Category: Limitation

Cain v Francis: CA 18 Dec 2008

The court was asked under what circumstances it should exercise its discretion to extend the limitation period under section 33.
Held: Lady Justice Smith said: ‘It appears to me that there is now a long line of authority to support the proposition that, in a case where the defendant has had early notice of the claim, the accrual of a limitation defence should be regarded as a windfall and the prospect of its loss, by the exercise of the section 33 discretion, should be regarded as either no prejudice at all (see Firman v Ellis [1978] QB 886) or only a slight degree of prejudice: see Donovan v Gwent Toys Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 472. It is true that, in Thompson v Brown [1981] 1 WLR 744, Lord Diplock said that the accrual of the defence might be regarded as a windfall only where the delay in issuing proceedings was short. However, with great respect, it does not seem to me that the length of the delay can be, of itself, a deciding factor. It is whether the defendant has suffered any evidential or other forensic prejudice which should make the difference.’ and
‘In the exercise of the discretion, the basic question to be asked is whether it is fair and just in all the circumstances to expect the defendant to meet the claim on the merits, notwithstanding the delay in commencement. The length of the delay will be important, not so much for itself as to the effect it has had. To what extent has the defendant been disadvantaged in his investigation of the claim and/or the assembly of evidence, in respect of the issues of both liability and quantum? But it will also be important to consider the reasons for the delay. Thus, there may be some unfairness to the defendant due to the delay in issue but the delay may have arisen for so excusable a reason, that, looking at the matter in the round, on balance, it is fair and just that the action should proceed. On the other hand, the balance may go in the opposite direction, partly because the delay has caused procedural disadvantage and unfairness to the defendant and partly because the reasons for the delay (or its length) are not good ones.
Although the delay referred to in s.33(3) is the delay after the expiry of the primary limitation period, it will always be relevant to consider when the defendant knew that a claim was to be made against him and also the opportunities he has had to investigate the claim and collect evidence: see Donovan v Gwentoys Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 472. If, as here, a defendant has had early notification of a claim and every possible opportunity to investigate and to collect evidence, some delay after the expiry of three years will have had no prejudicial effect.’

Lady Justice Smith
[2008] EWCA Civ 1451, [2009] LS Law Medical 82, [2009] CP Rep 19, [2009] RTR 18, [2009] 2 All ER 579, [2009] 3 WLR 551, [2009] QB 754
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 33
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Thompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd HL 1981
The plaintiff’s solicitors, out of negligence, failed to issue a writ until one month after the limitation period had expired. The application to extend the period was rejected at first instance since he had an unanswerable claim against his . .
Cited – Hartley v Birmingham City District Council CA 1992
The writ was issued one day late; there had been early notification of the claim; and the defendant’s ability to defend the case was unaffected. The plaintiff asked the court to exercide its discretion to allow the claim t proceed.
Held: The . .

Cited by:
Cited – Cheltenham Borough Council v Laird QBD 15-Jun-2009
The council sought damages saying that their former chief executive had not disclosed her history of depressive illness when applying for her job.
Held: The replies were not dishonest as the form could have been misconstrued. The claim failed. . .
Cited – McDonnell and Another v Walker CA 24-Nov-2009
The defendant appealed against the disapplication of section 11 of the 1980 Act under section 33.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The defendant had not contributed significantly to the delay: ‘the defendant received claims quite different in . .
Cited – Brady v Norman CA 9-Feb-2011
The claimant sought to have disapplied the limitation period in his defamation claim. The claimant said that in the case of Cain, the Steedman case had not been cited, and that the decisions were incompatible, and that Cain was to be prefered.
Limitation

Updated: 12 November 2021; Ref: scu.278947

Young v Downey: QBD 18 Dec 2019

Responsibility for IRA bombing fixed

The claimant sought a finding that the defendant had been responsible for a IRA bombing in 1982 which killed her father and three other soldiers and injured 31 others. He had been acquitted at a criminal trial.
Held: The limitation period was extended: ‘As was said in Carroll, the burden on the claimant is not necessarily a heavy one. She has sufficiently explained the reasons for the delay and pointed to the prejudice she will suffer if she is not permitted to have her claim adjudicated upon in the civil jurisdiction. The defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice to him in allowing the claim to proceed outside the primary limitation period. If the claim is not allowed to proceed, the defendant will avoid a determination on the evidence within this jurisdiction, having avoided adjudication in the criminal court due to an error on the part of the state. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, I do not believe that would be an equitable outcome. I therefore exercise the discretion under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the provisions of sections 11 and 12 and allow this claim to proceed (including insofar as it is brought for the benefit of the claimant’s mother).’
‘My analysis of the evidence presented to me leads me to find the following facts are established to the necessary standard:
i) The claimant’s father, Lance Corporal Jeffrey Young was unlawfully killed (as were the three other soldiers) by persons acting together in the name of the IRA.
ii) The deaths resulted from a deliberate, carefully planned attack on members of the military as they were on their way to carry out their ceremonial duties in the Changing of the Guard at Horse Guards.
iii) The explosion was caused by a radio-controlled improvised device in the boot of the Morris Marina, registered number LMD 657P, which had been designed and carefully assembled to kill and maim with the addition of nails as shrapnel.
iv) The car was bought at auction on 13 July 1982 by an Irishman, whom it can reasonably be inferred was one of the bomb conspirators.
v) The car is likely to have remained in the possession of the conspirators in the week leading up to the bombing, during which time the bomb was assembled in its boot.
vi) The car was parked in Portman Square between 17 and 18 July. It was then parked at the Royal Garden Hotel car park from 18 July until the morning of the bombing.
vii) The defendant’s fingerprints were on the tickets for both car parks.
viii) There can be no sensible explanation for the defendant’s fingerprints to be on the car parking tickets other than that he was responsible for moving the car between the car parks. It is probable that he was driving it on the morning of 20 July 2019.
ix) The defendant was a member of the IRA, as evidenced by his conviction in 1974.
x) In the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that the defendant was knowingly involved in the concerted plan to detonate the bomb in Hyde Park specifically targeted at the passing Guard.’

Yip J DBE
[2019] EWHC 3508 (QB)
Bailii, Judiciary
Limitation Act 1980 11 12, Fatal Accidents Act 1976
England and Wales

Torts – Other, Limitation

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.645998

In re Diplock’s estate: CA 1948

After considering a situation in which trust money had been applied in making alterations to the property of an innocent third party but had not added to the value of the property,
Held: The origin of the equitable rules of tracing were described: ‘the metaphysical approach of equity coupled with and encouraged by the far-reaching remedy of a declaration of charge that enabled equity to identify money in a mixed fund.’ and
‘In the absence of authority to the contrary, our conclusion is that as regards the Diplock money used in these cases it cannot be traced in any true sense; and, further, that even if this were not so, the only remedy available to equity, viz., that of a declaration of charge, would not produce an equitable result and is inapplicable accordingly’
and ‘In the case of adaptation of property of the volunteer by means of trust money, it by no means necessarily follows that the money can be said to be present in the adapted property. The beneficial owner of the trust money seeks to follow and recover that money and claims to use the machinery of a charge on the adapted property in order to enable him to do so. But in the first place the money may not be capable of being followed. In every true sense the money may have disappeared. …. The result may add not one penny to the value of the house. Indeed the alteration may well lower the value of the house. …. Can it be said that in such cases the trust money can be traced and extracted from the altered asset? Clearly not for the money will have disappeared leaving no monetary trace behind. ….’
As regards limitation, the 12 year period for enforcing a will trust runs from the date of the death, even though a personal representative is not bound to distribute within a year from death.

Lord Greene MR
[1948] Ch 465
England and Wales
Citing:
Explained – Sinclair v Brougham HL 1914
An insolvent building society had, outside its powers, run a banking business. The House considered the competing claims of the unadvanced shareholders of the building society’s intra vires business, members of the society who had not been granted . .

Cited by:
Cited – Aluminium Industrie Vaassen B V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd ChD 11-Feb-1975
The plaintiffs sold aluminium to the defendant and by a clause in the contract retained their title in the materials sold until payment was received. The purchaser went into insolvent receivership, and the seller sought recovery of the equipment and . .
Cited – Foskett v McKeown and Others CA 27-Jun-1997
Various people had paid money with the promise of acquiring an interest in land in Portugal. The scheme was fraudulent. The funds had been used to purchase a life/investment policy. The policy was held in trust for the fraudster’s mother but he had . .
Cited – Foskett v McKeown and Others HL 18-May-2000
A property developer using monies which he held on trust to carry out a development instead had mixed those monies with his own in his bank account, and subsequently used those mixed monies to pay premiums on a life assurance policy on his own life, . .
Cited – Green and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
Appeal from – Ministry of Health v Simpson; In re Diplock dec HL 1950
The will of Cable Diplock purported to make a gift to charity, and was distributed accordingly. The house however found the gift to be invalid.
Held: A personal remedy existed for the recovery of amounts wrongly paid in the distribution of an . .
Cited – Gomez and others v Vives CA 3-Oct-2008
The claimant appealed a finding that the court did not have jurisdiction over income payable to a trust governed by English law under which the claimant was beneficiary.
Held: The appeal failed in part. Because Article 5 is in derogation from . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.182265

A v Hoare: HL 30 Jan 2008

Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend the limitation period. The House was also asked as to whether the claimant’s personal characteristics could affect the finding of ‘significant injury’ under section 14(2).
Held: All claims for personal injuries, whether based in negligence or assault, are subject to the limitation periods provided for by section 11 of the 1980 Act which itself is subject to the discretion of the court provided by section 33 of the 1980 Act. Stubbings was wrongly decided, and the House should approve the decision in Letang. Section 14(2) set a test which was objective and not dependent on the personal characteristics of the claimant.
Lord Hoffmann discussed section 33 of the 1980 Act saying: ‘Section 33 enables the judge to look at the matter broadly and not have to decide the highly artificial question of whether knowledge which the claimant has in some sense suppressed counts as knowledge for the purposes of the Act . . The judge is expressly enjoined by subsection (3)(a) to have regard to the reasons for delay and in my opinion this requires him to give due weight to evidence, such as there was in this case, that the claimant was for practical purposes disabled from commencing proceedings by the psychological injuries which he had suffered.’
Lord Browne discussed the consequences of long delay: ‘Whether or not it will be possible for defendants to investigate these (allegations) sufficiently for there to be a reasonable prospect of a fair trial will depend upon a number of factors, not least when the complaint was first made and with what effect. If a complaint has been made and recorded, and more obviously still if the accused has been convicted of the abuse complained of, that will be one thing; if, however a complaint comes out of the blue with no apparent support for it (other perhaps than the alleged abuser has been accused or even convicted of similar abuse in the past), that would be another thing . .’

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carswell, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
[2008] UKHL 6, Times 31-Jan-2008, [2008] 2 WLR 311, Gazette 14-Feb-2008, [2008] 1 AC 844, (2008) 11 CCL Rep 249, [2008] 1 FCR 507, [2008] Fam Law 402, [2008] 1 FLR 771, (2008) 100 BMLR 1, [2008] 2 All ER 1
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 2 14(2) 33
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – C v Middlesbrough Council CA 21-Dec-2004
Damages were sought following sex abuse whilst in care. . .
Appeal from – Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) and Another v Young CA 14-Nov-2006
The claimant sought damages saying that he had been abused as a child whilst in the defendant’s care. The defendants appealed a finding that the claimant had not first known of his injury more than three years before begining his action.
Held: . .
See Also – A v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
Cited – Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) HL 1966
The House gave guidance how it would treat an invitation to depart from a previous decision of the House. Such a course was possible, but the direction was not an ‘open sesame’ for a differently constituted committee to prefer their views to those . .
Cited – Billings v Reed CA 1945
The plaintiff’s wife had been killed by a negligently piloted RAF aeroplane. It was argued that, although this was a war injury, the language of section 3(1) did not exclude a claim based on trespass to the person.
Held: Lord Greene MR said: . .
Cited – Kruber v Grzesiak 1963
The plaintiff had issued a writ claiming damages for personal injuries caused by negligent driving more than three years after the accident, and now wanted to amend the writ by adding a claim for trespass to the person based on the same facts. The . .
Cited – Letang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .
Overruled – Stubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .
Cited – Tennero Ltd v Arnold QBD 6-Jul-2006
The court considered an application for permission to appeal. The Defendant had not attended the trial, but had applied by letter for an adjournment, which was refused. The trial proceeded and resulted in an order against the Defendant. He applied . .
Criticised – KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 10-Jun-2003
The court considered an extension of the time for claiming damages for personal injuries after the claimants said they had been sexually abused as children in the care of the defendants.
Held: The test to be applied under section 14(2) was . .
Cited – Stingel v Clark 20-Jul-2006
Asutlii (High Court of Australia) Limitation of Actions – Appellant alleged respondent had raped and assaulted her in 1971 – Appellant alleged that she suffered post-traumatic stress disorder of delayed onset in . .
Cited – Jones v Secretary of State for Social Services; Jones v Hudson HL 1972
Unsatisfactory decisions of the highest court could cause uncertainty because lower courts tend to distinguish them on inadequate grounds.
One possible source of law is ‘informed professional opinion’. The word ‘final’ can denote different . .
Cited – ST v North Yorkshire County Council CA 14-Jul-1998
The court considered the liability of the respondent for sexual assaults committed by an employee teacher when taking students on school trips.
Held: The Local Authority was not vicariously liable for sexual assault committed by employee . .

Cited by:
Cited – Bowden v Poor Sisters of Nazareth and others and similar HL 21-May-2008
The appellants said they had suffered abuse while resident at children’s homes run by the respondents. The respondents denied the allegations and said that they were also out of time. The claims were brought many years after the events.
Held: . .
See Also – A v Hoare QBD 8-Jul-2008
The claimant sought damages for her rape by the defendant. After his conviction and having served his sentence, the defendant won substantial sums on the lottery.
Held: The sums paid by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board were not paid by . .
Cited – Adorian v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis CA 23-Jan-2009
The claimant received injuries when arrested. He was later convicted of resisting arrest. The defendant relied on section 329 of the 2003 Act. The claimant said that the force used against him was grossly disproportionate. The commissioner appealed . .
Cited – McDonnell and Another v Walker CA 24-Nov-2009
The defendant appealed against the disapplication of section 11 of the 1980 Act under section 33.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The defendant had not contributed significantly to the delay: ‘the defendant received claims quite different in . .
Cited – RAR v GGC QBD 10-Aug-2012
rar_ggcQBD2012
The claimant alleged that the defendant, her stepfather, had sexually and otherwise assaulted her when she was a child. He had pleaded guilty to one charge in 1978, and now said that the claim was out of time. The claimant sought the extension of . .
Cited – Adamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .
Cited – Knauer v Ministry of Justice SC 24-Feb-2016
The court was asked: ‘whether the current approach to assessing the financial losses suffered by the dependant of a person who is wrongfully killed properly reflects the fundamental principle of full compensation, and if it does not whether we . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Torts – Other

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.264020

Cartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd: HL 1963

The plaintiffs were steel dressers who, in the course of their employment, had inhaled quantities of noxious dust which had caused them to suffer from pneumoconiosis. They issued proceedings on 1 October 1956 but were unable to show any breach of duty by their employers which contributed to their condition after 1 October 1950. The defendants pleaded that the claims were barred by the six year limitation period under section 2 of the 1939 Act.
Held: Lord Reid made it clear that he would have wished to hold ‘that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person has discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it if he took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances’. But the House unanimously held that the 1939 Act and established authority precluded it from so holding. Where a defendant sought to rely upon some damage as setting the limitation clock running, the damage referred to must be ‘real’ as distinct from minimal. The common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result.
Lord Pearce said: ‘It is for a judge or jury to decide whether a man has suffered any actionable harm and in borderline cases it is a question of degree.
It is a question of fact in each case whether a man has suffered material damage by any physical changes in his body. Evidence that those changes are not felt by him and may never be felt tells in favour of the damage coming within the principle of de minimis non curat lex. On the other hand evidence that in unusual exertion or at the onslaught of disease he may suffer from his hidden impairment tells in favour of the damage being substantial.’ and ‘The cause of action accrued when it reached a stage, whether known or unknown, at which a judge could properly give damages for the harm that had been done.’
Lord Reid: ‘If this were a matter governed by the common law I would hold that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person has discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it if he took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances. The common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result . . But the present question depends on statute, the Limitation Act, 1939, and section 26 of that Act appears to me to make it impossible to reach the result which I have indicated.’

Lord Reid, Lord Evershed MR, Lord Pearce
[1963] AC 758, [1963] 1 All ER 341
Limitation Act 1939 2
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Cartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd CA 1962
The court gave guidance on when an injury passes from being de minimis to being sufficiently significant to found a cause of action: ‘there is from the beginning some injury occurring from day to day, as each of the minute particles which enter the . .

Cited by:
Cited – Hatton v Messrs Chafes (A Firm) CA 13-Mar-2003
The defendant firm appealed against a refusal to strike out the claimant’s claim for professional negligence, asserting that the judge should have considered the limitation issue in the light of Khan v Falvey.
Held: By the time that the . .
Cited – Lagden v O’Connor HL 4-Dec-2003
The parties had been involved in a road traffic accident. The defendant drove into the claimant’s parked car. The claimant was unable to afford to hire a car pending repairs being completed, and arranged to hire a car on credit. He now sought . .
Cited – McDonnell v Congregation of Christian Brothers Trustees (Formerly Irish Christian Brothers) and others HL 4-Dec-2003
In 2000, the claimant sought damages for sexual abuse from before 1951. The issue was as to whether the limitation law which applied was that as at the date of the incidents, or that which applied as at the date when he would be deemed uner the . .
Cited – The Law Society v Sephton and Co and others CA 13-Dec-2004
The Society appealed dismissal for limitation of its claim against the defendant firm of accountants arising from alleged fraud in approval of a solicitor’s accounts.
Held: The liability did not arise until the Society decided to make . .
Cited – Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd and Another CA 26-Jan-2006
Each claimant sought damages after being exposed to asbestos dust. The defendants resisted saying that the injury alleged, the development of pleural plaques, was yet insufficient as damage to found a claim.
Held: (Smith LJ dissenting) The . .
Cited – Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd CA 6-Feb-2006
The deceased had come into contact with asbestos when working on building sites for more than one contractor. The claimant here sought contribution from the defendants for the damages it had paid to his estate. The issue was as to liability on . .
Cited – Haward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
Cited – A v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
Mentioned – Law Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others HL 10-May-2006
A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from . .
Cited – Horton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .
Cited – Johnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd; Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd; similar HL 17-Oct-2007
The claimant sought damages for the development of neural plaques, having been exposed to asbestos while working for the defendant. The presence of such plaques were symptomless, and would not themselves cause other asbestos related disease, but . .
Cited – Axa General Insurance Ltd and Others v Lord Advocate and Others SCS 8-Jan-2010
axaReSCS201
The claimant sought to challenge the validity of the 2009 Act by judicial review. The Act would make their insured and themselves liable to very substantial unanticipated claims for damages for pleural plaques which would not previousl or otherwise . .
Cited – Dryden and Others v Johnson Matthey Plc SC 21-Mar-2018
Sensitisation to salt can be personal injury
The claimants, had developed platinum salt sensitisation due to the defendant employer’s breach of health and safety regulations and common law duty, claimed a cause of action for personal injury. Platinum salt sensitisation is, in itself, an . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.179759

Dalton v Henry Angus and Co: HL 14 Jun 1881

The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some reason the existence of such a grant is impossible, the law will adopt a legal fiction that such a grant was made, in spite of any direct evidence that no such grant was in fact made. ‘. . the whole law of prescription and the whole law which governs the presumption or inference of a grant or covenant rest upon acquiescence. The courts and the judges have had recourse to various expedients for quieting the possession of persons in the exercise of rights which have not been resisted by the persons against whom they are exercised, but in all cases it appears to me that acquiescence and nothing else is the principle upon which these expedients rest.’
Lord Blackburn, delivering the principal speech on this point, regarded the interposition of an independent contractor as irrelevant, because of the nature of the duty: ‘Ever since Quarman v Burnett (1840) 6 M and W 499, [1840] EngR 182, it has been considered settled law that one employing another is not liable for his collateral negligence unless the relation of master and servant existed between them. So that a person employing a contractor to do work is not liable for the negligence of that contractor or his servants. On the other hand, a person causing something to be done, the doing of which casts on him a duty, cannot escape from the responsibility attaching on him of seeing that duty performed by delegating it to a contractor. He may bargain with the contractor that he shall perform the duty and stipulate for an indemnity from him if it is not performed, but he cannot thereby relieve himself from liability to those injured by the failure to perform it: Hole v Sittingbourne Railway Co (1861) 6 H and N 488, [1861] EngR 170; Pickard v Smith 10 CB (NS) 470, [1861] EngR 71, Tarry v Ashton (1876) 1 QBD 314.’
Fry J (asked to give his opinion to the house said: ‘But leaving such technical questions aside, I prefer to observe that, in my opinion, the whole law of prescription and the whole law which governs the presumption or inference of a grant or covenant rest upon acquiescence. The Courts and the Judges have had recourse to various expedients for quieting the possession of persons in the exercise of rights which have not been resisted by the persons against whom they are exercised, but in all cases it appears to me that acquiescence and nothing else is the principle upon which these expedients rest.’

Lord Selborne LC, Lord Blackburn, Fry J (advising)
(1881) 6 App Cas 740, [1881] UKHL 1
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
At first instance – Dalton v Henry Angus and Co 1877
Fry J said: ‘ . .I cannot imagine any case of acquiescence in which there is not shown to be in the servient owner: 1, a knowledge of the acts done; 2, a power in him to stop the acts or to sue in respect of them; and 3, an abstinence on his part . .
Appeal from – Dalton v Henry Angus and Co CA 1878
. .

Cited by:
Cited – Regina v City of Sunderland ex parte Beresford HL 13-Nov-2003
Land had been used as a park for many years. The council land owner refused to register it as a common, saying that by maintaining the park it had indicated that the use was by consent and licence, and that prescription did not apply.
Held: . .
Explained – Tehidy Minerals Ltd v Norman CA 1971
The fact that land had been requisitioned by the Ministry of Agriculture between 1941 and 1960 and the 20-odd years’ user relied on as having created the rights had preceded 1941 was a bar to a prescriptive claim to grazing rights under the . .
Cited – Bakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
Cited – Hunter and Others v Canary Wharf Ltd HL 25-Apr-1997
The claimant, in a representative action complained that the works involved in the erection of the Canary Wharf tower constituted a nuisance in that the works created substantial clouds of dust and the building blocked her TV signals, so as to limit . .
Cited – Lawrence and Another v Fen Tigers Ltd and Others QBD 4-Mar-2011
The claimants had complained that motor-cycle and other racing activities on neighbouring lands were a noise nuisance, but the court also considered that agents of the defendants had sought to intimidate the claimants into not pursuing their action. . .
Cited – Woodland v Essex County Council SC 23-Oct-2013
The claimant had been seriously injured in an accident during a swimming lesson. She sought to claim against the local authority, and now appealed against a finding that it was not responsible, having contracted out the provision of swimming . .
Cited – Winterburn and Another v Bennett and Another CA 25-May-2016
The court was asked as to the steps which an owner of land must take to prevent others, who were using the land without permission, acquiring rights over the land. The claimants here had ignored clear signs placed on the land which asserted the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.187796

Bowling and Co Solicitors v Edehomo: ChD 2 Mar 2011

The court was asked ‘when an innocent vendor whose signature is forged on the documents for the conveyance of land suffers damage, for the purposes of limitation of an action arising from a solicitor’s breach of duty. Is it on the exchange of contracts, in which case the present claim is said to be time barred; or is it only on completion, in which case the claim was just commenced in time?’
Held: The loss was suffered on the exchange. It was at that time that she could have commenced proceedings.

Roth J
[2011] EWHC 393 (Ch)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 2
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Nouri v Marvi and Others CA 14-Oct-2010
The claimant was the registered owner of a leasehold flat, allowing the defendant to live in the flat while he was out abroad. The defendant first re-mortgaged the property in the claimant’s name, forging the claimant’s signature on the mortgage . .
Cited – Forster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .
Cited – Ahmed v Kendrick 1987
The effect of the passing of a beneficial interest by a fraudster owner of that interest to a third party is to sever the beneficial joint tenancy. . .
Cited – Nouri v Marvi and Others CA 14-Oct-2010
The claimant was the registered owner of a leasehold flat, allowing the defendant to live in the flat while he was out abroad. The defendant first re-mortgaged the property in the claimant’s name, forging the claimant’s signature on the mortgage . .
Cited – Bell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .
Cited – Edwards v Lloyd’s TSB Bank plc ChD 2004
A contract in which one co-owner’s signature has been forged by the other is not a nullity but remains valid in relation to the fraudulent co-owner. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Contract

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.430246

Hopper and Another v Hopper: CA 12 Dec 2008

Appeals were made after an order declaring an account a between former partners in a wholesale fruit and vegetable business. The dispute related to the applicability of limitation to undrawn profit shares, and the doctrine of Laches.
Held: The judge had been entitled to find on the evidence that undrawn profits had been capitalised. There was no inequity in allowing the widow to draw the undrawn capitalised earnings of the business. Limitation did not apply and nor did the doctrine of laches. ‘When a partnership at will is dissolved by the death of a partner, the surviving partner or partners, and the personal representatives of the deceased partner, may all agree, solely for the purpose of the winding up, to continue the business of the former partnership in order best to maximise the value of its business and goodwill on sale or other realisation. If they do all so agree, their rights and obligations, including their shares of any profit from the continued trading, and the authority of each former partner to bind the others continue as before: 1890 Act s.38. The surviving partners and the personal representatives of the deceased partner put themselves at risk if they take that course. The surviving partners, and possibly the personal representatives, will be personally liable for any losses incurred in the continued trading, and any such losses will diminish their and the deceased’s respective partnership shares. ‘ The widow of the deceased partner was an outgoing partner for the purposes of section 42(1) of the 1890 Act, and the judge’s order was adjusted accordingly.

Thomas LJ, Moore-Bick LJ, Etherton LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 1417
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980, Partnership Act 1890 38 42(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Bouche v Sproule 1887
Lord Bramwell discussed the capitalisation of undistributed profis within a partnership: ‘Where there is a partnership, whether an ordinary partnership or an incorporated partnership . . There the undivided profits of any period, a year or shorter . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Limitation, Equity

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.278673

Beaman v ARTS Ltd: CA 1949

The italian plaintiff had left Egland in 1935 leaving certain valuables with the defendants for safe keeping. During the war, the property was released to the authorities as alien property, who, informed by the defemdant that they were of no value, gave them to the Salvation Army. The plaintiff returned in 1946, and after discovering the history, began proceedings for conversion, saying that the action was not defeated by limitation for fraud.
Held: The actions of the defendants were not fraudulent as such sop that section 26(a) of the 1939 Act did not operate. However, the defendants had made no attempt to obtain the plaintiff’s instructions, before disposing of the property as a matter of their own convenience, and in breach of the duty of confidence accepted. Their failure to inform the plaintoff of what they had done did amount to a reckless ‘concealment by fraud’ with section 26(b), and the action could proceed.

Lord Greene
[1949] 1 KB 550, [1949] 1 All ER 465, 65 TLR 389, 93 Sol Jo 236
Limitation Act 1939 26(a) 26(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – The Bulli Coal Mining Company v Patrick Hill Osbourne and Another PC 1899
(New South Wales) . .

Cited by:
Cited – Cave v Robinson Jarvis and Rolf (a Firm) HL 25-Apr-2002
An action for negligence against a solicitor was defended by saying that the claim was out of time. The claimant responded that the solicitor had not told him of the circumstances which would lead to the claim, and that deliberate concealment should . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.194819

Shore v Sedgwick Financial Services Ltd: CA 23 Jul 2008

The claimant said that the defendant had given him negligent advice on pensions, failing to say that he should stay within his occupational scheme. The defendant pleaded limitation.
Held: The claimant suffered damage when he made the transfer in April 1997. There was a clear distinction between transactions which give rise to pure contingent liabilities and transactions where the claimant has ‘obtained less than she should have got’. Accordingly the claim was time barred.
Dyson LJ referred to a submission by the claimant that he had not yet suffered the damage and said: ‘First, it is common ground that the benefits surrendered in the Avesta scheme were properly valued at andpound;637,507. Secondly, that sum was used to invest in the PFW scheme. The price paid for this investment was its then current market price. That price reflected the market perception of the risks inherent in the PFW scheme. The performance of the scheme was subject to the vagaries of the market and the investment skills of the managers of the fund as well as the amount drawn down as income by Mr Shore. The amount available for drawdown as income would depend on the figure at which the GAD rates were fixed triennially as well as the performance of the fund. Mr Soole submits that all these risks were reflected in the price that Mr Shore paid. It is, therefore, irrelevant that the PFW scheme was riskier than the Avesta scheme. To adopt the example suggested by Keene L.J. in the course of argument, if a person invests andpound;100 in shares rather than in Government bonds, he does not suffer any loss when he buys the shares, because when he pays andpound;100 for the shares, that is what they are worth in the market.’ He rejecte dthe submission saying: ‘It is Mr Shore’s case (assumed for present purposes to be established) that the PFW scheme was inferior to the Avesta scheme because it was riskier. It was inferior because Mr Shore wanted a secure scheme: he did not want to take risks. In other words, from Mr Shore’s point of view, it was less advantageous and caused him detriment. If he had wanted a more insecure income than that provided by the Avesta scheme, then he would have got what he wanted and would have suffered no detriment. In the event, however, he made a risky investment with an uncertain income stream instead of a safe investment with a fixed and certain income stream which is what he wanted.’
Dysn LJ continued: ‘Mr Shore obtained a bundle of rights which, from the outset, were less advantageous to him than the benefits that he enjoyed under the Avesta scheme. On the facts of this case, it was not necessary to wait to see what happened to determine whether Mr Shore was financially worse off in the PFW scheme than he would have been in the Avesta scheme.’ So far as the analogy with a share purchase was concerned he said: ‘In my judgment, an investor who wishes to place andpound;100 in a secure risk-free investment and, in reliance on negligent advice, purchases shares does suffer financial detriment on the acquisition of the shares despite the fact that he pays the market price for the shares. It is no answer to this investor’s complaint that he has been induced to buy a risky investment when he wanted a safe one to say that the risky investment was worth what he paid for it in the market. His complaint is that he did not want a risky investment. A claim for damages immediately upon the acquisition of the shares would succeed. The investor would at least be entitled to the difference between the cost of buying the Government bonds and the cost of buying and selling the shares.’

Dyson LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 863, [2008] PNLR 37, Times 12-Aug-2008
Bailii
Financial Services Act 1986
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Pegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
Cited – Axa Insurance Ltd v Akther and Darby Solicitors and Others CA 12-Nov-2009
The court considered the application of the limitation period to answering when damage occurred when it arises under an unsecured contingent liability. The claimant insurance company had provided after the event litigation insurance policies to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Financial Services, Professional Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.271028

St Anselm Development Company Ltd v Slaughter and May: ChD 1 Feb 2013

The claimants appealed against rejection of their claim in negligence said to have been out of time. They had set out to sublet flats but their mistiming disallowed reclaiming of certain rents under the 1993 Act.
Held: The two flats were to be considered seperately, and on that basis the claim under the second had been timely, provided the period could be extended under section 14A.
In 1999 the claimant had realised that there was a problem, even if they did not then attribute it to negligence in the solicitors. They had reasonable cause then to start asking questions. Even though there had not yet been diclosure, the master had been correct that the claimant had no reasonable prospect establishing an extended limitation period.

David Richards J
[2013] EWHC 125 (Ch)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 14A, Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Khan v R M Falvey and Co (a Firm) CA 22-Mar-2002
The claimant sought damages from his former solicitors for failing to act to avoid his case being struck out. The second action was itself delayed, and the defendants asserted that the cause of action occurred not when his claim was actually struck . .
Cited – Haward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Professional Negligence

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.470707

Nolan v Wright: ChD 26 Feb 2009

The defendant sought to re-open the question of whether the charge under which he might otherwise be liable was an extortionate credit bargain. The creditor said that that plea was time barred. The defendant argued that a finding that the agreement amounted to an extortionate bargain would not be a substantive relief, and was therefore not subject to a time bar. The claimant had admitted leaving agreements to run unenforced to avoid arguments over whether the agreement was extortionate.
Held: The defendant was required under the rules to give notice to apply for such an order, and therefore ‘a claim to reopen a credit agreement as an extortionate credit bargain is an action upon a specialty to which in principle, and subject to section 9 (and the other provisions) of the 1980 Act, a limitation period of 12 years from the date of entry into the relevant credit agreement applies.’ It was clear that many of the defendant’s assertions were fanciful, and contradicted by his own contemporaneous and later documents. However there were similarly doubts about the claimants own case which required investigation at trial.

Hodge QC J
[2009] EWHC 305 (Ch)
Bailii
Consumer Credit Act 1974 137 138 139 140, Limitation Act 1980 8
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Collin v Duke of Westminster CA 1985
In 1975 the tenant sought to exercise his right to purchase the freehold reversion of his property. The landlord argued that the rent payable precluded any such entitlement. Under the law as then understood, the landlord’s contention appeared . .
Cited – Hill (As Trustee In Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v Spread Trustee Company Ltd and Another CA 12-May-2006
The defendants sought relief for transactions entered into at an undervalue. The bankrupt had entered into charges and an assignment of a loan account in their favour before his bankruptcy, and the trustee had obtained an order for them to be set . .
Cited – Bray v Stuart A West and Co 1989
The court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction over legal professions are not proceedings founded on any cause of action, and so are not subject to the Limitation Act. . .
Cited – Paragon Finance plc v Nash etc CA 15-Oct-2001
The court was asked to consider whether there was any implied term limiting the power of a mortgagee to set interest rates under a variable rate mortgage.
Held: A loan arrangement which allowed a lender to vary the implied rate of interest, . .
Cited – First National Bank Plc v Syed CA 1991
The court can exercise the supervisory jurisdiction over consumer contracts under the 1974 Act irrespective of any application made by a party. . .
Cited – Re Priory Garage (Walthamstow) Limited ChD 2001
The court considered the relevance of a statutory limitation period in relation to applications to set aside transactions as being at an undervalue or as voidable preferences under section 238 to 241 of the 1986 Act. Applications to set aside . .
Cited – Rahman v Sterling Credit Ltd CA 17-Oct-2000
A lender sought repossession of a property securing a loan from 1998. The borrower sought to assert that the loan was an extortionate credit bargain under the Act. The lender asserted that that claim was out of time.
Held: A claim under a . .
Cited – Letang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .
Cited – National Westminster Bank v Daniel CA 1993
The defence contained two contradictory grounds, and the defendant’s evidence again contradicted the defences. The plaintiff sought summary judgment.
Held: A judge, when considering whether a claim should be determined then or allowed to . .
Cited – Swain v Hillman CA 21-Oct-1999
Strike out – Realistic Not Fanciful Chance Needed
The proper test for whether an action should be struck out under the new Rules was whether it had a realistic as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success. There was no justification for further attempts to explain the meaning of what are clear . .
Cited – Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of The Bank of England HL 18-May-2000
The applicants alleged misfeasance against the Bank of England in respect of the regulation of a bank.
Held: The Bank could not be sued in negligence, but the tort of misfeasance required clear evidence of misdeeds. The action was now properly . .
Cited – E D and F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel and Another CA 4-Apr-2003
The rules contained two occasions on which a court would consider dismissal of a claim as having ‘no real prospect’ of success.
Held: The only significant difference between CPR 24.2 and 13.3(1), is that under the first the overall burden of . .
Cited – Nationwide Building Society v Dunlop Haywards Ltd and Another ComC 14-Jun-2007
Claims in deceit with regard to valuations of commercial properties. . .
Cited – Extraktionstechnik Gesellschaft fur Anlagenbau GmbH v Oskar CA 1984
Where there are unexplained features of both the claim and the defence which are disturbing because they bear the appearance of falsity and disreputable business dealings and questionable conduct, the Court should not make tentative assessments of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Contract, Consumer

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.304541

Dixon Coles and Gill (A Former Firm) v Baines, Bishop of Leeds and Another: CA 20 Jul 2021

Innocent Co-Trustee not Liable for Default

Proceedings were brought by former clients against their former solicitors. One of the partners stole money held in the firm’s client account on behalf of the claimants. The other two partners were entirely innocent of, and in no way implicated in, the frauds. Some of the losses sued for arose from transactions more than six years before the commencement of the proceedings. The issue on the appeal is whether the innocent partners, who are otherwise undoubtedly liable for the clients’ losses, can rely on a limitation defence in respect of those transactions, under section 21 of the Limitation Act 1980.
Held: The solicitors appeal succeeded: ‘A co-trustee is not to be treated as party or privy to another trustee’s fraudulent breaches of trust unless facts are alleged and proved which show the co-trustee to have been implicated in the frauds in some way, meeting the tests indicated in Thorne v Heard. It follows that DCG are not within the scope of section 21(1)(a) and they are entitled to rely on the six-year limitation period as a defence.’

Sir Timothy Lloyd
[2021] EWCA Civ 1097
Bailii, Judiciary
Limitation Act 1980 21
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Moore v Knight ChD 18-Dec-1890
The court considered the liability of partners in a solicitors’ firm for embezzlement of client money by an employee of the firm. Once the true position became known, after many years, the client sued the surviving partners, who relied on . .
Cited – Thorne v Heard CA 24-Jan-1894
A first mortgagee, Heard, had sold property under the power of sale and had retained a solicitor, Searle, to act in relation to the sale. Searle received the proceeds of sale, satisfied the first mortgage debt, but retained the balance, falsely . .
Cited – Thorne v Heard HL 1895
Recovery was sought from the partners of a defaulting solicitor.
Lord Herschell LC disposed of the argument about concealment first, and then turned to section 8, saying: ‘My Lords, the only remaining question is, Did the statute apply? It is . .
Cited – Blair v Bromley ChD 18-Nov-1846
Two solicitors having entered into partnership, each of them continued to attend to the business of his former clients, but on the partnership account; and one of the partners having proposed to invest a sum of money belonging to a client in a . .
Cited – Blair v Bromley CA 3-Jul-1847
Held; . .
Cited – Dubai Aluminium Company Limited v Salaam and Others HL 5-Dec-2002
Partners Liable for Dishonest Act of Solicitor
A solicitor had been alleged to have acted dishonestly, having assisted in a fraudulent breach of trust by drafting certain documents. Contributions to the damages were sought from his partners.
Held: The acts complained of were so close to . .
Appeal from – Lord Bishop of Leeds v Dixon Coles and Gill (A Firm) and Others ChD 28-Oct-2020
The claimants had been clients of the defendant solicitors former firmer. A partner of the defendants had stolen large sums of money in the names of the claimants from the firm’s client account. The defendants themselves were not said to have been . .
Cited – Hughes v Twisden ChD 1886
One partner in a firm of solicitors committed a fraud on a client by using deeds held on behalf of the client as security for a loan for his own benefit, the funds, so far as appeared, not passing through the firm’s accounts. The fraudulent partner . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Legal Professions, Limitation, Trusts, Company

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.666020

Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue and Another: HL 25 Oct 2006

The tax payer had overpaid Advance Corporation Tax under an error of law. It sought repayment. The revenue contended that the claim was time barred.
Held: The claim was in restitution, and the limitation period began to run from the date when the claimants discovered their mistake. The appellants had submitted that section 33 of the 1973 Act provided the second of only two remedies for recovery of tax paid under a mistake of law. The first remedy was said to be a common law right to recover tax unlawfully demanded, of which Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe said: ‘When parliament enacts a special regime providing special rights and remedies, that regime may (but does not always) supersede and displace common law rights and remedies (or more general statutory rights and remedies). Whether it has that effect is a question of statutory construction.’
Lord Hoffmann said: ‘The answer, at any rate for the moment, is that unlike civilian systems, English law has no general principle that to retain money paid without any legal basis (such as debt, gift, compromise, etc) is unjust enrichment. In the Woolwich case [1993] AC 70, 172 Lord Goff said that English law might have developed so as to recognise such a general principle – the condictio indebiti of civilian law – but had not done so. In England, the claimant has to prove that the circumstances in which the payment was made come within one of the categories which the law recognizes as sufficient to make retention by the recipient unjust. Lord Goff provided a list in the Woolwich case at pp 164-165 and the decision itself added another. [i.e. money paid by way of tax to a public body which was acting ultra vires]’

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
Times 26-Oct-2006, [2006] UKHL 49, [2007] 1 AC 558, [2006] BTC 781, [2007] Eu LR 226, [2007] 1 CMLR 14, [2006] STI 2386, [2006] 3 WLR 781, [2007] 1 All ER 449
Bailii, HL
Limitation Act 1980 32(1), Taxes Management Act 1973 33
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Meadows v Grand Junction Waterworks Company 1905
. .
Cited – Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (2) HL 20-Jul-1992
The society had set out to assert that regulations were unlawful in creating a double taxation. It paid money on account of the tax demanded. It won and recovered the sums paid, but the revenue refused to pay any interest accrued on the sums paid. . .
Cited – Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd HL 25-Jul-1994
Lloyds Agents Owe Care Duty to Member; no Contract
Managing agents conducted the financial affairs of the Lloyds Names belonging to the syndicates under their charge. It was alleged that they managed these affairs with a lack of due careleading to enormous losses.
Held: The assumption of . .
Cited – Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Limited HL 4-Dec-2003
The claimant’s house was regularly flooded by waters including also foul sewage from the respondent’s neighbouring premises. He sought damages and an injunction. The defendants sought to restrict the claimant to his statutory rights.
Held: The . .
Cited – Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
Cited – National Provincial Bank Limited v Ainsworth HL 1965
The significance of the distinction between occupation and rights was that although the deserted wife was in actual occupation of the former matrimonial home, the quality of her rights was not such as to be capable of amounting to an overriding . .
Cited – Metallgesellschaft Ltd and Others v Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another Hoechst Ag and Another v Same ECJ 8-Mar-2001
The British law which meant that non-resident parent companies of British based businesses were not able to recover interest on payments of advance corporation tax, was discriminatory against other European based companies. Accordingly the law was . .
At First Instance – Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue, HM Attorney General ChD 18-Jul-2003
The taxpayer sought to bring an action for restitution by the revenue of sums paid under a mistake of law. Under the Metallgesellschaft decision, rights of election for recovery of overpaid tax applied only between UK resident companies.
Held: . .
Appeal from – Inland Revenue and Another v Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc CA 4-Feb-2005
The company sought repayment of excess advance corporation tax payments made under a mistake of law. The question was the extent of the effect of the ruling in Klienwort Benson, in particular whether it covered sums paid as taxation, and how the law . .

Cited by:
Cited – Total Network Sl v Customs and Excise Commissioners CA 31-Jan-2007
The defendants suspected a carousel VAT fraud. The defendants appealed a finding that there was a viable cause of action alleging a ‘conspiracy where the unlawful means alleged is a common law offence of cheating the public revenue’. The defendants . .
Cited – Awoyomi v Radford and Another QBD 12-Jul-2007
The claimant sought damages from the defendant barristers who had represented her in criminal proceedings. They had not passed on to her the statement made by the judge in chambers that if she pleaded guilty he would not impose a sentence of . .
Cited – Sempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another HL 18-Jul-2007
The parties agreed that damages were payable in an action for restitution, but the sum depended upon to a calculation of interest. They disputed whether such interest should be calculated on a simple or compound basis. The company sought compound . .
Cited – Somerville v Scottish Ministers HL 24-Oct-2007
The claimants complained of their segregation while in prison. Several preliminary questions were to be decided: whether damages might be payable for breach of a Convention Right; wheher the act of a prison governor was the act of the executive; . .
Cited – Total Network Sl v Revenue and Customs HL 12-Mar-2008
The House was asked whether an action for unlawful means conspiracy was available against a participant in a missing trader intra-community, or carousel, fraud. The company appealed a finding of liability saying that the VAT Act and Regulations . .
Cited – Fender (Administrator of FG Collier and Sons Ltd) v National Westminster Bank Plc ChD 26-Sep-2008
The administrator sought declarations as to whether to treat the bank as a secured or unsecured creditor.
Held: The court directed the Administrator to recognise the Bank as a secured creditor, as if the Deed of Release had never been . .
Cited – McE, Re; McE v Prison Service of Northern Ireland and Another HL 11-Mar-2009
Complaint was made that the prisoner’s privileged conversations with his solicitors had been intercepted by the police.
Held: The Act made explicit provisions allowing such interception and set out the appropriate safeguards. The interceptions . .
Cited – Kommune and Another v DEPFA Acs Bank ComC 4-Sep-2009
Local authorities in Denmark sought to recover sums paid to the defendant banks for swap trading, saying that the payments had been outwith their powers. . .
Cited – Child Poverty Action Group, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary Of State for Work and Pensions CA 14-Oct-2009
CPAG appealed against a refusal of a declaration that the respondent could use only the 1992 Act to recover overpayment of benefits where there had been neither misrepresentation nor non-disclosure.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and the court . .
Cited – The Child Poverty Action Group v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions SC 8-Dec-2010
The Action Group had obtained a declaration that, where an overpayment of benefits had arisen due to a miscalculation by the officers of the Department, any process of recovering the overpayment must be by the Act, and that the Department could not . .
Cited – Test Claimants In The Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Inland Revenue SC 23-May-2012
The European Court had found the UK to have unlawfully treated differently payment of franked dividends between subsidiaries of UK companies according to whether all the UK subsidiaries were themselves UK based, thus prejudicing European . .
Cited – Zurich Insurance Plc UK Branch v International Energy Group Ltd SC 20-May-2015
A claim had been made for mesothelioma following exposure to asbestos, but the claim arose in Guernsey. Acknowledging the acute difficultis particular to the evidence in such cases, the House of Lords, in Fairchild. had introduced the Special Rule . .
Cited – Marine Trade Sa v Pioneer Freight Futures Co Ltd Bvi and Another ComC 29-Oct-2009
The parties stood to make substantial losses against each other under contracts for differences after the dramatic fall in the freight market in the financial turmoil of late 2008. . .
Cited – Littlewoods Ltd and Others v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs SC 1-Nov-2017
The appellants had overpaid under a mistake of law very substantial sums in VAT over several years. The excess had been repaid, but with simple interest and not compound interest, which the now claimed (together with other taxpayers amounting to 17 . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Corporation Tax, Limitation, Equity, Taxes Management

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.245608

Al-Rawas v Hassan Khan and Co (A Firm) and Another: CA 1 Feb 2017

Counterclaim not exempt from limitation by right

The claimant firms of solicitors sought to recover their fees from their former clients. In answer the defendants sought to say that they should be allowed to counterclaim in negligence saying that as a counterclaim, section 35(3) of the 1980 Act operated to allow the counterclaim as of right.
Held: That was not the effect of the subsection.

Elias, Sharp LJJ, Green J
[2017] EWCA Civ 42, [2017] WLR(D) 64, [2017] PNLR 13, [2017] 1 WLR 2301
Bailii, WLRD
Limitation Act 1980 35(3)
England and Wales

Limitation

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.573865

Ministry of Defence v AB and Others: SC 14 Mar 2012

The respondent Ministry had, in 1958, conducted experimental atmospheric explosions of atomic weapons. The claimants had been obliged as servicemen to observe the explosions, and appealed against dismissal of their claims for radiation sickness under the 1980 Act. They said that they had only acquired the knowledge to found an action in 2007 on the issue of a scientific report from New Zealand, but they had issued the action before then.
Held: The servicemen’s appeals were dismissed (Lord Phillips, Lady Hale and Lord Kerr dissenting). The court should answer two questions. It should first identify just what knowledge was to be present to satisfy the test, and then what state of mind, assessed subjectively or objectively would amount to knowledge of it. Since a claimant must state that he believes that his assertions are true, it must be a legal impossibility to deny knowledge of the facts at that time. The inquiry required by section 14(1) was also retrospective. Once an expert had been consulted and his advice received, a claimant’s belief’s properly were characterised as ‘knowledge’ for the section. Once that knowledge arose there could be no open ended extension of the time within which an action must be brought. Evidential difficulties faced by a claimant were not to be counted as lack of knowledge.
The dissenting judges drew clear distinctions between knowledge and belief. A claimant’s subjective belief was not a sensible basis for deciding whether the claim is time-barred.

Lord Phillips, President, Lord Walker, Lady Hale, Lord Brown, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson
[2012] UKSC 9, [2012] 2 WLR 643, UKSC 2010/0247, [2012] 3 All ER 673, [2013] 1 AC 78, 125 BMLR 69, [2012] PIQR P13, [2012] WLR(D) 79, (2012) 125 BMLR 69, [2012] Med LR 306
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC
Limitation Act 1980 11(4) 14(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Das v Ganju CA 31-Mar-1999
Where a personal injury action had been delayed for five years by bad advice from solicitors and counsel, the court’s discretion should be exercised to allow the plaintiff to proceed with her claim, not herself being responsible for the delay.
Cited – A’Court v Cross 28-Nov-1825
Defendant being arrested on a debt more than six years old, said, ‘I know that I owe the money, but the bill I gave is on a threepenny receipt stamp, and I will never pay it.’ Held, not such an acknowledgment as would revive the debt agdinst a plea . .
Cited – Smith v Central Asbestos Co Ltd; Central Asbestos Co Ltd v Dodd HL 1973
The House considered at what point an injured person was to be deemed to have become aware of his injury so as to start the limitation period.
Held: A majority rejected the proposition that knowledge of ‘material facts’ for section 1(3) . .
Cited – Church v Ministry of Defence QBD 23-Feb-1984
The 62 year old claimant sought damages after working in in the defendant’s dockyard and being exposed to asbestos. Pleural plaques were apparent on X-ray and the pleura would constrict the lung and induce breathlessness; and the asbestos must have . .
Cited – Sykes v Ministry of Defence QBD 19-Mar-1984
The claimant was exposed to asbestos whilst working for the defendant in the naval dockyard at Portsmouth, and sought damages having developed pleural plaques, but no further damage was expected, save ‘a slightly increased risk of developing a lung . .
Cited – Davis v Ministry of Defence CA 26-Jul-1985
May LJ said: ‘Knowledge’ is an ordinary English word with a clear meaning to which one must give full effect; ‘reasonable belief’ or ‘suspicion’ is not enough. The relevant question merits repetition – ‘when did the appellant first know that his . .
Cited – Halford v Brookes CA 1991
The plaintiff, the mother and administratrix of the estate of a 16 year old girl, alleged that her daughter had been murdered by one or both of the Defendants. The claim was for damages for battery. Rougier J at first instance had decided that: . .
Cited – Nash v Eli Lilly and Co CA 1993
The court considered whether a solicitor acting for a potential plaintiff was considered to be an expert for the purposes of the section.
Held: Purchas LJ said: ‘Of course as advice from a solicitor as to the legal consequences of the act or . .
Cited – Broadley v Guy Clapham and Co CA 9-Sep-1993
The limitation period starts when a reasonable person would have sought medical help. Section 14(1)(b) requires that ‘one should look at the way the plaintiff puts his case, distil what he is complaining about and ask whether he had in broad terms . .
Cited – Whitfield v North Durham Health Authority CA 1995
In 1987, and before the claim was issued in 1992 the claimant had issued a claim which had never been served. She sought to extend the limitation period arguing that she had not acquired the requisite knowledge until later,
Held: She had had . .
Cited – Spargo v North Essex District Health Authority CA 13-Mar-1997
The test of ‘When a plaintiff became aware of the cause of an injury’ is a subjective test of what passed through plaintiff’s mind. ‘(1) the knowledge required to satisfy s14(1)(b) is a broad knowledge of the essence of the causally relevant act or . .
Cited – Sniezek v Bundy (Letchworth) Limited CA 7-Jul-2000
The claimant appealed against a finding that having once already issued a claim, a second claim was out of time, not accepting that she had had the knowledge effective to commence the limitation period.
Held: Judge LJ had ‘difficulty in . .
Cited – Amin, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 16-Oct-2003
Prisoner’s death – need for full public enquiry
The deceased had been a young Asian prisoner. He was placed in a cell overnight with a prisoner known to be racist, extremely violent and mentally unstable. He was killed. The family sought an inquiry into the death.
Held: There had been a . .

Cited by:
Cited – Siddiqui v University of Oxford QBD 5-Dec-2016
The University applied to have struck out the claim by the claimant for damages alleging negligence in its teaching leading to a lower class degree than he said he should have been awarded.
Held: Strike out on the basis that the claim was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.452130

Soar v Ashwell: CA 1893

Trustees under a will had entrusted the trust fund to a solicitor for investment. The solicitor exercised all of their administrative and investment powers for them and distributed part of the fund invested to the beneficiaries under the will but retained part in his own hands. Some 12 years later, the surviving trustee brought an action claiming an account of the money retained by the solicitor.
Held: The solicitor must be considered as having been in the position of an express trustee of such money with the consequence that lapse of time did not bar the action.
A de facto trustee is subject to the same duties as an actual trustee.
Lord Esher MR said: ‘If there is created in expressed terms, whether written or verbal, a trust, and a person is in terms nominated to be the trustee of that trust, a Court of Equity, upon proof of such facts, will not allow him to vouch a Statute of Limitations against a breach of that trust. Such a trust is in equity called an express trust. If the only relation which it is proved the defendant or person charged bears to the matter is a contractual relation, he is not in the view of equity a trustee at all, but only a contractor; and equity leaves the contractual relation to be determined by the common or statute law. If the breach of the legal relation relied on, whether such breach be by way of tort or contract, makes, in the view of a Court of Equity, the defendant a trustee for the plaintiff, the Court of Equity treats the defendant as a trustee become so by construction, and the trust is called a constructive trust; and against the breach which by construction creates the trust the Court of Equity allows Statutes of Limitation to be vouched.’
Lord Esher continued: ‘There was an express trust created, but Ashwell was not at any time nominated as a trustee of that trust. He was the solicitor of the nominated trustees. As such solicitor he was entrusted by the nominated trustees to take and have in his hands the trust money, with a direction on their behalf to deal with it according to the terms of the trust. Assume that he misappropriated that money to his own use, and that that was all; the misappropriation would at once of itself make him the holder of the money in trust for the rightful owner, but, if that were all, only a trustee by construction of a constructive trust. But the questions in this case are whether Ashwell was not, in view of a Court of Equity, a trustee of the money before the alleged breach by misappropriation, and, if he was, under which class of trust he was with regard to limitations. The moment the money was in his hands, he was in a fiduciary relation to the nominated trustees; he was a fiduciary agent of theirs; he held the money in trust to deal with it for them as directed by them; he was a trustee for them. He was therefore a trustee of the money before he committed, if he did commit, the alleged breach of trust, and was in possession of and had control over the money before he committed, if at all, the alleged breach of trust.
The cases seem to me to decide that, where a person has assumed, either with or without consent, to act as a trustee of money or other property, ie, to act in a fiduciary relation with regard to it, and has in consequence been in possession of or has exercised command or control over such money or property, a Court of Equity will impose upon him all the liabilities of an express trustee, and will class him with and will call him an express trustee of an express trust. The principal liability of such a trustee is that he must discharge himself by accounting to his cestui que trusts for all such money or property without regard to lapse of time.
There is another recognised state of circumstances in which a person not nominated a trustee may be bound to liability as if he were a nominated trustee, namely, where he has knowingly assisted a nominated trustee in a fraudulent and dishonest disposition of the trust property. Such a person will be treated by a Court of Equity as if he were an express trustee of an express trust. I am of opinion that the present case is within the description of that which is treated as and is called in equity an express trust, and that the inquiry as to the alleged breach cannot be stopped by the Statute of Limitations.
I am clearly convinced by the evidence that Ashwell became on receipt of the money a trustee of it, and that, as he has not been shewn to have accounted for it, the defendant, his executrix, is liable as such for a breach of trust by him. ‘
Bowen LJ said: ‘It has been established beyond doubt by authority binding on this Court that a person occupying a fiduciary relation, who has property deposited with him on the strength of such relation, is to be dealt with as an express, and not merely a constructive, trustee of such property. His possession of such property is never in virtue of any right of his own, but is coloured from the first by the trust and confidence in virtue of which he received it.’
Recognising that the authorities were irreconcilable, he identified three cases where a constructive trustee would be treated for limitation purposes like an express trustee, namely the case of de facto trustees, which was the case before the court; the case of a stranger to the trust knowingly assisting the fraud of a trustee; and the case of a stranger knowingly receiving trust property in breach of trust.
Kay LJ said: ‘The result seems to be that there are certain cases of what are, strictly speaking, constructive trusts, in which the Statute of Limitations cannot be set up as a defence. Amongst these are the case where a stranger to the trust has assumed to act and has acted as a trustee, and the case where a stranger has concurred with the trustee in committing a breach of trust, and has taken possession of the trust property, knowing that it was trust property, and has not duly discharged himself of it by handing it over to the proper trustees or to the persons absolutely entitled to it.
I think that the present case comes within one or both those categories. I think that Ashwell did assume to act and acted as trustee of the funds which he received, and that he has not duly discharged himself from the plaintiff’s share of those funds, and must therefore be treated as an express trustee.’

Lord Esher MR, Bowen LJ, Kay LJ
[1893] 2 QB 390
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
Cited – Peconic Industrial Development Ltd v Lau Kwok FAI 27-Feb-2009
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. The limitation period for a claim in dishonest assistance is 6 years. For limitation purposes a distinction is to be made between two kinds of constructive trustees: those who are fiduciaries and those who are . .
Cited – Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria QBD 8-Apr-2011
The claimant had been defrauded by a customer of the defendant bank. He brought a claim against the bank, saying that they knew or ought to have known of the fraudster’s activities, and were liable. The Bank denied that the UK courts had . .
Cited – Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria SC 19-Feb-2014
Bank not liable for fraud of customer
The appellant sought to make the bank liable for a fraud committed by the Bank’s customer, the appellant saying that the Bank knew or ought to have known of the fraud. The court was asked whether a party liable only as a dishonest assistant was a . .
Dicta applied – In re Gallard 1897
. .
Dicta applied – Heynes v Dixon 1900
. .
Dicta applied – In re Eyre-Williams 1923
. .
Cited – Henchley and Others v Thompson ChD 16-Feb-2017
The Claimants sought an order directing the Defendant to provide a full account of his dealings with the assets of the two trusts as a trustee or as a de facto trustee.
Held: The court has a discretion whether or not to make an order for an . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Trusts, Legal Professions

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.230273

A v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth: CA 12 Apr 2006

Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the National Lottery. They complained that the Limitation Act gave the court no discretion to extend the period for a claim as it would in claim in negligence.
Held: Stubbings v Webb was binding on the court, and that decision had been confirmed by the ECHR. The court was bound to apply the six year limitation period and the court had no discretion to extend it. The assaults were deliberate, not by way of negligence. Human Rights law should not be used to take away the rights now of defendants not to be sued.

Sir Anthony Clarke MR, Brooke LJ VP, Arden LJ
[2006] Fam Law 533, [2006] 2 FLR 727, [2006] 1 WLR 2320, [2006] 3 FCR 673, [2006] EWCA Civ 395, Times 28-Apr-2006, [2006] 1 WLR 2320
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 11(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Barras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co HL 17-Mar-1933
The court looked at the inference that a statute’s draughtsman could be assumed when using a phrase to rely on a known interpretation of that phrase.
Viscount Buckmaster said: ‘It has long been a well established principle to be applied in the . .
Cited – Rogers, Regina (on the Application of) v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust CA 12-Apr-2006
The claimant challenged the policy of her local health authority not to allow prescription to her of the drug Herceptin.
Held: The policy had not been settled upon lawfully and was to be set aside. On the one hand the PCT developed a policy . .
Cited – KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 12-Feb-2003
The respondent appealed decisions by the court to allow claims for personal injury out of time. The claims involved cases of sexual abuse inflicted by its employees going back over many years.
Held: The judge had misapplied the test laid down . .
Cited – Billings v Reed CA 1945
The plaintiff’s wife had been killed by a negligently piloted RAF aeroplane. It was argued that, although this was a war injury, the language of section 3(1) did not exclude a claim based on trespass to the person.
Held: Lord Greene MR said: . .
Cited – Cartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd HL 1963
The plaintiffs were steel dressers who, in the course of their employment, had inhaled quantities of noxious dust which had caused them to suffer from pneumoconiosis. They issued proceedings on 1 October 1956 but were unable to show any breach of . .
Cited – Lowsley and Another v Forbes (Trading As I E Design Services) HL 29-Jul-1998
The plaintiffs, with the leave of the court, had obtained garnishee and charging orders nisi against the debtor 11 and a half years after they had obtained a consent judgment.
Held: An application by the judgment debtor to set aside the orders . .
Criticised – Stubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .
Cited – Regina v Chard HL 1983
The defendant appealed his conviction which had been obtained but based upon the evidence of a ‘super-grass’. His appeal failed, but the witness then withdrew his evidence. The matter was referred back to the court under the section, which then . .
Cited – Letang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .
Cited – Farrell v Alexander HL 24-Jun-1976
The House considered the construction of a consolidation Act.
Held: It is ordinarily both unnecessary and undesirable to construe a consolidation Act by reference to statutory antecedents, but it is permissible to do so in a case where the . .
Cited – Long v Hepworth 1968
. .
Cited – Maxwell v Murphy 1957
Sir Owen Dixon CJ said: ‘The general rule of the common law is that a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a . .
Cited – Maxwell v Murphy 1957
Sir Owen Dixon CJ said: ‘The general rule of the common law is that a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a . .
Cited – Laws and others v The Society of Lloyd’s CA 19-Dec-2003
The applicants sought to amend earlier pleadings to add a claim that their human rights had been infringed by the 1982 Act, which gave the respondents certain immunities.
Held: The Human Rights Act 1998 was not retrospective. At the time when . .
Cited – Rowe v Kingston-Upon-Hull City Council and Another CA 24-Jul-2003
The claimant sought damages for a breach of duty by his teachers which had happened before 1991. He argued that 3(1) of the HRA should affect the construction of section 14(1) of the 1980 Act. . .
Cited – Walkley v Precision Forgings Ltd HL 1979
The plaintiff tried to bring a second action in respect of an industrial injury claim outside the limitation period so as to overcome the likelihood that his first action, although timeous, would be dismissed for want of prosecution.
Held: He . .
Cited – Yew Bon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Mara PC 7-Oct-1982
(Malaysia) In 1972 the appellants were injured by the respondent’s bus. At that time the local limitation period was 12 months. In 1974 the limitation period became three years. The appellants issued a writ in 1975. To succeed they would have to sue . .
Cited – C v D QBD 23-Feb-2006
The claimant sought damages against the defendant and the school at which he was taught alleging that he had been sexually abused. The allegations were denied. . .
Cited – Assicurazioni Generali Spa v Arab Insurance Group (BSC) CA 13-Nov-2002
Rehearing/Review – Little Difference on Appeal
The appellant asked the Court to reverse a decision on the facts reached in the lower court.
Held: The appeal failed (Majority decision). The court’s approach should be the same whether the case was dealt with as a rehearing or as a review. . .
Cited – Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust and Another CA 16-Nov-2001
The claimant had sued her former employer for post-traumatic stress resulting from alleged harassment at her place of work. The claimant appealed against an order refusing damages. The court had held that outside the 1997 Act which was not in force . .
Cited – Rose v Plenty CA 7-Jul-1975
Contrary to his employers orders, a milkman allowed children to assist him in his milkround. One was injured, and sued the milkman’s employer.
Held: The milkman had not gone so far outside the activities for which he was employed for the . .

Cited by:
Cited – KR and others v Royal and Sun Alliance Plc CA 3-Nov-2006
The insurer appealed findings of liability under the 1930 Act. Claims had been made for damages for child abuse in a residential home, whom they insured. The home had become insolvent, and the claimants had pursued the insurer.
Held: The . .
See Also – A v Hoare HL 30-Jan-2008
Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Limitation, Human Rights

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.240356

Tito v Wadell (No 2): ChD 1977

The liability to account for profits on breach of the self-dealing rule and the fair-dealing rule does not arise from a breach of duty at all. In his judgment such liability is the consequence of an equitable disability rather than of a breach of duty, such as a breach of trust by a trustee or, it appears, a breach of an analogous duty, such as the fiduciary obligations of a company director to his company. The claim for an account of profits is a claim for unjust enrichment, which may succeed, even in the absence of the commission of any wrong, such as a breach of trust or of fiduciary duty or the misuse or misapplication of any of the assets of the beneficiary of the duty. the fair-dealing rule was not confined to trustees, but ‘to many others, such as agents, solicitors and company directors’. It would be anomalous if the limitation applied to trustees, but not to others subject to the same rule. ‘A possible line of escape from the anomaly would be to treat agents, solicitors and the rest as constructive trustees for this purpose, so that all would be subject to the six years period: but I should be reluctant to resort to such artificiality unless driven to it.’

Sir Robert Megarry VC
[1977] 1 Ch 107
Limitation Act 1939 19(2)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – DEG-Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v Koshy and Other (No 3); Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (in receivership) v Same (No 3) CA 28-Jul-2003
The company sought to recover damages from a director who had acted dishonestly, by concealing a financial interest in a different company which had made loans to the claimant company. He replied that the claim was out of time. At first instance the . .
Cited – Bhullar and Another v McArdle CA 10-Apr-2001
The defendant had registered a caution against the claimant’s land at the Land Registry. The claimant sought its removal and now appealed an order for rectification of the register against him. The parties had reached oral agreements as to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.187427

Nouri v Marvi and Others: CA 14 Oct 2010

The claimant was the registered owner of a leasehold flat, allowing the defendant to live in the flat while he was out abroad. The defendant first re-mortgaged the property in the claimant’s name, forging the claimant’s signature on the mortgage deed, and then, on 2 April 2001, sold the flat to himself, posing as the claimant in instructing solicitors as vendor and instructing other solicitors to act in his own name as the purchaser. Exchange of contracts and completion were simultaneous, and the defendant forged the claimant’s signature on the transfer. On 4 July 2001, using the transfer, the defendant obtained registration of the flat in his own name and he subsequently sold it to an unconnected third party.
On 2 July 2007, the claimant commenced proceedings against the defendant and also the solicitors who had acted for the defendant when he had impersonated the claimant. The action began more than six years after exchange and completion, but less than six years after registration. The limitation issue was whether the claimant suffered damage only on registration or already on 2 April 2001.
Held: The appeal failed. The claim against the solicitors was statute-barred because the claimant suffered actual damage on completion of the sale and was not simply exposed to the contingent loss of his title which would depend on whether Mr Marvi applied for registration as proprietor based on the forged transfer. From 2 April 2001, there was a blot on Mr Nouri’s title that significantly decreased the marketable value of the property.
Patten LJ said: ‘There was no valuation evidence before the judge directed to this issue but Mr Jones [Counsel for Mr Nouri] accepts that had a potential purchaser been told of the forged transfer in the period prior to registration of Mr Marvi’s title, this would undoubtedly have led to a diminution in the price he would have been willing to pay. Although the contract and the transfer to Mr Marvi were of no legal effect, they did expose any purchaser to the risk of possible litigation even if that risk was more apparent than real. This is the point taken in the respondent’s notice.
On this basis there will have been a diminution in the open market value of the Flat following completion on 2nd April 2001. Mr Jones contests this conclusion because it proceeds, he says, on a false assumption: i.e. that a potential purchaser would have been made aware of the difficulties caused by the forged transfer. He submits that there was no realistic possibility of Mr Nouri having discovered the fraud before registration on 4th July and therefore no question of his being under any obligation to disclose those matters to a potential purchaser. The facts were that he remained in ignorance of the fraud until much later.
I do not accept this analysis. It is well established that a cause of action in tort can accrue for the purposes of the Limitation Act without the claimant being aware of it. The decisions of the House of Lords in Cartledge v E. Jopling and Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758 and Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd v Oscar Faber and Partners [1983] 2 AC 1 led to limited changes to the Act to provide alternative time limits of three years running from the date of knowledge. These are now contained in ss.11 and 14A of the 1980 Act.
In this case Mr Nouri was not assisted by s.14A because he had the requisite knowledge of the fraudulent sale to Mr Marvi by 2002. But the provision of these alternative time periods to address the problem of lack of knowledge has left intact the principle that time will run under s.2 even if the claimant is unaware of the circumstances which have led to it. The existence of actual damage for these purposes does not therefore depend on the claimant’s state of knowledge in relation to the breach of duty or its consequences but on whether the breach has in fact caused actual loss.
For this purpose the correct hypothesis must be to ask whether Mr Nouri could have maintained an action for damages against [the solicitors] following completion of the sale to Mr Marvi. That requires one to assume that he was aware of the breach and to assess the impact of that on his property or other assets as at that date. Consistently with this hypothesis, any diminution in the value of the Flat attributable to the breach has to be determined on the basis that Mr Nouri was aware of the forged transfer and was under a corresponding duty to alert a purchaser to that problem. The Flat was unsaleable without such disclosure. It must therefore follow that its open market value was what a purchaser would pay for it with knowledge of the forged transfer. There was therefore actual damage suffered by Mr Nouri as of 2nd April 2001.’

Rix, Patten LJJ, Sir Mark Waller
[2010] EWCA Civ 1107, [2011] CP Rep 6, [2010] 50 EG 64, [2010] 42 EG 105, [2011] PNLR 7
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 2
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Bowling and Co Solicitors v Edehomo ChD 2-Mar-2011
The court was asked ‘when an innocent vendor whose signature is forged on the documents for the conveyance of land suffers damage, for the purposes of limitation of an action arising from a solicitor’s breach of duty. Is it on the exchange of . .
Cited – Bowling and Co Solicitors v Edehomo ChD 2-Mar-2011
The court was asked ‘when an innocent vendor whose signature is forged on the documents for the conveyance of land suffers damage, for the purposes of limitation of an action arising from a solicitor’s breach of duty. Is it on the exchange of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Land

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.425251

Maga v The Trustees of The Birmingham Archdiocese of The Roman Catholic Church: CA 16 Mar 2010

The claimant appealed against rejection of his claim for damages after alleging sexual abuse by a catholic priest. The judge had found the church not vicariously liable for the injuries, and that the archdiocese had not been under a duty further to pursue the investigation of the reports received by them at the time. The respondent appealed saying that the judge had incorrectly found the claimant to lack capacity.
Held: The judge had misdescribed the test for capacity, however, ‘on the question of whether section 28(1) applied . . the issue is certainly not one of discretion; nor is it an issue of primary fact. It is a matter of judgment, and one which is primarily for the first instance tribunal. There may, in an Aristotelian sense, be only one right answer to the question whether a claimant was able to conduct the litigation, but in this imperfect world, it must, in some cases, be an issue on which reasonable and fully informed Judges could differ. In such cases, and this is, in my view, such a one, an appellate court should not interfere with the Judge’s conclusion unless he has relied on irrelevant evidence, ignored relevant evidence, or misunderstood some evidence.’ The claimant was correctly found to lack capacity.
As to the vicarious liability of the archdiocese, the priest had not sought to draw the claimant within his ‘priestly activities’. This issue ‘although very much fact-dependant, is ultimately one of law rather than of inference from facts . .’ and ‘there are a number of factors, which, when taken together, persuade me that there was a sufficiently close connection between Father Clonan’s employment as priest at the Church and the abuse which he inflicted on the claimant to render it fair and just to impose vicarious liability for the abuse on his employer, the Archdiocese.’ Nevertheless, it was part of his duty to evangelise and befriend non-catholics. The claimant being 12, and the position of the priest in charge of youth activities also gave him special responsibilities. The claimant’s appeal succeeded.
As to the church’s duty to take the investigation further, the initial response was in accordance with standards and expectations at the time. The allegation whilst gross was not of the most serious, and it had been put to the priest who had denied it. However, having once been warned, the senior priest came under a duty to keep a closer eye on the priest. Had he done so further assaults would not have taken place. The church was liable for the acts of its senior priest. Applying the test from Caparo, the judge had been wrong to find no duty of care in the Archdiocese.

Lord Neuberger MR, Longmore LJ, Smith LJ
[2010] EWCA Civ 256, [2010] PTSR 1618, [2010] 1 WLR 1441
Bailii, Times
Limitation Act 1980 28(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Kirby v Leather CA 1965
The plaintiff crashed into a van whilst riding his moped and suffered serious brain damage. An inquiry as to a party’s competence to conduct a case had to focus on his capacity to conduct the proceedings. In this case the plaintiff ‘was not capable . .
Mentioned – ST v North Yorkshire County Council CA 14-Jul-1998
The court considered the liability of the respondent for sexual assaults committed by an employee teacher when taking students on school trips.
Held: The Local Authority was not vicariously liable for sexual assault committed by employee . .
Authoritative – Lister and Others v Hesley Hall Ltd HL 3-May-2001
A school board employed staff to manage a residential school for vulnerable children. The staff committed sexual abuse of the children. The school denied vicarious liability for the acts of the teachers.
Held: ‘Vicarious liability is legal . .
Cited – Lloyd v Grace, Smith and Co HL 1912
Mrs Lloyd delivered the title deeds of her cottages at Ellesmere Port to the solicitors’ managing clerk, who defrauded her.
Held: Vicarious liability can extend to fraudulent acts or omissions if those were carried out in the course of the . .
Cited – Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman and others HL 8-Feb-1990
Limitation of Loss from Negligent Mis-statement
The plaintiffs sought damages from accountants for negligence. They had acquired shares in a target company and, relying upon the published and audited accounts which overstated the company’s earnings, they purchased further shares.
Held: The . .
Cited – Lindsay v Wood QBD 16-Nov-2006
The claimant suffered severe brain injury in a crash. The parties sought guidance form the court as to his legal capacity.
Held: The fact that a party may be particularly susceptible to exploitation was a relevant element when considering his . .
Cited – Bernard v The Attorney General of Jamaica PC 7-Oct-2004
PC (Jamaica) The claimant had been queuing for some time to make an overseas phone call at the Post Office. Eventually his turn came, he picked up the phone and dialled. Suddenly a man intervened, announced . .
Applied – Jacobi v Griffiths 17-Jun-1999
(Canadian Supreme Court) The process for determining when a non-authorised act by an employee is so connected to the employer’s enterprise that liability should be imposed involved two steps: 1. Firstly a court should determine whether there are . .
Cited – Masterman-Lister v Brutton and Co and Another (2) CA 16-Jan-2003
The claimant had been funded for a personal injury claim under legal aid. He appealed against a decision that he was not a ‘patient’ and that he had been fully capable of managing and administering his affairs for many years. He lost. The . .
Cited – Dubai Aluminium Company Limited v Salaam and Others HL 5-Dec-2002
Partners Liable for Dishonest Act of Solicitor
A solicitor had been alleged to have acted dishonestly, having assisted in a fraudulent breach of trust by drafting certain documents. Contributions to the damages were sought from his partners.
Held: The acts complained of were so close to . .
Cited – Bazley v Curry 17-Jun-1999
(Canadian Supreme Court) The court considerd the doctrine of vicarious liability: ‘The policy purposes underlying the imposition of vicarious liability on employers are served only where the wrong is so connected with the employment that it can be . .
Appeal from – Maga v The Trustees of The Birmingham Archdiocese of The Roman Catholic Church QBD 22-Apr-2009
There was a sufficiently close connection between the employment of a priest at the church and the abuse which he inflicted on the claimant to render it fair and just to impose vicarious liability for the abuse on his employer, the Archdiocese. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Coulson v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd QBD 21-Dec-2011
coulson_NIQBD2011
The claimant had been employed by the defendant as editor of a newspaper. On leaving they entered into an agreement which the claimant said required the defendant to pay his legal costs in any action arising regarding his editorship. The defendant . .
Cited – The Catholic Child Welfare Society and Others v Various Claimants and The Institute of The Brothers of The Christian Schools and Others SC 21-Nov-2012
Law of vicarious liability is on the move
Former children at the children’s homes had sought damages for sexual and physical abuse. The court heard arguments as to the vicarious liability of the Society for abuse caused by a parish priest visiting the school. The Court of Appeal had found . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Vicarious Liability, Limitation

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.402951

Parker and Another v SJ Berwin and Co and Another: QBD 17 Dec 2008

The claimants sought damages from their former solicitors. They set out to purchase a football club, expending substantial sums for the purpose, relying on the defendants’ promised provision of service in finding and arranging the funding. They said that the defendants made no progress, the opportunity was lost, and their money wasted. After a dilatory action, the claimants sought permission to amend their particulars out of time to add several new claims.
Held: Some amendments were allowed since they arose from the same facts, and others were rejected as having no prospect of success. However, it was not open to the Claimants to ‘rely on the CCC Films principle in the present case. There is no presumption that their wasted expenditure is recoverable in full. To recover any of that expenditure they must establish that there was a real and substantial chance of the expenditure being recovered, as would be usual in cases of this nature, and as they themselves initially acknowledged and pleaded.’

Hamblen J
[2008] EWHC 3017 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Cobbold v London Borough of Greenwich CA 9-Aug-1999
The tenant had sought an order against the council landlord for failure to repair her dwelling. The defendant appealed refusal of leave to amend the pleadings in anticipation of the trial, now due to start on the following day.
Held: Leave was . .
Cited – Finlan v Winfield ChD 2007
Blackburne J said that when considering an application to amend particulars of claim outside the limitation period: ‘the court should not confine itself to a comparison of the new cause of action with the existing cause of action at the highest . .
Cited – Smith v Henniker-Major and Co CA 22-Jul-2002
The claimant appealed the strike-out of his claim for professional negligence against the respondent solicitors. He claimed that the solicitors had acted in breach of their duty, and he then called a company meeting. Only he attended. He mistakenly . .
Cited – Swain v Hillman CA 21-Oct-1999
Strike out – Realistic Not Fanciful Chance Needed
The proper test for whether an action should be struck out under the new Rules was whether it had a realistic as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success. There was no justification for further attempts to explain the meaning of what are clear . .
Cited – Independents’ Advantage Insurance Company Ltd v Cook and Another CA 24-Jul-2003
‘The power of the court to strike out a statement of case under CPR 3.4(2)(a) – and the related power to give summary judgment under CPR 24.2 – has an important place in the disposal of claims in accordance with the Civil Procedural Rules. The . .
Not applied – CCC Films (London) Ltd v Impact Quadrant Films Ltd 1984
The claimants purchased a licence to promote three films, but the defendant lost the film prints and CCC could not therefore promote them. After their claim for loss of profit failed in the absence of evidence, they claimed for the expenditure they . .
Cited – Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons and Simmons CA 12-May-1995
Lost chance claim – not mere speculative claim
Solicitors failed to advise the plaintiffs sufficiently in a property transaction. A warranty against liability for a former tenant’s obligations under leases had not been obtained. The trial judge held that, on a balance of probabilities, there was . .
Cited – Law Society of England and Wales and others v Shah and others ChD 30-Nov-2007
Solicitor firms had been made bankrupt leaving a shortfall after thefts from client accounts of over 12 million pounds. The thief had diappeared, and the other partners were now discharged form bankruptcy. The Law Society accepted that it could not . .
Cited – Cullinane v British ‘Rema’ Manufacturing Co Ltd CA 1954
The court considered the possibility of a claim in breach of contract for damages for both capital loss and loss of profit.
Lord Evershed MR said: ‘It seems to me, as a matter of principle, that the full claim of damages in the form in which . .
Cited – Anglia Television v Oliver Reed CA 1971
The television company had agreed with the actor defendant for him to appear in a production. He breached the contract. The company sought both loss of profits and for the expense incurred. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether such . .
Cited – South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd etc HL 24-Jun-1996
Limits of Damages for Negligent Valuations
Damages for negligent valuations are limited to the foreseeable consequences of advice, and do not include losses arising from a general fall in values. Valuation is seldom an exact science, and within a band of figures valuers may differ without . .
Cited – L Albert and Son v Armstrong Rubber Co 1949
(United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit) A purchaser of machines designed to recondition rubber sought damages for breach of contract, namely, the cost of the foundation on which the machines were placed. However, the purchaser did not prove . .
Cited – Filobake Ltd v Rondo Ltd and Another CA 11-May-2005
Unsuitability of baking equipment installation. A claimant in a breach of contract claim has a choice whether to claim loss of profits or wasted expenditure. . .
Cited – Galoo Ltd and Others v Bright Grahame Murray CA 21-Dec-1993
It is for the Court to decide whether the breach of duty was the cause of a loss or simply the occasion for it by the application of common sense. A breach of contract, to found recovery, must be shown to have been ‘an ‘effective’ or ‘dominant’ . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Litigation Practice, Limitation

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.278861

National Ability Sa v Tinna Oils and Chemicals Ltd: CA 11 Dec 2009

Implied promise to pay arbitral award

The parties disputed how limitation affects the enforcement of an arbitration award. More than six years had passed since the award had been made, and the defendant said it was out of time.
Held: A party can enforce an award either by ordinary action as an action founded upon the implied promise to pay the award, or in the same manner as a judgment is a statutory process. ‘There is a clear distinction between an arbitration award and a judgment. An arbitration agreement is in essence enforceable because of the implied contractual promise to pay an arbitration award contained in the arbitration agreement; all measures of enforcement essentially rest upon the contract. The provisions of s.26 of the 1950 Act and s.66 of the 1996 Act must be seen in that context. They are simply procedural provisions enabling the award made in consensual arbitral proceedings to be enforced.’

[2009] EWCA Civ 1330, Times 24-Dec-2009, [2010] CP Rep 18, [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222, [2009] 2 CLC 982, [2010] 2 All ER 899
Bailii
Arbitration Act 1950 26, Arbitration Act 1996 66, Limitation Act 1980 24
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Re Boks and Co v Peters, Rushton and Co Ltd CA 1919
The alternative procedure for seeking enforcement of an arbitrator’s award is by an action upon the award. The procedure is to be used only in ‘reasonably clear cases’. . .
Cited – Middlemiss and Gould v Hartley Corporation Pty Ltd CA 1972
The defendant challenged enforcement of an arbitration award.
Held: The challenge had not been made in time, and the award was final and conclusive. Lord Denning MR said that an arbitration award is like a final judgment which should be . .
Cited – Hall and Woodhouse Ltd v Panorama Hotel Properties Ltd 1974
. .
Cited – Agromet Motoimport Ltd v Maulden Engineering Co (Beds) Ltd 1985
Time begins to run on the collection of an arbitration award, not from the date upon which the award is made or published, but from the date when the paying party is in breach of its implied obligation to pay the award. . .
Cited – Good Challenger Navegante S A v Metalexportimport SA CA 24-Nov-2003
The claimant sought to enforce an arbitration award made in 1983. Time might otherwise have expired, but the claimants relied on a fax which they said was an acknowledgement of the debt, and also upon a finding in a Romanian court which created an . .
Cited – Lowsley and Another v Forbes CA 21-Mar-1996
The statutory time limit under the Limitation Act applied only to the right to take substantive proceedings and had nothing whatever to do with the procedural machinery for enforcing a judgment when one was obtained. The Act of 1875 brought about a . .
Cited – Ex Parte Caucasian Trading Corporation: Bankruptcy Petition CA 1896
A proceeding in bankruptcy was based upon an order to enforce an ordinary civil arbitration award. Under the 1889 Act it was possible to obtain an order in the High Court of England for the enforcement of such an order and all that was held was that . .
Cited – National Westminster Bank v Powney CA 1990
The limitation period has nothing to do with the procedural machinery of enforcing a judgment when one was obtained. . .
Cited – Erskine, Regina v; Regina v Williams CACD 14-Jul-2009
The defendants had been separately convicted of murder several years ago. They sought the quashing of the convictions and substitution of convictions for manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility.
Held: The appeal of Erskine . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Arbitration, Limitation

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.383834

Linfood Cash and Carry v Thomson: EAT 1989

One employee had informed his employer that a fellow employee had stolen two books of credit notes. He refused to allow his identity to be disclosed for fear of reprisals. The Tribunal had held that the dismissal was unfair because although the employers had a genuine belief in the employee’s guilt they had no reasonable ground for that belief and had not carried out as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in all the circumstances; and in particular considered that in the absence of any corroborative evidence, a most stringent enquiry should have been made by management to ascertain that the informant was not actuated by improper motives.
Held: The employer’s appeal was dismissed. Wood P said that when assessing credibility: ‘the tribunal must not substitute their own view for the view of the employer, and thus they should be putting to themselves the question – could this employer acting reasonably and fairly in these circumstances properly accept the facts and opinions which it did? The evidence given is that given during the disciplinary procedures and not that which is given before the Tribunal. If a Tribunal is to say that this employer could not reasonably have accepted a witness as truthful, it seems to us that this decision must be based on logical and substantial grounds – good reasons.’
The court set out a checklist to be used in assessing the reliability of an anonymous informant witness. ‘We have been told by both sides that there seems to be no decision of this court giving guidance upon appropriate procedures for an employer to adopt where informants are involved. It is obvious that from whichever side of industry one looks it is important that dishonesty and lack of trust should, where possible, be eliminated, but a careful balance must be maintained between the desirability to protect informants who are genuinely in fear, and providing a fair hearing of issues for employees who are accused of misconduct. We are told that there is no clear guidance to be found from ACAS publications, and the lay members of this court have given me the benefit of their wide experience.
Every case must depend upon its own facts, and circumstances may vary widely – indeed with further experience other aspects may demonstrate themselves – but we hope that the following comments may prove to be of assistance:

    1. The information given by the informant should be reduced into writing in one or more statements. Initially these statements should be taken without regard to the fact that in those cases where anonymity is to be preserved, it may subsequently prove to be necessary to omit or erase certain parts of the statements before submission to others – in order to prevent identification.
    2. In taking statements the following seem important:
    (a) date, time and place of each or any observation or incident;
    (b) the opportunity and ability to observe clearly and with accuracy;
    (c) the circumstantial evidence such as knowledge of a system, or the reason for the presence of the informer and why certain small details are memorable;
    (d) whether the informant has suffered at the hands of the accused or has any other reason to fabricate, whether from personal grudge or any other reason or principle.

3. Further investigation can then take place either to confirm or undermine the information given. Corroboration is clearly desirable.
4. Tactful inquiries may well be thought suitable and advisable into the character and background of the informant or any other information which may tend to add or detract from the value of the information.
5. If the informant is prepared to attend a disciplinary hearing, no problem with arise, but if, as in the present case, the employer is satisfied that the fear is genuine then a decision will need to be made whether or not to continue with the disciplinary process.
6. If it is to continue, then it seems to us desirable that at each stage of those procedures the member of management responsible for that hearing should himself interview the informant and satisfy himself that weight is to be given to the information.
7. The written statement of the informant – if necessary with omissions to avoid identification – should be made available to the employee and his representatives.
8. If the employee or his representative raises any particular and relevant issue which should be put to the informant, then it may be desirable to adjourn for the chairman to make further inquiries of that informant.
9. Although it is always desirable for notes to be taken during disciplinary procedures, it seems to us to be particularly important that full and careful notes should be taken in these cases.
10. Although not peculiar to cases where informants have been the cause for the initiation of an investigation, it seems to us important that if evidence from an investigating officer is to be taken at a hearing it should, where possible, be prepared in a written form.
‘This case also appears to highlight the problems facing a Tribunal when considering credibility. As Mr O’Hara confirmed to us, the tribunal must not substitute their own view for the view of the employer, and thus they should be putting to themselves the question – could this employer acting reasonably and fairly in these circumstances properly accept the facts and opinions which it did? The evidence is that given during the disciplinary procedures and not that which is given before the Tribunal.
If a Tribunal is to say that this employer could not reasonably have accepted a witness as truthful, it seems to us that that decision must be based upon logical and substantial grounds – good reasons. Instances might be – that the witness was a bare faced liar, who must have given that impression to the employer at the relevant time; that the witness was clearly biased – provided that such a bias should have been clear at the relevant time; that documents available at the relevant time clearly showed the witness to be inaccurate and that such documentary evidence was ignored by the employer.
However, there could be other less obvious situations where mere vagueness and uncertainty would not be sufficient, and it should never be forgotten that cross-examination by experienced advocates may produce a picture not made evident during the disciplinary procedures. For the Tribunal merely to prefer one witness to another might well not be sufficient as this could be to substitute their own view. The employers have the peculiar advantage over the Tribunal of having an intimate knowledge of the geography, the nature and workings of the business and the various members of the staff.’

Wood P
[1989] IRLR 235, [1989] ICR 518
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – British Home Stores Ltd v Burchell EAT 1978
B had been dismissed for allegedly being involved with a number of other employees in acts of dishonesty relating to staff purchases. She had denied the abuse. The tribunal had found the dismissal unfair in the methods used to decide to dismiss her. . .

Cited by:
Mentioned – Hussain v Elonex Plc CA 17-Mar-1999
The claimant appealed against a finding that he had not been unfairly dismissed. He said that the procedure adopted had been unfair, since he had not had opportunity to see the statements provided to his employer by independent witnesses of the . .
Mentioned – Regina (S) v Brent London Borough Council and Others Regina (T) v Brent and Others Regina (P) v Oxfordshire County Council’s Exclusion Appeals Panel and Another CA 17-May-2002
Three pupils appealed their exclusion from school for violent or threatening behaviour.
Held: The statute imposed clear obligations on the appeal panel to act independently, and to consider both the individual circumstances of the child and . .
Cited – West Coast Trains Ltd v Murphy EAT 4-Apr-2006
EAT The claimant, a service manager employed on the respondents’ trains, was dismissed on conduct grounds for having sworn at and been threatening towards a customer. She claimed she had been unfairly dismissed . .
Cited – Ramsey, Hamblet and Treweeke v Walker Snack Foods Ltd, D McDonnell EAT 13-Feb-2004
Three employees appealed decisions that they had not been unfairly dismissed. The employer had suspected them of involvement in a scam involving the diversion of prize-winning crisp packets. Informants had insisted on remaining anonymous. The . .
Cited – Asda Stores Ltd v Thompson and others EAT 11-Oct-2001
. .
Cited – 2 Care v Ababio EAT 20-Oct-1999
. .
Cited – TNT Express UK Ltd v McConnell EAT 25-Nov-1994
. .
Cited – Boys and Girls Welfare Society v McDonald EAT 18-Oct-1995
. .
Cited – Signs and Labels Ltd v Wallace EAT 22-Jan-1996
. .
Cited – Ainsworth and others v Whitbread Plc EAT 17-Dec-1997
. .
Cited – Louies v Coventry Hood and Seating Co EAT 1990
An employer’s dismissal procedure need not be prima facie unfair if the employee was not permitted to know the contents of statements on which the employer would rely in taking a decision to dismiss or confirm a previous dismissal. Wood J said: ‘It . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Employment

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.267933

Adelson and Another v Associated Newspapers Ltd: QBD 19 Dec 2007

Applications were launched with in defamation proceedings to seek to recover damages for parties who had not previously been part of the proceedings.
Held: The amendments were refused. The new claimants were now out of time, and it was clear that they had taken steps before the limitation period had expired, but chose to pursue a different and failed approach. Moreover, ‘I accept that Parliament, following the recommendations of the Neill Committee, decided to put in place a more flexible regime, in the sense that the much reduced period of limitation should be balanced by a broader discretion on the court’s part to extend the period, having regard to what is perceived to be ‘equitable’ in all the circumstances of the case. But genuine libel claims must still be pursued with vigour: that is the most important policy consideration underlying the legislative change.’

Eady J
[2007] EWHC 3028 (QB)
Bailii
Defamation Act 1996
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – D and L Caterers Ltd v D’Ajou 1945
Damages in favour of a corporate body in defamation cases are limited to financial damage. . .
Cited – Grovit and others v Doctor and others HL 24-Apr-1997
The plaintiff began a defamation action against seven defendants. Each had admitted publication but pleaded justification. The claims against the fourth to seventh defendants were dismissed by consent, and the third had gone into liquidation. The . .
Cited – Steedman, Clohosy, Smith, Kiernan, Newman, Creevy, Anderson v The British Broadcasting Corporation CA 23-Oct-2001
The claimants had issued defamation proceedings. The defendant said they were out of time, having begun the action more than one year after the alleged publication, but accepted that they had not been prejudiced in their defence. The court refused . .
Cited – Hartley v Birmingham City District Council CA 1992
The writ was issued one day late; there had been early notification of the claim; and the defendant’s ability to defend the case was unaffected. The plaintiff asked the court to exercide its discretion to allow the claim t proceed.
Held: The . .
See Also – Adelson and Another v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 1-May-2007
. .
See Also – Adelson and Another v Associated Newspapers Ltd CA 9-Jul-2007
The claimant sought to add the name of a further claimant. The defendant objected, saying that it was after the expiry of the limitation period.
Held: The claimant was seeking to use the rules for substitution of parties to add a party. In . .

Cited by:
See Also – Adelson and Another v Associated Newspapers QBD 19-Feb-2008
Complaint was made that an article was defamatory of the owner of Manchester United. The defendant now argued that the game was not worth the candle. The costs vastly exceeded any possible recovery, and it had openly offered vindication, and that . .
Cited – Bewry v Reed Elseveir (UK) Ltd and Another QBD 10-Oct-2013
The claimant had begin proceedings against the defendant legal publishers, saying that their summary of a cash had brought was defamatory. He now sought leave to extend the limitation period for his claim, and the defendants argued that, given the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation, Damages, Limitation

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.263254

Birmingham City Council v Abdulla and Others: SC 24 Oct 2012

Former employees wished to argue that they had been discriminated against whilst employed by the Council. Being out of time for Employment Tribunal Proceedings, they sought to bring their cases in the ordinary courts. The Council now appealed against the refusal to strike out the claims on the basis that they could more conveniently have been heard by the tribunals.
Held: The appeal failed (Wilson, Hale, Rogers LL majority, Sumption and Carnwath LL dissenting). The fact that the six months limit in the Tribunal had never allowed an extension by discretion, was enough to imply a recognition of the alternative jurisdiction available to claimants. Save for any other element of abuse, it could never be said that a case could be more conveniently disposed of where that disposal would be an inevitable dismissal without consideration of the merits or justice of the case.
Lord Sumption (dissenting) said that a decision in favour of the claimants would frustrate the underlying purposes of the 1970 Act. The availability of the limitation defence was of particular significance for employers. The notion of ‘convenience’ under section 2(3) was much wider than the mere efficient distribution of business. The fact that a claim in the tribunal would be out of time was highly relevant, but not conclusive.

Lady Hale, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath
[2012] UKSC 47, [2013] IRLR 38, [2012] ICR 1419, [2012] Eq LR 1147, [2012] WLR(D) 294
Bailii, Bailii Summary
Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998 1(2)(a), Equal Pay Act 1970 2(3)
England and Wales
Citing:
At first instance – Abdulla and Others v Birmingham City Council QBD 17-Dec-2010
The defendant applied for an order declaring that the claim would better be brought in an employment tribunal and that accordingly the County court should decline jurisdiction.
Held: The application was dismissed: ‘ I reject the submission by . .
Appeal from – Birmingham City Council v Abdulla and Others CA 29-Nov-2011
The Council appealed against an order dismissing its application for the claimants’ claims under equal pay legislation to be struck out for want of jurisdiction. The claims had been brought in the High Court rather than te hEmployment Tribunal, thus . .
Cited – Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd, The Spiliada HL 1986
Forum Non Conveniens Restated
The House reviewed the authorities on the principle of forum non conveniens and restated how to apply the principle where the defendant seeks a stay of proceedings on the ground that there is another more appropriate forum.
Held: ‘In the . .
Cited – Ashby and Others v Birmingham City Council QBD 3-Mar-2011
The claimants appealed against the strike out of their claims for damages for breach of contract on imposing changes in employment contract and conditions. The County Court had accepted the Council’s arguments on the construction and application of . .
Cited – Litster and Others v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Co Ltd HL 16-Mar-1989
The twelve applicants had been unfairly dismissed by the transferor immediately before the transfer, and for a reason connected with the transfer under section 8(1). The question was whether the liability for unfair dismissal compensation . .
Cited – Delaney v Staples HL 15-Apr-1992
The claimant had been dismissed but had been given no payment in lieu of notice. She claimed to the Industrial Tribunal that this was an unlawful deduction from her wages and that therefore the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction.
Held: The . .
Cited – Levez etc v T H Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd (No 2) EAT 1-Oct-1999
The restriction on the awards of compensation for sex discrimination to payments in respect of a period of two years prior to the claim was unlawful. Claims of other natures were not so limited, and this could not be supported, since it was in . .
Cited – Preston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others; Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank plc ECJ 16-May-2000
ECJ Social policy – Men and women – Equal pay – Membership of an occupational pension scheme – Part-time workers – Exclusion – National procedural rules – Principle of effectiveness – Principle of equivalence. . .
Cited – Preston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others, Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank Plc (No 2) HL 8-Feb-2001
Part-time workers claimed that they had been unlawfully excluded from occupational pension schemes because membership was dependent on an employee working a minimum number of hours per week and that that was discriminatory because a considerably . .
Cited – Radakovits v Abbey National Plc CA 17-Nov-2009
The Tribunal had considered the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. It heard evidence, and considered that there was no jurisdiction. This was despite the fact that, at an earlier stage, the employer had said that it would not contest . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Discrimination, Limitation

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.465179

OB v Aventis Pasteur SA: HL 11 Jun 2008

The claimant had been vaccinated with a HIB vaccine. He was severely injured and it was said that the vaccine was the cause, and a claim made under the 1987 Act. Originally the claim was made against a UK company, but it should have been against that company’s parent company. When the correct company was to be substituted, it said the claim was out of time. The House was asked where proceedings are commenced aganst someone wrongly identified as the producer ‘is it consistent with article 11 for the court to be able to say that the proceedings shall count as having been instituted against the real producer and amended accordingly? ‘
Held: There must be a further reference to the ECJ. It was not completely clear whether the ECJ had decided that provided a national court had due and proper regard to the Directive, it was permissible for that national court to treat proceedings against one company as if they were proceedings against another.

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond
[2008] UKHL 34
Bailii, HL
Council Directive 85/374/EEC 11, Consumer Protection Act 1987 35
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Horne-Roberts (a Child) v Smithkline Beecham plc and Another CA 18-Dec-2001
The court has a power to order substitution of a party though the limitation period, and even the ‘long stop’ limitation period had expired. The claimant child sought damages after a vaccination. The batch had been attributed to the wrong . .
At ECJ – Declan O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd, formerly Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd, Sanofi Pasteur SA ECJ 9-Feb-2006
ECJ Directive 85/374/EEC – Liability for defective products – Definition of -putting into circulation- of the product – Supply by the producer to a wholly owned subsidiary. . .
At QBD – O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd QBD 20-Oct-2006
The claimant sought damages under the 1967 Act asserting injury from a drug sold by the defendant. Proceedings had been mistakenly commenced against Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd within the limitation period, but outside the limitation period, it was . .
Cited – Skov AEG v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S ECJ 10-Jan-2006
ECJ Directive 85/374/EEC – Liability for defective products – Liability of the supplier of a defective product.
The class of persons liable against whom an injured person is entitled to bring an action under . .
Cited – Srl CILFIT v Ministero Della Sanita ECJ 6-Oct-1982
ECJ The obligation to refer to the Court of Justice questions concerning the interpretation of the EEC Treaty and of measures adopted by the community institutions which the third paragraph of article 177 of the . .
Cited – Countryside Alliance and others, Regina (on the Application of) v Attorney General and Another HL 28-Nov-2007
The appellants said that the 2004 Act infringed their rights under articles 8 11 and 14 and Art 1 of protocol 1.
Held: Article 8 protected the right to private and family life. Its purpose was to protect individuals from unjustified intrusion . .
At CA – O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
The claimant had made a mistake in naming the defendant company, but had intended the company which it now requested the court to substitute as defendant. The limitation period had expired.
Held: The substitution was necessary to decide the . .
Appeal from – O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
Whether two applications for leave to appeal between the same parties should be heard together. . .

Cited by:
See Also – O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
The claimant had made a mistake in naming the defendant company, but had intended the company which it now requested the court to substitute as defendant. The limitation period had expired.
Held: The substitution was necessary to decide the . .
See Also – O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
Whether two applications for leave to appeal between the same parties should be heard together. . .
At HL – Aventis Pasteur v O’Byrne (Environment And Consumers) ECJ 2-Dec-2009
Europa Directive 85/374/EEC – Liability for defective products Articles 3 and 11 Mistake in the classification of ‘producer’ Judicial proceedings – Application for substitution of the producer for the original . .
At HL – O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa SC 26-May-2010
The claimant wished to claim damages after suffering serious injury as a child having been vaccinated with a drug manufactured by a defendant (APMSD). The defendant had relied on a defence saying that the limitation period under the Directive was 10 . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, Limitation, Personal Injury

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.268809

Forster v Outred and Co: CA 1981

A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for payment was made, but when she signed the mortgage deed.
Held: The cause of action was complete when the mother relied on the solicitor’s negligent advice and acted to her detriment by signing the deed. ‘Actual damage suffered’ so as to give rise to a claim in tort, and to begin the limitation period, is any detriment, liability or loss capable of assessment in money terms and includes liability which may arise on a contingency.
Dunn LJ said: ‘As soon as she executed the mortgage the plaintiff not only became liable under its express terms but also – and more importantly – the value of the equity of redemption of her property was reduced. Before she executed the mortgage deed she owned the property free from incumbrances; thereafter she became the owner of a property subject to a mortgage. That, in my view, was a quantifiable loss and as from that date her cause of action against her solicitor was complete. The actual quantum of damages would, of course, depend on events between that date and the date when the damages had finally to be assessed, but the cause of action was complete when she executed the mortgage, without proof of special damage.’
Stephenson LJ asked: ‘What is meant by actual damage? Mr Stuart-Smith says that it is any detriment, liability or loss capable of assessment in money terms and it includes liabilities which may arise on a contingency, particularly a contingency over which the plaintiff has no control; things like loss of earning capacity, loss of a chance or bargain, loss of profit, losses incurred from onerous provisions or covenants in leases. They are all illustrations of a kind of loss which is meant by ‘actual’ damage. It was also suggested in argument, and I would accept it, that ‘actual’ is really used in contrast to ‘presumed’ or ‘assumed.’ Whereas damage is presumed in trespass and libel, it is not presumed in negligence and has to be proved. There has to be some actual damage.’
He concluded: ‘Although there is no more direct authority than those cases among those which have been cited to us, I would accept Mr. Stuart-Smith’s statement of the law and would conclude that, on the facts of this case, the plaintiff has suffered actual damage through the negligence of her solicitors by entering into the mortgage deed, the effect of which has been to encumber her interest in her freehold estate with this legal charge and subject her to a liability which may, according to matters completely outside her control, mature into financial loss – as indeed it did. It seems to me that the plaintiff did suffer actual damage in those ways; and subject to that liability and with that encumbrance on the mortgage property was then entitled to claim damages, not, I would think, an indemnity and probably not a declaration, for the alleged negligence of the solicitor which she alleges caused her that damage. In those circumstances her cause of action was complete on February 8, 1973, and the writ which she issued on March 25, 1980, was issued too late to come within the six years’ period of limitation.’

Stephenson LJ, Dunn LJ
[1982] 1 WLR 86
England and Wales
Cited by:
Approved – Nykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
Cited – Hatton v Messrs Chafes (A Firm) CA 13-Mar-2003
The defendant firm appealed against a refusal to strike out the claimant’s claim for professional negligence, asserting that the judge should have considered the limitation issue in the light of Khan v Falvey.
Held: By the time that the . .
Considered – UBAF Ltd v European American Banking Corporation CA 1984
The defendant invited the plaintiff to take part in a syndicated loan. The defendant’s assistant secretary signed a letter to the plaintiff making representations, now claimed to be fraudulent. The defendant succeeded at first instance arguing that . .
Cited – Daniels v Thompson CA 18-Mar-2004
The executor brought an action against the solicitor who had advised his client in connection with the transfer of her house in which she was to continue to live, saying he should have advised her that the gift would not protect her from Inheritance . .
Applied – Milton v Walker and Stanger 1981
The plaintiff instructed her solicitor to prepare documents and advise on a gift from P’s uncle to P and her cousin W in the proportions 2/3:1/3. P and W agreed that, should the farm be sold, the costs and capital gains tax (CGT) arising there from . .
Cited – Baker v Ollard and Bentley CA 12-May-1982
The plaintiff and a Mr and Mrs Bodman agreed to buy a house. The plaintiff intended to live on the first floor and the Bodmans on the ground floor. The solicitor should have advised them to convey the freehold into their joint names and then to . .
Cited – D W Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
The company took in a new director and shareholder, and relied upon their solicitors to draft a covenant to restrain him competing within a set time of leaving the company. The covenant turned out to be ineffective. The defendant solicitors replied . .
Cited – Bell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .
Cited – Knapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc and Another CA 30-Oct-1997
A claim in negligence was brought against insurance brokers for failing to advise the claimant of certain matters with the result that an insurance policy entered into by the claimant was voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The claimant . .
Followed – D W Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
The company took in a new director and shareholder, and relied upon their solicitors to draft a covenant to restrain him competing within a set time of leaving the company. The covenant turned out to be ineffective. The defendant solicitors replied . .
Cited – The Law Society v Sephton and Co and others CA 13-Dec-2004
The Society appealed dismissal for limitation of its claim against the defendant firm of accountants arising from alleged fraud in approval of a solicitor’s accounts.
Held: The liability did not arise until the Society decided to make . .
Distinguished – Telfair Shipping Operation SA v Inersea Carriers SA, the Caroline P 1984
A claim was made in contract based on an indemnity.
Held: The claim was not time-barred. Time normally begins to run against a claim on a general indemnity only from the moment when the liability of the indemnified is accepted by him or . .
Cited – Robert Mark Gordon v J B Wheatley and Co (a Firm) CA 24-May-2000
The defendant solicitors had negligently advised the claimant in connection with a mortgage scheme he operated for customers. His case was that the defendants had negligently failed to advise him to register under s3 of the 1986 Act. The claimant . .
Cited – Pirelli General Cable Works v Oscar Faber and Partners HL 2-Jan-1983
The plaintiff asked the defendant consulting engineer to design an extension to their factory in 1969. Not later than in April 1970, cracks developed in the chimney. In 1977 the cause of the damage was discovered. It arose from design faults in the . .
Cited – Abbott and Another v Will Gannon and Smith Ltd CA 2-Mar-2005
The claimant had employed the defendants to design refurbishment works for their hotel. The work was said to be negligent, and the claimant sought damages. The defendant argued as a preliminary point that the claim was time barred. The question was . .
Cited – Iqbal v Legal Services Commission CA 10-May-2005
The claimant had been a partner in a firm of solicitors. They came to be suspected by the respondent of overclaiming legal aid payments and sums were withheld. For this and other reasons the practice folded, and the claimant became insolvent. He . .
Cited – Haward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
Rejected – Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia 1992
(High Court of Australia) A claim was based on a statutory trade indemnity scheme. The insurers claimed damages from Wardley, on the basis that its alleged deceit induced them to grant an indemnity, which was subsequently called on.
Held: . .
Cited – Law Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others HL 10-May-2006
A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from . .
Cited – First National Comercial Bank plc v Humberts CA 27-Jan-1995
The plaintiff loaned money on the basis of a negligent survey by the defendant. The borrower subsequently defaulted, and the lender issued a writ. The defendant said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The court allowed the plaintiff’s . .
Cited – Watkins and Another v Jones Maidment Wilson (A Firm) CA 4-Mar-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence by the defendant solicitors in advising them to agree to a postponment of a completion. The defendants raised as a preliminary issue the question of limitation. The claimant said that the limitation . .
Cited – Tabarrok v E D C Lord and Co (A Firm) CA 14-Feb-1997
The appellant wanted to open a pizza restaurant. He and his partners acquired a company for the purpose, which was to take a lease of premises. They sought advice from the defendants who, they said, failed to advise them of the need to be aware of . .
Cited – Pegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
Cited – Bowling and Co Solicitors v Edehomo ChD 2-Mar-2011
The court was asked ‘when an innocent vendor whose signature is forged on the documents for the conveyance of land suffers damage, for the purposes of limitation of an action arising from a solicitor’s breach of duty. Is it on the exchange of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Damages, Professional Negligence

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.179760

Pegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another: ChD 11 Nov 2008

The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
Held: The defence in fact was that the claimant had both brought the claim too early because no tax liability had yet arisen, and too late because the arrangement had been set up several years before. Any contract breach took place when the breach occurred and that was time barred. In negligence, time ran from the time when any actual damage occurred, and ‘where the client has engaged professionals in connection with a transaction to secure for him some property or rights, and because of the negligence of those professionals, the client acquires less valuable property or rights than he would have done if he had been given correct advice, he suffers damage at the time of the transaction, even if the property or rights are worth no less than he actually paid for them.’ The damage occurred on the purchase of the shares, and the claim was time barred.

Lewison J
[2008] EWHC 2720 (Ch)
Bailii
Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 164A, Finance Act 1997, Finance Act 1993, Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Forster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .
Cited – Watkins and Another v Jones Maidment Wilson (A Firm) CA 4-Mar-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence by the defendant solicitors in advising them to agree to a postponment of a completion. The defendants raised as a preliminary issue the question of limitation. The claimant said that the limitation . .
Cited – Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd and Others v The Bolton Pharmaceutical Company 100 Ltd CA 26-May-2006
Appeals were made against interlocutory injunctions for alleged trade mark infringement.
Held: The court should hesitate about making a final decision for summary judgment without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the . .
Cited – Nykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
Cited – Baker v Ollard and Bentley CA 12-May-1982
The plaintiff and a Mr and Mrs Bodman agreed to buy a house. The plaintiff intended to live on the first floor and the Bodmans on the ground floor. The solicitor should have advised them to convey the freehold into their joint names and then to . .
Cited – Knapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc and Another CA 30-Oct-1997
A claim in negligence was brought against insurance brokers for failing to advise the claimant of certain matters with the result that an insurance policy entered into by the claimant was voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The claimant . .
Cited – E D and F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel and Another CA 4-Apr-2003
The rules contained two occasions on which a court would consider dismissal of a claim as having ‘no real prospect’ of success.
Held: The only significant difference between CPR 24.2 and 13.3(1), is that under the first the overall burden of . .
Cited – Swain v Hillman CA 21-Oct-1999
Strike out – Realistic Not Fanciful Chance Needed
The proper test for whether an action should be struck out under the new Rules was whether it had a realistic as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success. There was no justification for further attempts to explain the meaning of what are clear . .
Cited – The Royal Brompton Hospital National Health Service Trust v Hammond and Others (No 5) CA 11-Apr-2001
When looking at an application to strike out a claim, the normal ‘balance of probabilities’ standard of proof did not apply. It was the court’s task to assess whether, even if supplemented by evidence at trial, the claimant’s claim was bound to fail . .
Cited – UBAF Ltd v European American Banking Corporation CA 1984
The defendant invited the plaintiff to take part in a syndicated loan. The defendant’s assistant secretary signed a letter to the plaintiff making representations, now claimed to be fraudulent. The defendant succeeded at first instance arguing that . .
Cited – DW Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
A solicitor was instructed to prepare an agreement providing for the introduction of a new working director into an insurance broking business carried on by a company. His instructions called for the new director to enter into a restrictive covenant . .
Cited – Bell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .
Cited – Law Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others HL 10-May-2006
A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from . .
Cited – Watts and Co v Morrow CA 30-Jul-1991
The plaintiff had bought a house on the faith of the defendant’s report that there were only limited defects requiring repair. In fact the defects were much more extensive. The defendant surveyor appealed against an award of damages after his . .
Cited – Nykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
Cited – South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd etc HL 24-Jun-1996
Limits of Damages for Negligent Valuations
Damages for negligent valuations are limited to the foreseeable consequences of advice, and do not include losses arising from a general fall in values. Valuation is seldom an exact science, and within a band of figures valuers may differ without . .
Cited – R P Howard Ltd and Witchell v Woodman Matthews and Co (a firm) 1983
The solicitor defendant knew that the company was a family company effectively run by Mr Witchell from whom they received their instructions. The question raised was as to the duty of the solicitor to company and director.
Held: There is no . .
Cited – First National Comercial Bank plc v Humberts CA 27-Jan-1995
The plaintiff loaned money on the basis of a negligent survey by the defendant. The borrower subsequently defaulted, and the lender issued a writ. The defendant said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The court allowed the plaintiff’s . .
Cited – Coulthard, Ashton Shuttleworth, and Dawes v Neville Russell (a Firm) CA 27-Nov-1997
Auditors who were in a position to advise a company’s directors as to the legality of them making loan payments to a shell company which was acquiring there shares had a duty so to advise. The directors of a company sued them for failing to warn . .
Cited – Shore v Sedgwick Financial Services Ltd CA 23-Jul-2008
The claimant said that the defendant had given him negligent advice on pensions, failing to say that he should stay within his occupational scheme. The defendant pleaded limitation.
Held: The claimant suffered damage when he made the transfer . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.277737

Coad v Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Health Authority: CA 17 Jul 1996

A nurse suffered a back injury in 1983 in the course of her employment. She left the employment of the health authority in either 1990 or 1991. The judge had accepted her evidence that she did not know that she had a right of action against her employers until she left in 1991.
Held: The court should apply a subjective test of the reasons for delay in bringing an action when asked to disallow the three year limitation period. Ignorance of the law which might allow a claim was a reason for disapplying the limitation law. The court is engaged in a subjective inquiry in the sense of ascertaining what the claimant knew and what reasons in fact acted upon his mind. Having once satisfied itself as to the genuineness of the claimant’s reasons, in performing the overall exercise of deciding whether or not it is equitable to exercise the section 33 discretion in favour of the claimant, the court must consider whether or not, in all the circumstances, the reason or reasons advanced by the claimant are sufficient to be given real or decisive weight.
Lord Justice Ward said: ‘The court is required to conduct an inquiry into two factual situations. The first is the length of the delay; the second is the reason for delay on the part of the plaintiff. To add ‘on the part of the plaintiff’ indicates that it is a subjective inquiry in which the court is there engaged.’ and ‘Having found what the reason is, the court must decide whether it is a good or bad reason or, in the language of Russell LJ in Halford v Brooks [1991] 1 WLR 428, whether the plaintiff is culpable or not.’
As to whether a judge’s decision should be overturned: ‘The test is whether or not the learned judge was so plainly wrong that his decision exceeded the ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible.’

Ward, Judge, Rose LJJ
Times 30-Jul-1996, Gazette 17-Jul-1996, [1997] 8 Med LR 154, [1997] 1 WLR 189
Limitation Act 1980 33(3)(a)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Halford v Brooks CA 1991
The defendant had been tried for murder. The plaintiff now sought civil damages. The defendant replied that the case was brought out of time, and now appealed against the court’s extension of the time limit on the basis that the plaintiff had not . .

Cited by:
Cited – McHugh v Gray QBD 27-Jul-2006
. .
Cited – Skerratt v Linfax Ltd (T/A Go Karting for Fun) CA 6-May-2003
. .
Cited – Buckler v J F Finnegan Ltd CA 21-Jun-2004
The claimant sought damages for personal injuries after ingesting asbestos while employed as a joiner by the defendant. The defendant appealed an order allowing the claim to go ahead despite being out of time. . .
Cited – Riddell v Wessex Regional Hospital Authority and Another CA 12-Dec-1996
. .
Cited – Dale v Michelin Tyre Plc CA 3-Mar-1999
. .
Cited – A v Hoare QBD 8-Jul-2008
The claimant sought damages for her rape by the defendant. After his conviction and having served his sentence, the defendant won substantial sums on the lottery.
Held: The sums paid by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board were not paid by . .
Cited – Burke v Ashe Construction Ltd CA 23-May-2003
. .
Cited – Griffin and others v Clwyd Health Authority and others CA 14-May-2001
. .
Cited – KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 12-Feb-2003
The respondent appealed decisions by the court to allow claims for personal injury out of time. The claims involved cases of sexual abuse inflicted by its employees going back over many years.
Held: The judge had misapplied the test laid down . .
Cited – Reed Elsevier Uk Ltd (T/A Lexisnexis) and Another v Bewry CA 30-Oct-2014
Appeal from a decision granting the claimant’s application made pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the limitation period in his proceedings for libel and dismissing the defendants’ application to strike out the claimant’s . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.79241

Phillips and Others v Vaughan: LRA 4 Mar 2016

LRA Application to close registered title by documentary title owners/ first registration of possessory title based on adverse possession/ Whether factual and mental elements of adverse possession established/ Whether the occupation was with consent/ Whether witness statements made by their apparent author/ whether a witness offered an inducement to give evidence/ Whether a further adjournment of proceedings to facilitate a third opportunity to obtain handwriting evidence should be grant

[2016] EWLandRA 2014 – 0497
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15 17, Land Registration Act 2002 11(7)

Registered Land, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.564466

Massey and Another v Boulden and Another: CA 14 Nov 2002

The claimants said they had acquired a right of way by vehicle over land, a village green, having driven over it for more than forty years. It was responded that the act of driving over the land other than on a track had been an unlawful act, and as such could not be the basis for acquiring a right by prescription.
Held: Under the 1988 Act, such driving was a criminal offence, even though as a penal statute it must be interpreted restrictively. The common land fell within the statute. However the 2000 Act and 2002 Regulations would now create the right to purchase such a right of way.

Simon Brown, Mantell, Sedley LJJ
Times 27-Nov-2002, Gazette 23-Jan-2003, [2002] EWCA Civ 1634, [2003] 2 All ER 87, [2003] 1 WLR 1792, [2003] P and CR 355
Bailii
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 68, Road Traffic Act 1988 34(1), Vehicular Access Across Common and Other Land (England) Regulations 2002 (2002 No 1711)
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Hanning and Others v Top Deck Travel Group Ltd CA 9-Jun-1993
The owner of a common appealed a finding that the neighbouring land owner had acquired by prescription a right of way across the common to use a track for commercial vehicles (buses) to get to the property (the bus depot).
Held: An easement . .

Cited by:
Cited – Bakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
Cited – Wall v Collins and Another CA 17-May-2007
Properties, when leasehold, had acquired rights of way by prescription over neighbouring land. The freehold interests were acquired, and the claimant now appealed a decision that the right of way acquired under his lease had disappeared.
Held: . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.178288

Ezekiel v Orakpo: CA 16 Sep 1996

A charging order was made in 1982 to secure pounds 20,000 under a judgment given in 1979. The judgment creditor did not seek to enforce the charging order until almost 12 years had elapsed since the making of the charging order. An order for possession was made so as to enforce the order. The debtor tendered a sum sufficient to pay the principal debt but not interest on it. The parties appealed a finding that the creditor was entitled to interest, but only for six years.
Held: The creditor was entitled to interest not limited to six years. A charging order carries a charge to secure interest, whether or not interest is specifically mentioned. Enforcement of a foreign currency judgment by means of a charging order required the judgment debt first to be converted to Sterling before completion of the enforcement by the making of the charging order. Enforcement of a judgment debt by means of a charging order under the Charging Orders Act 1979 is completed when the charging order is made final.
Millett LJ said that, for a judgement to carry judgment interest it is not necessary to say so specifically. Therefore it is also not necessary to mention interest in any Charging Order carrying the judgement into effect for such interest to be added to the security. He continued:-
‘Section 3(4) of the Charging Orders Act 1979 provides that the Charging Order takes effect as an equitable charge created by the judgment debtor by writing under his hand. It must therefore be given the same effect unless the Act itself provides otherwise as would an equitable charge on the land in question to secure a stated principle sum but with no mention of interest. Such a charge would carry interest even though there were no words allowing interest on the charge itself. That was decided at first instance in re Drax… which was followed . . in Stoker v Elwell . . The defendant invited us to over rule Stoker . . and re Drax although they have stood unchallenged for nearly a century.
His submission was founded on the well established principle that a Charging Order cannot be given except for an ascertained sum . . It is clear Law for example that a Charging Order cannot be made for untaxed costs. In the present case, of course, the costs were taxed. But it is said by parity of reasoning that it cannot be made to secure future interest since the amount of such interest cannot be ascertained in advance. However, the Charging Orders Act 1979 itself entitles the Court to make a Charging Order for monies due or to become due, and it appears to me that future interest at an ascertained rate (albeit a variable rate) from the date of judgment to the date of payment is an ascertained or at least an ascertainable sum for the purpose of the rule in question.
So far as the costs of enforcing the security are concerned, it is of course perfectly true that at the date of the Charging Order, or indeed subsequently, it was quite impossible to ascertain them. The Judge came to the conclusion that the Charging Order must, by the provisions of the statute, be given the same effect as if it were an equitable charge under hand only. If it were, the chargee would have the right in equity to add the costs of enforcing the security to the security. He considered that that should be implied into the Charging Order by virtue of section 3(4). I agree with him and do not think it necessary to add anything further on the matter.’

Millett LJ
Times 16-Sep-1996, [1997] 1 WLR 340
Judgments Act 1938 17
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Ezekiel v Orakpo ChD 4-Nov-1994
The claimant had obtained a charging order to secure a judgment debt, but took no steps to enforce it for more than twelve years. The chargee denied that it could any longer be enforced, and also that the order carried interest when interest had not . .
See Also – Ezekiel v Orakpo CA 1977
A lease had been forfeited for non payment of rent. The lessor then took proceedings for possession. The tenant claimed that the action was invalid because a receiving order had been made against him in the meantime.
Held: The Court rejected . .

Cited by:
Cited – Carnegie v Glessen and Others CA 1-Mar-2005
A dispute had been settled by imposition of a charging order against property expressed in a foreign currency. The claimant now said such an order was not possible, and had been made by mistake correctable under the slip rule.
Held: The Master . .
Applied – Yorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.80429

DEG-Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v Koshy and Other (No 3); Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (in receivership) v Same (No 3): CA 28 Jul 2003

The company sought to recover damages from a director who had acted dishonestly, by concealing a financial interest in a different company which had made loans to the claimant company. He replied that the claim was out of time. At first instance the first defendant had been found dishonest through non-disclosure, and that section 21 of the 1980 Act applied to leave the claim not out of time.
Held: The authorities suggested that when looking at fiduciaries, a six year period would apply unless excluded under 21(1)(a) or (b). A claim for an account from someone acting as a trustee was such, since it was a claim against his personal liability for his own acts as director, and if fraud was established his case would fall within 21(1)(a), but not (b).
Mummery LJ said that: ‘For limitation purposes the two classes of trust and/or fiduciary duty are treated differently. The first class of case arising from the breach of a pre-existing duty is, or is treated by analogy, as an action by the beneficiary for breach of trust falling within section 21(1) of the 1980 Act. This means that there is no limitation period for the cases falling within section 21(1)(a) or (b); but that there is a six-year limitation period for cases falling with s21(3).’

Mummery, Hale, Carnwath LJJ
[2003] EWCA Civ 1048, Times 09-Sep-2003, [2004] 1 BCLC 131
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 21(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Deg-Deutsch Investitions Und Entwicklungsgesellschaft Mbh v Koshy (No 3) Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Same (No 3) ChD 26-Oct-2001
A claim against a company director which alleged a misapplication of company assets involving a fraudulent, or dishonest breach of trust, was not subject to a limitation period. A company was alleged to have fraudulently hidden certain profits. The . .
Cited – Companhia De Seguros Imperio v Heath (REBX) Ltd and Others CA 20-Jul-2000
Although a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, as a claim in equity, was not subject to the same limitation periods imposed by the Act as claims in tort or contract, a court exercising an equitable jurisdiction should apply similar periods under the . .
Cited – Furs Ltd v Tomkies 1936
(High Court of Australia) ‘the inflexible rule that, except under the authority of a provision in the articles of association, no director shall obtain for himself a profit by means of a transaction in which he is concerned on behalf of the company . .
Cited – Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver HL 20-Feb-1942
Directors Liability for Actions Ouside the Company
Regal negotiated for the purchase of two cinemas in Hastings. There were five directors on the board, including Mr Gulliver, the chairman. Regal incorporated a subsidiary, Hastings Amalgamated Cinemas Ltd, with a share capital of 5,000 pounds. There . .
Cited – Tito v Wadell (No 2) ChD 1977
The liability to account for profits on breach of the self-dealing rule and the fair-dealing rule does not arise from a breach of duty at all. In his judgment such liability is the consequence of an equitable disability rather than of a breach of . .
Cited – Movitex v Bulfield ChD 1988
The court considered a company’s articles of association which excused a director taking an interest in a contract with the company. The court treated the general exclusion of the self-dealing rule in the Articles as subject to the duty of the . .
Cited – Guinness plc v Saunders CA 1988
. .
Cited – Kelly v Cooper and Another PC 25-Nov-1992
There was a dispute between a client and an estate agent in Bermuda. The client sued the estate agent for damages for breach of duty in failing to disclose material information to him and for putting himself in a position where his duty and his . .
Cited – In Re Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd: Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd v Fitzgerald ChD 2-Mar-1995
A sole company director must still have company meetings before entering into a contract even if only he will be present. When a director’s claim to the validity of a contract or arrangement depends upon his disclosure of it at a meeting, he must . .
Cited – Knox v Gye HL 1872
A court will, by analogy, apply a statutory limitation period if the remedy in equity, specific performance, is ‘correspondent to the remedy at law’ and where ‘the suit in equity corresponds with an action at law’. Lord Westbury said: ‘For where the . .
Cited – In Re Sharpe 1892
The misapplication of company money in the form of ultra vires payments of interest to shareholders was treated as a breach of trust by the directors. . .
Cited – Re Lands Allotment Company CA 1894
A limited company is not a trustee of its funds, but their beneficial owner. However, the fiduciary character of the duties of its directors mean that they are treated as if they were trustees of those funds of the company which are in their hands . .
Cited – Taylor v Davies PC 19-Dec-1919
(Ontario) An assignee for the benefit of creditors conveyed mortgaged property to the mortgagee in satisfaction of part of the debt due to him. The mortgagee was also one of the inspectors required by the Canadian legislation to supervise the . .
Cited – Clarkson v Davies PC 1923
In a case involving fraud, referring to Taylor v Davies, Lord Justice Clerk said that: ‘it was there laid down that there is a distinction between a trust which arises before the occurrence of the transaction impeached and cases which arises only by . .
Cited – Mothew (T/a Stapley and Co) v Bristol and West Building Society CA 24-Jul-1996
The solicitor, acting in a land purchase transaction for his lay client and the plaintiff, had unwittingly misled the claimant by telling the claimant that the purchasers were providing the balance of the purchase price themselves without recourse . .
Cited – Paragon Finance Plc (Formerly Known As National Home Loans Corporation Plc v D B Thakerar and Co (a Firm); Ranga and Co (a Firm) and Sterling Financial Services Limited CA 21-Jul-1998
Where an action had been begun on basis of allegations of negligence and breach of trust, new allegations of fraud where quite separate new causes of claim, and went beyond amendments and were disallowed outside the relevant limitation period. . .
Cited – Bairstow and Others v Queens Moat Houses plc CA 17-May-2001
The court considered the liability of directors for an unlawfully paid dividend.
Held: Robert Walker LJ: ‘The prospect of the former directors being able to obtain contribution from innocent recipients of unlawful dividends was debated . .
Cited – J J Harrison v Harrison 2002
A company director, having concealed relevant information from the board, obtained company property at a substantial undervalue. . .
Cited – In re H and R (Minors) (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) HL 14-Dec-1995
Evidence allowed – Care Application after Abuse
Children had made allegations of serious sexual abuse against their step-father. He was acquitted at trial, but the local authority went ahead with care proceedings. The parents appealed against a finding that a likely risk to the children had still . .
Cited – Armitage v Nurse; etc CA 19-Mar-1997
A clause in a trust deed may validly excuse trustees from personal liability for even gross negligence. The trustee was exempted from liability for loss or damage ‘unless such loss or damage shall be caused by his own actual fraud’.
Held: The . .
Cited – Brickenden v London Loan and Savings Co PC 10-May-1934
In order to establish breach of the fiduciary dealing rules, the company does not have to prove that it would not have entered into the transaction if there had been compliance by the director with the fiduciary-dealing rules and he had made . .
Cited – Gross v Lewis Hillman Ltd CA 1970
Where there has been no misdirection on an issue of fact by the trial judge the presumption is that his conclusion on issues of fact is correct. The Court of Appeal will only reverse the trial judge on an issue of fact when it is convinced that his . .
Cited – Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (‘The Ocean Frost’) CA 1985
Proof of corruption not needed for bribe
In establishing that money was paid as an improper inducement or bribe, proof of corruptness or a corrupt motive was unnecessary.
When a court looks at a decision of a judge at first instance, the court stressed the need to look at the . .
See Also – Gwembe Valley Development Company Ltd v Koshy and others CA 3-Dec-2002
Second application further to amend court order . .

Cited by:
Cited – Newgate Stud Company, Newgate Stud Farm Llc v Penfold, Penfold Bloodstock Limited ChD 21-Dec-2004
The claimants sought damages from the defendant. He had been employed to manage their horse-racing activities, and it was alleged that he had made secret profits. The defendant denied any dishonesty, saying all matters were known to the deceased . .
Cited – Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
Cited – Berezovsky v Abramovich ComC 22-May-2008
Applications were made to amend pleadings and for consequential orders. The claimant sought damages of $4.3 billion alleging breach of trust. The claimant sought to add claims which the defendant said were out of time.
Held: The proposed . .
Cited – Green and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
Cited – Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria SC 19-Feb-2014
Bank not liable for fraud of customer
The appellant sought to make the bank liable for a fraud committed by the Bank’s customer, the appellant saying that the Bank knew or ought to have known of the fraud. The court was asked whether a party liable only as a dishonest assistant was a . .
Cited – Halton International Inc Another v Guernroy Ltd CA 27-Jun-2006
The parties had been involved in investing in an airline to secure its future, but it was now said that one party had broken the shareholders’ or voting agreement in not allowing further investments on a pari passu basis. The defendants argued that . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Trusts, Limitation, Equity

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.186028

Brady v Norman: QBD 26 May 2010

The claimant appealed against refusal of the Master to extend the 12 month limitation period in his proposed defamation claim. The allegations related to a dispute at an Aslef barbecue, and later of forgery. The claimant was a former General Secretary of the union, and the defendant the current General Secretary. Earlier allegations had been litigated, but the claimant said that more serious defamations had subsequently come to light.
Held: The appeal failed.
The master had properly considered the various elements, and looked at it, as he should, ‘in the round’: ‘In deciding whether to disapply the limitation period, it was certainly legitimate to weigh up (as he did) whether there remained any need for further vindication, having regard to all that had taken place, and to set that consideration alongside Mr Norman’s loss of the limitation defence and the prospect for him of being vexed, yet again, with litigation over the circumstances of the dismissal five or six years on.’

Eady J
[2010] EWHC 1215 (QB)
Bailii
Defamation Act 1996
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) HL 25-Apr-1985
The House asked when a decision, on the facts, of a first instance court is so wrong as to allow it to be overturned on appeal.
Held: The epithet ‘wrong’ is to be applied to the substance of the decision made by the lower court. ‘Certainly it . .
Cited – Lonzim Plc and Others v Sprague QBD 11-Nov-2009
The court asked whether any damages recovered by the claimant might be so small as to be totally disproportionate to the very high costs that any libel action involves.
Held: Tugendhat J said: ‘It is not enough for a claimant to say that a . .
Cited – Dow Jones and Co Inc v Jameel CA 3-Feb-2005
Presumption of Damage in Defamation is rebuttable
The defendant complained that the presumption in English law that the victim of a libel had suffered damage was incompatible with his right to a fair trial. They said the statements complained of were repetitions of statements made by US . .
Cited – Steedman, Clohosy, Smith, Kiernan, Newman, Creevy, Anderson v The British Broadcasting Corporation CA 23-Oct-2001
The claimants had issued defamation proceedings. The defendant said they were out of time, having begun the action more than one year after the alleged publication, but accepted that they had not been prejudiced in their defence. The court refused . .

Cited by:
Cited – Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD 16-Jun-2010
The claimant said that a review of her book was defamatory and a malicious falsehood. The defendant now sought summary judgment or a ruling as to the meaning of the words complained of.
Held: The application for summary judgment succeeded. The . .
Appeal from – Brady v Norman CA 9-Feb-2011
The claimant sought to have disapplied the limitation period in his defamation claim. The claimant said that in the case of Cain, the Steedman case had not been cited, and that the decisions were incompatible, and that Cain was to be prefered.
Cited – Bewry v Reed Elseveir (UK) Ltd and Another QBD 10-Oct-2013
The claimant had begin proceedings against the defendant legal publishers, saying that their summary of a cash had brought was defamatory. He now sought leave to extend the limitation period for his claim, and the defendants argued that, given the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.416135

Phelps v Mayor and Burgesses London Borough of Hillingdon: CA 4 Nov 1998

The plaintiff claimed damages for the negligent failure of an educational psychologist employed by a local authority to identify that the plaintiff was dyslexic.
Held: An educational psychologist has no duty of care to a child, as opposed to her employer, in failing to diagnose dyslexia which was not an injury but a congenital condition: (Evans LJ) ‘dyslexia is not itself an injury and I do not see how failure to ameliorate or mitigate its effects can be an injury.’ No economic loss damages occurred until the psychologist adopted a particular duty to the child.

Stuart-Smith LJ
Times 09-Nov-1998, Gazette 25-Nov-1998, [1998] EWCA Ci84699 1686, [1999] 1 WLR 500, [1998] ELR 38
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council QBD 10-Oct-1997
An educational psychologist has a professional duty of care to a child when asked to assess for that child for dyslexia, even though the report may be for the local authority. . .
Distinguished – X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council; M (A Minor) and Another v Newham London Borough Council; Etc HL 29-Jun-1995
Liability in Damages on Statute Breach to be Clear
Damages were to be awarded against a Local Authority for breach of statutory duty in a care case only if the statute was clear that damages were capable of being awarded. in the ordinary case a breach of statutory duty does not, by itself, give rise . .
Cited – Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd HL 25-Jul-1994
Lloyds Agents Owe Care Duty to Member; no Contract
Managing agents conducted the financial affairs of the Lloyds Names belonging to the syndicates under their charge. It was alleged that they managed these affairs with a lack of due careleading to enormous losses.
Held: The assumption of . .

Cited by:
Appeal from – Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council; Anderton v Clwyd County Council; Gower v Bromley London Borough Council; Jarvis v Hampshire County Council HL 28-Jul-2000
The plaintiffs each complained of negligent decisions in his or her education made by the defendant local authorities. In three of them the Court of Appeal had struck out the plaintiff’s claim and in only one had it been allowed to proceed.
Cited – Adams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council HL 17-Jun-2004
A attended the defendant’s schools between 1977 and 1988. He had always experienced difficulties with reading and writing and as an adult found those difficulties to be an impediment in his employment. He believed them to be the cause of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Education, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.145165

Aventis Pasteur v O’Byrne (Environment And Consumers): ECJ 2 Dec 2009

Europa Directive 85/374/EEC – Liability for defective products Articles 3 and 11 Mistake in the classification of ‘producer’ Judicial proceedings – Application for substitution of the producer for the original defendant Expiry of the limitation period.
(Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice) The claimant sought damages after consuming a defective medicine supplied by the company. In his action, he sought to amend his pleadings to name the company, having sued the wrong party.
Held: The action was for a claim having its origins in European law which would not give the same discretion as would be given in an English court to add a party after the expiration of the limitation period. However, here the proper defendant was a wholly owned subsidiary of the party named in the original proceedings, and the defendant must have known this, and the court was free, using article 3(3) of the Directive, to treat the actual defendant as the producer liable at law.
‘Article 11 of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, which allows the substitution of one defendant for another during proceedings, from being applied in a way which permits a ‘producer’, within the meaning of Article 3 of that directive, to be sued, after the expiry of the period prescribed by that article, as defendant in proceedings brought within that period against another person.’

V Skouris, P and Judges A. Tizzano, J. N. Cunha Rodrigues, K. Lenaerts, E. Levits, C. W. A. Timmermans, A. Rosas, A Borg Barthet, M. Ilesic, J. Malenovsk}, U. Lohmus, AO Caoimh and J-J Kasel
C-358/08, [2009] EUECJ C-358/08, Times 09-Dec-2009
Bailii
Consumer Protection Act 1987, Directive 85/374 3(3)
European
Citing:
At ECJ (1) – Declan O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd, formerly Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd, Sanofi Pasteur SA ECJ 9-Feb-2006
ECJ Directive 85/374/EEC – Liability for defective products – Definition of -putting into circulation- of the product – Supply by the producer to a wholly owned subsidiary. . .
At HL – OB v Aventis Pasteur SA HL 11-Jun-2008
The claimant had been vaccinated with a HIB vaccine. He was severely injured and it was said that the vaccine was the cause, and a claim made under the 1987 Act. Originally the claim was made against a UK company, but it should have been against . .
See Also – O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd QBD 20-Oct-2006
The claimant sought damages under the 1967 Act asserting injury from a drug sold by the defendant. Proceedings had been mistakenly commenced against Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd within the limitation period, but outside the limitation period, it was . .
At CA – O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
The claimant had made a mistake in naming the defendant company, but had intended the company which it now requested the court to substitute as defendant. The limitation period had expired.
Held: The substitution was necessary to decide the . .
At CA (2) – O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa CA 9-Oct-2007
Whether two applications for leave to appeal between the same parties should be heard together. . .

Cited by:
At ECJ (2) – O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur Sa SC 26-May-2010
The claimant wished to claim damages after suffering serious injury as a child having been vaccinated with a drug manufactured by a defendant (APMSD). The defendant had relied on a defence saying that the limitation period under the Directive was 10 . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Consumer, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.384094

Watkins and Another v Jones Maidment Wilson (A Firm): CA 4 Mar 2008

The claimants alleged professional negligence by the defendant solicitors in advising them to agree to a postponment of a completion. The defendants raised as a preliminary issue the question of limitation. The claimant said that the limitation period did not commence until the damage became more than contingent.
Held: The claimant’s appeal failed. Arden LJ said: ‘If the advice had not been negligent, the claimant would have had the chance of negotiating a better agreement. That chance was an asset with a measurable value. Its absence meant that there was an immediate loss.’

Arden LJ, Longmore LJ, Thomas LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 134, [2008] PNLR 23, [2008] I EGLR 149
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 3
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Nykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
Cited – Law Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others HL 10-May-2006
A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from . .
Cited – Forster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .
Cited – Knapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc and Another CA 30-Oct-1997
A claim in negligence was brought against insurance brokers for failing to advise the claimant of certain matters with the result that an insurance policy entered into by the claimant was voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The claimant . .
Cited – D W Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
The company took in a new director and shareholder, and relied upon their solicitors to draft a covenant to restrain him competing within a set time of leaving the company. The covenant turned out to be ineffective. The defendant solicitors replied . .
Cited – Bell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .
Cited – Anthony McCarroll v Statham Gill Davies (A Firm) CA 1-Apr-2003
The claimant said his solicitors had failed to protect his interests in a partnership agreement into which he subsequently entered. The agreement contained less favourable terms than those which should have been agreed and he claimed damages . .
Cited – Brunsden v Humphrey CA 1884
The defendant had negligently caused damage to a cab driver and his vehicle in the same accident. The cab driver obtained damages for the damage to his vehicle.
Held: He was not disentitled from bringing fresh proceedings for damages for . .
Cited – Hamlin and Another v Edwin Evans (A Firm) CA 15-Jul-1996
The plaintiffs had discovered that the defendant surveyors had negligently failed to observe that there was dry rot but did not start proceedings until other negligence was discovered more than six years later.
Held: Although the negligent . .

Cited by:
Cited – Pegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
Cited – Axa Insurance Ltd v Akther and Darby Solicitors and Others CA 12-Nov-2009
The court considered the application of the limitation period to answering when damage occurred when it arises under an unsecured contingent liability. The claimant insurance company had provided after the event litigation insurance policies to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.266079

Law Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others: HL 10 May 2006

A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from the accountants. The accountants pleaded limitation.
Held: The Law Society faced a contingent liability on the fund, but that was insufficient to start the limitation period. Damage was an essential part of a claim for negligence, and the damages was not suffered until the Society received a claim.
Lord Scott said: ‘a cause of action in tort did not accrue in the Law Society’s favour against Sephtons until the Law Society first received a claim on the Compensation Fund from a Payne and Co client whose money had been misappropriated.’ The limitation period began at that point, and the claim could continue.

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Mance
[2006] UKHL 22, Times 11-May-2006, [2006] 2 AC 543, [2006] 2 WLR 1091
Bailii, House of Lords
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Law Society v KPMG Peat Marwick and Others CA 29-Jun-2000
The respondent accountants had certified accounts for a firm of solicitors whose dishonest defaults later lead to substantial claims on the compensation fund set up by the claimants.
Held: The Law Society who collected funds from the . .
Appeal from – The Law Society v Sephton and Co and others CA 13-Dec-2004
The Society appealed dismissal for limitation of its claim against the defendant firm of accountants arising from alleged fraud in approval of a solicitor’s accounts.
Held: The liability did not arise until the Society decided to make . .
At First Instance – The Law Society v Sephton and Co and others ChD 2004
The Law Society claimed in negligence against the defendant firm of accountants who had wrongly certified the accounts of a firm of solicitors. The Society sought to recover the payments it had made from its compensation fund. The defendant pleaded . .
Mentioned – Cartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd HL 1963
The plaintiffs were steel dressers who, in the course of their employment, had inhaled quantities of noxious dust which had caused them to suffer from pneumoconiosis. They issued proceedings on 1 October 1956 but were unable to show any breach of . .
Approved – Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia 1992
(High Court of Australia) A claim was based on a statutory trade indemnity scheme. The insurers claimed damages from Wardley, on the basis that its alleged deceit induced them to grant an indemnity, which was subsequently called on.
Held: . .
Cited – Forster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .
Cited – Bell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .
Cited – D W Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
The company took in a new director and shareholder, and relied upon their solicitors to draft a covenant to restrain him competing within a set time of leaving the company. The covenant turned out to be ineffective. The defendant solicitors replied . .
Cited – Nykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
Cited – Knapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc and Another CA 30-Oct-1997
A claim in negligence was brought against insurance brokers for failing to advise the claimant of certain matters with the result that an insurance policy entered into by the claimant was voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The claimant . .
Helpful – First National Comercial Bank plc v Humberts CA 27-Jan-1995
The plaintiff loaned money on the basis of a negligent survey by the defendant. The borrower subsequently defaulted, and the lender issued a writ. The defendant said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The court allowed the plaintiff’s . .
Cited – Southern Railway of Peru Ltd v Owen HL 21-Jun-1956
When drawing up accounts where the company faces contingent laibilities and provision has to be made, the principles upon which such provisions are made does not depend upon (Lord Radcliffe) ‘any exact analysis of the legal form of the relevant . .
Cited – Clonard Developments Limited v Humberts (a Firm) CA 15-Jan-1999
A judge was right to acknowledge that a party’s expert witness might be biased, and assess accordingly. Where a surveyor’s valuation was negligent there was still no liability where the plaintiff did not show it had relied upon the valuation. . .
Cited – Haward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
Cited – Clonard Developments Limited v Humberts (a Firm) CA 15-Jan-1999
A judge was right to acknowledge that a party’s expert witness might be biased, and assess accordingly. Where a surveyor’s valuation was negligent there was still no liability where the plaintiff did not show it had relied upon the valuation. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Watkins and Another v Jones Maidment Wilson (A Firm) CA 4-Mar-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence by the defendant solicitors in advising them to agree to a postponment of a completion. The defendants raised as a preliminary issue the question of limitation. The claimant said that the limitation . .
Cited – Pegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
Cited – Axa Insurance Ltd v Akther and Darby Solicitors and Others CA 12-Nov-2009
The court considered the application of the limitation period to answering when damage occurred when it arises under an unsecured contingent liability. The claimant insurance company had provided after the event litigation insurance policies to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Professional Negligence

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.241654

Brickfield Properties Ltd v Newton: CA 1971

Court’s Investigation of Construction Claims

The court heard an application to amend pleadings to add a claim about negligent supervision of a construction. Sachs LJ said: ‘Where there are found in completed buildings serious defects of the type here under review the facts relating to design, execution and superintendence are inextricably entangled until such time as the court succeeds in elucidating the position through evidence. The design has inevitably to be closely examined even if the only claim relates to superintendence, and all the more so if the designs are, as is further alleged here, experimental or such as need amplification in the construction progresses. The architect is under a continuing duty to check that his design will work in practice and to correct any errors as they emerge. It savours of the ridiculous for the architect to be able to say, as it was here suggested to him that he could say: ‘true, my design was faulty, but, of course, I saw to it that the contractors followed it faithfully’ and be enabled on that ground to succeed in the action.
The same, or substantially the same set of facts, falls to be investigated in relation to the design claim and the superintendence claim. The plans and specifications and ancillary documents are relevant to the superintendence claim as well as to the designer claim: hence the inability of the defendant to allege prejudice with regard to the preparation of his defence if this appeal is allowed. Accordingly, the ‘new cause of action’ falls within the ambit of RSC Ord. 20 r. 5(5), and it is one which the court has jurisdiction to permit to be pursued’.

Sachs LJ, Edmund Davies LJ
[1971] 1 WLR 862, [1971] 3 All ER 328
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Roberts v Gill and Co Solicitors and Others SC 19-May-2010
The claimant beneficiary in the estate sought damages against solicitors who had acted for the claimant’s brother, the administrator, saying they had allowed him to take control of the assets in the estate. The will provided that property was to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Construction

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.415957

Musurus Bey v Gadban: CA 1894

Musurus Bey had been the accredited Ambassador of the Sultan of Turkey in London for some thirty years prior to his recall in December 1885. He wound up his official and personal business and in February 1886 he returned to Turkey where he lived until his death in 1890. In 1892 his executors brought proceedings against the defendants who sought to counterclaim in debt for money lent by them to Musurus Bey in 1873 while he was Ambassador in London and which, it was alleged, had never been repaid.
Held: The counterclaim was not statute barred. The wrongdoer may be entitled to diplomatic immunity at the time of the tort. No cause of action could accrue against a debtor during such period as he enjoyed diplomatic immunity, though an envoy’s immunity from suit and legal process in respect of acts done in his private capacity endures only so long as he is ‘en poste’ and for a sufficient time thereafter to enable him to wind up his affairs

AL Smith and Davey LJJ
[1894] 2 QB 352
England and Wales

Contract, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.561222

Joan Cuadrench More v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij Nv: ECJ 22 Nov 2012

Air transport – Compensation and assistance to passengers – Denied boarding and cancellation or long delays of flights – Period allowed for commencing proceedings
After cancellation of his flight in December 2005 the claimant brought proceedings against the airline in Spain in February 2009 seeking compensation under Regulation 261. The limitation period under Spanish law was ten years. Under the Convention is two years. The Court was asked to decide whether article 35 of the Montreal Convention or the Spanish law of limitation applied.
Held: The time limit for bringing a claim under Regulation 261 was a matter for national Spanish law, because the provisions for compensation contained in the Regulation fall outside the terms of the Convention. Regulation 261 provides a system of standardised and immediate redress for the inconvenience caused by delay and cancellation of flights which operates at an earlier stage than the Convention and is independent of it.

R. Silva de Lapuerta
C-139/11, [2012] EUECJ C-139/11, [2013] 2 All ER (Comm) 1152
Bailii
European
Cited by:
Cited – Dawson v Thomson Airways Ltd CA 19-Jun-2014
The claimant’s flight had been delayed for six hours. The airline said that the claim having been made outside the two year period applicable under the Montreal convention, no compensation was payable.
Held: The claimant’s appeal failed. ‘We . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Transport, Consumer, Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.465996

RB Policies at Lloyd’s v Butler: 1949

A car insured by the plaintiffs had been stolen by an unknown person in June 1940. In January 1947 the car was found in the possession of the defendant who it seems had ‘given good consideration for it without knowledge that it was a stolen car’. It had passed to him ‘an innocent purchaser, through a line of intermediate purchasers’ during the previous seven years.
Held: Time begins to run against the owner of a stolen chattel from the date of the theft, even though the owner does not know the identity of the thief or the whereabouts of the chattel.
Streatfeild J discussed the 1939 Act, saying: ‘The section was inserted to protect a plaintiff who was ignorant of his right of action in the special case of fraudulent concealment, and to overcome the difficulty that time would otherwise have been running against him, unknown to himself. But for the section, time would have run against him from the accrual of his right of action, for it is to be noted that the section, even in the case of fraudulent concealment, does not say that the cause of action shall not accrue until the fraud is discovered, but simply that ‘time shall not begin to run’ until that event.
It is to be noted that s 26 is the only provision in the Limitation Act 1939, in which a special exception of that nature is made. Nowhere is it to be found that where a person, who otherwise has a perfect cause of action, cannot pursue it because the defendant is unknown, time does not run. And it seems to me, therefore, that prima facie as soon as there is a cause of action (as there clearly was in the present case the moment the motor car was stolen) time begins to run notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff is ignorant of the identity of the defendant. . . It was, no doubt, a misfortune to the plaintiffs that they could not find a defendant whose name they could insert in a writ; but every other ingredient of the cause of action was present. The motor car had, in fact, been converted. A statement of claim could have been drawn without any difficulty; the only item missing being the name of the defendant.’
. . And ‘Can it be said, therefore, that the cause of action being otherwise complete, the ignorance of the owner of the car of the identity of the person against whom he could bring an action was of itself sufficient to prevent the accrual of that cause of action? I think not, and I agree with the argument of Mr Jackson. If that were so it would lead to appalling results. As Mr Jackson suggested to me, if his watch were stolen, and he discovered it years later, in the pocket of a wholly innocent person who had bought it many years before, it would follow that, if the plaintiffs are right, he could bring an action for the recovery of his watch merely because he had not known who was the original thief. I cannot think that that is the policy of the Act, or that to construe its words in favour of the plaintiffs’ argument would harmonize with the intention of the legislature’

Streatfeild J
[1950] 1 KB 76, [1949] 2 All ER 226
Limitation Act 1939 26
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Adamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.539583

Jones v Bellgrove Properties Limited: CA 1949

The court allowed the plaintiff to establish by evidence that his particular debt was included in the total sum acknowledged to be due to a number of creditors.
Lord Goddard CJ was satisfied that a lump sum in a balance sheet included the debt in question. The balance sheets of the defendant contained the statement, ‘to sundry creditors pounds 7,638 6s. 10d’. The defendant in that case owed the plaintiff pounds 1,807, which was the balance of moneys that had been lent to him. This debt did not accrue within six years of an action brought by the plaintiff to recover the debt. The plaintiff argued that the defendants made an acknowledgement of the debt in its balance sheet. Evidence was given at the hearing that a firm of chartered accountants had signed the balance sheets for various years and that the debt of pounds 1,807 owed by the defendant to the plaintiff was included in the sum of pounds 7,638 6s. 10d. The Court held that there was an acknowledgement of the debt in the balance sheet.

Lord Goddard CJ
[1949] 2 KB 700, [1949] 1 All ER 498
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Insolvency

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.187456

Brady v Norman: CA 9 Feb 2011

The claimant sought to have disapplied the limitation period in his defamation claim. The claimant said that in the case of Cain, the Steedman case had not been cited, and that the decisions were incompatible, and that Cain was to be prefered.
Held: The appeal failed. The two cases could be reconciled. Considerations in defamation actions were rather different from those in personal injury proceedings, and the two cases represented differing manifestations of the application of the same principles to be derived from the different circumstances to which adjacent sections of the 1980 Act are applicable. ‘The policy behind the much shorter limitation period is clear. The defamatory impact of libel or slander is likely to be transient and Parliament evidently intended that a claimant should assert and pursue his need for vindication speedily.’

Sir Roget Thomas P, Smith, Aikens LJJ
[2011] EWCA Civ 107, [2011] WLR (D) 40, [2011] EMLR 16, [2011] CP Rep 23
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 2, Defamation Act 1996
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Thompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd HL 1981
The plaintiff’s solicitors, out of negligence, failed to issue a writ until one month after the limitation period had expired. The application to extend the period was rejected at first instance since he had an unanswerable claim against his . .
Cited – Hartley v Birmingham City District Council CA 1992
The writ was issued one day late; there had been early notification of the claim; and the defendant’s ability to defend the case was unaffected. The plaintiff asked the court to exercide its discretion to allow the claim t proceed.
Held: The . .
Cited – Steedman, Clohosy, Smith, Kiernan, Newman, Creevy, Anderson v The British Broadcasting Corporation CA 23-Oct-2001
The claimants had issued defamation proceedings. The defendant said they were out of time, having begun the action more than one year after the alleged publication, but accepted that they had not been prejudiced in their defence. The court refused . .
Cited – Cain v Francis CA 18-Dec-2008
The court was asked under what circumstances it should exercise its discretion to extend the limitation period under section 33.
Held: Lady Justice Smith said: ‘It appears to me that there is now a long line of authority to support the . .
Cited – Thompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd HL 1981
The plaintiff’s solicitors, out of negligence, failed to issue a writ until one month after the limitation period had expired. The application to extend the period was rejected at first instance since he had an unanswerable claim against his . .
Appeal from – Brady v Norman QBD 26-May-2010
The claimant appealed against refusal of the Master to extend the 12 month limitation period in his proposed defamation claim. The allegations related to a dispute at an Aslef barbecue, and later of forgery. The claimant was a former General . .
Cited – Lonzim Plc and Others v Sprague QBD 11-Nov-2009
The court asked whether any damages recovered by the claimant might be so small as to be totally disproportionate to the very high costs that any libel action involves.
Held: Tugendhat J said: ‘It is not enough for a claimant to say that a . .

Cited by:
Cited – Reed Elsevier Uk Ltd (T/A Lexisnexis) and Another v Bewry CA 30-Oct-2014
Appeal from a decision granting the claimant’s application made pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the limitation period in his proceedings for libel and dismissing the defendants’ application to strike out the claimant’s . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation, Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.428526

National Westminster Bank Plc v Ashe (Trustee In Bankruptcy of Djabar Babai): CA 8 Feb 2008

The mortgagees had made no payments under the charge for more than twelve years, and had remained in possession throughout. They argued that the bank were prevented from now seeking to enforce the charge. The bank argued that the possession had not been adverse. The court had declared that the bank could not proceed.
Held: The bank’s appeal failed. The bank’s right of possession first accrued when the legal charge took effect. Any payment restarted the limitation period. The Bank had an immediate right of action to possession of the Property as soon as the legal charge was executed. Its initial right of action to possession of the Property was not dependent on the termination of a permission granted by the Bank for Mr and Mrs Babai to be in possession of the Property. ‘it does not necessarily follow from the Bank’s non-enforcement of its right to possession, or its lack of objection to, or tolerance of, Mr and Mrs Babai’s possession that the Bank was impliedly granting them permission to remain in possession of the Property so as to prevent them from being in adverse possession within paragraph 8 of Schedule 1. The Bank was simply not doing anything to enforce its right of action. ‘
‘In summary, the Bank had a right of action. More than 12 years passed since it accrued afresh . Mr and Mrs Babai’s continued possession of the Property with the apparent leave and licence of the Bank did not prevent them from being persons against whom the Bank’s right of action to recover the Property arose on the granting of the legal charge, which right is treated as having accrued afresh when a payment in respect of it was made. Nor did it prevent Mr and Mrs Babai from being persons in whose favour time can run under the 1980 Act. According to the ruling in Pye their possession was ‘adverse possession’ within paragraph 8. ‘

Mummery LJ, Hughes LJ, David Richards J
[2008] EWCA Civ 55, [2008] 1 WLR 710, [2008] 2 P and CR 10, [2008] BPIR 1, [2008] 7 EG 143, [2008] NPC 14, [2008] 1 EGLR 123
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15 17
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Four-Maids Ltd v Dudley Marshall (Properties) Ltd 1957
A mortgagee may under common law go into possession before the ink is dry on the mortgage unless there is something in the contract, express or by implication, whereby he has contracted himself out of that right. He has the right because he has a . .
Cited – National Westminster Bank plc v Skelton (Note) 1993
The court distinguished a claim by the mortgagee for possession from a claim on the mortgagor’s personal covenant to pay what was due. A claim for a set-off is merely a sub-species of counterclaim. The court will not readily imply a term into a . .
Cited – Keech v Hall 1778
The tenant resisted ejectment by the landlord’s mortgagee. His tenancy had been created after the mortgage.
Held: The mortgagee seeking ejectment did not first need to give a tenant a notice to quit. Mansfield CJ said: ‘Whoever wants to be . .
Cited – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
Cited – Rhodes v Allied Dunbar Pension Services Ltd CA 1989
The intermediate tenant had charged the lease to the bank, which appointed receivers. Both the sub rent and the head rent fell into arrears. The head landlord then served a notice direct on the subtenant requiring him to pay the rent direct to the . .
Cited – Heath v Pugh CA 1881
The freeholder charged the land in 1856. He remained in possession, and did not make any payments or give any acknowledgment of the mortgagee’s title. In 1870 the mortgagee presented a bill for foreclosure, and in 1874 a bill of redemption or . .

Cited by:
Cited – Yorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.264269

Rains v Buxton: 1880

rains_buxtonChD1880

Fry J said: ‘The difference between dispossession and the discontinuance of possession might be expressed in this way: the one is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession, the other case is where the person in possession goes out and is followed in by others.’ A defendant to a claim for adverse possession does not escape it by proving that he had not known of the acts relied upon against him nor by proving that that omission was not attributable to some negligence or default on his part.

Fry J
[1880] 14 ChD 537
Cited by:
Cited – Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
Cited – Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.259703

KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another: CA 12 Feb 2003

The respondent appealed decisions by the court to allow claims for personal injury out of time. The claims involved cases of sexual abuse inflicted by its employees going back over many years.
Held: The judge had misapplied the test laid down in Stebbings. The court of appeal had not previously considered how to apply its section 33 discretion to cases involving continuing psychological damage. Each case had to be assessed individually, but the length of time allowed to pass before an application was made was a significant factor. Once the court had used its discretion to extend the time allowed before the limitation period, it should be more cautious about leniency in any following period. The question was whether the claims could still be tried fairly as against the defendant. Such allegations were easy to make and difficult to refute, and the judge must bear in mind the possibility of exaggeration for financial gain. ‘The overall question is one of equity, namely, whether it would be ‘equitable’ to disapply the limitation provisions having regard to the balance of potential prejudice weighed with regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those specifically mentioned in s 33(3).’

Lord Justice Auld, Lord Justice Waller, Lord Justice Mantell
Times 17-Feb-2003, [2003] EWCA Civ 85, [2003] QB 1441, [2003] Fam Law 482, [2004] 2 All ER 716, [2003] 1 FLR 1203, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep Med 175, [2003] 3 WLR 107, [2003] 1 FCR 385
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 14 33
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Stubbings v Webb CA 1992
The claimant sought damages for having been raped. The defendant said the claim was out of time. . .
Cited – Stubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .
Cited – Coad v Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Health Authority CA 17-Jul-1996
A nurse suffered a back injury in 1983 in the course of her employment. She left the employment of the health authority in either 1990 or 1991. The judge had accepted her evidence that she did not know that she had a right of action against her . .
Cited – Seymour v Williams CA 1995
The plaintiff issued proceedings against her father and mother, alleging physical and sexual abuse against her father and want of parental care against her mother. The claim against the father was in trespass, but that against her mother was in . .

Cited by:
Cited – Adams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council HL 17-Jun-2004
A attended the defendant’s schools between 1977 and 1988. He had always experienced difficulties with reading and writing and as an adult found those difficulties to be an impediment in his employment. He believed them to be the cause of the . .
Cited – A v Hoare QBD 14-Oct-2005
The defendant had been convicted and sentenced for the attempted rape of the claimant. He had subsequently won a substantial sum on the lottery, and she now sought damages. He replied that the action was statute barred being now 16 years old. The . .
See Also – Rowlands and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Royal and Sun Alliance Plc CA 24-Mar-2003
. .
See Also – DK, KR, CGE, DHM, PS, RM, DJ, GOM v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd (In Liquidation) and Royal and Sun Alliance PLC CA 22-May-2003
. .
Cited – Jacqueline Adam v Rasal Ali CA 21-Feb-2006
The defendant sought damages against the defendant for personal injury from his alleged negligence. Her action was struck out and she recommenced the action. The defendant pleaded that she was out of time. The claimant said that the first action . .
Cited – A v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
Cited – Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) and Another v Young CA 14-Nov-2006
The claimant sought damages saying that he had been abused as a child whilst in the defendant’s care. The defendants appealed a finding that the claimant had not first known of his injury more than three years before begining his action.
Held: . .
Not followed – McCoubrey v Ministry of Defence CA 24-Jan-2007
The defendant appealed a decision allowing a claim to proceed more than ten years after it had been suffered. The claimant’s hearing had been damaged after an officer threw a thunderflash into his trench on an exercise.
Held: The defendant’s . .
Cited – Pierce v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council QBD 13-Dec-2007
The claimant sought damages, saying that the local authority had failed to protect him when he was a child against abuse by his parents.
Held: The claimant had been known to the authority since he was a young child, and they owed him a duty of . .
Cited – Buckler v J F Finnegan Ltd CA 21-Jun-2004
The claimant sought damages for personal injuries after ingesting asbestos while employed as a joiner by the defendant. The defendant appealed an order allowing the claim to go ahead despite being out of time. . .
Cited – BA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for The Home Department and Others SC 26-Nov-2009
The court was asked whether the expression ‘an asylum claim, or a human rights claim’ in section 92(4)(a) of the 2002 Act includes any second or subsequent claim that the asylum seeker may make, or only a second or subsequent claim which has been . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.179082

Donald v Rutherford: IHCS 1984

A pedestrian was injured in a road traffic accident on 3 November 1975 but only raised an action on 13 February 1981. The failure to raise a timeous action was attributable to the fault of his former solicitors.
Held: He was allowed to proceed out of time as he had misdirected himself on a material matter of fact. The words ‘it seems equitable’ in section 19A(1) meant and could only mean that the discretion thereby conferred upon the court was unfettered: ‘In the present case it would appear clear enough that no personal blame can properly be laid on the shoulders of the respondent himself, but he is answerable for the acts of his agents. Their failure to serve the ‘protective writ’ was the cause of the failure to proceed within the triennium, and their responsibility to the respondent for that failure and consequent liability in damages would, at least so far as pleadings and admitted correspondence disclose, appear to be beyond dispute.’ Lord Dunpark: ‘I regard the fact that no blame can be attached to the pursuer for his solicitors’ failure to raise his action timeously as cancelled out by the fact that neither the defender nor his insurance company contributed in any way to that failure. The sole fault for that failure was that of the pursuer’s solicitors who, for this purpose, are his alter ego.’

Lord Cameron, Lord Dunpark
1984 SLT 70
Limitation Act 1980 19A(1)
Scotland
Cited by:
Cited – David Lannigan v Glasgow City Council OHCS 12-Aug-2004
The pursuer said the teachers employed by the defendant had failed to identify that was dyslexic, leading him to suffer damage. The defenders said the claim was time barred, which the pursuer admitted, but then said that the claim ought to go ahead . .
Approved – Forsyth v A F Stoddard and Co Ltd OHCS 1985
An action for damages by an employee against his employer was raised 48 days after the expiry of the triennium due to an oversight by an assistant with the pursuer’s solicitors. The sheriff refused to allow the action to be brought, the Sheriff . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.200278

Roberts v Gill and Co Solicitors and Others: SC 19 May 2010

The claimant beneficiary in the estate sought damages against solicitors who had acted for the claimant’s brother, the administrator, saying they had allowed him to take control of the assets in the estate. The will provided that property was to be transferred only if the claimant’s brother paid all the Inheritance Tax. It was transferred without that tax having been paid. The events were now several years outside the limitation period. The claim was framed as a duty by the solicitors to the claimant personally.
Held: The claimant’s appeal was dismissed. The claimant had to succeed not only in applying to alter his claim to make it on behalf of the estate, but also to add the administrator, his brother to the claim. If he had to do the latter, could he do so after commencing the action, and outside the limitation period. The claimant did not show either that he need not add the brother, nor that he could do so after commencing the claim.
A party could be added after the commencement of an action only where this was necessary in order to determine the original litigation, and the action against the brother was not such.
Here the proposed addition of a party and amendments were for a new action. That new action would be out of time.
Lord Clarke and Lord Hope dissented in part in allowing that the brother could have been added as a party after the action had been commenced to avoid injustice, but there were no such special circumstances in this case.

Lord Hope, Deputy President, Lord Rodger, Lord Walker, Lord Collins, Lord Clarke
[2010] WLR (D) 130, [2010] UKSC 22, [2010] PNLR 30, [2010] WTLR 1223, [2010] 2 WLR 1227, [2011] AC 240
WLRD, Bailii, SC, SC Summ, Bailii Summary
Limitation Act 1980 35, Civil Procedure Rules 19.5
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Weldon v Neal CA 1887
An amendment to pleadings should not be allowed so as to allow a plaintiff to set up a cause of action which would otherwise be barred by the Statutes of Limitation. . .
Appeal from – Roberts v Gill and Co and Another CA 15-Jul-2008
The claimant sought damages in negligence against solicitors who had advised the executors in an estate of which he was a beneficiary. He now sought to amend his claim to make a claim in his personal and in derivative capacities. Sums had been paid . .
Cited – Spokes v Grosvenor and West End Railway Terminus Hotel Co Ltd CA 1897
The court discussed the joinder of the company in a derivative action. A L Smith LJ said: ‘That in the circumstances of this case the company are necessary parties to the suit I do not doubt, for without the company being made a party to the action . .
Cited – Yorkshire Regional Health Authority v Fairclough Building Ltd and Another CA 16-Nov-1995
The substitution of a successor party to a claim does not constitute a new claim for limitation purposes. Millett LJ considered the objects of the 1980 Act: ‘The 1980 Act was enacted in order to implement the recommendations of the Twenty-First . .
Cited – Performing Right Society Limited v London Theatre of Varieties Limited HL 1924
The parties, the plaintiff who was the equitable assignee of performing rights and the infringing defendant, joined specific issue on the absence of the legal owner of the rights.
Held: His absence was critical. PRS failed to obtain a . .
Cited – Mabro v Eagle, Star and British Dominions Insurance Co Ltd CA 1932
Scrutton LJ said: ‘In my experience the Court has always refused to allow a party or a cause of action to be added where, if it were allowed, the defence of the Statute of Limitations would be defeated. The Court has never treated it as just to . .
Cited – Haq v Singh and Another CA 25-May-2001
The claimant had been made bankrupt, and when she sued the defendant, was challenged as to her standing. She obtained an assignment of the right of action from her trustee in bankruptcy. She then sought to amend her pleadings under the rule. It was . .
Cited – Harmer v Armstrong CA 1934
The court considered the position where the assignor of a contract was required to attend court as a party when the assignee sought to enforce the debt.
Held: A beneficiary under a bare trust could bring proceedings in his own name and, where . .
Cited – Royal Brunei Airlines SDN BHD v Tan PC 24-May-1995
(Brunei) The defendants were a one-man company, BLT, and the one man, Mr Tan. A dishonest third party to a breach of trust was liable to make good a resulting loss even though he had received no trust property. The test of knowledge was an objective . .
Cited – Hayim v Citibank NA PC 1987
(Hong Kong) The plaintiffs were the testator’s sons, who were beneficiaries under his American will. He also executed a Hong Kong will under which the residue of his property outside the United States was to be held on trust for sale on the trusts . .
Cited – Liff v Peasley CA 1980
The court will not add a person as a defendant to an existing action if the claim was already statute-barred and he wished to rely on that defence, and if the court allows such addition ex parte it will not, on objection allow the addition to stand. . .
Cited – Oates v Consolidated Capital Services Pty Ltd 3-Jul-2009
Austlii (Supreme Court of New South Wales – Court of Appeal) CORPORATIONS – derivative action – sections 236 and 237 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – meaning of ‘proceedings on behalf of a company’ – whether using a . .
Cited – Cooke v Gill CCP 11-Jan-1873
What constitutes a cause of action is ‘every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed.’ . .
Cited – Ingall v Moran CA 1944
The plaintiff had issued a writ in 1942 as administrator of his deceased son’s estate. However, he did not take out letters of administration until the November. It was said that proceedings instituted by an applicant who at the time had no standing . .
Cited – Smith v Henniker-Major and Co CA 22-Jul-2002
The claimant appealed the strike-out of his claim for professional negligence against the respondent solicitors. He claimed that the solicitors had acted in breach of their duty, and he then called a company meeting. Only he attended. He mistakenly . .
Cited – Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) CA 1975
The court was asked whether Moir would be entitled to legal aid to bring a derivative action on behalf of a company against its majority shareholder.
Held: A minority shareholder bringing a derivative action on behalf of a company could obtain . .
Cited – Hilton v Sutton Steam Laundry CA 1946
. .
Cited – Brickfield Properties Ltd v Newton CA 1971
Court’s Investigation of Construction Claims
The court heard an application to amend pleadings to add a claim about negligent supervision of a construction. Sachs LJ said: ‘Where there are found in completed buildings serious defects of the type here under review the facts relating to design, . .
Cited – Lucy v W T Henleys Telegraph Works Co Ltd (ICI Ltd, third party) 1970
Megaw LJ discussed the application of O 15 r 1(4): ‘Paragraph (2) of that rule provides that a court may allow a party to amend the writ ‘after any period of limitation current at the date of the issue of the writ has expired’ but this is expressly . .
Cited – Burns v Campbell 1951
An action commenced by a plaintiff in a representative capacity which the plaintiff does not in fact possess is a nullity, and, further, that it makes no difference that the claim made in such an action is a claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts . .
Cited – Finnegan v Cementation Co Ltd CA 1953
The plaintiff had obtained Letters of Administration in Southern Ireland only but sought to bring an action under the Fatal Accidents Act in England. There were two separate bases upon which the plaintiff (the widow of a workman killed in a work . .
Cited – Davies v Elsby Brothers Ltd CA 1961
The writ was issued within the limitation period for the claim against ‘Elsby Brothers (a firm)’. In fact, the firm’s business had been taken over by Elsby Brothers Ltd before the proceedings had been issued. By the time the plaintiff applied for . .
Cited – Letang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .
Cited – Chatsworth Investments Ltd v Cussins (Contractors) Ltd CA 1969
. .
Cited – Braniff v Holland and Hannen and Cubitts (Southern) Ltd CA 1969
Widgery LJ said: ‘Again, I think that it would only complicate matters if I attempted to deal with the facts, but one thing is perfectly clear, namely, that in the view of Megaw J. the fact that in certain cases under Order 20 rule 5, amendments . .
Cited – Bickley v Dorrington 12-Nov-1737
A bill was brought by creditors, and by one of the residuary legatees of the testator, against his executors, the other residuary legatee, and the former partner of the testator to recover from the former partner money owing to the estate.
Cited – Alsager v Rowley 16-Mar-1802
Lord Eldon LC said: ‘The established rule of the Court is certainly . . that in ordinary cases a debtor to the estate cannot be made a party to a bill against the executor: but there must be, as the cases express it, collusion or insolvency. That . .
Cited – Bowsher v Watkins CA 16-Feb-1830
Residuary legatees brought suit against the estate executors and a surviving partner of the testator for an account. It was argued that there were no special circumstances justifying the action by legatees.
Held: Collusion between the executor . .
Cited – Davies v Davies CA 12-Jun-1837
Residuary legatees filed a bill against the executor and the surviving partner of the testator for an account of partnership transactions.
Held: In the absence of a charge of fraud or collusion, there were no special circumstances justifying . .
Cited – Barker v Birch 19-Jul-1847
There may be circumstances under which the Court will, at the suit of universal legatees under a will, direct an account against a debtor to the testator’s estate, without collusion being established between the debtor and the personal . .
Cited – In re Field 1971
The plaintiff had an order for maintenance against the deceased’s estate. She brought proceedings in her own name against an insurance company which had wrongly paid a claim to the widow and not to the estate. The insurer sought a strike out. The . .
Cited – Milne v Milne; Travis v Milne 29-May-1851
A suit by parties beneficially interested in the estate of a deceased partner could not be maintained against both his executors and surviving partners, in the absence of special circumstances; but collusion was not the only ground for such a suit; . .
Cited – Yeatman v Yeatman 1877
An action was brought by a residuary legatee against her mother-in-law’s executors and another member of the family, who it was alleged, had failed to account for partnership monies to the mother-in-law.
Held: A beneficiary of a trust could . .
Cited – Bradstock Trustee Services Ltd v Nabarro Nathanson ChD 1995
The plaintiffs were trustees of an occupational pension scheme. It began professional negligence proceedings to recover an expected surplus paid to the employer by the solicitors whose advice had been acted on. The anticipated costs were . .
Cited – Morrison v Morrison’s Executors 1912
Lord Skerrington said: ‘A decree in such an action would be res judicata, provided always that the whole trustees and beneficiaries had been called as defenders.’ . .
Cited – Armour v Glasgow Royal Infirmary 1909
Lord Ordinary, Lord Skerrington said that in the ordinary case the action could be brought only at the instance of the trustees. But the testamentary trustees had been called as defenders, and concurred with the Infirmary in maintaining that the . .
Cited – Rae v Meek HL 1889
The beneficiaries under a trust created by a marriage contract sued a trustee for having lost trust money which had been lent on the security of unfinished houses in a building speculation. The trustee was held liable to restore the trust fund. The . .
Cited – Konamaneni v Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) Limited ChD 20-Dec-2001
The claimants founded their action on the assertion that the defendants had been corrupt in obtaining contracts in India. The defendants argued that the English courts had no jurisdiction. The claimants held various small shareholdings in a company . .
Cited – E M Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith and Co 1904
Where an equitable assignee sues a third party, the assignor must be joined as a defendant. The Plaintiff as the equitable owner of a patent was given liberty to amend its pleading by joining the legal owner, (failing which the Plaintiff’s case . .
Cited – In Re Selectmove Ltd CA 21-Dec-1993
Promisse to Pay Tax due is not Consideration
The company appealed against an order for its winding up, saying that the debt was disputed, an accomodation having been reached with the Revenue.
Held: The court declined to regard a promise to the Revenue by a company to pay its existing . .
Cited – Nurcombe v Nurcombe CA 1985
The court discussed a minority shareholder’s action to enforce the company’s claim as a derivative claim. Browne-Wilkinson LJ said that such an action, where a courts in equity permitted a person interested to bring an action to enforce the . .
Cited – Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corp. of New York PC 1933
The plaintiff was injured in a motor accident. He failed in a direct claim against the insurers of the negligent defendant driver. The insurance was effected by the father (Mr Berry) of the negligent driver and provided that an indemnity would be . .
Cited – William Brandt’s Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co HL 1905
The court was asked whether instructions given by the bank’s customer to purchasers of rubber to make payment to its bank directly, amounted to an equitable assignment of debts, so that the bank could sue for their recovery. The bank sued the . .
Cited – Weddell v JA Pearce and Major 1988
A cause of action in negligence was assigned in February 1986. The writ was issued by the assignee alone on 2 May 1986, at which time no notice of the assignment had been given to the defendants. It was argued that the action was a nullity.
Cited – Robinson v Unicos Property Corpn Ltd CA 1962
The plaintiff sought an additional averment (unsuccessfully objected to as constituting the addition of a new cause of action) to plead that the first plaintiff sued as equitable assignee of the benefit of a contract made with the defendant (the . .
Cited – Central Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corpn (The Aiolos) CA 1983
Where an insurer indemnifies the assured, he is entitled to exercise, through subrogation, any claim the assured may have against the person who caused the losses. Absent an assignment of the claim, it belongs to the assured and the insurer does not . .
Cited – Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA and Others PC 21-Jul-1994
Lex loci delicti (the law of the jurisdiction in which the act complained of took place) can exceptionally be used when the lex fori (the jurisdiction formally assigned) gives no remedy. In the case of a claim under a foreign tort, the double . .
Cited – Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA and Others 1993
Hong Kong . .
Cited – William Brandt’s Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co HL 1905
The court was asked whether instructions given by the bank’s customer to purchasers of rubber to make payment to its bank directly, amounted to an equitable assignment of debts, so that the bank could sue for their recovery. The bank sued the . .
Cited – Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of Bank of England CA 6-Dec-1994
Equitable assignors of a deposit cannot pursue a claim for recovery of the assigned debt without joining in the assignee as a party, though it can sue in its own name. . .
Cited – Welsh Development Agency v Redpath Dorman Long Ltd CA 4-Apr-1994
A new claim was not deemed to have been made until the pleading was actually amended for limitation purposes, and should not be allowed after the limitation period had expired. The date of the application for leave to amend was not at issue. The . .

Cited by:
Cited – NML Capital Ltd v Argentina SC 6-Jul-2011
The respondent had issued bonds but in 2001 had declared a moratorium on paying them. The appellant hedge fund later bought the bonds, heavily discounted. Judgment was obtained in New York, which the appellants now sought to enforce against assets . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.415923

Ministry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians: SC 12 May 2016

Iraqi citizens claimed to have suffered unlawful detention and/or physical maltreatment from British armed forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. The claims were brought in tort in England against the Ministry of Defence, but the torts were governed by Iraqi law. Under the 1984 Act where a claim is brought in England but governed by foreign law, the English courts are to apply the foreign law of limitation. In many of these cases the action was begun more than three years after the relevant claimant became aware of the injury and the person who caused it, and was therefore time-barred under article 232 of the Iraqi Civil Code.
Held: The appeal failed.
‘The real question is whether it is legally relevant when the claimants have brought proceedings in England what impediments might have prevented similar proceedings in Iraq. The judge, as I have observed, regarded that as depending on the territorial ambit of article 435 as a matter of Iraqi law. On that footing it is obvious that a procedural time-bar arising under Iraqi law applied only in Iraq. But in my opinion, this was not a question of Iraqi law but of English law. In English proceedings, the relevant law is the Foreign Limitation Periods Act. Where the cause of action is governed by a foreign law, the Act requires an English court to ascertain the relevant rules of the foreign law of limitation and then to apply it to proceedings in England. Because the foreign law of limitation will have been designed for foreign proceedings, that necessarily involves a process of transposition. There may be facts which the foreign law of limitation would treat as relevant to foreign proceedings but which are irrelevant to proceedings in England.’
and ‘ The claimants’ submission, if accepted, would mean that there was no limitation period at all affecting the present proceedings in England, by reason of a consideration (CPA Order 17) which had no relevance to English proceedings because it has no application outside Iraq and has never impeded resort to the English court. The main argument advanced in support of it was that an English court applying the Act of 1984 must give effect to the whole of the relevant Iraqi law of limitation, and not just to part of it. This point was reinforced by reference to section 2 of the Act of 1984. Section 2(1) disapplies the relevant foreign law of limitation so far as its application would conflict with English public policy, and section 2(3) disapplies it so far as it suspends the running of time on account of ‘the absence of a party to the action or proceedings from any specified jurisdiction or country’. The point made is that where the Act disapplies some part of the foreign law of limitation, it does so expressly, thereby impliedly excluding its disapplication in any other circumstances. I reject the submission because it assumes that because the Iraqi law of limitation would treat certain facts as relevant to Iraqi proceedings, to treat those facts as irrelevant to English proceedings involves disapplying part of Iraqi law. It does not. It simply involves applying the same principles of Iraqi law to different facts. The facts relevant to proceedings in England are not necessarily the same as those which would be relevant to proceedings in Iraq.’

Lord Neuberger, President, Lady Hale, Deputy President, Lord Mance, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed
[2016] UKSC 25, [2016] 1 WLR 2001, [2016] WLR(D) 261, UKSC 2015/0126
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC, SC Summary
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984
England and Wales
Citing:
At QBD – Iraqi Civilian Litigation v Ministry of Defence QBD 26-Jan-2015
The court considered limitation issues as an interim issue in this claim and particularly as it was affected by Iraqi law.
Held: The effective period of CPA 17 ended on 31 December 2008. No claim had been brought relating to any alleged act or . .
Appeal from CA – Ministry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians CA 9-Dec-2015
‘This appeal raises a short but elusive point concerning the manner in which the English Court applies a foreign law relating to limitation when required to do so by section 1 of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984’ . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

International, Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.563387

Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding and Another: CA 17 Jun 2016

The company, now in liquidation sought to claim for the alledged misapplication by former directors of its funds in 2007. It now appealed against a summary rejection of its claim as time barred.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Section 21(1)(b) provides that no period of limitation prescribed by the Act applies to an action by a beneficiary under a trust ‘to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds of trust property in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use.’ That was to be taken not to be restricted to the personal receiot by the defendant but should include sums paid into a third party company to achieve a similar effect.

Arden , Tomlinson , David Richards LJJ
[2016] EWCA Civ 557, [2016] WLR(D) 313
Bailii, WLRD
Limitation Act 1980 21, Companies Act 1985 263
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding and Another ChD 5-Sep-2014
The company sought to recover from the defendants, two former directors.
Held: The claim was statute barred.
Hodge QC dealt with the claimant’s reliance on section 32: ‘That leaves the claimant’s reliance upon section 32. There the . .
Approved – In re Pantone 485 Ltd ChD 29-Nov-2001
The respondent Bain was a director of a number of connected companies, including Smarturgent and Pantone, both of which he indirectly controlled. The liquidator of both companies brought proceedings against Bain on a number of claims for breach of . .
Cited – Cave v Robinson Jarvis and Rolf (a Firm) HL 25-Apr-2002
An action for negligence against a solicitor was defended by saying that the claim was out of time. The claimant responded that the solicitor had not told him of the circumstances which would lead to the claim, and that deliberate concealment should . .
Cited – Jetivia Sa and Another v Bilta (UK) Ltd and Others SC 22-Apr-2015
The liquidators of Bilta had brought proceedings against former directors and the appellant alleging that they were party to an unlawful means conspiracy which had damaged the company by engaging in a carousel fraud with carbon credits. On the . .
Cited – JD Wetherspoon Plc v Van De Berg and Co Ltd and others ChD 4-May-2007
Lewison J summarised the approach to be taken by courts hearing an application by defendants to strike out claims: ‘Both the application to strike out and the application for summary judgment are summary applications. The application for summary . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Limitation, Trusts

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.565725

Peacock and Another v Custins and Another: CA 14 Nov 2000

The conveyance of a field constituting the dominant land to the claimants was expressed to be subject to the benefit of a right of way over land owned by the defendants, enabling the claimants to reach the dominant land ‘at all times and for all purposes in connection with the use and enjoyment of the property hereby conveyed’. The purchaser came to farm the purchased field as one unit with another field, and sought a declaration that the right of way was for the benefit of both fields.
Held: In construing such a grant the court was concerned with the identity of the land, and purpose of the grant, not with the extent of its use. Nevertheless, the declaration sought to identify different land and must not be granted.
Schiemann LJ said: ‘where a court is being asked to declare whether the right to use a way comprises a right to use it to facilitate the cultivation of land other than the dominant tenement, the court is not concerned with any comparison between the amount of use made or to be made of the servient tenement and the amount of use made or that might lawfully be made within the scope of the grant. It is concerned with declaring the scope of the grant, having regard to its purposes and the identity of the dominant tenement. The authorities indicate that the burden on the owner of the servient tenement is not to be increased without his consent. But burden in this context does not refer to the number of journeys or the weight of the vehicles. Any use of the way is, in contemplation of law, a burden and one must ask whether the grantor agreed to the grantee making use of the way for that purpose all three judges (in Harris) were addressing not the question of additional user, but the different question: whether the white land was being used for purposes which were not merely adjuncts to the honest use of the pink land (the dominant tenement); or, rephrasing the same question, whether the way was being used for the purposes of the white land as well as the dominant tenement.
It is in our judgment clear that the grantor did not authorise the use of the way for the purpose of cultivating the blue land. This can not sensibly be described as ancillary to the cultivation of [Whiteacre].’

Schiemann, Mance LJJ, Smith J
Gazette 15-Dec-2000, Times 15-Dec-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 1958, [2001] 2 All ER 827, [2002] 1 WLR 1815
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Affirmed – Harris v Flower CA 1904
The servient land-owner alleged an excessive user by which it was attempted to impose an additional burden on the servient tenement in the use of a right of way for obtaining access to a factory erected partly on the land to which the right of way . .
Cited – Skull And Another v Glenister And Others 1864
A right of way appurtenant to land passes to the tenant by a parol demise of the land, though nothiiig is said about it at the time of the demise. – A, having a right of way to D close, demised the close to B. The latter, being possessed of an . .
Cited – Inverugie Investments Ltd v Hackett PC 1995
The plaintiff was the lessee of 30 apartments within a hotel complex. The defendants ejected the plaintiff and for some years used the apartments as part of the hotel with an average occupancy rate of not more than 40%.
Held: The defendants . .
Cited – Stoke-on-Trent City Council v W and J Wass Ltd CA 1988
The council had operated open markets on its land under statutory authority. In breach of the statute, the defendant operated a market on a different day, but within the excluded area. This was a nuisance actionable on proof of damage. The council . .

Cited by:
Cited – Sargeant and Another v Macepark (Whittlebury) Ltd ChD 5-Mar-2003
The servient owner granted a lease of easements to the dominant owner, to provide a means of access to the dominant land, and from the dominant land (an hotel) to the Silverstone racing circuit. Subsequently the hotel owner negotiated a more direct . .
Cited – Wall v Collins and Another CA 17-May-2007
Properties, when leasehold, had acquired rights of way by prescription over neighbouring land. The freehold interests were acquired, and the claimant now appealed a decision that the right of way acquired under his lease had disappeared.
Held: . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.145437

David T Morrison and Co Ltd (T/A Gael Home Interiors) v ICL Plastics Ltd and Others: SC 30 Jul 2014

The claimant sought damages after an explosion at the defender’s nearby premises damaged its shop. The defender said that the claim was out of time, and now appealed against a decision that time had not begun to run under the 1973 Act.
Held: (Lord Hodge and Lord Toulson dissenting) The appeal was allowed. The natural meaning of the words ’caused as aforesaid’ in section 11(3) was adjectival: they described the loss with which the provision was concerned, but did not have the effect of postponing the running of time until the creditor was aware that the loss had been caused by a breach of duty. Properly construed, section 11(3) was concerned with latent damage. Construing it subjectively, as was in practice being suggested, would be anomalous. For the prescriptive period to begin under section 11(3) of the 1973 Act, the creditor needed to be aware (actually or constructively, if the creditor could with reasonable diligence have been aware) only of the occurrence of the loss or damage and not of its cause.

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, Lord Toulson , Lord Hodge
[2014] UKSC 48, 2014 GWD 25-5, 2014 SLT 791, UKSC 2013/0104
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 6(1) 11(3), Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954
Scotland
Citing:
See Also – ICL Plastics Ltd and Others, Re Application for Judicial Review SCS 11-Mar-2005
The applicants were concerned at the decision to exclude them from their premises to investigate the cause of an explosion leading to the collapse of the factory. . .
At Outer House – David T Morrison and Co Ltd v ICL Plastics Ltd and Others SCS 9-Mar-2012
Outer House – Opinion – In May 2004 an explosion at the defenders factory caused nine deaths. A pipeline carrying LPG gas had not been assessed for risks. Morrison owned neighbouring premises which were damaged. They began an action for damages. The . .
Cited – Glasper v Rodger SCS 1996
First Division – Inner House – Lord President Hope said: ‘In our opinion the lack of awareness which requires to be established for the purposes of section 11(3) of the 1973 Act is a lack of awareness that a loss has occurred caused by an act, . .
Cited – Watson v Fram Reinforced Concrete Co (Scotland) Ltd HL 1960
A workman had been injured through the breaking of a defective part in the machine with which he was working. He brought an action of damages against his employers, and later convened as second defenders the manufacturers of the machine, who had . .
Cited – Dunlop v McGowans HL 6-Mar-1980
The landlord of a block of flats needed vacant possession to pursue redevelopment. The respondent solicitors failed to give the necessary notice in good time, delaying the development by a year. The landlord appellant delayed five years before . .
Cited – Greater Glasgow Health Board v Baxter Clark and Paul SCS 1990
Outer House Court of Session – Lord Clyde held (obiter) that the ordinary and natural meaning of the phrase ’caused as aforesaid’ included the distinct ingredient of causation by negligence: ‘The question is one of the interpretation of section . .
Cited – Kirk Care Housing Association Ltd v Crerar and Partners SCS 1996
Outer House – Lord Clyde reiterated his view, rejecting a challenge by counsel for the defenders, that section 11(3) was concerned only with awareness of loss, a matter of fact, and not with matters of legal liability. . .
Cited – Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza HL 21-Jun-2004
Same Sex Partner Entitled to tenancy Succession
The protected tenant had died. His same-sex partner sought a statutory inheritance of the tenancy.
Held: His appeal succeeded. The Fitzpatrick case referred to the position before the 1998 Act: ‘Discriminatory law undermines the rule of law . .
Cited – AMN Group Ltd v Gilcomston North Ltd and others SCS 20-Jun-2008
Outer House – The phrase ‘aware . . that loss, injury or damage caused as aforesaid had occurred’ as meaning ‘aware . . that a stateable prima facie claim . . could properly be advanced against someone’ the resolution of that issue will ultimately . .
Cited – Pelagic Freezing Ltd v Lovie Construction SCS 28-Oct-2010
Outer House . .
Cited – Ghani v Peter T McCann and Co 2002
. .
Cited – Henderson v Henderson 20-Jul-1843
Abuse of Process and Re-litigation
The court set down the principles to be applied in abuse of process cases, where a matter was raised again which should have been dealt with in earlier proceedings.
Sir James Wigram VC said: ‘In trying this question I believe I state the rule . .

Cited by:
Cited – Gordon and Others v Campbell Riddell Breeze Paterson Llp SCS 8-Mar-2016
(Extra Division, Inner House) The claimant trustees appealed from rejection of their claims of professional negligence against the defendant solicitors as out of time. The parties disputed whether the limitation period ran from the service of . .
Cited – Gordon and Others (Trustees of The Inter Vivos Trust) v Campbell Riddell Breeze Paterson Llp SC 15-Nov-2017
The claimants appealed from rejection of their claims for losses saying that such losses had been caused by their solicitors in failing properly to identify the tenant and the relevant lease when issuing notices to quit. The solicitors argued that . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Negligence, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.535437

Bowden v Poor Sisters of Nazareth and others and similar: HL 21 May 2008

The appellants said they had suffered abuse while resident at children’s homes run by the respondents. The respondents denied the allegations and said that they were also out of time. The claims were brought many years after the events.
Held: The issues had been properly examined in the Court of Session and a discretion exercised. The House should not revisit that decision.

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Carswell
[2008] UKHL 32, 2008 SCLR 547, 2008 GWD 17-305, (2008) 152(22) SJLB 28, 2008 SLT 561, 2008 SC (HL) 146
Bailii, HL
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973
Scotland
Citing:
Cited – McIntyre v Armitage Shanks Ltd HL 1980
A workman contracted pneomoconiosis and knew all the relevant facts but was advised by the local secretary of his trade union that he could not sue. His later claim was met by a defence of limtation.
Held: The action was time barred. . .
Appeal from – Bowden v Sister Bernard Mary Murray and others OHCS 30-Jul-2004
. .
Cited – Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor 2-Oct-1996
(High Court of Australia) McHugh J said that the public interest requires disputes to be settled as quickly as possible. . .
Cited – A v Hoare HL 30-Jan-2008
Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend . .
Cited – Carson v Howard Doris Limited 1981
Whether it was equitable to allow an action to go ahead despite the expiry of the limitation period, depended upon three factors: ‘(1) the conduct of the pursuer since the accident and up to the time of his seeking the court’s authority to bring the . .
Disapproved – KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 10-Jun-2003
The court considered an extension of the time for claiming damages for personal injuries after the claimants said they had been sexually abused as children in the care of the defendants.
Held: The test to be applied under section 14(2) was . .
Cited – Girvan v Inverness Farmers Dairy and Another HL 13-Nov-1997
(Scotland) A second re-trial in order to obtain a jury assessment of damages more in line with that assessed by judges would be wrong. Lord Clyde: ‘In a system in which damages may be assessed in different cases either by a jury or by a judge it is . .
Cited – McCabe v McLellan IHCS 1994
An action of professional negligence was brought against two doctors for alleged negligence when the pursuer was a young child. He was 18 in 1986 and raised an action against the first defender within the triennium provided for in section 17(4) of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.267944

Loutchansky v The Times Newspapers Ltd and Others (Nos 2 to 5): CA 5 Dec 2001

Two actions for defamation were brought by the claimant against the defendant. The publication reported in detail allegations made against the claimant of criminal activities including money-laundering on a vast scale. They admitted the defamatory nature of the words, but claimed qualified Reynolds privilege. They said that as responsible journalists they had a duty to bring certain stories to the attention of the public, and that such activity should attract a qualified privilege. The court had to ask whether either the ‘duty-interest’ or ‘right to know’ test was satisfied. The journalist had to behave responsibly. If not, then had no duty to publish and the public had no proper interest in reading it. Unless the publisher was acting responsibly privilege could not arise. That test was to be answered by the court not the journalist, and as an issue preliminary to testing the truth or falsity of the allegation.
‘At the end of the day the court has to ask itself the single question whether in all the circumstances the ‘duty-interest test or the right to know test’ has been satisfied so that qualified privilege attaches.’
The court discussed the interest/duty test saying: ‘The interest is that of the public in a modern democracy in free expression and, more particularly, in the promotion of a free and vigorous press to keep the public informed. The vital importance of this interest has been identified and emphasised time and again in recent cases and needs no restatement here. The corresponding duty on the journalist (and equally his editor) is to play his proper role in discharging that function. His task is to behave as a responsible journalist. He can have no duty to publish unless he is acting responsibly any more than the public has an interest in reading whatever may be published irresponsibly. That is why in this class of case the question whether the publisher has behaved responsibly is necessarily and intimately bound up with the question whether the defence of qualified privilege arises. Unless the publisher is acting responsibly privilege cannot arise.’
The second issue related to the continued publication of the editions of the newspapers on the internet. The paper claimed that limitation ran from the date when the issue was put on the net, and the claimant that limitation began anew each time the site was accessed. The rule in Brunswick did not operate to restrict press freedom, and the accessing of the article on the net was a new publication each time a copy was transmitted to a reader. The continued publication of the unqualified article on the internet after complaint had been made and after it was known that no attempt to justify it would be made, properly led to the summary striking out of the defendant’s defence claiming qualified privilege.

Lord Phillips MR, Lord Justice Simon Brown, Lord Justice Tuckey
Times 07-Dec-2001, Gazette 06-Feb-2002, [2001] EWCA Civ 1805, [2002] 2 WLR 640, [2002] QB 783, [2002] Masons CLR 35, [2002] EMLR 14, [2002] 1 All ER 652
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 4A
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and others HL 28-Oct-1999
Fair Coment on Political Activities
The defendant newspaper had published articles wrongly accusing the claimant, the former Prime Minister of Ireland of duplicity. The paper now appealed, saying that it should have had available to it a defence of qualified privilege because of the . .
Cited – Duke of Brunswick v Harmer QBD 2-Nov-1849
brunswick_harmerQBD1849
On 19 September 1830 an article was published in the Weekly Dispatch. The limitation period for libel was six years. The article defamed the Duke of Brunswick. Seventeen years after its publication an agent of the Duke purchased a back number . .
Cited – Ogden v Association of the United States Army 1959
(US Supreme Court) . .
See Also – Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd and others CA 23-Jan-2001
The defendants requested that the defamation claim they faced be struck out despite the apparent reasonable possibility of success. . .
See also – Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Limited (No 2) CA 12-Mar-2001
The defendants appealed against a refusal to allow them to amend their pleadings. They wished to include allegations as to matters which were unknown to the journalist at the time of publication.
Held: It is necessary for the defendants to . .
Appeal from – Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd QBD 26-Apr-2001
A defendant could not support a defence in defamation proceedings of qualified privilege by putting before the court matters of which it was unaware at the time of publication. The duty to publish and the interest in receiving the information, and . .

Cited by:
Cited – MacIntyre v Phillips and Others CA 24-Jul-2001
The appellant police officers and others were defendants in an action for defamation. They appealed a refusal of a trial of the preliminary issue as to whether they had the benefit of qualified privilege. They said that recent case law (GKR Karate . .
Cited – George Galloway MP v Telegraph Group Ltd QBD 2-Dec-2004
The claimant MP alleged defamation in articles by the defendant newspaper. They claimed to have found papers in Iraqi government offices after the invasion of Iraq which implicated the claimant. The claimant said the allegations were grossly . .
Cited – Dow Jones and Co Inc v Jameel CA 3-Feb-2005
Presumption of Damage in Defamation is rebuttable
The defendant complained that the presumption in English law that the victim of a libel had suffered damage was incompatible with his right to a fair trial. They said the statements complained of were repetitions of statements made by US . .
Cited – Jameel and Another v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl (No 2) CA 3-Feb-2005
The claimant sought damages for an article published by the defendant, who argued that as a corporation, the claimant corporation needed to show special damage, and also that the publication had qualified privilege.
Held: ‘It is an established . .
Cited – Armstrong v Times Newspapers Ltd and David Walsh, Alan English CA 29-Jul-2005
The claimant sought damages after publication by the first defendant of articles which it was claimed implied that he had taken drugs. The paper claimed qualified privilege, and claimed Reynolds immunity.
Held: The defence of qualified . .
Cited – George Galloway MP v The Telegraph Group Ltd CA 25-Jan-2006
The defendant appealed agaiunst a finding that it had defamed the claimant by repeating the contents of papers found after the invasion of Iraq which made claims against the claimant. The paper had not sought to justify the claims, relying on . .
Cited – Mardas v New York Times Company and Another QBD 17-Dec-2008
The claimant sought damages in defamation. The US publisher defendants denied that there had been any sufficient publication in the UK and that the court did not have jurisdiction. The claimant appealed the strike out of the claims.
Held: The . .
Cited – Clift v Slough Borough Council and Another QBD 6-Jul-2009
clift_sloughQBD09
The claimant sought damages for defamation. The council had decided that she had threatened a member of staff and notified various people, and entered her name on a violent persons register. She alleged malice, the council pleaded justification and . .
See Also – Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd and others QBD 12-Dec-2002
The court considered the possible affront to jurors in a defamation action when asked to decide some elements of an action, but not others. . .
Cited – Metropolitan International Schools Ltd. (T/A Skillstrain And/Or Train2Game) v Designtechnica Corp (T/A Digital Trends) and Others QBD 16-Jul-2009
The claimant complained that the defendant had published on its internet forums comments by posters which were defamatory of it, and which were then made available by the second defendant search engine. The court was asked what responsibility a . .
Cited – Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd QBD 2-Oct-2009
The defendant had published a story in its newspaper. At that time it attracted Reynolds qualified privilege. After the circumstances changed, the paper offered an updating item. That offer was rejected as inadequate.
Held: The qualified . .
Cited – Budu v The British Broadcasting Corporation QBD 23-Mar-2010
budu_bbcQBD2010
The defendant sought to strike out the claimant’s action in defamation. It had reported that the police had withdrawn an employment offer to claimant after doubting his immigration status.
Held: The claims should be struck out. The articles . .
Cited – Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd CA 13-Jul-2010
The claimant police officer complained of an article he said was defamatory in saying he was being investigated for allegations of accepting bribes. The article remained on the internet even after he was cleared. Each party appealed interim orders. . .
Cited – Robins v Kordowski and Another QBD 22-Jul-2011
robins_kordQBD11
The claimant solicitor said he had been defamed on the first defendant’s website (‘Solicitors from Hell’) by the second defendant. The first defendant now applied to set aside judgment entered by default. The claimant additionally sought summary . .
Cited – Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd SC 21-Mar-2012
The defendant had published an article which was defamatory of the claimant police officer, saying that he was under investigation for alleged corruption. The inquiry later cleared him. The court was now asked whether the paper had Reynolds type . .
Cited – Brett Wilson Llp v Person(s) Unknown, Responsible for The Operation and Publication of The Website www.solicitorsfromhelluk.com QBD 16-Sep-2015
The claimant solicitors sought remedies against the unknown publishers of the respondent website which was said to publish material defamatory of them, and to ampunt to harassment.
Held: The alleged defamatory meanings were not challenged by . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation, Media, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.166964

Stott v Thomas Cook Tour Operators Ltd: SC 5 Mar 2014

The Court was asked whether a person may recover damages for discomfort and injury to feelings caused by a breach of the 2007 Regulations, which implement EC Regulation No. 1107/2006. The disabled passenger claimant alleged failure by the defendant air carrier to make reasonable efforts to provide his seating needs.
Held: Such a claim was precluded by the Montreal Convention. The Court declined to refer the Case to the ECJ. The meanings of the Regulations was not in issue, and nor was there said to be incompatibility with the Montreal Convention, and nor did it involve a question of European Law.
Lord Toulson said: ‘To summarise, this case is not about the interpretation or application of a European Regulation, and it does not in truth involve a question of European law, notwithstanding that the Montreal Convention has effect through the Montreal Regulation. The question at issue is whether the claim is outside the substantive scope and/or temporal scope of the Montreal Convention, and that depends entirely on the proper interpretation of the scope of that Convention. The governing principles are those of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If the issue concerned the compatibility of the Regulation with the Convention (as in Nelson) it would indeed involve a question of European law, but no such question arises and there is no basis for supposing that the Montreal Convention should be given a different ‘European’ meaning from its meaning as an international convention. On the contrary, it was the acknowledged purpose of the Regulation to ensure full alignment between the Convention as an international instrument and community law.’

Lord Neuberger, President, Lady Hale, Deputy President, Lord Reed, Lord Hughes, Lord Toulson
[2014] UKSC 15, [2014] 1 All ER (Comm) 849, [2014] 2 All ER 461, [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 207, [2014] 3 CMLR 7, [2014] Eq LR 287, [2014] 2 WLR 521, [2014] AC 1347, [2014] WLR(D) 111
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary
Civil Aviation (Access to Air Travel for Disabled Persons and Persons with Reduced Mobility) Regulations 2007, EC Regulation No. 1107/2006
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Stott v Thomas Cook Tour Operators Ltd and Another CA 7-Feb-2012
The claimants were disabled and, despite promises, had not had their seating needs met when flying with the defendants. . .
Cited – Sidhu and Others v British Airways Plc; Abnett (Known as Sykes) v Same HL 13-Dec-1996
The claimants had been air passengers who were unlawfully detained in Kuwait, when their plane was captured whilst on the ground on the invasion of Kuwait. They sought damages for that detention.
Held: There are no exceptions to the Warsaw . .
Cited – Regina, ex parte International Air Transport Association, European Low Fares Airline Association v Department for Transport ECJ 10-Jan-2006
ECJ Carriage by air – Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 – Articles 5, 6 and 7 -Compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights – Validity – . .

Cited by:
Cited – Dawson v Thomson Airways Ltd CA 19-Jun-2014
The claimant’s flight had been delayed for six hours. The airline said that the claim having been made outside the two year period applicable under the Montreal convention, no compensation was payable.
Held: The claimant’s appeal failed. ‘We . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Transport, Consumer, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.521995

Cave v Robinson Jarvis and Rolf (a Firm): HL 25 Apr 2002

An action for negligence against a solicitor was defended by saying that the claim was out of time. The claimant responded that the solicitor had not told him of the circumstances which would lead to the claim, and that deliberate concealment should extend the limitation period.
Held: Brocklesby was wrongly decided. Section 32 should deprive a defendant of his limitation defence where either he took active steps to conceal his failure, or the failure itself was deliberate and the concealment might not be discovered for sometime. Where the failing was non-deliberate negligence, a failure to disclose was not concealment. Deliberate commission did not require unconscionable behaviour, but was still to be contrasted with behaviour which was accidental, or inadvertent.
Lord Millettt said: ‘As I have explained, in enacting the 1980 Act Parliament substituted ‘deliberate concealment’ for ‘concealed fraud’. This is a different and more appropriate concept. It cannot be assumed that the law remained the same. But reference to the old law explains why Parliament enacted section 32(2) and did not rely on section 32(1)(b) alone to cover the whole ground. With all reference to fraud or conscious impropriety omitted, there was an obvious risk that ‘deliberate concealment’ might be construed in its natural sense as meaning ‘active concealment’ and not as embracing mere non-disclosure. Section 32(2) was therefore enacted to cover cases where active concealment should not be required. But such cases were limited in two respects: first, the defendant must have been guilty of a deliberate commission of a breach of duty; and secondly, the circumstances must make it unlikely that the breach of duty will be discovered for some time.
Given that section 32(2) is (or at least may be) required to cover cases of non-disclosure rather than active concealment, the reason for limiting it to the deliberate commission of a breach of duty becomes clear. It is only where the defendant is aware of his own deliberate wrongdoing that it is appropriate to penalise him for failing to disclose it.
In my opinion, section 32 deprives a defendant of a limitation defence in two situations: (i) where he takes active steps to conceal his own breach of duty after he has become aware of it; and (ii) where he is guilty of deliberate wrongdoing and conceals or fails to disclose it in circumstances where it is unlikely to be discovered for some time. But it does not deprive a defendant of a limitation defence where he is charged with negligence if, being unaware of his error or that he has failed to take proper care, there has been nothing for him to disclose.’
Lord Scott said: ‘If the claimant can show that the defendant knew he was committing a breach of duty, or intended to commit the breach of duty – I can discern no difference between the two formulations; each would constitute, in my opinion, a deliberate commission of the breach – then, if the circumstances are such that the claimant is unlikely to discover for some time that the breach of duty has been committed, the facts involved in the breach are taken to have been deliberately concealed for subsection (1)(b) purposes.
Morritt LJ said, in [Brocklesby v Armitage and Guest (Note) [2002] 1 WLR 598], that in general a person is assumed to know the legal consequences of his actions and that, therefore, if an act has been done intentionally, the actor’s unawareness of its legal consequences would be immaterial and no defence. The premise is, in my opinion, much too wide to constitute a satisfactory approach to construction of a statutory provision such as section 32(2). A person may or may not know that an act of his or an omission to do or say something or other constitutes a breach of tortious or contractual duty. His knowledge or lack of it may well be immaterial to the question whether a cause of action for which he is liable has accrued to the person injured by the act or omission. But that is no reason at all why Parliament, in prescribing the circumstances in which the person injured by the act or omission can escape from a Limitation Act defence, should not distinguish between the case where the actor knows he is committing a breach of duty and the case where he does not. The clear words of section 32(2) – ‘deliberate commission of a breach of duty’ – show that Parliament has made that distinction.
It follows that, in my opinion, the construction of section 32(2) adopted in the Brocklesby case was wrong.’

Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Lord Millett and Lord Scott of Foscote
Times 07-May-2002, [2002] UKHL 18, [2003] 1 AC 384, [2002] 2 WLR 1107, [2002] 19 EGCS 146, (2002) 81 Con LR 25, [2002] 2 All ER 641, [2002] PNLR 25, [2003] 1 CLC 101, [2002] 19 EGCS 146, 81 Con LR 25, [2003] 1 CLC 101
House of Lords, Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 32(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
Overruled – James Brocklesby v Armitage and Guest (a Firm) CA 9-Jul-1999
A failure by an adviser to make his position clear when he thought he had been negligent, could constitute a ‘deliberate’ act within section 32 even if the defendant’s actions were not motivated by any intention to deceive the claimant: ‘it is not . .
Cited – Beaman v ARTS Ltd CA 1949
The italian plaintiff had left Egland in 1935 leaving certain valuables with the defendants for safe keeping. During the war, the property was released to the authorities as alien property, who, informed by the defemdant that they were of no value, . .
Appeal from – Cave v Robinson Jarvis and Rolf CA 20-Feb-2001
The court was asked as to the meaning of the word ‘deliberate’ as it appeared in section 32(2) of the 1980 Act. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Williams v Fanshaw Porter and Hazelhurst CA 18-Feb-2004
The claimant alleged that her solicitors had concealed from her the fact that they had entered a consent order which dismissed her claim for medical negligence.
Held: The solicitor had failed to inform the client that her original claim . .
Cited – Chagos Islanders v Attorney-General and Another CA 22-Jul-2004
The claimants sought leave to appeal against a finding that they had no cause of action for their expulsion from their islands.
Held: ‘Exile without colour of law is forbidden by Magna Carta. That it can amount to a public law wrong is already . .
Cited – The Law Society v Sephton and Co and others CA 13-Dec-2004
The Society appealed dismissal for limitation of its claim against the defendant firm of accountants arising from alleged fraud in approval of a solicitor’s accounts.
Held: The liability did not arise until the Society decided to make . .
Cited – Polley v Warner Goodman and Streat (A Firm) CA 30-Jun-2003
A cause of action in negligence is complete once the claimant has suffered loss as a result of the negligence, even if the existence of the loss (and indeed of the negligence) is not, and could not be, known to him, and even where that loss is much . .
Cited – Denekamp v Denekamp CA 8-Dec-2005
Appeal against striking out of claim and civil restraint order. . .
Cited – Mortgage Express v Abensons Solicitors (A Firm) ChD 20-Apr-2012
The claimant lender sought damages against the defendant solicitors alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by them in acting for them on mortgage advances. The defendants now argued that the allowance of an amendment to add the allegation . .
Cited – Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding and Another CA 17-Jun-2016
The company, now in liquidation sought to claim for the alledged misapplication by former directors of its funds in 2007. It now appealed against a summary rejection of its claim as time barred.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Section 21(1)(b) . .
Cited – Siddiqui v University of Oxford QBD 5-Dec-2016
The University applied to have struck out the claim by the claimant for damages alleging negligence in its teaching leading to a lower class degree than he said he should have been awarded.
Held: Strike out on the basis that the claim was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Professional Negligence

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.170275

Forbes v Wandsworth Health Authority: CA 21 Mar 1996

The plaintiff had a history of circulatory problems in his legs. He underwent surgery losing his leg. The question was when he should have sought advice as to why an attempted by-pass operation had resulted in one leg having to be amputated. He enquired why only some 10 years after the event. He was told that it was because the operation had been unsuccessful and resulted in a loss of blood supply which threatened gangrene. This was not itself negligent, but the surgeon had made a second unsuccessful attempt to operate on the following day and the plaintiff was advised that he would have had a better chance of success if he had tried again earlier.
Held: The plaintiff did not have constructive knowledge that the loss of his leg was caused by any act or omission on the part of the surgeon. He trusted the surgeon (who had performed two previous successful operations on his legs) and thought he had simply suffered a misfortune. The limitation period begins to run after the Plaintiff has recovered sufficiently to be able to see need to take legal advice. The court applied a wholly objective test, holding that the average patient would have investigated the matter earlier, and doubted that the individual character and intelligence of the plaintiff was relevant to the inquiry: ‘It does not seem to me that the fact that a plaintiff is more trusting, incurious, indolent, resigned or uncomplaining by nature can be a relevant characteristic, since this too undermines any objective approach.’ and ‘In my judgment, a reasonable man in the position of the deceased, who knew that the operation had been unsuccessful, that he had suffered a major injury which would seriously affect his enjoyment of life in the future, would affect his employability on the labour market, if he had any, and would impose substantial burdens on his wife and family in looking after him, if he was minded to make a claim at any time, should and would take advice reasonably promptly.’
Evans LJ: ‘Since there is a wide discretionary power to extend the period in circumstances which Parliament has defined in section 33, there is no clear requirement to construe the knowledge provisions in section 14 narrowly or in favour of individual plaintiffs. I therefore consider that they should be interpreted neutrally so that in respect of constructive knowledge under section 14(3) an objective standard applies.’

Stuart-Smith LJ, Evans LJ
Gazette 24-Apr-1996, Times 21-Mar-1996, [1996/7] MLR 175, [1997] QB 402, [1996] EWCA Civ 1318, [1996] 3 WLR 1108, [1996] 7 Med LR 175, [1996] 4 All ER 881
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 11(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Doubted – Nash v Eli Lilly and Co CA 1993
The court considered whether a solicitor acting for a potential plaintiff was considered to be an expert for the purposes of the section.
Held: Purchas LJ said: ‘Of course as advice from a solicitor as to the legal consequences of the act or . .

Cited by:
Cited – O’Driscoll v Dudley Health Authority CA 30-Apr-1998
The plaintiff sought damages for the negligence of the respondent in her care at birth. Years later the family concluded that her condition was a result of negligence. They waited until she was 21, when they mistakenly believed that she became an . .
Persuasive – Adams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council HL 17-Jun-2004
A attended the defendant’s schools between 1977 and 1988. He had always experienced difficulties with reading and writing and as an adult found those difficulties to be an impediment in his employment. He believed them to be the cause of the . .
Cited – Smith v Leicestershire Health Authority CA 29-Jan-1998
The plaintiff appealed a finding that she had sufficient knowledge of her possible claim for medical negligence against the defendants, and that she was out of time. She had known of her condition, but said she had no sufficient reason to see that . .
Cited – McCoubrey v Ministry of Defence CA 24-Jan-2007
The defendant appealed a decision allowing a claim to proceed more than ten years after it had been suffered. The claimant’s hearing had been damaged after an officer threw a thunderflash into his trench on an exercise.
Held: The defendant’s . .
Cited – Buckler v J F Finnegan Ltd CA 21-Jun-2004
The claimant sought damages for personal injuries after ingesting asbestos while employed as a joiner by the defendant. The defendant appealed an order allowing the claim to go ahead despite being out of time. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Negligence

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.80628

Fisher v Brooker and Others: HL 30 Jul 2009

The claimant sought a share in the royalties from the song ‘A whiter shade of pale’ but had delayed his claim for 38 years. He had contributed the organ solo which had contributed significantly to the song’s success. He now sought a share of future royalties.
Held: His appeal was allowed. Limitation did not apply, and nor could the equitable doctrines of estoppel or laches be applied where the benefit of the delay to the defendant far outweighed any detriment from the delay. The issuing of a claim in 2005 revoked any implied licence to the defendants to continue to exploit the song.
Neuberger L said that laches could only bar equitable relief and a declaration as to the existence of a long term property right recognised as such by statute was not equitable relief, and in order to defeat the claimant’s claims on the ground of laches, the defendants had to demonstrate some acts during the delay period which resulted in a balance of justice justifying the refusal of relief to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled.

Lord Hope of Craighead
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Mance, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
[2009] UKHL 41, Times 12-Aug-2009, [2009] 1 WLR 1764, [2009] FSR 25, [2009] Bus LR 1334, [2009] 4 All ER 789, [2009] ECDR 17, [2010] EMLR 2
Bailii
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 12, Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/3297), Limitation Act 1980 39
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Zouch, Ex Dimiss Abbot And Hallet v Parsons 23-Nov-1765
Contract by Children for Necessities
Lord Mansfield said that: ‘miserable must the condition of minors be; excluded from the society and commerce of the world; deprived of necessaries, education, employment, and many advantages; if they could do no binding acts. Great inconvenience . .
Appeal from – Brooker and Another v Fisher CA 4-Apr-2008
The claimant had asserted a joint authorship of the song ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’ written in the sixties. The defendant appealed saying that the claim had been brought too late, and that the finding ignored practice in the music industry. The . .
At first instance – Fisher v Brooker and Another ChD 20-Dec-2006
The claimant said that he had contributed to the copyright in the song ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’ but had been denied royalties. He had played the organ and particularly the organ solo which had contrbuted significantly to the fame of the record.
Cited – Gillett v Holt and Another CA 23-Mar-2000
Repeated Assurances Created Equitable Estoppel
Repeated assurances, given over years, that the claimant would acquire an interest in property on the death of the person giving the re-assurance, and upon which the claimant relied to his detriment, could found a claim of equitable estoppel. The . .
Cited – Sledmore v Dalby CA 8-Feb-1996
The plaintiff sought possession of a house. She had owned it with her late husband. The defendant lived in and had done much work on the house, but the deceased left it all to the plaintiff and the defendant’s wife who had since also died. She . .
Cited – Edwards v Carter HL 1893
If an infant choses to repudiate a disposition, he must do so within a reasonable time after coming of age. . .
Cited – Jaggard v Sawyer and Another CA 18-Jul-1994
Recovery of damages after Refusal of Injunction
The plaintiff appealed against the award of damages instead of an injunction aftter the County court had found the defendant to have trespassed on his land by a new building making use of a private right of way.
Held: The appeal failed.
Cited – Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Company, Meux’s Brewery Co v Same CA 1895
The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction for nuisance by noise and vibration which was causing structural injury to a public house.
Held: The court set out the rules for when a court should not grant an injunction for an infringement of . .
Cited – Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd ChD 1981
The fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine of estoppel. In the light of the more recent cases, the principle ‘requires a very much broader approach which is . .
Cited – Doyle v White City Stadium Ltd CA 1934
A professional boxer, below the age for making a contract generally, was held to be bound by the terms of his licence from the British Boxing Board of Control, which allowed him to earn his living boxing but required him to keep the rules. It was . .
Cited – Shaw v Applegate CA 1977
There was a covenant against the use of a property as an amusement arcade. Within three years the purchaser had installed amusement machines, but it was not until three years later that the plaintiffs issued proceedings for an injunction and . .
Cited – Chaplin v Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd 1966
It had been agreed that the defendant publishers should during the legal term of the copyright have the exclusive right of producing, publishing and selling a work in volume form in any language throughout the world. The author warranted that he was . .

Cited by:
Cited – Adamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Intellectual Property, Limitation, Equity, Children, Contract

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.368926

Tower Hamlets v Barrett and Another: CA 19 Jul 2005

The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been demolished in 1960, and the land enclosed. By former tenants. The land was registered in 1978. In 1977, the then tenants, placed a lockable gate in the boundary fence and had used it as part of their premises until 1989. The defendants acquired the freehold of their own property in 1993. They had part completed the building of an extension on the land, but stopped when the claimant threatened proceedings.
Held: A tenant who encroaches on a neighbour’s land is presumed to act for the benefit of his landlord. The making of a grant by the authority to restore the wall was not done as owner of the land but as a public authority. The judge had erred in find that adverse possession had not been established up to 1995. The correspondence and offer to purchase the freeholder’s interest by the landlord would operate to defeat the landlord’s claim, however that acknowledgment was not made by the person then in possession, and was ineffective. The possessory title had been transferred with the main property when the defendants purchsed it. Appeal allowed.

Thorpe LJ, Wall LJ, Neuberger LJ
[2005] EWCA Civ 923
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Kingsmill v Millard 20-Jun-1855
Parke B set out the doctrine that a tenant acquiring adjoining land by adverse possession acquires it on behalf of his landlord: ‘It is laid down in all the cases – whether the inclosed land is part of the waste, or belongs to the landlord or a . .
Cited – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
Cited – Powell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the . .
Cited – Smirk v Lyndale Developments Ltd ChD 1975
The court considered the doctrine that a tenant acquiring title to land by adverse possession, did so on behalf of hs landlord.
Held: The cases demonstrated that ‘the law . . has got into something of a tangle’, but the doctrine, at least as . .
Cited – Littledale v Liverpool College CA 1900
The mere storage of items in a property was insufficient to demonstrate the necessary intention to dispossess the rightful owner. It was a mere exercise of the rights under an easement. Enclosure of land is not necessarily decisive. Lord Lindley MR . .
Cited – Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton CA 19-Mar-1997
The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar . .
Cited – British Railways Board v G J Holdings Ltd 1974
There can be no adverse possession where the squatter’s use of the land was not inconsistent with the use intended by the paper owner. . .
Cited – In re River Steamer Company 1871
A without prejudice letter was written by a person claiming adverse possession of land to the paper owner offering to purchase the land. The paper owner said this was an acknowledgment of his title.
Held: The letter was written in the context . .
Cited – Colin Dawson Windows Ltd v Borough Council of King’s Lynn and West Norfolk, Howard CA 20-Jan-2005
In a claim for adverse possession, the court will readily infer the grant of a licence (so as to defeat an assertion that possession is adverse to the owner) during negotiations for the purchase or letting of land, where the negotiating purchaser or . .
Cited – Doe d. Lewis v Rees 1834
Encroachments made by a tenant enured for the benefit of his landlord, ‘unless it appears clearly by some evidence at the time of the making of the encroachments that the tenant intended the encroachments for his own benefit . . ‘ . .
Cited – Doe d. Croft v Tidbury 1854
. .
Cited – Michael Batt Charitable Trust v Adams ChD 2001
The court looked at what was required to establish adverse possession in a claim for land. Laddie J said: ‘The only factor that appears, at first sight, to point in the direction to exclude anyone, is the fact that Mr Higgs maintained and repaired . .
Cited – Tabor v Godfrey 1895
Where a tenant occupies land adjacent to land demised to him by the landlord, he occupies it as additional to the tenancy, and subject to its terms. . .
Cited – Edginton v Clark CA 1964
An offer to purchase the paper owner’s interest, even if made ‘subject to contract’, can be a sufficient acknowledgement of his title to defeat a claim for adverse possession. Upjohn LJ said: ‘If a man makes an offer to purchase freehold property, . .
Cited – Doe d. Baddeley v Massey 1851
A paper owner, as a stranger to the landlord and tenant relationship, cannot invoke an acknowledgment by the squatter’s landlord. The doctrine is based on estoppel. ‘the landlord is thereby entitled against the tenant who took, but not against a . .
Cited – Watcham v Attorney-General of the East Africa Protectorate PC 1919
The Watchams held land along the bank of the Nairobi River. It had been conveyed to them by the Crown by a certificate under the East African Land Regulations. The certificate gave the area transferred as ’66 3/4 acres, or thereabouts’, but included . .
Cited – Beaulane Properties Ltd v Palmer ChD 23-Mar-2005
The paper owner sought possession of land. The defendant said he had acquired a possessory title. The land was registered.
Held: The claimant’s human rights under article 1 were engaged. To be justifiable, the interference in that right had to . .
Cited – Malekshad v Howard de Walden Estates Limited HL 5-Dec-2002
A house and an adjoining building had been first demised under one lease, then separated vertically. Two separate residential properties now existed.
Held: The vertical division meant that the two houses could not be enfranchised as one under . .
Cited – F L Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tools Sales Limited HL 4-Apr-1973
The parties entered an agreement to distribute and sell goods in the UK. They disagreed as to the meaning of a term governing the termination of the distributorship.
Held: The court can not take into account the post-contractual conduct or . .

Cited by:
Cited – Childs and Another v Vernon CA 16-Mar-2007
The parties disputed the boundary between their properties, alleging various trespasses. The judge ordered a single expert witness. The court had been unable to establish the line of the boundary from the conveyances or the Land Registry plans. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Registered Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.228924

Deutsche Bahn Ag and Others v Morgan Advanced Materials Plc: SC 9 Apr 2014

The Court was asked whether claims against MAM for losses suffered by reason of a cartel infringing article 81(1) TEC (now article 101 TFEU) were time-barred, and also as to substantive questions about the nature of the decisions of the European Commission (or European Court of Justice) which bind domestic courts as to the existence of such a cartel. Having themselves disclosed the cartel, they had not been fined, and nor had they been involved in the rejected appeals against the fines. It was now asked whether they could ake advantage of the limitation period generated by that decision. The Court of Appeal had decided that the claim could proceed.
Held: The appeal was allowed. Section 47A of the 1998 Act was to be taken to refer to the Commission Decision, and not to the later decision of the Court.
A Commission Decision regarding the existence of a cartel constitutes a series of decisions addressed to its individual addressees, which remain binding or not according to the lodging and outcome of any individual appeals. A successful appeal by one addressee, establishing that there was no cartel, has no effect on the validity and effects of the Decision determining that there was such a cartel and levying a fine as against another addressee who has not appealed, and even if the appeals against infringement by alleged cartel members other than the appellant had succeeded, that would in European law have made no difference to the findings as to the existence and scope of the ‘complex of agreements and concerted practices’ in the relevant sector to which the Commission Decision found the appellant to have been party.

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Sumption, Lord Toulson, Lord Hodge
[2014] UKSC 24, UKSC 2012/0209, [2014] UKCLR 667, [2014] Bus LR 377, [2014] 4 CMLR 33, [2014] WLR(D) 161, [2014] 2 All ER 785
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC, WLRD
Competition Act 1998 47A
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd ECJ 14-Dec-2000
Masterfoods Ltd, a subsidiary of Mars Inc, brought proceedings in Ireland against HB Ice Cream Ltd, a subsidiary of Unilever, for a declaration that its agreements to provide retailers with freezer cabinets on terms that they stocked only HB ice . .
Cited – Europese Gemeenschap v Otis Nv ECJ 6-Nov-2012
ECJ Representation of the European Union before national courts – Articles 282 EC and 335 TFEU – Claim for damages in respect of loss caused to the European Union by a cartel – Article 47 of the Charter of . .
Cited – BCL Old Co Ltd and Others v BASF Plc and Others SC 24-Oct-2012
The claimant sought damages after it had been established in 2001 that the defendants had engaged in an unlawful cartel to maintain the prices of vitamins. The defendants had paid fines, and now argued that the claims, begun in 2008, were out of . .
Appeal from – Deutsche Bahn Ag and Others v Morgan Crucible Company Plc and Others CA 31-Jul-2012
The respondent company (MC) had disclosed to the European Commission its own historical involvement in unlawful price-fixing cartels. Other members, but not MC received fines. The claimants (DB) sought damages for their losses arising from the . .
At CAT – Deutsche Bahn Ag and Others v Morgan Crucible Company Plc and Others CAT 25-May-2011
. .
Cited – Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA etc ECJ 13-Jul-2006
ECJ Article 81 EC- Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Accidents caused by motor vehicles, vessels and mopeds – Compulsory civil liability insurance – Increase in premiums – Effect on . .
Cited – Commissioners of the European Communities v Assidoman Kraft Produncts Ab and Others ECJ 14-Sep-1999
Wood Pulp II
A decision of the Commission imposing penalties against several business concerns was challenged successfully by some of those penalised. Others who had not made the challenge applied to have the decision annulled for themselves also. The court said . .
Cited – A Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio and others v Commission ECJ 31-Mar-1993
ECJ 1. The statement of objections, the aim of which is to provide undertakings alleged to have infringed the rules of competition with all the information they need to enable them to defend themselves . .
Cited – Enron Coal Services Ltd (In Liquidation) v English Welsh and Scottish Railway Ltd (No 2) CA 19-Jan-2011
Section 47A of the 1997 Act has the effect that ‘the defendant cannot deny that it has committed whatever infringement the regulator has found’ and that ‘the decision that there was an infringement, and a particular infringement, is conclusive’: . .
Cited – Galp Energia Espana SA v European Commission ECJ 16-Sep-2013
Some of the addressees of a Commission Decision had appealed, but they sought annulment of the Decision as against all its addressees.
Held: ‘Principally, the applicants submit claims seeking annulment of the contested decision in its entirety . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, Commercial, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.523627

McDonnell and Another v Walker: CA 24 Nov 2009

The defendant appealed against the disapplication of section 11 of the 1980 Act under section 33.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The defendant had not contributed significantly to the delay: ‘the defendant received claims quite different in magnitude from anything notified to them before, almost seven years to the day after the accident, and where there is only a period of 17 months for which there is any kind of excuse. They were clearly forensically disadvantaged by a substantial period of delay by the claimants for which there is no excuse.’ The claimant had an action in negligence against his solicitors.

Waller LJ VP, Rimer LJ, Sir Paul Kennedy
[2009] EWCA Civ 1257, [2010] CP Rep 14, [2010] PIQR P5
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 11 33
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Walkley v Precision Forgings Ltd HL 1979
The plaintiff tried to bring a second action in respect of an industrial injury claim outside the limitation period so as to overcome the likelihood that his first action, although timeous, would be dismissed for want of prosecution.
Held: He . .
Cited – Thompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd HL 1981
The plaintiff’s solicitors, out of negligence, failed to issue a writ until one month after the limitation period had expired. The application to extend the period was rejected at first instance since he had an unanswerable claim against his . .
Cited – Donovan v Gwentoys Ltd HL 1990
The plaintiff, then a 16 year old girl slipped and fell whilst employed at the defendant’s factory. The limitation period expired on her 21st birthday. She commenced proceedings five and a half months after that date. The judge extended time under . .
Cited – A B and others v Liverpool City Council; Nugent Care Society (Formerly Catholic Social Services [Liverpool]) and Trustees of National Children’s Home and Orphanage Registered CA 15-Jun-1998
. .
Cited – KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 10-Jun-2003
The court considered an extension of the time for claiming damages for personal injuries after the claimants said they had been sexually abused as children in the care of the defendants.
Held: The test to be applied under section 14(2) was . .
Cited – Cain v Francis CA 18-Dec-2008
The court was asked under what circumstances it should exercise its discretion to extend the limitation period under section 33.
Held: Lady Justice Smith said: ‘It appears to me that there is now a long line of authority to support the . .
Cited – Khairule v North West Strategic Health Authority QBD 4-Jul-2008
Cox J considered the circumstances required to justify the extension of time for limitation: ‘In my view the crucial question in cases such as these, when considering the effects of the passage of time generally and the Section 33 discretion, is . .
Cited – A v Hoare HL 30-Jan-2008
Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend . .
Cited – Dudarec v Andrews and others CA 22-Mar-2006
In a claim for negligence against his former solicitors, the claimant sought damages for the loss of a chance of success in a personal injuries action struck out for want of prosecution seven years earlier.
Held: If the evidence were the same . .
Cited – Horton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .
Cited – AB and Others v Nugent Care Society CA 29-Jul-2009
‘These appeals raise questions as to the correct approach to the application of section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 in the light of the decision of the House of Lords in A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6, [2008] 1 AC 844. Each appeal arises out of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.381295

Adams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council: HL 17 Jun 2004

A attended the defendant’s schools between 1977 and 1988. He had always experienced difficulties with reading and writing and as an adult found those difficulties to be an impediment in his employment. He believed them to be the cause of the depression, panic and lack of self-esteem which he suffered. He consulted his doctor about those conditions, but was too embarrassed to disclose his literacy difficulties during the consultations. In 1999, when aged 27, he met by chance an educational psychologist, who suggested that he might be dyslexic. Upon a doctor confirming that diagnosis the appellant, in 2002, issued proceedings against the defendant. He claimed damages for negligence on the grounds of the defendant’s failure properly to assess the educational difficulties he had experienced at school. He said that such an assessment would have revealed that he suffered from dyslexia and led to treatment to ameliorate the consequences of that condition.
Held: The judge was right in applying the standard of reasonable behaviour to a person assumed to be suffering from untreated dyslexia, but there is no reason why the normal expectation that a person suffering from a significant injury will be curious about its origins should not also apply to dyslexics. A substantially objective test is to be applied when deciding what knowledge a claimant could reasonably be expected to acquire within section 14(3)(b). No sufficient reason had been shown to justify exercise of the court’s discretion to extend the limitation period under s33. Dyslexia, or at least the failure to treat it could constitute personal injury.

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond
[2004] UKHL 29, [2005] 1 AC 76, [2004] 3 WLR 89, [2004] 3 All ER 897
House of Lords, Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 14(3)(b) 33
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Adams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council CA 6-May-2003
The claimant sought damages from the defendant for having failed to diagnose his dysexia, resulting in educational failure. The respondent argued a reasonable peson would have sought help earlier. The council appealed a refusal to strike out of the . .
Cited – Robinson v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council CA 25-Jul-2002
The claimant sought an extension of the limitation period to allow him to pursue an action. He sought damages for negligence against his former school which had failed to diagnose and treat his dyslexia.
Held: His appeal was denied. The claim . .
Cited – M and Another v Newham London Borough Council and Others; X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council CA 24-Feb-1994
A local authority was not liable in damages for breach of a statutory duty in Social Services. The policy which has first claim on the loyalty of the law is that wrongs should be remedied. The court would not go so far as to hold that the education . .
Cited – X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council; M (A Minor) and Another v Newham London Borough Council; Etc HL 29-Jun-1995
Liability in Damages on Statute Breach to be Clear
Damages were to be awarded against a Local Authority for breach of statutory duty in a care case only if the statute was clear that damages were capable of being awarded. in the ordinary case a breach of statutory duty does not, by itself, give rise . .
Cited – Phelps v Mayor and Burgesses London Borough of Hillingdon CA 4-Nov-1998
The plaintiff claimed damages for the negligent failure of an educational psychologist employed by a local authority to identify that the plaintiff was dyslexic.
Held: An educational psychologist has no duty of care to a child, as opposed to . .
Cited – Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council; Anderton v Clwyd County Council; Gower v Bromley London Borough Council; Jarvis v Hampshire County Council HL 28-Jul-2000
The plaintiffs each complained of negligent decisions in his or her education made by the defendant local authorities. In three of them the Court of Appeal had struck out the plaintiff’s claim and in only one had it been allowed to proceed.
Cited – Smith v Central Asbestos Co Ltd CA 1971
Edmund-Davies LJ said of a report prepared by a committee of which had been chairman into ‘whether any alteration is desirable in the law relating to the limitation of actions in cases of personal injury where the injury or disease giving rise to . .
No longer good law – Smith v Central Asbestos Co Ltd; Central Asbestos Co Ltd v Dodd HL 1973
The House considered at what point an injured person was to be deemed to have become aware of his injury so as to start the limitation period.
Held: A majority rejected the proposition that knowledge of ‘material facts’ for section 1(3) . .
Cited – Glasgow Corporation v Muir HL 16-Apr-1943
The House considered the proper test to define the standard of care that must be adopted by the reasonable man in a claim for negligence.
Held: Lord Clauson said that the test is whether the person owing the duty of care ‘had in contemplation . .
Persuasive – Forbes v Wandsworth Health Authority CA 21-Mar-1996
The plaintiff had a history of circulatory problems in his legs. He underwent surgery losing his leg. The question was when he should have sought advice as to why an attempted by-pass operation had resulted in one leg having to be amputated. He . .
Cited – O’Driscoll v Dudley Health Authority CA 30-Apr-1998
The plaintiff sought damages for the negligence of the respondent in her care at birth. Years later the family concluded that her condition was a result of negligence. They waited until she was 21, when they mistakenly believed that she became an . .
Cited – Nash v Eli Lilly and Co CA 1993
The court considered whether a solicitor acting for a potential plaintiff was considered to be an expert for the purposes of the section.
Held: Purchas LJ said: ‘Of course as advice from a solicitor as to the legal consequences of the act or . .
Cited – Ali v Courtaulds Textiles Ltd CA 26-May-1999
A claimant was not fixed with knowledge of the source of his injury by being referred for medical opinion. He could not be expected to understand the source of this injury without expert assistance, and time did not run until such assistance was . .
Cited – Fenech v East London and City Health Authority CA 2000
The court was asked how to set the time at which the claimant became fixed with knowledge of her injury. They ‘found it unnecessary to attempt any final reconciliation, because ‘on any sort of objective approach’ the claimant should have made . .
Cited – Smith v Leicestershire Health Authority CA 29-Jan-1998
The plaintiff appealed a finding that she had sufficient knowledge of her possible claim for medical negligence against the defendants, and that she was out of time. She had known of her condition, but said she had no sufficient reason to see that . .
Cited – Parry v Clwyd Health Authority QBD 1996
The court preferred the more objective approach as to looking at when a plaintiff was to be fixed with knowledge of his injury: ‘If the purpose of section 14(3) is to create deemed or constructive knowledge in circumstances where there is no actual . .
Cited – KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 12-Feb-2003
The respondent appealed decisions by the court to allow claims for personal injury out of time. The claims involved cases of sexual abuse inflicted by its employees going back over many years.
Held: The judge had misapplied the test laid down . .
Cited – Coban v Aynur Allen F Barnes and Son (a Firm) CA 8-Oct-1996
The defendant resisted the plaintiff’s claim for personal injuries as out of time. His explanation for not pursuing inquiries with his solicitor was that he was an over-stayer who feared deportation.
Held: Having good reason to make such . .
Cited – Glaister v Greenwood ChD 26-Feb-2001
. .
Cited – Webster v Cooper and Burnett CA 2000
. .
Cited – Mortgage Corporation v Lambert and Co (A Firm) and Another CA 24-Apr-2000
If it was alleged that a lender could should have been aware of an overvaluation of a property so as to start the limitation clock, the owner must satisfy the court that it was reasonable at the time alleged for the lender have become obliged to . .
Cited – Mellors v Perry CA 2003
The claimant had endured a childhood of renal problems with three kidney transplants but had no reason think that this was anything other than the consequence of her congenital disability. . .
Cited – Barrett v London Borough of Enfield HL 17-Jun-1999
The claimant had spent his childhood in foster care, and now claimed damages against a local authority for decisions made and not made during that period. The judge’s decision to strike out the claim had been upheld by the Court of Appeal.
Cited by:
Cited – Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) and Another v Young CA 14-Nov-2006
The claimant sought damages saying that he had been abused as a child whilst in the defendant’s care. The defendants appealed a finding that the claimant had not first known of his injury more than three years before begining his action.
Held: . .
Cited – McCoubrey v Ministry of Defence CA 24-Jan-2007
The defendant appealed a decision allowing a claim to proceed more than ten years after it had been suffered. The claimant’s hearing had been damaged after an officer threw a thunderflash into his trench on an exercise.
Held: The defendant’s . .
Cited – Collins v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills and Others CA 23-May-2014
The claimant appealed against rejection of his claim for personal injury which had been rejected on basis that it was out of time. He had contracted cancer in 2002, but had recovered. He later came to attribute this to exposure to asbestos at work . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Education, Professional Negligence, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.198183

AIC Ltd v ITS Testing Services (UK) Ltd (‘the Kriti Palm’): CA 28 Nov 2006

The defendant appealed a finding of deceit. Having issued its certificate as to the quality of a cargo of gasoline, it then failed to disclose to the party who had paid it to produce the certificate, information it had which cast doubt on the accuracy of te certificate.
Held: Dishonesty was the essence of the tort of deceit. Though it was possible to be fraudulent even by making an ambiguous statement, in such a case it was essental that the statement should be understood in the way intended and it should be a representation of fact, and be relied upon. In the circumstances of the case, the claimant could establish a cause of action in deliberate concealment but not in deceit.

Buxton LJ, Rix LJ, Sir Martin Nourse
[2006] EWCA Civ 1601, Times 21-Dec-2006, [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 562, [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 667
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 32(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – AIC Ltd v ITS Testing Services (UK) Ltd ComC 7-Oct-2005
. .
Cited – Jones v Sherwood Computer Services Limited plc CA 1992
A contract provided for the sale and purchase of shares. In the absence of agreement a third party firm of accountants would act as valuer as an expert, and his decision was to be final and binding on the parties. One party now appealed a decision . .
Cited – Veba Oil Supply and Trading Gmbh v Petrotrade Inc CA 6-Dec-2001
A dispute between parties to a contract was to be determined by an independent expert. It was claimed that his report was not binding on the parties, since he had departed from his instructions in a material way. In this context, what constituted a . .
Cited – Assicurazioni Generali Spa v Arab Insurance Group (BSC) CA 13-Nov-2002
Rehearing/Review – Little Difference on Appeal
The appellant asked the Court to reverse a decision on the facts reached in the lower court.
Held: The appeal failed (Majority decision). The court’s approach should be the same whether the case was dealt with as a rehearing or as a review. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Grosvenor Casinos Ltd v National Bank of Abu Dhabi ComC 17-Mar-2008
Banker’s reference no guarantee
An Arab businessman lost pounds 18m at the claimant casino, and wrote scrip cheques against his account with the defendant. The claimant obtained judgment, but being unable to enforce that judgment pursued his bank. The club had used a system where . .
Cited – Lindsay v O’Loughnane QBD 18-Mar-2010
lindsay_oloughnaneQBD11
The claimant had purchased Euros through a foreign exchange dealer. The dealer company became insolvent, causing losses to the claimant, who sought to recover from the company’s managing director, the defendant, saying that he was aware of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Torts – Other, Limitation

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.246701

Dowson and Others v Northumbria Police: QBD 30 Apr 2009

Nine police officers claimed damages for alleged harassment under the 1997 Act by a senior officer in having bullied them and ordered them to carry out unlawful procedures. Amendments were sought which were alleged to be out of time and to have arisen from different facts.
Held: Amendments were allowed where they arose from the facts and events already pleaded. Those rasing other issues which were now out of time were rejected.

Coulson J
[2009] EWHC 907 (QB)
Bailii
Protection From Harassment Act 1997, Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Brookfield Properties Limited v Newton 1971
An allegation of negligence against an architect in the design of a building arose out of the same or substantially the same facts as an allegation of negligence against him in respect of the supervision of the construction of the same building, so . .
Cited – Paragon Finance Plc (Formerly Known As National Home Loans Corporation Plc v D B Thakerar and Co (a Firm); Ranga and Co (a Firm) and Sterling Financial Services Limited CA 21-Jul-1998
Where an action had been begun on basis of allegations of negligence and breach of trust, new allegations of fraud where quite separate new causes of claim, and went beyond amendments and were disallowed outside the relevant limitation period. . .
Cited – The Convergence Group Plc and Another v Chantrey Vellacott (a Firm) CA 16-Mar-2005
An accountant sought payment of his professional fees. The defendants had sought to re-amend their defence and counterclaim. Appeals had variously been allowed to go ahead or denied after the master had not been able to deal with all of them for . .
Cited – Hughes and others (By Their Litigation Friend) v Richards (Trading As Colin Richards and Co ) CA 9-Mar-2004
Parents and their children claimed against a tax adviser for negligence in relation to setting up an offshore trust. The defendant applied to strike out the children’s claim on the basis that the defendant owed them no duty of care and only the . .
Cited – Palmer (Administratrix of the Estate of Rose Frances Palmer) v Tees Health Authority and Hartlepool and East Durham NHS Trust CA 2-Jun-1999
A claim for damages on behalf of a murdered child’s estate and the child’s mother for psychiatric damage against a health authority for negligence in having failed to manage a psychiatric outpatient who had abducted and murdered the child, was bound . .
Cited – Cobbold v London Borough of Greenwich CA 9-Aug-1999
The tenant had sought an order against the council landlord for failure to repair her dwelling. The defendant appealed refusal of leave to amend the pleadings in anticipation of the trial, now due to start on the following day.
Held: Leave was . .
Cited – Aldi Stores Ltd v Holmes Buildings Plc CA 1-Dec-2003
What makes a claim a ‘new claim’ as defined in section 35(2) of the Limitation Act 1980 is not the newness of the case according to the type or quantum of the remedy claimed, but the newness of the cause of action that it involves. A cause of action . .
Cited – Savings and Investment Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v Fincken CA 14-Nov-2003
Parties to litigation had made without prejudice disclosures. One party sought to give evidence contradicting the dsclosure, and the other now applied for leave to amend based upon the without prejudice statements to be admitted to demonstrate the . .
Cited – Harris v Bolt Burdon (A Firm) CA 2-Feb-2000
A case is suitable for striking out which raises an unwinnable case, where continuance of the proceedings is without any possible benefit and would waste resources on both sides. . .
Cited – Senior and Another v Pearson and Ward (A Firm) CA 26-Jan-2001
An amendment outside the limitation period against solicitors alleging a failure to advise was permitted, where the original allegation was simply that the solicitors had acted without or in disregard of instructions. . .
Cited – E D and F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel and Another CA 4-Apr-2003
The rules contained two occasions on which a court would consider dismissal of a claim as having ‘no real prospect’ of success.
Held: The only significant difference between CPR 24.2 and 13.3(1), is that under the first the overall burden of . .
Cited – Hoechst United Kingdom Ltd v Inland Revenue ChD 11-Apr-2003
If an amendment to a pleading proposes a new claim which does not arise out of the same or substantially the same facts, the court has no discretion and may not allow the amendment. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Limitation, Litigation Practice

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.341875

Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another: ChD 14 Mar 2007

The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by adverse possession notwithstanding the existence of the public right of navigation. The court made findings as to the several plots of land. Lindsay J said: ‘factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control having the following characteristics, namely that it must be a single and exclusive possession (though there can be a single possession exercised by or on behalf of several persons jointly); that if the squatter is in possession the paper owner cannot be; that what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances including, in particular, the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed; that what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no one else has done so and that factual possession must be sufficiently clear that, if the owner were present on the land, he would appreciate that the squatter was dispossessing him.’
Lindsay J
[2007] EWHC 513 (Ch), [2008] 2 WLR 1111, [2007] 2 PandCR 17
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Des Barres and Another v Shey 1873
The defendants resisted a claim for possession asserting adverse possession from 1815 or 1832. This included possession during periods over which they had granted tenancies or licences but where the tenants or licensees had been in occupation . .
Cited – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
Cited – Michael Batt Charitable Trust v Adams ChD 2001
The court looked at what was required to establish adverse possession in a claim for land. Laddie J said: ‘The only factor that appears, at first sight, to point in the direction to exclude anyone, is the fact that Mr Higgs maintained and repaired . .
Cited – Powell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the . .
Cited – Sze To Chun Keung v Kung Kwok Wai David and Lam Chak Man Estate Limited PC 27-Jun-1997
(Hong Kong) The respondents were registered owners of land occupied by the appellant who claim title by adverse possession after entry in 1955. Subsequently the claim resided with the Crown.
Held: ‘on the facts as pleaded, the land has been . .
Cited – Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
Cited – Lord Advocate v Lord Lovat 1880
Lord O’Hagan considered the nature of possession as regards land: ‘As to possession, it must be considered in every case with reference to the peculiar circumstances. The acts, implying possession in one case, may be wholly inadequate to prove it in . .
Cited – Powell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the . .
Cited – Rains v Buxton 1880
rains_buxtonChD1880
Fry J said: ‘The difference between dispossession and the discontinuance of possession might be expressed in this way: the one is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession, the other case is where the person in possession . .
Cited – Lord Advocate v Young 1887
Lord Watson said: ‘It is, in my opinion, practically impossible to lay down any precise rule in regard to the character and amount of possession necessary in order to give a riparian proprietor a prescriptive right to foreshore. Each case must . .
Cited – Attorney General v Emerson 1891
Forms of fishing which involve fixtures into the soil of the foreshore are more likely to be regarded as acts of possession of the soil itself than would be more ephemeral forms of fishing. . .
Cited – Nesbitt v Mablethorpe Urban District Council 1918
Where a squatter lets a tenant of his into possession the consequent acceptance of rent by the squatter is to be taken as evidence of possession by the squatter; . .
Cited – Hughes v Cook and Another CA 14-Feb-1994
Adverse possession will accrue even if the claimant believed and acted on the mistaken belief that the land was already his. That belief was inconsistent with ownership by others. Beldam LJ said that counsel’s argument was fallacious: ‘. . in the . .
Cited – Red House Farms (Thorndon) Ltd v Catchpole CA 1977
Cairns LJ said: ‘The authorities make it clear that what constitutes possession of any particular piece of land must depend upon the nature of the land and what it is capable of use for: see, for example, Tecbild Ltd v Chamberlain (1969) 20 P and CR . .
Cited – Jones v Williams ExcC 1837
A four-judge of the Court was asked as to the admissibility of evidence in a case as to trespass upon the bed of a river where title was uncertain and where the dispute was whether the claimant or defendant owned the very part of land upon which the . .
Cited – Lord Advocate v Lord Blantyre HL 1879
The defender claimed ownership of land based on possession from time immemorial of foreshore and banks in the River Clyde of some 5 miles and 2 miles respectively in length and spread over some 750 acres.
Held: Lord Blackburn said: ‘Every act . .
Cited – Higgs v Nassauvian Ltd PC 1975
A claim was made for possession of two plots of land, one some 92 and the other some 12 acres. The land was part arable, part pine barren and not fenced or otherwise enclosed.
Held: Sir Harry Gibbs said: ‘It is clearly settled that acts of . .
Cited – Friend v Duke of Richmond 1667
Two subjects brought action for ejectment. The defendant took the point that the claimant could not sue in ejectment. It was necessary to allege entry by a tenant. There could not be an entry, as the Crown had already obtained a judgment based on an . .
Cited – Attorney-General v Tomline (No 3) ChD 1877
For more than 20 years the Crown had been in possession of land forming part of a manor in Suffolk owned in fee simple by Colonel Tomline, who then entered the land in order to dig out mineral material (coprolites-fossilised dinosaur dung). The . .
Cited – Attorney-General v Tomline (No 3) CA 1880
The Crown claimed land by adverse possession. It had continued in possession for many years after a licence had expired.
Held: The Crown had acquired a fee simple by adverse possession, and not simply a copyhold title. James LJ: ‘From the time . .
Cited – Hughes v Griffin and Another CA 1969
Possession of land is never adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. . .
Cited – BP Properties Ltd v Buckler CA 31-Jul-1987
The putative owner of the paper title wrote to the defendant who occupied the relevant property in October 1974 as follows: ‘Since we wish to help you as much as possible we are prepared to allow you to remain in occupation of the house and garden . .
Cited – St Marylebone Property Co Ltd v Fairweather HL 16-Apr-1962
To defeat a defence of adverse possession, the plaintiff must succeed in an action which itself had been commenced within the twelve year period. A squatter does not succeed to the title that he has disturbed: by sufficiently long adverse possession . .
Cited – Rosenberg v Cook 1881
A squatter’s title is a freehold from day one of his possession. . .
Cited – Agency Co Ltd v Short 1888
Where there has been insufficient adverse possession, it ‘does not leave behind it any cloud on the title of the rightful owner.’ . .
Cited – Stening v Abrahams ChD 1931
The landlord complained that the tenant was in breach of his covenant not to part with possession of any part of the premises where the tenant had so organised things that he had effectively excluded himself from part of the demised premises.
Cited – Tobin v The Queen 1864
The Commander of a Queen’s ship, employed in the suppression of the slave trade on the coast of Africa, seized a schooner belonging to the suppliant, which he suspected of being engaged in slave traffic. It being inconvenient to take the ship to . .
Cited – Feather v The Queen 1865
Mr Feather had invented way of protecting ships against shot and obtained an exclusive patent. The Crown then had a ship constructed in a way that infringed the patent. As patentee Mr Feather asked for recompense; by petition of right he asked for . .
Cited – Fowley Marine (Emsworth) Ltd v Gafford 1968
A paper title owner of land is deemed to be in possession of the fee simple unless and until someone else acquires possession of it . .
Cited – M v Home Office and Another; In re M HL 27-Jul-1993
A Zairian sought asylum, but his application, and an application for judicial review were rejected. He was notified that he was to be returned to Zaire, but then issued new proceedings for judicial review. The judge said that his removal should be . .

Cited by:
Cited – Crown Estate Commissioners v Roberts and Another ChD 13-Jun-2008
The defendant claimed ownership as Lord Marcher of St Davids of historical rights in foreshores in Pembrokeshire. The claimants sought removal of his cautions against first registration.
Held: Lewison J explored the history of manorial . .
Cited – Barton v The Church Commissioners for England ChD 15-Dec-2008
The commissioners claimed a right by prescription to all fish to be taken in a stretch of the River Wye. The claimant was to moor a barge on the river.
Held: The court explained the nature and legal status of fisheries in the law going back to . .
Cited – The Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
Cited – Smith, Regina (on The Application of) v Land Registry (Peterborough Office) and Another CA 10-Mar-2010
The appellant had lived in a caravan on the verge of a byway and had been here for more than twelve years. He appealed against rejection of his request for possessory title. He said that there was no support in law for the maxim that adverse . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 October 2021; Ref: scu.250606

AMT Futures Ltd v Boural and Others: ComC 11 Apr 2018

Three defendants applied for summary strike out of the claim against them saying the claim was now time barred: ‘It raises the issue of whether the cause of action for breach of the implied undertaking in an exclusive jurisdiction clause arises once and for all when proceedings are begun otherwise than in the agreed forum, or arises successively each time a step is taken in those proceedings, or arises continuously for so long as those proceedings are on foot.’
Mr Salter QC
[2018] EWHC 750 (Comm), [2018] WLR(D) 211, [2018] 3 WLR 358
Bailii, WLRD
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales

Updated: 19 October 2021; Ref: scu.609089

Forbes v Skelton: 15 Feb 1837

The joint owners of plantations in Java, which they worked in the co-partnership, kept an account with certain merchants and agents at Bombay, to whom they became largely indebted in respect of money advanced and paid for the use.
Held: The account was not a mercantile account within the meaning of the exception in the statute of limitations.
A plea of the statute of limitations is not double.
Averments in a plea of the statute of limitation negativing facts that would defeat the plea, but which are not stated in the bill, are surplusage, but do not vitiate the plea.
A plea of the statute of limitations need not negative the usual general allegation that the defendant has, in his custody, documents relating to the matters contained in the bill.
[1837] EngR 510, (1837) 8 Sim 335, (1837) 59 ER 133
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 16 October 2021; Ref: scu.313627

Khan v R M Falvey and Co (a Firm): CA 22 Mar 2002

The claimant sought damages from his former solicitors for failing to act to avoid his case being struck out. The second action was itself delayed, and the defendants asserted that the cause of action occurred not when his claim was actually struck out, but at the time when it could have been struck out.
Held: ‘where a tort is actionable only on proof of damage, the cause of action is not complete and time does not begin to run for the purposes of statutory limitation until actual damage occurs.’ The cause of action accrued on the occurrence of the first item of material loss. Damage in a claim for pure financial loss arose before the action was actually dismissed, and limitation ran accordingly.
Chadwick LJ said: ‘Typically, the effect of cumulative delay has been that it becomes increasingly difficult to resist an application to strike out based on the contention that it is no longer possible to have a fair trial. Although it may be possible to say in such cases that before a certain date the claim is not vulnerable to being struck out, and after another and later date it was so vulnerable, there would usually be a period of some months in respect of which there is room for a legitimate difference of view. But what can be said with some confidence is that during that period the value of the claim is diminishing as its vulnerability to strike out increases. It seems to me that once the action has entered that period it is impossible to say that damage has not occurred as a consequence of the previous delay. It is no answer that the damage may be difficult to quantify.’
Schiemann LJ said: ‘By the phrase ‘amenable to be struck out’ the pleader intended to convey that after 1990 there was no arguable defence to an application to strike out. This is common ground. On that basis the claimant had suffered damage from the defendant’s negligence by, at the latest, January 1, 1991 and his cause of action had arisen then. What had been (let us assume) a right of action against the debtor which was worth something, had become a right of action which was worth nothing. All the alleged negligence by the solicitor had occurred by then. The present action was not started until more than six years later. In those circumstances it is time barred.’
Sir Murray Stuart-Smith referred to the judgment of Hobhouse LJ in Hopkins v Mackenzie and said of it: ‘I share Hobhouse LJ’s difficulties. A claimant cannot defeat the statute of limitations by claiming only in respect of damage which occurs within the limitation period, if he has suffered actual damage from the same wrongful acts outside that period.’
Lord Justice Schiemann, Lord Justice Chadwick and Sir Murray Stuart-Smith
Times 12-Apr-2002, Gazette 10-May-2002, [2002] EWCA Civ 400, [2002] Lloyd’s Rep PN 369, [2002] PNLR 28
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Disapproved – Hopkins v Mackenzie CA 27-Oct-1994
A loss arising from a solicitor’s failure to pursue a case arose only when the claim was struck out, not earlier when compromised, and even though value already diminished. Accordingly the limitation period began to run from that time. . .
Cited – Nykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
Cited – Knapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc and Another CA 30-Oct-1997
A claim in negligence was brought against insurance brokers for failing to advise the claimant of certain matters with the result that an insurance policy entered into by the claimant was voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The claimant . .

Cited by:
Cited – Hatton v Messrs Chafes (A Firm) CA 13-Mar-2003
The defendant firm appealed against a refusal to strike out the claimant’s claim for professional negligence, asserting that the judge should have considered the limitation issue in the light of Khan v Falvey.
Held: By the time that the . .
Cited – The Law Society v Sephton and Co and others CA 13-Dec-2004
The Society appealed dismissal for limitation of its claim against the defendant firm of accountants arising from alleged fraud in approval of a solicitor’s accounts.
Held: The liability did not arise until the Society decided to make . .
Cited – Iqbal v Legal Services Commission CA 10-May-2005
The claimant had been a partner in a firm of solicitors. They came to be suspected by the respondent of overclaiming legal aid payments and sums were withheld. For this and other reasons the practice folded, and the claimant became insolvent. He . .
Cited – Vision Golf Ltd v Weightmans (A Firm) ChD 26-Jul-2005
A lease had been forfeited. The defendant firm of solicitors had negligently failed to apply for relief. They argued that that failure had in fact caused no loss to the claimants, since they would have lost the lease anyway.
Held: The ‘but . .
Cited – Luke v Kingsley Smith and Company and Others QBD 23-Jun-2003
The claimant sued various of those who had represented him in a claim against the Ministry of Defence. He believed that he had had to accept an inadequate sum in settlement after being at risk of losing the claim for non-prosecution. The defendant . .
Cited – St Anselm Development Company Ltd v Slaughter and May ChD 1-Feb-2013
The claimants appealed against rejection of their claim in negligence said to have been out of time. They had set out to sublet flats but their mistiming disallowed reclaiming of certain rents under the 1993 Act.
Held: The two flats were to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 October 2021; Ref: scu.168538

Hopkins v Mackenzie: CA 27 Oct 1994

A loss arising from a solicitor’s failure to pursue a case arose only when the claim was struck out, not earlier when compromised, and even though value already diminished. Accordingly the limitation period began to run from that time.
Hobhouse LJ
Times 03-Nov-1994, Independent 27-Oct-1994, Gazette 07-Dec-1994, [1995] PIQR 43
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Cited by:
Disapproved – Khan v R M Falvey and Co (a Firm) CA 22-Mar-2002
The claimant sought damages from his former solicitors for failing to act to avoid his case being struck out. The second action was itself delayed, and the defendants asserted that the cause of action occurred not when his claim was actually struck . .
Cited – Iqbal v Legal Services Commission CA 10-May-2005
The claimant had been a partner in a firm of solicitors. They came to be suspected by the respondent of overclaiming legal aid payments and sums were withheld. For this and other reasons the practice folded, and the claimant became insolvent. He . .
Cited – Vision Golf Ltd v Weightmans (A Firm) ChD 26-Jul-2005
A lease had been forfeited. The defendant firm of solicitors had negligently failed to apply for relief. They argued that that failure had in fact caused no loss to the claimants, since they would have lost the lease anyway.
Held: The ‘but . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 October 2021; Ref: scu.81467

Hodgson v Armstrong: CA 1967

Sellers LJ considered the application of court rules requiring notices to be given within a certain number of days: ‘Does the court need in each statute requiring notices to be given to a court – of which there are so many – an express stipulation about days when a court to which an application or notice is to be made or given is closed, or can it not be be said that the courts are able and are intended to administer the provisions strictly but with regard to te functioning and avaiability of the court?’ and ‘It is said that the application could have been meade some days before. That is true, but that would have deprived te tenant of some part of the time which the statute has prescribed. I cannot find any such differentiation between one tenant and another or between one lease and another depending on te hdifferentces of their date in relation to te time of th efnctioning of the appropriate court. In my view th eproper construction of the statute requires that all tenants and all leases should be placed on the same basis as to time.
Sellers, Davies LJJ
[1967] 1 All ER 307, [1967] 2 QB 299
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Pritam Kaur v S Russell and Sons Ltd QBD 1-Jun-1972
The plaintiff sought damages following the death of her husband when working for the defendants. He had died on 5 September 1967 but the writ was not issued until Monday 7 September 1970. The applicable limitation period was 3 years, which the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 October 2021; Ref: scu.231060

Halford v Brookes: CA 1991

The plaintiff, the mother and administratrix of the estate of a 16 year old girl, alleged that her daughter had been murdered by one or both of the Defendants. The claim was for damages for battery. Rougier J at first instance had decided that: ‘where the burden of proof is concerned it is my view that I should adopt the equivalent of the criminal standard . . I have proceeded, as indeed Mr Scrivener invited me to, on the basis that no-one, whether in a criminal or a civil court, should be declared guilty of murder, certainly not such a terrible murder as this, unless the Tribunal were sure that the evidence did not admit of any other sensible conclusion’, and went on to hold that he was sure that both Defendants were party to the murder of the deceased. Strictly speaking therefore, his decision as to the standard of proof was not essential to the result, since the Claimant would have succeeded whatever the standard of proof; and indeed was reached on the basis of a concession by leading counsel for the plaintiff.
Held: The court discussed the meaning of ‘knowledge’ for the purposes of the 1980 Act.
Held: Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR said: ‘In this context ‘knowledge’ clearly does not mean ‘know for certain and beyond possibility of contradiction.’ It does, however, mean ‘know with sufficient confidence to justify embarking on the preliminaries to the issue of a writ, such as submitting a claim to the proposed defendant, taking legal and other advice and collecting evidence.’ and ‘suspicion, particularly if it is vague and unsupported, will indeed not be enough, but reasonable belief will normally suffice.’
Motives above and beyond obtaining damages – which a plaintiff may have in pursuing his claims in battery neither enhance nor damage his case for allowing those claims to proceed.
Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR
[1991] 1 WLR 428, [1991] 3 All ER 559
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Cited by:
Applied – O’Driscoll v Dudley Health Authority CA 30-Apr-1998
The plaintiff sought damages for the negligence of the respondent in her care at birth. Years later the family concluded that her condition was a result of negligence. They waited until she was 21, when they mistakenly believed that she became an . .
Cited – Dobbie v Medway Health Authority CA 11-May-1994
The plaintiff had a lump on her breast. The surgeon, without first subjecting the lump to a microscopic examination in order to determine whether it was cancerous or benign, removed the breast. This was in 1973. The lump was subsequently found to be . .
Cited – Haward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
Cited – Smith v Leicestershire Health Authority CA 29-Jan-1998
The plaintiff appealed a finding that she had sufficient knowledge of her possible claim for medical negligence against the defendants, and that she was out of time. She had known of her condition, but said she had no sufficient reason to see that . .
Cited – Ashley and Another v Chief Constable of Sussex Police HL 23-Apr-2008
The claimants sought to bring an action for damages after a family member suspected of dealing drugs, was shot by the police. At the time he was naked. The police officer had been acquitted by a criminal court of murder. The chief constable now . .
Cited – Ministry of Defence v AB and Others SC 14-Mar-2012
The respondent Ministry had, in 1958, conducted experimental atmospheric explosions of atomic weapons. The claimants had been obliged as servicemen to observe the explosions, and appealed against dismissal of their claims for radiation sickness . .
Not followed – Bento v The Chief Constable of Bedfordshire Police QBD 1-Jun-2012
bento_ccbpQBD2012
The claimant had been convicted of the murder of his girlfriend. On his acquittal on appeal, the police criticised the CPS decision not to retry the claimant, in effect, the claimant now said, continuing the accusation against him, and so defaming . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 October 2021; Ref: scu.186435

Powell v National Coal Board: CA 28 May 1986

Limitation operates as a defence, and therefore it is for he who sets it up to establish it, and prove that the claim was time barred. Once the initial limitation period had elapsed, it was for the plaintiff to assert that the date of knowledge under the section was later than accrual of the cause of action. If the proposed defendant wished to assert earlier knowledge either in the plaintiff himself or in his solicitors or by way of section 14(3) it was for him to do so. A party’s solicitor was not an ‘expert’ within the meaning of section 14(3)(b). That provision was directed to experts in the sense of ‘expert witnesses’. ‘expert’ advice in Section 14(3) meant advice which would establish by expert means the chain of causation of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. This was not a fact which could only be established by expert means.
Parker LJ, Sir George Waller
Times 28-May-1986
Limitation Act 1980 11 14(3)(b)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Henderson v Temple Pier Company Limited CA 23-Apr-1998
The plaintiff suffered injury walking a gangway onto a moored ship. Her solicitors failed to identify the owner of the ship, misspelling the name and failing to search in the General Register of Shipping and Seamen. The eventual claim was made . .
Cited – Nash v Eli Lilly and Co QBD 1991
The court discussed the relevance of knowledge obtainable by the plaintiff’s solicitor for limitation purposes.
Held: Hidden J said ‘My conclusion is therefore that there is no binding authority on whether facts ascertainable by a plaintiff . .
Cited – Nash v Eli Lilly and Co CA 1993
The court considered whether a solicitor acting for a potential plaintiff was considered to be an expert for the purposes of the section.
Held: Purchas LJ said: ‘Of course as advice from a solicitor as to the legal consequences of the act or . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 October 2021; Ref: scu.186430

Hogg v Scott: KBD 1947

A police officer complained as to his dismissal without a hearing
Held: A Chief Constable could dismiss without hearing him an officer who had been convicted of felony.
Statutory limitation periods are not directly applicable to proceedings for declaratory relief, but it appears that ordinarily the Court will apply a limitation period by analogy when exercising its discretion in relation to the grant of relief Cassels J indicated that, independently of his decision on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim for a declaration, he would have dismissed the claim because of waiver, delay and the application of a statutory time limit.
Cassels J
[1947] 1 All ER 788, (1947) 63 TLR 320, [1947] KB 759
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Ridge v Baldwin (No 1) HL 14-Mar-1963
No Condemnation Without Opportunity For Defence
Ridge, a Chief Constable, had been wrongfully dismissed because he was not given the opportunity of presenting his defence. He had been acquitted of the charges brought against him, but the judge at trial had made adverse comments about his . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 October 2021; Ref: scu.653094

Re Farmizer (Products) Ltd: ChD 19 Jun 1995

The limitation period for an action for wrongful trading under insolvency legislation is six years. Where the statute relied upon enables the court to give relief in monetary or non-monetary form the court should look to see what is actually claimed
Ind Summary 19-Jun-1995, [1997] 1 BCLC 589
Insolvency Act 1986 214, Limitation Act 1980 9(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Hill (As Trustee In Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v Spread Trustee Company Ltd and Another CA 12-May-2006
The defendants sought relief for transactions entered into at an undervalue. The bankrupt had entered into charges and an assignment of a loan account in their favour before his bankruptcy, and the trustee had obtained an order for them to be set . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.85776

J A Pye and Another v Graham and Another: ChD 14 Mar 2000

The fact alone of being prepared to take a licence of land would not defeat an application for adverse possession, but a request for a licence would be relevant. The adverse possession commenced from the time when the licence expired, given that a sufficient animus was then established. The reference in the section to the taking of action did not apply to an application to warn off the cautions made to the Land Registry which was not a court, and the application was not an application to recover land. Since the Grahams enjoyed factual possession of the land from January 1984, and adverse possession took effect from September 1984, the applicant company’s title was extinguished pursuant to the 1980 Act, and the Grahams were entitled to be registered as proprietors of the land. ‘[The Grahams] sought rights to graze or cut grass on the land after the summer of 1984, and were quite prepared to pay. When Pye failed to respond they did what any other farmer in their position would have done: they continued to farm the land. They were not at fault. But the result of Pye’s inaction was that they enjoyed the full use of the land without payment for 12 years. As if that were not gain enough, they are then rewarded by obtaining title to this considerable area of valuable land without any obligation to compensate the former owner in any way at all. In the case of unregistered land, and in the days before registration became the norm, such a result could no doubt be justified as avoiding protracted uncertainty where the title to land lay. But where land is registered it is difficult to see any justification for a legal rule which compels such an apparently unjust result, and even harder to see why the party gaining title should not be required to pay some compensation at least to the party losing it. It is reassuring to learn that the Land Registration Act 2002 has addressed the risk that a registered owner may lose his title through inadvertence. But the main provisions of that Act have not yet been brought into effect, and even if they had it would not assist Pye, whose title had been lost before the passing of the Act. While I am satisfied that the appeal must be allowed for the reasons given by my noble and learned friend, this is a conclusion which I (like the judge [Neuberger J]…) ‘arrive at with no enthusiasm’.’
Neuberger J
Gazette 17-Feb-2000, Gazette 24-Feb-2000, Times 14-Mar-2000, [2000] Ch 676, [2000] 3 All ER 865
Limitation Act 1980 15(1) 17
England and Wales
Citing:
Distinguished – Walters v Webb 1870
. .
Cited – Vandeleur v Sloane 1919
. .

Cited by:
Appeal from – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Caroline Graham and Another CA 6-Feb-2001
Where a tenant under a grazing license had stayed over after the end of the tenancy, and had been refused a renewed licence, and had continued to graze the land for over twelve years, the mere overstaying was not enough to evidence an animus . .
At first instance – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
At first instance – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Nov-2005
The claimants had been the registered proprietors of land, they lost it through the adverse possession of former tenants holding over. They claimed that the law had dispossessed them of their lawful rights.
Held: The cumulative effect of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.85085

Martin v Kaisary and Another (1): CA 16 Mar 2005

Substitution of other party after limitation period expiry. The court considered the Law Committee’s recommendations on limitation and noted the intention to allow the addition of defendants out of time where this might validate a claim.
Brooke LJ
[2006] PIQR 5, [2005] EWCA Civ 594
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Cited by:
See Also – Martin v Kaisary and Another QBD 5-Apr-2005
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 September 2021; Ref: scu.226044

Warner v Scapa Flow Charters (Scotland): SC 17 Oct 2018

This appeal raises a question about the interpretation of article 16 of the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974 (‘the Athens Convention’) and its application to the Scots law of limitation of actions. The pursuer’s son was fatally injured diving from a boat hired from the defenders, who now appealed from a decision that the claim was not time-barred.
Held: Mrs Warner’s claim as Vincent’s guardian was not time barred by the Athens Convention. The court should not give a technical meaning to the words ‘suspension and interruption’ which, the appellant asserted, can be derived from certain civil law systems. It is not appropriate to look to the domestic law of certain civil law systems for a technical meaning of the words in an international convention which was designed to be operated in many common law systems as well. Even within civil law systems and mixed legal systems which are strongly influenced by the civil law there was no uniformity in the use of the expression ‘suspension’ in 1974 when the Athens Convention was adopted. Furthermore: ‘an interpretation of article 16(3) of the Athens Convention as excluding domestic rules which have the effect of postponing the start of a limitation period would give rise to serious anomalies. Many legal systems suspend the operation of prescription or limitation when a claimant is a minor or is subject to a recognised legal disability such as mental incapacity. If Mr Howie were correct in his interpretation of ‘suspension’ in the Athens Convention, the Convention would recognise as a ground of suspension a legal incapacity which arose after the prescription or limitation period commenced but not such incapacity that predated the start of that period. A minor born before the commencement of the prescription or limitation period could not take advantage of the added year which article 16(3) provides but a minor born after the commencement of the period would benefit from that added year. A similar anomaly would arise depending on the date on which a creditor or claimant was affected by an incapacity such as mental illness.’ The words in article 16(3) of the Athens Convention, ‘the grounds of suspension . . of limitation periods’ are sufficiently wide to cover domestic rules which postpone the start of a limitation period as well as those which stop the clock after the limitation period has begun.
Lady Hale, President, Lord Reed, Deputy President, Lord Sumption, Lord Hodge, Lord Briggs
[2018] UKSC 52, 2019 SCLR 413, [2018] 1 WLR 4974, [2019] 2 All ER 1042, [2018] WLR(D) 651, 2019 SC (UKSC) 1, 2018 SLT 1057, 2018 GWD 32-411, [2019] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 529, [2019] 2 All ER (Comm) 1, UKSC 2017/0103, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2017-0103-press-summary.pdf
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC, SC Summary, SC Summary Video, SC 2018 Jun 28 am Video
Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 16, Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973
Scotland
Citing:
At Outer House – Warner v Scapa Flow Charters SCS 14-Jul-2016
(Outer House) The pursuer’s son had died in a diving accident from a boat hired from the defenders whose negligence, she said, was the cause of the injury. The defenders argued that the claim was time-barred.
Held: The Lord Ordinary upheld the . .
Cited – Stag Line v Foscolo, Mango and Company HL 1931
English statutes which give effect to international conventions need to be interpreted with the international origin of the rules well in mind. The Act only applies to contracts of carriage of goods outwards from ports in the United Kingdom, and the . .
Cited – James Buchanan and Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd HL 1978
A consignment of whisky was stolen whilst on consignemt from a bonded warehouse under CMR terms for Teheran. In bond, it was worth 7,000 pounds, and on export no excise duty was to be paid. Being stolen in the course of transit, excise duty of . .
Cited – Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd HL 10-Jul-1980
The plaintiff, on arriving at the airport found that his luggage had been lost. The defendant denied liability saying he had not notified his claim within the requisite period.
Held: Elementary justice requires that the rules by which the . .
Cited – King v Bristow Helicopters Ltd; Morris v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines HL 28-Feb-2002
Psychiatric Injury under Warsaw Convention
The applicants were passengers who claimed damages for psychiatric injury, after accidents in aircraft.
Held: The Convention created strict liability on air carriers, but explicitly restricted damages to be payable for ‘bodily injury’. That . .
Cited – Higham v Stena Sealink Ltd CA 26-Feb-1996
The Convention limitation period of two years overrode the national period where it was applied. . .
Cited – Sidhu and Others v British Airways Plc; Abnett (Known as Sykes) v Same HL 13-Dec-1996
The claimants had been air passengers who were unlawfully detained in Kuwait, when their plane was captured whilst on the ground on the invasion of Kuwait. They sought damages for that detention.
Held: There are no exceptions to the Warsaw . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.625869

Warner v Scapa Flow Charters: SCS 16 Feb 2017

(Extra Division, Inner House Court of Session) The deceased was injured and died from his injuries diving from a boat hired from the responders. The pursuer appealed from dismissal of her claim as time-barred.
Held: the Inner House upheld the Lord Ordinary’s opinion in relation to her claim as an individual but reversed his order in relation to her claim on behalf of her son, finding that her claim as guardian of her son was not time barred.
Lord Glennie
[2017] ScotCS CSIH – 13, 2017 GWD 7-106, 2017 SLT 239
Bailii
Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 16, Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973
Scotland
Citing:
Appeal from – Warner v Scapa Flow Charters SCS 14-Jul-2016
(Outer House) The pursuer’s son had died in a diving accident from a boat hired from the defenders whose negligence, she said, was the cause of the injury. The defenders argued that the claim was time-barred.
Held: The Lord Ordinary upheld the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.578191

Warner v Scapa Flow Charters: SCS 14 Jul 2016

(Outer House) The pursuer’s son had died in a diving accident from a boat hired from the defenders whose negligence, she said, was the cause of the injury. The defenders argued that the claim was time-barred.
Held: The Lord Ordinary upheld the time bar defence and dismissed the action.
[2016] ScotCS CSOH – 101
Bailii
Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 16, Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973
Scotland
Cited by:
Appeal from – Warner v Scapa Flow Charters SCS 16-Feb-2017
(Extra Division, Inner House Court of Session) The deceased was injured and died from his injuries diving from a boat hired from the responders. The pursuer appealed from dismissal of her claim as time-barred.
Held: the Inner House upheld the . .
At Outer House – Warner v Scapa Flow Charters (Scotland) SC 17-Oct-2018
This appeal raises a question about the interpretation of article 16 of the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974 (‘the Athens Convention’) and its application to the Scots law of limitation of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.568781

Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Company v Wauchope: HL 22 Mar 1842

The company had, under authority of a private statute, built a railway which passed across land belonging to the defendant. They were to pay a sum for the goods carried. At first they sought to collect a toll, but his proved unprofitable. The defendant sought payment for the carrying of passengers. The appellant said if he had any right to claim such, he had lost it after many years of allowing passengers to cross his land without charge.
Held: The respondent succeeded: ‘He cannot put an end to a right conferred by Act of Parliament, merely by the non-exercise of it for some years. ‘ and
‘There is little doubt that the provisions of the Act are ambiguous and inaccurate; but . . Mr. Wauchope is entitled to the sum of one halfpenny per ton upon the weigh of the carriage with the addition of the passengers. And if what has been stated at the bar is correct in fact, namely, that the directors of the company have actually paid him at the rate upon small parcels under five hundred weight, I must say that they have themselves put this very construction upon one part of the . . Act, and cannot be surprised that we have applied it to another.’
Irregularity in the conduct of parliamentary business is a matter for Parliament, not the courts. It was suggested that a private Act which affected a vested right could not be made applicable to a person who had had no notice served upon him of the introduction of the Bill. Lord Campbell said: ‘There is no foundation whatever for it. All that a Court of Justice can do is look to the Parliament Roll; if from that it should appear that a bill has passed both Houses and received the Royal Assent, no Court of Justice can inquire into the mode in which it was introduced into Parliament, nor into what was done previous to its introduction, or what passed in Parliament, during its progress in its various stages through both Houses. I trust, therefore, that no such inquiry will again be entered upon in any Court in Scotland, but that due effect will be given to every Act of Parliament, private as well as public, upon what appears to be the proper construction of its existing provisions ‘.
Lord Brougham and Lord Cottenham said that want of notice was no ground for holding that the Act did not apply. Lord Campbell based his opinion on more
general grounds. He said: ‘My Lords, I think it right to say a word or two before I sit down, upon the point that has been raised with regard to an act of Parliament being held inoperative by a court of justice because the forms, in respect of an act of Parliament, have not been complied with. There seems great reason to believe that notion has prevailed to a considerable extent in Scotland, for we have it here brought forward as a substantive ground upon which the act of the 4th and 5th William the Fourth could not apply: the language being, that the statute of the 4th and 5th William the Fourth being a private act, and no notice given to the pursuer of the intention to apply for an act of Parliament, and so on. It would appear that that defence was entered into, and the fact was examined into, and an inquiry, whether notice was given to him personally, or by advertisement in the newspapers, and the Lord Ordinary, in the note which he appends to his interlocutor, gives great weight to this. The Lord Ordinary says ‘ he is by no means satisfied that due parliamentary notice was given to the pursuer previous to the introduction of this last act.’ Undoubtedly no notice was given to him personally, nor did the public notices announce any intention to take away his existing rights. If, as the Lord Ordinary is disposed to think, these defects imply a failure to intimate the real design in view, he would be strongly inclined to hold in conformity with the principles of Donald, 27th November, 1832, that rights previously established could not be taken away by a private act, of which due notice was not given to the party meant to be injured.’ Therefore, my Lord Ordinary seems to have been most distinctly of opinion, that if this act did receive that construction, it would clearly take away the right to this tonnage from Mr. Wauchope, and would have had that effect if notice had been given to him before the bill was introduced into the House of Commons ; but that notice not having been given, it could have no such effect, and therefore the act is wholly inoperative.
I must express some surprise that such a notion should have prevailed. It seems to me there is no foundation for it whatever; all that a court of justice can look to is the parliamentary roll; they see that an act has passed both Houses of Parliament, and that it has received the royal assent, and no court of justice can inquire into the manner in which it was introduced, or what passed in parliament during the various stages of its progress through both Houses of Parliament. I therefore trust that no such inquiry will hereafter be entered into in Scotland, and that due effect will be given to every act of Parliament, both private as well as public, upon the just construction which appears to arise upon it.’
Lord Cottenham, Lord Brougham, Lord Campbell
[1842] UKHL 710, 8 ER 279, [1842] EngR 405, (1842) 8 Cl and Fin 710, (1842) 8 ER 279, [1842] UKHL J12
Bailii, Commonlii, Bailii
Scotland
Cited by:
Approved – Pickin v British Railways Board HL 30-Jan-1974
Courts Not to Investigate Parliament’s Actions
It was alleged that the respondent had misled Parliament to secure the passing of a private Act. The claimant said that the land taken from him under the Act was no longer required, and that he should be entitled to have it returned.
Held: . .
Cited – Regina on the Application of Jackson and others v HM Attorney General CA 16-Feb-2005
The applicant asserted that the 2004 Act was invalid having been passed under the procedure in the 1949 Act, reducing the period by which the House of Lords could delay legislation; the 1949 Act was invalid, being delegated legislation, had used the . .
Cited – Jackson and others v Attorney General HL 13-Oct-2005
The applicant sought to challenge the 2004 Hunting Act, saying that it had been passed under the provisions of the 1949 Parliament Act which was itself an unlawful extension of the powers given by the 1911 Parliament Act to allow the House of . .
Cited – Manuel and Others v Attorney-General; Noltcho and Others v Attorney-General ChD 7-May-1982
The plaintiffs were Indian Chiefs from Canada. They complained that the 1982 Act which granted independence to Canada, had been passed without their consent, which they said was required. They feared the loss of rights embedded by historical . .
Cited – HS2 Action Alliance Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v The Secretary of State for Transport and Another SC 22-Jan-2014
The government planned to promote a large scale rail development (HS2), announcing this in a command paper. The main issues, in summary, were, first, whether it should have been preceded by strategic environmental assessment, under the relevant . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 September 2021; Ref: scu.238718

Pritam Kaur v S Russell and Sons Ltd: CA 2 Jun 1972

The plaintiff sought damages following the death of her husband when working for the defendant. The limitation period expired on Saturday 5 September 1970. The writ was issued on the Monday following.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The writ was issued in time.
Lord Denning MR said: ‘The defendants can say: ‘The plaintiff has three years in which to bring his action. If the last day is a Saturday or Sunday, or other dies non, he ought not to leave it until the last day. He ought to make sure and issue it the day before when the offices are open’.
The plaintiff can say: ‘The statute gives me three years in which I can bring my action. If I go into the offices on the last day, and find them closed, I ought not to be defeated on that account. I should be allowed to go next day when the offices are open. Otherwise I should be deprived of the three years which the statute allows me.’
Those arguments are so evenly balanced that we can come down either way. The important thing to do is to lay down a rule for the future so that people can know how they stand. In laying down a rule, we can look to parallel fields of law to see the rule there. The nearest parallel is the case where a time is prescribed by rules of court for doing any act. The rule prescribed in both the County Court and the High Court is this: If the time expires on a Sunday or any other day on which the court office is closed, the act is done in time if it is done on the next day on which the court office is open. I think we should apply a similar rule when the time is prescibed by statute for doing any act. By so doing, we make the law consistent in itself; and we avoid confusion to practitioners. So I am prepared to hold that, when a time is prescribed by statute for doing any act, and that act can only be done if the court office is open on the day when the time expires, then, if it turns out in any particular case that the day is a Sunday or other dies non, the time is extended until the next day on which the court office is open.
Lord Denning MR
[1973] 1 QB 336, [1973] 1 All ER 617, [1973] 2 WLR 147
Limitation Act 1939 2
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Pritam Kaur v S Russell and Sons Ltd QBD 1-Jun-1972
The plaintiff sought damages following the death of her husband when working for the defendants. He had died on 5 September 1967 but the writ was not issued until Monday 7 September 1970. The applicable limitation period was 3 years, which the . .
Approved – Marren v Dawson Bentley and Co Ltd 1961
Compensation was sought for injuries received in the course of employment.
Held: The limitation period was to be calculated to have started on the day after the occurrence which founded the claim, the day itself being excluded from the . .

Cited by:
Applied – Aadan v Brent London Borough Council CA 3-Dec-1999
On a day when the court office is closed, the time for filing documents is accordingly extended by one day, if the expiring day would otherwise have been that day. A request for an appeal was due to be filed within 21 days. The last day was a day on . .
Cited – The Clifford Maersk QBD 25-May-1982
The defendants contracted to carry a cargo for the plaintiff. The plaintiffs asserted that it was delivered in a damaged condition. The Act required an action to be brought within one year. The defendants granted extensions of time until at last ‘up . .
Distinguished – Swainston v Hetton Victory Club Ltd CA 1983
The claimant was dismissed on 7 September 1981. The time limit of three months, expired at midnight on 6 December. Other departments shared the building entrance with the Tribunal. The front door was closed over the weekend, but there was a . .
Cited – St. Helens Metropolitan Borough Council v Barnes CA 25-Oct-2006
The claimant had delivered his claim form to the court, but it was not processed until after the limitation period had expired. The defendant appealed a finding that the claimant had brought the cliam within the necessary time.
Held: The claim . .
Cited – Mucelli v Government of Albania (Criminal Appeal From Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice) HL 21-Jan-2009
The House was asked whether someone who wished to appeal against an extradition order had an obligation also to serve his appellant’s notice on the respondent within the seven days limit, and whether the period was capable of extension by the court. . .
Cited – Modaresi, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Health SC 24-Jul-2013
The Court was asked: ‘As: (i) a public body with obligations in public law and (ii) a public authority under the Human Rights Act 1998 can the Secretary of State for Health ‘the S/S’ lawfully refuse to refer a patient’s case to the First-tier Mental . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 September 2021; Ref: scu.231055

In re McHenry: CA 1894

The court considered the effect of the Limitation Acts on the rights of a secured creditor where there was an express shortfall provision in a mortgage deed. There was an express promise by a mortgagor to pay the difference on realisation of the security on personal property (a scrip certificate of bonds) between the proceeds of the realisation and the amount of the advance. The issue was whether the limitation period ran from the date of realisation of the security, which was within the limitation period, or from the earlier date when the principal sum became repayable.
Held: The court rejected the contention that the time only began to run when the security was sold and the actual amount payable was ascertained and that there was a separate claim on the express promise to pay the difference. The cause of action arose when the original mortgage debt became due and that the promise to pay the difference did not create a new debt. Lord Herschell LC: ‘I cannot say that the right of realisation gave a new, separate and independent cause of action, so that the statute did not begin to run until from that date. The truth is that the debt is one debt only. The second clause of the document did not create a new debt, but only prescribed what should be done in the event of realisation and what should be made of the money realised. The words gave the creditor no right which would not equally have existed without them.’ Lindley LJ: ‘ The promise to pay the deficiency does not create a new obligation to pay: it only applies the old obligation to a reduced sum. The realisation of the security does not add to the cause of action; the cause of action accrued long before.’
.
Lord Herschell LC, Lindley LJ
(1894) 3 Ch 290
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Bristol and West plc v Bartlett and Another; Paragon Finance plc v Banks; Halifax plc v Grant CA 31-Jul-2002
The defendants resisted claims by lenders for the payment of mortgage debts. In each case the lender had exercised the power of sale before issuing proceedings for possession. The defendants queried the limitation period applicable.
Held: The . .
Cited – Wilkinson and Another v West Bromwich Building Society CA 30-Jul-2004
The Society had repossessed and sold the mortgagors’ house in 1990. It knew then that there was a shortfall, but took no further recovery proceedings until 2002. What was the date from which the relevant limitation period began to run? Though the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.183323

Orkney Islands Council for Suspension and Interdict: SCS 21 Sep 2001

A notice was served seeking to refer a dispute to arbitration. By the time of the hearing the claim itself would be time barred, unless it could be established that service of the notice was enough to suspend time running. It was argued that the notice served to stop time running only conditional upon an arbitration being begun. The court decided that the issue of limitation could properly be determined by an arbitrator, and the court should not intervene.
[2001] ScotCS 222
Bailii
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 6
Scotland

Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.166269