Regina (on the Application of Wainwright) v Richmond Upon Thames London Borough Council: CA 20 Dec 2001

A local authority was under a statutory duty to consult before undertaking road improvements. Because of the chaotic mail administration systems, the consultation had been ruled unlawful. The council appealed.
Held: The council had in fact failed in its duty to consult, but there was no possibility that its decision would have differed even if the consultation had been effective, and the plan was restored.

Lord Justice Henry, Lord Justice Clarke and Mr Justice Wall
Times 16-Jan-2002, Gazette 27-Feb-2002, [2001] EWHC Admin 1090, [2001] EWCA Civ 2062
Bailii, Bailii, Bailii
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 23
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Brent London Borough Council ex parte Gunning 1985
The demands of fair consultation procedures will vary from case to case and will depend on the factors involved. The requirements are: ‘First, that consultation must be at a time when proposals are still at a formative stage. Second, that the . .
CitedRegina v Camden London Borough Council Ex Parte Cran and Others QBD 25-Jan-1995
A designation of an area as a controlled parking area was vitiated by the failure of the Local Authority to consult locally. The court expanded on the principles for consultation set out in Gunning: ‘What kind and amount of consultation is required . .

Cited by:
CitedPartingdale Lane Residents’ Association, Regina (on the Application of) v Barnet London Borough Council Admn 2-Apr-2003
Complaint was made that a Councillor had closed his mind to any arguments and had predetermined the decision on a proposed road re-opening order.
Held: The application was allowed. Councillor Coleman had himself gone beyond a legitimate . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Local Government, Road Traffic

Updated: 06 December 2021; Ref: scu.167373

Commission Of The European Communities v Republic Of Austria: ECJ 11 Dec 2008

ECJ (Judgment Of The Court (Third Chamber)) Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Articles 28 EC and 30 EC – Registration of old used vehicles previously registered in other Member States – Technical requirements with regard to exhaust emissions and noise pollution – Public health – Protection of the environment
1. Approximation of laws – Motor vehicles – Community type-approval procedure – Directives 92/97 and 93/59 – Scope (Council Directives 92/97 and 93/59) (see paras 45-47)
2. Free movement of goods – Quantitative restrictions – Measures having equivalent effect (Arts 28 EC and 30 EC) (see paras 49-52, 56-64)
Re:
Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Infringement of Articles 28 and 30 EC – National rules making the registration of imported used vehicles previously registered in other Member States contingent upon compliance with certain technical requirements, although used vehicles already on the national market and having the same characteristics are not subject to such requirements in cases of re-registration

C-524/07, [2008] EUECJ C-524/07
Bailii

European, Road Traffic, Environment

Updated: 04 December 2021; Ref: scu.526340

Commission v Lithuania: ECJ 20 Mar 2014

ECJ Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Registration of motor vehicles – Articles 34 TFUE and 36 TFUE – Directive 70/311/EEC – Directive 2007/46/EC – Driving on the right in a Member State – Obligation, for the purpose of registration, to reposition to the left-hand side the steering equipment of passenger vehicles positioned on the right-hand side

T. von Danwitz, P
C-61/12, [2014] EUECJ C-61/12
Bailii

European, Road Traffic

Updated: 01 December 2021; Ref: scu.522646

Commission v Poland: ECJ 20 Mar 2014

ECJ Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Registration of motor vehicles – Articles 34 TFEU and 36 TFEU – Directive 70/311/EEC – Directive 2007/46/EC – Driving on the right in a Member State – Obligation, for the purpose of registration, to reposition to the left-hand side the steering equipment of passenger vehicles positioned on the right-hand side

T. von Danwitz, P
C-639/11, [2014] EUECJ C-639/11
Bailii
Directive 70/311/EEC, Directive 2007/46/EC

European, Road Traffic

Updated: 01 December 2021; Ref: scu.522647

Jones and Another v First Greater Western Ltd: CA 18 Mar 2014

The appellants on behalf of themselves and other members of the Bristol branch of the National Taxi Association, claimed that the introduction by the respondent First Greater Western Limited of a taxi permit scheme at the public taxi rank at Bristol Temple Meads station was unlawful. They now appealed against rejection of their claim.

Areden, Underhill, Floyd LJJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 301
Bailii
England and Wales

Licensing, Road Traffic

Updated: 01 December 2021; Ref: scu.522551

Castle v Crown Prosecution Service: Admn 24 Jan 2014

The defendant appealed from his conviction for having driven in excess of a variable speed limit on the motorway. He said that the Order under which the speed limit had been imposed was irregular.

Pitchford LJ, Cranston
[2014] RTR 19, [2014] WLR(D) 33, (2014) 178 JP 285, [2014] EWHC 587 (Admin), [2014] 1 WLR 4279
Bailii, WLRD
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 14, M62 Motorway (Junction 25 to Junction 30) (Temporary Restriction and Prohibition of Traffic) Order 2011, Road Traffic (Temporary Restrictions) Procedure Regulations 1992 3
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedCarltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works CA 1943
Ministers May Act through Civil Servants
The plaintiffs owned a factory which was to be requisitioned. They sought a judicial review of the lawfulness of the order making the requisition, saying that the 1939 Regulations had been implemented not by the Minister as required, but by an . .
CitedLewisham Borough Council v Roberts CA 1949
The council sought to exercise its powers under the Act to take possession of part of the defendant’s property.
Held: Denning LJ said: ‘It is necessary to consider the nature of the power to requisition land. It is only a power to take . .
CitedRegina v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Oladehinde HL 18-Oct-1990
A decision at Senior Executive Officer level was accepted as appropriate in a deportation case. There was an express form of delegation, and acts of the immigration officers required to be regarded as the acts of the Home Secretary.
Lord . .
CitedRegina v Secretary of State for Social Security ex parte Sherwin (a Patient By Her Next Friend Sherwin) Admn 16-Feb-1996
An official in the Benefits Agency, part of the Department of Health and Social Security, suspended an income support/severe disability premium payable to the appellant. The court was asked whether the decision of the Agency, made under the . .

Cited by:
CitedBourgass and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Justice SC 29-Jul-2015
The Court considered the procedures when a prisoner is kept in solitary confinement, otherwise described as ‘segregation’ or ‘removal from association’, and principally whether decisions to keep the appellants in segregation for substantial periods . .
CitedBourgass and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Justice SC 29-Jul-2015
The Court considered the procedures when a prisoner is kept in solitary confinement, otherwise described as ‘segregation’ or ‘removal from association’, and principally whether decisions to keep the appellants in segregation for substantial periods . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Constitutional

Updated: 01 December 2021; Ref: scu.522554

Albert v Motor Insurers Bureau: HL 1971

The plaintiff suffered injury as a passenger when getting a lift to work from a co-worker. The driver was uninsured and had given lift to several co-workers over a period of time, mking a charge.
Held: The lift arrangement was in the nature of a contract, and therefore under the MIB scheme, the MIB were obliged to pay compensation.
Viscount Dilhorne said: ‘To constitute carriage for hire or reward, it is not, of course, necessary that payment is made before the journey. If there is an arrangement that payment will be made for that it matters not when the payment is in fact made.’

Viscount Dilhorne
[1971] 3 WLR 291
England and Wales

Road Traffic, Insurance, Personal Injury, Contract

Updated: 30 November 2021; Ref: scu.565344

British Road Services v Wurzal: 1971

A trailer used to transport goods between this country and continental Europe as found to be without a plate as required by regulation 3. The defence claimed the trailer was exempted by Schedule 2 of the regulations as it fell within the class of trailers ‘Temporarily in Great Britain a period of 12 months not having elapsed since the vehicle in question was last brought into Great Britain’. He appealed a finding that ‘temporarily’ meant for a limited time. They heard nothing to the effect that the time during which the trailer had been or would be in this country was limited and therefore it followed that it ought to have been plated.
Held: There is implicit in the phrase ‘temporarily in Great Britain’ an element other than simply a time element. The trailer in question, was not here casually but regularly, as part of its regular habits of life so far as a trailer can have such habits. ‘If you have here, as you have, a trailer regularly travelling between England and the Continent so that its presence in England is intermittent but regular and repeated, I do not think that it can, on a fair use of language and in particular upon a true construction of this regulation, be said to be a trailer temporarily in Great Britain at any relevant time. I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.’

Lord Widgery CJ
[1971] 1 WLR 1508
Goods Vehicles (Plating and Testing) Regulations 1968 3
England and Wales
Citing:
ApprovedInland Revenue v Cadwalader 1904
An American citizen, with his ordinary residence and indeed practising the law in New York, took a three-year lease of a furnished shooting lodge in Scotland. He resided at the shooting lodge for a period of two months in each year during the . .

Cited by:
CitedStena Rederi Aktiebolag and Another v Irish Ferries Ltd CA 6-Feb-2003
A ferry plied its way between Dublin and Holyhead, coming into English territorial waters three or four times a day, and for up to three hours on each occasion. The claimants asserted that the construction of the hull infringed its patent.
Road Traffic

Updated: 30 November 2021; Ref: scu.195482

Yellow Cab Verkehrsbetriebs: ECJ 22 Dec 2010

ECJ Freedom to provide services – Freedom of establishment – Competition rules – Cabotage transport operations – National transportation of persons by bus service – Application to operate a service – Licence – Authorisation – Conditions – Requirement of a seat or permanent establishment in the national territory – Reduction of income compromising the profitability of a service already licensed

K. Lenaerts, P
[2010] EUECJ C-338/09, [2011] 2 CMLR 23
Bailii

European, Road Traffic

Updated: 29 November 2021; Ref: scu.521398

Powlesland v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 9 Dec 2013

The defendant apealed against his conviction for having taken part in a public procession, a a Critical Mass Cycle Ride, knowingly in breach of conditions attached to it by the Police. The defendant had argued that the ride was not a procession.
Held: The appeal failed. ‘The power to give directions is to be used, not just when the organisers of a procession have been co-operative enough to tell the police in advance of their intentions as to a specific route, but and perhaps more importantly when they have not done so. It would be an absurd interpretation if a direction, aimed at preventing serious disruption, could not be given unless the police knew as a matter of objectively provable fact that the procession would follow a specific route from A to B via particular roads, despite disruptive organisers masking their intentions. It cannot be that, until the police know the specific route, they cannot use s12 to prevent the use of a reasonably possible but seriously disruptive route. The power to give directions would not be useable when most needed; and it could always be objected that the police did not know what the route was to be, but had merely believed, however reasonably, that it could take a disruptive route.’

Goldring LJ, Ouseley J
[2013] EWHC 3846 (Admin), (2014) 178 JP 67, [2014] 1 WLR 2984, [2014] WLR(D) 139
Bailii, WLRD
Public Order Act 1986 12(5)
Citing:
CitedKay v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis HL 26-Nov-2008
The claimant had been involved in a monthly cycle ride through central London which had continued for many years. The ride took place without any central organisation and without any route being pre-planned. They objected to being required to apply . .
CitedKay v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Admn 27-Jun-2006
For many years and in many large cities, once a month, cyclists had gathered en masse to cycle through the city in a ‘Critical Mass’ demonstration. There was no central organisation. Clarification was sought as to whether the consent of the police . .
CitedFlockhart v Robinson 1950
A challenge was made to the organising of a procession. Its route was determined by Mr Flockhart as he went along.
Held: For the purposes of section 3(4) of the 1936 Act, a procession ‘is a body of persons moving along a route’ and that, by . .
CitedJukes and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 16-Jan-2013
Two of those participating in a march demonstrating against cuts in the education budget, left that march to join the Occupy Movement’s demonstration in Trafalgar Square against the excesses of capitalism. They were, convicted at Westminster . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic, Police

Updated: 28 November 2021; Ref: scu.519993

Staatsanwaltschaft Baden-Baden v Apelt: ECJ 13 Oct 2011

ECJ Directive 91/439/EEC – Mutual recognition of driving licences – Withdrawal of the national driving licence issued by the Member State of residence and issue of a driving licence for vehicles in categories B and D by another Member State – Refusal of recognition by the Member State of residence – Obligation to hold a valid licence for vehicles in category B at the time of issue of the licence for vehicles in category D

J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, P
[2011] EUECJ C-224/10, C-224/10
Bailii
Directive 91/439/EEC
Citing:
OpinionStaatsanwaltschaft Baden-Baden v Apelt ECJ 30-Jun-2011
ECJ Opinion – Directive 91/439/EEC – Mutual recognition of driving licenses – Withdrawal of national driving license and issuance of a driving license for categories B and D by another Member State – Refusal of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, Road Traffic

Updated: 28 November 2021; Ref: scu.519358

Coles and Others v Hetherton and Others: CA 20 Dec 2013

The claimants’ insurers disputed arrangements by the defendants’ insurers in motor accident claims which, they said artificially inflated the costs of repairs to the profit of the defendants’ insurers.

Moore-Bick, Aikens, Vos LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 1704
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoColes and Others v Hetherton and Others ComC 22-Sep-2011
Parties challenged the method used by the Royal and Sun Alliance insurance to calculate the cost of repairs to motor vehicles damaged in accidents. After conflicting decisions in County Courts, the issue was brought before the Commercial Court.
Appeal fromColes and Others v Hetherton and Others ComC 15-Jun-2012
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Damages, Road Traffic

Updated: 28 November 2021; Ref: scu.519317

Nemeti and Others v Sabre Insurance Co Ltd: CA 3 Dec 2013

The court considered the power of courts to allow substitution of a new party after the expiration of the limitation period.

Sir Terence Etherton Ch, Hallett VP, Sharp LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 1555
Bailii
European Communities (Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2002, Road Traffic Act 1988 151
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Liverpool City Council Ex Parte Muldoon; Regina v Same Ex Parte Kelly HL 11-Jul-1996
The claimant sought to challenge a refusal of the Housing Authority to pay housing benefit. The Secretary of State had made the relevant Regulations determining eligibility for benefits. If the challenge were successful, the Secretary of State would . .
CitedIrwin and Another v Lynch and Another CA 6-Oct-2010
The court considered an appeal against an order allowing an amendment outside the limitation period which would . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Insurance, Road Traffic

Updated: 26 November 2021; Ref: scu.518566

Katarina Haasova v Rastislav Petrik: ECJ 24 Oct 2013

ECJ Compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles – Directive 72/166/EEC – Article 3(1) – Directive 90/232/EEC – Article 1 – Road traffic accident – Death of a passenger – Right to compensation of the partner and of the child, who is a minor – Non-material damage – Compensation – Cover by compulsory insurance

C-22/12, [2013] EUECJ C-22/12
Bailii
Directive 72/166/EEC 3(1), Directive 90/232/EEC 1
European

Road Traffic

Updated: 22 November 2021; Ref: scu.516983

Spedition Welter Gmbh v Avanssur Sa: ECJ 10 Oct 2013

ECJ Insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability – Directive 2009/103/EC – Article 21(5) – Claims representative – Authority to accept service of judicial documents – National rule making the validity of that service conditional on the express grant of an authority to accept it – Interpretation in conformity with Union law

C-306/12, [2013] EUECJ C-306/12
Bailii
Directive 2009/103/EC 21(5)

European, Road Traffic, Insurance

Updated: 22 November 2021; Ref: scu.516581

Petillo v Unipol: ECJ 9 Oct 2013

Opinion – Insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles – Directive 72/166/EEC – Article 3 – Directive 84/5/EEC – Article 1 – Directive 90/232/EEC – Article 1a – Right to compensation – Limitation of the right to compensation – Non-material damage

Wahl AG
C-371/12, [2013] EUECJ C-371/12, [2014] EUECJ C-371/12
Bailii, Bailii
Directive 72/166/EEC 3, Directive 84/5/EEC 1, Directive 90/232/EEC 1a

European, Road Traffic

Updated: 21 November 2021; Ref: scu.516351

Attfield, Regina (on The Application of) v London Borough of Barnet: Admn 22 Jul 2013

The Claimant, a resident of the London Borough of Barnet, applies for judicial review of the decision of the Defendant to increase the charges for residents’ parking permits and visitor vouchers in Controlled Parking Zones in the Borough.

Lang DBE J
[2013] EWHC 2089 (Admin), [2013] WLR(D) 303
Bailii, WLRD

Road Traffic

Updated: 17 November 2021; Ref: scu.513542

Regina v Camden London Borough Council Ex Parte Cran and Others: QBD 25 Jan 1995

A designation of an area as a controlled parking area was vitiated by the failure of the Local Authority to consult locally. The court expanded on the principles for consultation set out in Gunning: ‘What kind and amount of consultation is required in a particular case must depend on the circumstances. A few general principles can however, be stated.
‘The process of consultation must be effective; looked at as a whole, it must be fair. This requires that: consultation must take place while the proposals are still at a formative stage; those consulted must be provided with information which is accurate and sufficient to enable them to make a meaningful response; they must be given adequate time in which to do so; there must be adequate time for their responses to be considered; the consulting party must consider responses with a receptive mind and a conscientious manner when reaching its decision.’

McCullough J
Times 25-Jan-1995, Ind Summary 20-Mar-1995, (1996) 94 LGR 8
European Convention on Human Rights 9
Citing:
CitedRegina v Brent London Borough Council ex parte Gunning 1985
The demands of fair consultation procedures will vary from case to case and will depend on the factors involved. The requirements are: ‘First, that consultation must be at a time when proposals are still at a formative stage. Second, that the . .

Cited by:
CitedRegina (on the Application of Wainwright) v Richmond Upon Thames London Borough Council CA 20-Dec-2001
A local authority was under a statutory duty to consult before undertaking road improvements. Because of the chaotic mail administration systems, the consultation had been ruled unlawful. The council appealed.
Held: The council had in fact . .
CitedPartingdale Lane Residents’ Association, Regina (on the Application of) v Barnet London Borough Council Admn 2-Apr-2003
Complaint was made that a Councillor had closed his mind to any arguments and had predetermined the decision on a proposed road re-opening order.
Held: The application was allowed. Councillor Coleman had himself gone beyond a legitimate . .
CitedX, Regina (on the Application of) v Y School Admn 21-Feb-2007
The court was asked whether a school was entitled to refuse to allow a Muslim girl to wear the niqab full face veil at school. The reasons were ‘first educational factors resulting from a teacher being unable to see the face of the girl with a . .
CitedWatkins-Singh, Regina (on the Application of) v The Governing Body of Aberdare Girls’ High School and Another Admn 29-Jul-2008
Miss Singh challenged her school’s policy which operated to prevent her wearing while at school a steel bangle, a Kara. She said this was part of her religion as a Sikh.
Held: Earlier comparable applications had been made under human rights . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Local Government

Updated: 17 November 2021; Ref: scu.86281

Marshall v Osmond: CA 1983

The plaintiff was passenger in a stolen car seeking to escape the police as they chased. The car was stopped, the plaintiff got out of the car, and was hit by a police car. He sought damages.
Held: His appeal against dismissal of his claim was dismissed. A police officer was to exercise such care and skill as was reasonable in the circumstances. Though the officer might have made errors of judgment, he had not in fact been negligent. Though the claimant had helped to create the circumstances which gave rise to the accident, the defence of volenti non fit injuria did not apply.
Sir John Donaldson MR said: ‘I think that the duty owed by a police driver to the suspect is, as Mr Spokes, on behalf of the plaintiff, has contended, the same duty as that owed to anyone else, namely to exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in all the circumstances. The vital words in that proposition of law are ‘in all the circumstances’, and of course one of the circumstances was that the plaintiff bore all the appearance of having been somebody engaged in a criminal activity for which there was a power of arrest.’
and ‘As I see it, what happened was that this police officer pursued a line in steering his car which would, in the ordinary course of events, have led to his ending up sufficiently far away from the Cortina to clear its open door. He was driving on a gravelly surface at night in what were no doubt stressful circumstances. There is no doubt that he made an error of judgment because, in the absence of an error of judgment, there would have been no contact between the cars. I am far from satisfied on the evidence that the police officer was negligent.’

Sir John Donaldson MR, Dillon LJ, Sir Denis Buckley
[1983] 2 All ER 367, [1983] 1 QB 1034, [1983] 3 WLR 13
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedAshton v Turner QBD 1981
The plaintiff sought damages after being injured as a passenger in a car. He and the driver had both just been involved in a burglary, and the driver, who had taken alcohol was attempting to escape. The driver was driving very dangerously in order . .

Cited by:
CitedKeyse v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis, Scutts CA 18-May-2001
The court considered liability where a police car on emergency duty hit Mr Scutts causing very serious injuries. The officer appealed against a finding of liability saying that the judge had declared irrelevant the fact he was on an emergency . .
AppliedHenry v Thames Valley Police CA 14-Jan-2010
The claimant appealed against rejection of his claim for damages after he had been injured when a police car following him ran over his leg. He had been riding a motorcycle and apparently seeking to escape them. He had stopped and was talking to one . .
CitedMacleod (By His Deputy and Litigation Friend, Macleod) v Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis QBD 3-Apr-2014
macleod_cpmQBD0414
The claimant sought damages after being severely injured when knocked from his cycle by police officers in a car attending an emergency, and driving over the speed limit.
Held: The claim succeeded, and there had been no contributory negligence . .
CitedRobinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police SC 8-Feb-2018
Limits to Police Exemption from Liability
The claimant, an elderly lady was bowled over and injured when police were chasing a suspect through the streets. As they arrested him they fell over on top of her. She appealed against refusal of her claim in negligence.
Held: Her appeal . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Police, Negligence, Road Traffic

Updated: 15 November 2021; Ref: scu.190025

AA and Sons Ltd v Slough Borough Council: Admn 14 Apr 2014

Statutory review pursuant to section 124 and Schedule 9 paragraph 35 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 in relation to four traffic regulation orders adopted by Slough Borough Council in 2012 which concern four roads in a largely residential area within the Slough conurbation.

[2014] EWHC 1127 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 15 November 2021; Ref: scu.524653

Cusack v London Borough of Harrow: SC 19 Jun 2013

The landowner practised from property in Harrow. The former garden had now for many years been used as a forecourt open to the highway, for parking cars of staff and clients. Cars crossed the footpath to gain access, and backing out into the road when leaving. That use was recognised as lawful under planning law. The authority decided to erect barriers making such use impossible, and the claimant sought compensation for damage to his practice. The Court of Appeal had decided that the erection of the barriers was under section 66 of the 1980 Act, and not section 80, and that therefore compensation would be payable. The Council appealed.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The common law rights of access from property to a public have been severely curtailed by statute, and in general no compensation would be payable. Neither of the sections could be seen as more specific than the other.
The Council were entitled to choose section 80 for their purpose if it was not an attempt to circumvent a restriction provided elsewhere (eg section 66).
That choice did not amount to a deprivation of the claimant’s use of his land, but was merely a control of his use for the purposes of safety. This was happening in the context of planning control in which a state enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation.
A use of property immune from planning control did not amount to a permission for that use.
Carnwath L said: ‘The issue is not simply whether the council’s action is an abuse of its powers under section 80, but whether in that action ‘a fair balance was . . struck between the competing general and individual interests.’ On the other hand, there is no challenge to the compatibility of section 80 as such. Accordingly, the mere fact that another statutory route was available involving compensation does not in itself lead to the conclusion that reliance on section 80 was disproportionate. ‘

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath, Lord Hughes
[2013] UKSC 40, [2013] PTSR 921, [2013] WLR(D) 250, [2013] HRLR 26, [2014] RVR 148, [2013] 26 EG 106, [2013] RTR 26, [2013] WLR(D) 250, [2013] 3 EGLR 29, [2013] 1 WLR 2022, [2013] 4 All ER 97, UKSC 2012/0006
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC, WLRD
Highways Act 1980 66(2) 80, European Convention on Human Rights A1P1
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedPretty v Solly CA 24-Jan-1859
In a statutory construction the specific overrides the general – generalia specialibus non derogant. Sir John Romilly MR said: ‘The general rules which are applicable to particular and general enactments in statutes are very clear, the only . .
CitedMarshall v Blackpool Corporation HL 1934
A land-owner having land adjacent to a public highway has, at common law, free access to and from the highway at any point where they abut.
Lord Atkin said: ‘The owner of land adjoining a highway has a right of access to the highway from any . .
CitedChing Garage Ltd v Chingford Corporation HL 1961
Lord Radcliffe said: ‘I think, however, that it needs to be remembered in connection with this statement that the full extent of the common law right to enter the highway at every point of the frontage for any highway purpose must have been modified . .
CitedWestminster Bank Limited v The Minister for Housing and Local Government, Beverley Borough Council HL 1971
The Bank’s application for planning permission was refused on the grounds that the development might prejudice the possible future widening of a road. The local authority could have prescribed a building line in accordance with a provision of the . .
CitedSporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden ECHR 23-Sep-1982
Balance of Interests in peaceful enjoyment claim
(Plenary Court) The claimants challenged orders expropriating their properties for redevelopment, and the banning of construction pending redevelopment. The orders remained in place for many years.
Held: Article 1 comprises three distinct . .
CitedJames and Others v The United Kingdom ECHR 21-Feb-1986
The claimants challenged the 1967 Act, saying that it deprived them of their property rights when lessees were given the power to purchase the freehold reversion.
Held: Article 1 (P1-1) in substance guarantees the right of property. Allowing a . .
CitedChassagnou and Others v France ECHR 29-Apr-1999
A law permitted local authorities to oblige landowners to transfer hunting rights over private land to approved hunting associations. The landowners could not prevent hunting on their property. Landowners so affected were made members automatically . .
CitedThomas and Others v Bridgend County Borough Council CA 26-Jul-2011
Carnwath LJ considered the effect of Bugajny and other cases after Sporrong: ‘ Later cases (see eg Bugajny v Poland (Application No 22531/05) (unreported) given 6 November 2007, para 56 and following) have given further guidance on the practical . .
CitedDepalle v France ECHR 29-Mar-2010
Grand Chamber
The Court summarised the effect of Sporrong: ‘The Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, Article 1 of Protocol No 1, which guarantees in substance the right of property, comprises three distinct rules (see, inter alia, . .
CitedBugajny And Others v Poland ECHR 6-Nov-2007
The claimants complained that their land had been expropriated. Certain plots in a development area had been designated as ‘internal roads’, which were in due course built and opened to the public. The developers sought to transfer ownership to the . .
CitedPepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart HL 26-Nov-1992
Reference to Parliamentary Papers behind Statute
The inspector sought to tax the benefits in kind received by teachers at a private school in having their children educated at the school for free. Having agreed this was a taxable emolument, it was argued as to whether the taxable benefit was the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Planning, Damages, Human Rights

Updated: 14 November 2021; Ref: scu.510916

Ashton v Turner: QBD 1981

The plaintiff sought damages after being injured as a passenger in a car. He and the driver had both just been involved in a burglary, and the driver, who had taken alcohol was attempting to escape. The driver was driving very dangerously in order to avoid their arrest after two taxi drivers had tried to block the car.
Held: The claim failed. As a matter of public policy the law would not recognise a duty of care owed by one participant in a crime to another: ‘a duty of care did not exist between the first defendant and the plaintiff during the course of the burglary and during the course of the subsequent flight in the get-away car.’
He held in the alternative that, even if a duty of care was owed, the Claimant had willingly accepted as his the risk of negligence and injury resulting from it.

Ewbank J
[1981] QB 137, [1980] 3 All ER 870
Road Traffic Act 1972 148(3)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedMarshall v Osmond CA 1983
The plaintiff was passenger in a stolen car seeking to escape the police as they chased. The car was stopped, the plaintiff got out of the car, and was hit by a police car. He sought damages.
Held: His appeal against dismissal of his claim was . .
DistinguishedKirkham v Anderton, The Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester police CA 20-Dec-1989
The claimant’s husband hanged himself in Risley Remand Centre after the police had failed to warn the prison authorities that he was (as the police knew) a suicide risk. He was suffering from clinical depression and had previously attempted suicide . .
Dictum DisapprovedPitts v The Personal Representatives of Mark James Hunt (Deceased) and Another CA 1990
The plaintiff and a friend had spent the evening drinking at a disco before setting off on the friend’s motorcycle. The plaintiff was aware that the motorcyclist was neither licensed to ride a motorcycle nor insured. During the journey, the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Negligence

Updated: 12 November 2021; Ref: scu.188781

Stott (Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline) and Another v Brown: PC 5 Dec 2000

The system under which the registered keeper of a vehicle was obliged to identify herself as the driver, and such admission was to be used subsequently as evidence against her on a charge of driving with excess alcohol, was not a breach of her right to a fair trial. The right not to give evidence against oneself was not an explicit, nor absolute right, and was subject to qualification. A balance was to be found between the right to a fair trial, and the need to respond to a serious problem in society: ‘while the overall fairness of a criminal trial cannot be compromised, the constituent rights comprised, whether expressly or implicitly, within article 6 are not themselves absolute. Limited qualification of these rights is acceptable if reasonably directed by national authorities towards a clear and proper public objective and if representing no greater qualification than the situation calls for.’ The response was not disproportionate. An issue as to conformity with human rights law is a devolution issue under the Scotland Act. ‘The [European] court has also recognised the need for a fair balance between the general interest of the community and the personal rights of the individual, the search for which balance has been described as inherent in the whole of the Convention.’
Lord Clyde said that it must be remembered that the Convention: ‘is dealing with the realities of life and it is not to be applied in ways which run counter to reason and common sense.’
Lord Bingham of Cornhill said: ‘The high incidence of death and injury on the roads caused by the misuse of motor vehicles is a very serious problem common to almost all developed societies. The need to address it in an effective way, for the benefit of the public, cannot be doubted. Among other ways in which democratic governments have sought to address it is by subjecting the use of motor vehicles to a regime of regulation and making provision for enforcement by identifying, prosecuting and punishing offending drivers. Materials laid before the Board, incomplete though they are, reveal different responses to the problem of enforcement. Under some legal systems (Spain, Belgium and France are examples) the registered owner of a vehicle is assumed to be the driver guilty of minor traffic infractions unless he shows that some other person was driving at the relevant time or establishes some other ground of exoneration. There being a clear public interest in enforcement of road traffic legislation the crucial question in the present case is whether section 172 represents a disproportionate response, or one that undermines a defendant’s right to a fair trial, if an admission of being the driver is relied on at trial.’
. . and ‘Judicial recognition and assertion of the human rights defined in the Convention is not a substitute for the processes of democratic government but a complement to them. While a national court does not accord the margin of appreciation recognised by the European court as a supra-national court, it will give weight to the decisions of a representative legislature and a democratic government within the discretionary area of judgment accorded to those bodies.’

Bingham, Hope, Steyn, Clyde, Kirkwood LL
Times 06-Dec-2000, [2001] 2 WLR 817, [2003] 1 AC 681, [2001] 2 All ER 97, [2000] UKPC D 3, 2000 GWD 40-151, 11 BHRC 179, 2001 SLT 59, 2001 SC (PC) 43, (2001) 3 LGLR 24, [2001] RTR 121, [2001] UKHRR 333, [2001] HRLR 9, 2001 SCCR 62
PC, Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 172, Scotland Act 1998, European Convention on Human Rights
Scotland
Citing:
CitedSporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden ECHR 18-Dec-1984
Balance of Interests in peaceful enjoyment claim
An interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions must strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interests of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. This balance is . .
CitedSheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom ECHR 30-Jul-1998
It is within a nation’s margin of appreciation to refuse to re-register birth details of people who had undergone sex-changes. Similarly it was not a human rights infringement not to allow post operative trans-sexuals to marry. However the court was . .

Cited by:
CitedMotorola Credit Corporation v Uzan and others (No 2) CA 12-Jun-2003
World-wide freezing orders had been made under the 1982 Act. The defendants were members of a Turkish family with substantial business interests in the telecommunications industry. In breach of orders made in the US some defendants had sought to . .
CitedLynch v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 8-Nov-2001
The defendant challenged a conviction for having a locked bladed article in his possession in a public place, on the basis that it placed on him a burden of proof contrary to the convention.
Held: Salabiaku permits a reverse onus but requires . .
CitedAttorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001) HL 11-Dec-2003
The house was asked whether it might be correct to stay criminal proceedings as an abuse where for delay. The defendants were prisoners in a prison riot in 1998. The case only came on for trial in 2001, when they submitted that the delay was an . .
CitedSamaroo and Sezek v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 17-Jul-2001
Two foreign nationals with leave to remain in this country committed serious crimes. The Secretary of State ordered their deportation.
Held: Where the deportation of a foreigner following a conviction here, would conflict with his human . .
CitedA, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, Mahmoud Abu Rideh Jamal Ajouaou v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 11-Aug-2004
The claimants had each been detained without trial for more than two years, being held as suspected terrorists. They were free leave to return to their own countries, but they feared for their lives if returned. They complained that the evidence . .
CitedRoberts v Parole Board CA 28-Jul-2004
The discretionary life-prisoner faced a parole board. The Secretary of State wished to present evidence, but wanted the witness to be protected. The Parole Board appointed special counsel to hear the evidence on behalf of the prisoner on terms that . .
CitedAl-Fayed and others v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and others CA 25-Nov-2004
The appellants appealed from dismissal of their claims for wrongful imprisonment by the respondent. Each had attended at a police station for interview on allegations of theft. They had been arrested and held pending interview and then released. Mr . .
CitedRegina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another, ex parte European Roma Rights Centre and others HL 9-Dec-2004
Extension oh Human Rights Beyond Borders
The appellants complained that the system set up by the respondent where Home Office officers were placed in Prague airport to pre-vet applicants for asylum from Romania were dsicriminatory in that substantially more gypsies were refused entry than . .
CitedHoxha and Another v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 10-Mar-2005
The claimants sought to maintain their claims for asylum. They had fled persecution, but before their claims for asylum were determined conditions in their home country changed so that they could no longer be said to have a well founded fear of . .
CitedMawdesley and Yorke v Chief Constable of Cheshire Constabulary and Another Admn 31-Jul-2003
The two appellant drivers had been sent forms requiring them to identify the drivers of vehicles identified by speed cameras. They had replied providing the requested information, but the forms were unsigned. They resisted use of the forms as . .
CitedClingham (formerly C (a minor)) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea; Regina v Crown Court at Manchester Ex parte McCann and Others HL 17-Oct-2002
The applicants had been made subject of anti-social behaviour orders. They challenged the basis upon which the orders had been made.
Held: The orders had no identifiable consequences which would make the process a criminal one. Civil standards . .
CitedN v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 5-May-2005
The applicant had sought asylum here, but her application was rejected. She was suffering advanced HIV/AIDS. With continued proper treatment she would survive several years. If returned to Uganda she would not receive that treatment and would not . .
CitedBrooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others HL 21-Apr-2005
The claimant was with Stephen Lawrence when they were both attacked and Mr Lawrence killed. He claimed damages for the negligent way the police had dealt with his case, and particularly said that they had failed to assess him as a victim of crime, . .
CitedAdam, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Limbuela v Same; Tesema v Same HL 3-Nov-2005
The applicants had each entered the UK with a view to seeking asylum, but having failed to seek asylum immediately, they had been refused any assistance, were not allowed to work and so had been left destitute. Each had claimed asylum on the day . .
CitedHammond, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 1-Dec-2005
The claimants had been convicted of murder, but their tariffs had not yet been set when the 2003 Act came into effect. They said that the procedure under which their sentence tarriffs were set were not compliant with their human rights in that the . .
CitedGrant v The Queen PC 16-Jan-2006
(Jamaica) The defendant appealed his conviction for murder saying that the admission of an unsworn statement by one witness and the non-admission of another similar statement who did not either attend court was unconstitutional. He shot the victim . .
CitedC Plc and W v P and Secretary of State for the Home Office and the Attorney General ChD 26-May-2006
cplc_pChD2006
The claimant sought damages from the first defendant for breach of copyright. An ex parte search order had been executed, with the defendant asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. As computer disks were examined, potentially unlawful . .
CitedC Plc v P and Attorney General Intervening CA 22-May-2007
The respondent had been subject to a civil search, which revealed the existence of obscene images of children on his computer. He appealed against refusal of an order that the evidence should not be passed to the police as evidence. He said that the . .
CitedGentle, Regina (on the Application of) and Another v The Prime Minister and Another HL 9-Apr-2008
The appellants were mothers of two servicemen who had died whilst on active service in Iraq. They appealed refusal to grant a public inquiry. There had already been coroners inquests. They said that Article 2 had been infringed.
Held: The . .
CitedAnimal Defenders International, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport HL 12-Mar-2008
The applicant, a non-profit company who campaigned against animal cruelty, sought a declaration of incompatibility for section 321(2) of the 2003 Act, which prevented adverts with political purposes, as an unjustified restraint on the right of . .
CitedRegina v S and A CACD 9-Oct-2008
The defendant appealed against his conviction under the 2000 Act for failing to disclose the key used to encrypt a computer file. He was subject to a control order as a suspected terrorist. As the police raided his house, they found the key had been . .
CitedAustin and Another v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis HL 28-Jan-2009
The claimants had been present during a demonstration policed by the respondent. They appealed against dismissal of their claims for false imprisonment having been prevented from leaving Oxford Circus for over seven hours. The claimants appealed . .
CitedA v Essex County Council SC 14-Jul-2010
The claimant, a severely disabled child sought damages, saying that for well over a year, the local authority had made no provision for his education.
Held: His appeal against the striking out of his action failed. The correct approach had . .
CitedWebster v Regina CACD 1-Dec-2010
The defendant appealed against his conviction under the 1889 Act for making a corrupt gift to a local government officer. He said that the 1916 Act placed an unfair burden on him to prove that the gift was not corruptly given.
Held: The appeal . .
CitedHome Office v Tariq SC 13-Jul-2011
(JUSTICE intervening) The claimant pursued Employment Tribunal proceedings against the Immigration Service when his security clearance was withdrawn. The Tribunal allowed the respondent to use a closed material procedure under which it was provided . .
CitedHer Majesty’s Advocate v P SC 6-Oct-2011
(Scotland) The appellant had been interviewed by police without being offered access to a solicitor. He complained that the interview and information obtained only through it had been used to found the prosecution.
Held: The admission of the . .
CitedAmbrose v Harris, Procurator Fiscal, Oban, etc SC 6-Oct-2011
(Scotland) The appellant had variously been convicted in reliance on evidence gathered at different stages before arrest, but in each case without being informed of any right to see a solicitor. The court was asked, as a devolution issue, at what . .
CitedST Eritrea, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 21-Mar-2012
The Tribunal had confirmed the appellant’s refugee status, but the respondent had ordered nevertheless that she be returned. The judge’s order setting aside that decision had been overturned in the Court of Appeal.
Held: The claimant’s appeal . .
CitedAtkinson v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 16-Dec-2011
The appellant’s motor scooter had been identified speeding. She replied to a notice to identify the driver by saying that she did not know. She now said that she had been selling it and that a potential buyer had taken it for a test drive, but that . .
CitedSmith and Others v The Ministry of Defence SC 19-Jun-2013
The claimants were PRs of men who had died or were severely injured on active duty in Iraq being variously fired at by mistake by other coalition forces, or dying in vehicles attacked by roadside bombs. Appeals were heard against a finding that the . .
CitedCoventry and Others v Lawrence and Another SC 22-Jul-2015
The appellants challenged the compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights of the system for recovery of costs in civil litigation in England and Wales following the passing of the Access to Justice Act 1999. The parties had been . .
CitedRegina v Kansal (2) HL 29-Nov-2001
The prosecutor had lead and relied at trial on evidence obtained by compulsory questioning under the 1986 Act.
Held: In doing so the prosecutor was acting to give effect to section 433.
The decision in Lambert to disallow retrospective . .
CitedKiarie and Byndloss, Regina (on The Applications of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 14-Jun-2017
The court considered a challenge to the rules governing ‘out of country’ appeals against immigration decisions. They had in each case convictions leading to prison terms for serious drugs related offences.
Held: The appeals were allowed, and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Human Rights

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.163268

Vitalijs Drozdovs v Baltikums Aas: ECJ 24 Oct 2013

ECJ Compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles – Directive 72/166/EEC – Article 3(1) – Directive 90/232/EEC – Article 1 – Road traffic accident – Death of the parents of the applicant, who is a minor – Right to compensation of the child – Non-material damage – Compensation – Cover by compulsory insurance

R. Silva de Lapuerta, P
C-277/12, [2013] EUECJ C-277/12
Bailii
Directive 72/166/EEC 3(1), Directive 90/232/EEC 1
European

European, Road Traffic, Personal Injury, Insurance

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.516995

Griffiths v Liverpool Corporation: CA 1967

The Highways Act of 1961 had enlarged the duty of the highway authority and made it a general duty to take reasonable care to secure that the highway was not dangerous to traffic.
As to the effect of the 1961 Act, Diplock LJ said: ‘The duty at common law to maintain, which includes a duty to repair a highway, was not based in negligence but in nuisance. It was an absolute duty to maintain, not merely a duty to take reasonable care to maintain, and the statutory duty which replaced it was also absolute.’ and ‘The defendants had a statutory duty to maintain the highway and the question of reasonable care has no relevance.’
DiplocK LJ continued: ‘Subsection (2) does not, in my opinion, make proof of lack of reasonable care on the part of a highway authority a necessary element in the cause of action of a plaintiff who has been injured by a danger on a highway. What it does is to enable the highway authority to rely upon the fact that it has taken reasonable care as a defence — the onus of establishing this resting upon it. A convenient way of expressing the effect of the subsection is that it does not qualify the legal character of the duty imposed by subsection (1) but provides the highway authority with a statutory excuse for not performing it.
But however this may be there are two crucial differences between a liability in negligence and the statutory liability of a highway authority under this section. To succeed in an action for negligence the plaintiff must prove, inter alia, (1) that the defendant has been guilty of lack of reasonable care and (2) that such lack of reasonable care was the cause of the injury to him. In an action under the statute against a highway authority for injury sustained from a danger on a highway the plaintiff need prove neither of these things in order to succeed. Unless the highway authority proves that it did take reasonable care the statutory defence under subsection (2) is not available to it at all. Nor is it a defence for the highway authority to show that even had it taken all reasonable care this might not have prevented the damage which caused the injury. It may be that if the highway authority could show that no amount of reasonable care on its part could have prevented the danger the common law defence of inevitable accident would be available to it; but that is not relied on in the present case and it is not necessary for us to express a final conclusion upon it.’

Diplock LJ, Sellers LJ
[1967] 1 QB 374
Highways Act 1961 58(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Inhabitants of High Halden 1859
highhalden1859
The court considered the liability of the parish for injury arising from a failure to repair the road. The road was ‘an old soft road formed of Weald of Kent clay, and had never been repaired with hard substances’. The evidence was that in wet . .

Cited by:
CitedGoodes v East Sussex County Council HL 16-Jun-2000
The claimant was driving along a road. He skidded on ice, crashed and was severely injured. He claimed damages saying that the Highway authority had failed to ‘maintain’ the road.
Held: The statutory duty on a highway authority to keep a road . .
CitedJones v Rhondda Cynon Taff County Borough Council CA 15-Jul-2008
The claimant, a fireman, sought damages for injuries suffered when he was injured answering a call out. He fell into a depressed area by the road side as he was pulling away a burning wooden pallet.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The court . .
CitedRance v Essex County Council CA 21-Feb-1997
Appeal against refusal of claim against highway authority. The appellant was injured when her car crashed. A high volume of heavy goods vehicles had been using a local road, damaging the road and verges. Though the road was wide enough for her car . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Nuisance, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.244696

Aylesbury Vale District Council, Regina (on The Application of) v Call A Cab Ltd: Admn 12 Nov 2013

The council appealed against dismissal of its prosecution of the respondent, alleging the operation of a private hire vehicle without having a current licence, ‘in a controlled district’. The respondent had denied that the necessary resolution had been effectively passed creating the ‘controlled district’ as required. The defendant had produced records from the parish council to the effect that they had not been served with the necessary notices. The Council argued that the statutory provisions read as a whole showed that the notice requirement was no more than a notification requirement. It did not incept a process of consultation, nor was it there obviously to give rise to a right of objection.
Held: ‘The District Judge was entitled, upon analysis of the minutes of the Parish Council which he had received, to infer that their record-keeping minuting, including minuting of correspondence was sufficiently detailed and thorough that the receipt of a notice would have been minuted.’ However, the statutory provisions read as a whole showed that the notice requirement was no more than a notification requirement. It did not incept a process of consultation, nor was it there obviously to give rise to a right of objection.
The District judge, having made his rulings, had not considered adequately whether the compliance was effective and substantial. The case was remitted accordingly.

Treacy LJ, Ouseley J
[2013] EWHC 3765 (Admin), [2013] WLR(D) 482
Bailii
Local Government Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1976 46, Town Police Clauses Act 1847
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Birmingham City Council ex parte Quietlynn Ltd 1985
The court held that on the failure of an application for a licence for a sex establishment, that part of the licence fee paid which related to the management of the supervisory regime rather than the cost of administering the application alone . .
CitedBoddington v British Transport Police HL 2-Apr-1998
The defendant had been convicted, under regulations made under the Act, of smoking in a railway carriage. He sought to challenge the validity of the regulations themselves. He wanted to argue that the power to ban smoking on carriages did not . .
CitedRegina v Soneji and Bullen HL 21-Jul-2005
The defendants had had confiscation orders made against them. They had appealed on the basis that the orders were made more than six months after sentence. The prosecutor now appealed saying that the fact that the order were not timely did not . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Licensing, Local Government, Road Traffic

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.519011

Regina v Martin (Colin): CACD 29 Nov 1988

Defence of Necessity has a Place in Criminal Law

The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving whilst disqualified. He said he had felt obliged to drive his stepson to work because his stepson had overslept. His wife (who had suicidal tendencies) had been threatening suicide unless he drove the boy to work, since she was so worried that her son might lose his job. He sought to bring the defence of necessity, but it had been disallowed.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The defence of necessity is recognised in English law. It was available if, viewed objectively, the defendant could be said to have acted reasonably to avoid death or serious injury, or the threat of it. When considering the defence of duress, what the jury had to be concerned with was the defendant’s perception of the threat with which he was confronted and to consider whether or not in relation to that perceived threat he acted reasonably and proportionately in responding as he did, and the question of whether or not there was actually a threat to justify his response is neither here nor there.
Simon Brown LJ said: ‘The principles may be summarised thus: first, English law does, in extreme circumstances, recognise a defence of necessity. Most commonly this defence arises as duress, that is pressure on the accused’s will from the wrongful threats or violence of another. Equally however it can arise from other objective dangers threatening the accused or others. Arising thus it is conveniently called ‘duress of circumstances’. Second, the defence is available only if, from an objective standpoint, the accused can be said to be acting reasonably and proportionately in order to avoid a threat of death or serious injury. Third, assuming the defence to be open to the accused on his account of the facts, the issue should be left to the jury, who should be directed to determine these two questions: first, was the accused, or may he have been, impelled to act as he did because as a result of what he reasonably believed to be the situation, he had good cause to fear that otherwise death or serious physical injury would result; second, if so, would a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the characteristics of the accused, have responded to that situation by acting as the accused acted? If the answer to both those questions was Yes, then the jury would acquit; the defence of necessity would have been established. That the defence is available in cases of reckless driving is established by Conway (supra) itself and indeed by an earlier decision of the court in Willer (1986) 83 Cr.App.R. 225. Conway is authority also for the proposition that the scope of the defence is no wider for reckless driving than for other serious offences. As was pointed out in the in the judgment, (1988) 88 Cr.App.R. at 164, [19888] 3 All E.R. at 1029h: ‘reckless driving can kill.’ We see no material distinction between offences of reckless driving and driving whilst disqualified so far as the application of the scope of this defence is concerned. Equally we can see no distinction in principle between various threats of death: it matters not whether the risk of death is by murder or by suicide or, indeed, by accident. One can illustrate the matter by considering a disqualified driver driven by his wife, she suffering a heart attack in remote countryside and he needing instantly to get her to hospital.’

Lord Lane LCJ, Simon Brown, Roch JJ
[1989] 1 All ER 652, [1988] 88 Cr App Rep 343, [1988] EWCA Crim 2
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
ApprovedRegina v Graham (Paul) CACD 18-Dec-1981
The defence of duress requires establishment of a reasonable belief. In judging the accused’s response the test is: ‘have the prosecution made the jury sure that a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the characteristics of the defendant, . .
CitedRegina v Conway CACD 28-Jul-1988
The defendant appealed against his conviction for reckless driving. He said the offence was committed out of necessity, since his passenger’s life was under threat.
Held: Necessity can only be a defence to a charge of reckless driving where . .
CitedRegina v Willer (Mark Edward) CACD 1986
The defendant appealed against his conviction for reckless driving (absolute discharge and ten penalty points). He drove his car slowly on the pavement in front of a shopping precinct. He said that this had seemed to him to be the only way in which . .

Cited by:
ApprovedRegina v Cairns CACD 22-Feb-1999
The defendant had been driving a car. It was surrounded by a group of youths, one of whom threw himself on the bonnet of the car. The defendant, feeling threatened drove off, and the man on the bonnet was injured.
Held: When establishing the . .
ApprovedRegina v Abdul-Hussain; Regina v Aboud; Regina v Hasan CACD 17-Dec-1998
The law of the defence of duress arising out of threat or circumstances is in need of urgent parliamentary clarification. Appeals were allowed where the defendants hijacked an airplane in order to escape deportation to a hostile country. ‘The . .
CitedRegina v G and R HL 16-Oct-2003
The defendants, young boys, had set fire to paper and thrown the lit papers into a wheelie bin, expecting the fire to go out. In fact substantial damage was caused. The House was asked whether a conviction was proper under the section where the . .
CitedJones and Milling, Olditch and Pritchard, and Richards v Gloucestershire Crown Prosecution Service CACD 21-Jul-2004
The court considered the extent to which the defendants in the proceedings can rely on their beliefs as to the unlawfulness of the United Kingdom’s actions in preparing for, declaring, and waging war in Iraq in 2003 in a defence to a charge of . .
CitedIn Re A (Minors) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment); aka In re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) CA 22-Sep-2000
Twins were conjoined (Siamese). Medically, both could not survive, and one was dependent upon the vital organs of the other. Doctors applied for permission to separate the twins which would be followed by the inevitable death of one of them. The . .
CitedRegina v Shayler CACD 28-Sep-2001
Duress as Defence not closely Defined
The defendant had been a member of MI5. He had signed the Official Secrets Act, but then disclosed various matters, including material obtained by interceptions under the Interception of Communications Act. He claimed that his disclosures were made . .
CitedRegina v Pommell CACD 16-May-1995
The defendant appealed against his conviction for possessing a loaded shotgun. He had wished to advance a defence to the effect that on the previous evening he had taken it ‘off a geezer who was going to do some damage with it’ in order to stop him. . .
CitedQuayle and others v Regina, Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of 2004) CACD 27-May-2005
Each defendant appealed against convictions associated variously with the cultivation or possession of cannabis resin. They sought to plead medical necessity. There had been medical recommendations to move cannabis to the list of drugs which might . .
CitedRegina v Jones (Margaret), Regina v Milling and others HL 29-Mar-2006
Domestic Offence requires Domestic Defence
Each defendant sought to raise by way of defence of their otherwise criminal actions, the fact that they were attempting to prevent the commission by the government of the crime of waging an aggressive war in Iraq, and that their acts were . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Ubhi Admn 11-Feb-2003
The prosecutors appealed the finding by the magistrates that there were special reasons for not disqualifying the defendant from driving after finding him guilty of driving with excess alcohol. He had driven his sister to hospital after she fell and . .
CitedRegina v CS CACD 29-Feb-2012
The defendant appealed against the refusal of the judge to allow her defence of necessity in answer to a charge under section 1 of the 1984 Act. She said that it had been necessary to prevent the child being sexually abused.
Held: The appeal . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.186846

Transport for London v Uber London Ltd: Admn 16 Oct 2015

TFL sought a declaration as to the legality of the Uber taxi system. Otherwise unlicensed drivers took fares with fees calculated by means of a smartphone app. The Licensed Taxi drivers said that the app operated as a meter and therefore required licensing.
Held: The system was not unlawful. The fare was calculated by a system external to the smarthone, and therefore the phone was not itself a meter: ‘A device for recording time and distance is not a device for calculating a fare based on time and distance, let alone one based on more than that, including the fare structure itself, a necessary component to the calculation. The language of the statute is quite clear. The essence of a taximeter for the purpose of section 11 is that the device must be for the calculation of the fare then to be charged, based on whatever inputs are appropriate. Such a device is not simply recording and transmitting some or all of the inputs to a calculation made elsewhere, or receiving the output, that is the calculated fare. The Smartphone is not a ‘thing designed or adapted for a particular functional purpose’ namely calculating fares for the PHV; see the Shorter OED. It is not a taximeter. The Smartphone with its Driver’s App may be essential to enabling the calculation to take place but that does not make it a device for calculating fares. Nor does that warrant treating the Smartphone as part of a single device with Server 2; it simply is not.’

Ouseley J
[2015] EWHC 2918 (Admin)
Bailii
Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 11
Citing:
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Ottewell HL 1968
The antecedent criminal history of an offender is a factor which may be taken into account in determining the sentence to be imposed, but it cannot be given such weight as to lead to the imposition of a penalty which is disproportionate to the . .
CitedThe Presidential Insurance Company Ltd v Resha St Hill PC 16-Aug-2012
(Trinidad and Tobago) The Board considered that when interpreting a statute certain requirements had to be met before external materials could be used. The scope for enquiry into extraneous records, following Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593, is broadly . .
CitedRoyal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security HL 2-Jan-1981
The court was asked whether nurses could properly involve themselves in a pregnancy termination procedure not known when the Act was passed, and in particular, whether a pregnancy was ‘terminated by a medical practitioner’, when it was carried out . .
CitedRegina v Secretary of State for Health ex parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) HL 13-Mar-2003
Court to seek and Apply Parliamentary Intention
The appellant challenged the practice of permitting cell nuclear replacement (CNR), saying it was either outside the scope of the Act, or was for a purpose which could not be licensed under the Act.
Held: The challenge failed. The court was to . .
CitedRegina v Her Majesty’s Attorney General ex parte Rusbridger and Another HL 26-Jun-2003
Limit to Declaratory Refilef as to Future Acts
The applicant newspaper editor wanted to campaign for a republican government. Articles were published, and he sought confirmation that he would not be prosecuted under the Act, in the light of the 1998 Act.
Held: Declaratory relief as to the . .
CitedHaynes, Regina (on the application of) v Stafford Borough Council Admn 14-Jun-2006
Walker J set out the principles applicable (in this case) before making a declaration as to the criminal law. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Licensing

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.553501

Martin v Regina: CACD 6 Jul 2010

The defendant had been a passenger on a car driven by a learner driver. The car crashed killing the driver and seriously injuring another. He appealed against his conviction for aiding and abetting dangerous driving.
Held: The appeal succeeded. A serious contributory factor was an over inflation of a tyre of which the defendant could not have known, and nor could the jury have accepted that the driver had been racing, when he was driving under the speed limit. The recorder’s directions to the jury had been inadequate, and the court could not see how a jury properly directed on a retrial could safely convict the defendant. No retrial was ordered.

Hooper LJ, Gross, Moss QC JJ
[2010] EWCA Crim 1450, [2010] 1 Cr App R (S) 38
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Powell (Anthony) and Another; Regina v English HL 30-Oct-1997
When the court looked at the issue of foreseeability of murder in an allegation of joint enterprise, there was no requirement to show intent by the secondary party. The forseeability of the risk of the principal committing the offence from the point . .
CitedWebster v Regina CACD 3-Mar-2006
The appellant challenged his conviction for aiding an abetting the causing of death by dangerous driving as a passenger. The driver had been drunk.
Held: The mere intoxication of the driver was not of itself and alone sufficient to establish . .

Cited by:
CitedAdeojo and Another v Regina CACD 6-Feb-2013
The defendants appealed against their convictions for murder saying that the court should not have relied upon hearsay evidence. A witness had refused to give evidence, but his earlier evidnece was used.
Held: The appeals failed. The judge had . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.420235

Regina v Denton: CACD 1987

Necessity not a defence to reckless driving

The trial judge had refused to leave to the jury the defence of necessity, which the appellant sought to bring to a road traffic allegation.
Held: The appeal failed. Caulfield J referred to the authorities, and said: ‘In view of our ultimate decision it is not necessary to review, still less to comment, on the law of this alleged defence of necessity. This is so because this court takes the view that even if necessity as a defence can be raised in a charge of reckless driving, it certainly could not be raised on the facts relied upon by the appellant in his defence. The appellant did not assert that he had to take risks of causing harm to others to escape from his pursuers or that he had to drive recklessly or that he did not give the nature of his driving a thought. He asserted in terms: ‘I did not take risks, I drove carefully throughout.’ In our view, such assertions exclude any possible defence of necessity, even assuming there is such a defence. The necessity if any, was to drive, not to drive recklessly.’
As to Willer, the court said: ‘This authority might be taken to suggest that the court assumed that on the facts of the case the defence of necessity could have been raised to a charge of reckless driving. We do not think this authority goes so far. We think it shows that the court doubted whether necessity as a defence could have been raised on the facts of that case but the court saw no need to decide whether such a defence existed as a matter of law. The court said a very different defence was available, which was duress, which should have been left to the jury It should be observed that where the headnote says, at p. 225. ‘Further the judge erred in ruling that the defence of necessity was not available to the defendant’ it is referring to the argument advanced by the appellant and not to the decision of the appellate court.’

Caulfield J
(1987) Cr App R 246
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Willer (Mark Edward) CACD 1986
The defendant appealed against his conviction for reckless driving (absolute discharge and ten penalty points). He drove his car slowly on the pavement in front of a shopping precinct. He said that this had seemed to him to be the only way in which . .

Cited by:
CitedRegina v Conway CACD 28-Jul-1988
The defendant appealed against his conviction for reckless driving. He said the offence was committed out of necessity, since his passenger’s life was under threat.
Held: Necessity can only be a defence to a charge of reckless driving where . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.470727

Mirvahedy v Henley and another: HL 20 Mar 2003

The defendants’ horses escaped from the field, and were involved in an accident with the claimant’s car.
Held: The defendants were liable under section 2(2). To bolt was a characteristic of horses which was normal ‘in the particular circumstances’, these being some sort of fright or other external stimulus. Section 2 places all animals into one of two categories by their species. Animals either belong to a dangerous species, or they do not. A keeper of an animal is liable for damage caused by his animal dependant upon the category. A dangerous species must meet two requirements, a) that it is not commonly domesticated here and b) that fully grown animals ‘normally have such characteristics that they are likely, unless restrained, to cause severe damage or that any damage they may cause is likely to be severe’.
Lord Nicholls: ‘Take a large and heavy domestic animal such as a mature cow. There is a real risk that if a cow happens to stumble and fall onto someone, any damage suffered will be severe. This would satisfy requirement (a). . . But a cow’s dangerousness in this regard may not fall within requirement (b). This dangerousness is due to a characteristic normally found in all cows at all times. The dangerousness results from their very size and weight. It is not due to a characteristic not normally found in cows ‘except at particular times or in particular circumstances.”

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Nicholls
Times 24-Mar-2003, [2003] UKHL 16, Gazette 15-May-2003, [2003] 2 AC 491, [2003] RTR 26, [2003] PIQR P25, [2003] NPC 38, [2003] 2 WLR 882, [2003] 2 All ER 401
House of Lords, Bailii
Animals Act 1971 2 6(2) 11
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromMirvahedy v Henley and Henley CA 21-Nov-2001
Horses with no abnormal characteristics were panicked, ran out and collided with a car. The car driver sought damages.
Held: The question was not whether the animals betrayed abnormal characteristics of which the owners should have been aware, . .
CitedBreeden v Lampard CA 21-Mar-1985
A riding accident occurred at a cubbing meet. The plaintiff’s leg was injured when the defendant’s horse kicked out. A claim was advanced under section 2. This horse, like any horse, was liable to kick out when approached too closely, or too . .
CitedCummings v Grainger CA 1977
An untrained Alsatian dog was turned loose in a scrap-yard to deter intruders. The dog seriously injured the plaintiff who had entered the yard.
Held: The requirements of section 2(2) were satisfied but the defendant was entitled to rely upon . .

Cited by:
CitedClark v Bowlt CA 26-Jun-2006
A claim was made for personal injury suffered riding a horse.
Held: The court doubted whether a propensity occasionally to move otherwise than as directed can be described as a characteristic of a horse, for the purposes of s. 2(2)(b), but, if . .
CitedWelsh v Stokes and Another CA 27-Jul-2007
The claimant sued a riding stables after she was badly injured on being thrown from the horse provided. Her claim in negligence failed, but she succeeded under strict liabiilty under the 1971 Act, after the judge relied upon hearsay evidence.
CitedFreeman v Higher Park Farm CA 30-Oct-2008
The claimant fell from a horse hired to her by the defendant. She claimed for her injuries, and appealed rejection of her claim in strict liability under the 1971 Act. The horse was known to be lively and occasionally to buck, but the claimant was a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Animals, Road Traffic, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.179981

Wittmann: ECJ 21 May 2015

ECJ (Judgment) Reference for a preliminary ruling – Directive 2006/126/EC – Mutual recognition of driving licences – Period of prohibition – Issue of the driving licence by a Member State before the entry into force of a period of prohibition in the Member State of normal residence – Grounds for refusing to recognise in the Member State of normal residence the validity of a driving licence issued by another Member State

C. Vajda, P
C-339/14, [2015] EUECJ C-339/14
Bailii
Directive 2006/126/EC
European

European, Road Traffic

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.547053

Director of Public Prosecutions v Hill: 1991

dpp_hill1991

The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of a summons alleging that the driver had driven with excess alcohol. The magistrates had concluded that the intoximeter must have been faulty.
Held: The conclusion that the device was unreliable was based on evidence which did not justify it.
Neill LJ said: ‘In this case it seems to us that if the defendant were to be believed, however credible a witness he appeared to be and however well he gave his evidence, it would involve three very surprising consequences: (1) that the intoximeter itself was faulty; (2) that not only was that faulty but the Drager Alert Device was also faulty, and finally that there was some explanation other than drink to account for the evidence of glazed vision which was not only given by the police, but was accepted by the Justices.’

Neill LJ
[1991] RTR 35
Cited by:
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Spurrier QBD 21-Jul-1999
It was not absolutely necessary for a defendant who asserted that a Lion Intoximeter was faulty because of a disparity between the reading and what had been drunk, to bring expert evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the Intoximeter was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.276431

Clarke v Kato and Others; Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd: HL 25 Nov 1998

Save exceptionally, a car park is not a road for the purposes of road traffic legislation on obligatory insurance. It is an unjustified strain on the language. A distinction made between the road ways and the parking bays was artificial and unhelpful. Whether any particular area was a road is a question of fact in each case. ‘In the generality of the matter it seems to me that in the ordinary use of language a car park does not so qualify. In character and more especially in function they are distinct. It is of course possible to park on a road, but that does not mean that the road is a car park. Correspondingly one can drive from one point to another over a car park, but that does not mean that the route which has been taken is a road. It is here that the distinction in function between road and car park is of importance. The proper function of a road is to enable movement along it to a destination. Incidentally a vehicle on it may be stationary. One can use a road for parking. ‘

Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Steyn, Lord Clyde
Times 23-Oct-1998, Gazette 25-Nov-1998, Gazette 11-Nov-1998, [1998] UKHL 36, [1998] 4 All ER 417, [1998] WLR 1647
House of Lords, Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 145(3)(a)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromCutter v Eagle Star Insurance Company Limited CA 22-Nov-1996
The concept of a ‘Road’ under the Act includes areas of a public car park marked out for the use of vehicles. . .
CitedHarrison v Hill 1932
The court considered the characteristics which would make ‘any other road to which the public has access’ a road for road traffic legislation.
Lord Clyde said: ‘There must be, as matter of fact, walking or driving by the public on the road, and . .
CitedGriffin v Squires 1958
To count as a road in road traffic law, a stretch of land must at least be a road. A car park was held not to be a road. . .
CitedBugge v Taylor 1941
A branch of a road which leads into and continues out of the place in question, such as in this case, a forecourt may qualify as a road. . .
CitedOxford v Austin 1981
The court said that a road was ‘a definable way between two points over which vehicles could pass.’ . .
CitedMarleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA ECJ 13-Nov-1990
Sympathetic construction of national legislation
LMA OVIEDO sought a declaration that the contracts setting up Commercial International were void (a nullity) since they had been drawn up in order to defraud creditors. Commercial International relied on an EC . .
CitedLonsdale v Howard and Hallam Ltd CA 8-Feb-2006
The claimant sought damages after his agency with the defendants was terminated. The central issue was whether compensation was to be calculated at two years commission as derived from French practice or otherwise.
Held: ‘there is no clear . .

Cited by:
CitedBrewer v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 11-Feb-2004
The defendant was a disqualified driver. He was seen to be driving slowly across a railway station car park. He was found to have excess alcohol in his blood.
Held: Allowing his appeal against conviction. The magistrates had found that the car . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.79206

Bates v Malyon: QBD 10 Oct 2008

The defendant had driven into the rear of the claimant’s car. The claimant appealed dismissal of his claim by the judge who said he had not discharged the burden of proof of negligence.
Held: The appeal failed. The judge had reached a conclusion as to the facts. In a fast track case such as this it was wrong to criticise the judge for failing to answer every point of fact raised.

Walker J
[2008] EWHC 2386 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedStephens and Another v Cannon and Another CA 14-Mar-2005
The claimants had purchased land from the defendants. The contract was conditional on a development which did not take place. The master had been presented with very different valuations of the property.
Held: The master was not entitled to . .
CitedBaird v Thurrock Borough Council CA 7-Nov-2005
The defendant council appealed a finding of negligence after a dustbinman had been injured when he was struck by a wheelie bin. He had said that a malfunction in the mechanism loading the wheelie bin caused him to be hit by one.
Held: The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Negligence

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.276808

Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000

The act of wheel clamping a car which was unlawfully parked is a trespass to goods. To avoid an action for damages, the clamper must show that the car parker consented to the clamping. He can do so by showing, in accordance with established principles, that the driver had had his attention brought to the fact that wheel clamping operated, through appropriate notices to that effect. Where, as here, the driver persuaded the court that she had not seen the notices, the clamping remained unlawful. No malice was intended, and no punitive damages could be awarded. ‘The act of clamping the wheel of another person’s car, even when that car is trespassing, is an act of trespass to that other persons property unless it can be shown that the owner of the car has consented to, or willingly assumed, the risk of his car being clamped. To show that the car owner consented or willingly assumed the risk of his car being clamped, it has to be established that the car owner was aware of the consequences of his parking his car so that it trespassed on the land of another. That will be done by establishing that the car owner saw and understood the significance of a warning notice or notices that cars in that place without permission were liable to be clamped. Normally the presence of notices which are posted where they are bound to be seen, for example at the entrance to a private car park, which are of a type which the car driver would be bound to have read, will lead to a finding that the car driver had knowledge of and appreciated the warning.’ The Recorder had held, correctly, that the appellant by parking her car where she did was trespassing. Unhappily, he then jumped to the conclusion that the appellant had consented to, or willingly assumed, the risk of her car being clamped. In making that leap the Recorder fell into error.

Lord Justice Roch, Lord Justice Waller, And Lord Justice May
Gazette 05-May-2000, Times 12-Apr-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 106, [2000] 1 WLR 2383, [2000] RTR 27, [2000] 4 All ER 169
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedLloyd v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 1992
Mr Lloyd had parked his car in a private car park with five large notices boards located at the entrance to and exit of this private car park positioned at eye-level for car drivers. All those notices warned that unauthorised vehicles would be . .
CitedArthur and Another v Anker and Another CA 1997
Consent required for parking charge
The owners of a private car park engaged the defendants to prevent unauthorised parking. The defendants erected notices which warned of wheel clamping. Mr Arthur had parked knowing he was not entitled to park and of the consequences. Mr Arthur’s car . .
CitedRookes v Barnard (No 1) HL 21-Jan-1964
The court set down the conditions for the award of exemplary damages. There are two categories. The first is where there has been oppressive or arbitrary conduct by a defendant. Cases in the second category are those in which the defendant’s conduct . .
CitedMetropolitan Water Board v Johnson and Co 1913
. .
CitedMendelssohn v Normand Ltd CA 1970
The court was asked whether a term on a notice board at a car park might have been incorporated into a contract where it was not obvious as the driver came in but was obvious when paying for parking at the end, and where the plaintiff had parked . .
CitedArthur and Another v Anker CA 1-Dec-1995
Clamping on Private Land may not be unlawful
The owners of private land engaged the defendants to prevent unauthorised parking. The defendants erected notices at the entrance to the car park and placed notices around the perimeter in red and white under the prominent heading ‘Warning’ and . .

Cited by:
CitedAkumah v London Borough of Hackney HL 3-Mar-2005
The authority set up a parking scheme for an estate of house of which it was the landlord. Those not displaying parking permits were to be clamped. The appellant complained that the regulations had been imposed by council resolution, not be the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Torts – Other, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.147139

Arthur and Another v Anker: CA 1 Dec 1995

Clamping on Private Land may not be unlawful

The owners of private land engaged the defendants to prevent unauthorised parking. The defendants erected notices at the entrance to the car park and placed notices around the perimeter in red and white under the prominent heading ‘Warning’ and reading ‘Wheel clamping and removal of vehicles in operation. Vehicles failing to comply or left without authority will be wheel clamped and a release fee of pounds 40 charged . . Vehicles causing an obstruction or damage or left for an unreasonable length of time may be towed away and held at the company’s pound in Truro. A release fee of pounds 90 plus storage costs will be charged. For release contact Armtrack Security’. A parked there knowing that he was not entitled to and of stated consequences. His car was clamped, and he claimed for damages for tortious interference. The defendants counterclaimed because A, having refused to pay the pounds 40 fee to have his car de-clamped, returned during the night and succeeded in removing his car together with the two clamps and padlocks that the defendants had used to immobilise his car. The defendants ran two defences to A’s action. First that he had consented or alternatively assumed the risk of his car being clamped, so that what would otherwise have been tortious conduct by the defendants was not tortious. Second, that the defendants had seized the car damage feasant.
Held: Wheel clamping was not illegal on private land with sufficient notice and a means of payment.
Sir Thomas Bingham, MR said: ‘The judge held that Mr Arthur parked in full knowledge that he was not entitled to park and of the possible consequences if he did. In those circumstances he was consenting to the consequences and could not thereafter complain of them. The effect of his consent was to render lawful conduct which would otherwise have been tortious.’
Sir Thomas Bingham, MR later said: ‘The judge found that Mr Arthur knew of and consented to the risk of clamping, and counsel for the Arthurs conceded in his written argument on appeal that this was so. But, counsel argued that the demand for payment amounted to blackmail and that the commission of this crime negated the effect of Mr Arthur’s consent. I give my reasons below for concluding that Mr Anker’s requirement of payment as a condition of de-clamping the vehicle did not amount to blackmail. It is enough at this point to say that by voluntarily accepting the risk that his car might be clamped Mr Arthur also, in my view, accepted the risk that the car would remain clamped until he paid the reasonable cost of clamping and de-clamping. He consented not only to the otherwise tortious act of clamping the car but also to the otherwise tortious action of detaining the car until payment. I would not accept that the clamper could exact any unreasonable or exorbitant charge for releasing the car, and the court would be very slow to find implied acceptance of such a charge. The same would be true if the warning were not of clamping or towing away but of conduct by or on behalf of the land owner which would cause damage to the car. Nor may the clamper justify detention of the car after the owner has indicated willingness to comply with the condition for release: the clamper cannot justify any delay in releasing the car after the owner offers to pay and there must be means for the owner to communicate his offer. But those situations did not arise here. The judge held that the de-clamping fee was reasonable. The contrary has not been argued. In my view the judge was right to hold that Mr Arthur impliedly consented to what occurred and he cannot now complain of it. It follows that I would dismiss the Arthur’s appeal against the judge’s decision in so far as it rested on consent.’

Sir Thomas Bingham, MR, Neill and Hirst LJJ
Times 01-Dec-1995, Independent 07-Dec-1995, [1997] QB 564
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedVine v London Borough of Waltham Forest CA 5-Apr-2000
The act of wheel clamping a car which was unlawfully parked is a trespass to goods. To avoid an action for damages, the clamper must show that the car parker consented to the clamping. He can do so by showing, in accordance with established . .
CitedAkumah v London Borough of Hackney HL 3-Mar-2005
The authority set up a parking scheme for an estate of house of which it was the landlord. Those not displaying parking permits were to be clamped. The appellant complained that the regulations had been imposed by council resolution, not be the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.77878

Pryor v Greater Manchester Police: CA 30 Jun 2011

The claimant had purchased a car, but not yet received confirmation of its registration in his name. After verifying his friend’s insurance he lent the car to him. The friend was stopped by officers, the non-registrations noted and the car was impounded and destroyed. He appealed against rejection of his claim.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The conditions for seizure had not been met. It was only after a relevant certificate of insurance has not been provided that it can be asked whether the officer had reasonable grounds for suspecting an offence under section 143. The certificate satisfied the requirement as ‘the relevant certificate of insurance’, and doubts later acquired did not enlarge the powers under section 165.

Ward, Stanley Burnton, Black LJJ
[2011] EWCA Civ 749, [2011] RTR 33, (2011) 175 JP 492
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 143 165A
England and Wales

Road Traffic, Police

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.441394

Skilton v Epsom and Ewell Urban District Council: CA 1937

A line of traffic studs had been placed in the centre of the highway. One of them had become loose. As a car passed over the loose stud it shot out and struck the plaintiff on her bicycle. She fell off and was injured. She sued the highway authority. The plaintiff succeeded at trial but the highway authority appealed on the ground that the plaintiff’s complaint was of non-repair of the highway.
Held: The appeal failed.
Slesser LJ said: ‘The question to be decided by the court is essentially this. Have the defendants caused a nuisance?’ They had.
Romer LJ said: ‘I think that the defendants have rightly been made liable for the damage caused to the plaintiff, and for this reason: they have done something on the highway not for the purpose of maintaining it as a highway but for some totally different purpose, and the act which they did had become at the time the injury was caused to the plaintiff a nuisance to the highway for which they were, in my opinion, properly made liable, notwithstanding the fact that they are also the highway authority.’

Romer LJ, Slesser LJ
[1937] 1 KB 112
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedGorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council HL 1-Apr-2004
Statutory Duty Not Extended by Common Law
The claimant sought damages after a road accident. The driver came over the crest of a hill and hit a bus. The road was not marked with any warning as to the need to slow down.
Held: The claim failed. The duty could not be extended to include . .
CitedShine v Tower Hamlets CA 9-Jun-2006
The claimant a nine year old boy had attempted to leap frog a bollard. He was badly injured when it fell. The authority had identified that it was insecure some months earlier. The authority appealed a finding of negligence and breach of statutory . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Torts – Other

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.195692

Robbie the Pict v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 26 Apr 2009

The defendant, a road traffic camera campaigner appealed against his conviction for contravening a red light traffic signal, saying that the camera was not approved.
Held: The appeal failed. A ‘prescribed device’ was a ‘device of a description specified in an order made by the secretary of state’. The camera had been so specified in 1992.
Davis J considered the approval process: ‘As I see it, this section connotes a two stage process. Generically (and this has to be approved by Parliament in the form of a statutory instrument) a description has to be specified in an order. Once that is done as a first stage then the Secretary of State may then as a second stage approve the type in question. So one goes from the general, in the sense of the specified description, to the specific, in the sense of an approved type. That makes perfectly good sense. It is, in fact, no departure in any significant way from that which existed under the previous legislation, save only in this respect: Parliament has now taken upon itself at least to wish to sanction the actual description of the device in question, in respect of which the Secretary of State may thereafter issue an approval as to type.’

Davis J
Times 14-May-2009
Road Traffic Act 1988 36(1), Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2001 (SI 2002 No 3113) 10, Road Traffic Offenders (Prescribed Devices) (No 2) Order 1992 (SI 1992 No 2843)
England and Wales
Cited by:
See AlsoRobbie the Pict v The Procurator Fiscal, Dumfries HCJ 15-May-2009
The defendant appealed against his conviction for speeding. He said that the speed gun used was not a device of a type approved by the Secretary of State since the regulationas allowed approval of speed measuring mechanisms activated by light, . .
CitedBrotherston and Others v The Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 3-Feb-2012
Four drivers said that the use of approved speed cameras for evidential purposes was unlawful. They argued that the cameras used were not ‘of a description specified’ under an Order.
Held: The appeals failed. The different speed trap . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.343071

Regina v Curtis (Attorney Generals Reference No 17 of 2009): CACD 30 Apr 2009

The Attorney General appealed against a sentence of 21 months imposed on the defendant. She was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving. The accident had occurred after she had been using her mobile phone to send text messages, but not at the moment of or immediately after sending one.
Held: The application was refused. Her behaviour had not directly affected the incident, though she might generally have been distracted. Though the sentence was lenient, and perhaps even unduly so, it was not to be disturbed. Each such case must be fact specific.

Lord Judge, Lord Chief Justice, Mr Justice Lloyd Jones and Mr Justice Wyn Williams
Times 12-May-2009
England and Wales

Criminal Sentencing, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.342999

Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council: HL 1 Apr 2004

Statutory Duty Not Extended by Common Law

The claimant sought damages after a road accident. The driver came over the crest of a hill and hit a bus. The road was not marked with any warning as to the need to slow down.
Held: The claim failed. The duty could not be extended to include one which went beyond the original common law duty to maintain the surface of the road. The statutory duty to maintain the road did not create additional duties in negligence. Lord Scott said: ‘[A]n overriding imperative is that those who drive on public highways do so in a manner and at a speed that is safe having regard to such matters as the nature of the road, the weather conditions and the traffic conditions. Drivers are first and foremost themselves responsible for their own safety.’
Lord Steyn said: ‘the courts must not contribute to the creation of a society bent on litigation, which is premised on the illusion that for every misfortune there is a remedy’
Lord Hoffmann said: ‘Speaking for myself, I find it difficult to imagine a case in which a common law duty can be founded simply upon the failure (however irrational) to provide some benefit which a public authority has power (or a public law duty) to provide.’

Steyn, Hoffmann, Scott, Rodger LL
[2004] UKHL 15, Times 02-Apr-2004, [2004] 1 WLR 1057, [2004] RTR 27, [2004] 2 All ER 326
HL, Bailii
Highways Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedX (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council; M (A Minor) and Another v Newham London Borough Council; Etc HL 29-Jun-1995
Liability in Damages on Statute Breach to be Clear
Damages were to be awarded against a Local Authority for breach of statutory duty in a care case only if the statute was clear that damages were capable of being awarded. in the ordinary case a breach of statutory duty does not, by itself, give rise . .
CitedBarrett v London Borough of Enfield HL 17-Jun-1999
The claimant had spent his childhood in foster care, and now claimed damages against a local authority for decisions made and not made during that period. The judge’s decision to strike out the claim had been upheld by the Court of Appeal.
CitedStovin v Wise, Norfolk County Council (Third Party) HL 24-Jul-1996
Statutory Duty Does Not Create Common Law Duty
The mere existence of statutory power to remedy a defect cannot of itself create a duty of care to do so. A highway authority need not have a duty of care to highway users because of its duty to maintain the highway. The two stage test ‘involves . .
CitedRowling v Takaro Properties Ltd PC 30-Nov-1987
(New Zealand) The minister had been called upon to consent to the issue of shares to a foreign investor. The plaintiff said that the minister’s negligent refusal of consent had led to the collapse of the project and financial losses.
Held: On . .
Appeal fromGorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council CA 2-May-2002
The claimant sought damages, alleging that an accident occurred as a result of the defendant highway authority’s negligence in failing to mark the road properly. A ‘Slow’ sign had become faded and had not been maintained.
Held: The judge had . .
CitedPhelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council; Anderton v Clwyd County Council; Gower v Bromley London Borough Council; Jarvis v Hampshire County Council HL 28-Jul-2000
The plaintiffs each complained of negligent decisions in his or her education made by the defendant local authorities. In three of them the Court of Appeal had struck out the plaintiff’s claim and in only one had it been allowed to proceed.
CitedTomlinson v Congleton Borough Council and others HL 31-Jul-2003
The claimant dived into a lake, severely injuring himself. The council appealed, arguing that it owed him no duty of care under the Act since he was a trespasser. It had placed warning signs to deter swimmers.
Held: The council’s appeal . .
CitedBurnside and Another v Emerson and Others CA 1968
The plaintiffs were injured in a road accident caused by flooding. They sued the executors of the deceased driver whose car spun out of control into the path of their own car, and also the highway authority, who had installed a proper system of . .
CitedGoodes v East Sussex County Council HL 16-Jun-2000
The claimant was driving along a road. He skidded on ice, crashed and was severely injured. He claimed damages saying that the Highway authority had failed to ‘maintain’ the road.
Held: The statutory duty on a highway authority to keep a road . .
CitedHaydon v Kent County Council CA 1978
Impacted snow and ice had built up on a steep, narrow, made-up footpath from Monday to Thursday during a short wintry spell. The plaintiff slipped and broke her ankle. The highway authority operated a system of priorities. Their resources were fully . .
CitedGoldman v Hargrave PC 13-Jun-1966
(Australia) In Western Australia, a red gum tree was struck by lightning and set on fire. The appellant had the tree cut down, but took no reasonable steps by spraying the fire with water to prevent the fire from spreading, believing that it would . .
CitedLavis v Kent County Council QBD 18-Feb-1992
The plaintiff had received serious injuries whilst riding his motor cycle at a road junction for which the defendants were responsible. He alleged that they were liable to him for failing to ensure that proper warning signs were placed at the . .
CitedLarner v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council CA 20-Dec-2000
The duty on a local authority to promote road safety did not remove from them the discretion as to how that duty was to be implemented. A claim that the authority had failed to place certain signage, and that an accident had occurred which might not . .
CitedO’Rourke v Mayor etc of the London Borough of Camden HL 12-Jun-1997
The claimant had been released from prison and sought to be housed as a homeless person. He said that his imprisonment brought him within the category of having special need. He also claimed damages for the breach.
Held: The Act was intended . .
CitedCapital and Counties Plc and Another v Hampshire County Council; Etc CA 20-Mar-1997
Three cases were brought against fire services after what were said to be negligent responses to call outs. On one, the fire brigade was called to a fire at office premises in Hampshire. The fire triggered the operation of a heat-activated sprinkler . .
CitedGeddis v Proprietors of Bann Reservoir HL 18-Feb-1878
The owner of land injured by operations authorised by statute ‘suffers a private loss for the public benefit’, and in the absence of clear statutory authority is unable to claim: ‘It is now thoroughly well established that no action will lie for . .
CitedCommissioner of Police for the Metropolis v Reeves (Joint Administratix of The Estate of Martin Lynch, Deceased) HL 11-Feb-1999
The deceased was a prisoner known to be at risk of committing suicide. Whilst in police custody he hanged himself in his prison cell. The Commissioner accepted that he was in breach of his duty of care to the deceased, but not that that breach was . .
CitedSkilton v Epsom and Ewell Urban District Council CA 1937
A line of traffic studs had been placed in the centre of the highway. One of them had become loose. As a car passed over the loose stud it shot out and struck the plaintiff on her bicycle. She fell off and was injured. She sued the highway . .
CitedSedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan HL 24-Jun-1940
Occupier Responsible for Nuisance in adopting it
A trespasser laid a drain along a ditch on the defendant’s land. Later the defendants came to use the drain themselves. A grate was misplaced by them so that in a heavy rainstorm, it became clogged with leaves, and water flowed over into the . .
CitedEast Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent HL 1941
An exceptionally high spring tide caused many breaches of the banks of the River Deben, and extensive flooding, including the respondent’s farm. By section 6 of the 1930 Act, the appellants had a statutory power to maintain the flood defences, but . .
CitedDorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office HL 6-May-1970
A yacht was damaged by boys who had escaped from the supervision of prison officers in a nearby Borstal institution. The boat owners sued the Home Office alleging negligence by the prison officers.
Held: Any duty of a borstal officer to use . .
CitedLeta Almeda v Her Majesty’s Attorney General for Gibraltar PC 24-Nov-2003
PC (Gibraltar) . .
CitedAnns and Others v Merton London Borough Council HL 12-May-1977
The plaintiff bought her apartment, but discovered later that the foundations were defective. The local authority had supervised the compliance with Building Regulations whilst it was being built, but had failed to spot the fault. The authority . .
CitedSutherland Shire Council v Heyman 4-Jul-1985
(High Court of Australia) The court considered a possible extension of the law of negligence.
Brennan J said: ‘the law should develop novel categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established categories. ‘
Dean J said: . .
CitedMurray v Nicholls 1983
A car was driven without stopping out of a side street colliding with another car. One driver was killed and his passengers were injured. They sued the driver’s widow and Strathclyde Regional Council as roads authority. It was averred that, some . .

Cited by:
CitedFiona Thompson v Hampshire County Council CA 27-Jul-2004
The claimant fell into a ditch by a path on the highway in the dark. She appealed a finding of no liability on the highway authority.
Held: The authority’s responsibility was as to the surface structures of the road way and not as to the . .
CitedJane Marianne Sandhar, John Stuart Murray v Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions CA 5-Nov-2004
The claimant’s husband died when his car skidded on hoar frost. She claimed the respondent was liable under the Act and at common law for failing to keep it safe.
Held: The respondent had not assumed a general responsibility to all road users . .
CitedCarty v London Borough of Croydon CA 27-Jan-2005
The claimant sought damages in negligence from education officers employed by the respondent. He appealed refusal of his claim. A statement of special education needs had been made which he said did not address his learning difficulties. The . .
CitedCorr v IBC Vehicles Ltd CA 31-Mar-2006
The deceased had suffered a head injury whilst working for the defendant. In addition to severe physical consequences he suffered post-traumatic stress, became more and more depressed, and then committed suicide six years later. The claimant . .
CitedHM Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank Plc HL 21-Jun-2006
The claimant had served an asset freezing order on the bank in respect of one of its customers. The bank paid out on a cheque inadvertently as to the order. The Commissioners claimed against the bank in negligence. The bank denied any duty of care. . .
CitedDepartment for Transport, Environment and the Regions v Mott Macdonald Ltd and others CA 27-Jul-2006
Claims arose from accidents caused by standing water on roadway surfaces after drains had not been cleared by the defendants over a long period of time. The Department appealed a decision giving it responsibility under a breach of statutory duty . .
CitedNeil Martin Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners 28-Sep-2006
The claimant sought damages from the revenue for their failure properly to process his claim for a sub-contractor’s certificate which had led to losses.
Held: The revenue owed no common law duty of care to the claimant and nor were damages . .
CitedRowley and others v Secretary of State for Department of Work and Pensions CA 19-Jun-2007
The claimants sought damages for alleged negligence of the defendant in the administration of the Child Support system.
Held: The defendant in administering the statutory system owed no direct duty of care to those affected: ‘a common law duty . .
CitedShine v Tower Hamlets CA 9-Jun-2006
The claimant a nine year old boy had attempted to leap frog a bollard. He was badly injured when it fell. The authority had identified that it was insecure some months earlier. The authority appealed a finding of negligence and breach of statutory . .
CitedK v Central and North West London Mental Health NHS Trust and Another QBD 30-May-2008
k_centralQBD2008
The claimant appealed against an order striking out his claim in negligence. He had leaped from a window in a suicide attempt. The accommodation was provided by the defendant whilst caring for him under the 1983 Act.
Held: The case should be . .
CitedMitchell and Another v Glasgow City Council HL 18-Feb-2009
(Scotland) The pursuers were the widow and daughter of a tenant of the respondent who had been violently killed by his neighbour. They said that the respondent, knowing of the neighbour’s violent behaviours had a duty of care to the deceased and . .
CitedConnor v Surrey County Council CA 18-Mar-2010
The claimant teacher said that she suffered personal injury from stress after the board of governors improperly failed to protect her from from false complaints. The Council now appealed against an award of substantial damages.
Held: The . .
CitedPoulton v Ministry of Justice CA 22-Apr-2010
The claimant was trustee in bankruptcy but the court failed to register the bankruptcy petition at the Land Registry as a pending action. The bankrupt was therefore able to sell her land, and the trustee did not recover the proceeds. The trustee . .
CitedAli v The City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council CA 17-Nov-2010
The claimant appealed against rejection of her claim for damages after slipping on a footpath maintainable by the defendant after an accumulation of mud and debris. The claim appeared to be the first under section 130, and the highway authority . .
CitedHome Office v Mohammed and Others CA 29-Mar-2011
The claimants sought damages saying that after a decision had been made that they should receive indefinite leave to remain in 2001 (latest), the leave was not issued until 2007 (earliest) thus causing them severe losses. The defendant now appealed . .
CitedMichael and Others v The Chief Constable of South Wales Police and Another SC 28-Jan-2015
The claimants asserted negligence in the defendant in failing to provide an adequate response to an emergency call, leading, they said to the death of their daughter at the hands of her violent partner. They claimed also under the 1998 Act. The . .
CitedDodson v Environment Agency QBD 28-Feb-2013
The claimant asserted that the steps taken by the defendant to encourage wildlife in the estuary had led to otters predating his fish farm stocks, and that the claimant had not been informed of this, in particular as to the construction of otter . .
CitedRobinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police SC 8-Feb-2018
Limits to Police Exemption from Liability
The claimant, an elderly lady was bowled over and injured when police were chasing a suspect through the streets. As they arrested him they fell over on top of her. She appealed against refusal of her claim in negligence.
Held: Her appeal . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Local Government, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.195054

Howe v Motor Insurers’ Bureau: QBD 22 Mar 2016

The claimant sought damages after a road traffic accident in France caused by a wheel spinning from a still unidentified lorry.
Held: Rejected

Stewart J
[2016] EWHC 640 (QB), [2016] WLR(D) 171, [2016] 1 WLR 2707, [2016] Lloyd’s Rep IR 359
Bailii, WLRD
Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003, Parliament and Council Directive 2000/26/EC 7
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSwansea City Council v Glass CA 1992
The defendant had failed himself to repair his property, and the Local Authority carried out the work itself under the 1957 Act. It sought to recover the associated costs from the defendant, but he said that their claim was time barred, being more . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Personal Injury, European, Limitation

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.562171

Bristol Alliance Ltd v Williams and Another: QBD 1 Jul 2011

bristol_williamsQBD11

The driver had crashed into the insured’s building causing substantial damage. The court was asked which of the driver’s and building’s insurers should bear the costs. The driver’s insurers said that he had acted deliberately and therefore they were not liable. Though they might even so be liable through the Motor Insurers Bureau, the provisions of that scheme would exempt them where, as here, the claim was under subrogation.
Held: The overriding purpose of the compulsory insurance scheme was to protect innocent third parties. The statute and regulations overrode certain kinds of exceptions which an insurer might place in the policy, but a clause against the causing of damage deliberately was not included. The judgment of Laws LJ in Charlton was to be preferred and the word ‘accident’ and its cognates may be construed so as to include the insured’s own criminal or deliberate acts.

Tugendhat J
[2011] EWHC 1657 (QB)
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 151, The Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risks) Regulations 1972
Citing:
CitedBeresford v Royal Insurance Co Ltd HL 1938
The forfeiture rule was to be applied in a case involving suicide. An insured may not recover under a policy of insurance in respect of loss intentionally caused by his own criminal or tortious act, however clearly the wording of the policy may . .
CitedZurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co Ltd v Morrison 1942
The statutory requirement for compulsory insurance in the Road Traffic Act 1930 was of little value if it was open to insurers to freely exclude liability for common risks. . .
CitedHardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau CA 1964
The court was asked whether insurance pursuant to the Road Traffic Act 1960 would provide valid cover for the benefit of a third party injured by deliberately criminal conduct on the part of the driver.
Held: Diplock LJ said: ‘The rule of law . .
CitedGardner v Moore HL 1984
The uninsured first defendant deliberately drove a car at the plaintiff who was walking on the pavement, and thus caused serious injuries. The MIB accepted that the trial judge was bound by Hardy to declare that the Bureau was bound to indemnify the . .
CitedChurchill Insurance v Charlton CA 2-Feb-2001
The victim of an unlawful act of a driver off-road sought damages from another driver and his insurers. The insurers refused to pay.
Held: There is a balance to be found between the statutory purpose of compulsory motor insurance and the . .
CitedCriminal proceedings against Ruiz Bernaldez ECJ 28-Mar-1996
Europa In the preliminary-ruling procedure under Article 177 of the Treaty, it is for the national courts alone, before which the proceedings are pending and which must assume responsibility for the judgment to . .
CitedWragg and Another v Partco Group Ltd UGC Ltd CA 1-May-2002
A claim was made against directors of a company involved in a takeover, for failure to make proper disclosure. The case involved also other issues. The defendants appealed against a refusal to strike out the claim.
Held: The rules made . .
CitedEB v France ECHR 30-Sep-2009
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Insurance

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.441423

Director of Public Prosecutions v Alexander: Admn 27 Jul 2010

The defendant had crashed his car after driving off with a girl, and while being chased by another car driven by her boyfriend. The police first cautioned him for false imprisonment, but then prosecuted him for careless driving. The prosecutor appealed against a successful plea of autrefois convict. The defendant said that the offence for which he was cautioned and the summons he now faced were the same incident.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The offences were different. In the one case the offence was the manner of driving, and the other the detention of the woman. The victims were different, and the modes of trial were different, so that in some circumstances there would have been two trials. Nor was any explicit promise given by the police.

Stanley Burnton LJ, Treacy, Nicol JJ
[2010] EWHC 2266 (Admin), (2010) 174 JP 519, [2010] ACD 98
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 3, Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedConnelly v Director of Public Prosecutions HL 1964
Plea of Autrefois Acquit is Narrow in Scope
The defendant had been tried for and acquitted of murder. The prosecution then sought to have him tried for robbery out of the same alleged facts. The House considered his plea of autrefois convict.
Held: The majority identified a narrow . .
CitedPhipps, Regina v CACD 14-Jan-2005
The appellant had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol. After complaints by the injured victim’s family he was further prosecuted for dangerous driving. He now appealed his conviction, having pleaded guilty when the judge failed to find an . .
CitedNicholas v Chester Magistrates Court Admn 11-Jun-2009
The claimant sought judicial review of a refusal by the respondents to state a case. . .
CitedGore, Regina v; Regina v Maher CACD 14-Jul-2009
The defendants appealed aginst their convictions for inflicting grievous bodily harm. When first arrested they had been issued with fixed penalty tickets for much lesser offences. The police officers did not anticipate the seriousness of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Criminal Practice

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.424081

London Borough of Camden v The Parking Adjudicator and Others: Admn 18 Feb 2011

The council appealed after parking adjudicators allowed four appeals where the council had imposed a surcharge on the payment of civil parking penalties where payment was made by credit card.

Burnett J
[2011] EWHC 295 (Admin)
Bailii
The Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) General Regulations 2007, The Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) Representations and Appeals Regulations 2007
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina on the Application of Davies (No 2) v HM Deputy Coroner for Birmingham CA 27-Feb-2004
The claimant appealed against a costs order. She had previously appealed against an order of the High Court on her application for judicial review of the inquest held by the respondent.
Held: The coroner, and others in a similar position . .
CitedCorner House Research, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry CA 1-Mar-2005
The applicant sought to bring an action to challenge new rules on approval of export credit guarantees. The company was non-profit and founded to support investigation of bribery. It had applied for a protected costs order to support the . .
CitedRegina (Ministry of Defence) v Wiltshire and Swindon Coroner QBD 19-Apr-2005
The applicant sought an order requiring the Coroner to provide a digitised recording of his summing up in an inquest regarding deaths at its facility at Porton.
Held: It should not be necessary for the claimant to set out just precisely which . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Costs

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.429683

Hussain v Hussain and Another: CA 23 Oct 2012

The claimant appealed against rejection of his claim for damages after a car accident. The defendants argued that the claim was fraudulent. The defendant driver had been involved in other collisions found to be fraudulent. The claimant appealed saying that the judges conclusions had not been justified on the evidence.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The claim was essentially on the facts: ‘I would for myself, however, be a little wary of saying that, for an appellate court to interfere with a judge’s assessment of the evidence, it must be satisfied that the trial judge was ‘plainly’ or ‘clearly’ wrong – because the Rules do not so provide. Moreover the issue on an appeal such as this does not concern the exercise of a discretion but concerns the judicial evaluation of evidence.’
The judge had insufficient evidence to support his finding. There is no ‘rule’ that a court should follow the money, and the court was wrong to conclude that the accident only made sense as a fraud by the defendant driver if the claimant was also involved.

Lord Neuberger MR, Davis, Treacy LJJ
[2012] EWCA Civ 1367
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedPowell v Streatham Manor Nursing Home HL 1935
Where the Judge at the trial has come to a conclusion upon the question which of the witnesses, whom he has seen and heard, are trustworthy and which are not, he is normally in a better position to judge of this matter than the appellate tribunal . .
CitedAssicurazioni Generali Spa v Arab Insurance Group (BSC) CA 13-Nov-2002
Rehearing/Review – Little Difference on Appeal
The appellant asked the Court to reverse a decision on the facts reached in the lower court.
Held: The appeal failed (Majority decision). The court’s approach should be the same whether the case was dealt with as a rehearing or as a review. . .
CitedHornal v Neuberger Products Ltd CA 1956
Proof Standard for Misrepresentation
The court was asked what was the standard of proof required to establish the tort of misrepresentation, and it contrasted the different standards of proof applicable in civil and criminal cases.
Held: The standard was the balance of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Litigation Practice

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.465112

Arthur and Another v Anker and Another: CA 1997

Consent required for parking charge

The owners of a private car park engaged the defendants to prevent unauthorised parking. The defendants erected notices which warned of wheel clamping. Mr Arthur had parked knowing he was not entitled to park and of the consequences. Mr Arthur’s car was clamped. He brought proceedings against the defendants for damages for tortious interference with his car. The defendants counterclaimed having refused to pay the pounds 40 fee the plaintiff returned and succeeded in removing his car with the two clamps. The defendants ran two defences: he had consented to his car being clamped, so as to excuse otherwise tortious act of the defendants. Second, that the defendants had seized the car damage feasant.
Held: What must be established is a consent freely given and which extended to the conduct of which the plaintiff now complains. The judge had found that Mr Arthur knew of and consented to the risk. But it was argued that the demand for payment amounted to blackmail and this crime negated the consent. The requirement of payment did not amount to blackmail. By accepting the clamping risk Mr Arthur also accepted that it would remain clamped until he paid the reasonable cost of clamping and de-clamping. He consented not only to the otherwise tortious act of clamping the car but also to the otherwise tortious action of detaining the car until payment. ‘I would not accept that the clamper could exact any unreasonable or exorbitant charge for releasing the car, and the court would be very slow to find implied acceptance of such a charge. That would also apply to conduct which would cause damage. The clamper may not detain the car after the owner has indicated willingness to pay. The fee was reasonable. Mr Arthur consented to what occurred and he cannot now complain.’ The court dismissed the appeal so far as it rested on consent.

Sir Thomas Bingham, MR, Neill and Hirst LJJ
[1997] QB 564
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedVine v London Borough of Waltham Forest CA 5-Apr-2000
The act of wheel clamping a car which was unlawfully parked is a trespass to goods. To avoid an action for damages, the clamper must show that the car parker consented to the clamping. He can do so by showing, in accordance with established . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Land, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.180661

Hughes, Regina v: SC 31 Jul 2013

Uninsured Driver Not Guilty of Causing Death

The appellant though an uninsured driver, was driving without fault when another vehicle veered across the road. The other driver died from his injuries, and the appellant convicted of causing his death whilst uninsured. At trial he succeeded in arguing that he had not caused the death, but the prosecutor’s appeal had succeeded.
Held: The appeal succeeded. ‘This is a statute creating a penal provision, and one of very considerable severity. The offence created is a form of homicide. To label a person a criminal killer of another is of the greatest gravity. The defendant is at risk of imprisonment for a substantial term. Even if, at least in a case of inadvertent lack of insurance or venial lack of licence, a sentence of imprisonment were not to follow, the defendant would be left with a lifelong conviction for homicide which would require disclosure in the multiple situations in which one’s history must be volunteered, such as the obtaining of employment, or of insurance of any kind. Nor should the personal burden or the public obloquy be underestimated; to carry the stigma of criminal conviction for killing someone else, perhaps a close relative, perhaps as in the kind of situation referred to in para 19 an innocent child, is no small thing. A penal statute falls to be construed with a degree of strictness in favour of the accused. It is undoubtedly open to Parliament to legislate to create a harsh offence or penalty, just as it is open to it to take away fundamental rights, but it is not to be assumed to have done so unless that interpretation of its statute is compelled, and compelled by the language of the statute itself. The rule of construction which applies to penal legislation, and a fortiori to legislation which carries the penalty of imprisonment, is not identical to, but is somewhat analogous to, the principle of statutory interpretation known as the principle of legality.’
‘ in order to give effect to the expression ’causes . . death . . by driving’ a defendant charged with the offence under section 3ZB must be shown to have done something other than simply putting his vehicle on the road so that it is there to be struck. It must be proved that there was something which he did or omitted to do by way of driving it which contributed in a more than minimal way to the death. The question therefore remains what can or cannot amount to such act or omission in the manner of driving. ‘

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Hughes, Lord Toulson
[2013] UKSC 56, [2013] WLR(D) 324, [2013] 1 WLR 2461, [2013] 4 All ER 613, [2013] RTR 31, [2014] 1 Cr App R 6, [2014] Crim LR 234, UKSC 2011/0240
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC
Road Traffic Act 1988 3ZB
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedPlanton v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 6-Jun-2001
The defendant was found by police sat in the driving seat of a car parked on an isthmus which would be submerged at high tide. The engine was running, and the car lights were on. He failed a breath test, but argued at trial that since the car had . .
CitedMeeking, Regina v CACD 29-Feb-2012
The defendant passenger pulled on the handbrake at speed and caused a crash which her husband, the driver could not prevent. She was charged with manslaughter. . .
CitedWilliams, Regina v CACD 2-Nov-2010
The offence of causing death by driving while unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured, is committed if the driver is unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured and if the driving is a cause of death in the sense that it was ‘more than negligible or de . .
CitedGaloo Ltd and Others v Bright Grahame Murray CA 21-Dec-1993
It is for the Court to decide whether the breach of duty was the cause of a loss or simply the occasion for it by the application of common sense. A breach of contract, to found recovery, must be shown to have been ‘an ‘effective’ or ‘dominant’ . .
CitedRegina v Kennedy HL 17-Oct-2007
The defendant had been convicted of manslaughter. He had supplied a class A drug to a friend who then died taking it. The House was asked ‘When is it appropriate to find someone guilty of manslaughter where that person has been involved in the . .
CitedRegina v Marsh CACD 19-Jul-1996
Damage caused after the taking of a car need not be at the fault of the driver defendant for the offence of aggravated vehicle taking to have been committed by him. The sole requirement of the subsection was that the driving of the vehicle should . .
CitedRegina v Secretary of State for The Home Department Ex Parte Simms HL 8-Jul-1999
Ban on Prisoners talking to Journalists unlawful
The two prisoners, serving life sentences for murder, had had their appeals rejected. They continued to protest innocence, and sought to bring their campaigns to public attention through the press, having oral interviews with journalists without . .

Cited by:
CitedTaylor, Regina v CACD 9-Apr-2014
. .
CitedTaylor, Regina v SC 3-Feb-2016
No Liability Extension on Taking Without Consent
Appeal by leave of the Court of Appeal on a point of law arising in the course of the trial of the appellant for aggravated vehicle taking, contrary to section 12A of the Theft Act 1968. The defendant had taken a vehicle without the owner’s consent, . .
CitedLane and Another, Regina v SC 11-Jul-2018
The defendants were to be tried for allegedly sending funds abroad to support terrorism. The court now considered the meaning of the phrase ‘reasonable cause to suspect’ in the context of the anticipated use of the funds: ‘Does it mean that the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.514219

Service Motor Policies at Lloyds v City Recovery Limited: CA 9 Jul 1997

Stolen cars had been recovered by the police, incurring the costs of removal. The insurers (now the owners) objected to the payment of fees before the cars were restored. They said that as owners they were exempt from mcharges imposed by section 102 of the 1984 Act. The defendant recoveryy service appealed.
Held: The appeal succeeded: ‘The provision exempting innocent vehicle owners from charges is confined to section 102 itself. No similar saving provision appears or is applied to section 101 and if it had been intended that the exemption in section 102 should extend to the circumstances covered by section 101 the section would have been drafted accordingly.’ The court distinguished between recovery of stolen cars and of cars removed as waste or inappropritely parked.

Butler-Sloss, Thorpe, Judge LJJ
[1997] EWCA Civ 2073
Bailii
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 99 101 102, Removal, Storage and Disposal of Vehicles (Prescribed Sums and Charges) Regulations 1993
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.142470

Williams v Devon County Council: CA 19 Apr 2016

Appeal by Devon County Council (the defendant) against a decision of the Administrative Court quashing a traffic regulation order.

Jackson, Kitchin, Briggs LJJ
[2016] EWCA Civ 419
Bailii
Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996, Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 122
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.563081

Litaksa UAB v BTA Insurance Company SE: ECJ 26 Mar 2015

Judgment – Reference for a preliminary ruling – Compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles – Directive 90/232/EEC – Article 2 – Differentiation in the amount of the insurance premium depending on the territory in which the vehicle is used

L. Bay Larsen, P
C-556/13, [2015] EUECJ C-556/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:202
Bailii
Directive 90/232/EEC 2
European

Road Traffic, Insurance

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.545366

Coates, Regina v: Misc 18 Jan 2011

(Barnsley Magistrates Court) The defendant owned a Segway, a two wheeled vehicle. He was charged with having driven it on a public footpath despite its being a motor vehicle. He denied that it was a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on the road’.
Held: ‘If I am satisfied from all the evidence presented, that a reasonable person was to say ‘yes, the Segway might well be used on a road’, then, applying the test, the vehicle is intended or adapted for such use.
In my judgement, the conclusion must be that general use on the roads is to be contemplated.’

Michael Rosenberg District Judge
[2011] EW Misc 3 (MC)
Bailii
Highways Act 1835, Road Traffic Act 1988 185(1), Road Traffic Regulation Act 1988 136(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v King Admn 13-Feb-2008
The defendant was charged after driving a ‘City Mantis Electric Scooter’. He was disqualified from driving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of the charges on the basis that the scooter was not of such a description as to require a licence . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Saddington; Chief Constable of the North Yorkshire Police v Michael Saddington Admn 1-Nov-2000
A motorised scooter of the type known as a ‘Go-Ped’ was a motor vehicle within the Act. Accordingly a driving licence and third party insurance were both required for its use on a public highway. The scooter required the passenger to stand on a . .
CitedBurns v Currell 1963
The defendant was accused of offences related to the driving on a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle, a Go-Kart.
Held: In fact it was not a motor vehicle within the statutory definition. The Court set out the test to be applied in . .
CitedChief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Fleming QBD 1987
The defendant was stopped pushing a motor-cycle along the road. It had been adapted for scrambling, and the registration plates lights and speedometer had been removed. He argued that it was no longer a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.430057

Richardson v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 28 Feb 2019

Private Car park was not a public plae.

The defendant appealed from his conviction for being drunk in charge of a vehicle in a public place. The place was marked private but allowed for paring for designated businesses.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The phrase public phrase had to be read ejusdem generis with ‘road’. Whether or not a particular place was public was a question of fact and degree in each case. Here the public were not invited to park, and it was not a place to which the public had access..

Julian Knowles J
[2019] EWHC 428 (Admin), [2019] 4 WLR 46, [2019] WLR(D) 170
Bailii, WLR
Road Traffic Act 1988 4(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Spence CACD 24-May-1999
A private company car park, where there was no proof of use by the public, was not a public road, and a driver could not be convicted of dangerous driving whilst in it. There must be evidence that the public actually utilised premises before a court . .
CitedFilmer v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 1-Nov-2006
Conviction for having driven a car whilst drunk in a public place, the car park of his employers. . .
CitedMontgomery v Loney CANI 1959
When asking whether a roadway is a public road, one asks whether there is about those who obtain permission to enter ‘some reason personal to them for their admittance’, and ‘Generally, the decision will be a matter of fact and degree, but whether . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutins v Vivier 1991
There had been a traffic accident in a large privately owned caravan park.
Held: Premises will be private where they are entered for reasons beneficial to the occupier. Referring to Harrison v Hill: ‘What Lord Sands, and indeed Lord Clyde, say . .
CitedMay v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 15-Apr-2005
Whether the car park where the driving took place was a ‘public place’ within the meaning of section 3.
Held: The appeal failed.
Laws LJ set out the following propositions as accurately summarising the relevant legal principles:
a. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.634215

McCord v Thomson: ScSf 16 Oct 2008

Scots Damages Calculation not as English

The parties disputed the damages payable after a road traffic accident. The pursuer was a passenger on a bus hit by the defendant driver, and suffered various minor injuries, particularly back and ankle pains.
Held: The court urged caution in the use of English cases in personal injury damages claims because of the different calculations of expenses. The court should look at the injuries as a whole. In this case the appropriate figure for solatium was pounds 3,400.

[2008] ScotSC 26
Bailii
Scotland

Damages, Road Traffic, Personal Injury

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.277654

Goldsmith v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 4 Nov 2009

The court was asked whether a defendant who pleads guilty to an offence of driving with excess alcohol contrary to section 5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, and therefore admits that he was driving ‘over the limit’, can seek a Newton hearing to contest the amount by which the prosecution allege he was over the limit, as he contends, or whether the court is bound by the certificate of analysis of the specimen provided.
Held: The defendant’s appeal succeeded. Section 15(2) applies only to trials, and ‘the assumption in section 15(2) applies only to trials. Once the defendant has pleaded guilty, once he has put forward an arguable case to suggest that his breath alcohol figure at the time of driving was significantly lower than the certified reading, then the issue as to the actual excess at the time of his driving can and should be resolved by holding a Newton hearing.’
Sullivan LJ said: ‘It would be an affront to justice if a sentencer was compelled by reason of a statutory assumption to sentence a convicted defendant on a basis that was not merely known to the sentencer to be false but was known to be falsely adverse to the defendant.’

Sullivan LJ, Openshaw J
[2009] EWHC 3010 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 15, Road Traffic Act 1988 5(1)(a)
England and Wales

Road Traffic, Criminal Practice

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.381473

Philip Owen Lloyd-Wolper v Robert Moore; National Insurance Guarantee Corporation Plc, Charles Moore: CA 22 Jun 2004

The first defendant drove a car belonging to his father and insured by his father. The father consented to the driving but under a mistaken belief that his son was licensed. The claimant was injured by the defendant in a road traffic accident.
Held: For insurance purposes, the father could validly permit the driving when under a mistake. A permission which would arise only subject to and upon the fulfillment of a condition was not a permission until that condition was fulfilled, but a permission given did not cease to be one only such for mistake. There was no relevance in different kinds of mistake.
Pill LJ said: ‘permission does not cease to be permission for the purposes of the statute because, in good faith, the person giving it believes that the person to whom it is given is covered by the policy when in fact the person is not.’

Lord Justice Pill, Lord Justice Rix
[2004] EWCA Civ 766, Times 06-Aug-2004, [2004] 3 All ER 741, [2004] 1 WLR 2350
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 151
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedNewbury v Davis QBD 1974
newbury_davisQBD1974
The owner of a vehicle agreed to lend it to someone else on condition that that person insured against third party risks. In the owner’s absence, that person drove the car on a road without insurance.
Held: The appeal against conviction was . .
CitedFerrymasters Ltd v Adams 1980
Employers were alleged to have caused or permitted an employee to drive a vehicle on the road while not holding a driving licence authorising him to do so. When the employee had entered the employment, the employers had ensured that he held a valid . .
CitedBaugh v Crago QBD 1975
The defendant believed that a driver was the holder of a driving licence and permitted him to use the vehicle, when the driver was not in fact such a holder. The prosecutor appealed his acquittal.
Held: Considering Newbury v Davis. The . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Fisher QBD 1992
F was asked to lend L a car. F knew L was disqualified, but agreed provided L found an insured driver with a full valid driving licence. F did not know who L would ask or that he in fact asked R to drive; R was employed as delivery driver and the . .
CitedMonk v Warbey CA 1935
The court took a strict view of a vehicle owner’s potential liability to injured third parties.
Held: A person who suffered injury by reason of a breach of s35 could maintain an action in damages for that breach: ‘The Road Traffic Act, 1930, . .
CitedLyons v May 1948
A person who was ignorant of the fact that there was no policy of insurance covering a vehicle may be guilty of an offence if he permits the use of the vehicles while uninsured. . .

Cited by:
CitedChurchill Insurance Company Ltd v Wilkinson and Others CA 19-May-2010
The various insured defendants had been driven in the insured vehicles by a non-insured driver. Suffering injury at the negligence of the driver, they recovered variously damages. Their insurance companies sought recovery of the sums paid from their . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insurance, Road Traffic, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.198301

Froom v Butcher: CA 21 Jul 1975

The court asked what reduction if any should be made to a plaintiff’s damages where injuries were caused not only by the defendant’s negligent driving but also by the failure of the plaintiff to wear a seat belt. It had been submitted that, since the defendant was not responsible for the failure of the plaintiff to wear a seat belt, the question should be looked at purely as a matter of causation not as a matter of contributory negligence.
Held: The defendant’s appeal was allowed.
Lord Denning MR said: ‘The question is not what was the cause of the accident. It is rather what was the cause of the damage . . The damage is caused in part by the bad driving of the defendant, and in part by the failure of the plaintiff to wear a seat belt. If the plaintiff was to blame in not wearing a seat belt, the damage is in part the result of his own fault. He must bear some share in the responsibility for the damage: and his damages fall to be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable.’ and ‘Negligence depends on a breach of duty, whereas contributory negligence does not. Negligence is a man’s carelessness in breach of duty to others. Contributory negligence is a man’s carelessness in looking after his own safety. He is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that if he did not act as a reasonable prudent man he might be hurt himself.’
Lord Denning MR continued: ‘It is compulsory for every motorcar to be fitted with seatbelts for the front seats . . Seeing that it is compulsory to fit seatbelts, Parliament must have thought it sensible to wear them. But it did not make it compulsory for anyone to wear a seatbelt. Everyone is free to wear it or not as he pleases. Free in this sense, that if he does not wear it he is free from any penalty by the magistrates. Free in the sense that everyone is free to run his head against a brick wall, if he pleases. He can do it if he likes without being punished by the law. But it is not a sensible thing to do. If he does it, it is his own fault; and he has only himself to thank for the consequences.
Much material has been put before us about the value of wearing a seatbelt. It shows quite plainly that everyone in the front seats of a car should wear a seatbelt. Not only on long trips, but also on short ones. Not only in the town, but also in the country. Not only when there is fog, but also when it is clear. Not only by fast drivers, but also by slow ones. Not only on motorways, but also on side roads . . the provision of the Highway Code which contains this advice’; Fit seat belts in your car and make sure they are always used’. This advice has been in the Highway Code since 1968, and should have been known to the plaintiff at the time of his accident in November 1972.’
and ‘The governments view is also plain. During the years 1972 to 1974 they spent 2.5 million pounds in advertisements telling people to wear seatbelts. Very recently a Bill was introduced into Parliament seeking to make it compulsory. In this respect England is following the example of Australia where it has been compulsory for the last three or four years. The Bill here has been delayed. And so it will not be compulsory yet a while. But, meanwhile, I think the judges should say plainly that it is the sensible practice for all drivers and passengers in front seats to wear seat belt whenever and wherever going by car. It is a wise precaution which everyone should take.’ and ‘In determining responsibility, the law eliminates the personal equation. It takes no notice of the views of the particular individual or of others like him. It requires everyone to exercise all such precautions as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.’ And ‘Whenever there is an accident, the negligent driver must bear by far the greatest share of responsibility. It was his negligence which caused the accident. It also was a prime cause of the whole of the damage. But in so far as the damage might have been avoided or lessened by wearing a seatbelt, the injured person must bear some share. But how much should this be? Is it proper to inquire whether the driver was grossly negligent or only slightly negligent? Or whether the failure to wear a seatbelt was entirely inexcusable or almost forgivable? . . But we live in a practical world. In most of these cases, the liability of the driver is admitted, the failure to wear a seatbelt is admitted, and the only question is: what damages should be payable? This question should not be prolonged by an expensive enquiry into the degree of blameworthiness on either side, which would be hotly disputed. Suffice it to assess a share of responsibility which will be just and equitable in the great majority of cases.
Sometimes the evidence will show that the failure made no difference. The damage would have been the same, even if a seatbelt had been worn. In such case the damages should not be reduced at all. At other times the evidence will show that the failure made all the difference. The damage would have been prevented altogether if a seat belt had been worn. In such cases I would suggest that the damages should be reduced by 25%. But often enough the evidence will only show that the failure made a considerable difference. Some injuries to the head, for instance, would have been a good deal less severe if a seatbelt had been worn, but there would still have been some injury to the head. In such case I would suggest that the damage is attributable to the failure to wear a seatbelt should be reduced by 15%.’

Lord Denning MR, Morritt LJ
[1976] QB 286, [1975] EWCA Civ 6, [1975] 3 All ER 520
Bailii
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 1(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedVaughan v Menlove 1837
The defendant had been advised of the probable consequences of allowing a stack of damp hay, which he had erected without proper ventilation, to remain in this condition. Subsequently the hay spontaneously ignited damaging the plaintiff’s house. At . .
CitedGlasgow Corporation v Muir HL 16-Apr-1943
The House considered the proper test to define the standard of care that must be adopted by the reasonable man in a claim for negligence.
Held: Lord Clauson said that the test is whether the person owing the duty of care ‘had in contemplation . .
Appeal fromFroom v Butcher 24-Jun-1974
The plaintiff was a front seat passenger injured in a car crash. The defendant sought to have the damages award reduced for the contributory negligence of the plaintiff in not wearing a seat belt.
Held: There was considerable disagreement . .

Cited by:
CitedJones (A Minor) v Wilkins (Wynn and Another, Third Parties) CA 6-Feb-2001
Where a child had not been properly restrained by a seat belt, the damages should be reduced but not by a great percentage. Here, although the child was partially restrained by sharing her mother’s lap belt, in fact this had made the injuries worse. . .
CitedPlatform Home Loans Ltd v Oyston Shipways Ltd and others HL 18-Feb-1999
The plaintiffs had lent about 1 million pounds on the security of property negligently valued at 1.5 million pounds. The property was sold for much less than that and the plaintiffs suffered a loss of 680,000 pounds. The judge found that the . .
CitedParkinson v Dyfed Powys Police CA 10-Jun-2004
. .
ConsideredCapps v Miller CA 30-Nov-1988
The plaintiff was injured riding with the defendant on a motor-cycle. The defendant drove negligently, and crashed. The plaintiff’s crash hemet came off and he sustained severe head injuries. He had not fastened it. The defendant appealed an . .
CitedOwens v Brimmell 1977
Both the driver and his passenger had drunk about eight to nine pints of beer, and on their way home the driver lost control of his car so that it collided with a lamppost. The passenger sued in negligence. The driver said the passenger was . .
CitedJohn James William Booth v Simon White CA 18-Nov-2003
The claimant sought damages after being injured in a car driven by the defendant. The defendant now appealed an award at 1005, saying that the plaintiff had known that he had been drinking. The defendant was known to be a heavy drinker, and he said . .
CitedBadger v The Ministry of Defence QBD 16-Dec-2005
The widow of the deceased sought damages after his exposure to asbestos whilst working for the defendant. He had contracted lung cancer. The defendant argued that the deceased had continued to smoke knowing of the risks, and that he had made a . .
CitedSt George v The Home Office CA 8-Oct-2008
The claimant was taken into prison. He was known to be subject to epilepsy, with high risks on withdrawal from drugs, but was allocated a high bunk. He had a seizure and fell, suffering head injuries. He sought damages in negligence. The defendant . .
CitedStanton v Collinson QBD 2-Mar-2009
The claimant was severely injured when a car driven by the defendant crashed. No-one was wearing a seat belt. The driver died. The driver’s estate argued that the claimant was contributorily negligent in not wearing a seat belt. The claimant said . .
CitedStanton v Collinson CA 24-Feb-2010
The defendant driver appealed against a refusal to reduce the claimant’s damages for contributory negligence. The claimant sat in the front seat and was severely injured in the accident, but had not been wearing a seat belt.
Held: ‘there is a . .
CitedGawler v Raettig (Leave) CA 3-Dec-2007
Application for leave to appeal. . .
CitedSmith v Finch QBD 22-Jan-2009
The claimant cyclist was severely injured in an accident when hit by a motorcyclist, the defendant. He was not wearing a cycle helmet, and the injuries were to his head. He was slowing down to turn right, and was hit a heavy glancing blow by the . .
CitedPhethean-Hubble v Coles QBD 24-Feb-2011
The claimant had been very severely injured when knocked from his cycle by the defendant’s car. He had come out onto the roadway at night but without cycle lights, and into the path of the car. The claimant was not wearing a helmet.
Held: . .
CitedReynolds v Strutt and Parker LLP ChD 15-Jul-2011
The defendant had organised a team bonding day, including a cycling event. The claimant employee was severely injured falling from his cycle. He said that the defendant had been engligent in not providing cycling helmets. The circuit hosting company . .
CitedWilliams v Williams (The Estate of) CA 30-Apr-2013
A child aged three had been injured as a passenger in her mother’s car when it was hit by another negligently driven vehicle. The mother appealed against a finding that she was 25% contributorily negligent in that the child seat used had been . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Negligence, Road Traffic, Damages, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.182180

Mansfield and Another v Weetabix Limited and Another: CA 26 Mar 1997

A lorry belonging to the defendants failed to take a bend crashing into the plaintiffs’ shop causing extensive damage. Mr Terence Tarleton, the driver later died, as did Mrs Mansfield. Mr Tarleton did not know he had malignant insulinoma, resulting in a hypoglycaemic state in which the brain was starved of glucose and so was unable to function properly. That caused the accident.
Held: There is no reason in principle why a driver should not escape liability where the disabling event is not sudden, but gradual, provided that the driver is unaware of it.

Lord Justice Leggatt Lord Justice Aldous Sir Patrick Russell
[1997] EWCA Civ 1352, [1998] 1 WLR 1263
England and Wales
Citing:
DoubtedRoberts v Ramsbottom 1980
A motorist was involved in an accident when unknowingly he was suffering from a stroke and was unaware of his unfitness to drive. The court considered several criminal cases about automatism before holding: ‘I am satisfied that in a civil case a . .
DistinguishedRegina v Spurge CCA 1961
The driver claimed automatism as his defence.
Held: The defendant ‘continued to drive when he was unfit to do so, and when he should have been aware of his unfitness.’ . .
Not followedAttorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) CACD 21-Jun-1993
The defendant lorry driver collided with cars parked on the hard shoulder of the motorway, killing two people. He pleaded in defence a non-insane automatism induced by the experience of ‘repetitive visual stimulus experienced on long journeys on . .
CitedNettleship v Weston CA 30-Jun-1971
The plaintiff gave a friend’s wife driving lessons. An experienced driver himself, he checked her insurance first. The learner crashed into a lamp-post, and he was injured. She was convicted of careless driving, and he sought damages. The judge held . .
CitedAttorney-General of Canada v Connolly 1990
(Canada) A policeman was injured when a driver drove his car off the policeman’s arm was pinned in the window. The driver was held not liable in negligence, since by reason of severe mental disorder he was not capable of foreseeing the harm that . .
CitedSnelling v Whitehead HL 1975
‘The case is one which is severely distressing to all who have been concerned with it and one which should attract automatic compensation regardless of any question of fault. But no such system has yet been introduced in this country and the courts, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Negligence, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.141748

Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis: CA 23 Apr 2015

The appellant had overstayed the permitted period of free parking in a retail park by nearly an hour. The parking was managed by the respondent who had imposed a charge of 85.00 pounds. The judge had found that the appellant was in breach of a contract entered into when parking. The charge had been a penalty, but one which was commercially justifiable in the light of the 2012 Act.
The court noted the development of ‘a tendency to recognise that a simple dichotomy between liquidated damages and penalty is inadequate, because it fails to take into account the fact that some clauses which require payment on breach of a sum which cannot be justified as liquidated damages in accordance with established principles should nonetheless be enforceable because they are not extravagant and unconscionable and are justifiable in other terms.’
Held: The appeal failed. The court approved the judges interpretation.
Moore-Bick LJ said ‘The application in a case of this kind of a rule based on a simple comparison between the amount of the payment and the direct loss suffered by the innocent party is inappropriate. In order to achieve a just outcome it is necessary in my view to return to the principles which underlie what is ultimately no more than a rule grounded in public policy, namely, that the court will not enforce an agreement for the payment in the event of breach of an amount which is extravagant and unconscionable, despite the importance which it would normally attach to enforcing contracts freely entered into’
Nor did the company breah the requirements of the 1999 Regulations.

Moore-Bick LJ VP, Patten LJ, Sir Timothy Lloyd
[2015] EWCA Civ 402, [2015] WLR(D) 190
Bailii, WLRD
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 56
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedAstley v Frances Weldon CCP 27-Jan-1801
Clause was a Penalty – Not Estimate of Loss
By articles of agreement between the Plaintiff arid Defendant it was agreed on the part of the former that he should pay the latter so much per week to perform at his theatres, with her travelling expences of removing from one theatre to another . .
CitedKemble v Farren 6-Jul-1829
Liquidated Damages Clause to Specify Which Loss
The manager of Covent Garden sought damages from an actor (a principal comedian) in the form of liquidated damages for breach of a contract. He had contracted to perform for four seasons, but had refused to continue after the first.
Held: . .
CitedClydebank Engineering Co v Castaneda HL 19-Nov-1904
The House considered a contract for the construction by a Scottish shipbuilder of four torpedo boats for the Spanish government. The contract provided that: ‘The penalty for late delivery shall be at the rate of andpound;500 per week for each . .
CitedCavendish Square Holdings Bv and Another v El Makdessi ComC 14-Dec-2012
The parties disputed whether clauses in a share sale agreement between them amounted to a penalty and as such were rendered unenforeable.
Held: Burton J felt able to escape those constraints, and concluded that the two provisions were valid . .
CitedLordsvale Finance Plc v Bank of Zambia QBD 20-Mar-1996
The court looked at a facility agreement opened by a bank in favour of the defendant which provided that in the event of default the defendant should pay interest during the period of default at an aggregate rate equal to the cost to the bank of . .
CitedCine Bes Filmcilik Ve Yapimcilik and Another v United International Pictures and Others CA 21-Nov-2003
The parties entered into agreements licensing the exclusive distribution of encrypted television channels within Turkey. A clause provided a calculation of damages for a breach amounting to the balance of licence fees due, and other penalties, . .
CitedMurray v Leisureplay Plc CA 28-Jul-2005
The court considered the extent to which the content of negotiations leading up to the signing of a contract were admissible. Arden LJ said: ‘Lord Dunedin in the Dunlop case makes the point that, although the issue is one of construction, the court . .
CitedEl Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings Bv and Another CA 26-Nov-2013
The appellants had agreed for the sale of his company by way of a share sale agreement. The price to be paid was to vary accoriding to the operating profits. A large part of the price reflected goodwill. The agreement contained a clause providing . .
CitedDirector General of Fair Trading v First National Bank HL 25-Oct-2001
The House was asked whether a contractual provision for interest to run after judgment as well as before in a consumer credit contract led to an unfair relationship.
Held: The term was not covered by the Act, and was not unfair under the . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromCavendish Square Holding Bv v Talal El Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis SC 4-Nov-2015
The court reconsidered the law relating to penalty clauses in contracts. The first appeal, Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi, raised the issue in relation to two clauses in a substantial commercial contract. The second appeal, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Consumer, Contract, Road Traffic, News

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.545936

Coates v Crown Prosecution Service: Admn 29 Jul 2011

The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge had correctly read and applied the authorities. The manufacturer’s statement that the Segway was not intended for use on the roads was not determinitive, and nor was its treatment in foreign jurisdictions. The test is an objective one.
Munby LJ said: ‘the ultimate question for the court in a case such as this, depending upon whether the offence is charged under the first or second limb, is whether, within the meaning of section 72, the defendant (i) was riding and/or (ii) was leading or driving a carriage, not whether he was riding or driving a motor vehicle. As the statutory provisions to which I have referred demonstrate, a motor vehicle is a carriage for this purpose, but it does not follow from this that the carriage must be a motor vehicle. Indeed, as the authorities that I must shortly come to demonstrate, something which is not a motor vehicle can nonetheless be a carriage for this purpose.’
The Segway was a carriage within the meaning of section 72.

Munby LJ, Langstaff J
[2011] EWHC 2032 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 185(1), Highway Act 1835 72 78
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedCorkery v Carpenter KBD 1950
The defendant was accused of being drunk in charge of a carriage. He was in fact riding a cycle. Section 12 made it an offence to be ‘drunk while in charge on any highway . . of any carriage, horse, cattle, or steam engine’.
Held: The Act was . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v King Admn 13-Feb-2008
The defendant was charged after driving a ‘City Mantis Electric Scooter’. He was disqualified from driving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of the charges on the basis that the scooter was not of such a description as to require a licence . .
CitedDaley v Hargreaves 1961
The court considered what it was for a vehicle to be intended or adapted for use as a motor vehicle.
Held: The phrase did not refer to the intention as such of any particular purpose. Salmon J suggested that the word ‘intended’ might be . .
CitedBurns v Currell 1963
The defendant was accused of offences related to the driving on a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle, a Go-Kart.
Held: In fact it was not a motor vehicle within the statutory definition. The Court set out the test to be applied in . .
CitedChief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Fleming QBD 1987
The defendant was stopped pushing a motor-cycle along the road. It had been adapted for scrambling, and the registration plates lights and speedometer had been removed. He argued that it was no longer a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on . .
CitedSelby (Justin) v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 1994
The defendant sat on a motor bike, propelling it on a pavement with his feet; although the engine was running the machine, according to the defendant, was not in gear.
Held: The justices were correct to have found that the defendant, even on . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Saddington; Chief Constable of the North Yorkshire Police v Michael Saddington Admn 1-Nov-2000
A motorised scooter of the type known as a ‘Go-Ped’ was a motor vehicle within the Act. Accordingly a driving licence and third party insurance were both required for its use on a public highway. The scooter required the passenger to stand on a . .
CitedRegina v Mathias 1861
The court was aked whether the use of a child’s perambulator on a footpath amounted to a public nuisance or, if it did not, something that the owner of the soil was nonetheless entitled to prevent. The defendant argued as to section 72: ‘If a . .
CitedTaylor v Goodwin QBD 1879
The court was asked whether a bicycle was a ‘carriage’ within the meaning of section 78. It was said to have been ‘ridden at a furious pace’. The appellant argued that: ‘A bicycle is not a ‘carriage’ within the meaning of the Act, nor can it be said . .
CitedWilliams v Ellis 1880
The court was asked whether a bicycle was a carriage for toll purposes.
Held: It was not. The applicable local turnpike Act defined a carriage in such a way that motorised and animal drawn vehices were caught but not otherwise. . .
CitedKadhim v Housing Benefit Board, London Borough of Brent CA 20-Dec-2000
A lower court was not bound to follow a decision of a higher court, where the decision at issue had been based, on the relevant point, on an unargued assumption about the law, which had in turn been pivotal to the decision of that higher court: ‘The . .
CitedRegina v Burstow, Regina v Ireland HL 24-Jul-1997
The defendant was accused of assault occasioning actual bodily harm when he had made silent phone calls which were taken as threatening.
Held: An assault might consist of the making of a silent telephone call in circumstances where it causes . .
CitedFlower Freight Co Ltd v Hammond 1963
. .
CitedTaylor v Mead QBD 1961
The defendant, a commercial traveller, fitted a rail across in the back of his private motor car to carry dresses. The issue was whether or not there had been some degree of adaptation.
Held: Lord Parker CJ said: ‘It seems to me that, by . .
CitedCannan v Earl of Abingdon QBD 6-Apr-1900
The court was asked whether it was correct to charge a bicycle as a ‘carriage’ at a toll station for the bridge over the River Thames at Swinford.
Held: On the language of the particular statute a bicycle or tricycle was a ‘carriage’.
CitedSimpson v Teignmouth and Shaldon Bridge Company CA 1903
The owners of the tolled bridge over the Teign, sought to charge bicycle riders tolls.
Held: A bicycle was not chargeable as a carriage on the bridge toll under the Act establishing it. The court doubted that a bicycle was a ‘carriage hung on . .
CitedSmith v Kynnersley 1903
The court held that a bicycle seeking to use a toll road was, by virtue of the words of the statute allowing the charge, not chargeable as a carriage. . .
CitedEnvironment Agency v Stanford Admn 30-Jun-1998
The prosecutor appealed against the decision of magistrates to stay a prosecution as an abuse.
Held: The decision of a prosecutor to prosecute remains his alone. Where no clear representations had been made that if certain works were carried . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.442437

Daniel Lundberg: ECJ 3 Oct 2013

lundbergECJ1013

ECJ Road transport – Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 – Obligation to install recording equipment – Derogations in respect of the non-commercial carriage of goods – Concept – Carriage of goods by a private individual as part of his leisure activity as an amateur rally driver, financed in part by sponsorship from third parties

M Berger P
C-317/12, [2013] EUECJ C-317/12
Bailii
Regulation (EC) No 561/2006

European, Transport, Road Traffic

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.516343

Brotherston and Others v The Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 3 Feb 2012

Four drivers said that the use of approved speed cameras for evidential purposes was unlawful. They argued that the cameras used were not ‘of a description specified’ under an Order.
Held: The appeals failed. The different speed trap mechanisms were lawful and specified wihin the regulations. The court discussed the stages involved in the designation of a system within the regulations.

Toulson LJ, Cranston J
[2012] EWHC 136 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 89, Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 20, Road Traffic Offenders (Prescribed Devices) Order 1992 SI 1992 No 1209, Road Traffic Offenders (Prescribed Devices) Order 1993 SI 1993 No 1698
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedRobbie the Pict v The Procurator Fiscal, Dumfries HCJ 15-May-2009
The defendant appealed against his conviction for speeding. He said that the speed gun used was not a device of a type approved by the Secretary of State since the regulationas allowed approval of speed measuring mechanisms activated by light, . .
CitedRobbie the Pict v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 26-Apr-2009
The defendant, a road traffic camera campaigner appealed against his conviction for contravening a red light traffic signal, saying that the camera was not approved.
Held: The appeal failed. A ‘prescribed device’ was a ‘device of a description . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.451360

Ryder v Crown Prosecution Service: Admn 14 Apr 2011

The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, saying that the collection of a sample of urine had not been in accordance with the requirements of section 7. He had had the samples taken whilst in hospital from a catheter bag. He said there had not been two samples.
Held: The appeal failed.
Langstaff L said: ‘what must be applied, as it seems to me, is the plain English of the statute. If one asks here whether or not two samples — I shall call them samples to distinguish them from the statutory requirement, which is that of a specimen for analysis — were provided, then factually, as it seems to me, there could be no other conclusion to which the Bench could come other than that they were. Urine came within the hour after the request from the motorist. It went to the officer in some suitable container. The motorist knew that it would, and had accepted the procedure. The urine was plainly ‘provided’.’ and
‘if a flow of urine is connected in a chamber and that chamber is emptied, as it was here, into another chamber, the urine which thereafter collects in the first chamber is not the same sample, not the same urine as that which has been drained away. A specimen of that second filling seems to me to constitute a second specimen of urine. In this case, there were in fact three samples, one or two specimens being disregarded before that which was taken for evidential purposes shortly before 6.00 a.m. in the morning. Given that the purpose of the provisions was to ensure that the urine ultimately sent for analysis was a fresh specimen, and properly reflected the bodily condition of the person from whom it was taken, it seems to be entirely consistent with that principle that the statutory words should be interpreted here as the Bench interpreted them, , that there was here more than one specimen.’

Langstaff, Spencer JJ
[2011] EWHC 4003 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 5(1)(a) 7, Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 2
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRoney v Matthews QBD 1975
The LCJ considered an argument that the officer had not complied with the requirement that a defendant to be requested to provide two specimens within one hour of the request. He said: ‘The reference to two specimens of urine, I think, is explained . .
CitedProsser v Dickeson QBD 1982
The motorist who had been arrested and required to provide a laboratory test specimen under what was then section 9, under which it was for him to choose to provide a specimen of either blood or urine. He decided to provide two specimens of urine . .
CitedRegina v Radcliffe CACD 1977
In the procedure for giving two specimens of urine at a police station to test for driving over the prescribed limit, it does not matter that the first specimen was of any particular quantity. It therefore follows that, provided two specimens are . .
CitedRegina v Musker 1985
The motorist defendant had been required to provide a laboratory test specimen, under section 9(1). He filled one-third of a two-pint container at 2:15 am. A constable disposed of that pursuant to section 9(6) and the container was washed out. A . .
CitedNugent v Ridley 1987
May LJ considered the need to require two samples of urine under the Road Traffic act. He said that the only construction that he could give to that subsection was to read it precisely as it reads, namely that a specimen was to be provided within . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.463084

Herron and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v The Parking Adjudicator: CA 27 Jul 2011

The claimant appealed against refusal of judicial review of decisions of the parking adjudicator as to the correctness of 39 penalty charge notices. In each case, they said that the signage supporting the notice, in particular single and double yellow lines and flashes was inadequate or wrong. It was said that a failure of any part of the signage vitiated enforcement anywhere in the zone.
Held: The appeal failed. A parking control zone had been properly designated. Some irregularites had been accepted by the adjudicator but were not seen to be such as to invalidate the enforcement of restrictions within the zone. Regulation 4 does not require that every part of every street is signed in the manner it specifies. Applying the statutory construction princile exemplified in Soneji, the court rejected the submission that any departure beyond the trivial invalidated the zone: ‘The test for invalidity is not ‘Are the irregularities trivial?’, but whether there is substantial compliance with the statutory definition.’ and ‘If the situation, viewed as a whole, is that the motorist is adequately informed of the parking restriction, there is in my judgment no good reason to render the restriction ineffective.’

Stanley Burnton, Aikens LJJ, Sird David Keene
[2011] EWCA Civ 905, [2011] RTR 34, [2012] PTSR 1257
Bailii
Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 4, Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, Road Traffic Act 1988, Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996, Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) Representations and Appeals Regulations 2007
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Soneji and Bullen HL 21-Jul-2005
The defendants had had confiscation orders made against them. They had appealed on the basis that the orders were made more than six months after sentence. The prosecutor now appealed saying that the fact that the order were not timely did not . .
Appeal fromHerron and Another v The Parking Adjudicator Admn 25-May-2010
The claimant sought judicial review of decisions of the parking adjudicator as to the commission of parking offences. He said that failures in ceratiin parts of a controlled parking zone in Sunderland invalidated parking controls in the entire zone. . .
CitedCannadine v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 2007
The fact that the back of a road sign showing a speed limit had been painted the wrong colour did not make the road de-restricted. There had been no question of the driver being misled. The law was not troubled by trivialities. . .
CitedMacleod v Hamilton 1965
Unless an authority which makes a traffic control order complies with the requirements imposed on the making of such an order and the publication of the order is adequate, any offence which it purports to create cannot be effectively prosecuted.
CitedOxfordshire County Council, Regina (on The Application of) v The Bus Lane Adjudicator Admn 26-Apr-2010
The driver was caught using a bus lane and issued with a fixed penalty notice. He appealed to the adjudicator. The Council now appealed against a finding that the area was not a designated bus lane allowing enforcement by civil penalty rather than . .
CitedJames v Cavey QBD 1967
The council introduced regulations restricting parking at a site on alternate weeks between certain hours. The ‘no parking’ signes were covered over with an unrestricted parking sign when parking was permitted. The defendant parked and left his car . .
Not FollowedDavies v Heatley QBD 1971
The defendant appealed, by case stated, against his conviction of failing to stay to the left of a continuous white line. An intermittent white line had been placed between the two continuous white lines. The magistrates convicted saying that the . .
IncorrectMoss, Regina (on The Application of) v KPMG Llp Admn 14-Oct-2010
The claimant objected to accounts drawn by the defendant auditors for Bolton Council, saying that they had wrongfully included sums from parking fines which had (he said) been unlawfully claimed by the Council. He contended that because parking . .
CitedHassan v Director of Public Prosecutions 1992
The defendant said there had been no sign plate displaying the times of restricted parking.
Held: That was a failure to provide adequate information, and the motorist’s conviction was quashed. . .
CitedCotterill v Chapman 1984
A trivial departure from the statutory specification for a road sign did not invalidate the sign nor exculpate the defendant. . .
CitedCanadine and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 14-Feb-2007
The defendant drivers appealed against convictions for speeding, saying that the speed signs did not have the correct width of black border.
Held: The appeals failed. The signs were in casings the lip of which did not form a background which . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.442232

Oxfordshire County Council, Regina (on The Application of) v The Bus Lane Adjudicator: Admn 26 Apr 2010

The driver was caught using a bus lane and issued with a fixed penalty notice. He appealed to the adjudicator. The Council now appealed against a finding that the area was not a designated bus lane allowing enforcement by civil penalty rather than being enforceable only by criminal process. It was also found that the signage was inadequate, giving drivers insufficient opportunity to avoid the lane. Other cities had adopted similar signage systems.
Held: Different Acts making up the bus lane regulation system had different definitions of what vehicles might use them. The vehicles to be allowed to use the bus lanes in Oxford were not as indicated on the prescribed signs. The council obtained the Minister’s consent to use variant signs. The adjudicator had however erred in construing the phrase ‘any other circumstances whatever’ in the 1984 Act so as not to apply to the purposes of the restriction.
Nor was the signage inadequate. It was irrational to differentiate the requirements for signage according to the mode of enforcement.

Beatson J
[2010] EWHC 894 (Admin)
Bailii
Transport Act 2000 144(5), Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 1 2, Traffic Signs Regulation and General Directions 2002 (SI 2002 No. 3113), Bus Lane Contraventions Regulations 2005 (SI 2005 No. 2757)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedHerron and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v The Parking Adjudicator CA 27-Jul-2011
The claimant appealed against refusal of judicial review of decisions of the parking adjudicator as to the correctness of 39 penalty charge notices. In each case, they said that the signage supporting the notice, in particular single and double . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.408642

Craggy v Chief Constable of Cleveland Police: CA 6 Oct 2009

The claimant was driving his fire engine on an emergency call. The defendant’s constable was similarly engaged. It was in the early hours, and they each went through the traffic junction. They crashed and the judge held both drivers negligent to the found proportions. The claimant had gone through the lights at red, but the police car was driving much more quickly.
Held: The judge had erred in finding negligence on the part of the police driver. The four reasons he had given did not stand up to scrutiny. The fire engine driver admitted negligence, and that is where responsibility lay.
Sedley LJ said that but for the admission of negligence, the court may well have found it to be a pure accident, with neither driver at fault.

Lord Neuberger MR, Sedley LJ, Owen J
[2009] EWCA Civ 1128
Bailii
Traffic Signs Regulation and General Directions 2002 36(1)(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedJoseph Eva Ltd v Reeves CA 1938
An accident occurred when a police vehicle went through traffic lights at green, but on the wrong side of the road.
Held: A driver crossing through traffic lights at green owes no duty to traffic entering the crossing in disobedience to the . .
CitedGriffin v Mersey Regional Ambulance CA 8-Oct-1997
A driver who had crossed through a green traffic light but had collided with an ambulance was 60 per cent contributorily negligent. He had failed to hear the ambulance, had failed to see it, and had ignored unusal driving of other motorists.
Road Traffic, Negligence

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.377530

Smith v Skanska Construction Services Ltd: QBD 29 Jul 2008

The court considered whether the driver of a vehicle involved in a fatal road accident in Thailand was driving within the authority of the UK employers. The driver was not an employee but had authority to use company vehicles for tasks for the company. He had previously been banned from driving such vehicles but that ban had been relaxed subject to conditions preventing him driving alone or at night. The accident occurred when the driver took people home from the christmas staff party.
Held: The Thai civil code required two elements for vicarious liability each of which was satisfied. In this respect the Thai law did not differ from UK law. It had not been shown that the driver had taken the car with the authority of the company, and it was not vicariously liable. Nor could the company be said to have given retrospective authority by the way it had handled its insurance claim, or to have ratified the tort. The claimant was solely responsible for authorising the driver to take the car and the defendant was not liable.

Ouseley J
[2008] EWHC 1776 (QB)
Bailii
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedCrouch v Hooper 1852
Sir John Romilly MR discussed the possibility of a witness being honest but mistaken: ‘it must always be borne in mind . . how extremely prone persons are to believe what they wish. And where persons are once persuaded of the truth of such a fact, . .
CitedBanque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschesky) v Kindersley CA 1951
Sir Raymond Evershed MR discussed the need to keep the doctrine against approbation and reprobation within limits. . .
CitedExpress Newspapers v News (UK) plc 1990
If summary judgment is given to one party on his claim, it must also be given on a counterclaim made on the same basis by the defendant. The principle that a party to litigation cannot ‘approbate and reprobate’ (or ‘blow hot and cold’) can curtail a . .
CitedStapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd HL 25-Jun-1953
Plaintiff to take own responsibility for damage
The question was whether the fault of the deceased’s fellow workman, they both having disobeyed their foreman’s instructions, was to be regarded as having contributed to the accident.
Held: A plaintiff must ‘share in the responsibility for the . .
CitedFirst National Bank Plc v Walker and Another CA 23-Nov-2000
A claim that a bank’s charge should be set aside as having been obtained by the undue influence of a co-mortgagee was parasitic upon a claim as between the co-mortgagors in family proceedings. The wife sought as against the bank to challenge the . .
CitedPW and Co v Milton Gate Investments Ltd (BT Property Ltd and another, Part 20 defendants) ChD 8-Aug-2003
The parties, head lessor and sub-lessess, had assumed that following Brown -v- Wilson the sub-lease would continue upon the determination of the head lease, and had overlooked Pennell which overruled Brown v Wilson. However the lease made express . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Vicarious Liability

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.271313

Lac and others v Clayton: CA 3 Feb 2009

Highway Code applied by analogy

The defendant contended that the three claimants had negligently contributed to the losses they suffered in a road traffic accident of which he admitted primary liability. There had been a spillage of oil, it was dark, the weather was poor, and the claimant passed the scene of an accident over the brow of a flyover to see another vehicle stopped. He stopped without collision, but his car part mounted the kerb. He decided to try to move it, but being upset as to the condition of his car walked back. At that point the defendant’s car came over the brow, hitting him and his passengers. The defendant said that they should not have gone back onto the carriageway and were in breach of the Highway Code. The judge had said that the three were upset, that the Highway Code did not apply save by analogy, and that it was not immediately obvious how they could comply, being on a flyover.
Held: While there might have been a safer place to stand, it was not immediately obvious, and the judge had been free to reach the conclusion he had. The appeal failed.

Mummery, Smith, Hughes LJJ
[2009] EWCA Civ 106
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 38(7)
England and Wales

Negligence, Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.301651

Hatton, Regina (on the Application of) v Devon and Cornwall Constabulary: Admn 4 Feb 2008

The defendant sought judicial review, on a renewed application, to challenge the decision to issue a speeding fine, and in the alternative that he had failed to identify the driver as required. The defendant had supplied the information but under a condition not allowing that information to be used for prosecution, citing Funke.
Held: The defendant had provided the information required, but his condition was not worth the paper it was written on. The Chief Constable had been wrong to proceed with a prosecution under section 172, but should simply have proceeded with the allegation of speeding. Permission was refused.

Collins J
[2008] EWHC 209 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Offences Act 1988 12
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.264593

Weightman v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 6 Mar 2007

Magistrates to identify reasons for finding guilt

The defendant appealed agains his conviction under section 172 of the 1988 Act. He had been abroad when his car attracted the speeding fine, but had been unable to identify which iof the several people who might have driven it, had done so.
Held: The decision of the magistrates left the defendant unable to identify the reasoning of the magistrates: ‘the oral judgment fails to explain in any satisfactory way why the statutory defence was rejected. That amounted to an error of law. That being so, and in the light of my earlier holding that the crown court’s decision appeared to be Wednesbury unreasonable in that there were no recorded facts on which the decision was based, I would hold that the appeal must be allowed.’

Smith LJ, Gross J
[2007] EWHC 634 (Admin), [2007] RTR 565
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 172(3)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedMarshall v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 17-Jun-2015
A car was seen speeding. Husband and wife each said that they did not know who was driving it in response to notices requiring that information. Mrs M now appealed against her conviction under section 172. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Magistrates

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.251159

Romantiek Transport Bvba and others v Vehicle and Operator Services Agency: CA 16 May 2008

Vehicles and trailers had been detained by the respondent. The claimants said that the vehicles were being used under a ‘cabotage’ scheme allowing foreign lorries to be used temporarily on the UK.
Held: Any haulage contractor holding the appropriate European licence was entitled to perform cabotage. That applied irrespective of the withdrawal of the UK licences. That did not apply however where the operator was in effect practising as a full time operator within the UK.

Lord Justice Tuckey, Lord Justice Longmore and Lord Justice Toulson
[2008] EWCA Civ 534, Times 03-Jun-2008
Bailii
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3118/93, Council Regulation (EEC) 3118/93 (OJ November 12, 1993, No L279/1), EEC 3118/93, Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Regulations (1995 No 2869)
England and Wales

Road Traffic, European

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.267919

Keeley (Widow of Terence Noel James Keeley Deceased) v Pashen and Wren Motor Syndicate 1202 at Lloyd’s: CA 10 Nov 2004

The driver had driven his car at a crowd of people intending to frighten them. Instead one had been killed. The insurers resisted liability saying that the use of the car for this purpose and as it was being used as a taxi, was not use for social domestic or pleasure purposes.
Held: The court should look to the essential character of the journey. The incident took place after he had finished his last fare of the evening. At that time he was merely returning home and driving within the terms of the policy.

Lord Justice Brooke Lord Justice Keene Lord Justice Parker The Vice President Of The Court Of Appeal (Civil Division)
[2004] EWCA Civ 1491, Times 17-Nov-2004, [2005] 1 WLR 1226
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 151
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedGardner v Moore HL 1984
The uninsured first defendant deliberately drove a car at the plaintiff who was walking on the pavement, and thus caused serious injuries. The MIB accepted that the trial judge was bound by Hardy to declare that the Bureau was bound to indemnify the . .
CitedHardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau CA 1964
The court was asked whether insurance pursuant to the Road Traffic Act 1960 would provide valid cover for the benefit of a third party injured by deliberately criminal conduct on the part of the driver.
Held: Diplock LJ said: ‘The rule of law . .
CitedSeddon v Binions CA 1978
The Court gave guidance on the proper method of interpreting a term of a motor insurance policy which defines the limitations of use subject to which the policy provides cover. Roskill LJ: ‘Inevitably, where one has a phrase such as ‘social, . .
CitedCaple v Sewell and others CA 9-Nov-2001
. .
CitedBeresford v Royal Insurance Co Ltd HL 1938
The forfeiture rule was to be applied in a case involving suicide. An insured may not recover under a policy of insurance in respect of loss intentionally caused by his own criminal or tortious act, however clearly the wording of the policy may . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Insurance, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.219335

Crown Prosecution Service, Regina (on The Application of) v Wolverhampton Magistrates’ Court: Admn 27 Nov 2009

The Service appealed by case stated against the dismissal of a charge of driving with excess alcohol. The arresting officer had not administered the roadside breath test not having one with him, and had not been trained to make the necessary assessment. The driver had said that the arrest without the test was unlawful.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and the acquittal quashed.
Laws LJ said: ‘The District Judge has not considered the critical section 78 question, namely, whether admission of the evidence in issue would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that it should not be admitted. Instead, he has delivered what I fear I can only call a rhetorical plea for, ‘the right of a motorist not to be arrested due to lack of training or resources of police officers’. In fact, for my part, I am unable to see how the unlawfulness of the arrest, constituted by the want of any preliminary road side test, occasioned the least unfairness to the defendant. Given the readings at the police station it is surely inconceivable that a breath test at the scene would have been favourable to the defendant. And whatever the result of a road side test, the officer would still have been entitled to arrest the defendant if he had reasonable cause to suspect that he had committed a section 4 offence.’

Laws LJ, Ouseley J
[2009] EWHC (Admin) 3467
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 5, Policae and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 78
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedFox v Chief Constable of Gwent HL 1986
The driver left an accident. The police entered his home unlawfully, and on his refusal to supply a breath test, he was arrested and charged with faiing to supply.
Held: A lawful arrest is not an essential requirement before a breath test, and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.396503

Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 27 Jan 2011

The driver appealed against his conviction for exceeding the relevant maximum speed on a Special Road, the A55 in North Wales. The speed limit signs were designed to be illuminated, but the lamps were not working. Instructions had been given not to enforce the limit until the signs were repaired. The police argued that it was not an abuse to pursue the prosecution.
Held: The appeal failed. The circumstances were not sufficient to satisfy an allegation of abuse of process. The argument pressed by the applicant would prevent a court testing the lawfulness of the instruction given. The terminal signs at each end of the limit area were in order. The mandatory provisions in the relevant regulations had been complied with. Though there were specifications that the signs should be either illuminated or reflective, these were not mandatory. The appellant’s argument would preclude the court taking a purposive approach to the Regulations.

Charles J, Wyn Williams J
[2011] EWHC 50 (Admin)
Bailii
Special Road (Llanddulas to Colwyn Bay) Regulations 1984,
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Beckford CACD 27-Jan-1995
Procedures are needed so that cars which have been involved in major accidents or crashes and criminal proceedings are envisaged should only be destroyed with consent. Neil LJ considered the law of abuse of process saying that: ‘the constitutional . .
CitedPeake v Director of Public Prosecution Admn 19-Feb-2010
If the signage indicating a speed limit was defective, the fact that the Appellant knew that the speed limit was 50 mph is not relevant. However, the essential question was where the limit must be indicated. Elias LJ said: ‘The effect of sub-section . .
CitedIn re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd CA 1990
The court gave guidelines for the periods of disqualification to be applied for company directors under the Act. The maximum period of ten years should be reserved for only the most serious of cases. Periods of two to five years should apply to . .
CitedCoombes v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 20-Dec-2006
The defendant appealed against his conviction for speeding. The speed camera was placed just after the 30mph limit was imposed, and the signs were obscured by foliage.
Held: There was no case law direct on the point. The appeal was allowed. It . .
CitedSecretary of State for Trade and Industry v Langridge CA 1991
The lower court had dismissed a petition for a director disqualification because of the failure to comply with the ten day requirement in section 16.
Held: (Majority) The provisions of section 16 were directory only and not mandatory. . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Butler Admn 4-Mar-2010
The Local Authority appealed against the rejection of an allegation of speeding, on the basis that that the speed limit sign, which was designed to be illuminated, was not in fact lit.
Held: The appeal failed. . .
CitedPeake v Director of Public Prosecution Admn 19-Feb-2010
If the signage indicating a speed limit was defective, the fact that the Appellant knew that the speed limit was 50 mph is not relevant. However, the essential question was where the limit must be indicated. Elias LJ said: ‘The effect of sub-section . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.428282

Wright v Wenlock: 1971

The court set out the circumstances in which, in the absense of an explanation, the only proper inference is careless driving.
Lord Parker CJ said ‘the facts of a particular case may be such that, in the absence of some explanation the only possible inference is careless driving’

Lord Parker CJ
[1971] RTR 228, [1972] CLR 49
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBingham, Regina (on the Application of) v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 7-Feb-2003
The defendant appealed by case stated against a conviction for driving a lorry without due care and attention, leading to the death of another road user. There had been an unexplained swing of the rear of his trailer out into the path of the other . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Criminal Evidence

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.538292

Smith v Stratton and Another: CA 8 Dec 2015

‘The question in the case was and is whether the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (‘the MIB’), second defendants in the action and respondents in this court, are liable to meet the appellant’s claim for damages for personal injury sustained in a motor accident on 6 January 2011. The appellant was a back seat passenger in a Vauxhall Astra being driven by the first defendant, Stratton. The Astra struck a parked vehicle.’

Laws LJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 1413
Bailii
England and Wales

Road Traffic, Personal Injury

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.561570

Regina v Inhabitants of High Halden: 1859

highhalden1859

The court considered the liability of the parish for injury arising from a failure to repair the road. The road was ‘an old soft road formed of Weald of Kent clay, and had never been repaired with hard substances’. The evidence was that in wet weather and in the winter months it was ‘very bad, soft and in an impassable state’ with deep ruts which ‘formed in fact the watercourses of the road’. Blackburn J directed the jury that the parish was not bound to make the road hard ‘. . but they were bound in some way, by stone or other hard substances to repair the road ; but they were bound in some way, by stone or other hard substances, if necessary, to put the road in such repair so as to be reasonably passable for the ordinary traffic of the neighbourhood at all seasons of the year.’ A guilty verdict was returned.

Blackburn J
26 Digest (Repl) 383, (1859) 1 F and F 678, [1860] EngR 93, (1860) 175 ER 903
Commonlii
Cited by:
CitedBurnside and Another v Emerson and Others CA 1968
The plaintiffs were injured in a road accident caused by flooding. They sued the executors of the deceased driver whose car spun out of control into the path of their own car, and also the highway authority, who had installed a proper system of . .
CitedHaydon v Kent County Council CA 1978
Impacted snow and ice had built up on a steep, narrow, made-up footpath from Monday to Thursday during a short wintry spell. The plaintiff slipped and broke her ankle. The highway authority operated a system of priorities. Their resources were fully . .
CitedDepartment for Transport, Environment and the Regions v Mott Macdonald Ltd and others CA 27-Jul-2006
Claims arose from accidents caused by standing water on roadway surfaces after drains had not been cleared by the defendants over a long period of time. The Department appealed a decision giving it responsibility under a breach of statutory duty . .
CitedGriffiths v Liverpool Corporation CA 1967
The Highways Act of 1961 had enlarged the duty of the highway authority and made it a general duty to take reasonable care to secure that the highway was not dangerous to traffic.
As to the effect of the 1961 Act, Diplock LJ said: ‘The duty at . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Negligence, Torts – Other, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.244626

Griffiths v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 22 Mar 2007

Photographic output was part of device process

The defendant appealed his conviction for speeding, complaining at the technical accuracy of the Gatso camera used, and the use of photographs developed from pictures taken by the cameras.
Held: The photographs used for analysis were records produced by a prescribed device, even though not directly produced: ‘The record produced directly by the device, the film, is not readable until it has been developed. It is then readable through a viewer or it can be printed on to paper. The photographic print is, in our view, a record produced (albeit indirectly) by the device, notwithstanding the need for the development and printing processes. We do not consider that the scope of section 20(1) is limited to records which issue directly from the machine, such as those produced by devices which use a digital camera or other form of printout. In our judgment, a print produced from a film used in a Gatsometer is a record produced by a prescribed device. ‘
As to the non availability of an opportunity to check the timing of the photographs: ‘The device makes use of two completely independent types of technology. The primary speed check uses radar and is dependent on the ‘Doppler’ effect. The device emits a high frequency radio beam along the road. A vehicle approaching the device will reflect some of the signal back to the device. The frequency of the returned signal will be different from that of the transmitted signal and the difference between the two is a function of the speed of the approaching vehicle. The device is able to calculate the speed from the difference in frequency. Thus the primary speed check is wholly independent of the correct working of the clock inside the device. The secondary check is dependent on the clock. Only if the secondary check tallies with the primary check will there be a prosecution. It seems to us that it is not unfair to require the defence to take on trust the correct functioning of the camera at an interval of half a second because, if the camera timing were not correct, it would be an extraordinary coincidence that the result of the two checks, independently carried out, should turn out to be the same. ‘

Smith LJ, Gross J
[2007] EWHC 619 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 21(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedGarner v Director of Public Prosecutions 1990
The court considered the admissibility of evidence produced by a prescribed device for measuring breath alcohol levels.
Held: The record (the printout from a Lion Intoximeter device) was admissible either under the statutory provision without . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Thornley Admn 3-Feb-2006
The prosecution appealed dismissal of an allegation of speeding. The defendant had argued that the prosecution had not served the required evidence. The prosecution sought to rely upon the evidence of the officer.
Held: The provisions of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.250458

Copley v Lawn; Maden v Haller: CA 17 Jun 2009

The parties had been involved in a road accident. The insurer for the liable party offered a car for use whilst the claimant’s car was being repaired. The claimants had rejected that offer, and now appealed against a refusal to award them the cost of alternate car hire.
Held: The appeals succeeded. For such an offer to have effect, it must contain all such information as will be relevant for the claimants and their advisers or representatives to make a reasonable response. In this case, the letter did not include the cost to the defendant’s insurers of hiring the car. Even if the claimants had acted unreasonably, they should at least recover the actual reasonable cost of hire.

Lord Justice Waller, Lord Justice Longmore and Lord Justice Jacob
[2009] EWCA Civ 580, Times 15-Jul-2009, [2009] RTR 24, [2009] Lloyd’s Rep IR 496, [2009] PIQR P21, [2009] WLR (D) 200
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
ApprovedEvans v TNT Logistics Ltd 2007
(Pontypridd County Court) The court considered the treatment of rejection of the offer of a car to the claimant for use whilst his own car was being repaired after an accident.
Held: Although the offer of the defendant’s insurers could be . .
CitedDimond v Lovell HL 12-May-2000
A claimant sought as part of her damages for the cost of hiring a care whilst her own was off the road after an accident caused by the defendant. She agreed with a hire company to hire a car, but payment was delayed until the claim was settled.
CitedDarbishire v Warran CA 30-Jul-1963
Damages were claimed for a damaged car.
Held: Pearson LJ said: ‘It is vital, for the purpose of assessing damages fairly between the plaintiff and the defendant, to consider whether the plaintiff’s course of action was economic or uneconomic, . .
AppliedStrutt v Whitnell CA 1975
The house sale contract provided for vacant possession on completion, notwithstanding that it was in fact occupied by a protected tenant who in the event declined to leave. The vendor offered to accept a reconveyance of the house, but that offer was . .
CitedSotiros Shipping Inc v Sameiet; The Solholt CA 1983
The seller had failed to deliver the vessel he had sold by the delivery date. The buyer cancelled and requested return of his deposit, also claiming damages because the vessel was worth $500,000 more on the delivery date than she had been when the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Damages, Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.347012

White v White and The Motor Insurers Bureau: HL 1 Mar 2001

The requirements as to the extent of knowledge in the mind of a passenger sufficient to defeat a claim against the Motor Insurers Bureau, of the driver’s lack of insurance, was actual knowledge. The rules implemented a European Directive which required knowledge of the absence of insurance, and must be interpreted accordingly so as to restrict an exclusion from claiming to the possession of some information which led to a conclusion that the driver was not insured. Carelessness, or negligence as to whether the driver was insured was not knowledge, despite the wording of the English rules.
HL Lord Nicholls said: ‘The Court of Justice has stressed repeatedly that exceptions are to be construed strictly. Here, a strict and narrow interpretation of what constitutes knowledge for the purpose of article 1 is reinforced by the subject matter. The subject matter is compensation for damage to property or personal injury caused by vehicles. The general rule is that victims of accidents should have the benefit of protection up to specified minimum amounts, whether or not the vehicle which caused the damage was insured. The exception, therefore, permits a member state, contrary to the general rule, to make no provision for compensation for a person who has suffered personal injury or damage to property. Proportionality requires that a high degree of personal fault must exist before it would be right for an injured passenger to be deprived of compensation. A narrow approach is further supported by the other prescribed limitation on the permissible ambit of any exclusion: the person claiming compensation must have entered the vehicle voluntarily. The need for the passenger to have entered the vehicle voluntarily serves to confirm that the exception is aimed at persons who were consciously colluding in the use of an uninsured vehicle. And it can be noted that the Directive emphasises the exceptional nature of the exclusion of compensation by placing the burden of proving knowledge on the party who seeks to invoke the exception, namely, the institution responsible for paying compensation.’

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Cooke of Thorndon Lord Hope of Craighead Lord Scott of Foscote
Times 06-Mar-2001, Gazette 12-Apr-2001, [2001] UKHL 9, [2001] 2 All ER 43, [2001] 1 WLR 481, [2001] 1 LLR 679, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 1105, [2001] PIQR P20, [2001] 2 CMLR 1, [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 679, [2001] RTR 25, [2001] Lloyds Rep IR 493
House of Lords, Bailii
Motor Insurers Bureau (Compensation of Victims of Uninsured Drivers) Agreement 1988, Second EEC Motor Insurance Directive 84/5/EEC
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromEvans v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions Motor Insurers’ Bureau CA 18-Jan-2001
. .

Cited by:
CitedMcMminn v McMinn and Another QBD 11-Apr-2006
The claimant had been severely injured in a car crash when his younger brother was driving. The driver did not have the owner’s permission to drive, and the insurer sought to avoid laibility.
Held: ‘insurers do not have to prove that the . .
CitedPhillips v Rafiq and Motor Insurers Bureau (MIB) CA 13-Feb-2007
The MIB appealed from a judgment making it liable for an award of damages to the estate of the deceased who had been a passenger in a vehicle which he knew to be being driven without insurance. The estate had not sued the MIB directly, but first . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Road Traffic, Insurance

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.90472

Selby (Justin) v Director of Public Prosecutions: QBD 1994

The defendant sat on a motor bike, propelling it on a pavement with his feet; although the engine was running the machine, according to the defendant, was not in gear.
Held: The justices were correct to have found that the defendant, even on his version of the facts, was riding within the meaning of section 72. The justices had been referred to the definition of ‘ride’ taken from the Concise Oxford Dictionary.
An alleyway was not a footpath by a roadway.
Henry J said: ‘The difficulty that faces him in making such a submission is that it clearly would be riding a bicycle and it would be a curious state of affairs if something that amounted to riding in the case of a bicycle was not riding in the case of a motor cycle simply because the motor cycle is power-assisted in a way that a bicycle is not. It seems to me that this was riding and the justices were quite right to find that as such.’
Taylor LJ said: ‘the justices’ view as to what amounted to riding was correct. In my judgment, riding is being carried out if a person is being carried on a motor cycle as it moves on its wheels, whether propelled by the engine, by his feet or by gravity.’

Henry J, Taylor LJ
[1994] RTR 157
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedCoates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.442518