The plaintiffs, with the leave of the court, had obtained garnishee and charging orders nisi against the debtor 11 and a half years after they had obtained a consent judgment.
Held: An application by the judgment debtor to set aside the orders on the ground that they were statute barred under section 24(1) should be refused. A judgment can be enforced after six years, but not any claim for interest on that judgment. Execution was not a fresh action and so was not caught by the statutory restriction. Execution has historically been treated other than as a separate action. s24(1) does not apply to proceedings by way of execution of a judgment in the same action: the expression ‘action upon any judgment’ in s24(1) means, as it did in s2(4) of the 1939 Act, bringing a ‘fresh action’ upon a judgment for another judgment. It did not include the execution of an existing judgment, which could proceed despite the expiration of more than 6 years from the judgment.
Judges:
Lord Lloyd of Berwick
Citations:
Times 24-Aug-1998, Gazette 16-Sep-1998, [1998] UKHL 34, [1998] 3 All ER 897, [1998] 3 WLR 501, [1999] 1 AC 329
Links:
Statutes:
Limitation Act 1980 24(1) 24(2), Supreme Court of Judicature (1873) Amendment Act 1875
Citing:
Appeal from – Lowsley and Another v Forbes CA 21-Mar-1996
The statutory time limit under the Limitation Act applied only to the right to take substantive proceedings and had nothing whatever to do with the procedural machinery for enforcing a judgment when one was obtained. The Act of 1875 brought about a . .
Cited – W T Lamb and Sons v Rider CA 1948
The judge at first instance had rescinded the master’s order giving leave to the judgment creditor to proceed to levy execution although six years had passed since the judgment. On appeal the judgment creditor challenged the validity of the rule of . .
Cited – Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof Aschaffenburg AG HL 5-Mar-1975
Statute’s Mischief May be Inspected
The House considered limitations upon them in reading statements made in the Houses of Parliament when construing a statute.
Held: It is rare that a statute can be properly interpreted without knowing the legislative object. The courts may . .
Cited by:
Cited – Ridgeway Motors (Isleworth) Ltd v Alts Ltd CA 10-Feb-2005
The company appelaed a refusal of the judge to strike out a winding up petition. They said the petition was based upon a judgment which was now time barred. The petitioner replied that such a petition was not an action under the section.
Held: . .
Cited – A v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
Cited – Harding v Wealands HL 5-Jul-2006
Claim in UK for Accident in Australia
The claimant had been a passenger in a car driven by his now partner. They had an accident in New South Wales. The car was insured in Australia. He sought leave to sue in England and Wales because Australian law would limit the damages.
Held: . .
Cited – Yorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Limitation, Litigation Practice
Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.83230
