The plaintiff, then a 16 year old girl slipped and fell whilst employed at the defendant’s factory. The limitation period expired on her 21st birthday. She commenced proceedings five and a half months after that date. The judge extended time under LA section 33, holding that he could only consider prejudice suffered by the defendant in the last five and a half month period. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision. The defendant appealed.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The defendant had been prejudiced by delay in ‘a truly stale claim first made on them five years after the event.’ Prejudice which occurred before the expiry of the limitation period was a relevant matter for the court to consider in deciding whether to override any limitation period.
The House noted that the opening words of section 33 (3) required the court to ‘have regard to all the circumstances of the case.’ That provision enabled the court to take into account prejudice caused to the defendant by the plaintiff’s delay over the entire period since her accident.
Lord Griffiths said: ‘In the course of his speech, Lord Diplock considered the meaning of delay in what was then, section 2D(3)(a)(b) of the Limitation Act 1939, as inserted by the Act of 1975 and which is now s.33(3)(a)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980. He said [1981] 1 WLR 744, 751:
‘Subsection (3) requires the court to have regard to ‘all the circumstances of the case’ but singles out six matters for particular mention. These six present a curious hotchpotch. ‘The delay’ referred to in paragraph (a) must be the same delay as in paragraph (b); so it means the delay after the primary limitation period expired. It is the length of this delay (in the instant case 37 days) and the reasons for it that matter under paragraph (a).’
There was some debate before your Lordships, for which I was primarily responsible, as to whether delay in subsection (3)(a) was referring to delay from the accrual of the cause of action rather than delay after the expiry of the primary limitation period. There can, however, be no doubt that the delay referred to in subsection (3)(b) is delay subsequent to the expiry of the primary limitation period and I am persuaded that Lord Diplock’s construction is correct and it is to this same period of delay that the court is to have regard under paragraph (a) and also in subsection (4).
It does not, however, follow that, in weighing the prejudice to the defendant, the court is not entitled to take into account the date upon which the claim is first made against the defendant. Compare the facts in Thompson v Brown with the facts of this case. In Thompson v Brown the claim had been made within a few weeks of the accident and liability and damage had been fully considered by the defendants’ insurers at an early stage. At the time the limitation period expired, the defendants’ insurers were in a position to settle the claim on its true merit. The fact that the plaintiff’s solicitors slipped up so that the writ was issued 37 days late was a totally unexpected windfall benefit for the defendants’ insurers. The primary purpose of the limitation period is to protect a defendant from the injustice of having to face a stale claim, that is, a claim with which he never expected to have to deal.’
Lord Oliver said: ‘The argument in favour of the proposition that dilatoriness on the part of the plaintiff in issuing his writ is irrelevant until the period of limitation has expired rests upon the proposition that, since a defendant has no legal ground for complaint if the plaintiff issues his writ one day before the expiry of the period, it follows that he suffers no prejudice if the writ is not issued until two days later, save to the extent that, if the section is disapplied, he is deprived of his vested right to defeat the plaintiff’s claim on that ground alone. In my opinion, this is a false point. A defendant is always likely to be prejudiced by the dilatoriness of a plaintiff in pursuing his claim. Witnesses’ memories may fade, records may be lost or destroyed, opportunities for inspection and report may be lost. The fact that the law permits a plaintiff within the prescribed limits to disadvantage a defendant in this way does not mean that the defendant is not prejudiced. It merely means that he is not in a position to complain of whatever prejudice he suffers. Once a plaintiff allows the permitted time to elapse, the defendant is no longer subject to that disability, and in a situation in which the court is directed to consider all the circumstances of the case and to balance the prejudice to the parties, the fact that the claim has, as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to use the time allowed to him, become a thoroughly stale claim, cannot, in my judgment, be irrelevant. It is clear from the judge’s judgment that, because sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 33(3) of the Act of 1980 focus particular attention on the time elapsing after expiry of the limitation period, he felt constrained to regard the time which had to been allowed to pass prior to that date as something which had to be left wholly out of account. In my judgment, he was wrong to do so and that necessarily vitiated the exercise of his discretion.’
and ‘The argument in favour of the proposition that dilatoriness on the part of the plaintiff in issuing his writ is irrelevant until the period of limitation has expired rests upon the proposition that, since a defendant has no legal ground for complaint if the plaintiff issues his writ one day before the expiry of the period, it follows that he suffers no prejudice if the writ is not issued until two days later, save to the extent that, if the section is disapplied, he is deprived of his vested right to defeat the plaintiff’s claim on that ground alone. In my opinion, this is a false point. A defendant is always likely to be prejudiced by the dilatoriness of a plaintiff in pursuing his claim. Witnesses’ memories may fade, records may be lost or destroyed, opportunities for inspection and reports may be lost. The fact that the law permits a plaintiff within prescribed limits to disadvantage a defendant in this way does not mean that the defendant is not prejudiced. It merely means that he is not in a position to complain of whatever prejudice he suffers. Once a plaintiff allows the permitted time to elapse, the defendant is no longer subject to that disability, and in a situation in which the court is directed to consider all the circumstances of the case and to balance the prejudice to the parties, the fact that the claim has, as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to use the time allowed to him, become a thoroughly stale claim, cannot, in my judgment, be irrelevant.’
Judges:
Lord Griffiths, Lord Oliver, Lord Bridge, Lord Templeman and Lord Lowry
Citations:
[1990] 1 WLR 472, [1990] 1 All ER 1018
Statutes:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Roberts vWinbow (3) CA 4-Dec-1998
The plaintiff was treated for depression by the defendant by prescription of drugs. She sufferred a reaction, but now claimed that the doctor’s slow reaction caused her to suffer lasting injury. The question on appeal was, if a plaintiff suffers . .
Cited – Jacqueline Adam v Rasal Ali CA 21-Feb-2006
The defendant sought damages against the defendant for personal injury from his alleged negligence. Her action was struck out and she recommenced the action. The defendant pleaded that she was out of time. The claimant said that the first action . .
Cited – Horton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .
Cited – Kamar v Nightingale and Another QBD 14-Dec-2007
The claimant sought damages from his barrister saying that he should have introduced evidence of his good character during the trial. The defendant appealed against the order permitting extension of the limitation period.
Held: The court had . .
Cited – McDonnell and Another v Walker CA 24-Nov-2009
The defendant appealed against the disapplication of section 11 of the 1980 Act under section 33.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The defendant had not contributed significantly to the delay: ‘the defendant received claims quite different in . .
Cited – Kaneria v Kaneria and Others ChD 15-Apr-2014
The parties were embroiled in a company dispute with allegations of conduct prejudicial to minority shareholders. An application was now made for sanctions for a failure to comply with court directions.
Held: Unless and until a higher Court . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Limitation, Litigation Practice
Updated: 11 July 2022; Ref: scu.186438
