The plaintiff had issued a writ in 1942 as administrator of his deceased son’s estate. However, he did not take out letters of administration until the November. It was said that proceedings instituted by an applicant who at the time had no standing to institute those proceedings were an incurable nullity. The limitation period had by then expired.
Held: The grant did not date back to the date of death, and it was too late to issue fresh proceedings or to amend.
Scott LJ said: ‘The cause of action arose, and was vested in the deceased lad, at the moment when he was injured, and the measure of his damages included fair compensation for such loss of expectation of life as was caused to him by the defendant’s tort. That chose in action was his. To it the common law maxim ‘Actio personalis moritur cum persona’ would have applied on his death but for the Act of 1934 which caused it to survive. If he had left a will, it would at the moment of his death automatically have vested in his executor. As he died intestate, it vested in the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, and remained in him until letters of administration were issued. Then – and not before – it would automatically pass from the President to the administrator. As the writ was issued on September 17, 1942, and there was no grant till November, it follows, necessarily, that at the time of writ issued the plaintiff had no shadow of title to his son’s surviving chose in action, in respect of which he purported to issue a writ, falsely (although no doubt quite innocently) alleging that he issued it as administrator. It purported to launch a representative action under Or. III, r. 4 – an action in which he confessed, first, that he was not suing in his own right, and, secondly, that he had no right in that action to prosecute any claim except in his representative capacity. The defendant could have demanded production of the non-existent letters of administration, and on the plaintiff’s failure to produce them the action would, on the defendant’s application, automatically have been struck out. Such an action was, in my opinion, incapable of conversion by amendment into a valid action – just as much so as if he had issued a personal writ claiming to be lawfully possessed of the estate of the deceased and had subsequently asked leave to amend by substituting a representative claim. It is true that when he got his title by the grant of administration he prima facie became entitled to sue, and could then have issued a new writ, but that was all. An application by him to treat the original writ of September 17 as retrospectively valid from that date would have been refused by the court, not only because it might prejudice existing rights of defence, but because it would not be permissible under the Rules of the Supreme Court or the Judicature Acts. The old writ was, in truth, incurably a nullity. It was born dead and could not be revived. If that conclusion is right it follows equally that the statement of claim was not delivered in any action recognized by the Rules of the Supreme Court, and all subsequent proceedings in the supposed action, including the judgment of the learned county court judge, were likewise nugatory, for, if the action and the pleadings were bad, there was no valid action before the learned judge to try and it is our duty to say so.’
Judges:
Scott LJ
Citations:
[1944] KB 160
Statutes:
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Roberts v Gill and Co Solicitors and Others SC 19-May-2010
The claimant beneficiary in the estate sought damages against solicitors who had acted for the claimant’s brother, the administrator, saying they had allowed him to take control of the assets in the estate. The will provided that property was to be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Limitation, Litigation Practice
Updated: 18 June 2022; Ref: scu.415952
