Rosenzweig v NMC Recordings Ltd: ChD 4 Dec 2013

The claimant a composer and musician said that the defendant charity’s failure to incorporate his music within their programmes was the result of the personal animosity of its chairman, and that this allowed relief under section 115(1) of the 2011 Act.

Norris J
[2013] EWHC 3792 (Ch), [2014] PTSR 261
Bailii
Charities Act 2011 115(1)
England and Wales

Charity

Updated: 26 November 2021; Ref: scu.518723

In re Hummeltenberg; Beatty v London Spiritualistic Alliance Limited: ChD 1923

A testator by his will bequeathed 3,000 pounds to the London Spiritualistic Alliance Limited to form the nucleus of a fund for the purpose of establishing a college for the training and developing a suitable person’s male and female as mediums, preference being given to healing mediums, and those for diagnosis of disease.
A committee of three of the council was to control the money, and invest and use the interest for the above-mentioned purpose; and if that became impracticable, then for the advancement of the cause of spiritualism as seemed best to the council. Should at any time the alliance cease to exist, the testator directed his residuary estate to be divided equally between certain hospitals.
Held: The request was invalid, involving, as it did, a perpetuity, because it had not been established that the trust was one which was, or might be, operative for the public benefit, or one of the administration of which the court could, if necessary undertake or control. It was therefore not a valid charitable gift, and fell into residue. Whether a gift or trust was or might be operative for the public benefit was a question to be determined by the court, by forming an opinion on the evidence before it, the personal or private opinion of the judge being immaterial; but it was not a question of which the donor of the gift or the creator of the trust was as had been contended, the only judge.

Russell J
[1923] 1 Ch 237, [1923] All ER 49
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGilmour v Coats HL 1949
Prayers Alone did not make Convent Charitable
A trust to apply the income of a fund for all or any of the purposes of a community of Roman Catholic Carmelite nuns living in seclusion and spending their lives in prayer, contemplation and penance, was not charitable because it could not be shown . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.653057

Cocks v Manners: ChD 26 Jul 1871

Testatrix, a married woman, bequeathed the residue of all her property, consisting of impure and pure personalty belonging to her separate use, to be divided equally between four religious institutions, two of them being the Dominican convent at C, an institution consisting of Roman Catholic females living together by mutual agreement in a state of celibacy, under a common superior, for the purpose of sanctifying their own souls by prayer and pious contemplation, and the Sisters of Charity of St. Paul at S0, an institution composed of Roman Catholic women living together by mutual consent, whose primary object was personal sanctification, and who, as a means thereto, employed themselves in the exercise of works of piety and charity in teaching the poor and nursing the sick ; and directed that the payments should be made to the superior for the time being respectively.
Held: that the community of sisters at S0 was a voluntary association and a charitable institution, and that the bequest to them was good as to the pure personalty:
Held: also, that the bequest to the Dominican convent at C was neither within the letter nor the spirit of 43 Eliz. c. 4 ; that it was good both as to the pure and impure personalty; and that it was not void on the ground of perpetuity. Semble, religious purposes are charitable only when religious services tend directly or indirectly towards the instruction or edification of the public.
Wickens VC said: ‘On the Act [sc. the Statute of ‘ Elizabeth] unaffected by authority I should certainly hold that the gift to the Dominican Convent is neither within the letter nor the spirit of it; and no decision has been referred to which compels me to adopt a different conclusion. A voluntary association of women for the purpose of working out their own salvation by religious exercises and self-denial seems to me to have none of the requisites of a charitable institution, whether the word ‘ charitable’ is used in its popular sense or in its legal sense. It is said, in some of the cases, that religious purposes are charitable, but that can only be true as to religious services tending directly or indirectly towards the instruction or the edification of the public; an annuity to an individual, so long as he spent his time in retirement and constant devotion, would not be charitable, nor would a gift to ten persons, so long as they lived together in retirement and performed acts of devotion, be charitable. Therefore the gift to the Dominican Convent is not, in my opinion, a gift on a charitable trust.’

Wickens VC
(1871) LR 12 Eq 574, (1871) 24 LT 869, (1871) 36 JP 244, (1871) 19 WR 1055, [1871] UKLawRpEq 152
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGilmour v Coats HL 1949
Prayers Alone did not make Convent Charitable
A trust to apply the income of a fund for all or any of the purposes of a community of Roman Catholic Carmelite nuns living in seclusion and spending their lives in prayer, contemplation and penance, was not charitable because it could not be shown . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.653054

In re Caus; Lindeboom v Camille: ChD 1934

A Roman Catholic testator by his will bequeathed 1,000 pounds for Masses, foundation and other and also devoted four houses ‘for one Foundation Mass to be said for my soul and the souls of my parents and relatives during the space of 25 years’ and directed that property should revert to a named church. Evidence was given that by a ‘Foundation mass’ was intended a mass the saying of which was to be paid for out of the interest of an investment fund so that unless the gift was charitable it would be void for perpetuity.
Held: A gift for the saying of masses is charitable as being for the advancement of religion because it enables a ritual act to be performed which is the central act of the origin of a large proportion of Christian people, and because it assists in the endowment of priests whose duty it is to perform the act period.

[1934] 1 Ch 162
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGilmour v Coats HL 1949
Prayers Alone did not make Convent Charitable
A trust to apply the income of a fund for all or any of the purposes of a community of Roman Catholic Carmelite nuns living in seclusion and spending their lives in prayer, contemplation and penance, was not charitable because it could not be shown . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.653059

Hoare v Hoare: 1887

It is not a charitable purpose to provide for Church of England services in a private chapel, nor Almshouses for estate labourers, nor for the education of estate children.

(1887) 56 LT 147
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGilmour v Coats HL 1949
Prayers Alone did not make Convent Charitable
A trust to apply the income of a fund for all or any of the purposes of a community of Roman Catholic Carmelite nuns living in seclusion and spending their lives in prayer, contemplation and penance, was not charitable because it could not be shown . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.653058

National Anti-Vivisection League v Inland Revenue Commissioners: HL 2 Jul 1947

The main object of the Society was political viz, the repeal of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, and for that reason the Society was not established for charitable purposes only and was not entitled to exemption from tax. An organisation whose aims could be seen as harmful to the public could not be recognised as a charity. the object of repealing the Act of 1876 was ‘a main object, if not the main object, of the Society, to obtain an alteration of the law.’
Seeking an amendment of acts of parliament, or even their repeal, where that is ancillary to one of the established charitable objects in common law did not deprive an organisation of its charitable status. But this society ‘has chosen to restrict its attack upon cruelty to a narrow and peculiar field, and it has adopted as its leading purpose the suppression of vivisection by legislation’
Lord Simonds said that there may be circumstances in which the Court will in a later age hold an object not to be charitable which has in earlier ages been held to possess that virtue. And the converse case may be possible. That degree of uncertainty in the law must be admitted.
Lord Simonds said: ‘Nowhere perhaps did the favour shown by the law to charities exhibit itself more clearly than in the development of the doctrine of general charitable intention, under which the court, finding in a bequest (often, as I humbly think, on a flimsy pretext) a general charitable intention, disregarded the fact that the named object was against the policy of the law . .’

Wright, Porter, Simonds, Norman LL
[1948] AC 31, [1947] UKHL 4, [1947] 2 All ER 217
Bailii
Cruelty to Animals Act 1876
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIncome Tax Special Commissioners v Pemsel HL 20-Jul-1891
Charitable Purposes used with technical meaning
The House was asked whether, in a taxing statute applying to the whole of the United Kingdom and allowing for deductions from and allowances against the income of land vested in trustees for charitable purposes, the words ‘charitable purposes’ . .

Cited by:
CitedAttorney General v British Museum ChD 27-May-2005
The trustees brought a claim against the Attorney-General seeking clarification of their duties and powers to return objects which were part of the collection in law, but where a moral duty might exist to return it to a former owner. Here drawings . .
CitedGilmour v Coats HL 1949
Prayers Alone did not make Convent Charitable
A trust to apply the income of a fund for all or any of the purposes of a community of Roman Catholic Carmelite nuns living in seclusion and spending their lives in prayer, contemplation and penance, was not charitable because it could not be shown . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Income Tax

Updated: 17 November 2021; Ref: scu.220239

Dunne v Byrne: PC 22 Feb 1912

Will – Construction – Charitable Bequest – Fund to be expended for the Good of
Religion – Religious Purposes.
Held, that a residuary bequest ‘to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane and his successors to be used and expended wholly or in part as such Archbishop may judge most conducive to the good of religion in this diocese’ is not a good charitable bequest and is void. The expression used by the testator is not identical with the expression ‘for religious purposes.’
Where the purposes of a trust are expressed in plain language, it is not permissible to appeal to the nature of the trustee in order to impart a charitable character.
What the Archbishop might consider to be conducive to ‘the good of religion’ could cover activities that were not charitable in law. It was the width of the subjective view of the Archbishop and the lack of restriction to purely charitable religious activities that were fatal to the charitable status of the gift.
Lord Macnaghten said: ‘The fund is to be applied in such manner as the ‘Archbishop may judge most conducive to the good of religion’ in his diocese. It can hardly be disputed that a thing may be ‘conducive’, and in particular circumstances ‘most conducive’, to the good of religion in a particular diocese or in a particular district without being charitable in the sense which the Court attaches to the word, and indeed without being in itself in any sense religious.’
Lord Macnaghten managed to distinguish the case from the general principle that a gift for religious purposes is a good charitable gift by reasoning: ‘This is not in terms a gift for religious purposes, nor are the words synonymous with that expression. Their Lordships agree with the opinion of the Chief Justice that the expression used by this testator is wider and more indefinite.’

Lord MacNaghten
[1912] AC 407, [1912] UKLawRpAC 16, (1912) 28 TLR 257, [1911-13] All ER 1105, [1912] UKPCHCA 2, (1912) 16 CLR 500, (1912) 18 Argus LR 122
Commonlii, Austlii, Bailii
Australia
Citing:
Appeal fromJames Byrne v Robert Dunne 16-Dec-1910
(High Court of Australia) Will – Bequest for religious purposes – Charitable trust – Uncertainty – Gift of residue to Roman Catholic Archbishop and successors – ‘ To be used wholly or ‘ in part as ‘ the donee ‘ may judge most conducive to the good . .
ExemplarWhite, In re; White v White ChD 8-Feb-1893
A testator gave his property ‘to the [listed] religious societies, to be divided in equal shares among them,’ the particular objects not being named.
Held: (reversing Kekewich J) A bequest to a religious institution, or for a religious . .

Cited by:
CitedBath and North East Somerset Council v HM Attorney General, The Treasury Solicitor (Bona Vacantia) ChD 31-Jul-2002
Land was conveyed to the Council’s predecessor on condition that it be left available for use for sports and similar recreations, and left as an open space. It was now sought to develop the land as a home for a football club. The Council sought . .
CitedGilmour v Coats HL 1949
Prayers Alone did not make Convent Charitable
A trust to apply the income of a fund for all or any of the purposes of a community of Roman Catholic Carmelite nuns living in seclusion and spending their lives in prayer, contemplation and penance, was not charitable because it could not be shown . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Trusts, Charity, Wills and Probate

Updated: 17 November 2021; Ref: scu.181218

Inland Revenue v Broadway Cottages: CA 26 Jul 1954

Two charitable trusts appealed against decisions disallowing their claim to allowance for relief against income tax of certain incomes.
Held: To be valid, a trust must be one which the Court can control and execute. In this case, the discretion given to the trutees was absolute, and nor was the class of beneficiaries ascertainable.

Singleton, Jenkins, Hodson LJJ
[1954] EWCA Civ 4, [1955] Ch 20, (1954) 33 ATC 305, [1954] 3 All ER 120, [1954] TR 295, [1954] 3 WLR 438
Bailii
Income Tax Act 1918 37(1)(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedMorice v Bishop of Durham HL 1805
The court was asked whether a gift of residue to be applied ‘to such objects of benevolence and liberality as the Bishop of Durham in his own discretion shall most approve of’ was valid as being confined to purposes that were charitable.
Held: . .
CitedIn re Gestetner ChD 1953
The court considered a discretionary distribution power given to trustees.
Held: Harman J said that the trustees were bound ‘to consider at all times during which the trust is to continue whether or no to distribute any and if so what part of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Income Tax, Charity

Updated: 16 November 2021; Ref: scu.262848

Harries and Others v Church Commissioners for England and Another: ChD 25 Oct 1991

Trustees Investing using Wider Considerations

The applicant sought a declaration that the Commissioners were obliged to have regard to the object of promoting the Christian faith and not to act in a manner which would be incompatible with that object when managing the assets of which they were trustees. The plaintiffs said that the commissioners, in making investment decisions, attached overriding importance to financial considerations, and that they were only prepared to take non-financial considerations into account to the extent that they did not significantly jeopardise or interfere with accepted investment principles.
Held: The declarations sought were refused. The Church Commissioners were entitled to take ethical considerations into account in forming an investment policy provided there was no risk of detriment to the Trust funds. Ethical investments putting financial return at risk were not open to trustees. Investments should aim for the best return, and be chosen only not to conflict with any express aims of the charity, and should not be used to make moral statements. Trustees must find balance neither bringing their charity into disrepute, nor failing to act with prudence. Such considerations could be allowed provided they did not adversely affect the return.
When property was held by trustees for the purpose of generating money, then prima facie, the purposes of the trust were best served by the trustees seeking to obtain the best return which was consistent with commercial prudence and in most cases, the best interests of the charity required that the trustees’ choice of investments be made solely on the basis of well-established investment criteria. The circumstances in which charity trustees were bound or entitled to make financially disadvantageous investment decisions for ethical considerations were extremely limited and there was no evidence that such circumstances existed in the case before the court. The declaration was refused.
Donald Nicholls VC said: ‘the law is not so cynical as to require trustees to behave in a fashion which would bring them or their charity into disrepute . . on the other hand, trustees must act prudently. They must not use property held by them for investment purposes as a means for making moral statements at the expense of the charity of which they are trustees.’

Sir Donald Nicholls VC
Gazette 11-Nov-1991, [1992] 1 WLR 1241, [1992] 2 All ER 300, [1991] 135 SJLB 180, Times 30-Oct-1991, Independent 29-Oct-1991
England and Wales

Trusts, Equity, Charity

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.81250

Oxfam v Revenue and Customs: ChD 27 Nov 2009

The charity appealed against refusal to allow it to reclaim input VAT. It also sought judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal not to allow it to raise an argument of legitimate expectation. The charity had various subsidiaries conducting commercial activities, which paid VAT in its supplies. The parties disputed how input taxes were attributed between the different activitie, particularly in the context of unrestricted fundraising expenditure.
Held: The Tribunal had had power to listen to the argument on legitimate expectation. In 2000, the revenue had written to the claimant setting out the agreed calculation methods, but the law had altered on the Church of England case. However ‘in a case such as this, involving an assurance given to only one person and where there is no irrationality on the part of the public authority in adopting a different approach, the absence of detrimental reliance on the part of the person to whom the assurance is given is fatal to the argument that to modify the assurance would involve an abuse of power on the part of the public authority which gave the assurance.’

Sales J
[2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch), Times 31-Dec-2009
Bailii
Value Added Tax Act 1994 24(5), Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC 17
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromOxfam v Revenue and Customs VDT 30-Jul-2008
VDT VAT – INPUT TAX – Charity applying method apportioning VAT to business purposes – Church of England Children’s Society decision permitted the Appellant to recover part of VAT incurred on unrestricted . .
CitedGus Merchandise Corporation Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise CA 24-Oct-1994
The Commissioners’ general tax management powers include a power to enter into a binding contract with taxpayers as to the method of calculation of Excess VAT paid on sales to agents was not recoverable since there was a binding agreement. . .
CitedRevenue and Customs v The Boots Company Plc ChD 16-Mar-2009
. .
CitedChurch of England Children’s Society v Revenue and Customs ChD 29-Jul-2005
The Society sent out free newsletters to its unpaid fund-raisers and supporters. They sought to deduct input tax charged to them from the supplies associated with the costs.
Held: The Society might be able to deduct such tax as residual input . .
CitedKretztechnik AG v Finanzamt Linz ECJ 26-May-2005
Europa Sixth VAT Directive – Supplies for consideration – Share issue – Admission of a company to a stock exchange – Deductibility of VAT).
Kretztechnik’s objects were the development and sale of . .
CitedRegina v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd CA 1990
Legitimate Expectation once created not withdrawn
The claimant said that a change of practice by the Revenue was contrary to a legitimate expectation.
Held: The Inland Revenue could not withdraw from a representation if it would cause: substantial unfairness to the applicant; if the . .
CitedRegina v North and East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan and Secretary of State for Health Intervenor and Royal College of Nursing Intervenor CA 16-Jul-1999
Consultation to be Early and Real Listening
The claimant was severely disabled as a result of a road traffic accident. She and others were placed in an NHS home for long term disabled people and assured that this would be their home for life. Then the health authority decided that they were . .
CitedBamber, Regina (on the Application Of) v Revenue and Customs Admn 21-Dec-2005
. .
CitedRegina v Department of Education and Employment ex parte Begbie CA 20-Aug-1999
A statement made by a politician as to his intentions on a particular matter if elected could not create a legitimate expectation as regards the delivery of the promise after elected, even where the promise would directly affect individuals, and the . .
CitedBritish Oxygen Co Ltd v Board of Trade HL 15-Jul-1970
Cylinders containing hydrogen gas were being put on a trailer pulled by a tractor for the purpose of delivery to the premises of the purchaser. One of the issues before the court was whether the function of the hydrogen trailers and the cylinders . .
CitedRegina v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte the National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd HL 9-Apr-1981
Limitations on HMRC discretion on investigation
The Commissioners had been concerned at tax evasion of up to 1 million pounds a year by casual workers employed in Fleet Street. They agreed with the employers and unions to collect tax in the future, but that they would not pursue those who had . .
CitedMullen, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 29-Apr-2004
The claimant had been imprisoned, but his conviction was later overturned. He had been a victim of a gross abuse of executive power. The British authorities had acted in breach of international law and had been guilty of ‘a blatant and extremely . .
CitedRegina v Inland Revenue Commission ex parte Preston; In re Preston HL 1984
Duty of Fairness to taxpayer – Written Assurance
The applicant was assured by the Inland Revenue that it would not raise further inquiries on certain tax affairs if he agreed to forgo interest relief which he had claimed and to pay a certain sum in capital gains tax.
Held: Where the . .
CitedIn Re Findlay, in re Hogben HL 1985
A public authority, and the Prison Service in particular, is free, within the limits of rationality, to decide on any policy as to how to exercise its discretions; it is entitled to change its policy from time to time for the future, and a person . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

VAT, Charity, Administrative

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.381597

Helena Partnerships Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs: CA 9 May 2012

The company had undertaken substantial building works and sought associated tax relief. The court was asked whether, following a change in the company’s memorandum and articles of association, the company, a registered social landlord, remained a charitable organisation. The articles allowed some tenants to become members of the company, and would allow pursuance of objects other than the provision of social housing. It was argued that members would thus be able to run the company for their own benefit. The question was whether, the separate objects being independent of each other, the housing object remained predominant, and the company charitable.
Held: The company’s appeal failed. Though the company ran for public benefit, that was not enough of itself to make it charitable: ‘the provision of a housing stock available for occupation by tenants generally (rather than so as to relieve a charitable need) is not a charitable purpose, because it could only be so if it came within Lord Macnaghten’s fourth category, and it does not do that because it is not within the spirit and intendment of the preamble, nor is it analogous with the examples in the preamble of works of general public utility.’
As to the benefits to individuals: ‘the objects of Helena are not limited, on their true construction, to undertaking operations which are for the primary benefit of the community, to the exclusion of non-incidental benefit for individuals.’
The observations of the Court of Appeal on abuse of right are not binding as a matter of ratio, but they remain persuasive.

Lloyd, Black, Lewison LJJ
[2012] EWCA Civ 569, [2012] PTSR 1409, [2012] WLR(D) 142
Bailii
Statute of Charitable Uses 1601
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedMorice v The Bishop of Durham CA 26-Mar-1804
Bequest, in trust for such objects of benevolence and liberality as the trustee in his own discretion shall most approve, cannot be supported as a charitable Legacy ; and is therefore a Trust for the next of kin.
Ann Cracherade by her Will, . .
CitedMorice v Bishop of Durham HL 1805
The court was asked whether a gift of residue to be applied ‘to such objects of benevolence and liberality as the Bishop of Durham in his own discretion shall most approve of’ was valid as being confined to purposes that were charitable.
Held: . .
CitedThe Trustees Of The British Museum v White 8-Jul-1826
William White, deceased, devised a freehold estate to trustees, in trust to sell it, and pay the proceeds, together with his residuary personal estate, to the Trustees of the British Museum, to be by them employed for the benefit of that . .
CitedIncome Tax Special Commissioners v Pemsel HL 20-Jul-1891
Charitable Purposes used with technical meaning
The House was asked whether, in a taxing statute applying to the whole of the United Kingdom and allowing for deductions from and allowances against the income of land vested in trustees for charitable purposes, the words ‘charitable purposes’ . .
CitedIn re Macduff; Macduff v Macduff CA 1896
Lindley LJ qualified the judgment of Lord Macnaghten in Pemsel: ‘Now Sir Samuel Romilly did not mean, and I am certain Lord Macnaghten did not mean, to say that every object of public general utility must necessarily be a charity. Some may be, and . .
CitedWilliams’ Trustees v Inland Revenue Commisioners HL 1947
A trust was created by the memorandum and articles of association of a company. The overall objects of the company were to promote Welsh interests in London. The principal object of the trust was to create a centre in London ‘for promoting the moral . .
CitedIn Re Strakosch 1949
The court may construe a gift as impliedly limited to charitable purposes. Lord Greene MR said: ‘In Williams’ Trustees v Inland Revenue Commissioners the House of Lords has laid down very clearly that in order to come within Lord Macnaghten’s fourth . .
CitedScottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society v Glasgow Corporation HL 26-Jul-1967
The appellants sought partial exemption from rates on its premises. The Corporation challenged their charitable status. The society’s object was to encourage and provide facilities for cremation.
Held: The object was charitable.
Lord Reid . .
CitedIncorporated Council of Law Reporting For England And Wales v Attorney-General And Others CA 14-Oct-1971
The Council sought charitable status for its activities of reporting the law. The Revenue appealed against the decision by Foster J that the Council ought to be registered as a charity.
Held: The appeal failed. The company should have . .
Appeal FromHelena Partnerships Limited v HM Revenue and Customs UTTC 6-Apr-2011
UTTC Registered Social Landlord – objects for ‘benefit of the community’ – whether charity – no – availability of relief under s 505 Taxes Act – no . .
At FTTTxHelena Housing Ltd v Revenue and Customs FTTTx 1-Feb-2010
FTTTx CORPORATION TAX – ASSESSMENT – DEDUCTION FOR EXPENDITURE – Was the expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for its Schedule A business – No – Was the Appellant a Charity – No – Appeal dismissed . .
CitedWilliams’ Trustees v Inland Revenue Commisioners HL 1947
A trust was created by the memorandum and articles of association of a company. The overall objects of the company were to promote Welsh interests in London. The principal object of the trust was to create a centre in London ‘for promoting the moral . .
CitedGeneral Nursing Council for England and Wales v St Marylebone Borough Council HL 1959
The court considered how to decide whether the Council could claim exemption from rates.
Held: The court should restrict its consideration to the purposes as set out and not look to the actual activities. The relevant clause had as its main . .
CitedInland Revenue Commissioners v McMullen CA 1979
The Football Association had set up a trust to promote football in universities and schools, claiming this was charitable under the 1958 Act.
Held: The trust was not charitable whether as being for the advancement of education, or in the . .
CitedIn re South Place Ethical Society 1980
The court considered the meaning and nature of religious belief, and whether a trust for this purpose could be charitable.
Held: Dillon J referred to Russell LJ as having taken the view that the court could hold that there are purposes ‘so . .
CitedInland Revenue Commissioners v McMullen HL 6-Mar-1980
HL Charity – Promotion of sport – Trust created ‘to organise or provide or assist in the organisation and provision of facilities which will enable and encourage pupils of schools and universities in any part of . .
CitedAl-Mehdawi v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 23-Nov-1989
The applicant, a student had overstayed his leave. Through his solicitor’s negligence, he lost his appeal against deportation. He sought judicial review of that decision.
Held: Judgment obtained in a party’s absence due entirely to the fault . .
CitedAttorney General of the Caymen Islands and others v Even Wahr-Hansen PC 26-Jun-2000
(Caymen Islands) A memorandum of agreement that proceeds of a trust fund should be paid to ‘any one or more religious, charitable or educational institutions . . or . . operating for the public good’ was not charitable since it the objects were not . .
CitedKendall v Granger CA 2-Jul-1842
Bequest of personalty to trustees, to be ‘applied for the relief of domestic distress, assisting indigent but deserving individuals, or encouraging undertakings of general utility.’ Held, void as a charitable bequest. . .
CitedTomlinson v Congleton Borough Council and others HL 31-Jul-2003
The claimant dived into a lake, severely injuring himself. The council appealed, arguing that it owed him no duty of care under the Act since he was a trespasser. It had placed warning signs to deter swimmers.
Held: The council’s appeal . .
CitedThe Attorney-General v Aspinall 4-Jul-1836
Municipal corporations hold their property for public charitable purposes. . .
CitedIn Re Estlin 1903
A home of rest was to be provided for lady teachers.
Held: This was a valid charitable bequest. . .
CitedAttorney General v De Winton 1906
The Borough operated using all its borrowing powers. Its accounts were conducted in the name of its treasurer. The accounts were properly audited. A burgess complained at the payment of the interest on the loan accounts to the treasurer for payment . .
CitedIn Re James 1932
A legacy for the setting up and operation of a home of rest for the sisters of a religious community was a valid charitable bequest, on the basis that it was to be provided for persons in need of such a facility or amenity. . .
CitedIn re Compton; Powell v Compton CA 1945
The court considered the charitable status of a trust ‘for the education of Compton and Powell and Montague children’.
Held: It was not charitable. If the group of beneficiaries is distinguishable from other members of the community by a . .
CitedOppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd HL 13-Dec-1950
Trustees were directed to apply certain income in providing for ‘the education of children of employees or former employees’ of a British limited company or any of its subsidiary or allied companies. The number of eligible employees was over . .
CitedRe Sanders 1954
A legacy to provide dwellings for the working classes and their families resident in the area of Pembroke Dock or within a radius of five miles, with preference for dockworkers and their families, was not a charitable bequest, because the class of . .
CitedInland Revenue Commissioners v Oldham Training and Enterprise Council ChD 11-Oct-1996
The court was asked whether Oldham TEC was established for exclusively charitable purposes. The Commisioners now appealed against a finding that tey were.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The promotion of commerce is not capable of being a . .
CitedJoseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Housing Association Ltd v Attorney-General 1983
Housing associations wished to build self-contained dwellings for sale to the elderly. The court was asked whether such activity would be charitable in nature.
Held: The proposed schemes were charitable. They were for the relief of the aged, . .

Cited by:
CitedPendragon Plc and Others v HM Revenue and Customs CA 23-Jul-2013
The Revenue had imposed a penalty on the appellants saying that their arrangement for the sale and VAT taxation of demonstrator cars was, in European law terms. The taxpayer sought re-instatment of the First Tier Tribunal judgment in its favour.
Charity, Housing

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.456517

Neville Estates Ltd v Madden: ChD 1962

A charitable trust was created for the benefit of the members of Catford Synagogue.
Held: The court considered three categories of valid non-charitable purpose gifts: (1) an absolute gift to members of an association at the date of the gift, under which the members take as joint tenants, and any member can sever his share; or (2) a trust for the members at the date of the gift, subject to their contractual rights and liabilities towards one another as members of the association.
Cross J said that: ‘a donor does not direct a special application of his gift unless he subjects it to a trust which prevents the governing body of the charity from using it for its general purposes. The fact that he expects it to be used – and that it is in fact used – for a special purpose is not enough.’
Cross J identified three ways in which a gift to an unincorporated association such as a sports club could take effect: ‘In the first place, it may, on its true construction, be a gift to the members of the association at the relevant date as joint tenants, so that any member can sever his share and claim it whether or not he continues to be a member of the association. Secondly, it may be a gift to the existing members not as joint tenants, but subject to their respective contractual rights and liabilities towards one another as members of the association. In such a case a member cannot sever his share. It will accrue to the other members on his death or resignation, even though such members include persons who became members after the gift took effect. If this is the effect of the gift, it will not be open to objection on the score of perpetuity or uncertainty unless there is something in its terms or circumstances or in the rules of the association which precludes the members at any given time from dividing the subject of the gift between them on the footing that they are solely entitled to it in equity.
Thirdly, the terms or circumstances of the gift or the rules of the association may show that the property in question is not to be at the disposal of the members for the time being, but is to be held in trust for or applied for the purposes of the association as a quasi-corporate entity. In this case the gift will fail unless the association is a charitable body.’

Cross J
[1962] Ch 832
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedLeahy v Attorney-General of New South Wales PC 20-Apr-1959
leahy_agnswPC1959-4
A gift to an unincorporated association simpliciter, i.e. where neither the circumstances of the gift nor the directions given nor the object expressed impose on the donee the character of a trustee, is nothing else than a gift to its members at the . .

Cited by:
ApprovedRe Recher’s Will Trusts ChD 1972
The deceased gave a share of the residue, to ‘The Anti-Vivisection Society, 76 Victoria Street, London S.W.1.’ She died in 1962 and her husband died in 1968. Until the end of 1956 a non-charitable unincorporated society, known as the ‘London and . .
CitedHunt and Another v McLaren and others ChD 4-Oct-2006
Land had been given to a football club under a trust for its exclusive use as such. That land was sold and a new ground acquired and a stadium built, but the land was subject to restrictive covenenats limiting its use to sports, which considerably . .
CitedRe Lipinski’s Will Trusts ChD 1976
Harry Lipinski bequeathed his residuary estate on trust as to half for the Hull Judeans (Maccabi) Association to be used solely to construct and improve the new buildings for the association. The executors sought a determination whether the bequest . .
CitedRe Grant’s Will Trusts ChD 1980
The deceased left property to the Labour Party property committee.
Held: A trust created by making a gift to the members of an unincorporated assoication as at the date of the gift can be wound up only if under the rules, the members could, at . .
CitedHunt and Another v McLaren and others ChD 4-Oct-2006
Land had been given to a football club under a trust for its exclusive use as such. That land was sold and a new ground acquired and a stadium built, but the land was subject to restrictive covenenats limiting its use to sports, which considerably . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Trusts, Charity

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.245259

The New Deer Community Association v Revenue and Customs: FTTTx 11 Nov 2014

FTTTx ZERO RATING – Construction – Construction of a building intended for use for a relevant charitable purpose – building described as a new pavilion – whether use as a village hall or similarly in providing social or recreational facilities for a local community – In Part – whether available to the whole community to an extent of non sporting, social or recreational use – Yes – whether limited to members of the community who participate in sport and therefore constitute a special interest group – No – Schedule 8, Group 5, Notes (2), (6) and (10), VATA 1994. Appeal allowed in part.

[2014] UKFTT 1028 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Construction, Charity, VAT

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.539023

The Vestryman of The Parish of St Marylebone In Middlesex v The Zoological Society Of London: 31 May 1854

The Zoological Society was incorporated by Charter ‘for the advancement of Zoology and Animal Physiology, and the introduction of new and curious subjects of the animal kingdom.’ They occupied land on which were buildings appropriated as receptacles for housing animals and birds, and as a museum for stuffed specimens. Three acres, not so appropriated, were cultivated as a flower garden. Refreshment rooms on the premises were occupied for the purpose of supplying refreshment to visitors, by M, who paid to the Society a rent for this privilege. The public were admitted, to the grounds, either by paying money upon each admittance, or by ticketa given to them by the fellows. Once in the weeks for three months in tbe year, the Society procured the attendance of a musical band.
Held: The Society was not exempt from rates, under stat. 6 and 7 Vict. c. 36, s. 1, the premises not being occupied exclusively for the purposes of science. The Society was supported in part by annual contributions from the fellows and subscribers. Each fellow was entitled to personal admission, with a specified number of companions on, every day, and could also give admission at oertain times by written orders and tickets, to which he was entitled: and fellows were also entitled to purchase tickets giving free admission to the bearer. Subscribers also were entitled to purchase annually an ivory ticket, admitting a named person of their family, with a companion,. Semble: that the annual contributions by the felloes were not voluntary contributions within the meaning of sect 1, inasmuch as the fellows and subscribers obtained a benefit not purely scientific, in consideration of the payments.

[1854] EngR 566, (1854) 3 El and Bl 807, (1854) 118 ER 1343
Commonlii
England and Wales

Charity, Rating

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.293423

Regina v Charity Commission for England and Wales ex parte Swain: Admn 2 Jul 1998

The applicant sought an order of certiorari to prevent an investigation of his companies which sought to raise funds for charities. Did the Charity Commission have jurisdiction under the section?
Held: The companies were themselves charities and clearly raised funds by proclaiming that the funds were being raised for charities. The moneys raised and held were subject to a charitable trust, and the Commission had jurisdiction to investigate.

[1998] EWHC Admin 698
Charities Act 1993 8

Charity

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.138819

The Pollen Estate Trustees Ltd Kings College London v HM Revenue and Customs: UTTC 3 Aug 2012

UTTC STAMP DUTY LAND TAX – Charities and Minister of the Crown relief – whether reliefs apply to interest in land acquired by a charity or Minister of the Crown as a tenant in common pursuant to a purchase made through a bare trustee on behalf of the charity or Minister and other non-charitable or Crown joint owners – No FA2003 sections 42 to 44,48 ,49,55, 75A, 76,77,85,103,107,117 and Schedules 8 and 16.

Warren J
[2012] UKUT 277 (TCC)
Bailii
Finance Act 2003
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromThe Pollen Estate Trustee Company Ltd and Another v HM Revenue and Customs CA 26-Jun-2013
The court was asked ‘If a charity acquires property in furtherance of its charitable purposes, or as an investment, it is entitled to relief against liability to pay stamp duty land tax (SDLT) on the purchase price.’
Held: The modern approach . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Stamp Duty, Charity

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.466691

Dingle v Turner and Others: HL 16 Feb 1972

Gift to Specified person not Charitable

The testator left part of his property on charitable trusts for the relief of the poverty of ‘the poor employees’ of a company. The appellant argued that it was not a charitable gift, and that the gift failed.
Held: The purpose will not be charitable if the intention is to make a gift to a specified person, even if it is a gift to alleviate poverty. Here, the intention of the gift was to benefit the poor generally who fell within a certain description, rather than certain individuals. Since they were a ‘section of the public’, the gift was charitable and did not fail. (Majority) The fiscal advantages obtained by making a gift charitable should not be taken into account in assessing its motives and charitable status.
Lord Cross of Chelsea said: ‘In truth the question whether or not the potential beneficiaries of a trust can fairly be said to constitute a section of the public is a question of degree and cannot be by itself decisive of the question whether the trust is a charity. Much must depend on the purpose of the trust. It may well be that, on the one hand, a trust to promote some purpose, prima facie charitable, will constitute a charity even though the class of potential beneficiaries might fairly be called a private class and that, on the other hand, a trust to promote another purpose, also prima facie charitable, will not constitute a charity even though the class of potential beneficiaries might seem to some people fairly describable as a section of the public . . To establish a trust for the education of the children of employees in a company in which you are interested is no doubt a meritorious act; but however numerous the employees may be the purpose which you are seeking to achieve is not a public purpose.’

Viscount Dilhorne, Lord MacDermott, Lord Hodson, Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Cross of Chelsea
[1972] 2 WLR 523, [1972] UKHL 2, [1972] AC 601
lip, Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
ApprovedIn re Scarisbrick’s Will Trusts, Cockshott v Public Trustee CA 1951
Possible Charity for poor persons within an area
The court was asked whether a trusts for poor persons within a restricted category, the testator’s descendants, not meeting the usual requirement that the benefits be available to a wider section of the community, may be held charitable.
Held: . .
CitedIn re Compton; Powell v Compton CA 1945
The court considered the charitable status of a trust ‘for the education of Compton and Powell and Montague children’.
Held: It was not charitable. If the group of beneficiaries is distinguishable from other members of the community by a . .
CriticisedOppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd HL 13-Dec-1950
Trustees were directed to apply certain income in providing for ‘the education of children of employees or former employees’ of a British limited company or any of its subsidiary or allied companies. The number of eligible employees was over . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Wills and Probate

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.174317

Liverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v Attorney-General: ChD 1981

Charitable Company is Trustee of Assets

The court was asked as to the distribution of surplus assets of a charitable company which was in winding up, and the question whether or not s 257 et seq. Companies Act 1948 applied, including s 265 which made provision for the distribution of surplus assets to members.
Held: The position of a charitable company in relation to its assets had ‘at all times been analogous to that of a trustee for charitable purposes’ and that that ‘suffices to give rise to the jurisdiction of the court to order a cy-pres scheme’. Slade J ordered a cy-pres scheme on the basis that the jurisdiction to do that was not limited to a case where there was a strict trust, and applied on the facts because the association’s constitution obliged the assets to be held for charitable purposes.
Slade J said: ‘The expressions ‘trust’ and ‘trust property’ may be, and indeed have been, used by the court in rather different senses in different contexts. Examples of cases where the court has used the expression otherwise than in their strict traditional sense are to be found in Lord Diplock’s review of certain earlier authorities in Ayerst v C. and K. (Construction) Ltd. [1976] AC 167, 179-180[7]. In a broad sense a corporate body may no doubt aptly be said to hold its assets as a ‘trustee’ for charitable purposes in any case where the terms of its constitution place a legally binding restriction upon it which obliges it to apply its assets for exclusively charitable purposes. In a broad sense it may even be said, in such a case, that the company is not the ‘beneficial owner’ of its assets. In my judgment, however, none of the authorities on which Mr Mummery has relied, including the decision in Construction Industry Training Board v Attorney-General [1973] Ch 173 , establish that a company formed under the Companies Act 1948 for charitable purposes is a trustee in the strict sense of its corporate assets, so that on a winding up these assets do not fall to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of section 257 et seq. of that Act. They do, in my opinion, clearly establish that such a company is in a position analogous to that of a trustee in relation to its corporate assets, such as ordinarily to give rise to the jurisdiction of the court to intervene in its affairs; but that is quite a different matter.’

Slade J
[1981] Ch 193, [1981] 1 All ER 994, [1981] 2 LR 379, (1980) 125 SJ 79
Companies Act 1948 257 265
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedVon Ernst and Cie SA v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1979
The assets of a corporate charity were held on charitable trusts: ‘We were referred to certain authorities which give support to the view that a company incorporated for exclusively charitable purposes is in the position of a trustee of its funds or . .

Cited by:
CitedHope Community Church (Wymondham) v Phelan and Others ChD 22-May-2020
The Church, a private company limited by guarantee, sought a declaration that it had the right to enfranchise its church premises under the 1920 Act. . .
CitedThe Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) v Attorney General and Others ChD 9-Jun-2017
The court considered the propriety of a payment made by a charitable company to a director for her loss of office. The charity was to transfer a substantial sum to a new charity headed by the departing director.
Held: The court approved the . .
CitedLehtimaki v The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) and Others CA 6-Jul-2018
A charity established by H and W wanted to transfer part of its fund to a new charity headed by W in return for her resignation from the first charity on the breakdown of the marriage. Court approval was sought for a transfer, but the remaining . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Company

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.652836

Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd: HL 13 Dec 1950

Trustees were directed to apply certain income in providing for ‘the education of children of employees or former employees’ of a British limited company or any of its subsidiary or allied companies. The number of eligible employees was over 110,000. Charitable status was claimed.
Held: The trust was not charitable. The nexus, that of being employment by particular employers, did not satisfy the test of public benefit to establish the trust as a charitable trust.
Lord Simonds said: ‘The question is whether that class of persons can be regarded as such a ‘section of the community’ as to satisfy the test of public benefit. These words ‘section of the community’ have no special sanctity, but they conveniently indicate first, that the possible (I emphasize the word ‘possible’) beneficiaries must not be numerically negligible, and secondly, that the quality which distinguishes them from other members of the community, so that they form by themselves a section of it, must be a quality which does not depend on their relationship to a particular individual. It is for this reason that a trust for the education of members of a family or, as in In re Compton [1945] Ch 123, of a number of families cannot be regarded as charitable. A group of persons may be numerous but, if the nexus between them is their personal relationship to a single propositus or to several propositi, they are neither the community nor a section of the community for charitable purposes.’
He remarked that whilst the law of charity is pervaded with illogicalities: ‘It must not, I think, be forgotten that charitable institutions enjoy rare and increasing privileges, and that the claim to come within that privileged class should be clearly established.’

Lord Simonds, Lord Normand, Lord Oaksey, Lord Morton of Henryton, Lord MacDermott
[1951] AC 297 HL(E), [1950] UKHL 2, [1951] 1 All ER 31
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedVerge v Somerville PC 1924
On an appeal from New South Wales, The Board considered the validity of a gift ‘to the trustees’ of the Repatriation Fund or other similar fund for the benefit of New South Wales returned soldiers’.
Held: Trusts for education and religion do . .

Cited by:
CriticisedDingle v Turner and Others HL 16-Feb-1972
Gift to Specified person not Charitable
The testator left part of his property on charitable trusts for the relief of the poverty of ‘the poor employees’ of a company. The appellant argued that it was not a charitable gift, and that the gift failed.
Held: The purpose will not be . .
CitedInland Revenue Commissioners v Glasgow Police Athletic Association HL 9-Mar-1953
The House was asked whether the taxpayer association was established for ‘Charitable purposes only’ so as to benefit from tax exemptions. The association promoted sporting activities among members of the Glasgow police.
Held: Though the . .
CitedHelena Partnerships Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs CA 9-May-2012
The company had undertaken substantial building works and sought associated tax relief. The court was asked whether, following a change in the company’s memorandum and articles of association, the company, a registered social landlord, remained a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.181284

Kennedy v The Charity Commission: SC 26 Mar 2014

The claimant journalist sought disclosure of papers acquired by the respondent in its conduct of enquiries into the charitable Mariam appeal. The Commission referred to an absolute exemption under section 32(2) of the 2000 Act, saying that the exemption continued until the papers were destroyed, or for 20 years under the 1958 Act.
Held: The claim failed. As a matter of ordinary common law construction, the construction is clear: section 32 was intended to provide an absolute exemption which would not cease abruptly at the end of the court, arbitration or inquiry proceedings, but would continue until the relevant documents became historical records; that however does not mean that the information held by the Charity Commission as a result of its inquiries may not be required to be disclosed outside section 32 under other statutory and/or common law powers preserved by section 78 of the FOIA. The claim had been argued on the basis that section 32 of the FOIA can and should be read down to have a meaning contrary to that which Parliament clearly intended. It followed that no basis existed for any declaration of incompatibility with article 10 of the Convention.

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath, Lord Toulson
[2014] UKSC 20, [2015] 1 AC 455, [2014] EMLR 19, [2014] HRLR 14, [2014] WLR(D) 143, [2014] 2 All ER 847, [2014] 2 WLR 808, UKSC 2012/0122
Bailii, SC, SC Summary
Freedom of Information Act 2000 32(2), Public Records Act 1958 3, Charities Act 1993, Charities Act 2006, European Convention on Human Rights 2 10, Inquiries Act 2005
England and Wales
Citing:
At Information TribunalKennedy v Information Commissioner IT 14-Jun-2009
The claimant sought release of documents placed with the Charity Commission in connection with investigations into a charity.
Held: With certain exceptions, the applicaion failed: ‘once a public authority places documents it held prior to an . .
At AdminKennedy v Information Commissioner Admn 19-Jan-2010
The claimant journalist had made a freedom of information request to the Charity Commission as to its investigations of a charity under section 8 of the 1993 Act. The Commission claimed absolute exemption under section 32(2). He now appealed against . .
Appeal fromKennedy v The Information Commissioner and Another CA 12-May-2011
The claimant, a journalist, sought further information from the Charity Commission after the release of three investigations into the ‘Mariam Appeal’ and questions about the source and use of its funds. The Commission replied that it was exempt . .
CitedGuardian News and Media Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court CA 3-Apr-2012
The newspaper applied for leave to access documents referred to but not released during the course of extradition proceedings in open court.
Held: The application was to be allowed. Though extradition proceedings were not governed by the Civil . .
CitedAli Shipping Corporation v Shipyard Trogir CA 19-Dec-1997
In the case of an arbitration, there is a strong contractual presumption in favour of confidentiality and against non-disclosure. But this may be overridden by a court where necessary to protect a party’s rights against a third party or in other . .
CitedDepartment of Economic Policy and Development of City of Moscow and Another v Bankers Trust Company and Another CA 25-Mar-2004
The word ‘private’ in rule 39.2 means the same as ‘secret’. Lord Justice Mance said: ‘It may be equated with the old ‘in camera’ procedure, rather than the old ‘in chambers’ procedure.’ Privacy and confidentiality are features long assumed to be . .
CitedDoherty and others v Birmingham City Council HL 30-Jul-2008
The House was asked ‘whether a local authority can obtain a summary order for possession against an occupier of a site which it owns and has been used for many years as a gipsy and travellers’ caravan site. His licence to occupy the site has come to . .
CitedKay And Others v United Kingdom ECHR 17-Oct-2008
. .
CitedManchester City Council v Pinnock SC 3-Nov-2010
The tenant had been secure but had his tenancy had been reduced to an insecure demoted tenancy after he was accused of anti-social behaviour. He had not himself been accused of any misbehaviour, but it was said that he should have controlled his . .
CitedAttorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (‘Spycatcher’) HL 13-Oct-1988
Loss of Confidentiality Protection – public domain
A retired secret service employee sought to publish his memoirs from Australia. The British government sought to restrain publication there, and the defendants sought to report those proceedings, which would involve publication of the allegations . .
CitedDerbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others HL 18-Feb-1993
Local Council may not Sue in Defamation
Local Authorities must be open to criticism as political and administrative bodies, and so cannot be allowed to sue in defamation. Such a right would operate as ‘a chill factor’ on free speech. Freedom of speech was the underlying value which . .
CitedCrampton v Secretary of State for Health CA 9-Jul-1993
. .
CitedRegina v Secretary of State for Health, Ex Parte Wagstaff etc QBD 31-Aug-2000
The Secretary of State announced a public enquiry into the Shipman case. He did not say whether it would be a public enquiry. The bereaved families and media wanted it to be public, and contended that it had been invalidly constituted, that an . .
CitedRegina (Persey and Others) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Admn 15-Mar-2002
The applicants sought an order that the government enquiries into the foot and mouth outbreak should be held in public. They argued that the need to re-establish public faith made a decision not to hold the enquiries in public irrational, and that a . .
CitedRegina v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Bugdaycay HL 19-Feb-1986
Three applicants had lied on entry to secure admission, stayed for a considerable time, and had been treated as illegal immigrants under section 33(1). The fourth’s claim that upon being returned he would been killed, had been rejected without . .
CitedRegina v Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith; ex parte Grady CA 3-Nov-1995
Four appellants challenged the policy of the ministry to discharge homosexuals from the armed services.
Held: Where a measure affects fundamental rights or has profoundly intrusive effects, the courts will anxiously scrutinise the decision to . .
CitedSmith and Grady v The United Kingdom ECHR 27-Sep-1999
The United Kingdom’s ban on homosexuals within the armed forces was a breach of the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life. Applicants had also been denied an effective remedy under the Convention. The investigations into . .
CitedRegina (on the Application of Q and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 18-Mar-2003
The Home Secretary appealed a ruling that his implementation of section 55 was unlawful, having been said to be incompatible with human rights law.
Held: The way in which the section had been operated, by denying consideration and all benefits . .
CitedOffice of Fair Trading and others v IBA Health Limited CA 19-Feb-2004
The OFT had considered whether it was necessary to refer a merger between two companies to the Competition Commission, and decided against. The Competition Appeal Tribunal held that the proposed merger should have been referred. The OFT and parties . .
CitedRegina v Secretary of State for Health ex parte Eastside Cheese Company (a Firm) and R A Duckett and Co Interested CA 1-Jul-1999
The respondent had made an order banning the processing of milk products from the interested party’s farm into cheese products. Cheese manufacturers objected to the order. The order had been held unlawful, and the Secretary of State now appealed. . .
CitedSinclair Collis Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v The Secretary of State for Health CA 17-Jun-2011
The claimants sought to challenge the validity of rules brought in under the 2009 Act as to the placement of cigarette vending machines in retail outlets. They said it was a a national measure restricting the free movement of goods. The . .
CitedRegina v Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food and Another Ex Parte First City trading Etc QBD 20-Dec-1996
EU law principles do not apply in domestic law unless implementing EU law. Laws J said that: ‘Wednesbury and European review are two different models – one looser, one tighter -of the same juridical concept, which is the imposition of compulsory . .
CitedLeander v Sweden ECHR 26-Mar-1987
Mr Leander had been refused employment at a museum located on a naval base, having been assessed as a security risk on the basis of information stored on a register maintained by State security services that had not been disclosed him. Mr Leander . .
CitedGaskin v The United Kingdom ECHR 7-Jul-1989
The applicant complained of ill-treatment while he was in the care of a local authority and living with foster parents. He sought access to his case records held by the local authority but his request was denied.
Held: The refusal to allow him . .
CitedGuerra and Others v Italy ECHR 19-Feb-1998
(Grand Chamber) The applicants lived about 1km from a chemical factory which produced fertilizers and other chemicals and was classified as ‘high risk’ in criteria set out by Presidential Decree.
Held: Failure by a government to release to an . .
CitedRoche v The United Kingdom ECHR 19-Oct-2005
(Grand Chamber) The claimant had been exposed to harmful chemicals whilst in the Army at Porton Down in 1953. He had wished to claim a service pension on the basis of the ensuing personal injury, but had been frustrated by many years of the . .
CitedSecretary of State for Defence v Al-Skeini and others (The Redress Trust Intervening) HL 13-Jun-2007
Complaints were made as to the deaths of six Iraqi civilians which were the result of actions by a member or members of the British armed forces in Basra. One of them, Mr Baha Mousa, had died as a result of severe maltreatment in a prison occupied . .
CitedSecretary of State for the Home Department v AF AN and AE (No 3) HL 10-Jun-2009
The applicants complained that they had been made subject to non-derogating control orders as suspected terrorists, but that the failure to inform them of the allegations or evidence against them was unfair and infringed their human rights. The . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Defence and Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening) SC 30-Jun-2010
The deceased soldier died of heat exhaustion whilst on active service in Iraq. It was said that he was owed a duty under human rights laws, and that any coroner’s inquest should be a fuller one to satisfy the state’s duty under Article 2.
CitedRabone and Another v Pennine Care NHS Foundation SC 8-Feb-2012
The claimant’s daughter had committed suicide whilst on home leave from a hospital where she had stayed as a voluntary patient with depression. Her admission had followed a suicide attempt. The hospital admitted negligence but denied that it owed . .
CitedSugar v British Broadcasting Corporation and Another (2) SC 15-Feb-2012
The claimant sought release of a report prepared by the respondent as to its coverage of the Arab/Israel conflict partly for journalistic purposes, and partly for compliance.
Held: The appeal failed. Where the report was prepared even if only . .
CitedSmith and Others v The Ministry of Defence SC 19-Jun-2013
The claimants were PRs of men who had died or were severely injured on active duty in Iraq being variously fired at by mistake by other coalition forces, or dying in vehicles attacked by roadside bombs. Appeals were heard against a finding that the . .
CitedSturnham, Regina (on The Application of) v The Parole Board of England and Wales and Another (No 2) SC 3-Jul-2013
From 4 April 2005 until 3 December 2012, English law provided for the imposition of sentences of imprisonment for public protection (‘IPP’). The Court addressed the practical and legal issues resulting from the new system.
Held: The decision . .
CitedMatky v Czech Republic ECHR 10-Jul-2006
(French Text) Members of an environmental group sought access to the original project documents lodged with a government department. They wanted to compare the plans with revised plans which were currently the subject of an environmental assessment. . .
CitedTarsasag A Szabadsagjogokert v Hungary ECHR 13-Nov-2008
The Hungarian Civil Liberties Union sought access to details of a legal challenge filed by a Hungarian parliamentarian in the Hungarian Constitutional Court concerning the constitutionality of legislative amendments to the Hungarian Criminal Code. . .
CitedKenedi v Hungary ECHR 26-May-2009
(Second Chamber) The applicant historian specialised in the analysis and recording of the secret services of dictatorships, comparative studies of the political police forces of totalitarian regimes and the functioning of Soviet-type States. The . .
CitedGillberg v Sweden ECHR 2-Nov-2010
The applicant, professor in adolescent psychiatry had collected assorted data after having given undertakings to the parents of the children as to its absolute privacy. A sociologist had applied for and been given authority for its release by the . .
CitedShapovalov v Ukraine ECHR 31-Jul-2012
The claimant, a Ukrainian journalist said that he had (contrary to the Ukranian Information Act 1992) been refused access by administrative authorities during the 2004 elections to certain information and meetings. He relied on article 6 because the . .
CitedYouth Initiative For Human Rights v Serbia ECHR 25-Jun-2013
The Court heard of a refusal by the Serbian intelligence agency to provide the complainant with information as to how many people had been the subject of electronic surveillance by the agency. The Serbian Information Commissioner – whose role was to . .
CitedOsterreichische Vereinigung Zur Erhaltung, Starkung Und Schaffung v Austria ECHR 28-Nov-2013
All agricultural and forest land transactions in Austria required approval by local and regional authorities (in the Tyrol, the Tyrol Real Property Transactions Commission), the aim being to preserve land for agriculture and forestry and avoid the . .

Cited by:
CitedSandiford, Regina (on The Application of) v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs SC 16-Jul-2014
The appellant a British Citizen awaited execution in Singapore after conviction on a drugs charge. The only way she might get legal help for a further appeal would be if she was given legal aid by the respondent. She sought assistance both on Human . .
CitedA v British Broadcasting Corporation (Scotland) SC 8-May-2014
Anonymised Party to Proceedings
The BBC challenged an order made by the Court of Session in judicial review proceedings, permitting the applicant review to delete his name and address and substituting letters of the alphabet, in the exercise (or, as the BBC argues, purported . .
CitedYoussef v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs SC 27-Jan-2016
An Egyptian national, had lived here since 1994. He challenged a decision by the Secretary of State,as a member of the committee of the United Nations Security Council, known as the Resolution 1267 Committee or Sanctions Committee. The committee . .
CitedMichalak v General Medical Council and Others SC 1-Nov-2017
Dr M had successfully challenged her dismissal and recovered damages for unfair dismissal and race discrimination. In the interim, Her employer HA had reported the dismissal to the respondent who continued their proceedings despite the decision in . .
CitedDover District Council v CPRE Kent SC 6-Dec-2017
‘When a local planning authority against the advice of its own professional advisers grants permission for a controversial development, what legal duty, if any, does it have to state the reasons for its decision, and in how much detail? Is such a . .
CitedAhuja v Politika Novine I Magazini Doo and Others QBD 23-Nov-2015
Action for misuse of private information and libel. Application to have set aside leave to serve out of the jurisdiction. The defendant published a newspaper in Serbian, in print in Serbia and online. Though in Serbian, the claimant said that online . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Information, Human Rights

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.523195

Harris v Revenue and Customs: FTTTx 18 Aug 2010

FTTTx Income tax – gift aid – s 25 FA 1990 – gifts to charity under deed of variation of a deceased’s estate – s 142 IHTA 1984 – – whether gift a qualifying donation – whether donors received a benefit in consequence of making the gifts – s 25(2)(e) FA 1990.

Berner J
[2010] UKFTT 385 (TC)
Bailii
Finance Act 1990 25, Inheritance Tax Act 1984 142(1), Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 62(6)
England and Wales

Income Tax, Charity

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.422354

Z and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Hackney London Borough Council and Another: SC 16 Oct 2020

Housing Orthodox Jewish Only not Discriminatory

Hackney had statutory housing functions as to allocating social housing. It also nominated applicants to properties owned by housing associations, including AIHA, which only accepted for such nominations households belonging to the Orthodox Jewish community. Hackney identified the First Appellant (Z), who is not a member of the Orthodox Jewish community, as having the highest level of housing need in the borough due to the vulnerability of her children (one of whom, RS, is the Second Appellant). Hackney agreed to make Z a ‘direct offer’ of the next available and suitable unit of permanent social housing. However, suitable housing was not provided until February 2019. Between October 2017 and February 2019, AIHA allocated various properties to members of the Orthodox Jewish community. The Appellants did not apply for, and Hackney did not nominate them for, any of those properties because of AIHA’s policy of only letting to Orthodox Jewish households.
The Appellants challenged AIHA’s allocation policy and Hackney’s allocation arrangements with AIHA by judicial review. The Divisional Court refused the application and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The Court was now asked whether the Housing Charity acted unlawfully or not in restricting access to its stock of social housing.
Held: Section 158 and 193 allowed certain limited exemption to the general prohibition of discrimination for protected characteristics. The actions of the Housing Association, and therefore the Council fell within those exemptions.

Lord Reed, President, Lord Kerr, Lady Arden, Lord Kitchin, Lord Sales
[2020] UKSC 40
Bailii, Bailii Press Summary, Bailii Issues and Facts
Equality Act 2010 158 193, Council Directive 2000/43/EC, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedMarleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA ECJ 13-Nov-1990
Sympathetic construction of national legislation
LMA OVIEDO sought a declaration that the contracts setting up Commercial International were void (a nullity) since they had been drawn up in order to defraud creditors. Commercial International relied on an EC . .
Appeal from (CA)Z and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v London Borough of Hackney and Another CA 27-Jun-2019
A charitable institution was set up to provide and did provide housing assistance to members of the Orthodox Jewish Community. The court was now asked whether this discrimination was lawful. . .
At First Instance (Admn)Z and Others, Regina (on The Application of) v Hackney London Borough Council and Another Admn 4-Feb-2019
The claim challenges the arrangements made by AIHA for the allocation of social housing properties owned or controlled by AIHA, which in present circumstances in effect preclude any persons who are not members of the Orthodox Jewish community from . .
CitedE, Regina (on The Application of) v Governing Body of JFS and Another SC 16-Dec-2009
E complained that his exclusion from admission to the school had been racially discriminatory. The school applied an Orthodox Jewish religious test which did not count him as Jewish because of his family history.
Held: The school’s appeal . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Discrimination, Charity, European

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.654666

Lehtimaki and Others v Cooper: SC 29 Jul 2020

Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties

A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was obtained, but the court ordered the remaining non-interested director to vote in favour of the transaction. He appealed successfully against that order, and W now herself appealed.
Held: The appeal raised several issues.
Lady Arden discussed whether L was a fiduciary when acting as a member of CIFF. The defining characteristic of a fiduciary is that he has a single duty to his trustor. A member of a charitable company has that duty, the company itself being in a position of trustee. The position of the member was as under a trust given shape by statute and the company’s own constitution.
The application having been made to the court to approve such an arrangement, the Court’s answer governed the decision on what was in the charity’s best interests, and therefore the member no longer retained discretion to vote against it, and had to work to implement it. If the member disagreed, his remedy was to appeal.
Lady Arden, dissenting, saying that the fiduciary duty was in its nature subjective, and could not be ousted in favour of an objective direction.
Lady Arden confirmed the capacity of the Court to direct a member’s vote under section 217 of the 2006 Act.

Lord Reed, President, Lord Wilson, Lord Briggs, Lady Arden, Lord Kitchin
[2020] UKSC 33
Bailii, Press Summary, Issues and Facts
Companies Act 2006 217, Charities Act 2011 201
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re The French Protestant Hospital ChD 1951
The charity was an incorporated body created by a Royal Charter granted in 1718. The governor and directors sought to exercise a power conferred on them by the charter to amend the byelaws to enable the directors’ professional firms to be . .
CitedVon Ernst and Cie SA v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1979
The assets of a corporate charity were held on charitable trusts: ‘We were referred to certain authorities which give support to the view that a company incorporated for exclusively charitable purposes is in the position of a trustee of its funds or . .
CitedLiverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v Attorney-General ChD 1981
Charitable Company is Trustee of Assets
The court was asked as to the distribution of surplus assets of a charitable company which was in winding up, and the question whether or not s 257 et seq. Companies Act 1948 applied, including s 265 which made provision for the distribution of . .
CitedThe Attorney-General, at The Relation of W Izard v Brown, And Forty-Seven Others 3-Apr-1818
The Crown has a role as parens patriae or protector of charities.
Lord Eldon LC said: ‘It is the duty of the King, as parens patriae, to protect property devoted to charitable uses; and that duty is executed by the officer who represents the . .
CitedJohn Shaw and Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw 1935
The members of a company cannot interfere with the decisions of the trustees and directors unless they amend the articles to enable them to do so. . .
CitedRe Egerton Trust Retirement Benefit Scheme ChD 2000
(No Date) Robert Walker J identified four categories of case in which the court has to consider actions taken or to be taken by trustees, as follows:-
‘ . . it seems to me that, when the court has to adjudicate on a course of action proposed . .
CitedPublic Trustee v Cooper 2001
The court looked at the circumstances required when a court was asked to approve a proposed exercise by trustees of a discretion vested in them. The second category of circumstances was (quoting Robert Walker J): ‘Where the issue was whether the . .
At First InstanceThe Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) v Attorney General and Others ChD 9-Jun-2017
The court considered the propriety of a payment made by a charitable company to a director for her loss of office. The charity was to transfer a substantial sum to a new charity headed by the departing director.
Held: The court approved the . .
Appeal from (CA)Lehtimaki v The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) and Others CA 6-Jul-2018
A charity established by H and W wanted to transfer part of its fund to a new charity headed by W in return for her resignation from the first charity on the breakdown of the marriage. Court approval was sought for a transfer, but the remaining . .
CitedHope Community Church (Wymondham) v Phelan and Others ChD 22-May-2020
The Church, a private company limited by guarantee, sought a declaration that it had the right to enfranchise its church premises under the 1920 Act. . .
CitedPender v Lushington CA 1877
After stating that the Court would not restrain the exercise of certain votes by members of a company merely because the holder of the votes had a motive for voting them which the Court might not approve, his Lordship said: ‘I am confirmed in that . .
CitedThe North-West Transportation Company and James Hughes Beatty v Henry Beatty and Others PC 21-Jul-1887
(Canada) . .
CitedAllan v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd CA 19-Feb-1900
The company had altered its articles so as to give itself a lien on paid up shares in respect of the failure of the shareholder to pay calls on other shares which had not been fully paid up. The effect of the amendment was to alter the contractual . .
CitedArbuthnott v Bonnyman and Others CA 20-May-2015
Appeal from refusal of unfair prejudice petition.
After listing cases: ‘I would extract from them the following principles:
(1) The limitations on the exercise of the power to amend a company’s articles arise because, as in the case of . .
CitedNorthern Counties Securities Ltd v Jackson and Steeple Ltd ChD 1974
Walton J reiterated that, when a shareholder is voting for or against a particular resolution, he is voting as a person owing no fiduciary duty to the company and who is exercising his own right of property to vote as he thinks fit. . .
CitedLetterstedt v Broers PC 22-Mar-1884
(Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope) Lack of harmony may be of itself a good reason for a trustee to resign or be dismissed. Lord Blackburn approved a passage in Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, s 1289: ‘But in cases of positive misconduct, courts . .
CitedBolton v Madden QBD 25-Nov-1873
The Court of Queen’s Bench on appeal from the Lord Mayor’s Court held that they could ‘find no legal principle to justify us in holding that the subscriber to a charity may not give his votes as he pleases’. Blackburn J said that ‘The general rule . .
CitedSEC v Chenery Corporation 1-Feb-1943
(United States Supreme Court) Frankfurter J held: ‘to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?’ . .
CitedGoldcorp Exchange Ltd and others v Liggett and others PC 25-May-1994
(New Zealand) The non allocated claimants purchased gold bullion from a company for future delivery on a non allocated basis. The company stored and insured the metal, but the claimants had a right to call for delivery of their part within 7-days. . .
CitedBolton v Madden QBD 25-Nov-1873
The Court of Queen’s Bench on appeal from the Lord Mayor’s Court held that they could ‘find no legal principle to justify us in holding that the subscriber to a charity may not give his votes as he pleases’. Blackburn J said that ‘The general rule . .
CitedMothew (T/a Stapley and Co) v Bristol and West Building Society CA 24-Jul-1996
The solicitor, acting in a land purchase transaction for his lay client and the plaintiff, had unwittingly misled the claimant by telling the claimant that the purchasers were providing the balance of the purchase price themselves without recourse . .
CitedF and C Alternative Investments (Holdings) Ltd v Barthelemy and Another (No 2) ChD 14-Jul-2011
The court was asked as to the fiduciary obligations owed by members of the board of a limited liability company.
Held: Sales J said that: ‘there is nothing in the Act to qualify the usual fiduciary obligations which an agent owes his principal . .
CitedGrimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) 21-Feb-2012
Federal Court of Australia
CORPORATIONS – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9 – ‘director’ – ‘officer’ – de facto director – no single test for determining whether a person is such – assuming or performing the functions of a director of the . .
CitedChinachem Charitable Foundation Ltd v The Secretary for Justice 18-May-2015
(Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong) Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe NPJ referred to a proposed scheme as ‘a written instrument approved by the court to regulate, in whole or in part, the future management and administration of the trust’ . .
CitedIncome Tax Special Commissioners v Pemsel HL 20-Jul-1891
Charitable Purposes used with technical meaning
The House was asked whether, in a taxing statute applying to the whole of the United Kingdom and allowing for deductions from and allowances against the income of land vested in trustees for charitable purposes, the words ‘charitable purposes’ . .
CitedNational Anti-Vivisection League v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 2-Jul-1947
The main object of the Society was political viz, the repeal of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, and for that reason the Society was not established for charitable purposes only and was not entitled to exemption from tax. An organisation whose aims . .
CitedConstruction Industry Training Board v Attorney-General CA 1973
The principal issue was whether a body set up by statute and subject to the control of a minister of the Crown was a ‘charity’ within the meaning of section 45(1) of the Charities Act 1960, for which purpose it had to be subject to ‘the control of . .
CitedArmitage v Nurse; etc CA 19-Mar-1997
A clause in a trust deed may validly excuse trustees from personal liability for even gross negligence. The trustee was exempted from liability for loss or damage ‘unless such loss or damage shall be caused by his own actual fraud’.
Held: The . .
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .
CitedEx Parte Lacey 5-Feb-1802
Trustee Not To purchase Property of Trust
Lord Eldon held that equity imposed stringent duties on persons who were appointed trustees of trusts and that these duties were imposed with ‘relentless jealousy’ in order to ensure that trustees fulfilled their duties, and that trustees had to be . .
CitedCitibank Na and Another v QVT Financial Lp CA 22-Jan-2007
Securitisation of Channel Tunnel debts.
The controlling noteholder of a series of notes issued by the company and secured by a trust deed argued that its extensive powers, while its notes remained outstanding, to direct the trustee of the . .
CitedStanway v Attorney-General CA 5-Apr-2000
Sir Richard Scott V-C said: ‘Charities operate within a framework of public law, not private law. The Crown is parens patriae of the charity and the judges of the courts represent the Crown in supervising what the charity is doing and in giving . .
CitedArklow Investments Ltd and Another v Maclean and Others PC 1-Dec-1999
PC (New Zealand) Land was offered for sale. A potential buyer, the appellant was approached by a merchant bank with a proposal for finance. When he sought finance elsewhere, a company associated with the bank . .
CitedAssenagon Asset Management Sa v Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd ChD 27-Jul-2012
The court considered the right of a company member to vote as he wishes. Briggs J said: ‘The basis for the application of that principle in relation to powers conferred on majorities to bind minorities is traditionally described as arising from . .
CitedThe Attorney-General v The Dean and Canons of Christ Church CA 28-Mar-1822
Devise to the Dean and Canons of Christ Church in trust to constitute and support a grammar school at P, to appoint a master and usher, and pay them certain salaries; and the Dean and Canons to direct the management of the school.
Held: 1 That . .
CitedAttorney-General v The Bishop Of Worcester 8-Nov-1851
If a scheme for the regulation of a charity, settled by a decree, does not operate beneficially for the charity, and the attorney-general considers that the interests of the charity would, consistently with the foundation, usage and law, be promoted . .
CitedGirls Public Day School Trust v Minister of Community and Country Planning ChD 1951
A company was formed for the purpose of establishing in England, public day schools for the education of girls. The position on the day appointed by the minister of Town and Country planning under the 1947 Act, section 119, namely July 18th 1948, . .
CitedChapman v Chapman HL 25-Mar-1954
It was suggested to the House that: ‘A judge of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice has an inherent jurisdiction, in the execution of the trusts of a settlement, to sanction, on behalf of infant beneficiaries and unborn persons, a . .
CitedRe Royal Society’s Charitable Trusts 1956
The Society, a charitable company regulated by statute, requested that it be permitted inter alia, to consolidate various different trust funds of which it was trustee for investment and accounting purposes.
Held: The application did not come . .
CitedIn re J W Laing Trust ChD 1984
The trust was first created in 1922 with a gift of 15,000 shares worth pounds 15,000 ‘the proceeds of which and the dividends thereon from time to time declared and paid … to be devoted to charitable purposes, it being understood that the capital . .
CitedIn re Steed CA 26-Jan-1960
The court considered an application under the 1968 Act to vary a trust. The testator had shown in the terms of his will a particular purpose in creating a protective trust; that was to protect the life tenant from improvident dealings with property . .
CitedRe Ashton Charity CA 3-May-1856
The Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to alien the real estate of a charity, and it can do so upon an application under Sir Samuel Romilly’s Act: ‘upon an information, the Court of Chancery has a general jurisdiction, as incident to the . .
CitedThe Attorney-General v The Governors Of The Free Grammar School Of Queen Elizabeth In Dedham The Attorney-General v Ellis The Attorney-General v Grignon In The Matters Of The 52 Geo 3, C 101, The Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, And Of The Several Speci 30-Jan-1857
The jurisdiction of the court was not ousted where the charity obtained a charter subsequent to its founding . .
CitedEx Parte The Governors Of Christ’s Hospital 10-Dec-1864
. .
CitedAttorney General v British Museum ChD 27-May-2005
The trustees brought a claim against the Attorney-General seeking clarification of their duties and powers to return objects which were part of the collection in law, but where a moral duty might exist to return it to a former owner. Here drawings . .
CitedClephane and Others v Magistrates of Edinburgh SCS 30-Oct-1869
This case came before the Court on a petition by the defenders, dated 21st May 1869, to apply the judgment of the House of Lords. The Kirk-session lodged a minute, asserting their interest in the matter, and craving to be sisted as parties to the . .
CitedAndrews v McGuffog 1886
Applications to court – partial decree not granted – directions where scheme of founder cannot be carried out – commingling of different funds
Pursuers in an actio popularis in re a public trust have no right to demand a partial decree which . .
CitedHampden v Buckinghamshire (Earl of) ChD 24-Apr-1893
(ChD and CA) By sect. 11 of the Settled Land Act, 1890 (which Act and the Settled Land Act, 1882, are to be read and construed together as one Act): ‘Where money is required for the purpose of discharging an incumbrance on the settled land or part . .
CitedAttorney-General v Governors of Christ’s Hospital 3-Mar-1896
The Attorney-General proposed a scheme to except certain endowments from the 1869 Act. They would be made over to another governing body in augmentation of the endowments held by them subject to the provisions of that Act.
Held: The court . .
CitedRoyal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Attorney-General and others ChD 26-Jan-2001
The right to freedom of association could be exercised by a society choosing to remove from its membership individuals who held views which it saw as inimical to its purposes. Such a removal did not infringe the members’ rights of freedom of speech. . .
CitedIn re Steed CA 26-Jan-1960
The court considered an application under the 1968 Act to vary a trust. The testator had shown in the terms of his will a particular purpose in creating a protective trust; that was to protect the life tenant from improvident dealings with property . .
CitedIn re S (an infant) CA 1965
A boy was received into the care of the local authority in 1954, when he was 5 weeks old. The local authority entrusted him to foster parents, who signed an agreement that the boy could be removed from them when required by an authorised person. In . .
CitedAttorney General v Haberdashers’ Company 7-May-1791
Where a surplus to be distributed is an uncertain sum, the Master ought to report the shares in aliquot parts, not in money. The only way of administering a charity is under general direction to trustees; in case of misbehaviour there must be a new . .
CitedAttorney-General, At The Relaion Of Barrett And Hayman v The Mayor, Bailiffs, And Commonalty Of The City Of Exeter, Defendants 10-Mar-1826
Semble. It is not a general rule of a court of equity, that a charitable gift for the benefits of the poor is to be confined to such poor as do not receive parish relief. Where trustees of a charity, under an instrument of doubtful construction, . .
CitedRandell, In re; Randell v Dixon ChD 10-Feb-1888
A testatrix bequeathed pounds 14,000 on trust to pay the income to the incumbent of the church at H. for the time being so long as he permitted the sittings to be occupied free : in case payment for sittings was ever demanded, she directed the . .
CitedGarnham v PC and Others 13-Mar-2012
(Royal Court – Samedi) . .
CitedCowan v Scargill and Others ChD 13-Apr-1984
Trustee’s duties in relation to investments
Within the National Coal Board Pension scheme, the trustees appointed by the NCB were concerned at the activities of the trustees of the miners, and sought directions from the court. The defendants refused to allow any funds to be invested abroad. . .
CitedMcPhail v Doulton (on appeal from In re Baden’s Deed Trusts) HL 6-May-1970
The settlor asked whether the test for validity, in point of certainty of objects, is the same for trusts and powers, or whether the test for trusts is more demanding.
Held: The test is the same. The context was a provision, held to be a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Company

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.652834

Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Britain v Charity Commission: Admn 12 Dec 2014

The respondent had instigated a statutory inquiry under the 2011 Act into the claimant’s child safeguarding practices, and policies after compaints made to it. The Society now sought judicial review of that decision, and to production orders made to support it. The respondent argued that the Charity should first use the statutory remedies available to it in the First Tier Tribunal.
Held: The matter would clearly require consideration of assorted Human Rights issues, but the First tier tribunal would be able to include such matters. The courtw as accordingly satisfied that the discretion to allow judicial review should not be exercised.

Dove J
[2014] EWHC 4135 (Admin)
Bailii
Charities Act 2011 46
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBaker, Regina (on the Application of) v Devon County Council CA 21-Dec-1992
The plaintiffs appealed against orders dismissing claims for judicial review. They had challenged the intended closure of residential homes for old people. The plaintiffs said that there had been inadequate consultation, and the Councils argued that . .
CitedLeech v Governor of Parkhurst Prison HL 1988
The House was asked whether a disciplinary decision by a governor was amenable to judicial review.
Held: The functions of a governor adjudicating upon disciplinary charges are separate and distinct from his functions in running the prison; . .
CitedRegina v Devon County Council Ex Parte Baker, Regina v Durham County Council Ex Parte Broxson CA 22-Feb-1993
A Local Authority considering closing a residential home did not have a duty to notify and consult with each resident who might be affected, but did have a duty to act fairly, and to give sufficiently prominent notice and sufficient time to allow . .
CitedShoesmith, Regina (on The Application of) v OFSTED and Others CA 27-May-2011
The claimant appealed against dismissal of her claim. She had been head of Child Services at Haringey. After the notorious violent death of Baby P, the Secretary of State called for an inquiry under the Act. He then removed her as director. She . .
CitedRegina (Great Yarmouth Port Company Limited) v Marine Management Organisation CA 2013
There is a presumption that the bespoke statutory regime will be deployed unless there are clear and powerful reasons which exceptionally justify judicial review being permitted. . .
CitedWillford, Regina (on The Application of) v Financial Services Authority (FSA) CA 13-Jun-2013
Where a separate specialist statutory regime has been established by Parliament, there would need to be powerful reasons or exceptional circumstances to bypass that regime and permit an application for judicial review.
The Court considered and . .
CitedWillford, Regina (on The Application of) v Financial Services Authority (FSA) CA 13-Jun-2013
Where a separate specialist statutory regime has been established by Parliament, there would need to be powerful reasons or exceptional circumstances to bypass that regime and permit an application for judicial review.
The Court considered and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Judicial Review

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.542591

The Pollen Estate Trustee Company Ltd and Another v HM Revenue and Customs: CA 26 Jun 2013

The court was asked ‘If a charity acquires property in furtherance of its charitable purposes, or as an investment, it is entitled to relief against liability to pay stamp duty land tax (SDLT) on the purchase price.’
Held: The modern approach to statutory construction is to have regard to the purpose of a particular provision and interpret its language, so far as possible, in a way which best gives effect to that purpose. Where a charity contributed to the purchase of a property, to be held on trust for it and other, non-charitable, contributors in proportion to their contributions, the ‘chargeable interest acquired’ by reference to which stamp duty land tax was to be levied was the equitable estate collectively acquired by the beneficiaries under the trust. However, paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 8 to the 2003 Act was exempted the land transaction from charge to the extent of the charity’s interest.

Laws, McFarlane, Lewison LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 753, [2013] 1 WLR 3785, [2013] STC 1479, [2013] 3 All ER 742, [2013] WLR(D) 255, [2013] BTC 606, [2013] 27 EG 91, [2013] WTLR 1593, [2013] STI 2298
Bailii, WLRD
Finance Act 2003 42(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromThe Pollen Estate Trustees Ltd Kings College London v HM Revenue and Customs UTTC 3-Aug-2012
UTTC STAMP DUTY LAND TAX – Charities and Minister of the Crown relief – whether reliefs apply to interest in land acquired by a charity or Minister of the Crown as a tenant in common pursuant to a purchase made . .

Cited by:
CitedBogdanic v The Secretary of State for The Home Department QBD 29-Aug-2014
The claimant challenged fines imposed on him after three illegal immigrants were found to have hidden in his lorry in the immigration control zone at Dunkirk. The 1999 At was to have been amended by the 2002 Act, and the implementation was by the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Stamp Duty, Constitutional

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.511088

Kennedy v The Information Commissioner and Another: CA 12 May 2011

The claimant, a journalist, sought further information from the Charity Commission after the release of three investigations into the ‘Mariam Appeal’ and questions about the source and use of its funds. The Commission replied that it was exempt under section 32. The claimant appealed against the finding of a blanket exemption, and continued after completion of the inquiry for which it had been obtained. Did the section refer to the purpose of obtaining the document, or that for which it was held (but no longer).
Held: The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted to the Tribunal to consider the Human Rights arguments now raised. The grammar of the section was ambiguous or favoured the claimant. Nevertheless, the Act included provision for the release of documents after thirty years, which provision would be largely unnecessary if the claimant’s argument applied: ‘The controversy is put to rest when reference is made to section 18(3) of the Inquiries Act 2005 which cannot be construed otherwise than as taking effect as an amendment of section 32(2) of FoIA. There would have been no need to pass it otherwise. The need to construe the exemptions restrictively cannot displace the true meaning. Thus, for the reasons largely given by Mr Beer [for the respondent] whose submissions I prefer on these points of the conventional approach to construction, I would have dismissed the appeal.’
However the appellant now raised a persuasive argument under the Convention, and ‘(1) Although the point was not argued before the appeal tribunal there is an understandable reason for that omission. Both judgments of the Strasbourg Court upon which Mr Coppel relies were only delivered at or about the time of the hearing before the tribunal and were not reported until later. These cases are Tarsasag a Szabadsagjogokert v Hungary [2009] ECHR 618 decided on 24th March or 14th April 2009 and apparently finalised only on 14th July 2009 and Kenedi v Hungary [2009] ECHR 78, (2009) BHRC 335 which was dated 26th May 2009. Although the arguments is late, it is not so late that we should ignore these very recent and potentially important new developments of Strasbourg jurisprudence.
(2) The present case is moreover an ideal one for the Article 10 point to be tested. Important and difficult questions are raised in the counter-argument of Mr Beer. If the appellant has to rely on his status as a journalist to bring Article 10 into play, should the Court be reading section 32(2) down when it would not be obliged to do so were the applicant an ordinary citizen not able as the public watchdog to invoke Article 10? Mr Beer submits that the FoIA is ‘applicant and motive blind’. Another important question is whether the Charity Commission hold an information monopoly which may be the necessary pre-condition to establish before Article 10 can be engaged: see Tarsasag. If Article 10 is engaged and interfered with is such interference justified and proportionate? All these matters may require further evidence.
(3) It is unlikely, at least so far as concerns the Charity Commission, that a better case for analysing the Convention point will arise again in the near future. If, as we are told, the Charity Commission are considering changing their rules to reflect more accurately procedures adopted by the courts for disclosure of information, then it would be helpful they did so with the implications of the Human Rights Act known in advance.
(4) The matters which the appellant seeks to investigate are obviously matters of general public interest and his investigation may be totally thwarted if his case fails as it would if we refused to countenance the Human Rights argument.
(5) If section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires the reading down of section 32(2) then my hesitations about the proper construction to place upon that subsection, and the more firmly expressed disenchantment of Jacob LJ, can be assuaged. ‘
Ward LJ, with whom Etherton J agreed, considered that section 32(1) and section 63(1) of the FOIA and section 18(3) of the Inquiries Act 2005 supported that conclusion. Jacob LJ rested his conclusion solely on the basis of section 32 itself.

Ward, Jacob, Etherton LJJ
[2011] EWCA Civ 367, [2011] EMLR 24
Bailii
Freedom of Information Act 2000 1 32, Inquiry Rules 2006, Inquiries Act 2005 18(3), European Convention on Human Rights 2 10
England and Wales
Citing:
At ITKennedy v Information Commissioner IT 14-Jun-2009
The claimant sought release of documents placed with the Charity Commission in connection with investigations into a charity.
Held: With certain exceptions, the applicaion failed: ‘once a public authority places documents it held prior to an . .
Appeal fromKennedy v Information Commissioner Admn 19-Jan-2010
The claimant journalist had made a freedom of information request to the Charity Commission as to its investigations of a charity under section 8 of the 1993 Act. The Commission claimed absolute exemption under section 32(2). He now appealed against . .
CitedTurco v Council (Law Governing The Institutions) ECFI 23-Nov-2004
ECJ Openness – Public access to Council documents – Partial refusal of access – Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 – Exceptions. . .
CitedCommon Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner HL 9-Jul-2008
An MP had asked the Agency under the 2002 Act for details of all incidents of childhood leukaemia for both sexes by year from 1990 to 2003 for all the DG (Dumfries and Galloway) postal area by census ward. The Agency replied by saying that the . .
CitedSweden v API and Commission (Law Governing The Institutions) ECJ 21-Sep-2010
ECJ (Grand Chamber) Appeals – Right of access to documents of the institutions – Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 – Second and third indents of Article 4(2) – Pleadings lodged by the Commission in proceedings before . .
CitedFetherstonhaugh (formerly Finch) v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1985
. .
CitedKenedi v Hungary ECHR 26-May-2009
(Second Chamber) The applicant historian specialised in the analysis and recording of the secret services of dictatorships, comparative studies of the political police forces of totalitarian regimes and the functioning of Soviet-type States. The . .
CitedBeaufort Developments (NI) Limited v Gilbert-Ash NI Limited and Others HL 26-Feb-1998
The contractual ability given to an arbitrator under standard JCT terms did not oust the court from assessing and prejudging the acts of the architect under a building contract. As to the means for interpreting documents, Lord Hoffmann said: ‘I . .
CitedTarsasag A Szabadsagjogokert v Hungary ECHR 14-Apr-2009
The court upheld a complaint by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union that, contrary to article 10, it had been refused access to details of a complaint in connection with drugs policy on the basis that details of the complaint could not be released, . .
CitedKennedy v Information Commissioner Admn 19-Jan-2010
The claimant journalist had made a freedom of information request to the Charity Commission as to its investigations of a charity under section 8 of the 1993 Act. The Commission claimed absolute exemption under section 32(2). He now appealed against . .

Cited by:
See AlsoKennedy v Charity Commission CA 20-Mar-2012
The claimant sought disclosure of an investigation conducted by the respondent. The respondent replied that the material was exempt within section 32(2). The court had found that that exemption continued permanently even after the inquiry was . .
Appeal fromKennedy v The Charity Commission SC 26-Mar-2014
The claimant journalist sought disclosure of papers acquired by the respondent in its conduct of enquiries into the charitable Mariam appeal. The Commission referred to an absolute exemption under section 32(2) of the 2000 Act, saying that the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Information, Charity, Human Rights

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.439736

Williams’ Trustees v Inland Revenue Commisioners: HL 1947

A trust was created by the memorandum and articles of association of a company. The overall objects of the company were to promote Welsh interests in London. The principal object of the trust was to create a centre in London ‘for promoting the moral social spiritual and educational welfare of Welsh people and fostering the study of the Welsh language and of Welsh history literature music and art.’ The House was asked whether the objects were charitable.
Held: Where a gift states an express purpose, that purpose must itself be charitable; and a non-charitable purpose trust cannot be validated by localising the gift. The property was not vested in the trustees for charitable purposes only, and consequently the company was not a charitable company.
Lord Simonds referred to the cases on charitable gifts to localities: ‘But I would suggest that it is possible to justify as charitable a gift to ‘my country England’ upon the ground that, where no purpose is defined, a charitable purpose is implicit in the context; it is at least not excluded by the express prescription of ‘public’ purposes. Where the gift is localized but the nature of the benefit is defined, no reconciliation is possible except on the assumption that the particular purpose was in each case regarded as falling within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the statute of Elizabeth, though I find it difficult to ascribe this quality to the benefit taken by the freemen of Saltash.’
He noted: ‘cases in which the question of charity has come before the courts are legion and no one who is versed in them will pretend that all the decisions even of the highest authority are easy to reconcile.’

Lord Simonds
[1947] UKHL 1, [1947] AC 447, [1947] 1 All ER 513
Bailii
Statute of Charitable Uses 1601
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGibbs v Harding and others ChD 12-Jan-2007
The testatrix left a will anticipating making another. The court was asked whether a clause leaving her estate to ‘be taken over by the Diocese of Westminster to hold in trust for the Black community of Hackney’ was valid.
Held: The gift was . .
CitedIn Re Strakosch 1949
The court may construe a gift as impliedly limited to charitable purposes. Lord Greene MR said: ‘In Williams’ Trustees v Inland Revenue Commissioners the House of Lords has laid down very clearly that in order to come within Lord Macnaghten’s fourth . .
CitedHelena Partnerships Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs CA 9-May-2012
The company had undertaken substantial building works and sought associated tax relief. The court was asked whether, following a change in the company’s memorandum and articles of association, the company, a registered social landlord, remained a . .
CitedHelena Partnerships Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs CA 9-May-2012
The company had undertaken substantial building works and sought associated tax relief. The court was asked whether, following a change in the company’s memorandum and articles of association, the company, a registered social landlord, remained a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.247695

Park v Cho and Others: ChD 24 Jan 2014

The parties disputed the chairmanship of a charity. The claimant succeeded, but a third party later intervened saying that permission had not first been obtained from the Charity Commission as required. The defendant now appealed against the lifting of the stay after the claimant had received permission.
Held: The objection failed. Authority could be granted retrospectively. The practice of granting retrospective leave for proceedings has long been well-established in English cases. The phrase ‘the taking of proceedings’ would make little sense unless interpreted to include ‘initiating or commening proceedings’. ‘Taking of proceedings’ was possible in the course of an action which had already been commenced.
The Commission did not itself consider that it could grant retrospective consent, but the order made by the Charity Commission was a permissible order, authorising the taking of a step in the existing proceedings, albeit that the order did not authorise the proceedings from their inception.

Jeremy Cousins QC
[2014] EWHC 55 (Ch), [2014] PTSR 769, [2014] WLR(D) 27
Bailii, WLRD
Charities Act 2011 115
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re Saunders (A Bankrupt) ChD 1997
Very emphatic language was required in a statute before want of leave should, without more, result in proceedings being treated as a nullity. Leave could in appropriate circumstances be granted after the event notwithstanding the proceedings had . .
CitedRendall v Blair 1890
Where a statute requires leave to commence proceedings to be granted, a failure to obtain such consent does not automatically render the proceedings a nullity.
Bowen LJ said: ‘this section is not framed in the way in which sections are framed . .
CitedStrachan v The Gleaner Company Limited and Stokes PC 25-Jul-2005
PC (Jamacia) The plaintiff challenged an order setting aside a default assessment of damages in his claim for defamation. After the action was lost, two witnesses had come forward who might have allowed a defence . .
CitedSimpson v Eggington 9-Feb-1855
It is a good answer to a plea of set-off, that the amount has heen paid by a person professing to act as agent for and on account of the plaintiff, though without his authority, and that the latter ratified the act at the time of the trial. The . .
CitedThe Attorney-General, At The Relation Of Joseph Greenhill v Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge; Trinity College, Oxford, And Frederick Greenhill 4-May-1865
Lord Chelmsford LC said, of an argument by that college that the leave of the Charity Commissioners ought to have been obtained to the plaintiff’s proceedings but had not been, that: ‘The objection if persisted in must prevail, but in that case [he] . .
CitedGray v Raper CCP 1866
The defendants had given promissory notes to a friendly society, which came to be dissolved. An action was brought for recovery of the debts, but without the necessary permission first.
Held: The failure was not one to be taken advantage of in . .
CitedGlen v Gregg 1882
. .
CitedIn re Wanser Ltd 1891
A landlord of Scottish property began proceedings after a winding up order for sequestration of the company’s goods on the premises in order to answer for future rent.
Held: North J allowed the sequestration to continue, being satisfied that . .
CitedRegina v Lord Mayor of London; Ex parte Boaler QBD 1893
Boaler had brought unsuccessful proceedings in the Lord Mayor’s Court against a company, and was ordered to pay its costs. When he failed to pay them, an order of commitment was made against him. He applied for certiorari, alleging, inter alia, that . .
CitedIn re Hutton (A Bankrupt), Mediterranean Machine Operations Ltd v Haigh and Others ChD 1969
Proceedings were instituted against a trustee in bankruptcy after he had seized an aircraft claimed by the plaintiff.
Held: There is no right to sue an officer of the court in another court, without the sanction of the court, which appointed . .
CitedSeal v Chief Constable of South Wales Police HL 4-Jul-2007
The claimant had sought to bring proceedings against the respondent, but as a mental patient subject to the 1983 Act, had been obliged by the section first to obtain consent. The parties disputed whether the failure was a procedural or substantial . .
CitedAdorian v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis CA 23-Jan-2009
The claimant received injuries when arrested. He was later convicted of resisting arrest. The defendant relied on section 329 of the 2003 Act. The claimant said that the force used against him was grossly disproportionate. The commissioner appealed . .
CitedIn re Ford’s Charity 6-Jul-1855
A new scheme for the development of a new school which had not previously been considered by the court did not amount to a matter pending, even though another scheme in respect of the same charity funds had been so considered. He held that it was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Litigation Practice

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.520824

Simpson and Others (Trustees of the East Berkshire Sports Foundation) v Revenue and Customs: SCIT 19 Jan 2009

SCIT Income Tax – Donations to charity – Assessment made to recover income tax initially refunded, the recovery based on the claim that donations to an alleged charity had not ranked as qualifying donations under section 25 Finance Act 1990 – whether the alleged donations took the form of ‘a payment of a sum of money’ – whether the recipient of the donations was a charity – Appeal dismissed

[2009] UKSPC SPC00732, [2009] STI 514, [2009] STC (SCD) 226, [2009] WTLR 499
Bailii
Finance Act 1990 25
England and Wales

Income Tax, Charity

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.373748

Kennedy v Information Commissioner: Admn 19 Jan 2010

The claimant journalist had made a freedom of information request to the Charity Commission as to its investigations of a charity under section 8 of the 1993 Act. The Commission claimed absolute exemption under section 32(2). He now appealed against rejection of his application by the Information Tribunal as to most of the material sought.
Held: The claimant’s appeal failed. Though the Charity Commmissioner had a discretion to disclose materials gathered during an investigation, it had no obligation to do so. The exemption continued notwithstanding that the enquiry was now concluded.

Calvert Smith J
[2010] EWHC 475 (Admin), [2010] WLR (D) 6
Bailii, WLRD
Freedom of Information Act 2000 59, Charities Act 1993 8
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromKennedy v Information Commissioner IT 14-Jun-2009
The claimant sought release of documents placed with the Charity Commission in connection with investigations into a charity.
Held: With certain exceptions, the applicaion failed: ‘once a public authority places documents it held prior to an . .
CitedCommon Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner HL 9-Jul-2008
An MP had asked the Agency under the 2002 Act for details of all incidents of childhood leukaemia for both sexes by year from 1990 to 2003 for all the DG (Dumfries and Galloway) postal area by census ward. The Agency replied by saying that the . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromKennedy v The Information Commissioner and Another CA 12-May-2011
The claimant, a journalist, sought further information from the Charity Commission after the release of three investigations into the ‘Mariam Appeal’ and questions about the source and use of its funds. The Commission replied that it was exempt . .
Appeal fromKennedy v Charity Commission CA 20-Mar-2012
The claimant sought disclosure of an investigation conducted by the respondent. The respondent replied that the material was exempt within section 32(2). The court had found that that exemption continued permanently even after the inquiry was . .
CitedKennedy v The Information Commissioner and Another CA 12-May-2011
The claimant, a journalist, sought further information from the Charity Commission after the release of three investigations into the ‘Mariam Appeal’ and questions about the source and use of its funds. The Commission replied that it was exempt . .
At AdminKennedy v The Charity Commission SC 26-Mar-2014
The claimant journalist sought disclosure of papers acquired by the respondent in its conduct of enquiries into the charitable Mariam appeal. The Commission referred to an absolute exemption under section 32(2) of the 2000 Act, saying that the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Information

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.402727

McGovern v Attorney-General: ChD 1982

Amnesty International established a trust with a view to obtaining charitable status for some of its activities.
Held: The trust established to promote certain of its objects was not charitable because it was established for political purpose; however a trust for research into the observance of human rights and the dissemination of the results of such research could be charitable. Slade J refused a declaration that the Trust ought to be registered as a charity. He found that although a trust set up for the relief of human suffering and distress would be capable of being charitable in nature it would not be charitable if any of its main objects were of a political nature that: trusts for the purpose of seeking to alter the laws of the United Kingdom or a foreign country or persuading a country’s government to alter its policies or administrative decisions were political in nature; and that, accordingly, the object of the trust to secure the release of prisoners of conscience by procuring the reversal of governmental policy or decisions by lawful persuasion was of a political nature and since that object affected all the trusts of the trustee, the trust was not a charitable one. But the object clauses of the Trust set up by Amnesty were very different from the rules of Bangor and the decision seems to me clearly distinguishable.’

Slade J
[1982] 1 Ch 321, [1981] 3 All ER 493
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRegina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) HL 15-Jan-1999
A petition was brought to request that a judgment of the House be set aside because the wife of one their lordships, Lord Hoffmann, was as an unpaid director of a subsidiary of Amnesty International which had in turn been involved in a campaign . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.183295

Gilmour v Coats: HL 1949

Prayers Alone did not make Convent Charitable

A trust to apply the income of a fund for all or any of the purposes of a community of Roman Catholic Carmelite nuns living in seclusion and spending their lives in prayer, contemplation and penance, was not charitable because it could not be shown that it conferred any benefit on the public or on any section of the public. There is no proven or provable benefit to the community if the results of the contemplation are in no way communicated to the public’.
If religious beliefs are genuinely held, the ‘truth or falsity of religions is not the business of courts.’ The law of charity does not now favour one religion to another.
It would be unwise to regard charity law as a paradigm of rationality.
Lord Simonds said that charity law had been built up ‘not logically but empirically.’
Lord Simonds said: ‘I would speak with all respect and reverence of those who spend their lives in cloistered piety, and in this House of Lords Spiritual and Temporal, which daily commences its proceedings with intercessory prayers, how can I deny that the Divine Being may in His wisdom think fit to answer them? But, my Lords, whether 1 affirm or deny, whether I believe or disbelieve, what has that to do with the proof which the Court demands that a particular purpose satisfies the test of benefit to the community? Here is something which is manifestly not susceptible of proof. But, then it is said, this is a matter not of proof but of belief: for the value of intercessory prayer is a tenet of the Catholic faith, therefore in such prayer there is benefit to the community. But it is just at this ‘ therefore ‘ that I must pause. It is, no doubt, true that the advancement of religion is generally speaking one of the heads of charity. But it does not follow from this that the Court must accept as proved whatever a particular church believes. The faithful must embrace their faith believing where they cannot prove: the Court can act only on proof. A gift to two or ten or a hundred cloistered nuns in the belief that their prayers will benefit the world at large does not from that belief alone derive validity any more than does the belief of any other donor for any other purpose.’

Lord Reid, Lord Simonds
[1949] AC 426, [1949] UKHL 1, [1949] 1 All ER 848
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBourne v Keane HL 1919
Gift for Masses not Void for Superstition
An Irish Roman Catholic testator, domiciled in England, bequeathed 200 pounds to Westminster Cathedral for masses, and 200 pounds and his residuary personal Estate to the Jesuit Fathers of Farm Street, again for masses. The next of kin contended . .
CitedNational Anti-Vivisection League v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 2-Jul-1947
The main object of the Society was political viz, the repeal of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, and for that reason the Society was not established for charitable purposes only and was not entitled to exemption from tax. An organisation whose aims . .
CitedWhite, In re; White v White ChD 8-Feb-1893
A testator gave his property ‘to the [listed] religious societies, to be divided in equal shares among them,’ the particular objects not being named.
Held: (reversing Kekewich J) A bequest to a religious institution, or for a religious . .
CitedCocks v Manners ChD 26-Jul-1871
Testatrix, a married woman, bequeathed the residue of all her property, consisting of impure and pure personalty belonging to her separate use, to be divided equally between four religious institutions, two of them being the Dominican convent at C, . .
CitedHoare v Hoare 1887
It is not a charitable purpose to provide for Church of England services in a private chapel, nor Almshouses for estate labourers, nor for the education of estate children. . .
CitedDunne v Byrne PC 22-Feb-1912
Will – Construction – Charitable Bequest – Fund to be expended for the Good of
Religion – Religious Purposes.
Held, that a residuary bequest ‘to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane and his successors to be used and expended wholly . .
CitedIn re Hummeltenberg; Beatty v London Spiritualistic Alliance Limited ChD 1923
A testator by his will bequeathed 3,000 pounds to the London Spiritualistic Alliance Limited to form the nucleus of a fund for the purpose of establishing a college for the training and developing a suitable person’s male and female as mediums, . .
CitedIn re Caus; Lindeboom v Camille ChD 1934
A Roman Catholic testator by his will bequeathed 1,000 pounds for Masses, foundation and other and also devoted four houses ‘for one Foundation Mass to be said for my soul and the souls of my parents and relatives during the space of 25 years’ and . .

Cited by:
CitedVarsani and others v Jesani, Patel and Her Majesty’s Attorney-General CA 3-Apr-1998
A Hindu religious sect, constituted as a charity, had split into two factions.
Held: The court had jurisdiction to order that the assets of the sect should be divided under the powers in the Act, and held upon separate trusts for the two . .
CitedInland Revenue Commissioners v Glasgow Police Athletic Association HL 9-Mar-1953
The House was asked whether the taxpayer association was established for ‘Charitable purposes only’ so as to benefit from tax exemptions. The association promoted sporting activities among members of the Glasgow police.
Held: Though the . .
CitedGallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints HL 30-Jul-2008
The House considered whether certain properties of the Church were subject to non-domestic rating. Various buildings were on the land, and the officer denied that some fell within the exemptions, and in particular whether the Temple itself was a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.187521

Attorney-General v Pearson: 1817

No Alteration to Charty’s Objects

A protestant dissenters’ meeting house in Wolverhampton which was declared by a trust deed to be held for ‘the worship and service of God’ was the subject of a dispute between the schismatic congregation. The issue was the nature of the worship denoted by those words and the occasion was the ejection of a minister.
Held: Referring to Craigdallie, Lord Eldon said: ‘if any persons seeking the benefit of a trust for charitable purposes should incline to the adoption of a different system from that which was intended by the original donors and founders; and if others of those who are interested think proper to adhere to the original system, the leaning of the Court must be to support those adhering to the original system, and not to sacrifice the original system to any change of sentiment in the persons seeking alteration, however commendable that proposed alteration may be.’

Lord Eldon
(1817) 3 Mer 353, [1817] EngR 645, (1817) 3 Mer 353, (1817) 36 ER 135
Commonlii
England and Wales
Citing:
ExplainedCraigdallie v Aikman PC 14-Jun-2013
A chapel was acquired with the subscriptions of a congregation which seceded from the Church of Scotland in 1737 and subsequently split over whether a magistrate might suppress heresy. Each of the rival groups claimed that the chapel belonged to . .

Cited by:
Not followedVarsani and others v Jesani, Patel and Her Majesty’s Attorney-General CA 3-Apr-1998
A Hindu religious sect, constituted as a charity, had split into two factions.
Held: The court had jurisdiction to order that the assets of the sect should be divided under the powers in the Act, and held upon separate trusts for the two . .
CitedKhaira and Others v Shergill and Others CA 17-Jul-2012
The parties disputed the trusteeship and governance of two Gurdwaras (Sikh temples). The defendants now applied for the claim to be struck out on the basis that the differences were as to Sikh doctrines and practice and as such were unjusticiable. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Trusts

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.187518

Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales: UTTC 2 Nov 2012

TLC Provision of adoption services by a charity – discrimination against homosexuals and same sex couples who are potential adoptive parents – whether objectively justified under section 193 of the Equality Act 2010 – analogy with approach under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights – whether permission should be granted for amendment of the charity’s Memorandum of Association.

Sales J
[2012] UKUT 395 (TCC)
Bailii
Equality Act 2010 193, European Convention on Hman Rights 14
England and Wales

Charity, Human Rights, Adoption, Discrimination

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.466704

Routier and Another v Revenue and Customs: CA 16 Sep 2016

Executors appealed against a decision that a residual gift in a will was not charitable and that it was therefore subject to Inheritance Tax arguing that the section if construed in this way was an unlawful restriction on the free movement of captal. The revenue contended that the gift by a Jersey resident was to a Jersey Trust which was not solely charitable not being subject only to UK law.
Held: The authority as to the charity point was unassailable and the trustees’ appeal om that point failed. However, the court could not reconcile the question as to freedom of movement under European law, and it asked the parties to consider a question for referral to the European Court o Justice.

Moore-Bick VP CA, Tomlinson, Kitchin LJJ
[2016] EWCA Civ 938, [2016] WLR(D) 496
Bailii, WLRD
Inheritance Tax Act 1984 23, TFEU 63, Income Tax Act 2007 989
England and Wales
Citing:
At ChDRoutier and Another v Revenue and Customs ChD 18-Sep-2014
Executors appealed against rejection of their claim that a gift in the will qualified for relief against Inheritance Tax as being a charitable gift. The Trusts concerned assets in Jersey.
Held: The appeal failed: ‘The expression ‘held on trust . .
CitedCamille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1954
The Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to make an order with respect to a company registered in New York for objects which were charitable according to the laws of England.
Held: The Revenue’s appeal against a finding that the . .
CitedCamille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 1956
The company was a foreign corporation constituted according to the laws of the state of New York for objects which were exclusively charitable according to the law of the United Kingdom.
Held: The term ‘charity’ does not include an institution . .
CitedBarras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co HL 17-Mar-1933
The court looked at the inference that a statute’s draughtsman could be assumed when using a phrase to rely on a known interpretation of that phrase.
Viscount Buckmaster said: ‘It has long been a well established principle to be applied in the . .
CitedRoque v The Lieutenant Governor of Jersey ECJ 16-Jul-1998
(Judgment) Free movement of persons – Act of Accession 1972 – Protocol No 3 concerning the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man – Jersey . .
CitedHM Inspector of Taxes v Dextra Accessories Ltd HL 7-Jul-2005
The taxpayer companies had paid funds into a trust for employees. They sought to set off the payments against their liability to corporation tax. The revenue argued that they were deductible only in the year in which they were paid to the employees. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Inheritance Tax, Charity, European

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.569895

Royal College of Nursing v Borough of St Marylebone: CA 27 Oct 1959

The College sought exemption from rates in respect of a nurses’ home saying that its objects made it a charitable organisation. It was not conducted for profit, but appeared to have two main purposes.
Held: Each of the purposes must be charitable for the exemption to apply. The one at issue was the object ‘to promote the advance of nursing as a profession in all or any of its branches’,

Morris, Romer, Willmer LJJ
[1959] EWCA Civ 1, [1959] 3 All ER 663, [1959] 1 WLR 1077
Bailii
Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 8
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedOverseers of the Savoy v Art Union of London Limited QBD 1894
AL Smith LJ considered the objects of the company: ‘If the other object be only a means to the one end . . then the Society has a sole and exclusive object and not another object subsidiary thereto’. . .
CitedGeneral Nursing Council for England and Wales v St Marylebone Borough Council HL 1959
The court considered how to decide whether the Council could claim exemption from rates.
Held: The court should restrict its consideration to the purposes as set out and not look to the actual activities. The relevant clause had as its main . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Rating, Charity

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.262822

Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales and Another: ChD 17 Mar 2010

The charity appealed against refusal of permission to amend its charitable objects as set out in the memorandum of association. The charity was successful as an adoption agency particularly in placing children who would otherwise have had difficulty finding a home, following the principles of the Roman Catholic Church, and it wanted to restrict its services to married couples, excluding same-sex, unmarried and civil partner couples, taking advantage of the exception in regulation 18 of the 2007 Regulations, by expressly restricting those to whom it might provide a service. The Charity Tribunal had restricted its interpretation of ‘benefits’ in the Regulation to to those derived from a ‘pure charitable activity’. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) argued that the change would deprive the charity of a claim to charity status.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and the case was remitted to the Commission for reconsideration in accordance with the principles identified. The 2007 Regulations made provision to protect the Human Rights to freedom of religion, and that must be respected in its interpretation.
Whereas an ordinary trust is valid only if it exists for the benefit of a defined class of beneficiaries, a charitable trust is, by definition, a purpose trust. However ‘although general charity law . . is the primary source for the understanding of the meaning of public benefit, it is no longer to be presumed that any particular type of purpose is for the public benefit. Section 3 [1996 Act] . . contemplates that purposes commonly regarded as charitable, such as the advancement of religion or education, the relief of sickness or poverty, or the care of children in need, may not be for the public benefit, for example if they are sought to be achieved in a particular manner.’ An organisation proposing a purpose for the public benefit will only qualify as a charity if, taking into account any dis-benefit arising from its modus operandi, its activities nonetheless yield a net public benefit.
‘[T]he purpose behind all the relevant exceptions in the [2007] Regulations . . is to exclude from the general prohibition types of differential treatment on grounds of sexual orientation which would, in the view of Parliament (applying for that purpose an appropriate margin of appreciation) be justified in the sense which I have described, so as to fall short of discrimination contrary to Article 14.’
The purpose of Regulation 18 is to afford to charities an exception from the prohibition of differential treatment on grounds of sexual orientation, wherever the public purpose being (or to be) achieved by the charity in question constitutes an Article 14 justification for that differential treatment.

Briggs J
[2010] EWHC 520 (Ch), Times 13-Apr-2010, [2010] PTSR 1074
Bailii
Charities Act 1993 64, Equality Act 2006 81, Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 18, European Convention on Human Rights 13, Charities Act 2006 1(1)(a) 3, Sex Discrimination Act 1975 43(3)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedPepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart HL 26-Nov-1992
Reference to Parliamentary Papers behind Statute
The inspector sought to tax the benefits in kind received by teachers at a private school in having their children educated at the school for free. Having agreed this was a taxable emolument, it was argued as to whether the taxable benefit was the . .
CitedC v United Kingdom ECHR 15-Dec-1983
(Commission) ‘Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds, ie, the area which is sometimes called the forum of the internal. In addition, it protects acts which are intimately linked with these attitudes, such as . .
CitedKozak v Poland ECHR 2-Mar-2010
In relation to the justification of differential treatment on grounds of sexual orientation, the State’s margin of appreciation is narrow, and that the principle of proportionality requires that the measure chosen to realise the legitimate aim must . .
CitedLadele v London Borough of Islington CA 15-Dec-2009
The appellant was employed as a registrar. She refused to preside at same sex partnership ceremonies, saying that they conflicted with her Christian beliefs.
Held: The council’s decision had clearly disadvantaged the claimant, and the question . .
CitedEB v France ECHR 14-Mar-2007
A homosexual woman complained that she had not been allowed to adopt a child. Her application was rejected by the French administrative court on grounds based substantially upon her sexual orientation.
Held: The provision was an unlawful . .
CitedSalgueiro Da Silva Mouta v Portugal ECHR 21-Dec-1999
There was a difference in treatment between the applicant and a comparator based on the applicant’s sexual orientation, a concept which is undoubtedly covered by Article 14. The list set out in this provision is of an indicative nature and is not . .
CitedKarlheinz Schmidt v Germany ECHR 18-Jul-1994
Article 14 of the Convention operates not by way of the conferral of a freestanding right not to be discriminated against, but rather by way of complementing the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption, Discrimination, Charity, Human Rights

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.403332

Marwaha and Others v Singh and Others: ChD 18 Feb 2013

The claimants sought injunctions and declaratory relief relating to: (a) a purported amendment to the constitution of the Guru Tegh Bahadur Gurdwara (‘the charity’); (b) the completion of a new list of members of the charity; and (c) for amendment of the scheme applicable to the charity so as to facilitate an election of a new executive committee for the charity.

Peling QC HHJ
[2013] EWHC B6 (Ch), [2013] PTSR D14
Bailii
Cited by:
Appeal fromMarwaha v Singh and Others CA 6-Nov-2013
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Company

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.510168

Rendall v Blair: 1890

Where a statute requires leave to commence proceedings to be granted, a failure to obtain such consent does not automatically render the proceedings a nullity.
Bowen LJ said: ‘this section is not framed in the way in which sections are framed when it is intended that some preliminary steps should be taken before the action is maintainable at all’ and ‘It directs what ought to be done. Unless the duty is complied with by the litigant the court must hold its hand. But it does not oblige the court to close the gates of mercy upon the applicant, but enables it to stay proceedings until that consent, which as a matter of duty ought to be obtained in the first instance, is obtained at last.’
The legislature knows well enough how to provide that leave shall be a strict condition precedent to valid proceedings being issued and that clear words are to be used if that is intended, words perhaps even requiring a provision for the dismissal of the proceedings if the condition precedent is not satisfied. Without some such clear language being used the provision can be taken to be directory.
Bowen LJ
(1890) 45 Ch D 139
Charitable Trusts Act 1853 17
Cited by:
ConsideredIn re Saunders (A Bankrupt) ChD 1997
Very emphatic language was required in a statute before want of leave should, without more, result in proceedings being treated as a nullity. Leave could in appropriate circumstances be granted after the event notwithstanding the proceedings had . .
CitedSeal v Chief Constable of South Wales Police CA 19-May-2005
Mr Seal noisily objected to a neighbour blocking in his car. Police were called who took him into custody under the 1983 Act. He was released several days later, and eventually sought damages for his wrongful treatment. He had failed to first seek . .
CitedSeal v Chief Constable of South Wales Police HL 4-Jul-2007
The claimant had sought to bring proceedings against the respondent, but as a mental patient subject to the 1983 Act, had been obliged by the section first to obtain consent. The parties disputed whether the failure was a procedural or substantial . .
CitedAdorian v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis CA 23-Jan-2009
The claimant received injuries when arrested. He was later convicted of resisting arrest. The defendant relied on section 329 of the 2003 Act. The claimant said that the force used against him was grossly disproportionate. The commissioner appealed . .
CitedPark v Cho and Others ChD 24-Jan-2014
The parties disputed the chairmanship of a charity. The claimant succeeded, but a third party later intervened saying that permission had not first been obtained from the Charity Commission as required. The defendant now appealed against the lifting . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 October 2021; Ref: scu.226024

The Attorney-General v The Haberdashers’ Company: 15 Nov 1832

The defendants and other companies were formerly obliged to keep a stock of corn for the supply of the market, and to sell it when the Lord Mayor directed, and he, on some occasions, fixed the price. In 1646 an estate was conveyed to trustees in trust to pay out of the rents certain annual sums. One of the sums was to be paid to the defendants for the increase of the stock of corn for the service of the market. Some of the other sums were given for clearly charitable purposes.
Held: that the gift to the defendants was not a charity,, and that the purpose of it having failed, they were entitled to apply it to their corporate purposes period
[1832] EngR 828, (1832) 5 Sim 478, (1832) 58 ER 417
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 22 October 2021; Ref: scu.319775

Attorney-General, At The Relaion Of Barrett And Hayman v The Mayor, Bailiffs, And Commonalty Of The City Of Exeter, Defendants: 10 Mar 1826

Semble. It is not a general rule of a court of equity, that a charitable gift for the benefits of the poor is to be confined to such poor as do not receive parish relief. Where trustees of a charity, under an instrument of doubtful construction, have acted honestly, though erroneously, they will not be charged in respect of past mis-application of the funds. Reluctance of the court to compel a corporation to make a discovery of the property which they possess applicable to general corporate purposes. In the reign of Henry VII, lands were given to the corporation of Exeter and their successors, for the aid and relief of the poor Citizens and inhabitants of Exeter, ‘who are heavily burdened by fee-farm rents of that city and other impositions and talliages’ Quaere, whether the rents ought to be applied to the relief only of such poor inhabitants of Exeter as do not receive parish relief? Quaere, whether it is a due administration of such a charity to apply the rights to the payment of fee-farm rents due from the city, repairing the goal, maintaining the prisoners, and other public purposes?
[1826] EngR 856, (1826) 2 Russ 45, (1826) 38 ER 252
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 October 2021; Ref: scu.325620

Ex Parte The Governors Of Christ’s Hospital: 10 Dec 1864

[1864] EngR 852, (1864) 2 H and M 166, (1864) 71 ER 425
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 October 2021; Ref: scu.282566

The Attorney General At The Relation of Richard Whitworth, Esq, Plaintiff; The Master And Wardens of The Company of Haberdashers of The City of London, Governors of The Possessions And Revenues of The Free Grammar School of Newport, Com Salop, of The Foun: 11 Dec 1792

Where an estate is given to a charity, and the rents are afterwards increased, there is no resulting trust all the air law, but the charity shall have the advantage of the surplus rents.
[1792] EngR 3219, (1792) 4 Bro CC 103, (1792) 29 ER 800
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 20 October 2021; Ref: scu.361431

The Attorney-General v Lepine: 1789

[1789] EngR 2055, (1789-1817) 2 Ves Jun Supp 573, (1789) 34 ER 1232 (G)
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
See AlsoAttorney-General v Lepine 1818
The testator left part of his residuary estate for the benefit of a school for the poor in the parish of Dollar in Scotland.
Held: The English court declined jurisdiction. ‘I have always understood that, where a charity is to be administered . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 October 2021; Ref: scu.367686

Attorney-General v Governors of Harrow School: 26 Jul 1754

Charity jurisdiction – where trustees of a charity have discretionary powers, the court will not interpose unless they act corruptly. Though it may not choose to interpose, it does not follow that an information seeking the court’s interference, will be dismissed; since it may be serviceable to maintain a control over them. Where there is, in point of substance, a visitor, it excludes the general interference of the court either by commission within the 43 Eliz. or its ordinary jurisdiction.
[1754] EngR 159, (1754) Ves Sen Supp 406, (1754) 28 ER 562 (C), [1754] EngR 160, (1754) 2 Ves Sen 551, (1754) 28 ER 351 (B)
Commonlii, Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 17 October 2021; Ref: scu.378139

Attorney-General v The Haberdashers’ Company: 17 Jun 1835

The attendance of the attorney-general before the master, upon a reference to settle a scheme for the administration of a charity, may be dispensed with in certain cases. A direction for such attendance in a case where the charity fund did not much exceed pounds 1100 was struck out of the minutes of the decree.
[1835] EngR 836, (1835) 2 My and K 817, (1835) 39 ER 1156
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 17 October 2021; Ref: scu.316344

Attorney-General v Black: 17 Jul 1805

Petition to the Lord Chancellor, as visitor in right of the crown of the Free School of Woodbridge; two persons having been elected; the right of election being in the chief inhabitants; and the chief inhabitants at the time of the foundation, and the heir of the survivor, not to be discovered. Both elections were declared void; and a reference to the attorney-general to report, what directions or alterations will be proper as to the mode and right of election, and in the orders, constitutions, and directions, of the school; as shall seem to him most conducive to the interest of the objects of the charity, and the furtherance of the intention of the donors.
Lord Eldon, having decided that the election of a master of a free school had not been carried out in accordance with the terms of the trusts, continued the appointment of acting master until proper elections could be held, which was obviously a necessary and expedient intervention by the court.
Lord Eldon
[1805] EngR 248, (1805) 11 Ves Jun 191, (1805) 32 ER 1061
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 17 October 2021; Ref: scu.343321

Attorney-General v The Master And Wardens Of The Haberdashers’ Company: 12 Mar 1834

A gift of a specific sum, out of the rents of an estate, to one of the chartered companies in the city of London, ‘for the increase of the stock of corn for the service of the market in London’; and a gift of the Residue of such funds to the same company, ‘for the further increase of their stock of corn’, are donations for the benefit of the company and its revenues, and not subject, therefore, to the jurisdiction of the court as charities.
[1834] EngR 583, (1834) 1 My and K 420, (1834) 39 ER 741
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 17 October 2021; Ref: scu.317259

Randell, In re; Randell v Dixon: ChD 10 Feb 1888

A testatrix bequeathed pounds 14,000 on trust to pay the income to the incumbent of the church at H. for the time being so long as he permitted the sittings to be occupied free : in case payment for sittings was ever demanded, she directed the pounds 14,000 to fall into her residue.
Held: first, that the testatrix had not expressed a general intention to devote the pounds 14,000 to charitable purposes, so that in case of failure of the trust for the benefit of the incumbent the fund would be applied cy-pres ; secondly, that the direction that the fund should fall into the residue, being a direction that the fund should go as the law would otherwise carry it, did not offend the rule against perpetuities.
(1888) 38 Ch D 213, [1888] UKLawRpCh 33
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 October 2021; Ref: scu.653190

Stanway v Attorney-General: CA 5 Apr 2000

Sir Richard Scott V-C said: ‘Charities operate within a framework of public law, not private law. The Crown is parens patriae of the charity and the judges of the courts represent the Crown in supervising what the charity is doing and in giving directions . . The Attorney General’s function is to make representations to the court as to where lies the public interest as he sees it.’
Sir Richard Scott V-C
Ureported, 5 April 2000
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromStanway v Attorney-General et al ChD 25-Nov-1999
Where a defendant had brought a counter-claim against his co-defendants but had restricted that claim to issues raised already by the claim against himself, he was not to be prevented from commencing fresh proceedings against the co-defendants where . .

Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 October 2021; Ref: scu.653167

The Attorney-General v Lepine: 22 Feb 1815

[1815] EngR 578, (1815) 19 Ves Jun 309, (1815) 34 ER 532 (A)
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
See AlsoAttorney-General v Lepine 1818
The testator left part of his residuary estate for the benefit of a school for the poor in the parish of Dollar in Scotland.
Held: The English court declined jurisdiction. ‘I have always understood that, where a charity is to be administered . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 October 2021; Ref: scu.336388

Fisher v Jackson: ChD 7 Mar 1891

The deed of trust establishing an endowed school provided that the master of the school should he appointed by the vicars of three specified parishes, and power was given to the three vicars to remove the master for certain specified causes. The Plaintiff was appointed master of the school in April, 1890, and in December, 1890, two of the vicars served on him a notice of dismissal, signed by themselves, which stated certain reasons for his dismissal. No meeting of the vicars had been summoned to consider the question of the Plaintiff’s dismissal, and he had not had any opportunity of being heard in his defence. There was no evidence that the third
vicar had been consulted. The Plaintiff’ commenced an action against the two vicars who had signed the notice, and moved for an interlocutory injunction to restrain them from removing, or purporting to remove, him from his office until after the holding of a meeting of the vicars, and until he should have had an opportunity of being heard at such a meeting in reply to any changes made against him.
Held: That the Defendants could not remove the Plaintiff without first affording him an opportunity of being heard in his own defence at a properly constituted meeting of the vicars, and that he was entitled to the injunction.
Held: Also, that for the purpose of obtaining this relief it was not necessary, under sect. 17 of the Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, to obtain the consent of the Charity Commissioners to the bringing of the action.
North J
[1891] 2 Ch 84, (1891) 7 TLR 358, [1891] UKLawRpCh 40
Commonlii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedCapel v Child 1832
A bishop issued a requisition under statute, requiring the Vicar of W to nominate a Curate with a stipend, on the ground that it appeared to the bishop, of his own knowledge, that the ecclesiastical duties of the vicarage and parish church of W were . .

Cited by:
CitedRidge v Baldwin (No 1) HL 14-Mar-1963
No Condemnation Without Opportunity For Defence
Ridge, a Chief Constable, had been wrongfully dismissed because he was not given the opportunity of presenting his defence. He had been acquitted of the charges brought against him, but the judge at trial had made adverse comments about his . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 October 2021; Ref: scu.653093

Von Ernst and Cie SA v Inland Revenue Commissioners: ChD 1979

[1979] 1 WLR 1325, (1979) 123 SJ 390, [1979] STC 478
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from (Reversed)Von Ernst and Cie SA v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1979
The assets of a corporate charity were held on charitable trusts: ‘We were referred to certain authorities which give support to the view that a company incorporated for exclusively charitable purposes is in the position of a trustee of its funds or . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 September 2021; Ref: scu.652992

The Attorney-General, at The Relation of W Izard v Brown, And Forty-Seven Others: 3 Apr 1818

The Crown has a role as parens patriae or protector of charities.
Lord Eldon LC said: ‘It is the duty of the King, as parens patriae, to protect property devoted to charitable uses; and that duty is executed by the officer who represents the Crown for all forensic purposes. On this foundation rests the right of the Attorney General in such cases to obtain by information the interposition of a court of equity’
Lord Eldon LC
[1818] EngR 326, (1816, 1817, 1818) 1 Wils Ch 323, (1818) 37 ER 138
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 September 2021; Ref: scu.332326

Bolton v Madden: QBD 25 Nov 1873

The Court of Queen’s Bench on appeal from the Lord Mayor’s Court held that they could ‘find no legal principle to justify us in holding that the subscriber to a charity may not give his votes as he pleases’. Blackburn J said that ‘The general rule is that an executory agreement, by which the plaintiff agrees to do something on the terms that the defendant agrees to do something else, may be enforced if what the plaintiff has agreed to do is either for the benefit of the defendant or to the trouble or prejudice of the plaintiff.’
The traditional requirement for consideration is that the person benefiting from the promise, the promisee, must either provide a benefit to the promisor in return for the promise, or suffer a detriment requested by the promisor.
Blackburn J
(1873) LR 9 QB 55
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.652997

James Byrne v Robert Dunne: 16 Dec 1910

(High Court of Australia) Will – Bequest for religious purposes – Charitable trust – Uncertainty – Gift of residue to Roman Catholic Archbishop and successors – ‘ To be used wholly or ‘ in part as ‘ the donee ‘ may judge most conducive to the good of religion’
(1911) 17 Argus LR 457, [1910] ArgusLawRp 143
Austlii
Australia
Cited by:
Appeal fromDunne v Byrne PC 22-Feb-1912
Will – Construction – Charitable Bequest – Fund to be expended for the Good of
Religion – Religious Purposes.
Held, that a residuary bequest ‘to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane and his successors to be used and expended wholly . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.653056

In re The French Protestant Hospital: ChD 1951

The charity was an incorporated body created by a Royal Charter granted in 1718. The governor and directors sought to exercise a power conferred on them by the charter to amend the byelaws to enable the directors’ professional firms to be remunerated for their services to the charity. The Court considered the obligations of its officers.
Held: The directors of the corporation in question were, although not technically trustees, in the same fiduciary position as trustees in respect of the corporation’s affairs, and were therefore within the scope of a rule of law which debarred trustees from receiving payment for their services. The governor, deputy governor and directors of a charitable corporation were ‘as much in a fiduciary position as trustees in regard to any acts which are done respecting the corporation and its property’ and that they were, ‘to all intents and purposes, bound by the rules which affect trustees’. It would be illegal if the directors used the property for their own purposes ‘and not for the purposes of the charitable trust for which the property is held’, and he also referred to it being a ‘great change’ if it were thought proper for a provision enabling remuneration to be charged ‘to be inserted in a document regulating a charitable trust’.
Danckwerts J said: ‘It is said by [Counsel for the directors] that it is the corporation which is trustee of the property in question, and that the governor and directors are not trustees. Technically that may be so. The property of the charity is, of course, vested in and held by the corporation.’
Danckwerts J
[1951] Ch 567
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedVon Ernst and Cie SA v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1979
The assets of a corporate charity were held on charitable trusts: ‘We were referred to certain authorities which give support to the view that a company incorporated for exclusively charitable purposes is in the position of a trustee of its funds or . .
CitedThe Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) v Attorney General and Others ChD 9-Jun-2017
The court considered the propriety of a payment made by a charitable company to a director for her loss of office. The charity was to transfer a substantial sum to a new charity headed by the departing director.
Held: The court approved the . .
CitedLehtimaki v The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) and Others CA 6-Jul-2018
A charity established by H and W wanted to transfer part of its fund to a new charity headed by W in return for her resignation from the first charity on the breakdown of the marriage. Court approval was sought for a transfer, but the remaining . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 August 2021; Ref: scu.652835

Andrews v McGuffog: 1886

Applications to court – partial decree not granted – directions where scheme of founder cannot be carried out – commingling of different funds
Pursuers in an actio popularis in re a public trust have no right to demand a partial decree which will leave unsettled matters seriously affecting the future administration of the charity. If trustees of a public charitable trust cannot carry out the main purpose of the trust in the mode the trustee has expressed, it is their duty to apply to the court for directions. When capital of one trust fund is bona fide intermixed by the same trustees with capital of another trust fund, both funds being bequeathed for the same public charity, and an actio popularis is brought, the duty of the court is to consider what course is best, looking at all the circumstances, for the interest of the charity, and the court ought to refuse to give any decision until all the circumstances necessary to form such final decision are before them, it being within the power of the court to order either an independent enquiry or the production of further evidence by the parties.
(1886) 11 App Cas 313
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 August 2021; Ref: scu.653171

Girls Public Day School Trust v Minister of Community and Country Planning: ChD 1951

A company was formed for the purpose of establishing in England, public day schools for the education of girls. The position on the day appointed by the minister of Town and Country planning under the 1947 Act, section 119, namely July 18th 1948, what was that the articles of the company empowered the preference shareholders, in seeking to enforce their rights in relation to arrears of dividends or the return of their capital, to put to the company into liquidation.
Held: That being one of the purposes for which the land was held on the appointed today, it was impossible to say that it was, on that day, held for charitable purposes only. It was immaterial that none of the preference shareholders had any intention of enforcing his rights; the determination by the minister that the land was not land to which section 85 of the 1947 Act applied was therefore right, and the company was accordingly not exempt from development charge under section 85.
Roxburgh J
[1951] Ch 400, (1951) 95 Sol Jo 76, (1951) P and CR 423
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 August 2021; Ref: scu.653168

In re J W Laing Trust: ChD 1984

The trust was first created in 1922 with a gift of 15,000 shares worth pounds 15,000 ‘the proceeds of which and the dividends thereon from time to time declared and paid … to be devoted to charitable purposes, it being understood that the capital and income is to be wholly distributed’ within the settlor’s lifetime or within 10 years of his death. The settlor died in 1978. By the 1982 financial year the value of the trust assets had grown to be in excess of pounds 24 million and in that year generated an income exceeding pounds 1.2 million.
Held: The Court approved a scheme, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, discharging a trustee from an obligation to distribute the trust capital and accumulated income within 10 years of the death of the settlor.
Peter Gibson J said: ‘In my judgment, the plaintiff has made out a very powerful case for the removal of the requirement as to distribution, which it seems to me to be inexpedient in the very altered circumstances of the charity since that requirement was laid down 60 years ago. I take particular account of the fact that this application is one that has the support of the Attorney-General. Although the plaintiff is not fettered by the express terms of the gift as to the charitable purposes for which the charity’s funds are to be applied, it is, in my view, proper for the plaintiff to wish to continue to support the causes which the settlor himself wished the charity to support from its inception, and which would suffer if that support was withdrawn as a consequence of the distribution of the charity’s assets. I have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that the court should, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction approve a scheme under which the trustees for the time being of the charity will be discharged from the obligation to distribute the capital within 10 years if the death of the settlor. I shall discuss with counsel the precise form of order that is appropriate’
Peter Gibson J
[1984] Ch 143
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 August 2021; Ref: scu.653169

Re Ashton Charity: CA 3 May 1856

The Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to alien the real estate of a charity, and it can do so upon an application under Sir Samuel Romilly’s Act: ‘upon an information, the Court of Chancery has a general jurisdiction, as incident to the administration of a charity estate, to alien charity property, where it clearly sees it is for its benefit and advantage.’
Sir John Romilly MR
[1856] EngR 482 (A), (1856) 22 Beav 288, (1856) 52 ER 1119
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.291237

The Attorney-General v The Governors Of The Free Grammar School Of Queen Elizabeth In Dedham The Attorney-General v Ellis The Attorney-General v Grignon In The Matters Of The 52 Geo 3, C 101, The Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, And Of The Several Speci: 30 Jan 1857

The jurisdiction of the court was not ousted where the charity obtained a charter subsequent to its founding
[1857] EngR 220, (1857) 23 Beav 350, (1857) 53 ER 138
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.289966

Attorney-General v The Bishop Of Worcester: 8 Nov 1851

If a scheme for the regulation of a charity, settled by a decree, does not operate beneficially for the charity, and the attorney-general considers that the interests of the charity would, consistently with the foundation, usage and law, be promoted by an alteration of the scheme, it is competent to him to apply to the court for such alteration, but schemes which have been settled under the directions of the court ought not be disturbed upon merely speculative use, order matters of discretion or regulation, upon which judges or attorneys-general may differ in opinion, or except upon substantial grounds and clear evidence, not only that the scheme does not operate beneficially, but that it can, by the alteration, be made do so consistently with the objects of the foundation.
[1851] EngR 828, (1851) 9 Hare 328, (1851) 68 ER 530
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.297144

The Attorney-General v The Dean and Canons of Christ Church: CA 28 Mar 1822

Devise to the Dean and Canons of Christ Church in trust to constitute and support a grammar school at P, to appoint a master and usher, and pay them certain salaries; and the Dean and Canons to direct the management of the school.
Held: 1 That the school was to be a free grammar school for teaching the learning languages; 2 That the proper objects were the children of the resident inhabitants of P; 3 That they must be the children of Protestants, and they must be educated according to the principles of the Church of England. 4 The master might take borders and day scholars. 5 That the number of free scholars was to be limited, and in fixing the number the court was guided by the amount of salary originally provided. 6 That the free scholars were to be nominated by the trustees. 7 That the trustees could visit the school at their discretion, and be allowed their reasonable expenses. 8 An augmentation of the salaries of the master and usher made by the trustees, upon an increase of the income of the charity, not allowed to them, the school, through error, not having been devoted to the proper objects.
Sir Thomas Plumer MR held that he did not ‘know how any restriction on [the] power [of the Dean and Canons conferred by the testator to manage a school in Portsmouth and choose persons to be educated there] [could] be introduced’.
Sir Thomas Plumer MR
[1822] EngR 242, (1821-1822) Jac 474, (1822) 37 ER 929
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.329135

Royal Society for The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals v Sharp and Others: ChD 19 Feb 2010

The parties disputed the effect of a term in the will leaving a share calculated according to the current rate of exemption from Inheritance Tax.
Held: ‘the purpose of clause 3 was to bequeath a legacy of the amount that was the maximum amount without inheritance tax being payable. The draftsman intended by the description to cover the possibility that the nil rate band might increase between the date of the will and the death. In other words it was intended that this legacy would be free of tax and would be an amount equal to the nil rate band at the time of the death of the Deceased.’ The claimant’s interpretation failed, and ‘ it is said that Trustees of charitable organisations are required to maximise the return for their charity but I really wonder whether the discharge of that duty required this action to be brought. In my view the RSPCA whatever the view as to the will ought really to have considered that the residuary legacy that I have determined it is entitled to was generous and ample provision out of this estate. The impact of the arguments on the size of the bequest to the Deceased’s brother was quite stark. This action has plainly caused distress to the Defendants and in my view ought not to have been brought.’
Peter Smith J
[2010] EWHC 268 (Ch)
Bailii
Inheritance Tax Act 1984 4(1)
England and Wales

Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.401667

Re Shipwrecked Fishermen and Mariners’ Royal Benevolent Society: ChD 1959

The court approved a scheme conferring wider powers of investment than those authorised by the statute incorporating the charity: ‘It is said on behalf of persons interested in the charity that the court is empowered to make a scheme to authorize a wider range of investments in this case, because the matter is not really covered by the very limited power of investment contained in section 11 of the Act of 1850. On the other hand, it is said on behalf of the Attorney-General that that is not the right way to construe section 11 of the Act of 1850: that although in form it is a positive permission, it involves a negative prohibition and, therefore, to allow any wider power of investment of the trust funds would be to attempt to alter the statute by ‘a stroke of .. the pen’ and the court has no power to do that. The cases to which I have been referred are far from clear, but I think the general principle which emerges is that the court cannot alter the said statute by a stroke of the pen and cannot therefore direct anything which is inconsistent with the terms of the Act of Parliament in question. The conclusion which I reach is that to allow a wider power of investment is to confer additional powers of investment and is not, therefore, inconsistent with but is in aid of and supplemental to the powers of investment which are conferred by section 11 of the Act. On that view it would be open to the court to allow what has been done by settling a scheme conferring the necessary powers.’
Danckwerts J
[1959] Ch 220
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRe: Shrewsbury Grammar School 1849
Trustees of the school had accumulated income in excess of what was required to achieve the objects of the charitable trust, and asked the court how to apply them. Having upheld the contention that what was described as Sir S. Romilly’s Act . .
CitedAttorney-General v Governors of Christ’s Hospital 3-Mar-1896
The Attorney-General proposed a scheme to except certain endowments from the 1869 Act. They would be made over to another governing body in augmentation of the endowments held by them subject to the provisions of that Act.
Held: The court . .
CitedThe Berkhamstead School Case 1865
The school was regulated inter alia by a statute of Edward VI.
Held: The court approved a scheme for its further regulation which permitted the charging of fees for all pupils, notwithstanding that the statute provided that some boys should be . .
CitedIn re Whitworth Art Gallery Trusts 1958
. .

Cited by:
CitedAttorney General v British Museum ChD 27-May-2005
The trustees brought a claim against the Attorney-General seeking clarification of their duties and powers to return objects which were part of the collection in law, but where a moral duty might exist to return it to a former owner. Here drawings . .
CitedConstruction Industry Training Board v Attorney-General CA 1973
The principal issue was whether a body set up by statute and subject to the control of a minister of the Crown was a ‘charity’ within the meaning of section 45(1) of the Charities Act 1960, for which purpose it had to be subject to ‘the control of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.225532

Attorney-General v Governors of Christ’s Hospital: 3 Mar 1896

The Attorney-General proposed a scheme to except certain endowments from the 1869 Act. They would be made over to another governing body in augmentation of the endowments held by them subject to the provisions of that Act.
Held: The court declined. Chitty J said: ‘I hold that it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to sanction the Attorney-General’s scheme in the face of the opposition of the existing governing body. Their title is founded on Royal Charter, and is established by Act of Parliament. To whatever lengths the Court may have gone, it has never assumed legislative authority: it has never by a stroke of the pen at one and the same time revoked a Royal Charter and repealed an Act of Parliament. It has never ousted from its rights of administering the charitable trusts of such a body as the present governors against their will, and that, too, in a case where no breach of trust is charged.’ To establish such a scheme as that submitted by the Attorney-General nothing less than an Act of Parliament would suffice.
Chitty J
[1896] 1 Ch 879, [1896] UKLawRpCh 34
Commonlii
Endowed Schools Act 1869
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRe Shipwrecked Fishermen and Mariners’ Royal Benevolent Society ChD 1959
The court approved a scheme conferring wider powers of investment than those authorised by the statute incorporating the charity: ‘It is said on behalf of persons interested in the charity that the court is empowered to make a scheme to authorize a . .
CitedAttorney General v British Museum ChD 27-May-2005
The trustees brought a claim against the Attorney-General seeking clarification of their duties and powers to return objects which were part of the collection in law, but where a moral duty might exist to return it to a former owner. Here drawings . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.225531

Re Royal Society’s Charitable Trusts: 1956

The Society, a charitable company regulated by statute, requested that it be permitted inter alia, to consolidate various different trust funds of which it was trustee for investment and accounting purposes.
Held: The application did not come within s 57 of the 1925 Act or alternatively under what he called ‘the rather ill-defined scope of the court’s general jurisdiction’. However, Vaisey J held that the Court had power under its special jurisdiction relating to charities to consider the applications. The conferment of a limited power did not give rise to an implied prohibition against any action outside that limit.
Vaisey J
[1956] 1 Ch 87
Trustee Act 1925 57
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedAttorney General v British Museum ChD 27-May-2005
The trustees brought a claim against the Attorney-General seeking clarification of their duties and powers to return objects which were part of the collection in law, but where a moral duty might exist to return it to a former owner. Here drawings . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.225534

Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Attorney-General and others: ChD 26 Jan 2001

The right to freedom of association could be exercised by a society choosing to remove from its membership individuals who held views which it saw as inimical to its purposes. Such a removal did not infringe the members’ rights of freedom of speech. Nevertheless, such a charitable and respected association could not be seen to behave arbitrarily, and the proposed scheme should be amended to allow that those who met the criteria to be rejected for membership should have a right to have the rejection of their membership application reviewed.
Lightman J held that ‘the court starts with a clean sheet and has an unfettered discretion to decide what it considers should be done in the best interests of the trust’
Lightman J
Gazette 15-Feb-2001, Times 13-Feb-2001, [2001] EWHC 474 (Ch), [2001] 3 All ER 530, [2001] UKHRR 905, [2002] 1 WLR 448
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.88899

Von Ernst and Cie SA v Inland Revenue Commissioners: CA 1979

The assets of a corporate charity were held on charitable trusts: ‘We were referred to certain authorities which give support to the view that a company incorporated for exclusively charitable purposes is in the position of a trustee of its funds or at least in an analogous position. The authorities were In re French Protestant Hospital [1951] Ch 567; Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmen’s Families Association v Attorney General [1968] 1 WLR 313; Construction Industry Training Board v Attorney General [1973] Ch 173 and In re Finger’s Will Trusts [1972] Ch 286. In the first two of these cases it seems to me that it was assumed, rather than decided, that a corporate charity was in the position of a trustee of its funds. In the third, the question was what was meant by the words ‘in the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction with respect to charities’ in section 45(1) of the Charities Act 1960. In the course of my judgment in that case I certainly did express the view that the court would exercise its jurisdiction over corporate charities on the basis that their assets were held on charitable trusts and it appears to me that Plowman J, as I understand his very short judgment, agreed with me in that respect. In re Finger’s Will Trusts turned on a question of whether or not a bequest to a charitable corporation, which ceased to exist in the testatrix’s lifetime, demonstrated a general charitable intention capable of permitting a cy-pres application. I do not think that it is a decision which is of assistance for present purposes.’
Buckley LJ
[1980] 1 WLR 468, (1979) 124 SJ 17, [1980] 1 All ER 677, [1979] TR 461, [1980] STC 111
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from (Reversed)Von Ernst and Cie SA v Inland Revenue Commissioners ChD 1979
. .
CitedIn re The French Protestant Hospital ChD 1951
The charity was an incorporated body created by a Royal Charter granted in 1718. The governor and directors sought to exercise a power conferred on them by the charter to amend the byelaws to enable the directors’ professional firms to be . .

Cited by:
CitedThe Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) v Attorney General and Others ChD 9-Jun-2017
The court considered the propriety of a payment made by a charitable company to a director for her loss of office. The charity was to transfer a substantial sum to a new charity headed by the departing director.
Held: The court approved the . .
AppliedLiverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v Attorney-General ChD 1981
Charitable Company is Trustee of Assets
The court was asked as to the distribution of surplus assets of a charitable company which was in winding up, and the question whether or not s 257 et seq. Companies Act 1948 applied, including s 265 which made provision for the distribution of . .
CitedHope Community Church (Wymondham) v Phelan and Others ChD 22-May-2020
The Church, a private company limited by guarantee, sought a declaration that it had the right to enfranchise its church premises under the 1920 Act. . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.652991

Attorney General v British Museum: ChD 27 May 2005

The trustees brought a claim against the Attorney-General seeking clarification of their duties and powers to return objects which were part of the collection in law, but where a moral duty might exist to return it to a former owner. Here drawings had been looted in Czechoslovakia in 1939 by the Gestapo.
Held: The court reviewed the authorities. The A-G does not have the authority to suspend the operation of an Act of Parliament. The 1963 Act prohibited any disposition by the trustees. No moral obligation can justify a disposition by the Trustees of an object forming part of the collections of the Museum in breach of s.3(4).
The Vice-Chancellor, Sir Andrew Morritt
[2005] EWHC 1089 (Ch), Times 02-Jun-2005, [2005] 3 WLR 396, [2005] Ch 397
Bailii
Museum Act 1753 9 14, British Museum Act 1963, Charities Act 1993 27(3)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRe Snowden ChD 1970
Two summonses came before the court arising form wills of a Mr Snowden and a Mrs Henderson. Norman Snowden, had made sales adeeming bequests but, in consequence, pecuniary legacies and bequests of shares of residue were greater than contemplated. . .
CitedRe Shipwrecked Fishermen and Mariners’ Royal Benevolent Society ChD 1959
The court approved a scheme conferring wider powers of investment than those authorised by the statute incorporating the charity: ‘It is said on behalf of persons interested in the charity that the court is empowered to make a scheme to authorize a . .
CitedRe: Shrewsbury Grammar School 1849
Trustees of the school had accumulated income in excess of what was required to achieve the objects of the charitable trust, and asked the court how to apply them. Having upheld the contention that what was described as Sir S. Romilly’s Act . .
CitedThe Berkhamstead School Case 1865
The school was regulated inter alia by a statute of Edward VI.
Held: The court approved a scheme for its further regulation which permitted the charging of fees for all pupils, notwithstanding that the statute provided that some boys should be . .
CitedHazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council HL 1991
Swap deals outwith Council powers
The authority entered into interest rate swap deals to protect itself against adverse money market movements. They began to lose substantial amounts when interest rates rose, and the district auditor sought a declaration that the contracts were . .
CitedConstruction Industry Training Board v Attorney-General CA 1973
The principal issue was whether a body set up by statute and subject to the control of a minister of the Crown was a ‘charity’ within the meaning of section 45(1) of the Charities Act 1960, for which purpose it had to be subject to ‘the control of . .
CitedAttorney General and Another v Great Eastern Railway Company HL 27-May-1880
An Act of Parliament authorised a company to construct a railway. Two other companies combined and contracted with the first to supply rolling stock. An injunction was brought to try to restrain this, saying that such a contract was not explicitly . .
CitedBinder v Alachouzos CA 1972
A contract recited that the parties had been advised by solicitors and counsel that the Moneylenders Acts did not apply to transactions which were the subject of legal proceedings between them, and went on to provide for a compromise.
Held: . .
CitedAttorney-General v Governors of Christ’s Hospital 3-Mar-1896
The Attorney-General proposed a scheme to except certain endowments from the 1869 Act. They would be made over to another governing body in augmentation of the endowments held by them subject to the provisions of that Act.
Held: The court . .
CitedNational Anti-Vivisection League v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 2-Jul-1947
The main object of the Society was political viz, the repeal of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, and for that reason the Society was not established for charitable purposes only and was not entitled to exemption from tax. An organisation whose aims . .
CitedIn re Whitworth Art Gallery Trusts 1958
. .
CitedRe Royal Society’s Charitable Trusts 1956
The Society, a charitable company regulated by statute, requested that it be permitted inter alia, to consolidate various different trust funds of which it was trustee for investment and accounting purposes.
Held: The application did not come . .

Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.225333

Lehtimaki v The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) and Others: CA 6 Jul 2018

A charity established by H and W wanted to transfer part of its fund to a new charity headed by W in return for her resignation from the first charity on the breakdown of the marriage. Court approval was sought for a transfer, but the remaining trustee (L) declined to say how he would cast his decisive vote. When giving approval, the court had made an order for L to vote in favour of the transaction. He now appealed against that order.
Held: His appeal succeeded. He had not threatened to act contrary to his fiduciary duty, since he had stated that he intended to act in what he considered would promote CIFF’s charitable purposes.
A member of the charity was part of the internal workings of the charity and his powers were exercisable for the benefit of the charity. However, that the position might be different in relation to companies with a large membership, which it called ‘mass-membership charities’: ‘It does not necessarily follow that members of charities such as the National Trust also have fiduciary obligations. Since we are not dealing with such an organisation, we do not need to decide whether their members are in the same position as CIFF’s. There may possibly, moreover, be scope for argument as to whether it is less reasonable to expect those belonging to mass-membership charities to act exclusively in the charities’ interests. That said, it is far from clear that it should be legitimate for members of, say, the National Trust to vote to obtain benefits for themselves from an entity with exclusively charitable objects.’
The members of a charitable company have no proprietary rights. As to the content of their fiduciary duty, it was unnecessary: ‘to rule on the precise scope of the fiduciary duties owed by members of CIFF. It is sufficient to say that a member of CIFF owes, in our view, a duty corresponding to that specifically imposed on members of CIOs by section 220 of the Charities Act 2011. In other words, the member must exercise the powers that he has in that capacity in the way that he decides, in good faith, would be most likely to further the purposes of CIFF. It should be stressed that this duty is subjective: in other words, that what matters is the member’s state of mind (compare eg Regentcrest plc v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80, para 120, dealing with company directors).’
Lady Justice Gloster (Vice-President of the Court of Appeal, Civil Division), Lord Justice David Richards and Lord Justice Newey
[2018] EWCA Civ 1605, [2019] 1 All ER 845, [2019] Ch 139, [2018] WLR(D) 423, [2018] 2 BCLC 478, [2018] 3 WLR 1470, 2018] WTLR 491
Bailii,
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re The French Protestant Hospital ChD 1951
The charity was an incorporated body created by a Royal Charter granted in 1718. The governor and directors sought to exercise a power conferred on them by the charter to amend the byelaws to enable the directors’ professional firms to be . .
CitedLiverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v Attorney-General ChD 1981
Charitable Company is Trustee of Assets
The court was asked as to the distribution of surplus assets of a charitable company which was in winding up, and the question whether or not s 257 et seq. Companies Act 1948 applied, including s 265 which made provision for the distribution of . .
Appeal fromThe Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) v Attorney General and Others ChD 9-Jun-2017
The court considered the propriety of a payment made by a charitable company to a director for her loss of office. The charity was to transfer a substantial sum to a new charity headed by the departing director.
Held: The court approved the . .

Cited by:
Appeal from (CA)Lehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.618970

The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) v Attorney General and Others: ChD 9 Jun 2017

The court considered the propriety of a payment made by a charitable company to a director for her loss of office. The charity was to transfer a substantial sum to a new charity headed by the departing director.
Held: The court approved the proposed transaction and ordered the remaining director to cast his decisive vote in favour of the transaction. In the ‘unique circumstances’ of this ‘extremely unusual’ case, the Grant was in the best interests of CIFF. The principal reasons given by the Chancellor were that the parties should not be allowed to renege on the deal they had made in good faith, that Ms Cooper would be contributing a further $40m to her new charity and that approving the Grant would bring finality and avoid further legal costs. He referred to the considerable talents of Ms Cooper. The Chancellor expressly stated that, while he had come to a clear conclusion that he should approve the Grant, he was ‘not saying that no reasonable trustee or fiduciary could disagree with [his] view’ that the Grant was in the best interests of CIFF or that ‘anyone who disagreed with [his] view would automatically be acting in bad faith’
Section 217 of the 2006 Act applies as much to charitable companies as it does to ordinary trading companies.
Sir Geoffrey Vos Ch
[2017] EWHC 1379 (Ch), [2017] WLR(D) 390, [2018] 1 BCLC 677, [2018] 2 WLR 259, [2018] Ch 371, [2018] 2 All ER 504
Bailii, WLRD
Companies Act 2006 215 217
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re The French Protestant Hospital ChD 1951
The charity was an incorporated body created by a Royal Charter granted in 1718. The governor and directors sought to exercise a power conferred on them by the charter to amend the byelaws to enable the directors’ professional firms to be . .
CitedVon Ernst and Cie SA v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1979
The assets of a corporate charity were held on charitable trusts: ‘We were referred to certain authorities which give support to the view that a company incorporated for exclusively charitable purposes is in the position of a trustee of its funds or . .
CitedLiverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v Attorney-General ChD 1981
Charitable Company is Trustee of Assets
The court was asked as to the distribution of surplus assets of a charitable company which was in winding up, and the question whether or not s 257 et seq. Companies Act 1948 applied, including s 265 which made provision for the distribution of . .
CitedPender v Lushington CA 1877
After stating that the Court would not restrain the exercise of certain votes by members of a company merely because the holder of the votes had a motive for voting them which the Court might not approve, his Lordship said: ‘I am confirmed in that . .
CitedThe North-West Transportation Company and James Hughes Beatty v Henry Beatty and Others PC 21-Jul-1887
(Canada) . .
CitedAllan v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd CA 19-Feb-1900
The company had altered its articles so as to give itself a lien on paid up shares in respect of the failure of the shareholder to pay calls on other shares which had not been fully paid up. The effect of the amendment was to alter the contractual . .
CitedArbuthnott v Bonnyman and Others CA 20-May-2015
Appeal from refusal of unfair prejudice petition.
After listing cases: ‘I would extract from them the following principles:
(1) The limitations on the exercise of the power to amend a company’s articles arise because, as in the case of . .
CitedNorthern Counties Securities Ltd v Jackson and Steeple Ltd ChD 1974
Walton J reiterated that, when a shareholder is voting for or against a particular resolution, he is voting as a person owing no fiduciary duty to the company and who is exercising his own right of property to vote as he thinks fit. . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromLehtimaki v The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) and Others CA 6-Jul-2018
A charity established by H and W wanted to transfer part of its fund to a new charity headed by W in return for her resignation from the first charity on the breakdown of the marriage. Court approval was sought for a transfer, but the remaining . .
At First InstanceLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 August 2021; Ref: scu.588022

Forbes v Forbes: 3 Mar 1854

General Forbes died. It became necessary to decide what was his domicile at the date of death. He had been born in Scotland, but then served for 35 years in India, before retirng to live in London.
Held: The domicile in India was a domicile of choice, and it was easier to show a change of domicile of choice than for a domicile of origin. The court declined to make an order with respect to a case of a gift to build a bridge over the River Don in Scotland. This was in effect an issue of Scottish charity law, and the Scottish courts would have jurisdiction.
(1854) 18 Beav 552, (1854) Kay 341, [1854] EngR 317, (1854) 18 Beav 552, (1854) 52 ER 216
Commonlii
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoForbes v Forbes 9-Feb-1854
A man cannot have two domicils, at least with reference to the succession to his personal estate.
Legitimate children acquire by birth the domicil of their father.
An infant cannot change his domicil by his own act.
A new domicil . .

Cited by:
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .
CitedAgulian and Another v Cyganik CA 24-Feb-2006
The question was whether the deceased had lost his domicile of birth and acquired one of choice when living and working in the UK for 43 years. He had retained land in Cyprus, but lived here.
Held: He had retained his domicile of birth: . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.293174

Re Duncan: CA 1867

The court was asked whether the consent of the Charity Commissioners was necessary to petition the Court to appoint a new trustee of a charity established in England to promote Christian education in Jamaica.
Held: In the 1853 Act, ‘Charity’ was defined as ‘every endowed foundation and institution taking or to take effect in England and Wales and coming within the meaning, purview and interpretation of the statute of 43 Eliz c.4, or as to which, or the administration of the revenues or property whereof, the Court of Chancery has or may exercise jurisdiction’. The authority of the Charity Commissioners extended to charities which were founded and endowed in England or Wales, even though the revenues were applied to benefit those abroad. It was not necessary for the court to decide whether the Charity Commissioner’s powers extended to charities founded and endowed abroad who applied their revenues in England and Wales. (Obiter) that it might well be said that the institution, even though located abroad, takes effect here if it applies its property here. Lord Cairns LJ: ‘… I see no reason to doubt that, as a general rule, where there is the application and expenditure of money in England under a charitable endowment, there also the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioners attaches, to the extent, at all events, of that application and expenditure, even though the constitution of the charity, or the corpus of the property, should be abroad.’
Turner LJ and Lord Cairns LJ
(1867) 2 LR Ch App 356
Charitable Trusts Act 1853
England and Wales
Cited by:
DoubtedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200678

Attorney-General v Sturge: 4 Nov 1854

The testatrix had left funds to support a school in Genoa.
Held: The courts have no authority to make a scheme where the trustees would not be within the jurisdiction of the English courts.
Sir John Romilly MR
(1854) 19 Beav 597, [1854] EngR 837, (1854) 52 ER 482
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200673

Income Tax Special Commissioners v Pemsel: HL 20 Jul 1891

Charitable Purposes used with technical meaning

The House was asked whether, in a taxing statute applying to the whole of the United Kingdom and allowing for deductions from and allowances against the income of land vested in trustees for charitable purposes, the words ‘charitable purposes’ should be understood according to their meaning in English law, or whether they should be given a meaning which was common to the law of England, Scotland and Ireland.
Held: (majority: Lords Watson, Herschell, Macnaghten, and Morris; Halsbury LC and Lord Bramwell dissenting) The deduction should be allowed.
The House defined what is meant at law by a charity. Lord Macnaghten said: ”Charity’ in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads. The trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law, because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed, every charity that deserves the name must do either directly or indirectly.’
Lord MacNaghten contrasted the systems of administrative law in England and Scotland: ‘By expounding the Act by analogy, and if you will apply your usual penetration to this point, you will find that there is often no other possible way of making a consistent sensible construction upon statutes conceived in general words, which are to have their operation upon the respective laws of two countries, the rules and forms whereof are different. These general views will probably always be taken from the language or style of one of these countries more than from the other, and not correspond equally with the genius or terms of both laws. You must then, as in other sciences, reason by analogy, or leave at least one-half of the statute without effect.’ It was argued that, although the words ‘charity’ and ‘charitable’ had a definite legal meaning in England, they could not be applied in the same way in Scotland unless they had a definite legal meaning there too: ‘That was not Lord Hardwicke’s view. He seems to have thought reflected light better than none.’ The words ‘ charity ‘ and ‘ charitable ‘ in the Income Tax Act, 1842 must be construed in their technical meaning according to English law.
The House discussed also the interpretation of statutes having effect both in England and Wales and in Scotland: ‘But in some cases certainly . . the statute proclaims its origin and speaks the language of the English lawyer, with some Scottish legal phrases thrown in rather casually. How are you to approach the construction of such statutes? We are not, I think, without a guide. It seems to me that there is much good sense in what Lord Hardwicke said in his well known letter to an eminent Scottish judge ‘you must’ he says ‘as in other sciences reason by analogy’ – that is, as I understand it, you must take the meaning of legal expressions from the law of the country to which they properly belong, and in any case arising in the sister country you must apply the statute in an analogous or corresponding sense so as to make the operation and effect of the statute the same in both countries. Thus you get what Lord Hardwicke calls ‘consistent, sensible construction”.
Lord Macnaghten discussed the development of the law of charity, saying of the 1601 Statute: ‘The object of that statute was merely to provide new machinery for the reformation of abuses in regard to charities. But by a singular construction it was held to authorize certain gifts to charity which otherwise would have been void. And it contained in the preamble a list of charities so varied and comprehensive that it became the practice of the Court to refer to it as a sort of index or chart. At the same time it has never been forgotten that the ‘objects there enumerated,’ as Lord Chancellor Cranworth observes, ‘are not to be taken as the only objects of charity but are given as instances’.’ and ‘I have dwelt for a moment on this point, because it seems to me that there is a disposition to treat the technical meaning of the term ‘charity’ rather as the idiom of a particular Court than as the language of the law of England. And yet of all words in the English language bearing a popular as well as a legal signification I am not sure that there is one which more unmistakably has a technical meaning in the strictest sense of the term, that is a meaning clear and distinct, peculiar to the law as understood and administered in this country, and not depending upon or coterminous with the popular or vulgar use of the word.’
Lord Macnaghten, Lord Watson, Lord Morris, Lord Herschell
[1891] AC 531, [1891] UKHL 1, [1891] UKHL TC – 3 – 53, (1891) 3 TC 53
Bailii, Bailii
Statute of Charitable Uses 1601
Scotland
Cited by:
CitedReclaiming Motion In Petition of Scott Davidson for Judicial Review of A Decision To Continue To Detain the Prisoner In Inhuman and Degrading Prison C SCS 18-Dec-2001
A prisoner sought an order for his removal from a prison found to have a regime which breached his human rights. The Crown replied that an order could not be made under s21 of the 1947 Act.
Held: The prisoner had followed through his rights to . .
CitedDavidson v Scottish Ministers HL 15-Dec-2005
The complainant a prisoner sought an order that he should not be kept in conditions found to be inhumane. He had been detained in Barlinnie priosn. The Crown replied that a mandatory order was not available against the Scottish Ministers.
CitedInland Revenue Commissioners v Glasgow Police Athletic Association HL 9-Mar-1953
The House was asked whether the taxpayer association was established for ‘Charitable purposes only’ so as to benefit from tax exemptions. The association promoted sporting activities among members of the Glasgow police.
Held: Though the . .
CitedGuild v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 6-May-1992
The will left land for a sports centre to a local authority which no longer existed. If the gift was charitable, the gift would be applied cy pres, but if not it would fail and pass to the family and be subect to Inheritance Tax.
Held: A gift . .
CitedO’Brien v Department for Constitutional Affairs CA 19-Dec-2008
The claimant was a part time recorder. He claimed to be entitled to a judicial pension.
Held: The Employment Appeal Tribunal was wrong to find an error of law in the decision of the Employment Tribunal to extend time; but the court declined to . .
CitedHelena Partnerships Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs CA 9-May-2012
helena_hmrcCA2012
The company had undertaken substantial building works and sought associated tax relief. The court was asked whether, following a change in the company’s memorandum and articles of association, the company, a registered social landlord, remained a . .
CitedIncorporated Council of Law Reporting For England And Wales v Attorney-General And Others CA 14-Oct-1971
The Council sought charitable status for its activities of reporting the law. The Revenue appealed against the decision by Foster J that the Council ought to be registered as a charity.
Held: The appeal failed. The company should have . .
ExplainedIn re Macduff; Macduff v Macduff CA 1896
Lindley LJ qualified the judgment of Lord Macnaghten in Pemsel: ‘Now Sir Samuel Romilly did not mean, and I am certain Lord Macnaghten did not mean, to say that every object of public general utility must necessarily be a charity. Some may be, and . .
CitedNational Anti-Vivisection League v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 2-Jul-1947
The main object of the Society was political viz, the repeal of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, and for that reason the Society was not established for charitable purposes only and was not entitled to exemption from tax. An organisation whose aims . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.220235

Camille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners: CA 1954

The Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to make an order with respect to a company registered in New York for objects which were charitable according to the laws of England.
Held: The Revenue’s appeal against a finding that the objects would be charitable under English law failed. However, the Special Commissioners had also decided that, in order to obtain the privilege of exemption under the sedtion of the 1918 Act, the body claiming the privilege must be one established under and in accordance with the laws of the United Kingdom. The foundation, being a foreign corporation and not subject to the jurisdiction, was debarred from claiming the benefit of the exemption. The foundation’s own appeal against this point failed.
Jenkins LJ said: ‘I have already expressed the view that ‘trust’ in an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament means a trust taking effect and enforceable under the law of the United Kingdom. It follows that, in my opinion, a ‘trust established for charitable purposes only’, must here mean a trust taking effect and enforceable under the law of the United Kingdom and creating an obligation enforceable in the courts of the United Kingdom to apply its funds for the purposes which are, according to the law of the United Kingdom, exclusively charitable. I can attribute no different meaning to the phrase ‘established for charitable purposes only’ when applied to a body of persons. So applied, I think it is only satisfied by a body of persons which is under the law of the United Kingdom subject to an obligation enforceable in our courts to apply its funds for purposes which are according to that law exclusively charitable. Accordingly, I would hold that the foundation is not ‘established for charitable purposes only’ within the meaning of section 37(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act 1918.’ Lord Evershed: ‘To my mind, the words ‘charities’ or ‘charitable institutions’ in an ordinary context in an English Act of Parliament or any English document must (prima facie at least) mean institutions regulated by, and subject to the jurisdiction of, the laws or the courts of the United Kingdom and constituted for the carrying out of objects or purposes which, in the courts of the United Kingdom and nowhere else, would be held to be ‘charitable’. In my judgment the two aspects or characteristics are almost inseparable. The law relating to charities or charitable trusts is a peculiar and highly complex part of our legal system. An Act of Parliament which uses the words ‘charity’ or ‘charitable’ must be intending to refer to that special and characteristic, if not in some respects artificial, part of our law.’ and ‘I am considering what, as a matter of ordinary language and common sense, is intended (in the absence of a special context) by the phrase, in an English Act of Parliament or other document, ‘body of persons established for charitable purposes only.’ In my judgment, applying the test I have formulated, once it is conceded that ‘for charitable purposes only’ means ‘for purposes which are what the laws of the United Kingdom define as charitable and hold to fall within the special and somewhat artificial significance of that word,’ then it seems to me, prima facie, that a body cannot be ‘established’ for such purposes, unless it is so constituted or regulated as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts which can alone define and regulate those purposes.’
Sir Raymond Evershed MR explained that it would be awkward and artificial to consider a body of persons established under the law of a foreign country as falling within the scope of the legislation and that, administrative difficulties aside, there was ‘an inherent incompatibility’ in the conception of a corporation regulated according to the laws of a foreign country and carrying on the whole of its activities in that country being able to show that it was ‘established for charitable purposes only’: ‘I am considering what, as a matter of ordinary language and common sense, is intended (in the absence of a special context) by the phrase, in an English Act of Parliament or other document, ‘body of persons established for charitable purposes only.’ In my judgment, applying the test I have formulated, once it is conceded that ‘for charitable purposes only’ means ‘for purposes which are what the laws of the United Kingdom define as charitable and hold to fall within the special and somewhat artificial significance of that word,’ then it seems to me, prima facie, that a body cannot be ‘established’ for such purposes unless it is so constituted or regulated as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts which can alone define and regulate those purposes.’
Sir Raymond Evershed MR discussed the use within the section of the word ‘any’ before ‘body of persons’, saying: ‘Still more significant to my mind is the circumstance that the formula ‘any body of persons or trust established for charitable purposes only’ is followed by the alternative ‘or which, according to the rules or regulations established by Act of Parliament, charter, decree, deed of trust or will are applicable to charitable purposes only.’ It is, in my judgment, reasonably clear that the alternative was added in order to cover those cases in which only a part of the income is, by virtue of the Act of Parliament or other instrument named, applicable to charitable purposes, in contradistinction to those bodies of persons or trusts which are exclusively established for such purposes.
In my view, however, the alternatives are true alternatives; the distinction, that is to say, is between institutions, in other respects alike, whose income is either, on the one hand, wholly applicable to the purposes named, or, on the other hand, is, as to the relevant part only, so applicable. And since, in my judgment, it cannot be in doubt that by ‘Act of Parliament’ is meant an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament, so it follows, in my view, that by ‘charter, decree, deed of trust or will’ is meant an instrument of the kind specified subject to, and taking effect according to, the laws of the United Kingdom. The alternative formula must therefore be regarded as wholly limited by reference to our local law; and, if this is so, then, as it seems to me, the earlier phrase ‘any body of persons or trust established, etc.’ must be regarded as equally so limited.
In my judgment, therefore, the bodies of persons mentioned in the paragraph cannot comprehend foreign institutions such as the foundation. I have earlier stated my view that the essential word is ‘established.’ In my judgment, whatever might be the true significance of the four words ‘any body of persons’ taken in isolation, those words in the context of paragraph (b) of section 37(1) of the Act of 1918, and particularly when immediately followed by the words ‘or trust established for charitable purposes only,’ must be limited to bodies of persons so constituted and regulated as to be (in reference to the income in question) subject to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom courts.’
Hodson LJ considered that, in context, the phrase ‘any body of persons or trust established for charitable purposes only’ must be a body of persons constituted under the law of the United Kingdom. He also found support for his conclusions in the practical difficulties involved in the contrary view. He thought the Commissioners would be set a difficult task if they had to apply the law of any part of the world in order to ascertain the purposes for which a particular body of persons was established before determining whether those purposes were charitable within the meaning of United Kingdom law.
Jenkins LJ, Hodson LJ, Lord Evershed MR
[1954] 1 Ch 672
Income Tax Act 1918 37(1)(b)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromCamille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 1956
The company was a foreign corporation constituted according to the laws of the state of New York for objects which were exclusively charitable according to the law of the United Kingdom.
Held: The term ‘charity’ does not include an institution . .
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .
CitedRoutier and Another v Revenue and Customs ChD 18-Sep-2014
Executors appealed against rejection of their claim that a gift in the will qualified for relief against Inheritance Tax as being a charitable gift. The Trusts concerned assets in Jersey.
Held: The appeal failed: ‘The expression ‘held on trust . .
CitedRoutier and Another v Revenue and Customs CA 16-Sep-2016
Executors appealed against a decision that a residual gift in a will was not charitable and that it was therefore subject to Inheritance Tax arguing that the section if construed in this way was an unlawful restriction on the free movement of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200677

In Re Robinson; Besant v German Reich: ChD 1931

The claim concerned a gift which had been made to the German government for the benefit of disabled German soldiers.
Held: The English court had no jurisdiction: ‘if the trustee is abroad there is no power in the Court to direct a scheme to be settled, and the practice in such a case is to hand over the fund to the trustee to be applied according to the trusts of the will without directing a scheme.’ Maugham J had formed the view that it would be possible for the trustees to carry out the objects of the trust without the necessity for a scheme to be formulated or approved by the court . . There was evidence before him that, through its counsel, the German Government had informed the court that there would be no objection… to a statement being made on behalf of the German Government that the fund would be applied according to the wishes of the testator.
However, the Court has the jurisdiction to provide the detailed machinery for the administration of the donor’s charitable objects by means of an administrative scheme.
Maugham J
[1931] 2 Ch 122
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200672

Camille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners: HL 1956

The company was a foreign corporation constituted according to the laws of the state of New York for objects which were exclusively charitable according to the law of the United Kingdom.
Held: The term ‘charity’ does not include an institution established under the laws of another legal system.
Lord Morton said: ‘It is at once apparent that the phrase in section 37(1)(b) ‘any body of persons or trust established for charitable purposes only’ is not expressly limited to bodies of persons or trusts established in the United Kingdom, but the Court of Appeal held that it should be construed as being so limited. This conclusion was based entirely upon a consideration of the true construction of the Act of 1918 . . I agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal, and as no question of principle arises in this case, and my reasons are in substance the same as those appearing in the judgments of that court, I shall not detain your Lordships by setting them out in my own words.’
Lord Norman said: ‘it is clearly the English system that he has in mind, [referring to the judgment of Lord Evershed] for it goes without saying that the Attorney-General has no right to invoke the powers of the courts beyond the boundary of England.’
Lord Morton of Henryton, Lord Normand
[1956] AC 39, [1955] 3 All ER 97, 36 TC 126, [1955] UKHL TC – 36 – 126
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromCamille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1954
The Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to make an order with respect to a company registered in New York for objects which were charitable according to the laws of England.
Held: The Revenue’s appeal against a finding that the . .

Cited by:
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .
CitedRoutier and Another v Revenue and Customs ChD 18-Sep-2014
Executors appealed against rejection of their claim that a gift in the will qualified for relief against Inheritance Tax as being a charitable gift. The Trusts concerned assets in Jersey.
Held: The appeal failed: ‘The expression ‘held on trust . .
CitedRoutier and Another v Revenue and Customs CA 16-Sep-2016
Executors appealed against a decision that a residual gift in a will was not charitable and that it was therefore subject to Inheritance Tax arguing that the section if construed in this way was an unlawful restriction on the free movement of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200676

Attorney-General v City of London: 1790

A trust had been established in England for the advancement of Christianity among ‘infidels in America’. Acting on information that after the American War of Independence, there were no longer any infidels within the areas designated, and that the charity was lacking in objects, and also acting on information that the College of William and Mary, which had acted in the local administration of the charity, was now ‘subject to a foreign power’, the independent States of America, the Court directed a new scheme to be made for the administration of the charity.
Lord Thurlow L-C
(1790) Bro CC 171
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200675

Emery v Hill: 14 Feb 1826

The Court was asked to make an order with respect to a bequest to the treasurer of a society established in Scotland for the propagation of Christian knowledge.
Held: The English court had no jurisdiction over a Scottish charity.
(1826) 1 Russ 112, [1826] EngR 807, (1826) 38 ER 44
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200669

Attorney-General v Lepine: 1818

The testator left part of his residuary estate for the benefit of a school for the poor in the parish of Dollar in Scotland.
Held: The English court declined jurisdiction. ‘I have always understood that, where a charity is to be administered in Scotland, this Court should not take into its own hands the administration.’ He directed that the money should be paid to trustees and administered under the supervision of the Scottish courts.
Lord Eldon LC
(1818) 2 Swanst 181, (1818) 1 Wils Ch 465, (1818) 36 ER 584 LC
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoThe Attorney-General v Lepine 22-Feb-1815
. .
See AlsoThe Attorney-General v Lepine 1789
. .

Cited by:
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200668

Mayor of Lyons v East India Co: PC 12 Dec 1836

Lord Brougham said: ‘The objection, in the ordinary case, to administering a foreign charity under the superintendence of the Court, is this: those who are engaged in the actual execution of it, are beyond the Court’s control, and those who are within the jurisdiction are answerable to the Court for the acts of persons as to whom they can derive no aid from the Court. Such an office will not easily be undertaken by any one; and its duties cannot be satisfactorily performed; at least the party must rely more on the local, that is, the foreign, authorities for help, than on the Court to which he is accountable.’
Lord Brougham
(1836) 1 Moore’s PC 175, [1836] UKPC 23
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200665

Gaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary: CA 30 Jul 1997

The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava religion in London.
Held: Charities Act jurisdiction is restricted to charities registered in the UK, with no control over charities established and administered abroad. The Mission was not a charity within the meaning of the 1993 Act.
Mummery LJ observed that: ‘Under English law charity has always received special treatment. It often takes the form of a trust; but it is a public trust for the promotion of purposes beneficial to the community, not a trust for private individuals. It is therefore subject to special rules governing registration, administration, taxation and duration. Although not a state institution, a charity is subject to the constitutional protection of the Crown as parens patriae, acting through the Attorney-General, to the state supervision of the Charity Commissioners, and to the judicial supervision of the High Court. This regime applies whether the charity takes the form of a trust or of an incorporated body’.
Lord Justice Leggatt Lord Justice Morritt Lord Justice Mummery
Times 24-Sep-1997, [1998] Ch 341, [1997] EWCA Civ 2239
Bailii
Charities Act 1993 33 96(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromGaudiya Mission and Others v Kamalaksha Das Brahmachary ChD 14-Mar-1997
There was a dispute as to the management and ownership of the London Temple of the plaintiff, a Vaishnava religious sect in India.
Held: The proceedings were charity proceedings within section 33(8), because they are proceedings brought under . .
CitedMayor of Lyons v East India Co PC 12-Dec-1836
Lord Brougham said: ‘The objection, in the ordinary case, to administering a foreign charity under the superintendence of the Court, is this: those who are engaged in the actual execution of it, are beyond the Court’s control, and those who are . .
CitedClark (Inspector of Taxes) v Oceanic Contractors Inc HL 16-Dec-1982
HL Income tax, Schedule E – Non-resident employer – Employees working in U.K. sector of North Sea – Whether employer liable to deduct tax from emoluments – Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1973 – Income and . .
DistinguishedConstruction Industry Training Board v Attorney-General CA 1973
The principal issue was whether a body set up by statute and subject to the control of a minister of the Crown was a ‘charity’ within the meaning of section 45(1) of the Charities Act 1960, for which purpose it had to be subject to ‘the control of . .
CitedProvost of Edinburgh v Aubery 1754
The English court declined the jurisdiction for the distribution of a fund of 3,500 pounds bequeathed by the testator to the Provost of Edinburgh to be applied for the maintenance of poor labourers residing in Edinburgh and towns adjacent. He said . .
CitedRe Marr’s Will Trusts 1936
. .
CitedAttorney-General v Lepine 1818
The testator left part of his residuary estate for the benefit of a school for the poor in the parish of Dollar in Scotland.
Held: The English court declined jurisdiction. ‘I have always understood that, where a charity is to be administered . .
CitedIn Re Robinson; Besant v German Reich ChD 1931
The claim concerned a gift which had been made to the German government for the benefit of disabled German soldiers.
Held: The English court had no jurisdiction: ‘if the trustee is abroad there is no power in the Court to direct a scheme to be . .
CitedEmery v Hill 14-Feb-1826
The Court was asked to make an order with respect to a bequest to the treasurer of a society established in Scotland for the propagation of Christian knowledge.
Held: The English court had no jurisdiction over a Scottish charity. . .
CitedForbes v Forbes 3-Mar-1854
General Forbes died. It became necessary to decide what was his domicile at the date of death. He had been born in Scotland, but then served for 35 years in India, before retirng to live in London.
Held: The domicile in India was a domicile of . .
CitedAttorney-General v Sturge 4-Nov-1854
The testatrix had left funds to support a school in Genoa.
Held: The courts have no authority to make a scheme where the trustees would not be within the jurisdiction of the English courts. . .
CitedRe Colonial Bishoprics Fund 1841 1935
The court was asked to make a order with respect to the Fund, a trust established in England for the endowment of Bishoprics in the Colonies.
Held: The court had jurisdiction to make a cy-pres order. Since the trustees of the fund were in this . .
CitedAttorney-General v City of London 1790
A trust had been established in England for the advancement of Christianity among ‘infidels in America’. Acting on information that after the American War of Independence, there were no longer any infidels within the areas designated, and that the . .
CitedCamille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 1956
The company was a foreign corporation constituted according to the laws of the state of New York for objects which were exclusively charitable according to the law of the United Kingdom.
Held: The term ‘charity’ does not include an institution . .
CitedCamille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners CA 1954
The Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to make an order with respect to a company registered in New York for objects which were charitable according to the laws of England.
Held: The Revenue’s appeal against a finding that the . .
DoubtedRe Duncan CA 1867
The court was asked whether the consent of the Charity Commissioners was necessary to petition the Court to appoint a new trustee of a charity established in England to promote Christian education in Jamaica.
Held: In the 1853 Act, ‘Charity’ . .

Cited by:
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.142636

Provost of Edinburgh v Aubery: 1754

The English court declined the jurisdiction for the distribution of a fund of 3,500 pounds bequeathed by the testator to the Provost of Edinburgh to be applied for the maintenance of poor labourers residing in Edinburgh and towns adjacent. He said that that belonged ‘to another jurisdiction, that is, to some of the courts in Scotland’. He ordered the fund to be transferred to such person as the Provost of Edinburgh should appoint.
Lord Hardwicke
(1754) Amb 236, [1737] EngR 53, (1737-1784) Amb 236, (1737) 27 ER 157 (A)
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200667

Gaudiya Mission and Others v Kamalaksha Das Brahmachary: ChD 14 Mar 1997

There was a dispute as to the management and ownership of the London Temple of the plaintiff, a Vaishnava religious sect in India.
Held: The proceedings were charity proceedings within section 33(8), because they are proceedings brought under the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of trusts in relation to the administration of a trust for charitable purposes. A foreign registered charity operating in UK is subject to Charities Act jurisdiction. The court found that the plaintiff was a Charity, and that the Attorney-General should be joined.
David Oliver QC
Times 01-Apr-1997
Charities Act 1993 33(2) 33(8) 96(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.80771

Construction Industry Training Board v Attorney-General: CA 1973

The principal issue was whether a body set up by statute and subject to the control of a minister of the Crown was a ‘charity’ within the meaning of section 45(1) of the Charities Act 1960, for which purpose it had to be subject to ‘the control of the High Court in the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction with respect to charities’.
Held: Sufficient control was vested in the High Court despite the fact that the minister had complete control over the running of the board.
Buckley LJ considered the authorities for permitting a charity to act outside its original charitable aims: ‘It has long been recognised that, where a charity is established by an Act of Parliament, the court will not exercise its jurisdiction in any way which will conflict with the provisions of the Act (In re Shrewsbury Grammar School (1849) 1 Mac. and G. 324, 333), but this does not mean that in such a case the jurisdiction of the court is entirely ousted. In In re Shipwrecked Fishermen and Mariners’ Royal Benevolent Society [1959] Ch. 220, Danckwerts J. expressed the view (in which I respectfully concur) that the court has power to sanction a scheme in relation to a charity established by an Act of Parliament in respect of matters not in conflict with the provisions of the Act, and even in respect of those matters which are regulated by Act of Parliament the court can entertain an application by charity trustees to consider whether they should apply to Parliament for an amending Act: In re Shrewsbury Grammar School, 1 Mac. and G. 324. It seems that the position may be similar in the case of a charity incorporated by Royal Charter: In re Whitworth Art Gallery Trusts [1958] Ch. 461.’
Buckley LJ gave a description of the court’s extensive jurisdiction over charities: ‘It is a function of the Crown as parens patriae to ensure the due administration of established charities and the proper application of funds devoted to charitable purposes. This it normally does through the instrumentality of the courts, but this is not the only way in which the Crown can regulate charities or the application of charitable funds. Where a charity has been incorporated by Royal Charter, the Crown may amend its constitution or vary its permitted objects by granting a supplemental charter. Where funds are given for charitable purposes in circumstances in which no express or implied trust is created, the Crown can regulate the application of those funds by means of a scheme under the sign manual. Where the Crown invokes the assistance of the courts for such purposes, the jurisdiction which is invoked is, I think, a branch of the court’s jurisdiction in relation to trusts. In such cases the relief granted often takes the form of an order approving a scheme for the administration of the charity which has been laid before the court, but this is not the only way in which the court can exercise jurisdiction in respect of a charity or over charity trustees. The approval of a scheme of this nature is, so far as I am aware, a form of relief peculiar to charities, but it does not constitute relief of a kind given in the exercise of a jurisdiction confined to giving relief of that sort. The court could, for instance, restrain trustees from applying charitable funds in breach of trust by means of an injunction. In the case of a charity incorporated by statute this might, as was suggested in the present case, be explained as an application of the doctrine of ultra vires, but I do not think that this would be a satisfactory explanation, for a similar order upon unincorporated trustees could not be so explained. Or, by way of further example, the court could order charity trustees to make good trust funds which they had misapplied, or could order them to account, or could remove or appoint trustees, or could exercise any other kind of jurisdiction available in the execution of trusts other than charitable trusts. In every such case the court would be acting upon the basis that the property affected is not in the beneficial ownership of the persons or body in whom its legal ownership is vested but is devoted to charitable purposes, that is to say, is held upon charitable trusts. Any relief of this kind is, in my judgment, appropriately described as relief granted in the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction with respect to charities, and, where the relief is such as to bind the body of trustees as a whole, this would, in my opinion, constitute control of the charity by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to charities. I consequently feel unable to accept the suggestion put forward on behalf of the Attorney General that the reference in section 45 of the Act of 1960 to the court’s jurisdiction with respect to charities is in some way confined to its jurisdiction to approve charitable schemes.’
Russell LJ, Buckley LJ, Plowman J
[1973] Ch 173
Charities Act 1960 45(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRe: Shrewsbury Grammar School 1849
Trustees of the school had accumulated income in excess of what was required to achieve the objects of the charitable trust, and asked the court how to apply them. Having upheld the contention that what was described as Sir S. Romilly’s Act . .
CitedRe Shipwrecked Fishermen and Mariners’ Royal Benevolent Society ChD 1959
The court approved a scheme conferring wider powers of investment than those authorised by the statute incorporating the charity: ‘It is said on behalf of persons interested in the charity that the court is empowered to make a scheme to authorize a . .

Cited by:
DistinguishedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .
CitedAttorney General v British Museum ChD 27-May-2005
The trustees brought a claim against the Attorney-General seeking clarification of their duties and powers to return objects which were part of the collection in law, but where a moral duty might exist to return it to a former owner. Here drawings . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200666