Powell v National Coal Board: CA 28 May 1986

Limitation operates as a defence, and therefore it is for he who sets it up to establish it, and prove that the claim was time barred. Once the initial limitation period had elapsed, it was for the plaintiff to assert that the date of knowledge under the section was later than accrual of the cause of action. If the proposed defendant wished to assert earlier knowledge either in the plaintiff himself or in his solicitors or by way of section 14(3) it was for him to do so. A party’s solicitor was not an ‘expert’ within the meaning of section 14(3)(b). That provision was directed to experts in the sense of ‘expert witnesses’. ‘expert’ advice in Section 14(3) meant advice which would establish by expert means the chain of causation of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. This was not a fact which could only be established by expert means.
Parker LJ, Sir George Waller
Times 28-May-1986
Limitation Act 1980 11 14(3)(b)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedHenderson v Temple Pier Company Limited CA 23-Apr-1998
The plaintiff suffered injury walking a gangway onto a moored ship. Her solicitors failed to identify the owner of the ship, misspelling the name and failing to search in the General Register of Shipping and Seamen. The eventual claim was made . .
CitedNash v Eli Lilly and Co QBD 1991
The court discussed the relevance of knowledge obtainable by the plaintiff’s solicitor for limitation purposes.
Held: Hidden J said ‘My conclusion is therefore that there is no binding authority on whether facts ascertainable by a plaintiff . .
CitedNash v Eli Lilly and Co CA 1993
The court considered whether a solicitor acting for a potential plaintiff was considered to be an expert for the purposes of the section.
Held: Purchas LJ said: ‘Of course as advice from a solicitor as to the legal consequences of the act or . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 October 2021; Ref: scu.186430