarted.
Held: ‘the Defendant is not correct . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.83827

Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Shaire and Another: ChD 25 Feb 2000

The claimant had an equitable charge over the property, and sought a possession order after failures to keep up repayments. The order was sought under the Act, and the claimants asserted that the conditions for the grant of possession were unchanged.
Held: Parliament had clearly intended a change. The interests of a chargee ranked alongside those of, for example, children living in the house. This might act to the detriment of banks, and the old authorities, whilst not entirely irrelevant, should be viewed with caution. Where the parties have reached a consensus on the beneficial interests in the property, the court will give effect to it, unless there is very good reason for not doing so, such as a subsequent renegotiation.

Judges:

Neuberger J

Citations:

Gazette 16-Mar-2000, Times 21-Mar-2000, [2000] 1 FLR 973, [2001] Ch 743, [2000] EWHC Ch 452

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 14 15, Law of Property Act 1925 30

Cited by:

CitedStack v Dowden CA 13-Jul-2005
The parties purchased a property together. The transfer contained a survivorship restriction but no declaration of the beneficial interests. The judge had held the property to be held as tenants in commn on equal shares.
Held: In a case where . .
CitedStack v Dowden HL 25-Apr-2007
The parties had cohabited for a long time, in a home bought by Ms Dowden. After the breakdown of the relationship, Mr Stack claimed an equal interest in the second family home, which they had bought in joint names. The House was asked whether, when . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Banking, Trusts

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.83867

Stanton, Mills; Mills v Blackwell and Blackwell: CA 15 Jul 1999

Two strips of land were adjacent but separated by a wall with a gate. The owner of one plot was given broadly phrased rights of way over both strips. He removed part of the wall over the neighbour’s land in order to make full use of the wider strip.
Held: The removal of the wall was not justified. In the absence of express rights to do so, the cross rights were to be construed in the context of the physical situation when granted. The original plan setting out the rights had shown the wall as it was, and it was not for the dominant land owners to choose at what point they were to have access.
Morritt LJ discussed the appropriate principle of construction, saying: ‘Thus, the process of construction does not just start with a consideration of the words, but one has to consider the words, one has to consider the surrounding circumstances, and then one must reach a conclusion as to what the parties’ intention was as expressed in the deed.
The surrounding circumstances to which the court is entitled to have regard include, but are not limited to, the physical limitation on the exercise of the right of way. The decided cases indicate that those physical circumstances may or may not be sufficient to enable the court to find that the wide words of the grant are in fact restricted by the surrounding circumstances. Thus, in Todrick v Western National Omnibus Co Ltd [1993] 1 Ch 190, St Edmondsbury and Ipswich Diocesan Board of Finance v Clark (No 2) and White v Richards [1993] 68 PandCR 105, the physical circumstances did so operate. But, by contrast, in Bulstrode v Lambert [1953] 1 WLR 1064, Keefe v Amor [1965] 1 QB 234 and Charles v Beach [1993] EGCS 124 they did not.

Judges:

Morritt LJ, Wilson J

Citations:

Gazette 28-Jul-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 1852

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedBulstrode v Lambert ChD 1953
The parties disputed the effective extent of an easement which gave an express right to pass and repass providing access across a yard to a side door at premises on which a business was conducted at the time of the grant.
Held: The court . .
CitedTodrick v Western National Omnibus Co Ltd ChD 1934
A vendor sold land with a reservation for the benefit of certain land of ‘a perpetual right of way in common with the Purchaser her heirs and assigns at all times and for all purposes with or without vehicles and animals from and to the public . .
CitedWhite v Richards CA 1993
A right had been granted to ‘pass or repass on foot and with or without motor vehicles over and along the track coloured brown on the plan so far as the said right may be necessary for the use and enjoyment of the retained land.’ The county court . .
CitedKeefe v Amor CA 1965
The Court declined to limit the extent of a right of way 20 feet wide by reference to the bottleneck at its entrance from the road of 4 feet 6 inches, consisting of a pair of gate pillars and a gate of that width. The grant was over the whole 20 . .
CitedSt Edmondsbury and Ipswich Diocesan Board of Finance v Clark (No 2) ChD 1975
A reservation contained In a conveyance must be construed in the context of the deed as a whole, and in the light of the surrounding circumstances.
Held: Sir John Pennycuick said: ‘Mr Vinelott contended that the proper method of construction . .
CitedCharles v Beach 1993
The parties shared a right of way over land. The common way could be used for most of its length, except for an intervening flowerbed on the land of the servient owner.
Held: The existence of the flowerbed was insufficiently permanent or . .

Cited by:

CitedLomax and Another v Wood CA 11-Jun-2001
Land owners were granted a right of way over an occupation road to the highway. They had other means of access to the highway, but eventually sought to construct a gateway onto the occupation road. The owners of the occupation road resisted. It was . .
CitedOliver v Symons CA 15-Mar-2012
The parties disputed the extent of a right of way, the claimant appealing against the rejection of his claim for ‘swing space’ alongside the right of way.
Held: The appeal failed. Elias LJ said that the ‘argument for swing space fails. That is . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.83732

Holder and Others v APC Supperstone and Others: ChD 24 Nov 1999

Tenants obtained a charging order against their landlord, and, after his bankruptcy, incurred substantial costs defending their charge against other claimants. The trustee declined to allow payment of the costs.
Held: The costs were properly payable under the Act. The charge operated also as an equitable charge, and such a charge would carry the costs of defending the chargee’s rights. A charging order covers not only the judgment debt, but also future interest on the debt and ‘all costs charges and expenses reasonably and properly incurred in enforcing or preserving (the) security.’

Citations:

Gazette 08-Dec-1999, [2001] 1 All ER 473, [1999] EWHC Ch 189

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Charging Orders Act 1979 1(1) 3(4)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedOwo-Samson v Barclays Bank Plc, Boyden CA 21-May-2003
The appellant challenged a formal statutory demand which had led to his bankruptcy. The demand had included the anticipated cost of realising the charged property, and also had been inflated to allow for extra costs of dealing the appellant who was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Insolvency

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.81437

Minor v Groves: CA 20 Nov 1997

The parties were neighbours, with houses adjacent to a right of way. Slabs had been laid next to the houses forming a raised pavement. The respondents had sought to enclose their area of this raised pavement, building a porch. They now appealed an order requiring to remove what had already been built.
Held: The pavement did not form part of the right of way, and had been conveyed to them by implication of the section. A dominant owner of land subject to a right of way may build on his land up to the very edge of the right of way established.
Millett LJ said: ‘I know of no principle of law which precludes the owner of land from building right up to the boundary of his land. If this land abuts on a right of way, building right up to the end of his land does not interfere with the right of way. It is of course true that if he leaves the land unbuilt on, it may be that vehicles properly using the right of way may from time to time be able to deviate onto the adjoining land and temporarily trespass upon the land by driving over it, or commit a technical trespass by permitting part of the superstructure of the vehicles to intrude into the airspace over the adjoining land. But they have no right to do so. In the case of dispute, in my judgment, the dominant owner has no cause for complaint if he is restricted in his user of the way to the exact width of the way.’

Judges:

Hirst LJ, Millett LJ, Swinton Thomas LJ

Citations:

Times 20-Nov-1997, [1997] EWCA Civ 2565, (2000) P and C R 136

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 62(2)(ii)(a)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedRobinson v Bailey CA 1948
The court considered the extent of use of a right of way. After citing Farwell J in Todrick, Lord Greene said: ‘While not in any way dissenting from that statement as a general proposition, I would like to give this word of caution, that it is a . .
CitedTodrick v Western National Omnibus Co Ltd ChD 1934
A vendor sold land with a reservation for the benefit of certain land of ‘a perpetual right of way in common with the Purchaser her heirs and assigns at all times and for all purposes with or without vehicles and animals from and to the public . .
CitedBulstrode v Lambert ChD 1953
The parties disputed the effective extent of an easement which gave an express right to pass and repass providing access across a yard to a side door at premises on which a business was conducted at the time of the grant.
Held: The court . .
CitedSt Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocesan Board of Finance v Clark (No.2) CA 1973
When looking at a contract ‘one must construe the document according to the natural meaning of the words contained in the document as a whole, read in the light of surrounding circumstances.’
The contra preferetem rule can only come into play . .
CitedKeefe v Amor CA 1965
The Court declined to limit the extent of a right of way 20 feet wide by reference to the bottleneck at its entrance from the road of 4 feet 6 inches, consisting of a pair of gate pillars and a gate of that width. The grant was over the whole 20 . .

Cited by:

CitedPhelps v Stewarts (A Firm) and Another ChD 2-Jul-2007
The claimant sought damages for the negligent drafting of a deed of trust, saying that he had not been advised of a charge to tax which would arise. The defendant said that her duties were limited, and did not include advice on this point, having . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.81061

Graham v Pitkin: PC 9 Mar 1992

A delay in completion was not challenged by a notice to complete; mere delay may itself be repudiatory. Specific performance was considered. As to Lee-Parker v Izzett, the Board doubted the finding that there was no contract in that case, because the purchaser could always have decided that the mortgage was satisfactory and proceeded.

Judges:

Lord Templeman

Citations:

Gazette 29-Apr-1992, [1992] 1 WLR 403, [1992] UKPC 8

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

Commonwealth

Citing:

CitedLee-Parker v Izzett (1) ChD 1971
Money expended by a tenant on discharging his landlord’s covenants will in appropriate circumstances operate as a partial or a complete discharge so as to furnish a defence of set-off at law to a claim for unpaid rent. Justice Goff discussed the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80964

Green and Another v Wheatley: CA 19 May 1999

Where a garage had been built upon land, and allowed to stay there for over twenty years, title had been acquired by adverse possession, and a right of way which might previously have existed over the land, had also been lost.

Judges:

Stuart Smith LJ, Laws LJ, Jonathan Parker LJ

Citations:

Gazette 03-Jun-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 1442

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Limitation

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.81003

Director of Buildings and Lands v Shun Fung Ironworks Ltd: PC 20 Feb 1995

Compensation is payable for losses properly anticipating resumption of possession of the land. The principle of equivalence gives rise to the statutory right to interest under section 11(1). The council explained the conceptual foundation of the discounted cash flow basis of calculation: ‘In this calculation the discount rate, or capitalisation rate, comprises the rate at which an amount of money payable at a future date should be reduced to arrive at its present value. Its present value is the price which a person would pay now for the right or prospect of receiving the amount of money in question at the future date. Three ingredients can be identified in the discount rate. One is the rate of return the potential purchaser would expect on his money, assuming that the payment to him at the future date is free of risk. A second ingredient is the allowance the potential purchaser would make because of the likely impact of inflation. He is buying today, in today’s currency, the right to be paid at a future date an amount which, when paid, will be paid in tomorrow’s depreciated currency. The third ingredient is the risk factor. The greater the risk that the purchaser will not receive in due course the future payments he is buying, the higher the rate of return he will require.’

Judges:

Lord Nicholls, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Mustill, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Lloyd of Berwick

Citations:

Times 27-Feb-1995, [1995] 2 AC 111

Links:

PC

Statutes:

Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 11(1)

Cited by:

CitedHalstead v Council of City of Manchester CA 23-Oct-1997
Land had been compulsorily purchased, and the compensation agreed, but after long delays in payment, not as to the calculation of interest.
Held: Interest would be payable from the date of entry. The limitation period arose only once the . .
CitedMohammed Aslam v South Bedfordshire District Council CA 21-Dec-2000
The claimant appealed an award of the Lands Tribunal of compensation for an order discontinuing his use as a slaughterhouse of premises of which he held a long lease. The tribunal had applied a discount for wastage on sheep carcasses of 25%, but had . .
CitedFaraday v Carmarthenshire County Council CA 10-May-2004
The claimant appealed against an award of compensation on the compulsory acquisition of his land by the defendant.
Held: The award was incorrect. The authority had wrongly deducted a sum in respect of ‘freed up time’ – which would have allowed . .
CitedRyde International Plc v London Regional Transport CA 5-Mar-2004
The landowner had developed land which was then made the subject of compulsory purchase. The court was asked how the compensation was to be calculated. The landowner expected to sell the development as a whole. The respondent argued that the profit . .
CitedMoto Hospitality Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport CA 26-Jul-2007
The company sought damages to its business on a motorway service station when works closed an access road.
Held: The Secretary of State’s appeal succeeded. A claim for compensation under section 10 had not been established, at least in respect . .
CitedStar Energy Weald Basin Ltd and Another v Bocardo Sa SC 28-Jul-2010
The defendant had obtained a licence to extract oil from its land. In order to do so it had to drill out and deep under the Bocardo’s land. No damage at all was caused to B’s land at or near the surface. B claimed in trespass for damages. It now . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Commonwealth, Damages

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79977

Cresstock Investments Ltd v The Commons Commissioner: CA 10 Jul 1992

The Commons Commissioner had included a wood within the commons. The landowner appealed.
Held: A 1933 conveyance as had referred to the land as ‘several pieces or parcels of land adjoining and enjoyed with’ the house, and it had been enjoyed with the house for many years. The wooded garden should excluded from the common. The words ‘land ancillary to’ a dwelling house should be read to include a garden, and need not be construed tightly so as to include only agricultural or cultivated land.

Citations:

Gazette 16-Sep-1992, [1992] 1 WLR 1088, [1993] 1 All ER 213

Statutes:

Common Land (Rectification of Registers) Act 1989 1(2) 1(3)

Cited by:

CitedRe Land at Freshfields ChD 27-Jan-1993
Where land had been registered by the Commons Commissioner as common land by virtue of a mistake, the Act provided no mechanism for the correction of that mistake. In this case it was not established that the land comprised fields which were not as . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79624

Bybrook Barn Garden Centre Ltd and Others v Kent County Council: CA 8 Jan 2001

A culvert had been constructed taking a stream underneath the road. At the time when it came into the ownership of the local authority, it was adequate for this purpose. Later developments increased the flow, and the culvert came to become an obstruction leading to the claimant’s property being flooded. It was checked regularly, but no steps taken to increase the capacity. It was held that the local authority could become liable in nuisance when such a feature for which they had responsibility came to be an obstruction to the escape of material occurring naturally on land.

Citations:

Times 08-Jan-2001, Gazette 05-Apr-2001, [2000] EWCA Civ 300, [2000] EWCA Civ 299, [2001] BLR 55

Links:

Bailii, Bailii

Statutes:

Highways Act 1980 41 58(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromBybrook Barn Garden Centre Ltd and Others v Kent County Council QBD 5-Nov-1999
Owners of land downstream of a culvert had their lands flooded after works on land upstream changed the water flow, causing the culvert to be inadequate to cope with the water now running off.
Held: The culvert did not constitute a nuisance, . .
CitedCorporation of Greenock v Caledonian Railway Company HL 1917
The West Burn flowed in a channel considerably below the surrounding ground which drained into it and in particular was below the level of Inverkip Road. In 1908, in order to form a playground for children, the natural channel of the West Burn was . .
CitedSedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan HL 24-Jun-1940
Occupier Responsible for Nuisance in adopting it
A trespasser laid a drain along a ditch on the defendant’s land. Later the defendants came to use the drain themselves. A grate was misplaced by them so that in a heavy rainstorm, it became clogged with leaves, and water flowed over into the . .
AppliedLeakey v The National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty CA 31-Jul-1979
Natural causes were responsible for soil collapsing onto neighbouring houses in Bridgwater.
Held: An occupier of land owes a general duty of care to a neighbouring occupier in relation to a hazard occurring on his land, whether such hazard is . .
CitedPemberton v Bright and Another CA 1960
A culvert had been altered and extended in 1926 and the entrance left uncovered and unprotected.
Held: The interference with the flow of water created a potential nuisance in that ‘heavy rain was always a potential danger unless properly . .
CitedRadstock Co-operative and Industrial Society v Norton-Radstock Urban District Council 1976
. .
CitedGoldman v Hargrave PC 13-Jun-1966
(Australia) In Western Australia, a red gum tree was struck by lightning and set on fire. The appellant had the tree cut down, but took no reasonable steps by spraying the fire with water to prevent the fire from spreading, believing that it would . .
CitedRex v Bell 1822
‘that which is not a nuisance at the time it is done, cannot become so by length of time’ . .
CitedGlossop v Heston and Isleworth Local Board 1878
The local authority was held not liable for damage caused by an overflow of their sewage systems which had been adequate when installed but became inadequate over time. . .
CitedSmeaton v Ilford Corporation ChD 1954
Overloading caused the corporation’s foul sewer to erupt through a manhole and discharge ‘deleterious and malodorous matter’ into Mr Smeaton’s garden.
Held: The authority were not liable for the connections with the sewer and discharge of . .
CitedGreat Central Railway v Hewlett HL 1916
A railway company had been empowered to erect in a highway certain gateposts and in a war-time blackout a taxi-driver had run into them. The company was found not liable for the accident.
Held: The accident was caused by the post which had . .
CitedMoore v Lambeth Waterworks Co 1886
The defendants were found not liable when a fireplug lawfully fixed in a highway had become exposed as the road surface had worn. . .
CitedThompson v Brighton Corporation CA 1894
A manhole cover became exposed as the road surface eroded, causing injury.
Held: The Corporation were not liable. . .
CitedPride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd v British Celanese Ltd CA 1953
The plaintiff brought an action for nuisance against the local authority for having discharged insufficiently treated effluent into the river Derwent.
Held: The plaintiffs: ‘have a perfectly good cause of action for nuisance, if they can show . .
CitedHurst and Another v Hampshire County Council CA 19-Jun-1997
A Local Authority is liable for any damage to adjacent property caused by the roots of a tree growing on the verge of a public highway.
Held: Pre-adoption trees vest in the highway authority for all purposes. . .
CitedStovin v Wise, Norfolk County Council (Third Party) HL 24-Jul-1996
Statutory Duty Does Not Create Common Law Duty
The mere existence of statutory power to remedy a defect cannot of itself create a duty of care to do so. A highway authority need not have a duty of care to highway users because of its duty to maintain the highway. The two stage test ‘involves . .
CitedNeath Rural District Council v Williams QBD 1951
A watercourse became silted by natural causes and the local authority served an abatement notice on the landowner, who failed to respond, and when prosecuted relied on a proviso which excluded from liability ‘any person other than the person by . .
CitedCambridge Water Company v Eastern Counties Leather Plc HL 9-Dec-1993
The plaintiffs sought damages and an injunction after the defendant company allowed chlorinated chemicals into the plaintiff’s borehole which made unfit the water the plaintiff itself supplied.
Held: The appeal was allowed. Liability under . .
CitedDear v Thames Water and Others 1992
. .
CitedJob Edwards Ltd v Birmingham Navigations Proprietors CA 1924
Land next to the canal was used for the deposit of refuse by trespassers. The mound spread until, for a fee, it was dumped also across the canal. It caught fire, and the fire spread toward the canal. By agreement the parties got together to put out . .

Cited by:

CitedStannard (T/A Wyvern Tyres) v Gore CA 4-Oct-2012
The defendant, now appellant, ran a business involving the storage of tyres. The claimant neighbour’s own business next door was severely damaged in a fire of the tyres escaping onto his property. The court had found him liable in strict liability . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Nuisance, Land

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.78788

British Waterways Board v Severn Trent Water Ltd: CA 23 Mar 2001

The parties disputed discharges from a sewer outfall into the Stourbridge canal which had been constructed by a regional water authority in about 1976, under the previous statutory regime. The relevant outfall was therefore already in use at the transfer date pursuant to a right enjoyed by the regional water authorities under the Public Health Act 1936 and transferred to the privatised sewerage undertakers under the Water Act 1989. The powers given to sewerage undertakers did not include a power, either express or implied for a sewerage contractor to lay sewage outfall over land belonging to someone else without their consent. Express powers were given for certain acts including the laying of pipes, but not for discharges. This contrasted with express powers for water undertakers which did include outfalls. No implicit power could be inferred; this was neither necessary, and nor could sufficient precision be achieved.
The Water Industry Act had to be construed as a coherent scheme in its own right, without any a priori assumption that it was intended to reproduce everything in the previous statute law.
Chadwick LJ summarised the position: ‘The fallacy, as it seems to me, lies in the underlying (but unspoken) premise that Parliament must have intended that sewerage undertakers should have facilities to discharge (which, plainly, they do require in order to carry out their functions) without paying for those facilities. Whether or not that premise could have been supported in the context of a public authority charged with functions imposed in the interests of public health, it cannot be supported, as it seems to me, in the context of legislation enacted following a decision to privatise the water industry.’

Judges:

Peter Gibson, Chadwick, Keene LJJ

Citations:

Times 23-Mar-2001, Gazette 29-Mar-2001, Gazette 20-Apr-2001, [2001] 3 WLR 613, [2002] Ch 25, [2001] EWCA Civ 276, [2002] EHLR 1, [2001] 3 All ER 673, [2001] Env LR 45, [2001] NPC 53

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Water Industry Act 1991 159, Public Health Act 1936, Water Act 1989

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromBritish Waterways Board v Severn Trent Water Ltd ChD 26-Oct-1999
A water company may have the implied power to discharge surface run-off water from sewers into canals. The powers and duties of water companies and sewerage undertakers were different both under statute and in general. The power to lay a run-off . .

Cited by:

CitedThe Manchester Ship Canal Company Ltd and Another v United Utilities Water Plc SC 2-Jul-2014
The court was asked: ‘whether a sewerage undertaker under the Water Industry Act 1991 has a statutory right to discharge surface water and treated effluent into private watercourses such as the Respondents’ canals without the consent of their . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Environment, Utilities, Land

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78652

Bowers v Kennedy: IHCS 28 Jun 2000

A landowner who had no alternative means of access to his land could not lose a right of way to it by a failure to use it. It was not a right of servitude, but rather an incident of the rights inherent as owner. The inapplicability of periods and rules of limitation in such cases was well established.

Citations:

Times 27-Jul-2000, [2000] ScotCS 178, [2000] ScotCS 179

Links:

Bailii, Bailii

Land, Limitation, Scotland

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78518

Bettison and others v Langton and others: HL 17 May 2001

A right to pasture animals on a common had been levant and couchant, and as such was inalienable as a separate asset from the land where the animals were kept. The right was registered under the Act, and was thereby transformed into a right to graze a certain number of animals on the common. That right was no longer defined by reference to the dominant tenement, and so was a separate right which could be sold and conveyed on to a third party as an asset separated from the land.

Judges:

Lord Slynn of Hadley Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead Lord Steyn Lord Hutton Lord Scott of Foscote

Citations:

Times 30-May-2001, Gazette 21-Jun-2001, [2001] UKHL 24, [2001] 3 All ER 417, [2001] 2 WLR 1605

Links:

Bailii, House of Lords

Statutes:

Commons Registration Act 1965 15, Law of Property Act 1925 187

Citing:

Appeal fromBettison and Another v Penton and Another CA 22-Jan-1998
A common right of grazing which was quantified but not related to the ability of the land to sustain it was capable of existing in gross, and was therefore severable entirely from the land to which it related. The severance was no necessary . .
CitedWhite v Taylor (No 2) ChD 1969
The alienation of grazing rights for a fixed number of beasts cannot prejudice the residual interest of the owner of the servient common. Whoever the grazing right belongs to, the number of beasts that can be grazed upon the common pursuant to the . .
CitedDrury v Kent 1603
‘he could not grant it over, for he hath it quasi sub modo viz. for the beasts levant and couchant; . . but common appurtenant for beasts certain may be granted over.’ . .
CitedDaniel v Hanslip 1672
‘if a man hath common appurtenant to a messuage and land for certain number of beasts, he may alien the same; aliter if it be common for all his beasts levant and couchant upon the land, he cannot by his alienation sever that from the land.’ It was . .
CitedRichards v Squibb 1698
A right to depasture a fixed number of beasts differs from a right for beasts levant and couchant. It is not confined to enjoyment by beasts levant and couchant on the dominant land and may be enjoyed by beasts that do not come from the tenement to . .
CitedCarr v Lambert 1866
Levancy and couchancy is a ‘measure of the capacity of the land to keep cattle out of artificial or natural produce grown within its limits’. . .
CitedBaylis v Tyssen-Amhurst 1877
In order to acquire by prescription a right of pasture appurtenant to land, there had to be some relation between the enjoyment of the right and the enjoyment of the land in question. The number of animals for the pasturing of which the right was . .
CitedLord Chesterfield v Harris CA 27-Jun-1908
The court considered the acquisition of a profit a prendre of fishing, by prescription over a stretch of the River Wye.
Held: Lord Chesterfield’a appeal succeeded. To be valid, a profit appurtenant must, as I have said, be limited and that . .
CitedLord Chesterfield v Harris HL 17-Jul-1911
The House considered the nature and ownership of fishing rights on the River Wye. Freeholders in adjoining parishes had been fishing a non-tidal portion of the river for centuries, not by stealth or indulgence, but openly, continuously, as of right . .
CitedPritchard v Briggs CA 1980
A conveyance of part in 1944 gave a right of pre-emption over retained land. The vendor’s successors the let the retained land to the plaintiff with an option to buy the freehold reversion. The retained land was sold to the defendants in purported . .
CitedKirkness v John Hudson and Co Ltd HL 1955
Viscount Simonds said: ‘the beliefs or assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law’. While subsequent legislation could resolve ambiguity in earlier legislation, it could only do so where the subject of the subsequent . .

Cited by:

CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
CitedPolo Woods Foundation v Shelton-Agar and Another ChD 17-Jun-2009
The court considered whether the claimant had established a profit a prendre against the defendant neighbour’s land in the form of a right of pasturage, acquired either by lost modern grant or by prescription.
Held: The appeal succeeded, but . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78374

Battersea Freehold and Leasehold Property Company Ltd v Wandsworth London Borough Council: ChD 2 Mar 2001

The tenant of the applicant had occupied land adjacent to the tenanted land and belonging to the council respondent for more than 12 years. The applicant sought to assert that he had acquired possessory title. The tenant had however shared the keys when requested.
Held: The claimants appeal failed. Even if the tenant’s use of the land had not been permissive, in order to establish adverse possession the claimant had to show that its tenant had intended to exclude the whole world at large from the disputed land; The sharing of the keys by the tenant indicated that he had not viewed himself as asserting exclusive possession, by excluding the world at large.

Judges:

Rimer J

Citations:

Gazette 17-May-2001

Land, Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78291

Batchelor v Marlow and Another: CA 12 Jul 2001

The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement acquired by prescription. At first instance the rights were recognised as an easement. The rights included parking during daylight hours during weekdays. The land-owner appealed on the ground that the extent of use claimed destroyed the owner’s ability to use the land, to the point where his ownership was illusory. The court agreed, and declared that there was no easement if it extended to that point.
Tuckey LJ asked: ‘Does an exclusive right to park six cars for 9.5 hours every day of the working week leave the plaintiff without any reasonable use of his land, whether for parking or anything else?’ and he gave the answer: ‘[The plaintiff’s] right to use his land is curtailed altogether for intermittent periods throughout the week. Such a restriction would, I think, make his ownership of the land illusory.’

Judges:

Henry LJ, Tuckey LJ, Kay LJ

Citations:

Gazette 12-Jul-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 1051, [2003] 1 WLR 764

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedLondon and Blenheim Estates Ltd v Ladbroke Retail Parks Ltd ChD 29-Jul-1992
A right to park was claimed as an easement.
Held: The question whether the right to park that had been claimed was consistent with the nature of an easement was one of degree: ‘A small coal shed in a large property is one thing. The exclusive . .
CitedDyce v Lady James Hay HL 1852
A claim was made for a prescriptive right for all the Queen’s subjects ‘to go at all times upon the . . appellant’s property . . for the purpose of recreation’.
Held: Leonards LC said that the right claimed was one that ‘cannot be maintained’ . .
CitedCopeland v Greenhalf ChD 1952
If a right claimed by way of an easement would effectively deprive the servient owner of any reasonable user of the area of land over which it is exercisable, than that right is not capable of being an easement. The rights asserted here were both . .
CitedBilkus v London Borough of Redbridge 1968
The court was asked to construe the terms of a covenant given by the council to the claimant. . .
CitedLondon and Blenheim Estates v Ladbroke Retail Parks Ltd CA 1-Jun-1993
The land-owner sold part of his land, granting easements over the retained land, and an agreement that, if further plots were purchased, similar easements would be granted. The agreement stated that the purchaser should have the right to give notice . .
Appeal fromBatchelor v Marlow and Another ChD 25-May-2000
The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement. If an easement was capable of arising by virtue of a deed of grant, it could also be acquired by prescription. This was such an easement. Use in the absence of planning permission did not vitiate . .

Cited by:

CitedMoncrieff and Another v Jamieson and others HL 17-Oct-2007
The parties disputed whether a right of way over a road included an implied right for the dominant owner to park on the servient tenement.
Held: The appeal failed. ‘The question is whether the ancillary right is necessary for the comfortable . .
CitedPolo Woods Foundation v Shelton-Agar and Another ChD 17-Jun-2009
The court considered whether the claimant had established a profit a prendre against the defendant neighbour’s land in the form of a right of pasturage, acquired either by lost modern grant or by prescription.
Held: The appeal succeeded, but . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78279

Batchelor v Marlow and Another: ChD 25 May 2000

The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement. If an easement was capable of arising by virtue of a deed of grant, it could also be acquired by prescription. This was such an easement. Use in the absence of planning permission did not vitiate the acquisition by prescription, since the use did not become unlawful until a planning enforcement notice had been served.

Citations:

Times 07-Jun-2000, Gazette 25-May-2000, Gazette 08-Jun-2000, (2001) 82 P and CR 36

Cited by:

CitedP and S Platt Ltd v Crouch and Another CA 25-Jul-2003
The claimant sought a declaration that certain easements had been included by implication in a conveyance of part of land to him.
Held: Since the easements were capable of subsisting at law, and existed as quasi-easements at the time, and did . .
Appeal fromBatchelor v Marlow and Another CA 12-Jul-2001
The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement acquired by prescription. At first instance the rights were recognised as an easement. The rights included parking during daylight hours during weekdays. The land-owner appealed on the ground that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Road Traffic, Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78277

Bath and Wells Diocesan Board of Finance and Another v Jenkinson and Others: ChD 6 Sep 2000

Where there was a gift of land on charitable trusts, but where the gift was first expressed to be unlimited in time, but later in the deed provided powers for revocation, and conditions for defeasance, it must remain a matter of construction of the particular deed to decide whether the gift was in perpetuity. In the current cases the reversionary provisions were void for remoteness, and the trustees had acquire a possessory title for charity on the trusts of the original deeds.

Citations:

Times 06-Sep-2000, Gazette 05-Oct-2000

Land, Charity, Trusts

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78288

Banque National De Paris Plc v Montman Ltd and others: ChD 2 Sep 1999

A person claiming to be ‘interested’ in property had to demonstrate either some proprietary interest or similar or that he was directly affected by a charging order. An unsecured creditor could not take priority over the liquidator in seeking to overturn a charging order predating the winding up.

Citations:

Times 02-Sep-1999

Statutes:

Charging Orders Act 1979

Land

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78179

B and Q Plc v Liverpool and Lancashire Properties Ltd: ChD 26 Jul 2000

The dominant owner wished to deal with delivery vehicles in a manner where they were left parked awaiting emptying. The servient owner (a lessee) wanted to construct buildings over a large part of the land. The servient owner objected.
Held: Whether an easement was being subjected to an actionable interference, was answered by asking whether insistence upon the use of the entire easement contracted for was reasonable. The grantee should not be deprived of the full extent of what might appear to be an ample right only because he reasonably might require a lesser extent of right.
Blackburne J concluded that there are three propositions which can be deduced from the authorities: (1) the test of an ‘actionable interference’ is not whether what the grantee is left with is reasonable, but whether his insistence on being able to continue the use of the whole of what is contracted for is reasonable; (2) it is not open to the grantor to deprive the grantee of his preferred modus operandi and then argue that someone else would prefer to do things differently, unless the grantee’s preference is unreasonable or perverse; (3) if the grantee has contracted for the ‘relative luxury’ of an ample right, he is not to be deprived of that right in the absence of an explicit reservation merely because it is a relative luxury and the reduced, non-ample right would be all that was reasonably required. He summarised the third proposition as follows: ‘In short, the test . . is one of convenience and not necessity or reasonable necessity. Provided that what the grantee is insisting on is not unreasonable, the question is: can the right of way be substantially and practically exercised as conveniently as before?’.

Judges:

Mr Justice Blackburne (Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster)

Citations:

Times 06-Sep-2000, Gazette 12-Oct-2000, [2001] 1 EGLR 93, (2001) 81 P and CR 20, [2000] EG 10

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedKeefe v Amor CA 1965
The Court declined to limit the extent of a right of way 20 feet wide by reference to the bottleneck at its entrance from the road of 4 feet 6 inches, consisting of a pair of gate pillars and a gate of that width. The grant was over the whole 20 . .
CitedVT Engineering Limited v Richard Barland and Co Limited ChD 1968
The court was asked whether a right of way ‘at all times and for all purposes’ over a roadway included an ancillary right to lateral and vertical ‘swing space’ in the course of loading and unloading in the exercise of the principal right.
CitedWest v Sharp CA 1999
Mummery LJ set out the test to be applied when asking whether there had been a substantial interference in the exercise of an easement so as to be actionable: ‘Not every interference with an easement, such as a right of way, is actionable. There . .
CitedCelsteel Ltd v Alton House Holdings Ltd ChD 1985
An equitable easement (a right of way), which was not protected by any entry on the register, was a right openly exercised and enjoyed as appurtenant, in this case to a garage, and it adversely affected registered land as an overriding interest. The . .

Cited by:

CitedBesley v John CA 29-Oct-2003
The defendant farmed land adjacent to land over which he had registered rights of common allowing him to graze sheep. The freeholders brought the action saying that the use was in excess of the rights. He counter-claimed that the extension of a golf . .
CitedClarke and Another v Corless and Another ChD 8-Jul-2009
The parties disputed whether one could retain for his own benefit land on an estate reserved for an estate road. A trust was claimed under Pallant saying that the parties had made an informal agreement before the property was purchased.
Held: . .
CitedBradley and Another v Heslin and Another ChD 9-Oct-2014
The parties were neighbours. One had a right of way over the other’s land. A gate existed over it. B wished to close the gate for security, but H wished it open in order to be able to drive through it without having to get out of his car, and so he . .
CitedEmmett v Sisson CA 3-Feb-2014
Appeal against judgment in boundary dispute involving a private driveway.
Held: The appeal failed. ‘The respondents are entitled to exercise the ‘relative luxury’ of the ample right to gain both vehicular and pedestrian access to their land . .
CitedBramwell and Others v Robinson ChD 21-Oct-2016
Interference with right of way
Neighbour dispute as to right of way.
Held: The defendant had failed to establish the ‘swing space’ he asserted, but otherwise the claimant had in several ways behaved unreasonably and interfered with the use of the right and harrassed the . .
CitedZieleniewski v Scheyd and Another CA 6-Mar-2012
The parties disputed the existence of a right of way. Briggs J set out the legal principles involved in a claim of interference with a right of way: ‘1) Not every interference with a right of way is actionable. The owner of the right may only object . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78036

Anderson v Dickie: SCS 26 May 1914

A disposition of lands by X contained a declaration that it should not be lawful for A (the disponee) or his foresaids to sell or feu part of the lands disponed except under certain specified conditions as to the number and value of the dwelling-houses to be erected thereon, ‘which restriction shall be a real burden affecting the said lands, and shall operate as a servitude in favour of’ B (another disponee of X) and his foresaids in all time coming.
Held that the declaration merely placed upon A and his heirs a personal prohibition against selling or feuing except under the conditions specified, and did not constitute the restriction a real burden on the lands, and that, accordingly, a singular successor of B was not entitled to interdict a singular successor of A from contravening the restriction.

Citations:

[1914] SLR 614

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Cited by:

Appeal fromAnderson v Dickie HL 22-Apr-1915
S. feued a piece of his ground to M., the feucontract containing this clause-‘Declaring . . that it shall not be lawful to the said S. or his aforesaids or the other disponees to sell or feu any part of the said ground now occupied as the lawn . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.621101

Kirby v Hunslet Union Assessment Committee: HL 1906

The Act provided that the assessment of hereditaments was regulated on the principle that the rateable value was the rent which might be expected to be given for the hereditament alon
Held: The House disapproved a distinction based on whether the plant was a fixture, in the traditional land law sense. A factory’s assessment to poor rate must be based on the standing equipment of machinery in the factory, irrespective of whether or not it was affixed to the freehold so as to form part of it.
Held: The House disapproved a distinction based on whether the plant was a fixture, in the traditional land law sense. A factory’s assessment to poor rate must be based on the standing equipment of machinery in the factory, irrespective of whether or not it was affixed to the freehold so as to form part of it.
Lord Halsbury said that he would: ‘decline myself to enter into what I may call the original equities which might have guided this matter. It is, enough for me that a long series of decisions, for certainly half a century, have established the bald proposition, which is all I am insisting upon, namely’. that although the machinery may not be part of the freehold, it yet is to be taken into account, and in saying that, I do not want to muffle it in a phrase, but what I mean by that is, that to increase the amount of the rate which is exacted from the tenant you may enter into that question and form a judgment upon it, although, as a matter of fact, the machinery may hot be attached to the freehold.’

Judges:

Lord Macnaghten,Lord Halsbury

Citations:

[1906] AC 43

Statutes:

Parochial Assessment Act 1836

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Much CriticisedIceland Foods Ltd v Berry (Valuation Officer) SC 7-Mar-2018
Air System plant excluded from Rating value
The court was asked whether the services provided by a specialised air handling system, used in connection with refrigerated merchandise in the appellant’s retail store, are ‘manufacturing operations or trade processes’ for rating purposes.
CitedIceland Foods Ltd v Berry (Valuation Officer) CA 23-Nov-2016
The court was asked whether the air handling system used by Iceland Foods Limited in its retail store at Liverpool was plant or machinery ‘used or intended to be used in connection with services mainly or exclusively as part of manufacturing . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Rating

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.605769

Potters v Loppert: ChD 1973

The court was asked as to the liability of an estate agent to account for interest earned upon a pre-contract deposit paid to him expressly as a stakeholder. No contract was made.
Held: A stakeholder is not a trustee or agent; he is a principal who owes contractual obligations to the depositors. A pre-contract deposit paid by a prospective purchaser was received subject to an obligation to repay the money on request unless and until a contract was concluded. Material considerations included that until the event was known the recipient was to keep the money in his own hands, but if the recipient employed the money he was entitled to any profit and answerable for any loss.
Sir John Pennycuick V-C said: ‘I propose, in the first place, to consider the law in relation to contract deposits. Looking at the position apart from authority, one might perhaps at first sight rather expect that where any property is placed in medio in the hands of a third party to await an event as between two other parties the third party receives that property as trustee, and that the property and the investments for the time being representing it represent the trust estate. Where the property is something other than money – for example, an investment – that must, in the nature of things, almost certainly be the position. But where the property is money – that is, cash or a cheque resulting in a bank credit – this is by no means necessarily so. Certainly the money may be paid to the third party as trustee, but equally it may be paid to him as principal upon a contractual or quasi-contractual obligation to pay the like sum to one or other of the parties according to the event. It must depend upon the intention of the parties, to be derived from all the circumstances, including any written documents, in which capacity the third party receives the money.’

Judges:

Sir John Pennycuick V-C

Citations:

[1973] Ch 399, [1973] 1 All ER 658

Cited by:

CitedRockeagle Ltd v Alsop Wilkinson CA 1991
The position of a stakeholder and the two potential claimants to a stake is the subject of a tripartite contract. The relationship between the stakeholder and the two potential claimants is contractual, not fiduciary. The money is not trust money. . .
CitedManzanilla Limited v Corton Property and Investments Limited; John MacIver (Southport) Limited; Rootbrights Limited and Halliwell Landau (a Firm) CA 13-Nov-1996
Millett LJ set out the principles applicable to a deposit paid on a land transaction being held by a stakeholder: ”Where a stakeholder is involved, there are normally two separate contracts to be considered. There is first the bilateral contract . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Contract

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.550154

Irani Finance Ltd v Singh: CA 1970

Two brothers had acquired land as joint tenants with the aid of a mortgage. Distinct orders were made against each of them charging their respective interests in the land. The mortgagee assigned the mortgage. The brothers held under a trust for sale. The judgment creditor sought to redeem the mortgage which was opposed by the party to whom the mortgage had been assigned, presumably to give effect to the charges upon the proceeds of sale of the land. There was a power to make a charging order over land or an interest in land. The Court was now asked whether a charging order could be made on the debtor’s interest in the proceeds of sale of land.
Held: The purpose of the trust for sale was to make sure, by shifting the equitable interests away from land and into the proceeds of sale, that a purchase of land is free from equitable interests. Joint owners holding the property or trust for sale and for themselves beneficially did not hold sufficient interests in land as required by the legislation to support a charging order.
Cross LJ said: ‘The words ‘interest in land’ are no doubt capable in an appropriate context of including interests under trusts for sale of land, and though there is no need for us to express a concluded opinion on the point we certainly do not wish to be taken to be casting any doubt on the correctness of the dicta in Cooper v. Critchley [1955] Ch. 431, but for 100 years before 1956 the words, or equivalent words, have been held in this field not to include interests arising under trusts for sale . . To turn finally to Bull v. Bull and Barclay v. Barclay; in the judgments in Bull v. Bull and Cook v. Cook [1962] P. 235, in which the principle laid down in Bull v. Bull was applied, the beneficiaries are in places described as ‘equitable tenants in common’ of the house in question. But the use of these words – which are apt enough to describe the physical situation – does not, we think, necessarily imply that the court considered that the interests of the beneficiaries were interests in realty and not interests in personalty. It is true that in his judgment in Barclay v. Barclay [1970] 2 Q.B. 677, Lord Denning M.R., at p. 684, does refer to the interests that the beneficiaries in Bull v. Bull as equitable interests in land, but that expression of opinion was not necessary to the decision in any of the cases and, with respect, we cannot agree with it. No doubt such tenants in common are interested in the land in a general sense as was remarked by Russell L.J. in In re Kempthorne [1930] 1 Ch. 268, 292. But that is not the same thing as their being owners of equitable interests in the realty. The whole purpose of the trust for sale is to make sure, by shifting the equitable interest away from the land and into the proceeds of sale, that a purchaser of the land takes free from the equitable interests. To hold these to be equitable interests in the land itself would be to frustrate this purpose. Even to hold that they had equitable interests in the land for a limited period, namely, until the land is sold, would, we think, be inconsistent with the trust for sale being an ‘immediate’ trust for sale working an immediate conversion, which is what the Law of Property Act, 1925, envisages (see section 205(l)(xxix)), though, of course it is not in fact only such a limited interest that the plaintiffs are seeking to charge.’

Judges:

Russell, Cross, Widgery LJJ

Citations:

[1971] Ch 59, [1970] 3 All ER 199

Statutes:

Administration of Justice Act 1956 35

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedClark and Another v Chief Land Registrar and Another ChD 2-Dec-1992
The defendant had made a mistake resulting in an equitable chargee not being given proper opportunity to object to the registration of a further charge with priority. The chargee sought compensation from the defendant registrar.
Held: The . .
DistinguishedNational Westminster Bank Ltd v Allen ChD 1971
The defendants, a husband and wife, were jointly and severally liable on two joint accounts which were overdrawn. The defendants were joint owners of a house property as joint tenants holding on trust for sale. The plaintiff was seeking a charging . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.536057

Slack v Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd: CA 1924

Nothing in Colls served to undermine the ‘good working rule’ of A L Smith LJ in Shelfer, although they discharged a quia timet injunction and ordered an inquiry as to damages

Judges:

Sir Ernest Pollock MR, and Warrington and Sargant LJJ

Citations:

[1924] 2 Ch 475

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedShelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Company, Meux’s Brewery Co v Same CA 1895
The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction for nuisance by noise and vibration which was causing structural injury to a public house.
Held: The court set out the rules for when a court should not grant an injunction for an infringement of . .
CitedColls v Home and Colonial Stores Ltd HL 2-May-1904
The courts below had concluded that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff’s right to light, and had awarded an injunction.
Held: the appeal succeeded. The House set out the requirements for establishing the existence of a right to light. . .

Cited by:

Appeal fromLeeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack HL 1924
The plaintiff complained of a threatened interference with ancient lights.
Held: Damages may be awarded in lieu of an injunction even where the injunction sought is a quia timet injunction, but that power imports a further power to give an . .
CitedCoventry and Others v Lawrence and Another SC 26-Feb-2014
C operated a motor racing circuit as tenant. The neighbour L objected that the noise emitted by the operations were a nuisance. C replied that the fact of his having planning consent meant that it was not a nuisance.
Held: The neighbour’s . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Damages, Litigation Practice

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.536798

Toplis v Green: CA 14 Feb 1992

Butler-Sloss LJ said, as to the construction of a conveyance with a plan: ‘In taking the objective approach, one looks at the language used in the contract, the content of the plan and in the context the facts relating to the locus in quo, if it is in issue as indeed it is in this appeal, including relevant photographs and the preliminary enquiries. The question, therefore, is: what would the reasonable layman think he was in fact buying?’

Judges:

Butler-Sloss LJ

Citations:

Unreported 14 February 1992

Land

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.515259

Case XXV 7 Co 40 A B, Bedel’s Case Uses, Covenants, Inrollment: 1220

A father covenants by indenture, in consideration of continuing the land in his blood, and of natural affection, to stand seized to the use of himself for life, remainder to his wife for life, remainder to his second son in tail : resolved that the use to the wife is well raised ; for the naming of her, being his wife, is sufficient: so of any cousin ; for it is a consideration of money paid by the wife or son, the indenture ought to be inrolled.
Adjudged and affirmed in error.
If the consideration be of blood and money paid ; where there is kindred; an use will rise upon a covenant by indenture without inrollment : for the words of 27 H. 8, cap. 16, for inrollments, are, where a freehold or inheritance passes by bargain and state only : not where blood is joined.

Citations:

[1220] EngR 599, (1220-1623) Jenk 289, (1220) 145 ER 209 (B)

Links:

Commonlii

Land

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.461511

35 H 6, 52 28 H 8 Br Livery, 55 Br Cases, 187, 78, 113, 114 12 H 4, 18 Stamf Praer 10 Dally, 90, Pl 8 Co Lit 77 A F N B 258, 256 Gard, Livery, Charrel Br Cases, 322 By 12 C 2, Ch 24, These Tenures And Services Are Abolish’D: 1220

No livery shall be sued by any heir, if the tenure be not of the King by knight’s service in capite, or in socage in capite, if the heir be of full age at the time of the death of his father, he shall pay half a year’s value of the land : if the tenure be socage in capite, such heir shall pay relief: if he be fourteen years of age at the time of the death of his ancestor, he shall pay nothing. Where the King has a ward, because of another ward who is the King’s tenant in capite by knight’s service ; and the ward because of ward comes first to full age, he shall sue his livery ; but not where his guardiian has sued his livery before him : but though his guardian has sued his livery before him, yet the King shall retain the land and body of the ward because of ward till his full age. So shall every other lord do who has a ward because of ward ; if he has not the seigniory by a defeasible title : if so, the entry of him who has right shall avoid it : so of a mortgage redeemed, and a seigniory granted upon condition. The heir of the King’s tenant by knight’s service, not in capite, at his full age, after he has paid relief, shall have an ouster le maine. The King’s tenant of lands within the Dutchy of Lancaster shall sue livery, but not for lands held of the dutchy, and lying out of the dutchy. 21 E. 4, 60. 26 H. 8.

Citations:

[1220] EngR 445, (1220-1623) Jenk 113, (1220) 145 ER 80 (A)

Links:

Commonlii

Children, Land

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.461357

2 Jac Cr 40, Earl of Rutland’s Case 1 Co 76 A B Curia Wardor’, Surrender, Tail, Fines, Discontinuance, Bar Baldwin’s Case: 1220

A tenant for life, remainder to B. in tail ; B. levies a fine, with proclamations, sur concessit, to A. and C. for their lives : this fine bars the intail during the said two lives only, and is not a discontinuance omnio : for B. was riot seised by force of the tail, and the fine is sur concessit : it seems that A.’s acceptance of this estate to him and C. is a surrender of the former estate which he had : as in the case of a lease for years made to A. and during the years, he accepts a lease for years of the same land to him and B.

Citations:

[1220] EngR 274, (1220-1623) Jenk 321, (1220) 145 ER 233 (D)

Links:

Commonlii

Land, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.461186

Case VI 2 H 8 9 Co 118 H Dally, 25, Pl 8 11 Co 59 A B Keyleway, 159, 204 Forcible Entry, Restitution Commissioners De Oyer And Terminer, Bank Le Roy: 1220

Commissioners of oyer and terminer have no power to exclude upon the statute of forcible entry : for the statute of 8 H 6, cap. 3, which provides an enquiry and restitutiori in this case, appropriates it to the justices of peace : but the judges of the King’s Bench are wittin the statute ; for the King sits there, and where the King sits est plenitudo potestatis. Proprietates verborum tuendae sunt.

Citations:

[1220] EngR 269, (1220-1623) Jenk 197, (1220) 145 ER 132 (B)

Links:

Commonlii

Land, Constitutional

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.461181

Case XXIX 19 E 3 Co Lit 222 A B 2 Co 80 A Fitz Entry Congeable, 39 18 Ass Ult Tourson’s Case, 8 Co 170 B, 91 A Cromwell’s Case, 4 Co 27: 1220

A tenant in capite obtains the King’s licence to enfeoff two of the manor of Dale, upon condition to give it back to him in tail, the remainder to E. iri fee ; the feoffment was made to two accordingly ; A. afterwards dies, his heir being within age, afterwards the gift was made to the heir of the body of A. the remainder ut supra. Resolved, that this licence doth not extend to give this land to the heir of the body of A. but a new licence is necessary ; and the obtaining of this licence is a new charge to the land suffered by the two feoffees, and therefore in this case the condition is broken. A. dies seised of other land held of the King in capite, his dying seised of this land, and all this other matter is fond by office. The Kirig shall seize the said manor for the breach of this condition, in right of the said heir being within age, and shall have all the profits of it, as guardian after the deat of A.
By all the justices.
Verba accipienda sunt cum effectu.

Citations:

[1220] EngR 220, (1220-1623) Jenk 16, (1220) 145 ER 13 (A)

Links:

Commonlii

Land

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.461132

Case LIII 2 H 4, 23 Jointenants, Petition, Scire Facias, Joinder In Actions: 1220

There are two jointenants in fee, their land is seised into the King’s hands ; each of them may hy himself sue a petition of right to the King: and if the King has granted this land; upon a scire facias upon such petition against the Kings patentee ; the jointenancy of the plaintiffs is not a plea for the patentee. By all the judges.
This also seems to be the law in a monstrans de droit and a traverse ; for they are not properly actions. An action does not lie against the King. But regularly jointenants ought to join in actions real and personal.

Citations:

[1220] EngR 253, (1220-1623) Jenk 78, (1220) 145 ER 56 (B)

Links:

Commonlii

Land

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.461165

In Re Wallis and Simmonds (Builders) Ltd: ChD 1974

The deposit of title documents, without more, gives rise to an inference that the deposit was intended by the parties to operate as creating an equitable charge or mortgage over the property whose title document is deposited. In logic there could be no distinction between deposits to secure a first and third party indebtedness.
Templeman J said: ‘But in my judgment this is a contractual lien – it is said to be a contractual lien – and that makes all the difference. It is also a contractual charge; true it is that the charge arises by presumption, but it does not arise by operation of law. What the court does is to say: `We shall not compel the parties to write down in so many words what the effect of the deposit of title deeds is; we shall simply assume that when they contract, and although they probably do not know the consequences, the person who takes the title deeds contracts not only to retain them but also to have an equitable charge on the land.’ The presumption reads into the contract the charge which is implied. If that is right, the charge was created by the company and is therefore registrable under s95.’

Judges:

Templeman J

Citations:

[1974] 1 WLR 391, [1974] 1 All ER 561, [1974] AC 467

Cited by:

CitedUnited Bank of Kuwait Plc v Sahib and Others CA 2-Feb-1996
The bank appealed against a decision that the simple deposit of deeds with a bank did not take effect as an equitable charge.
Held: Depositing deeds with a bank is not sufficient to create a charge over them. The old law as to the creation of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Equity

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.434815

Leeds v Shakerley: 1599

In an action for diverting a water-course from one of three mills, on not guilty, the ven. Fac. shall be where the nuisance was done, sed aliter on a prescription; but a seisin of the mill at the time of the nuisance must be shewn.

Citations:

[1653] EngR 1212, (1599) Cro Eliz 751, (1653) 78 ER 983 (A)

Links:

Commonlii

Cited by:

CitedCoventry and Others v Lawrence and Another SC 26-Feb-2014
C operated a motor racing circuit as tenant. The neighbour L objected that the noise emitted by the operations were a nuisance. C replied that the fact of his having planning consent meant that it was not a nuisance.
Held: The neighbour’s . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Nuisance

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.413519

British Commonwealth Holdings plc v Quadrex Holdings Inc: 1989

In considering the reasonableness of a time set in a notice to complete for construction works, the time it would actually take to complete the work is not the only consideration.

Citations:

[1989] 1 QB 842

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedNorth Eastern Properties Ltd v Coleman and Another CA 19-Mar-2010
The appellants challenged specific performance orders obliging them to complete the purchase of apartments, saying that the contracts had not complied with the 1989 Act, and that their repudiation of the contracts had been accepted. The contracts . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Contract

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.403476