Whiteside v The Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 21 Dec 2011

The defendant appealed by case stated against conviction under section 172 of failing to provide appropriate driver details. The notices had been received at his address, but he had been unaware of them. He was at the time working regularly in the far East for week at a time.
Held: The reference to due diligence rather than reasonable practicability was an unfortunate error, but not one which made a significant difference. The questions were answered: ‘(i) The offence created by section 172(3) does not require knowledge on the defendant’s part that he is under an obligation to provide the specified information;
(ii) The notice was properly served on the defendant notwithstanding that it was not actually received by him;
(iii) The defendant does not have a defence under section 172(7)(b) merely by virtue of the fact that he has no knowledge that the Notices were sent. However, in an appropriate case a defendant may be able to show in such circumstances that it was not reasonably practicable for him to have been aware of the Notice, in which case the defence will apply.’

Judges:

Elias LJ, King J

Citations:

[2011] EWHC 3471 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 172(3)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedHarding v Price KBD 1948
Section 22 of the 1930 Act obliged a driver in certain circumstances to report an accident causing damage to another vehicle, person or animal. The defendant failed to do so because he was unaware that he had been involved in an accident. He claimed . .
CitedSweet v Parsley HL 23-Jan-1969
Mens Rea essential element of statutory Offence
The appellant had been convicted under the Act 1965 of having been concerned in the management of premises used for smoking cannabis. This was a farmhouse which she visited infrequently. The prosecutor had conceded that she was unaware that the . .
CitedSelby v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset QBD 1988
The defendant lorry driver was interviewed to discover his involvement in a road traffic accident in whch damage was caused to a stationery vehicle. He said that he had been unaware of any such collision, though he had been driving at that location . .
CitedPurnell, Regina (on The Application of) v Snaresbrook Crown Court Admn 30-Mar-2011
The claimant sought judicial review of a dismissal of his appeal against conviction for failing to provide information as to the identity of a driver. The appeal court had found that he had not received the notices requiring him to provide the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.459745

Vehicle and Operator Services Agency v Jones (Nell): Admn 5 Oct 2005

The Agency appealed against dismissal of its allegation that the defendant had wrongfully withdrawn his tachograph record. He had lifted the top of the tachograph which had the effect if disengaging the marker without actually removing the record sheet.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The section was to be construed purposively. Any action which lifted the record sheet from the stylus could be construed as falling within the word ‘withdraw.’

Judges:

Keene LJ, Poole J

Citations:

Times 13-Oct-2005, [2005] EWHC 2278 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedBulmer (HP) Ltd v Bollinger SA CA 1974
The plaintiff complained that the respondent had described its drink ‘Babycham’ as a champagne perry, which it said was a misuse of the appellation ‘champagne’.
Held: The court considered the effect of European legislation on the law of . .
CitedHP Bulmer Ltd and Another v J Bollinger Sa and others CA 22-May-1974
Necessity for Reference to ECJ
Lord Denning said that the test for whether a question should be referred to the European Court of Justice is one of necessity, not desirability or convenience. There are cases where the point, if decided one way, would shorten the trial greatly. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.231177

Director of Public Prosecutions v Thornley: Admn 3 Feb 2006

The prosecution appealed dismissal of an allegation of speeding. The defendant had argued that the prosecution had not served the required evidence. The prosecution sought to rely upon the evidence of the officer.
Held: The provisions of section 20 were permissive and did not preclude the prosecution from adducing the evidence of the record in some other way.

Judges:

Owen J, Hallett LJ

Citations:

[2006] EWHC 312 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Road Traffic Offenders (Prescribed Devices) Order 1999 20

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedFlegg v Justices of the Peace for the New Forest Local Justice Area Sitting at Lyndhurst Admn 21-Feb-2006
The defendant sought judicial review of the refusal by the magistrates to state a case. He was convicted for failing to identify the driver of a motor cycle of which he was a registered keeper which had been caught by a speed camera. Either of two . .
CitedGriffiths v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 22-Mar-2007
Photographic output was part of device process
The defendant appealed his conviction for speeding, complaining at the technical accuracy of the Gatso camera used, and the use of photographs developed from pictures taken by the cameras.
Held: The photographs used for analysis were records . .
CitedIaciofano v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 15-Jul-2010
The defendant appealed against his conviction for speeding, saying that the device used to measure his speed was not approved. The only evidence relied on was that the officer said it had been installed in many police vehicles.
Held: The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 22 May 2022; Ref: scu.239152

Cuns, Regina (on The Application of) v Hammersmith Magistrates’ Court: Admn 4 Mar 2016

Application for permission to apply for judicial review, heard as a rolled-up hearing with considerable speed in circumstances where the disqualification of the claimant from driving after a conviction in relation to a drink drive offence meant that he wanted an interim suspension of the disqualification. The defendant claimed to have a phobia of needles, and said this was a proper reason for refusing to give a sample of blood.
Held: Refused.

Judges:

Ouseley J

Citations:

[2016] EWHC 748 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 7(6)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Crime, Road Traffic

Updated: 22 May 2022; Ref: scu.567931

Regina (Westminster City Council) v Parking Adjudicator: Admn 22 May 2002

The adjudicator sought, when deciding an appeal against a parking penalty, to take account of the applicant’s mitigating circumstances. He had reduced the penalty to zero.
Held: The reference to a discretion allowed where ‘the penalty charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case’ did not allow for mitigation derived from the appellant’s circumstances.

Judges:

Mr Justice Elias

Citations:

Times 06-Jun-2002, Gazette 11-Jul-2002, [2002] EWHC 1007 (Admin), [2003] RTR 1

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1991 Sch6 para 2(4)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedWalmsley, Regina (on the Application of) v Lane and Another CA 17-Nov-2005
The defendant had successfully appealed her fine after giving the wrong car number to the congestion charge system.
Held: When the driver appealed to the adjudicator’s discretion, she could submit anything which might be relevant. Where the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 22 May 2022; Ref: scu.172223

Regina v Liverpool Stipendiary Magistrates ex parte Ellison: QBD 1990

Bingham LJ said: ‘If any criminal court at any time has cause to suspect that a prosecutor may be manipulating or using the procedures of the court in order to oppress or unfairly to prejudice a defendant before the court, I have no doubt that it is the duty of the court to inquire into the situation and ensure that its procedure is not being so abused. Usually no doubt such inquiry will be prompted by a complaint on the part of the defendant. But the duty of the court in my view exists even in the absence of a complaint.’
Leggatt J said: ‘Where a prosecutor applies to withdraw one charge and substitute another, which on the face of it is less serious, the magistrates’ court will ordinarily have no reason to object, and indeed no ground for doing so, provided that their powers of sentence remain sufficient. Here it is said that the stipendiary magistrate should have required the prosecutor to proceed on the charge of attempted theft instead of the charge of interfering with a motor vehicle, because the effect of the substitution was, as it is put, to deprive the defendant of his right to trial by jury. It is therefore said to have constituted an abuse of process, notwithstanding that the applicant was thereby rendered vulnerable to a less severe maximum punishment.
The key to the determination of this case appears to me to be that a defendant arraigned in a magistrates’ court has in truth no absolute right to trial by jury. Whether he has such a right depends on the charge which is preferred against him. Until the more serious charge . . was withdrawn the applicant enjoyed such a prospective right, but in relation to the less serious charge he did not. To speak of depriving the applicant of his right to trial by jury is . . only a pejorative way of making the point that upon reduction of the charge he ceased to be confronted by a charge sufficiently serious to warrant a right to trial by jury. In the absence of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor or of unfairness or prejudice to the accused, the prosecutor’s motive in making the substitution was irrelevant. The question is whether the substitution is in this sense a proper one.’
and ‘Whilst it is no doubt preferable that the charge ultimately made against a defendant should be correct in the first place that cannot always occur.’

Judges:

Bingham LJ, Leggatt J

Citations:

[1990] RTR 220

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedLouca v A German Judicial Authority SC 19-Nov-2009
The defendant resisted extradition saying that the European Arrest Warrant was defective in not revealing the existence of two earlier such warrants. He said that absence of such information would hinder a court which was concerned as to possible . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Criminal Practice

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.380336

Vehicle and Operator Services Agency, Regina (on the Application of) v Henderson: Admn 15 Dec 2004

The prosecutor appealed a decision of the magistrates not to convict a lorry driver. He had stopped after feeling vibration. At the service station he had taken off and replaced the wheel nuts by hand, and was awaiting service. The vehicle inspector then found him and reported him.
Held: The magistrates could not have decided the matter properly, since the vehicle was clearly in a dangerous condition when the driver noticed the situation.

Citations:

[2004] EWHC 3118 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedCornish v Ferry Masters Ltd 1975
The court discussed the criminal liability imposed for dangerous heavy goods vehicles: ‘I think that the general principle that these offences are absolute offences has to be applied here and I think that, in deciding whether the condition of the . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Potts QBD 4-Dec-1988
Whether or not the condition of a vehicle is such that it is a danger to any person is a question of fact. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.226941

Director of Public Prosecutions v Memery: QBD 4 Jul 2002

The Crown Court had concluded that the intoximeter EC/IR was not a validly approved device or if it was that it was unreasonable for the Secretary of State to have approved it since it was a device which detected mouth alcohol, i.e. was liable to give a false reading by failing to distinguish mouth alcohol from the alcohol in the exhaled alreolar (deep lung) breath. The prosecution appealed.
Held: It was not open to a court to look at whether it was Wednesbury unreasonable for the secretary to approve a type of machine. The issue was as to the admissibility of evidence. Any challenge as to reliability was a separate issue. The ability to detect mouth alcohol was not relevant where experts had approved the machine.

Judges:

Lord Justice Rose and Mr Justice Gibbs

Citations:

Times 09-Jul-2002, [2002] EWHC Admin 1720, [2003] RTR 18

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 7(1)(a)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Andrew Earle Anthony Brown, Jose Teixeira QBD 16-Nov-2001
Where a defendant to a charge of driving with excess alcohol, sought to test the accuracy of the Intoximeter, the Magistrates should consider whether the evidence was as to the particular Intoximeter used, and was of sufficient quality to displace . .
CitedBrown v Gallagher HCJ 15-May-2002
The appellant contended that the Intoximeter which had been used to measure the level of alcohol in his breath, had not been manufactured by the approved manufacturer, and did not therefore satisfy the type approval, and that the inconsistency in . .

Cited by:

CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Wood; Director of Public Prosecutions v McGillicuddy Admn 19-Jan-2006
Each defendant sought disclosure of materials concerning the intoximeter instruments, having been charged with driving with excess alcohol. The defendants said that the meters were inaccurate and that the manufacturers were in effect part of the . .
CitedRose v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 11-Mar-2010
The defendant appealed by case stated his conviction of driving with excess alcohol. He said that the device used was not an approved one. He also said that the reading was invaid in including a reading of mouth alcohol. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.174275

Criminal Proceedings Against Johannes Martinus Lemmens: ECJ 16 Jun 1998

Evidence called by prosecutor of breathalyser machine was admissible even though the regulations for the type of machine used had not been notified for this purpose as required to the European Commission. The failure created no obstacle to trade.

Citations:

Times 20-Jul-1998, Gazette 09-Sep-1998, C-226/97, Ecj/Cfi Bulletin 16/98, 7, [1998] ECR I-3711

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Directive 83/189/EEC

Cited by:

CitedRegina v Budimir and Another CACD 29-Jun-2010
The defendants sought leave to appeal out of time saying that their convictions had been under the 1984 Act which was later found to have been unenforceable for failure to comply with notification requirements under European law. The 1984 Act had . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, European

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.82527

Director of Public Prosecutions v Milton: Admn 1 Feb 2006

The prosecutor appealed acquittal of a police officer who had been driving at 150mph. The judge had allowed for the fact that the officer believed that this was safe because of his training.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The test was objective.

Judges:

Hallett LJ

Citations:

[2006] EWHC 242 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Road Traffic ACt 1988 2A

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedMilton v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 16-Mar-2007
The defendant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, saying that his special skills as a trained police driver should have been allowed for. He had driven on a motorway at average speeds of 148mph.
Held: His appeal was allowed. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.239151

Director of Public Prosecutions v Warren: HL 9 Dec 1992

It was a Police Constable’s responsibility to decide whether a blood or urine specimen was to be taken. He needn’t offer the urine option: ‘it is clear that under section 8(2) the driver, in order that he may decide whether or not to claim that the breath specimen be replaced, should be fully informed of the nature of the option open to him and what will be involved if he exercises it. He should be told that the specimen of breath which he has given containing the lower proportion of alcohol exceeds the statutory limit but does not exceed 50 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath; that in these circumstances he is entitled to claim to have this specimen replaced by a specimen of blood or urine if he wishes; but that, if he does so, it will be for the constable to decide whether the replacement is to be of blood or urine and that if the constable requires a specimen of blood it will be taken by a doctor unless the doctor considers that there are medical reasons for not taking blood, when urine may be given instead.’ and ‘In a case where the driver’s option is to be explained to him under section 8(2), the driver should be told that if he exercises the right to have a replacement specimen taken under section 7(4), it will be for the constable to decide whether that specimen is to be of blood or urine and, if the constable intends to require a specimen of blood to be taken by a medical practitioner, the driver should be told that his only right to object to giving blood and to give urine instead will be for medical reasons to be determined by the medical practitioner. In neither case is there any need to invite the driver to express his preference for giving blood or urine.’

Judges:

Lord Bridge

Citations:

Gazette 09-Dec-1992, [1993] AC 319

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 7(3)(b) 7(4) 8(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Jackson, Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions HL 29-Jul-1998
When requesting a drink driver suspect to give a specimen of blood, an officer’s failure to say that the specimen will be taken by a doctor was not fatal to the prosecution. The issue of whether the blood sample was to be taken had properly been . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Orchard Admn 17-Oct-2000
The prosecution appealed a finding of no case to answer against a defendant accused of driving with excess alcohol. On being offered a choice of blood or urine test, he had asked ‘What is the quickest way out of here’ which the officer recorded as . .
CitedJoseph v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 24-Nov-2003
The defendant had given a specimen of breath over the minimum, but below 5omg, and accordingly he was to be allowed to give a specimen of blood or urine. The choice was the officers using a wide discretion. That discretion was still to be exercised . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80053

Director of Public Prosecutions v Wilson: QBD 21 Mar 2001

The use of an admission obtained under compulsion that a driver was the driver, at the time when a car was being driven so as to commit an offence, was not an infringement of the defendant’s human rights, and there was no requirement of a notice that the admission obtained might be used in evidence.

Citations:

Times 21-Mar-2001, Gazette 03-May-2001

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 172(2)(b)

Road Traffic, Human Rights

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80057

Director of Public Prosecutions v Winstanley: QBD 1 Mar 1993

A constable going through the procedure of breathalysing a motorist has the right to require a urine specimen if subsequently no doctor is available, even where he has already heard from the detainee as to his wish to provide a blood sample, and has agreed to that.

Citations:

Ind Summary 01-Mar-1993

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80059

Dittah and Another v Phillipps: QBD 1 Mar 1993

Limits on operation of taxis. A taxi license authorised a taxi to operate within the district to which it related and not beyond. To operate within another district would require a license from that district.

Citations:

Ind Summary 01-Mar-1993

Statutes:

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 46(1)(d)

Road Traffic, Local Government, Licensing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80067

Director of Public Prosecutions v Saddington; Chief Constable of the North Yorkshire Police v Michael Saddington: Admn 1 Nov 2000

A motorised scooter of the type known as a ‘Go-Ped’ was a motor vehicle within the Act. Accordingly a driving licence and third party insurance were both required for its use on a public highway. The scooter required the passenger to stand on a small platform, and was powered by a 22.5cc engine. The braking and steering systems were inadequate, and the scooter had none of the other services such as lights and controls normally required to control a motor vehicle. The test was whether a reasonable person would see the rider as a road user. If he would, then it was a motor vehicle. Its use on roads was to be expected, and it therefore was intended to be so used despite disclaimers from the manufacturers. Pill LJ said that ‘surrender to the temptation to use [it] on the roads will not be an isolated occurrence’.

Judges:

Pill LJ

Citations:

Times 01-Nov-2000, [2000] EWHC Admin 409, [2001] RTR 227

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 185(1)

Citing:

CitedBurns v Currell 1963
The defendant was accused of offences related to the driving on a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle, a Go-Kart.
Held: In fact it was not a motor vehicle within the statutory definition. The Court set out the test to be applied in . .
CitedChief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Fleming QBD 1987
The defendant was stopped pushing a motor-cycle along the road. It had been adapted for scrambling, and the registration plates lights and speedometer had been removed. He argued that it was no longer a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on . .

Cited by:

CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v King Admn 13-Feb-2008
The defendant was charged after driving a ‘City Mantis Electric Scooter’. He was disqualified from driving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of the charges on the basis that the scooter was not of such a description as to require a licence . .
CitedCoates, Regina v Misc 18-Jan-2011
(Barnsley Magistrates Court) The defendant owned a Segway, a two wheeled vehicle. He was charged with having driven it on a public footpath despite its being a motor vehicle. He denied that it was a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on the . .
CitedCoates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Crime

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80042

Director of Public Prosecutions v Spurrier: QBD 21 Jul 1999

It was not absolutely necessary for a defendant who asserted that a Lion Intoximeter was faulty because of a disparity between the reading and what had been drunk, to bring expert evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the Intoximeter was in working order. A court could reach such a conclusion without such evidence, but should be careful to examine all relevant aspects of the evidence.
The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of a charge under section 5. The magistrates heard that the reading was exceptionally high, but that the police had not noticed any effect on her demeanour and it had been twelve hours since she had consumed any alcohol.
Held: The case bumped up against the limits for magistrates to act without expert evidence, but the appeal failed. Their decision was not perverse. It was not absolutely necessary for a defendant who asserted that a Lion Intoximeter was faulty because of a disparity between the reading and what had been drunk, to bring expert evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the Intoximeter was in working order. A court could reach such a conclusion without such evidence, but should be careful to examine all relevant aspects of the evidence.

Citations:

Gazette 27-Oct-1999, Times 12-Aug-1999, [1999] EWHC Admin 721

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 5(1)

Citing:

CitedCracknell v Willis HL 1988
The evidence which is admissible on a challenge to the reliability of an intoximeter device is not limited to direct evidence of the unreliability of the breath testing device, but can be based on evidence such as the level of consumption, and the . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Hill 1991
dpp_hill1991
The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of a summons alleging that the driver had driven with excess alcohol. The magistrates had concluded that the intoximeter must have been faulty.
Held: The conclusion that the device was unreliable was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Evidence, Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80049

Director of Public Prosecutions v John Kay: QBD 4 Mar 1998

The court considered a decision by Justices to exclude evidence under section 8 of the 1984 Act where a police officer had allegedly failed to follow the guidance in relation to a roadside breath test.
Held: The procedure was not required by the Act and sent the case back to the Justices with a direction to admit the constable’s evidence of that test. The failure of a constable to wait until after twenty minutes after driver’s last drink did not invalidate the request for a roadside breath test. The Act is not to be defeated by technicalities.

Citations:

Times 13-Apr-1998, [1998] EWHC Admin 258, [1999] RTR 109

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 3 4 5, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 8

Cited by:

CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Coulter Admn 29-Jun-2005
The magistrates stated a case where the police officer requiring a breath speciment, had not allowed a wait of 20 minutes where the defendant had recently eaten a ‘tic-tac’, contrary to the procedure. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80022

Director of Public Prosecutions v Bristow: QBD 28 Oct 1996

The prosecutor appealed against the decision of the magistrates, having found the defendant guilty of driving with excess alcohol, then not to disqualify him, finding special reasons for so doing. He had gone in answer to a call that a child niece was being assaulted and held against her will.
Held: There may be special reasons for non-disqualification of a driver convicted of driving with excess alcohol, if a sober reasonable and responsible friend might have said that the defendant should drive. Here however a sober friend would have advised the driver against driving, and the appeal succeeded.

Judges:

Simon Brown LJ, Gage J

Citations:

Times 28-Oct-1996, [1998] RTR 100

Statutes:

Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 34(1), Road Traffic Act 1988 5

Citing:

CitedPugsley v Hunter 1973
The court discussed the basis of a submission that there existed special reasons for non-disqualification for driving whilst under the influence of drink when the driver’s drinks had been spiked. It was necessary for the applicant to show first, . .
CitedWhittle v Kirby 1946
A special reason for not disqualifying a driver is one which is special to the facts of the case and not personal to the offender. . .
CitedTaylor v Rajan 2-Jan-1974
The defendant had consumed alcohol so that the alcohol level was 102 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. An appeal was heard as to whether there existed special reasons for not disqualifying him.
Held: The court considered . .
CitedChatters v Burke QBD 1986
A car had rolled over and stopped in a field next to the highway and was then driven with a flat tyre a few yards from the field through a gate, onto the road and parked there.
Held: In determining whether special reasons existed to justify . .

Cited by:

CitedKhan, Regina (on the Application of) v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 12-Oct-2004
Defendant pleaded guity to drink driving – claim for special reasons – appeal against finding of absence of special reasons to disqualify. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79989

Director of Public Prosecutions v Coyle: QBD 17 Jul 1995

There was no need for a police officer to warn the defendant of the three minute cycle for the Intoximeter after a test. A failure to warn a motorist of the machine time limit was not good reason for a driver to refuse to give a specimen.

Citations:

Ind Summary 17-Jul-1995, Times 20-Jul-1995

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 7

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79997

Director of Public Prosecutions v McCarthy: QBD 8 Jan 1999

A driver required to give his name and address satisfied the address requirement by giving an address at which he could properly be contacted. The address of his solicitor was satisfactory provided reasonably swift and easy communication was possible.

Citations:

Gazette 17-Mar-1999, Times 08-Jan-1999, Gazette 03-Feb-1999

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 170(2)

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80031

Director of Public Prosecutions v Falzarano: QBD 16 Nov 2000

The defendant had failed to provide a specimen of breath at the police station. Her GP gave evidence that she suffered from panic attacks, and that such an attack would lead to a shortness of breath which would make it difficult for her to provide a specimen of breath. The prosecutor’s appeal failed. The magistrates had had the advantage of observing the defendant’s demeanour, and the reasonable excuse defence had been established.

Citations:

Gazette 16-Nov-2000, Times 24-Nov-2000

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 7(6)

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80000

Director of Public Prosecutions v Furby: QBD 23 Mar 2000

A motorist had deliberately failed to complete the breath test procedure twice. In later court proceedings he was able to bring medical evidence that he would have been unable to do so in any event. He was held to have been properly convicted. There could be no reasonable excuse where inability was later shown. He would only have been able to rely on the inability to supply a specimen if he had tried to provide one and failed.

Citations:

Times 23-Mar-2000

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 7(6)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Road Traffic, Crime

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80002

Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphries: QBD 3 Dec 1999

Following a conviction for driving with excess alcohol, the defendant argued that the short (nil) distance driven constituted a special reason for not disqualifying him. The court said that the magistrates were entitled to take into account the defendant’s intention, over and above what had actually been achieved by him in driving away.

Citations:

Times 03-Dec-1999

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 5(1)(a), Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 Sch 2

Citing:

InterpretedChatters v Burke QBD 1986
A car had rolled over and stopped in a field next to the highway and was then driven with a flat tyre a few yards from the field through a gate, onto the road and parked there.
Held: In determining whether special reasons existed to justify . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Criminal Sentencing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80010

Criminal Proceedings Against E Clarke Ltd and Sons (Coaches) Ltd and Another: ECJ 1 May 1998

Tachograph equipment was required for tour coach which took passengers from airports, tourist locations and hotels. Lack of predetermined routes or stopping off places disallowed exemption.

Citations:

Times 01-May-1998, C-47/97, [1998] EUECJ C-47/97

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

European

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79659

Criminal Proceedings Against Hume Case C-193/99: ECJ 5 Oct 2000

When a driver subject to the tachograph requirements did not take his rest period in one week, the regulation permitting him to aggregate it with that in the week following did not permit him to take two separate rest periods in that week, but rather two periods together. The wording of the directive as expressed in languages other than English was clear, and the English was not very doubtful.

Citations:

Times 05-Oct-2000

Road Traffic, European

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79662

Criminal Proceedings Against Skills Motor Coaches Ltd and Others: ECJ 18 Jan 2001

Where drivers drove away from their home and main centre of work to pick up a vehicle which would require them to record their activities on the tachograph, they were obliged in addition to record the time travelling as another period of work. This was not a situation where a driver had begun driving immediately after a rest period. Whether the driver had had specific instructions as to what to do or had had some element of choice was not conclusive either.

Citations:

Times 20-Feb-2001, [2001] EUECJ C-297/99, C-297/99

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Transport Act 1968

Road Traffic, European

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79669

Churchill Insurance v Charlton: CA 2 Feb 2001

The victim of an unlawful act of a driver off-road sought damages from another driver and his insurers. The insurers refused to pay.
Held: There is a balance to be found between the statutory purpose of compulsory motor insurance and the principal that a man should not benefit from his own wrongful act. The victim stood in the shoes of the insured as against the insurance company. He therefore had no better claim than the insured, and was subject to the defences available to the insurer against the insured.
Laws LJ said: A useful starting-point, I think, is to have in mind two contrasting propositions, neither of which (taken in isolation) can sensibly be doubted, but which would appear at face value to be inconsistent with one another.
The first of these proposition consists in the general rule that an assured is not covered by an insurance contract in respect of loss caused by his own intentional act: see for example Beresford [1938] AC 586 per Lord Atkin . . Rix LJ has described this as ‘a basic rule of insurance law’ . . Lord Atkin stated that the proposition ‘is not the result of public policy, but of the correct construction of the contract’. But public policy would surely vouchsafe at least as much, at any rate in a case where the intentional act in question was also a crime.
The second proposition is derived from the following state of affairs. The user of a vehicle is required by statute (on pain of criminal penalties) to be insured in respect of any liability which he may incur by virtue of the death of or personal injury to any person (or damage to property) which is occasioned by the use of the vehicle on a road in Great Britain, and this includes the case where the injury is deliberately and criminally caused: Road Traffic Act 1988 ss. 143(1)(a), 145(3)(a), Hardy [1964] 2 QB 745, Gardner [1984] AC 548. This state of affairs entails the conclusion that there is a class of case in which a policy of motor insurance may as a matter of construction cover the assured against losses caused by his own intentional and criminal act (else the statute would be incapable of fulfilment in relation to a category of possible events which, upon high authority, was plainly intended to be covered). This conclusion constitutes the second proposition. On its face it is inconsistent with the first proposition or is an exception to it.
It will be obvious that there are two public policies involved here. The first is the broad principle of the common law that no man may rely on his own wrong to gain advantage or benefit against another. That is behind the first proposition. The second is the principle of statute, that innocent third parties should be protected so far as money can do it from the harm – sometimes fatal – that may be inflicted by careless, dangerous and criminal drivers on the public roads: a protection not sufficiently given by the private law of insurance. That is behind the second proposition. The tension between the two arising where the driver’s conduct is criminal is resolved by the rule (derived from Hardy v MIB, confirmed in Gardner’s case) that a policy whose words on their face cover liability for death, personal injury or damage to property occasioned by the use of a vehicle on a road is treated – so as to give effect to the second proposition – as still doing so even where the liability arises on the facts from the driver’s own criminal act; although in that case – so as to give effect to the first proposition – the insured driver himself cannot take advantage of the policy . .
In my judgment a policy, such as that in the present case, whose insuring clause contains the word ‘accident’, may readily fulfil the requirements of s.145(3)(a), even in relation to a set of facts where the insured’s liability arises from his own deliberate criminal act. I have no difficulty in accepting that ‘accident’ and its cognates may be applied so as to cover such a set of facts: depending on the context of the word’s use, they plainly can. Billingham [1979] 1 WLR 747 and Lees [1981] RTR 506, cited by my Lords, vouchsafe as much.
Moreover, if the court’s view of ‘accident’ is conditioned by the force of the first proposition, there at once arises the danger of an approach being taken to the material provisions of the 1988 Act which would undermine the purpose and utility of section 151. As Rix LJ says . . the first proposition – the basic rule – applies whether or not the word ‘accident’ appears in the policy. In theory one might, driven by the first proposition, arrive at a result such as would not allow any policy of motor insurance (whether or not containing the word ‘accident’) to cover the insured’s liability for damages caused by his own deliberate criminal act; but that would contradict entirely the second proposition. Once one recognises (a) that in the field of motor insurance the role of the first proposition is only to disable the insured from recovering for his own benefit in a case of deliberate criminal conduct, and (b) that the policy may nevertheless and at the same time be treated as one which for the purposes of sections 143 and 145 insures the driver against liability for death (etc) in just such a case (and that is the effect of Hardy . . and Gardner . .), it becomes apparent that the presence or absence in the insuring clause of ‘accident’ or its cognates is of little or no significance.’

Judges:

Laws, Kennedy, Rix LJJ

Citations:

Gazette 08-Mar-2001, Times 21-Feb-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 112, [2001] EWCA Civ 1230, [2002] QB 578, [2001] RTR 33, [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 387, [2001] 3 WLR 1435, [2001] PIQR P23, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 769

Links:

Bailii, Bailii

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 151, Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHawley v Luminar Leisure Ltd and others CA 24-Jan-2006
The claimant was assaulted and severely injured at a night club by a doorman supplied to the club by a third party company now in liquidation. He claimed the club was the ‘temporary deemed employer’ of the doorman. He also sought to claim under the . .
CitedBristol Alliance Ltd v Williams and Another QBD 1-Jul-2011
The driver had crashed into the insured’s building causing substantial damage. The court was asked which of the driver’s and building’s insurers should bear the costs. The driver’s insurers said that he had acted deliberately and therefore they were . .
CitedMulcaire v News Group Newspapers Ltd ChD 21-Dec-2011
The claimant, a private investigator had contracted with the News of the World owned by the defendant but since closed. He had committed criminal offences in providing information for the paper, had been convicted and had served his sentence. He . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insurance, Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.78992

Cawthhorn v Director of Public Prosecutions: QBD 31 Aug 1999

The duty falling upon a driver to stop and report an accident immediately and in any event with 24 hours, was not dependent upon him actually driving at the time. A driver parked the vehicle on a hill and left it to post a letter. It rolled away and caused damage. The driver ran away, but was properly convicted.

Citations:

Times 31-Aug-1999

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 170

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.78950

Cantabrica Coach Holdings Ltd v Vehicle Inspectorate: Admn 31 Mar 2000

Even though no underlying offence was suspected, the owner of tachograph records was required to hand them over to the inspector for inspection off the premises if necessary. An offer to allow inspection, but only at the record keeper’s offices was not a sufficient compliance with a requirement to hand them over. The express power to take records arose when an offence was suspected. The obligation did not depend upon receipt of a notice requiring delivery of the records within ten days to the office of the Traffic Commissioner.

Citations:

Gazette 05-May-2000, Times 13-Apr-2000, [2000] EWHC Admin 315

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Transport Act 196899

Cited by:

Appeal fromCantabrica Coach Holdings Limited v Vehicle Inspectorate (on Appeal From a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division) HL 22-Nov-2001
A transport examiner investigating compliance with the drivers hours regulations was allowed to remove records from an office for examination, and a company refusing him to be allowed to do that committed an offence. Where removal was necessary, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.78870

Margaret Anderson Brown v Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline: HCJ 4 Feb 2000

The power in the Road Traffic Act to force a registered keeper to say who was driving a car denies the driver a right to a fair trial by compelling a driver to give evidence against himself. A refusal to answer is itself a crime. The restriction on such powers must apply at the stage of evidence gathering as much as at trial. It does not apply at the stage where an officer is investigating whether a crime has been committed, but does when he moves on to ask who committed the offence.

Judges:

Lord Allanbridge and Lord Justice General and Lord Marnoch

Citations:

Times 14-Feb-2000, [2000] ScotHC 14

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 172, European Convention on Human Rights

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Human Rights, Road Traffic, Crime

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78707

Batchelor v Marlow and Another: ChD 25 May 2000

The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement. If an easement was capable of arising by virtue of a deed of grant, it could also be acquired by prescription. This was such an easement. Use in the absence of planning permission did not vitiate the acquisition by prescription, since the use did not become unlawful until a planning enforcement notice had been served.

Citations:

Times 07-Jun-2000, Gazette 25-May-2000, Gazette 08-Jun-2000, (2001) 82 P and CR 36

Cited by:

CitedP and S Platt Ltd v Crouch and Another CA 25-Jul-2003
The claimant sought a declaration that certain easements had been included by implication in a conveyance of part of land to him.
Held: Since the easements were capable of subsisting at law, and existed as quasi-easements at the time, and did . .
Appeal fromBatchelor v Marlow and Another CA 12-Jul-2001
The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement acquired by prescription. At first instance the rights were recognised as an easement. The rights included parking during daylight hours during weekdays. The land-owner appealed on the ground that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Road Traffic, Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78277

Baldwin v West Yorkshire Police, orse Baldwin v Director of Public Prosecutions: QBD 3 Jul 1995

The choice given to a person detained on suspicion of driving with excess alcohol, of giving either a blood or a urine sample was given satisfactorily, if it was done properly and fairly. Curtis J: ‘I would observe that the words of Lord Bridge in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Warren [1993] R.T.R. 58 are not a statute. As I have endeavoured to set out, they are words to guide the lower courts in the interpretation of the statute and how this branch of the law should be approached.
In my judgment, so long as the option given by the statute is explained fairly and properly so that the driver can make an informed decision, the requirements of justice and the efficacy of the driver’s option given by the statute under section 8(2) are ensured. Of course, it is right, as Turner v. Director of Public Prosecutions (Note-1994) [1996] R.T.R. 274, 278L-279A requires, that the explanation of the matters that the driver has to be told in order to exercise his proper right should be detailed.
However, on the facts of this case, in my judgment, this particular defendant did make an informed decision and was given all the necessary explanations and information that he would need to make a proper and informed decision.’

Judges:

Curtis J

Citations:

Ind Summary 03-Jul-1995, [1996] RTR 238

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 8(2)

Road Traffic, Police

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78105

Williams v Ellis: 1880

The court was asked whether a bicycle was a carriage for toll purposes.
Held: It was not. The applicable local turnpike Act defined a carriage in such a way that motorised and animal drawn vehices were caught but not otherwise.

Citations:

(1880) 5 QBD 175, [1880] 49 LJMC 47, [1880] 42 LT 249

Cited by:

CitedCoates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.442524

Teape v Godfrey: 1986

Citations:

[1986] RTR 213

Cited by:

Not to be followedPiggott v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 8-Feb-2008
The defendant driver had been stopped and required to provide a specimen of breath. She failed to do so, and gave no reason. At trial she produced nedical evidence, accepted by the magistrates, that she suffered asthma and a hyperventilation . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.266481

Regina v Pettipher: CACD 1989

Citations:

[1989] 11 CAR (S) 321

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRegina v Shepherd; Regina v Wernet; Attorney General’s References Nos. 14 and 24 of 1993 CACD 26-Jan-1994
New sentencing guidelines were handed down for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving whilst driving with excess alcohol. The definition and sentence for the offence had been changed. Lord Taylor CJ: ‘Drivers who drive after taking . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Sentencing, Road Traffic

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.251433

Regina v Morris: 1972

Whether the particular facts of a case amount to an accident is a question of law. In a case of disputed facts under s2(2) of the 1967 Act it is for the jury to decide the facts and apply to the facts found the judge’s direction as to the meaning of accident.
Lord Widgery CJ:’We would add only one other point on this aspect of the case. It is now recognised and has been recognised in a number of instances that there will be cases under section 2(2) where the primary facts are not in dispute and when the question of accident or no becomes a matter of pure law, in the same way that cases sometimes arise where the primary facts are not in dispute and in which the question of whether a person is driving or not becomes a pure matter of law. We think that in this case the deputy chairman would not have erred if he had directed the jury in that sense. We do not criticise him for not taking that line – he may well have been wise in seeking the verdict of the jury on the facts before them – but cases of this kind, where there really is no factual dispute left and the matter is one of law only, are cases in which the presiding judge can, if he thinks fit, give a ruling to that effect. If there is a dispute as to fact the issue must of course be left to the jury.’
As to the meaning of ‘accident’: ‘Several attempts at definitions of the words ‘accident’ have been made in the course of argument. (he referred to Fenton v J Thorley and Co Ltd) Sachs LJ in the course of the argument supplied an alternative, with which the other members of the court agree, in which he suggested that ‘accident’ in the present context means an unintended occurrence which has an adverse physical result. We think that it would be wrong to construe ‘accident’ in this context too narrowly. We are conscious of the fact that this is an interference with the liberty of the subject, but the Act does not make the having of an accident an offence, it merely provides it as a qualification for the taking of a breath test, and the underlying conception of section 2(2) is that if some unintended occurrence which has adverse physical result arises out of the presence of motor vehicle on a road, that is a fair basis on which a police officer may request the provision of a specimen of breath. Such an occurrence is one in which, prima facie at any rate, the circumstances of the occurrence and of the driver involved in it deserves consideration by authority, and accordingly we think that the definition suggested by Sachs LJ is one which fits the intention of Parliament and will not open the door unduly widely to the suggestion that random breath tests can be taken in purported consequence of it.’

Judges:

Lord Widgery CJ, Sachs LJ

Citations:

[1972] RTR 201

Statutes:

Road Safety Act 1967 2(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedRegina v Seward 1970
The section in the 1967Act required as a precondition to a request for a breath specimen that an accident had occurred. The defendant complained that this was an issue of fact, but had been decided by the deputy chairman and not the jury.
CitedFenton v J Thorley and Co Ltd HL 1903
A workman who ruptured himself by an act of over-exertion in trying to turn a wheel was held to have suffered an injury ‘by accident.’ The act of turning the wheel was not in itself an accident. But the injury which the man sustained while carrying . .

Cited by:

CitedCurrie, Regina v CACD 26-Apr-2007
The defendant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving. The failure of the police to serve him with a notice of intended prosecution invalidated the conviction. The police replied that there was no need for such a notice because there had been . .
CitedChief Constable of West Midlands Police v Billingham 1979
Bridge LJ considered the meaning of the word ‘accident’, and, after saying that there had been many authorities for different stautory and contractual contexts, said: ‘It is, in my judgment, a word which has a perfectly well understood meaning in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.251521

Regina v Browning: CACD 2002

The defendant, a lorry driver veered from the road whilst sending a text message. He killed a man in a lay-by.
Held: The sentence of 5 years was upheld. Mance LJ said: ‘The use of a mobile phone to read and compose text messages while driving is a highly perilous activity. Even the use of a hand-held mobile phone by a driver whilst moving, a much too common feature of driving today, is self-evidently risky. But the risks of reading and composing, text messages appears to us of a wholly different order and to be to use the judges words, of the most ‘blatant nature’. Browning had pleaded guilty but there had to be a Newton hearing. Browning’s evidence was not accepted so he was not entitled to full credit for his plea.

Judges:

Mance LJ

Citations:

[2002] 1 CAR (S) 377

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Road Traffic, Criminal Sentencing

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.251432

Greenway v Director of Public Prosecutions: 1993

The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. The officer had given evidence that at the time of the test all of the readings showed that the machine was working properly. That evidence was not challenged by the defence.
Held: The court rejected, submissions that the print-out had not been put in evidence and the oral evidence of the officers of the readings on the print-out, was not sufficient.
Buckley J: ‘For my part I would accept that as clearly sufficient evidence, albeit perhaps in shorthand, that he had considered the calibration readings amongst others, and was telling the court that the machine was reliable and was working properly and he went on to give the actual reading of 51 microgrammes. The time for the defence to challenge that aspect of the case, that is, the reliability of the machine, if they had any basis at all for doing so, was then. They did not do so and that evidence went unchallenged.’ and ‘It seems that the position is clear. Section 16 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 enables, and it is a permissive section, the prosecution to rely on the documents produced by the machine provided they do so in the prescribed fashion. But it is clear that the prosecution may also rely on the direct evidence of the officer who administered the breath test at the police station to give the reading based on his observation of the figures on the machine. If he is going to do that, he must give evidence that the machine was working properly and appeared to be reliable at the time. That is a matter of basic common sense which the courts have underlined.
The question for us is whether there was sufficient evidence in this case that that occurred. In my judgment there clearly is. That is to be found in the finding at paragraph 3 of the case …’
Staughton LJ: ‘We have been referred to three cases where this court has said that, if a police officer gives oral evidence of the result of a Lion Intoximeter test but does not identify the print-out and produce it to the court, he must give evidence of the calibration of the machine both before and after the test was taken. Those cases are Owen v Chesters, Morgan v Lee and Denneny v Harding. In my judgment it does not follow that the officer must in terms give evidence of what the actual calibration results were. Here the officer’s evidence-in-chief is summarised in paragraph 3 of the case as follows: ‘He stated that at the time of the test all of the readings showed the machine was working properly.’ That is no doubt a summary. We do not know the actual words used by the officer giving evidence, but we must accept it as an accurate and comprehensive summary. If the defence wanted to test that evidence, they should have explored the point in cross-examination. It would seem that, if the defence had done so, the sergeant could have given some answers. He had the print-out with him, but no questions were asked. In my judgment on the sergeant’s evidence here there was a case to answer and the justices were entitled to find the offence proved.
It was argued by Mr Sapsard in reply that the sergeant’s evidence was defective in another respect in that it did not disclose his experience of using the Lion Intoximeter and his knowledge of its operation. There is, however, nothing whatever in the case to show that this point was taken in the Magistrates’ Court. It does not feature in the question which the justices stated for the opinion of the court. We have no idea whether the sergeant gave any evidence on that topic or, if he did, what his evidence amounted to. It is too late to take that point now.’

Judges:

Buckley J, Staughton LJ

Citations:

[1994] RTR 17

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedSneyd v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 24-Feb-2006
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He complained that though the officers suspected him of having consumed alcohol, they asked him whether he had been drinking without cautioning him, and that no print out . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.240393

Thom v Director of Public Prosecutions: 1993

The defendant was prosecuted for driving with excess alcohol. No print-out was produced but there was oral evidence from the officers who carried out the procedure that the machine was calibrated properly and working properly and what the readings were.
Held: That evidence was admissible and sufficient both as a matter of principle and by reference to the previous authorities. Owen v Chesters was decided on the failure of the prosecution to bring evidence that the machine was calibrated and working properly.

Judges:

Glidewell LJ, Curtis J

Citations:

[1994] RTR 11

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

ExplainedOwen v Chesters 1985
The court considered the means of proving the reading from a breath test meter: ‘It was clearly the intention of the legislature, in enacting subsection (5), that the defendant should be provided in advance of the hearing with the information . .

Cited by:

CitedSneyd v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 24-Feb-2006
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He complained that though the officers suspected him of having consumed alcohol, they asked him whether he had been drinking without cautioning him, and that no print out . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.240392

Denneny v Harding: 1986

Although a police officer was able to give evidence about what he saw on the Intoximeter display panel, the evidence of the officer in the case went no further than the evidence of the readings of alcohol in the appellant’s breath. In order to prove that the machine was producing reliable evidence: ‘it had to be accompanied by evidence of the calibration of the machine, both before and after the specimen of breath had been provided by the defendant and of the date and time when the test was taken. The witness also had to be in a position to inform the justices that the figures for calibration which he saw, if he did, on the display panel were within permissible limits and that therefore the device was functioning properly.
A police officer is not in a position to give this evidence unless he is one who has been trained upon the use of this device and its manner of performance. Put another way, he has to be one who understands the calibration process and recognises that unless the result of the process lies with accepted limits the machine is not calibrating as it should and is therefore unreliable.

Citations:

[1986] RTR 350

Cited by:

CitedSneyd v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 24-Feb-2006
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He complained that though the officers suspected him of having consumed alcohol, they asked him whether he had been drinking without cautioning him, and that no print out . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.240390

Regina v Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Howell: 1986

After twelve years a London cab driver’s licence was not renewed on medical grounds.
Held: His challenge succeeded because he had been given no opportunity to make representations about the matters said to have concerned the decision-makers. An order that the matter be reconsidered and decided afresh.

Citations:

(1986) RTR 52

Cited by:

CitedNaidike, Naidike and Naidike v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago PC 12-Oct-2004
(Trinidad and Tobago) The claimant was arrested following expiry of the last of his work permits and after he had failed to provide evidence of his intention to leave. As he was arrested he was also arrested for assaulting a police officer. He was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Administrative, Road Traffic

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.237243

Bastable v Little: 1907

The police had set up a series of speed traps in London Road, Croydon. Mr Little occupied himself giving warning signals to drivers approaching the traps, thus ensuring that they did not exceed the speed limit. There was no evidence that the drivers were exceeding the speed limit at the time when they received Mr Little’s signals, although all slowed down. The defendant had been charged with obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty under section 2 of the 1885 Act.
Held:
Lord Alverstone CJ said: ‘Suppose a party of men are engaged in the offence of night poaching, and a person passing near warns them that the police are coming, I think it is clear that that could not be held to be an offence within this section. We must not allow ourselves to be warped by any prejudice against motor cars, and so to strain the law against them.’
Darling J made the point that there was no evidence from another driver, and added: ‘In my opinion it is quite easy to distinguish the cases where a warning is given with the object of preventing the commission of a crime from the cases in which the crime is being committed and the warning is given in order that the commission of the crime should be suspended while there is danger of detection, with the intention that the commission of the crime should be re-commenced as soon as the danger of detection is past.’

Judges:

Lord Alverstone CJ

Citations:

[1907] 1 KB 59

Statutes:

Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act 1885 2

Cited by:

DistinguishedBetts v Stevens 1910
The defendant, an Automobile Association patrolman was accused of obstructing a police constable in the execution of his duty. The police had set a speed trap, and the defendant had warned approaching vehicles of the trap. At the time they were . .
CitedGreen v Moore 1982
The respondent, a probationer police constable was convicted for obstructing police officers in the execution of their duty under s51(3) of the 1964 Act. He was a regular in a bar he knew was to be raided. He warned the landlord who complied with . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions, Regina (on the Application of) v Glendinning Admn 13-Oct-2005
The defendant had been accused of obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty by warning motorists of presence of a police speed trap. The prosecutor appealed from dismissal of the charge.
Held: ‘the hand signals given by the . .
DistinguishedHinchcliffe v Sheldon QBD 20-Jan-1955
The appellant was the son of the licensee of an inn. On returning to the inn one night at about 11.17, he found that police officers wished to enter the premises as they suspected that the licensee was committing an offence under the Licensing Act . .
CitedLunt v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 1993
The defendant had been in a road traffic accident. The police came to his house to investigate the accident, but he refused to unlock the door to allow them entry. Stating reliance on section 4 of the 1988 Act, the officers threatened to force . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.235212

Ross Hillman v Bond: 1974

An employer can be found to be causing or permitting an employee to overload a vehicle when he was acting in the course of his employment even though the employer is unaware of the employee’s exact activities.

Citations:

[1974] QB 435

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedCambridgeshire County Council v Associated Lead Mills Ltd ChD 22-Jul-2005
The prosecutor appealed dismissal of the charge of driving a heavy commercial vehicle on a road which was subject to a maximum weight restriction in breach of the 1984 Act. The company denied that it had any knowledge of the actual route taken by . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Vicarious Liability

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.229018

Harker v Caledonian Insurance Co: 1980

The monetary limit of the compulsory insurance was to be read into section 10, however ‘there are instances, of which costs and interest on the judgment are examples, where the insurer would be liable in the direct action for sums in excess of the permissible monetary limits upon the cover afforded by the policy.’

Judges:

Lord Diplock

Citations:

[1980] 1 Lloyds Rep 556

Statutes:

Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risks) Act 10

Cited by:

CitedPresidential Insurance Company v Molly Hosein Stafford PC 22-Mar-1999
PC (Trinidad and Tobago) Mrs Stafford obtained judgment against a driver insured by the appellant. He was unable to satisfy the claim and she sought recovery from the insurers. They claimed that their liability . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insurance, Road Traffic

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.200465

Coombs v Kehoe: 1972

The defendant defended a charge of driving with excess alcohol, saying that he had only driven a short distance, and that there were special circumstances;
Held: The circumstances surrounding the respondent’s actions did not amount to a special reason. Lord Widgery CJ distinguished James v Hall by finding that in that case, the offender had only driven a few yards while here the respondent had driven a lorry about 200 yards and was therefore a potential danger.

Judges:

Lord Widgery CJ

Citations:

[1972] 2 All ER 55

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

MentionedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Conroy Admn 23-Jun-2003
The DPP appealed a finding of special reasons for not disqualifying the defendant after finding him guilty of driving with excess alcohol. He had been stopped driving at excess speed, he had driven over a mile and had a further two hundred yards to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.187500

Chief Constable of Northumbria v Brown: 1986

The defendant had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol. He challenged the use of a machine for the breath test which was not an Intoximeter.
Held: The charge was valid.

Citations:

[1986] RTR 113

Cited by:

CitedBrown v Gallagher HCJ 15-May-2002
The appellant contended that the Intoximeter which had been used to measure the level of alcohol in his breath, had not been manufactured by the approved manufacturer, and did not therefore satisfy the type approval, and that the inconsistency in . .
CitedBrown v Procurator Fiscal, Falkirk HCJ 8-Mar-2002
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He complained that the machine used to take his sample of breath did not conform to the necessary type. It had been manufactured by an independent company. Though not . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.182986

Butty v Davey: 1972

Where a defendant provided an explanation of an accident which was not fanciful, he was entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

Citations:

[1972] CLR 48

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedBingham, Regina (on the Application of) v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 7-Feb-2003
The defendant appealed by case stated against a conviction for driving a lorry without due care and attention, leading to the death of another road user. There had been an unexplained swing of the rear of his trailer out into the path of the other . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.538293

Kay v Butterworth: KBD 1945

The defendant had been charged only with driving to the danger of the public and with driving without due care and attention. He was acquitted by the justices and the prosecutor appealed.
Held: He should have been convicted of both offences and a direction for remission was made. A man who became unconscious whilst driving due to the onset of a sudden illness should not be made liable at criminal law, however in this case: ‘it was his business to keep awake. If drowsiness overtook him while driving, he should stop and wait until he recovered himself and became fully awake the driver must have known that drowsiness was overtaking him. The case was too clear for argument.’

Judges:

Humphreys J

Citations:

(1945) 61 TLR 452

Cited by:

CitedHill v Baxter QBD 1958
The Court was asked whether the accused had put forward sufficient evidence on a charge of dangerous driving to justify the justices adjudging that he should be acquitted, there having been no dispute that at the time when his car collided with . .
MentionedRegina v Quick CACD 18-Apr-1973
The defendant appealed against his conviction for assault. He had pleaded guilty after a ruling by the judge as to the meaning of the phrase ‘a defect of reason, from disease of the mind’ within the meaning of the M’Naughten Rules. More particularly . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.539360

Pugh v Knipe: 1972

Where land is on the face of it private land, the prosecutor accusing the defendant of driving on a public road, must establish the fact of public access, as here in relation to the forecourt of a private members club.

Citations:

[1972] RTR 286

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHarriot v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 4-May-2005
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction under the 1988 Act of possessing a bladed article in a public place. He had been found in the forecourt of a hostel by the police seeking to re-enter after being excluded. He said that it . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.512350

Nicholson v Tapp: 1972

A traffic summons had to be served within 14 days and it was sent by registered post on the fourteenth day, so that in the normal course of post it would not have arrived until after the 14 days had elapsed. The prosecution sought to rely upon the deeming provision in Schedule 4.
Held: The provision only appliied in circumstances where, in the ordinary course of post, the letter would have been received in time.

Citations:

[1972] 1 WLR 1044

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1962 Sch4

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedGroome v Driscoll QBD 1969
The defendant, prosecuted for a minor driving offence of driving without due care and attention, did not receive the information of intended prosecution within 14 days as the statute required. He appeal by case stated.
Held: Schedule 4 to the . .

Cited by:

CitedGidden v Chief Constable of Humberside Admn 29-Oct-2009
The driver appealed against his conviction for speeding, saying that he had not been given the requisite notice within the 14 days required: ‘The notice of intended prosecution had been sent to him by first class ordinary post in circumstances where . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.471009

Simpson v Teignmouth and Shaldon Bridge Company: CA 1903

The owners of the tolled bridge over the Teign, sought to charge bicycle riders tolls.
Held: A bicycle was not chargeable as a carriage on the bridge toll under the Act establishing it. The court doubted that a bicycle was a ‘carriage hung on springs’.

Judges:

The Earl of Halsbury LC, Lord Alverstone CJ and Sir Francis Jeune P

Citations:

[1903] 1 KB 405, [1903] 72 LJKB 204, [1903] 88 LT 117, [1903] 67 JP 65, [1903] 51 WR 545, [1903] 19 TLR 225, [1903] 47 Sol Jo 278, [1903] 1 LGR 235

Cited by:

CitedCoates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.442523

Simpson v Peat: 1952

As to the offence of driving without due care and attention, Lord Goddard said: ‘The expression ‘error of judgment’ is not a term of art; it is in fact one of the vaguest possible description: it can be used colloquially to describe either a negligent act or one which, though mistaken, is not negligent.’

Judges:

Lord Goddard

Citations:

[1952] 2 QB 24

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHenry v Thames Valley Police CA 14-Jan-2010
The claimant appealed against rejection of his claim for damages after he had been injured when a police car following him ran over his leg. He had been riding a motorcycle and apparently seeking to escape them. He had stopped and was talking to one . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.392873

Attorney General’s Reference No 4 of 2000: CACD 2001

Lord Woolf CJ reaffirmed that the test for dangerous driving was an objective one: ‘Section 2A sets out a wholly objective test. The concept of what is obvious to a careful driver places the question of what constitutes dangerous driving within the province of the jury. It is the jury who should set the standard as to what is or what is not dangerous driving.’

Judges:

Lord Woolf CJ

Citations:

[2001] EWCA Crim 780, [2001] 2 Cr App R 2

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedBannister, Regina v CACD 28-Jul-2009
The defendant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving. As a police officer he had driven at over 110 mph on a motorway in the wet, lost control and crashed. He said that the fact that he had undertaken the police advanced drivers’ course . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.368300

Hawkins v Edwards: 1901

Citations:

[1901] 2 KB 169

Statutes:

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 38

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedNewcastle City Council, Regina (on the Application of) v Berwick-Upon-Tweed Borough Council and others Admn 5-Nov-2008
The applicant council complained that the respondent council was issuing a disproportionately high number of taxi licences, believing that it should only refuse a licence where the driver appeared to be unfit.
Held: The purpose of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Licensing, Road Traffic

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.277888

Lomas v Bowler: 1984

The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He had wanted to bring his own expert evidence. At the roadside, he had failed fully to inflate the device.
Held: The trial court had been entitled to be satisfied of the defendant’s guilt on the evidence as a whole. It included not only that of the forensic scientist but also that relating to the manner in which the defendant had been seen to drive and the positive breathalyser test obtained later.

Citations:

[1984] Crim LR 178

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1972 6(1)

Cited by:

CitedSmith v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 30-Jan-2007
The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, arguing that the prosecution had failed to provide the roadside breath test figures.
Held: The appeal failed, and was indeed hopeless. Pill LJ said: ‘The specimens of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.277140

Vaughan v Dunn: 1984

Goff LJ considered the circumstances where, a defendant having been convicted of driving wih excess alcohol, the court could find special reasons for not disqualifying him. He referred to Taylor v Rajan and said: ‘The first is that the exercise of discretion should only be exercised in clear and compelling circumstances. I do not think that the present case could possibly be described as one where there were clear and compelling circumstances.
The next matter is the manner in which the defendant drove. Here we have a case where the man was so drunk that he simply drove his car straight into a lamp-post, without any other vehicle being involved. Then it is said by Lord Widgery CJ that it will be a very powerful reason against exercising the discretion in favour of the defendant if the relevant alcohol content is very high. In the present case, the alcohol content in the defendant’s breath [the reading there was 100] exceeded the permitted limit by nearly 200 per cent.
Finally Lord Widgery CJ referred to the fact that even in cases of emergency — and the present case, I repeat, was not one of emergency — it is much more difficult for a driver to justify using a car to go home, the obvious reason being that he can, if necessary, take steps to obtain alternative transport. He can get a lift, hire a taxi or, if it is available, use public transport.’

Judges:

Goff LJ

Citations:

[1984] RTR 376

Citing:

CitedTaylor v Rajan 2-Jan-1974
The defendant had consumed alcohol so that the alcohol level was 102 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. An appeal was heard as to whether there existed special reasons for not disqualifying him.
Held: The court considered . .

Cited by:

CitedKhan, Regina (on the Application of) v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 12-Oct-2004
Defendant pleaded guity to drink driving – claim for special reasons – appeal against finding of absence of special reasons to disqualify. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.277135

Smith v Director of Public Prosecutions and Another: QBD 28 Jul 1999

Whilst there is no absolute rule of law requiring a delay in a road traffic case involving death pending the results of a coroner’s inquest, in practice they should do so, and make appropriate enquiries as to the stage reached by the inquest. Nevertheless, in this case, being unaware of the true position and having proceeded in ignorance of it, the trial decision must stand.

Citations:

Times 28-Jul-1999, Gazette 08-Sep-1999

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Road Traffic, Coroners

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.89331

Murray v Director of Public Prosecutions: QBD 4 Feb 1993

The defendant claimed that a breathalyser procedure mistake vitiated the subsequent prosecution.
Held: It was essential that the motorist who was asked to provide a sample of breath be first warned that a failure to provide a specimen would make him liable to be prosecuted. Even though the motorist had not in this case been prejudiced by the omission, the evidence produced by the test was not admissible: ‘It is, therefore, in our judgment, not surprising that a strict and compulsory code is laid down as a set of pre-conditions which must be fulfilled before any specimen produced by the defendant, which may condemn him at the hearing of the charge against him, can be adduced in evidence: no matter that there may be some instances where breach of the code occasions no discernible prejudice.’

Judges:

Watkins LJ

Citations:

Times 09-Feb-1993, [1993] RTR 209, [1993] Crim LR 968

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 7 15

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRussell v Devine (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal Northern Ireland) HL 8-May-2003
The House was asked whether a specimen of blood required under the regulations, having been requested at a hospital or health centre had to be taken there.
Held: The health centre was not a hospital within the regulations. However the request . .
CitedWright v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 25-May-2005
The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He complained that the device used to measure his breath at the police station, the EC/IR intoximeter, was not an approved device. The court had refused to accept evidence to . .
CitedEdmond v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-Feb-2006
The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. The readings on the Intoximeter were too wide apart and the officer requested a blood specimen. He complained that he had not been given a fresh warning before this request.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Crime

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.84132

Rex v Bolkis: CCA 1932

The defendant complained that a jury had not been asked a question of fact, namely whether his name and address could not be discovered withut due diligence. The section had a proviso that failure to comply with the section was not a bar to conviction if the court was satisfied inter alia that the accused’s name and address could not be discovered with reasonable diligence.
Held: The appeal failed. The words in the proviso ‘the court is satisfied’ referred to the judge and not the jury.

Citations:

(1932) 24 Cr App R 19

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1930 21

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedCurrie, Regina v CACD 26-Apr-2007
The defendant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving. The failure of the police to serve him with a notice of intended prosecution invalidated the conviction. The police replied that there was no need for such a notice because there had been . .
CitedRegina v Stacey CA 1982
The defendant had been arrested for driving whilst unfit through drink. He was warned three hours later that he might be prosecuted for reckless driving. In fact he was not charged with any offence relating to drink. When tried for reckless driving . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.251519

Jarvis v The Director of Public Prosecutions: QBD 1996

There are limits to the extent to which magistrates may use in one case knowledge acquired from another.

Citations:

[1996] RTR 192

Cited by:

CitedMelia v Director of Public Prosecution Admn 5-Jun-1998
The defendant appealed his coviction for driving with excess alcohol. The Intoximeter readings had shown a test calibration range outside the figures set down. An officer gave evidence that the machine was working correctly.
Held: The issue of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.235145

Director of Public Prosecutions v Broomfield: QBD 2002

If a notice is in reasonable form and requires the information to be given in a particular form then that form must be used. A purpose of seeking the information in section 172 of the 1988 Act was to enable proof of certain matters, including the identity of the driver of the vehicle, to be given in summary proceedings and, accordingly, there was an important reason why the information should be given in writing and, as the judge held, in the form in which it had been requested.

Judges:

Judge Wilkie QC

Citations:

166 Justice of the Peace 736, (2002) EWHC 1962 (Admin)

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 172

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedBoss v Measures QBD 1990
The defendant was prosecuted for having failed to provide information on a form when he had responded by telephone. . .

Cited by:

CitedJones v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 30-Jan-2004
The defendant was the registered keeper of a vehicle recorded as having exceeded the speed limit. He was required to identify the driver. He responded saying that it was one of six fleet vehicles and could not say who was driving it at the time. He . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.235215

Thompson v Thynne: 1996

Citations:

[1996] RTR 293

Cited by:

CitedWright v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 25-May-2005
The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He complained that the device used to measure his breath at the police station, the EC/IR intoximeter, was not an approved device. The court had refused to accept evidence to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.228468

Peek v Towler: 1945

A driver of a vehicle who had been involved in an accident, remained under a duty to report the accident and to provide his particulars whether or not he had been requested to do so: ‘It would be a remarkable state of affairs if . . The obligations should only arise in cases where there has been some bystander who has asked for these particulars and where there has been a failue to comply with his request.’

Judges:

Tucker J

Citations:

[1945] KB 458

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1930 822(2)

Cited by:

CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Hay QBD 13-Jun-2005
The driver was unconscious following an accident. The police attended the accident. He was acquitted of later failing to report the accident to the police. The prosecutor appealed. The car had crashed as the police pursued it. No notice had been . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.228586

Joseph Eva Ltd v Reeves: CA 1938

An accident occurred when a police vehicle went through traffic lights at green, but on the wrong side of the road.
Held: A driver crossing through traffic lights at green owes no duty to traffic entering the crossing in disobedience to the lights beyond a duty that if he in fact sees such traffic he must take all reasonable steps to avoid a collision.
Scott LJ said: ‘Nothing but implicit obedience to the absolute prohibition of the red — and indeed of the amber, subject only to the momentary discretion which it grants — can ensure safety to those who are crossing on the invitation of the green. Nothing but absolute confidence, in the mind of the driver invited by the green to proceed, that he can safely go right ahead, accelerating up the full speed proper to a clear road in the particular locality, without having to think of the risk of traffic from the right crossing his path, will promote the free circulation of traffic, which, next to safety is the main purpose of all traffic-regulations. Nothing again will help more to encourage obedience to the prohibition of the lights than the knowledge that, if there is a collision on the crossroads, the trespasser will have no chance of escaping liability on a plea alleging contributory negligence against the car which has the right of way. Finally, nothing will help more to encourage compliance with the summons of the green to go straight on than the knowledge of the driver that the law will not blame him if unfortunately he does have a collision with an unexpected trespasser from the left or right.’

Judges:

Scott LJ

Citations:

[1938] 2 All ER 115

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedGriffin v Mersey Regional Ambulance CA 8-Oct-1997
A driver who had crossed through a green traffic light but had collided with an ambulance was 60 per cent contributorily negligent. He had failed to hear the ambulance, had failed to see it, and had ignored unusal driving of other motorists.
CitedCraggy v Chief Constable of Cleveland Police CA 6-Oct-2009
The claimant was driving his fire engine on an emergency call. The defendant’s constable was similarly engaged. It was in the early hours, and they each went through the traffic junction. They crashed and the judge held both drivers negligent to the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Negligence

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.224492

Boss v Measures: QBD 1990

The defendant was prosecuted for having failed to provide information on a form when he had responded by telephone.

Judges:

Woolf LJ

Citations:

[1990] RTR 26

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Broomfield QBD 2002
If a notice is in reasonable form and requires the information to be given in a particular form then that form must be used. A purpose of seeking the information in section 172 of the 1988 Act was to enable proof of certain matters, including the . .
CitedJones v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 30-Jan-2004
The defendant was the registered keeper of a vehicle recorded as having exceeded the speed limit. He was required to identify the driver. He responded saying that it was one of six fleet vehicles and could not say who was driving it at the time. He . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.224360

Hayes v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 2004

Absence of caution from form requesting information form driver.

Citations:

[2004] EWHC 277 (Admin)

Citing:

CitedMawdesley and Yorke v Chief Constable of Cheshire Constabulary and Another Admn 31-Jul-2003
The two appellant drivers had been sent forms requiring them to identify the drivers of vehicles identified by speed cameras. They had replied providing the requested information, but the forms were unsigned. They resisted use of the forms as . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Magistrates

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.224359

Nottingham City Council v Wooding: 1994

Citations:

[1994] RTR 72

Statutes:

Metropolitan Police Public Carriage Act 1869 7

Cited by:

CitedOddy, Regina (on the Application of) v Bugbugs Ltd Admn 12-Nov-2003
A private prosecutor appealed dismissal of his complaint that the respondent had operated an unlicensed man-powered rickshaw service. The district judge had held that it was not a taxi service. It was, under the 1869 Act a stage carriage and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.193391

Sales v Lake: 1922

A hackney carriage may be plying for hire siomply by waiting in the street available to take passengers.

Citations:

[1922] 1KB 553

Cited by:

CitedOddy, Regina (on the Application of) v Bugbugs Ltd Admn 12-Nov-2003
A private prosecutor appealed dismissal of his complaint that the respondent had operated an unlicensed man-powered rickshaw service. The district judge had held that it was not a taxi service. It was, under the 1869 Act a stage carriage and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Licensing

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.193389