Archbishop Bowen and Another v JL: CA 21 Feb 2017

The defendants appealed against finding that they were responsible for the assaults by a priest on the claimant.

Lewison, Burnett LJJ, Sir Ernest Ryder SP T
[2017] EWCA Civ 82
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedStubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Limitation

Updated: 22 November 2021; Ref: scu.575330

Alves v Attorney General of The Virgin Islands (British Virgin Islands): PC 18 Dec 2017

From the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (British Virgin Islands)

Lord Neuberger

Lord Kerr

Lord Carnwath

Lord Hughes

Lord Hodge
[2017] UKPC 42
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedStubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 22 November 2021; Ref: scu.601883

Ofulue and Another v Bossert: HL 11 Mar 2009

The parties disputed ownership of land, one claiming adverse possession. In the course of negotations, the possessor made a without prejudice offer to purchase the paper owner’s title. The paper owner claimed that this was an acknowledgement under section 29.
Held: The letter should not be admitted. Any admission in the first letter could not be treated as a continuing acknowledgement, and it could not now be relied upon. The House emphasised the vital importance of the without prejudice system.
Lord Hope said: ‘Where a letter is written ‘without prejudice’ during negotiations with a view to a compromise, the protection that these words claim will be given to it unless the other party can show that there is a good reason for not doing so.’ and ‘The essence of it lies in the nature of the protection that is given to parties when they are attempting to negotiate a compromise. It is the ability to speak freely that indicates where the limits of the rule should lie. Far from being mechanistic, the rule is generous in its application. It recognises that unseen dangers may lurk behind things said or written during this period, and it removes the inhibiting effect that this may have in the interests of promoting attempts to achieve a settlement. It is not to be defeated by other considerations of public policy which may emerge later, such as those suggested in this case, that would deny them that protection.’
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry said: ‘it is that parties and their representatives who are trying to settle a dispute should be able to negotiate openly, without having to worry that what they say may be used against them subsequently, whether in their current dispute or in some different situation.’
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe agreed with Lord Rodger and said: ‘As a matter of principle I would not restrict the without prejudice rule unless justice clearly demands it. In England the rule has developed vigorously (more vigorously, probably, than in other common law jurisdictions, and more vigorously than some overseas scholars, notably J H Wigmore approved.)’

Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
[2009] UKHL 16, [2009] 2 WLR 749, [2009] 2 All ER 223, [2009] 11 EG 119, [2009] NPC 40, [2009] 1 WLR 718, [2009] 2 Cr App R 2, [2009] 1 AC 990
Bailii, Times, HL
Limitation Act 1980& 29(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedWhiffen v Hartwright 15-Apr-1848
The court refused to order the production of letters which had passed ‘without prejudice’. Lord Langdale MR observed that he ‘did not see how the plaintiff could get over this express agreement, though he did not agree, that the right of discovery . .
CitedWaldridge v Kennison 1794
A without prejudice admission that a document was in the handwriting of one of the parties was received in evidence because it was independent of the merits of the case. . .
CitedJones v Foxall CA 27-Mar-1852
Romilly MR deplored attempts to convert offers of compromise into admissions of acts prejudicial to the party making them, saying: ‘I find that the offers were in fact made without prejudice to the rights of the parties; and I shall, as far as I am . .
Appeal fromOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedHoghton v Hoghton CA 16-Apr-1852
When a person has made a large voluntary disposition the burden is thrown on the party benefitting to show that the disposition was made fairly and honestly and in full understanding of the nature and consequences of the transaction. Romilly MR . .
CitedIn Re Daintrey, Ex Parte Holt QBD 1893
The court was asked whether a letter could be admitted in evidence and relied upon as an act of bankruptcy. The letter was sent by the debtor to the creditor at a time when there was no dispute, headed ‘without prejudice’. It contained an offer of . .
CitedBradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid HL 12-Jul-2006
Disapplication of Without Prejudice Rules
The House was asked whether a letter sent during without prejudice negotiations which acknowledged a debt was admissible to restart the limitation period. An advice centre, acting for the borrower had written, in answer to a claim by the lender for . .
CitedTomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd CA 1969
Without prejudice material can be admitted if the issue is whether or not the negotiations resulted in an agreed settlement. Without considering the communications in question it would be impossible to decide whether there was a concluded settlement . .
CitedUnilever plc v Procter and Gamble Company CA 4-Nov-1999
The defendant’s negotiators had asserted in an expressly ‘without prejudice’ meeting, that the plaintiff was infringing its patent and they threatened to bring an action for infringement. The plaintiff sought to bring a threat action under section . .
LimitedMuller and Another v Linsley and Mortimer (A Firm) CA 8-Dec-1994
The plaintiff sued his former solicitors for professional negligence. The damages he sought to recover related to loss he suffered when dismissed as a director of a private company leading to a forced sale of his shares in the company. The plaintiff . .
CitedRush and Tomkins Ltd v Greater London Council HL 3-Nov-1988
The parties had entered into contracts for the construction of dwellings. The contractors sought payment. The council alleged shortcomings in the works. The principal parties had settled the dispute, but a sub-contractor now sought disclosure of the . .
CitedCutts v Head and Another CA 7-Dec-1983
There had been a trial of 35 days regarding rights of way over land, which had proved fruitless, and where some orders had been made without jurisdiction. The result had been inconclusive. The costs order was now appealed, the plaintiff complaining . .
CitedWhiffen v Hartwright 15-Apr-1848
The court refused to order the production of letters which had passed ‘without prejudice’. Lord Langdale MR observed that he ‘did not see how the plaintiff could get over this express agreement, though he did not agree, that the right of discovery . .

Cited by:
CitedKohli v Lit and Others ChD 13-Nov-2009
The claimant asserted that the other shareholders had acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to her within the company.
Held: The claimant was allowed to bring in without prejudice correspondence to contradict evidence by the defendant which . .
CitedOceanbulk Shipping and Trading Sa v TMT Asia Ltd CA 15-Feb-2010
The parties had settled their disagreement, but now disputed the interpretation of the settlement. The defendant sought to be allowed to give in evidence correspondence leading up to the settlement which had been conducted on a without prejudice . .
CitedOceanbulk Shipping and Trading Sa v TMT Asia Ltd and Others SC 27-Oct-2010
The court was asked whether facts which (a) are communicated between the parties in the course of without prejudice negotiations and (b) would, but for the without prejudice rule, be admissible as part of the factual matrix or surrounding . .
CitedBerkeley Square Holdings and Others v Lancer Property Asset Management Ltd and Others ChD 1-May-2020
Application by the Claimants to strike out parts of the Defence as an abuse of process and an application by the Defendants to amend their Defence. However, both applications turn on the question whether certain facts on which the Defendants seek to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice, Evidence

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.317966

In re Diplock’s estate: CA 1948

After considering a situation in which trust money had been applied in making alterations to the property of an innocent third party but had not added to the value of the property,
Held: The origin of the equitable rules of tracing were described: ‘the metaphysical approach of equity coupled with and encouraged by the far-reaching remedy of a declaration of charge that enabled equity to identify money in a mixed fund.’ and
‘In the absence of authority to the contrary, our conclusion is that as regards the Diplock money used in these cases it cannot be traced in any true sense; and, further, that even if this were not so, the only remedy available to equity, viz., that of a declaration of charge, would not produce an equitable result and is inapplicable accordingly’
and ‘In the case of adaptation of property of the volunteer by means of trust money, it by no means necessarily follows that the money can be said to be present in the adapted property. The beneficial owner of the trust money seeks to follow and recover that money and claims to use the machinery of a charge on the adapted property in order to enable him to do so. But in the first place the money may not be capable of being followed. In every true sense the money may have disappeared. …. The result may add not one penny to the value of the house. Indeed the alteration may well lower the value of the house. …. Can it be said that in such cases the trust money can be traced and extracted from the altered asset? Clearly not for the money will have disappeared leaving no monetary trace behind. ….’
As regards limitation, the 12 year period for enforcing a will trust runs from the date of the death, even though a personal representative is not bound to distribute within a year from death.

Lord Greene MR
[1948] Ch 465
England and Wales
Citing:
ExplainedSinclair v Brougham HL 1914
An insolvent building society had, outside its powers, run a banking business. The House considered the competing claims of the unadvanced shareholders of the building society’s intra vires business, members of the society who had not been granted . .

Cited by:
CitedAluminium Industrie Vaassen B V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd ChD 11-Feb-1975
The plaintiffs sold aluminium to the defendant and by a clause in the contract retained their title in the materials sold until payment was received. The purchaser went into insolvent receivership, and the seller sought recovery of the equipment and . .
CitedFoskett v McKeown and Others CA 27-Jun-1997
Various people had paid money with the promise of acquiring an interest in land in Portugal. The scheme was fraudulent. The funds had been used to purchase a life/investment policy. The policy was held in trust for the fraudster’s mother but he had . .
CitedFoskett v McKeown and Others HL 18-May-2000
A property developer using monies which he held on trust to carry out a development instead had mixed those monies with his own in his bank account, and subsequently used those mixed monies to pay premiums on a life assurance policy on his own life, . .
CitedGreen and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
Appeal fromMinistry of Health v Simpson; In re Diplock dec HL 1950
The will of Cable Diplock purported to make a gift to charity, and was distributed accordingly. The house however found the gift to be invalid.
Held: A personal remedy existed for the recovery of amounts wrongly paid in the distribution of an . .
CitedGomez and others v Vives CA 3-Oct-2008
The claimant appealed a finding that the court did not have jurisdiction over income payable to a trust governed by English law under which the claimant was beneficiary.
Held: The appeal failed in part. Because Article 5 is in derogation from . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.182265

Cartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd: HL 1963

The plaintiffs were steel dressers who, in the course of their employment, had inhaled quantities of noxious dust which had caused them to suffer from pneumoconiosis. They issued proceedings on 1 October 1956 but were unable to show any breach of duty by their employers which contributed to their condition after 1 October 1950. The defendants pleaded that the claims were barred by the six year limitation period under section 2 of the 1939 Act.
Held: Lord Reid made it clear that he would have wished to hold ‘that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person has discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it if he took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances’. But the House unanimously held that the 1939 Act and established authority precluded it from so holding. Where a defendant sought to rely upon some damage as setting the limitation clock running, the damage referred to must be ‘real’ as distinct from minimal. The common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result.
Lord Pearce said: ‘It is for a judge or jury to decide whether a man has suffered any actionable harm and in borderline cases it is a question of degree.
It is a question of fact in each case whether a man has suffered material damage by any physical changes in his body. Evidence that those changes are not felt by him and may never be felt tells in favour of the damage coming within the principle of de minimis non curat lex. On the other hand evidence that in unusual exertion or at the onslaught of disease he may suffer from his hidden impairment tells in favour of the damage being substantial.’ and ‘The cause of action accrued when it reached a stage, whether known or unknown, at which a judge could properly give damages for the harm that had been done.’
Lord Reid: ‘If this were a matter governed by the common law I would hold that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person has discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it if he took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances. The common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result . . But the present question depends on statute, the Limitation Act, 1939, and section 26 of that Act appears to me to make it impossible to reach the result which I have indicated.’

Lord Reid, Lord Evershed MR, Lord Pearce
[1963] AC 758, [1963] 1 All ER 341
Limitation Act 1939 2
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromCartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd CA 1962
The court gave guidance on when an injury passes from being de minimis to being sufficiently significant to found a cause of action: ‘there is from the beginning some injury occurring from day to day, as each of the minute particles which enter the . .

Cited by:
CitedHatton v Messrs Chafes (A Firm) CA 13-Mar-2003
The defendant firm appealed against a refusal to strike out the claimant’s claim for professional negligence, asserting that the judge should have considered the limitation issue in the light of Khan v Falvey.
Held: By the time that the . .
CitedLagden v O’Connor HL 4-Dec-2003
The parties had been involved in a road traffic accident. The defendant drove into the claimant’s parked car. The claimant was unable to afford to hire a car pending repairs being completed, and arranged to hire a car on credit. He now sought . .
CitedMcDonnell v Congregation of Christian Brothers Trustees (Formerly Irish Christian Brothers) and others HL 4-Dec-2003
In 2000, the claimant sought damages for sexual abuse from before 1951. The issue was as to whether the limitation law which applied was that as at the date of the incidents, or that which applied as at the date when he would be deemed uner the . .
CitedThe Law Society v Sephton and Co and others CA 13-Dec-2004
The Society appealed dismissal for limitation of its claim against the defendant firm of accountants arising from alleged fraud in approval of a solicitor’s accounts.
Held: The liability did not arise until the Society decided to make . .
CitedRothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd and Another CA 26-Jan-2006
Each claimant sought damages after being exposed to asbestos dust. The defendants resisted saying that the injury alleged, the development of pleural plaques, was yet insufficient as damage to found a claim.
Held: (Smith LJ dissenting) The . .
CitedBolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd CA 6-Feb-2006
The deceased had come into contact with asbestos when working on building sites for more than one contractor. The claimant here sought contribution from the defendants for the damages it had paid to his estate. The issue was as to liability on . .
CitedHaward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
CitedA v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
MentionedLaw Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others HL 10-May-2006
A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from . .
CitedHorton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .
CitedJohnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd; Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd; similar HL 17-Oct-2007
The claimant sought damages for the development of neural plaques, having been exposed to asbestos while working for the defendant. The presence of such plaques were symptomless, and would not themselves cause other asbestos related disease, but . .
CitedAxa General Insurance Ltd and Others v Lord Advocate and Others SCS 8-Jan-2010
axaReSCS201
The claimant sought to challenge the validity of the 2009 Act by judicial review. The Act would make their insured and themselves liable to very substantial unanticipated claims for damages for pleural plaques which would not previousl or otherwise . .
CitedDryden and Others v Johnson Matthey Plc SC 21-Mar-2018
Sensitisation to salt can be personal injury
The claimants, had developed platinum salt sensitisation due to the defendant employer’s breach of health and safety regulations and common law duty, claimed a cause of action for personal injury. Platinum salt sensitisation is, in itself, an . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.179759

Dalton v Henry Angus and Co: HL 14 Jun 1881

The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some reason the existence of such a grant is impossible, the law will adopt a legal fiction that such a grant was made, in spite of any direct evidence that no such grant was in fact made. ‘. . the whole law of prescription and the whole law which governs the presumption or inference of a grant or covenant rest upon acquiescence. The courts and the judges have had recourse to various expedients for quieting the possession of persons in the exercise of rights which have not been resisted by the persons against whom they are exercised, but in all cases it appears to me that acquiescence and nothing else is the principle upon which these expedients rest.’
Lord Blackburn, delivering the principal speech on this point, regarded the interposition of an independent contractor as irrelevant, because of the nature of the duty: ‘Ever since Quarman v Burnett (1840) 6 M and W 499, [1840] EngR 182, it has been considered settled law that one employing another is not liable for his collateral negligence unless the relation of master and servant existed between them. So that a person employing a contractor to do work is not liable for the negligence of that contractor or his servants. On the other hand, a person causing something to be done, the doing of which casts on him a duty, cannot escape from the responsibility attaching on him of seeing that duty performed by delegating it to a contractor. He may bargain with the contractor that he shall perform the duty and stipulate for an indemnity from him if it is not performed, but he cannot thereby relieve himself from liability to those injured by the failure to perform it: Hole v Sittingbourne Railway Co (1861) 6 H and N 488, [1861] EngR 170; Pickard v Smith 10 CB (NS) 470, [1861] EngR 71, Tarry v Ashton (1876) 1 QBD 314.’
Fry J (asked to give his opinion to the house said: ‘But leaving such technical questions aside, I prefer to observe that, in my opinion, the whole law of prescription and the whole law which governs the presumption or inference of a grant or covenant rest upon acquiescence. The Courts and the Judges have had recourse to various expedients for quieting the possession of persons in the exercise of rights which have not been resisted by the persons against whom they are exercised, but in all cases it appears to me that acquiescence and nothing else is the principle upon which these expedients rest.’

Lord Selborne LC, Lord Blackburn, Fry J (advising)
(1881) 6 App Cas 740, [1881] UKHL 1
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
At first instanceDalton v Henry Angus and Co 1877
Fry J said: ‘ . .I cannot imagine any case of acquiescence in which there is not shown to be in the servient owner: 1, a knowledge of the acts done; 2, a power in him to stop the acts or to sue in respect of them; and 3, an abstinence on his part . .
Appeal fromDalton v Henry Angus and Co CA 1878
. .

Cited by:
CitedRegina v City of Sunderland ex parte Beresford HL 13-Nov-2003
Land had been used as a park for many years. The council land owner refused to register it as a common, saying that by maintaining the park it had indicated that the use was by consent and licence, and that prescription did not apply.
Held: . .
ExplainedTehidy Minerals Ltd v Norman CA 1971
The fact that land had been requisitioned by the Ministry of Agriculture between 1941 and 1960 and the 20-odd years’ user relied on as having created the rights had preceded 1941 was a bar to a prescriptive claim to grazing rights under the . .
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedHunter and Others v Canary Wharf Ltd HL 25-Apr-1997
The claimant, in a representative action complained that the works involved in the erection of the Canary Wharf tower constituted a nuisance in that the works created substantial clouds of dust and the building blocked her TV signals, so as to limit . .
CitedLawrence and Another v Fen Tigers Ltd and Others QBD 4-Mar-2011
The claimants had complained that motor-cycle and other racing activities on neighbouring lands were a noise nuisance, but the court also considered that agents of the defendants had sought to intimidate the claimants into not pursuing their action. . .
CitedWoodland v Essex County Council SC 23-Oct-2013
The claimant had been seriously injured in an accident during a swimming lesson. She sought to claim against the local authority, and now appealed against a finding that it was not responsible, having contracted out the provision of swimming . .
CitedWinterburn and Another v Bennett and Another CA 25-May-2016
The court was asked as to the steps which an owner of land must take to prevent others, who were using the land without permission, acquiring rights over the land. The claimants here had ignored clear signs placed on the land which asserted the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.187796

Beaman v ARTS Ltd: CA 1949

The italian plaintiff had left Egland in 1935 leaving certain valuables with the defendants for safe keeping. During the war, the property was released to the authorities as alien property, who, informed by the defemdant that they were of no value, gave them to the Salvation Army. The plaintiff returned in 1946, and after discovering the history, began proceedings for conversion, saying that the action was not defeated by limitation for fraud.
Held: The actions of the defendants were not fraudulent as such sop that section 26(a) of the 1939 Act did not operate. However, the defendants had made no attempt to obtain the plaintiff’s instructions, before disposing of the property as a matter of their own convenience, and in breach of the duty of confidence accepted. Their failure to inform the plaintoff of what they had done did amount to a reckless ‘concealment by fraud’ with section 26(b), and the action could proceed.

Lord Greene
[1949] 1 KB 550, [1949] 1 All ER 465, 65 TLR 389, 93 Sol Jo 236
Limitation Act 1939 26(a) 26(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedThe Bulli Coal Mining Company v Patrick Hill Osbourne and Another PC 1899
(New South Wales) . .

Cited by:
CitedCave v Robinson Jarvis and Rolf (a Firm) HL 25-Apr-2002
An action for negligence against a solicitor was defended by saying that the claim was out of time. The claimant responded that the solicitor had not told him of the circumstances which would lead to the claim, and that deliberate concealment should . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.194819

Winterburn and Another v Bennett and Another: CA 25 May 2016

The court was asked as to the steps which an owner of land must take to prevent others, who were using the land without permission, acquiring rights over the land. The claimants here had ignored clear signs placed on the land which asserted the defendant’s ownership, using it exclusively as a car park for their shop customers.
Held: The claimants’ appeal against rejection of a claim to use for more than 20 years giving rise to a presumption of lost modern grant failed. The signs had been continually present, and now in the context of commons registration, the signs were enough to defeat the claim. ‘The situation which has arisen in the present case is commonplace. Many millions of people in this country own property. Most people do not seek confrontation, whether orally or in writing, and in many cases they may be concerned or even frightened of doing so. Most people do not have the means to bring legal proceedings. There is a social cost to confrontation and, unless absolutely necessary, the law of property should not require confrontation in order for people to retain and defend what is theirs. The erection and maintenance of an appropriate sign is a peaceful and inexpensive means of making clear that property is private and not to be used by others. I do not see why those who choose to ignore such signs should thereby be entitled to obtain legal rights over the land.’

Sharp, David Richards LJJ, Moylan J
[2016] EWCA Civ 482, [2016] WLR(D) 297
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedDalton v Henry Angus and Co HL 14-Jun-1881
The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some . .
CitedNewnham v Willison CA 1987
Kerr LJ considered the exercise of an easement over land (a sweep of a curve over a driveway) by force, saying: ‘In my view, what these authorities show is that there may be ‘vi’ – a forceful exercise of the user – in contrast to a user as of right . .
CitedRegina v Oxfordshire County Council and Another, Ex Parte Sunningwell Parish Council HL 25-Jun-1999
When setting out to establish that a piece of land has become a village green with rights of common, the tests are similar to those used in the law of prescription and adverse possession. Accordingly, there is no need to establish a belief in those . .
CitedTaylor v Betterment Properties (Weymouth) Ltd and Another CA 7-Mar-2012
The respondent owned farmland over which public rights of way were claimed. . .
CitedBarkas, Regina (on The Application of ) v North Yorkshire County Council and Another SC 6-Mar-2014
The Court was asked as to the registration of a playing field as a ‘town or village green’. Local residents asserted that their use of the land, having been ‘as of right’ required the registration. They now appealed against rejection of that . .
CitedEaton v The Swansea Waterworks Company 5-Jun-1851
Case for disturbing a watercourse which of right ought to flow into plaintiff’s close to irrigate it, On the trial it appeared that the watercourse was not ancient, but that the water had flowed in its present muree for more than twenty years, past . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.564718

Powell v McFarlane: ChD 1977

A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the owner of land with the paper title is deemed to be in possession of the land, as being the person with the prima facie right to possession. The law will thus, without reluctance, ascribe possession either to the paper owner or to the persons who can establish a title as claiming through the paper owner.
If the law is to attribute possession of land to a person who can establish no paper title to possession, he must be shown to have both factual possession and the requisite intention to possess (‘animus possidendi’).’ and
‘Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single [exclusive] possession, though there can be a single possession exercised by or on behalf of several persons jointly. Thus an owner of land and a person intruding on that land without his consent cannot be both in possession of the land at the same time. The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed . . Everything must depend on the particular circumstances, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so.’ and
‘The question of animus possidendi is, in my judgment, one of crucial importance in the present case. An owner or other person with a right to possession of land will be readily assumed to have the requisite intention to possess, unless the contrary is clearly proved. This, in my judgment, is why the slightest acts done by or on behalf of an owner in possession will be found to negative discontinuance of possession. The position, however, is quite different from a case where the question is whether a trespasser has acquired possession. In such a situation the courts will, in my judgment, require clear and affirmative evidence that the trespasser, claiming that he has acquired possession, not only had the requisite intention to possess, but made such intention clear to the world. If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made it perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner.’
Slade J said: ‘In view of the drastic results of a change of possession, however, a person seeking to dispossess an owner must, in my judgment, at least make his intention sufficiently clear so that the owner, if present at the land, would clearly appreciate that the claimant is not merely a persistent trespasser, but is actually seeking to dispossess him.’ and
‘What is really meant, in my judgment, is that the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow.’ and
‘Whether or not acts of possession done on parts of an area establish title to the whole area must, however, be a matter of degree. It is impossible to generalise with any precision as to what acts will or will not suffice to evidence factual possession.’

Slade J
(1977) 38 PandCR 452
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Cited by:
Approved ‘Remarkable’J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .
CitedTopplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
CitedLondon Borough of Lambeth v Blackburn CA 14-Jun-2001
The appellant had broken into an empty council owned flat, and subsequently occupied it. After twelve years the authority obtained a court order for possession. The court had held that the appellant had not had a sufficient animus possidendi since . .
CitedTower Hamlets v Barrett and Another CA 19-Jul-2005
The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been . .
CitedChapman and Another v Godinn Properties Ltd and others CA 27-Jun-2005
Dispute over right of way over land subject to claim for possessory title. ‘But each case must turn on its own facts. In a case of this nature, the court must ask itself what it is that would be expected of somebody in possession of land of this . .
CitedInglewood Investments Company Ltd v Baker CA 8-Nov-2002
The court considered a claim for the adverse possesion of land.
Held: Dyson LJ said: ‘to establish a claim of adverse possession for the requisite period of 12 years it is necessary to establish: (1) actual possession; (2) an intention to . .
CitedAllen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .
CitedGodmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs HL 20-Jun-2007
The house was asked about whether continuous use of an apparent right of way by the public would create a public right of way after 20 years, and also whether a non overt act by a landowner was sufficient to prove his intention not to dedicate the . .
CitedClear Channel United Kingdom Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 14-Oct-2004
The claimant sought a declaration that it had a tenancy for its occupation by an advertising station, and that it had protection under the 1954 Act. The defendant council said that only a licence had been granted.
Held: The grants included the . .
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedLodge (T/A JD Lodge) v Wakefield Metropolitan Council CA 21-Mar-1995
The plaintiff had formerly been a tenant of the defendant under an informal tenancy. No rent had been paid since 1974. He claimed to have acquired the land by adverse possession. He gave evidence at trial that if he had been asked to pay rent at any . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on the Application of) v The Land Registry (Peterborough Office) Admn 13-Feb-2009
The applicant sought judicial review of the cancellation of his application for first registration of land by adverse possession. The application had been rejected because a public right of way existed through it, and the claimant had not shown the . .
CitedThe Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
CitedWilson and Another v Grainger ChD 4-Dec-2009
The claimants appealed against a decision of the Adjudicator that they had not acquired a piece of their neighbour’s land by adverse possession, on the basis that their use had been by virtue of an oral licence. The judge had found the occupation to . .
CitedStar Energy Weald Basin Ltd and Another v Bocardo Sa SC 28-Jul-2010
The defendant had obtained a licence to extract oil from its land. In order to do so it had to drill out and deep under the Bocardo’s land. No damage at all was caused to B’s land at or near the surface. B claimed in trespass for damages. It now . .
CitedBalevents Ltd v Sartori ChD 29-Sep-2011
A strip of land had at one point been left aside for an anticipated road widening which never took place. The defendant had eventually obtained a registered possessory title to it. The claimant, owner of a neighbouring plot, now challenged that . .
CitedZarb and Another v Parry and Another CA 15-Nov-2011
The parties disputed the position of the boundary between their neighbouring properties. The appellant Z had succeeded in establishing that the the boundary was as they decribed on paper, but the respondents had succeeded in their claim for adverse . .
CitedChambers v London Borough of Havering CA 20-Dec-2011
The defendant appealed against an order for him to surrender possession of land he had claimed by adverse possession. The Council was the registered proprietor. The defendant said he had used the land since 1981 for dumping of motor vehicle parts. . .
CitedCity of London v Samede and Others QBD 18-Jan-2012
The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.182281

Tito v Wadell (No 2): ChD 1977

The liability to account for profits on breach of the self-dealing rule and the fair-dealing rule does not arise from a breach of duty at all. In his judgment such liability is the consequence of an equitable disability rather than of a breach of duty, such as a breach of trust by a trustee or, it appears, a breach of an analogous duty, such as the fiduciary obligations of a company director to his company. The claim for an account of profits is a claim for unjust enrichment, which may succeed, even in the absence of the commission of any wrong, such as a breach of trust or of fiduciary duty or the misuse or misapplication of any of the assets of the beneficiary of the duty. the fair-dealing rule was not confined to trustees, but ‘to many others, such as agents, solicitors and company directors’. It would be anomalous if the limitation applied to trustees, but not to others subject to the same rule. ‘A possible line of escape from the anomaly would be to treat agents, solicitors and the rest as constructive trustees for this purpose, so that all would be subject to the six years period: but I should be reluctant to resort to such artificiality unless driven to it.’

Sir Robert Megarry VC
[1977] 1 Ch 107
Limitation Act 1939 19(2)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedDEG-Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v Koshy and Other (No 3); Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (in receivership) v Same (No 3) CA 28-Jul-2003
The company sought to recover damages from a director who had acted dishonestly, by concealing a financial interest in a different company which had made loans to the claimant company. He replied that the claim was out of time. At first instance the . .
CitedBhullar and Another v McArdle CA 10-Apr-2001
The defendant had registered a caution against the claimant’s land at the Land Registry. The claimant sought its removal and now appealed an order for rectification of the register against him. The parties had reached oral agreements as to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.187427

Parker and Another v SJ Berwin and Co and Another: QBD 17 Dec 2008

The claimants sought damages from their former solicitors. They set out to purchase a football club, expending substantial sums for the purpose, relying on the defendants’ promised provision of service in finding and arranging the funding. They said that the defendants made no progress, the opportunity was lost, and their money wasted. After a dilatory action, the claimants sought permission to amend their particulars out of time to add several new claims.
Held: Some amendments were allowed since they arose from the same facts, and others were rejected as having no prospect of success. However, it was not open to the Claimants to ‘rely on the CCC Films principle in the present case. There is no presumption that their wasted expenditure is recoverable in full. To recover any of that expenditure they must establish that there was a real and substantial chance of the expenditure being recovered, as would be usual in cases of this nature, and as they themselves initially acknowledged and pleaded.’

Hamblen J
[2008] EWHC 3017 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedCobbold v London Borough of Greenwich CA 9-Aug-1999
The tenant had sought an order against the council landlord for failure to repair her dwelling. The defendant appealed refusal of leave to amend the pleadings in anticipation of the trial, now due to start on the following day.
Held: Leave was . .
CitedFinlan v Winfield ChD 2007
Blackburne J said that when considering an application to amend particulars of claim outside the limitation period: ‘the court should not confine itself to a comparison of the new cause of action with the existing cause of action at the highest . .
CitedSmith v Henniker-Major and Co CA 22-Jul-2002
The claimant appealed the strike-out of his claim for professional negligence against the respondent solicitors. He claimed that the solicitors had acted in breach of their duty, and he then called a company meeting. Only he attended. He mistakenly . .
CitedSwain v Hillman CA 21-Oct-1999
Strike out – Realistic Not Fanciful Chance Needed
The proper test for whether an action should be struck out under the new Rules was whether it had a realistic as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success. There was no justification for further attempts to explain the meaning of what are clear . .
CitedIndependents’ Advantage Insurance Company Ltd v Cook and Another CA 24-Jul-2003
‘The power of the court to strike out a statement of case under CPR 3.4(2)(a) – and the related power to give summary judgment under CPR 24.2 – has an important place in the disposal of claims in accordance with the Civil Procedural Rules. The . .
Not appliedCCC Films (London) Ltd v Impact Quadrant Films Ltd 1984
The claimants purchased a licence to promote three films, but the defendant lost the film prints and CCC could not therefore promote them. After their claim for loss of profit failed in the absence of evidence, they claimed for the expenditure they . .
CitedAllied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons and Simmons CA 12-May-1995
Lost chance claim – not mere speculative claim
Solicitors failed to advise the plaintiffs sufficiently in a property transaction. A warranty against liability for a former tenant’s obligations under leases had not been obtained. The trial judge held that, on a balance of probabilities, there was . .
CitedLaw Society of England and Wales and others v Shah and others ChD 30-Nov-2007
Solicitor firms had been made bankrupt leaving a shortfall after thefts from client accounts of over 12 million pounds. The thief had diappeared, and the other partners were now discharged form bankruptcy. The Law Society accepted that it could not . .
CitedCullinane v British ‘Rema’ Manufacturing Co Ltd CA 1954
The court considered the possibility of a claim in breach of contract for damages for both capital loss and loss of profit.
Lord Evershed MR said: ‘It seems to me, as a matter of principle, that the full claim of damages in the form in which . .
CitedAnglia Television v Oliver Reed CA 1971
The television company had agreed with the actor defendant for him to appear in a production. He breached the contract. The company sought both loss of profits and for the expense incurred. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether such . .
CitedSouth Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd etc HL 24-Jun-1996
Limits of Damages for Negligent Valuations
Damages for negligent valuations are limited to the foreseeable consequences of advice, and do not include losses arising from a general fall in values. Valuation is seldom an exact science, and within a band of figures valuers may differ without . .
CitedL Albert and Son v Armstrong Rubber Co 1949
(United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit) A purchaser of machines designed to recondition rubber sought damages for breach of contract, namely, the cost of the foundation on which the machines were placed. However, the purchaser did not prove . .
CitedFilobake Ltd v Rondo Ltd and Another CA 11-May-2005
Unsuitability of baking equipment installation. A claimant in a breach of contract claim has a choice whether to claim loss of profits or wasted expenditure. . .
CitedGaloo Ltd and Others v Bright Grahame Murray CA 21-Dec-1993
It is for the Court to decide whether the breach of duty was the cause of a loss or simply the occasion for it by the application of common sense. A breach of contract, to found recovery, must be shown to have been ‘an ‘effective’ or ‘dominant’ . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Litigation Practice, Limitation

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.278861

Linfood Cash and Carry v Thomson: EAT 1989

One employee had informed his employer that a fellow employee had stolen two books of credit notes. He refused to allow his identity to be disclosed for fear of reprisals. The Tribunal had held that the dismissal was unfair because although the employers had a genuine belief in the employee’s guilt they had no reasonable ground for that belief and had not carried out as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in all the circumstances; and in particular considered that in the absence of any corroborative evidence, a most stringent enquiry should have been made by management to ascertain that the informant was not actuated by improper motives.
Held: The employer’s appeal was dismissed. Wood P said that when assessing credibility: ‘the tribunal must not substitute their own view for the view of the employer, and thus they should be putting to themselves the question – could this employer acting reasonably and fairly in these circumstances properly accept the facts and opinions which it did? The evidence given is that given during the disciplinary procedures and not that which is given before the Tribunal. If a Tribunal is to say that this employer could not reasonably have accepted a witness as truthful, it seems to us that this decision must be based on logical and substantial grounds – good reasons.’
The court set out a checklist to be used in assessing the reliability of an anonymous informant witness. ‘We have been told by both sides that there seems to be no decision of this court giving guidance upon appropriate procedures for an employer to adopt where informants are involved. It is obvious that from whichever side of industry one looks it is important that dishonesty and lack of trust should, where possible, be eliminated, but a careful balance must be maintained between the desirability to protect informants who are genuinely in fear, and providing a fair hearing of issues for employees who are accused of misconduct. We are told that there is no clear guidance to be found from ACAS publications, and the lay members of this court have given me the benefit of their wide experience.
Every case must depend upon its own facts, and circumstances may vary widely – indeed with further experience other aspects may demonstrate themselves – but we hope that the following comments may prove to be of assistance:

    1. The information given by the informant should be reduced into writing in one or more statements. Initially these statements should be taken without regard to the fact that in those cases where anonymity is to be preserved, it may subsequently prove to be necessary to omit or erase certain parts of the statements before submission to others – in order to prevent identification.
    2. In taking statements the following seem important:
    (a) date, time and place of each or any observation or incident;
    (b) the opportunity and ability to observe clearly and with accuracy;
    (c) the circumstantial evidence such as knowledge of a system, or the reason for the presence of the informer and why certain small details are memorable;
    (d) whether the informant has suffered at the hands of the accused or has any other reason to fabricate, whether from personal grudge or any other reason or principle.

3. Further investigation can then take place either to confirm or undermine the information given. Corroboration is clearly desirable.
4. Tactful inquiries may well be thought suitable and advisable into the character and background of the informant or any other information which may tend to add or detract from the value of the information.
5. If the informant is prepared to attend a disciplinary hearing, no problem with arise, but if, as in the present case, the employer is satisfied that the fear is genuine then a decision will need to be made whether or not to continue with the disciplinary process.
6. If it is to continue, then it seems to us desirable that at each stage of those procedures the member of management responsible for that hearing should himself interview the informant and satisfy himself that weight is to be given to the information.
7. The written statement of the informant – if necessary with omissions to avoid identification – should be made available to the employee and his representatives.
8. If the employee or his representative raises any particular and relevant issue which should be put to the informant, then it may be desirable to adjourn for the chairman to make further inquiries of that informant.
9. Although it is always desirable for notes to be taken during disciplinary procedures, it seems to us to be particularly important that full and careful notes should be taken in these cases.
10. Although not peculiar to cases where informants have been the cause for the initiation of an investigation, it seems to us important that if evidence from an investigating officer is to be taken at a hearing it should, where possible, be prepared in a written form.
‘This case also appears to highlight the problems facing a Tribunal when considering credibility. As Mr O’Hara confirmed to us, the tribunal must not substitute their own view for the view of the employer, and thus they should be putting to themselves the question – could this employer acting reasonably and fairly in these circumstances properly accept the facts and opinions which it did? The evidence is that given during the disciplinary procedures and not that which is given before the Tribunal.
If a Tribunal is to say that this employer could not reasonably have accepted a witness as truthful, it seems to us that that decision must be based upon logical and substantial grounds – good reasons. Instances might be – that the witness was a bare faced liar, who must have given that impression to the employer at the relevant time; that the witness was clearly biased – provided that such a bias should have been clear at the relevant time; that documents available at the relevant time clearly showed the witness to be inaccurate and that such documentary evidence was ignored by the employer.
However, there could be other less obvious situations where mere vagueness and uncertainty would not be sufficient, and it should never be forgotten that cross-examination by experienced advocates may produce a picture not made evident during the disciplinary procedures. For the Tribunal merely to prefer one witness to another might well not be sufficient as this could be to substitute their own view. The employers have the peculiar advantage over the Tribunal of having an intimate knowledge of the geography, the nature and workings of the business and the various members of the staff.’

Wood P
[1989] IRLR 235, [1989] ICR 518
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBritish Home Stores Ltd v Burchell EAT 1978
B had been dismissed for allegedly being involved with a number of other employees in acts of dishonesty relating to staff purchases. She had denied the abuse. The tribunal had found the dismissal unfair in the methods used to decide to dismiss her. . .

Cited by:
MentionedHussain v Elonex Plc CA 17-Mar-1999
The claimant appealed against a finding that he had not been unfairly dismissed. He said that the procedure adopted had been unfair, since he had not had opportunity to see the statements provided to his employer by independent witnesses of the . .
MentionedRegina (S) v Brent London Borough Council and Others Regina (T) v Brent and Others Regina (P) v Oxfordshire County Council’s Exclusion Appeals Panel and Another CA 17-May-2002
Three pupils appealed their exclusion from school for violent or threatening behaviour.
Held: The statute imposed clear obligations on the appeal panel to act independently, and to consider both the individual circumstances of the child and . .
CitedWest Coast Trains Ltd v Murphy EAT 4-Apr-2006
EAT The claimant, a service manager employed on the respondents’ trains, was dismissed on conduct grounds for having sworn at and been threatening towards a customer. She claimed she had been unfairly dismissed . .
CitedRamsey, Hamblet and Treweeke v Walker Snack Foods Ltd, D McDonnell EAT 13-Feb-2004
Three employees appealed decisions that they had not been unfairly dismissed. The employer had suspected them of involvement in a scam involving the diversion of prize-winning crisp packets. Informants had insisted on remaining anonymous. The . .
CitedAsda Stores Ltd v Thompson and others EAT 11-Oct-2001
. .
Cited2 Care v Ababio EAT 20-Oct-1999
. .
CitedTNT Express UK Ltd v McConnell EAT 25-Nov-1994
. .
CitedBoys and Girls Welfare Society v McDonald EAT 18-Oct-1995
. .
CitedSigns and Labels Ltd v Wallace EAT 22-Jan-1996
. .
CitedAinsworth and others v Whitbread Plc EAT 17-Dec-1997
. .
CitedLouies v Coventry Hood and Seating Co EAT 1990
An employer’s dismissal procedure need not be prima facie unfair if the employee was not permitted to know the contents of statements on which the employer would rely in taking a decision to dismiss or confirm a previous dismissal. Wood J said: ‘It . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Employment

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.267933

J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another: HL 4 Jul 2002

The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had overstayed the expiration of a grazing tenancy, and been asked to leave but had not been dispossessed.
Held: The claimant’s appeal was allowed. The issue was only whether or not the claimant had been in actual possession of the land – had the defendant squatter dispossessed the paper owner by going into ordinary possession of the land for the requisite period without the owner’s consent? Older cases relating to an idea of ‘non-adverse possession’ should not be followed. Actual possession for one own or another’s benefit was required. The intention needed was to possess, not necessarily to ‘own’ the land. The only question after the 1833 Act was whether the squatter had been in possession in the ordinary sense of that word for the requisite period without the consent of the owner. The requirement that the land is in the possession of a person in whose favour time can run is not directed to the nature of the possession, but to the capacity of the squatter or other person in possession of the land.
An offer to purchase the paper owner’s interest need not defeat a claim (Ocean Estates).
Lord Hope of Craighead discussed the claim under Human Rights. That question: ‘….is not an easy one, as one would have expected the law – in the context of a statutory regime where compensation is not available – to lean in favour of the protection of a registered proprietor against the actions of persons who cannot show a competing title on the register. Fortunately…….a much more rigorous regime has now been enacted in Schedule 6 to the 2002 Act. Its effect will be to make it much harder for a squatter who is in possession of registered land to obtain title against the wishes of the proprietor. The unfairness in the old regime which this case has demonstrated lies not in the absence of compensation, although that is an important factor, but in the lack of safeguards against oversight or inadvertence on the part of the registered proprietor.’

Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Hutton
Times 05-Jul-2002, [2002] UKHL 30, [2002] 3 All ER 865, [2002] 3 WLR 221, [2003] 1 AC 419, [2002] NPC 92, [2002] HRLR 34, [2003] 1 P and CR 10, [2002] 28 EGCS 129, [2002] 2 P and CR DG22
House of Lords, Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15 Sch 1 para 1 Sch 1 para 8, European Convention on Human Rights 1
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved ‘Remarkable’Powell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the . .
DisapprovedLittledale v Liverpool College CA 1900
The mere storage of items in a property was insufficient to demonstrate the necessary intention to dispossess the rightful owner. It was a mere exercise of the rights under an easement. Enclosure of land is not necessarily decisive. Lord Lindley MR . .
DisapprovedLeigh v Jack CA 1879
The plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Mr Leigh) had laid out part of his estate as proposed streets to be known as Grundy Street and Napier Place. He conveyed to the defendant certain land described as being ‘bounded by’ Grundy Street and Napier . .
CitedOcean Estates Ltd v Pinder HL 1969
The court asked whether the sufficiency of adverse possession might be qualified either by the intentions of the paper owner or the squatter’s willingness to pay for their occupation if asked. Lord Diplock: ‘Where questions of title to land arise in . .
Appeal fromJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Caroline Graham and Another CA 6-Feb-2001
Where a tenant under a grazing license had stayed over after the end of the tenancy, and had been refused a renewed licence, and had continued to graze the land for over twelve years, the mere overstaying was not enough to evidence an animus . .
At first instanceJ A Pye and Another v Graham and Another ChD 14-Mar-2000
The fact alone of being prepared to take a licence of land would not defeat an application for adverse possession, but a request for a licence would be relevant. The adverse possession commenced from the time when the licence expired, given that a . .

Cited by:
Appealed toJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v South Gloucestershire District Council and Others CA 29-Mar-2001
Where there was an agreement between an applicant and the planning authority under section 106 of the new Act, with respect the undertaking of work in return for the grant of planning permission, there was no requirement for there to be a direct . .
CitedTopplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
CitedTower Hamlets v Barrett and Another CA 19-Jul-2005
The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been . .
CitedChapman and Another v Godinn Properties Ltd and others CA 27-Jun-2005
Dispute over right of way over land subject to claim for possessory title. ‘But each case must turn on its own facts. In a case of this nature, the court must ask itself what it is that would be expected of somebody in possession of land of this . .
At House of LordsJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Nov-2005
The claimants had been the registered proprietors of land, they lost it through the adverse possession of former tenants holding over. They claimed that the law had dispossessed them of their lawful rights.
Held: The cumulative effect of the . .
CitedInglewood Investments Company Ltd v Baker CA 8-Nov-2002
The court considered a claim for the adverse possesion of land.
Held: Dyson LJ said: ‘to establish a claim of adverse possession for the requisite period of 12 years it is necessary to establish: (1) actual possession; (2) an intention to . .
CitedAllen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .
CitedGodmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs HL 20-Jun-2007
The house was asked about whether continuous use of an apparent right of way by the public would create a public right of way after 20 years, and also whether a non overt act by a landowner was sufficient to prove his intention not to dedicate the . .
CitedClear Channel United Kingdom Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 14-Oct-2004
The claimant sought a declaration that it had a tenancy for its occupation by an advertising station, and that it had protection under the 1954 Act. The defendant council said that only a licence had been granted.
Held: The grants included the . .
CitedJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 30-Aug-2007
UK Advers Possession Law – Not Compliant
The claimant had said that the UK law which allowed it to lose land by virtue of twelve year’s occupation by a squatter, interfered with its right to ownership of property.
Held: The UK law on adverse possession did comply with the Convention. . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedNational Westminster Bank Plc v Ashe (Trustee In Bankruptcy of Djabar Babai) CA 8-Feb-2008
The mortgagees had made no payments under the charge for more than twelve years, and had remained in possession throughout. They argued that the bank were prevented from now seeking to enforce the charge. The bank argued that the possession had not . .
CitedRoberts v Crown Estate Commissioners CA 20-Feb-2008
The commissioners sought to claim title to a foreshore by adverse possession. The claimant asserted that he had acquired title in his capacity of Lord Marcher of Magor which had owned the bed of the estuary since the Norman Conquest, and that the . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedJohn Laing Construction Ltd v Amber Pass Ltd ChD 7-Apr-2004
The landlord resisted the exercise of a break clause saying that the entire premises had not been vacated. The difference was as to whether mere vacation was enough, or whether the tenant had to do some further positive act. The tenant had left . .
CitedJones v London Borough of Merton CA 16-Jun-2008
The court was asked ‘If a former secure tenant of a dwelling-house who has become a ‘tolerated trespasser’ in it decides to cease to occupy it, does his liability to pay mesne profits to his former landlord in respect of the dwelling-house cease . .
CitedLancashire County Council v Buchanan Admn 7-Nov-2007
The defendant estate agent was prosecuted for misdescribing the ability of his client to convey good title to the land offered. The seller did not initially have a registered possessory title to part of the land.
Held: The agent’s appeal . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on the Application of) v The Land Registry (Peterborough Office) Admn 13-Feb-2009
The applicant sought judicial review of the cancellation of his application for first registration of land by adverse possession. The application had been rejected because a public right of way existed through it, and the claimant had not shown the . .
CitedClarence House Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc CA 8-Dec-2009
The defendant tenants, anticipating that the landlord might delay or refuse consent to a subletting entered into a ‘virtual assignment’ of the lease, an assignment in everything but the deed and with no registration. The lease contained a standard . .
CitedBaxter v Mannion ChD 18-Mar-2010
B appealed against an order for rectification against him of the land register returning ownership to M. B had obtained registration with possessory title, claiming to have kept horses on the field for many years in adverse possession of it. M had . .
CitedWilson and Another v Grainger ChD 4-Dec-2009
The claimants appealed against a decision of the Adjudicator that they had not acquired a piece of their neighbour’s land by adverse possession, on the basis that their use had been by virtue of an oral licence. The judge had found the occupation to . .
CitedThe Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
CitedStar Energy Weald Basin Ltd and Another v Bocardo Sa SC 28-Jul-2010
The defendant had obtained a licence to extract oil from its land. In order to do so it had to drill out and deep under the Bocardo’s land. No damage at all was caused to B’s land at or near the surface. B claimed in trespass for damages. It now . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on The Application of) v Land Registry (Peterborough Office) and Another CA 10-Mar-2010
The appellant had lived in a caravan on the verge of a byway and had been here for more than twelve years. He appealed against rejection of his request for possessory title. He said that there was no support in law for the maxim that adverse . .
CitedBalevents Ltd v Sartori ChD 29-Sep-2011
A strip of land had at one point been left aside for an anticipated road widening which never took place. The defendant had eventually obtained a registered possessory title to it. The claimant, owner of a neighbouring plot, now challenged that . .
CitedZarb and Another v Parry and Another CA 15-Nov-2011
The parties disputed the position of the boundary between their neighbouring properties. The appellant Z had succeeded in establishing that the the boundary was as they decribed on paper, but the respondents had succeeded in their claim for adverse . .
CitedChambers v London Borough of Havering CA 20-Dec-2011
The defendant appealed against an order for him to surrender possession of land he had claimed by adverse possession. The Council was the registered proprietor. The defendant said he had used the land since 1981 for dumping of motor vehicle parts. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.174187

Birmingham City Council v Abdulla and Others: SC 24 Oct 2012

Former employees wished to argue that they had been discriminated against whilst employed by the Council. Being out of time for Employment Tribunal Proceedings, they sought to bring their cases in the ordinary courts. The Council now appealed against the refusal to strike out the claims on the basis that they could more conveniently have been heard by the tribunals.
Held: The appeal failed (Wilson, Hale, Rogers LL majority, Sumption and Carnwath LL dissenting). The fact that the six months limit in the Tribunal had never allowed an extension by discretion, was enough to imply a recognition of the alternative jurisdiction available to claimants. Save for any other element of abuse, it could never be said that a case could be more conveniently disposed of where that disposal would be an inevitable dismissal without consideration of the merits or justice of the case.
Lord Sumption (dissenting) said that a decision in favour of the claimants would frustrate the underlying purposes of the 1970 Act. The availability of the limitation defence was of particular significance for employers. The notion of ‘convenience’ under section 2(3) was much wider than the mere efficient distribution of business. The fact that a claim in the tribunal would be out of time was highly relevant, but not conclusive.

Lady Hale, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath
[2012] UKSC 47, [2013] IRLR 38, [2012] ICR 1419, [2012] Eq LR 1147, [2012] WLR(D) 294
Bailii, Bailii Summary
Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998 1(2)(a), Equal Pay Act 1970 2(3)
England and Wales
Citing:
At first instanceAbdulla and Others v Birmingham City Council QBD 17-Dec-2010
The defendant applied for an order declaring that the claim would better be brought in an employment tribunal and that accordingly the County court should decline jurisdiction.
Held: The application was dismissed: ‘ I reject the submission by . .
Appeal fromBirmingham City Council v Abdulla and Others CA 29-Nov-2011
The Council appealed against an order dismissing its application for the claimants’ claims under equal pay legislation to be struck out for want of jurisdiction. The claims had been brought in the High Court rather than te hEmployment Tribunal, thus . .
CitedSpiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd, The Spiliada HL 1986
Forum Non Conveniens Restated
The House reviewed the authorities on the principle of forum non conveniens and restated how to apply the principle where the defendant seeks a stay of proceedings on the ground that there is another more appropriate forum.
Held: ‘In the . .
CitedAshby and Others v Birmingham City Council QBD 3-Mar-2011
The claimants appealed against the strike out of their claims for damages for breach of contract on imposing changes in employment contract and conditions. The County Court had accepted the Council’s arguments on the construction and application of . .
CitedLitster and Others v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Co Ltd HL 16-Mar-1989
The twelve applicants had been unfairly dismissed by the transferor immediately before the transfer, and for a reason connected with the transfer under section 8(1). The question was whether the liability for unfair dismissal compensation . .
CitedDelaney v Staples HL 15-Apr-1992
The claimant had been dismissed but had been given no payment in lieu of notice. She claimed to the Industrial Tribunal that this was an unlawful deduction from her wages and that therefore the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction.
Held: The . .
CitedLevez etc v T H Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd (No 2) EAT 1-Oct-1999
The restriction on the awards of compensation for sex discrimination to payments in respect of a period of two years prior to the claim was unlawful. Claims of other natures were not so limited, and this could not be supported, since it was in . .
CitedPreston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others; Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank plc ECJ 16-May-2000
ECJ Social policy – Men and women – Equal pay – Membership of an occupational pension scheme – Part-time workers – Exclusion – National procedural rules – Principle of effectiveness – Principle of equivalence. . .
CitedPreston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others, Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank Plc (No 2) HL 8-Feb-2001
Part-time workers claimed that they had been unlawfully excluded from occupational pension schemes because membership was dependent on an employee working a minimum number of hours per week and that that was discriminatory because a considerably . .
CitedRadakovits v Abbey National Plc CA 17-Nov-2009
The Tribunal had considered the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. It heard evidence, and considered that there was no jurisdiction. This was despite the fact that, at an earlier stage, the employer had said that it would not contest . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Discrimination, Limitation

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.465179

Pegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another: ChD 11 Nov 2008

The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
Held: The defence in fact was that the claimant had both brought the claim too early because no tax liability had yet arisen, and too late because the arrangement had been set up several years before. Any contract breach took place when the breach occurred and that was time barred. In negligence, time ran from the time when any actual damage occurred, and ‘where the client has engaged professionals in connection with a transaction to secure for him some property or rights, and because of the negligence of those professionals, the client acquires less valuable property or rights than he would have done if he had been given correct advice, he suffers damage at the time of the transaction, even if the property or rights are worth no less than he actually paid for them.’ The damage occurred on the purchase of the shares, and the claim was time barred.

Lewison J
[2008] EWHC 2720 (Ch)
Bailii
Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 164A, Finance Act 1997, Finance Act 1993, Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedForster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .
CitedWatkins and Another v Jones Maidment Wilson (A Firm) CA 4-Mar-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence by the defendant solicitors in advising them to agree to a postponment of a completion. The defendants raised as a preliminary issue the question of limitation. The claimant said that the limitation . .
CitedDoncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd and Others v The Bolton Pharmaceutical Company 100 Ltd CA 26-May-2006
Appeals were made against interlocutory injunctions for alleged trade mark infringement.
Held: The court should hesitate about making a final decision for summary judgment without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the . .
CitedNykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
CitedBaker v Ollard and Bentley CA 12-May-1982
The plaintiff and a Mr and Mrs Bodman agreed to buy a house. The plaintiff intended to live on the first floor and the Bodmans on the ground floor. The solicitor should have advised them to convey the freehold into their joint names and then to . .
CitedKnapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc and Another CA 30-Oct-1997
A claim in negligence was brought against insurance brokers for failing to advise the claimant of certain matters with the result that an insurance policy entered into by the claimant was voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The claimant . .
CitedE D and F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel and Another CA 4-Apr-2003
The rules contained two occasions on which a court would consider dismissal of a claim as having ‘no real prospect’ of success.
Held: The only significant difference between CPR 24.2 and 13.3(1), is that under the first the overall burden of . .
CitedSwain v Hillman CA 21-Oct-1999
Strike out – Realistic Not Fanciful Chance Needed
The proper test for whether an action should be struck out under the new Rules was whether it had a realistic as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success. There was no justification for further attempts to explain the meaning of what are clear . .
CitedThe Royal Brompton Hospital National Health Service Trust v Hammond and Others (No 5) CA 11-Apr-2001
When looking at an application to strike out a claim, the normal ‘balance of probabilities’ standard of proof did not apply. It was the court’s task to assess whether, even if supplemented by evidence at trial, the claimant’s claim was bound to fail . .
CitedUBAF Ltd v European American Banking Corporation CA 1984
The defendant invited the plaintiff to take part in a syndicated loan. The defendant’s assistant secretary signed a letter to the plaintiff making representations, now claimed to be fraudulent. The defendant succeeded at first instance arguing that . .
CitedDW Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
A solicitor was instructed to prepare an agreement providing for the introduction of a new working director into an insurance broking business carried on by a company. His instructions called for the new director to enter into a restrictive covenant . .
CitedBell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .
CitedLaw Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others HL 10-May-2006
A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from . .
CitedWatts and Co v Morrow CA 30-Jul-1991
The plaintiff had bought a house on the faith of the defendant’s report that there were only limited defects requiring repair. In fact the defects were much more extensive. The defendant surveyor appealed against an award of damages after his . .
CitedNykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
CitedSouth Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd etc HL 24-Jun-1996
Limits of Damages for Negligent Valuations
Damages for negligent valuations are limited to the foreseeable consequences of advice, and do not include losses arising from a general fall in values. Valuation is seldom an exact science, and within a band of figures valuers may differ without . .
CitedR P Howard Ltd and Witchell v Woodman Matthews and Co (a firm) 1983
The solicitor defendant knew that the company was a family company effectively run by Mr Witchell from whom they received their instructions. The question raised was as to the duty of the solicitor to company and director.
Held: There is no . .
CitedFirst National Comercial Bank plc v Humberts CA 27-Jan-1995
The plaintiff loaned money on the basis of a negligent survey by the defendant. The borrower subsequently defaulted, and the lender issued a writ. The defendant said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The court allowed the plaintiff’s . .
CitedCoulthard, Ashton Shuttleworth, and Dawes v Neville Russell (a Firm) CA 27-Nov-1997
Auditors who were in a position to advise a company’s directors as to the legality of them making loan payments to a shell company which was acquiring there shares had a duty so to advise. The directors of a company sued them for failing to warn . .
CitedShore v Sedgwick Financial Services Ltd CA 23-Jul-2008
The claimant said that the defendant had given him negligent advice on pensions, failing to say that he should stay within his occupational scheme. The defendant pleaded limitation.
Held: The claimant suffered damage when he made the transfer . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.277737

Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran: CA 13 Feb 1989

The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and using the land for their own purposes. The evidence was that the Plaintiff, the owner of the paper title, had no immediate use for the land but intended in due course to dedicate it for the purposes of a road diversion. Accordingly, the use made of the disputed land by the Defendants did not interfere with the proposed future use to which the true owner intended to devote the land.
Held: The Defendant had established a title by adverse possession, and the fact that the acts of ownership relied upon to establish his claim to adverse possession were not inconsistent with the use to which the true owner intended to put the land in the future was irrelevant. ‘Possession of land would never be ‘adverse’ within the meaning of the Act if it is enjoyed under a lawful title. If, therefore, a person occupies or uses land by licence of the owner with the paper title, and his licence has not been duly determined, he can not be treated as having been in ‘adverse possession’ as against the owner with the paper title.’
Nourse LJ said: ‘The essential difference between prescription and limitation is that in the former case title can be acquired only be possession as of right. That is the antithesis of what is required for limitation, which perhaps can be described as possession as of wrong. It can readily be understood that with prescription the intention of the true owner may be of decisive importance, it being impossible to presume a grant by someone whose intention is shown to have been against it. But with limitation it is the intention of the squatter which is decisive. He must intend to possess the land to the exclusion of all the world, including the true owner, while the intention of the latter is, with one exception, entirely beside the point. In order that title to land may be acquired by limitation, (1) the true owner must either (a) have been dispossessed, or (b) have discontinued his possession, of the land; and (2) the squatter must have been in adverse possession of it for the statutory period before action brought . .’ Hoffmann LJ said that what is required is ‘not an intention to own or even an intention to acquire ownership but an intention to possess.’
Slade LJ referred to Powell v MacFarlane and said: ‘I agree with the judge that ‘what is required for this purpose is not an intention to own or even an intention to acquire ownership but an intention to possess’ – that is to say, an intention for the time being to possess the land to the exclusion of all other persons, including the owner with the paper title. No authorities cited to us establish the contrary proposition.’

Slade LJ, Nourse LJ, Butler-Sloss LJ
[1990] 1 Ch 623, [1989] EWCA Civ 11, [1990] Ch 632, [1989] 2 All ER 255
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15
England and Wales
Citing:
DisapprovedLeigh v Jack CA 1879
The plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Mr Leigh) had laid out part of his estate as proposed streets to be known as Grundy Street and Napier Place. He conveyed to the defendant certain land described as being ‘bounded by’ Grundy Street and Napier . .
CitedWallis’s Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd CA 10-Jul-1974
A strip of land between a holiday camp and a garage had been conveyed as an intended roadway. It had not been fenced. A plot of land was sold by the previous farmer to the garage. Later the plaintiffs bought the farm, excluding the roadway, and the . .
CitedIn Re Daintrey, Ex Parte Holt QBD 1893
The court was asked whether a letter could be admitted in evidence and relied upon as an act of bankruptcy. The letter was sent by the debtor to the creditor at a time when there was no dispute, headed ‘without prejudice’. It contained an offer of . .
CitedSouth Shropshire District Council v Amos CA 1986
Lord Justice Parker said that the use of the words ‘without prejudice’ prima facie meant that a letter was intended to be a part of negotiation. A letter which purported to initiate some sort of negotiation (‘an opening shot’) is not necessarily . .
CitedRains v Buxton 1880
rains_buxtonChD1880
Fry J said: ‘The difference between dispossession and the discontinuance of possession might be expressed in this way: the one is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession, the other case is where the person in possession . .
CitedRush and Tomkins Ltd v Greater London Council HL 3-Nov-1988
The parties had entered into contracts for the construction of dwellings. The contractors sought payment. The council alleged shortcomings in the works. The principal parties had settled the dispute, but a sub-contractor now sought disclosure of the . .
CitedTreloar v Nute CA 1976
The judge in the County Court had rejected a claim to adverse possession by a defendant who together with his father had done a number of acts, some more trivial than others, in and around a disputed gully and adjacent land leading eventually to the . .
CitedPowell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the . .

Cited by:
ApprovedRhondda Cynon Taff Borough Council v Watkins CA 12-Feb-2003
Land had been purchased compulsorily, but the respondent unlawfully returned to possession in 1966, and now claimed title by adverse possession. The Council executed a vesting deed poll in 1988. The Council asserted that he could not be in adverse . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton CA 19-Mar-1997
The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton CA 19-Mar-1997
The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar . .
CitedTopplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
CitedChapman and Another v Godinn Properties Ltd and others CA 27-Jun-2005
Dispute over right of way over land subject to claim for possessory title. ‘But each case must turn on its own facts. In a case of this nature, the court must ask itself what it is that would be expected of somebody in possession of land of this . .
CitedAllen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .
CitedLong v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council ChD 20-Mar-1996
The parties had agreed for a lease, and the tenant entered possession, but no formal lease was executed. The tenant stopped paying rent in 1977 or 1984. He now claimed rectification of the registers to show him as proprietor. The landlord argued . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedSze To Chun Keung v Kung Kwok Wai David and Lam Chak Man Estate Limited PC 27-Jun-1997
(Hong Kong) The respondents were registered owners of land occupied by the appellant who claim title by adverse possession after entry in 1955. Subsequently the claim resided with the Crown.
Held: ‘on the facts as pleaded, the land has been . .
CitedWilliams v Hull ChD 19-Nov-2009
The parties had bought a house together, but disputed the shares on which it was held. The appeal was on the basis that a without prejudice letter had been redacte and then wrongly admitted as not in fact without prejudice, an as an unambiguous . .
CitedThe Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
CitedCity of London v Samede and Others QBD 18-Jan-2012
The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.259373

Phillips and Others v Vaughan: LRA 4 Mar 2016

LRA Application to close registered title by documentary title owners/ first registration of possessory title based on adverse possession/ Whether factual and mental elements of adverse possession established/ Whether the occupation was with consent/ Whether witness statements made by their apparent author/ whether a witness offered an inducement to give evidence/ Whether a further adjournment of proceedings to facilitate a third opportunity to obtain handwriting evidence should be grant

[2016] EWLandRA 2014 – 0497
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15 17, Land Registration Act 2002 11(7)

Registered Land, Limitation

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.564466

Ezekiel v Orakpo: CA 16 Sep 1996

A charging order was made in 1982 to secure pounds 20,000 under a judgment given in 1979. The judgment creditor did not seek to enforce the charging order until almost 12 years had elapsed since the making of the charging order. An order for possession was made so as to enforce the order. The debtor tendered a sum sufficient to pay the principal debt but not interest on it. The parties appealed a finding that the creditor was entitled to interest, but only for six years.
Held: The creditor was entitled to interest not limited to six years. A charging order carries a charge to secure interest, whether or not interest is specifically mentioned. Enforcement of a foreign currency judgment by means of a charging order required the judgment debt first to be converted to Sterling before completion of the enforcement by the making of the charging order. Enforcement of a judgment debt by means of a charging order under the Charging Orders Act 1979 is completed when the charging order is made final.
Millett LJ said that, for a judgement to carry judgment interest it is not necessary to say so specifically. Therefore it is also not necessary to mention interest in any Charging Order carrying the judgement into effect for such interest to be added to the security. He continued:-
‘Section 3(4) of the Charging Orders Act 1979 provides that the Charging Order takes effect as an equitable charge created by the judgment debtor by writing under his hand. It must therefore be given the same effect unless the Act itself provides otherwise as would an equitable charge on the land in question to secure a stated principle sum but with no mention of interest. Such a charge would carry interest even though there were no words allowing interest on the charge itself. That was decided at first instance in re Drax… which was followed . . in Stoker v Elwell . . The defendant invited us to over rule Stoker . . and re Drax although they have stood unchallenged for nearly a century.
His submission was founded on the well established principle that a Charging Order cannot be given except for an ascertained sum . . It is clear Law for example that a Charging Order cannot be made for untaxed costs. In the present case, of course, the costs were taxed. But it is said by parity of reasoning that it cannot be made to secure future interest since the amount of such interest cannot be ascertained in advance. However, the Charging Orders Act 1979 itself entitles the Court to make a Charging Order for monies due or to become due, and it appears to me that future interest at an ascertained rate (albeit a variable rate) from the date of judgment to the date of payment is an ascertained or at least an ascertainable sum for the purpose of the rule in question.
So far as the costs of enforcing the security are concerned, it is of course perfectly true that at the date of the Charging Order, or indeed subsequently, it was quite impossible to ascertain them. The Judge came to the conclusion that the Charging Order must, by the provisions of the statute, be given the same effect as if it were an equitable charge under hand only. If it were, the chargee would have the right in equity to add the costs of enforcing the security to the security. He considered that that should be implied into the Charging Order by virtue of section 3(4). I agree with him and do not think it necessary to add anything further on the matter.’

Millett LJ
Times 16-Sep-1996, [1997] 1 WLR 340
Judgments Act 1938 17
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromEzekiel v Orakpo ChD 4-Nov-1994
The claimant had obtained a charging order to secure a judgment debt, but took no steps to enforce it for more than twelve years. The chargee denied that it could any longer be enforced, and also that the order carried interest when interest had not . .
See AlsoEzekiel v Orakpo CA 1977
A lease had been forfeited for non payment of rent. The lessor then took proceedings for possession. The tenant claimed that the action was invalid because a receiving order had been made against him in the meantime.
Held: The Court rejected . .

Cited by:
CitedCarnegie v Glessen and Others CA 1-Mar-2005
A dispute had been settled by imposition of a charging order against property expressed in a foreign currency. The claimant now said such an order was not possible, and had been made by mistake correctable under the slip rule.
Held: The Master . .
AppliedYorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.80429

Brickfield Properties Ltd v Newton: CA 1971

Court’s Investigation of Construction Claims

The court heard an application to amend pleadings to add a claim about negligent supervision of a construction. Sachs LJ said: ‘Where there are found in completed buildings serious defects of the type here under review the facts relating to design, execution and superintendence are inextricably entangled until such time as the court succeeds in elucidating the position through evidence. The design has inevitably to be closely examined even if the only claim relates to superintendence, and all the more so if the designs are, as is further alleged here, experimental or such as need amplification in the construction progresses. The architect is under a continuing duty to check that his design will work in practice and to correct any errors as they emerge. It savours of the ridiculous for the architect to be able to say, as it was here suggested to him that he could say: ‘true, my design was faulty, but, of course, I saw to it that the contractors followed it faithfully’ and be enabled on that ground to succeed in the action.
The same, or substantially the same set of facts, falls to be investigated in relation to the design claim and the superintendence claim. The plans and specifications and ancillary documents are relevant to the superintendence claim as well as to the designer claim: hence the inability of the defendant to allege prejudice with regard to the preparation of his defence if this appeal is allowed. Accordingly, the ‘new cause of action’ falls within the ambit of RSC Ord. 20 r. 5(5), and it is one which the court has jurisdiction to permit to be pursued’.

Sachs LJ, Edmund Davies LJ
[1971] 1 WLR 862, [1971] 3 All ER 328
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRoberts v Gill and Co Solicitors and Others SC 19-May-2010
The claimant beneficiary in the estate sought damages against solicitors who had acted for the claimant’s brother, the administrator, saying they had allowed him to take control of the assets in the estate. The will provided that property was to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Construction

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.415957

Rains v Buxton: 1880

rains_buxtonChD1880

Fry J said: ‘The difference between dispossession and the discontinuance of possession might be expressed in this way: the one is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession, the other case is where the person in possession goes out and is followed in by others.’ A defendant to a claim for adverse possession does not escape it by proving that he had not known of the acts relied upon against him nor by proving that that omission was not attributable to some negligence or default on his part.

Fry J
[1880] 14 ChD 537
Cited by:
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.259703

Roberts v Gill and Co Solicitors and Others: SC 19 May 2010

The claimant beneficiary in the estate sought damages against solicitors who had acted for the claimant’s brother, the administrator, saying they had allowed him to take control of the assets in the estate. The will provided that property was to be transferred only if the claimant’s brother paid all the Inheritance Tax. It was transferred without that tax having been paid. The events were now several years outside the limitation period. The claim was framed as a duty by the solicitors to the claimant personally.
Held: The claimant’s appeal was dismissed. The claimant had to succeed not only in applying to alter his claim to make it on behalf of the estate, but also to add the administrator, his brother to the claim. If he had to do the latter, could he do so after commencing the action, and outside the limitation period. The claimant did not show either that he need not add the brother, nor that he could do so after commencing the claim.
A party could be added after the commencement of an action only where this was necessary in order to determine the original litigation, and the action against the brother was not such.
Here the proposed addition of a party and amendments were for a new action. That new action would be out of time.
Lord Clarke and Lord Hope dissented in part in allowing that the brother could have been added as a party after the action had been commenced to avoid injustice, but there were no such special circumstances in this case.

Lord Hope, Deputy President, Lord Rodger, Lord Walker, Lord Collins, Lord Clarke
[2010] WLR (D) 130, [2010] UKSC 22, [2010] PNLR 30, [2010] WTLR 1223, [2010] 2 WLR 1227, [2011] AC 240
WLRD, Bailii, SC, SC Summ, Bailii Summary
Limitation Act 1980 35, Civil Procedure Rules 19.5
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedWeldon v Neal CA 1887
An amendment to pleadings should not be allowed so as to allow a plaintiff to set up a cause of action which would otherwise be barred by the Statutes of Limitation. . .
Appeal fromRoberts v Gill and Co and Another CA 15-Jul-2008
The claimant sought damages in negligence against solicitors who had advised the executors in an estate of which he was a beneficiary. He now sought to amend his claim to make a claim in his personal and in derivative capacities. Sums had been paid . .
CitedSpokes v Grosvenor and West End Railway Terminus Hotel Co Ltd CA 1897
The court discussed the joinder of the company in a derivative action. A L Smith LJ said: ‘That in the circumstances of this case the company are necessary parties to the suit I do not doubt, for without the company being made a party to the action . .
CitedYorkshire Regional Health Authority v Fairclough Building Ltd and Another CA 16-Nov-1995
The substitution of a successor party to a claim does not constitute a new claim for limitation purposes. Millett LJ considered the objects of the 1980 Act: ‘The 1980 Act was enacted in order to implement the recommendations of the Twenty-First . .
CitedPerforming Right Society Limited v London Theatre of Varieties Limited HL 1924
The parties, the plaintiff who was the equitable assignee of performing rights and the infringing defendant, joined specific issue on the absence of the legal owner of the rights.
Held: His absence was critical. PRS failed to obtain a . .
CitedMabro v Eagle, Star and British Dominions Insurance Co Ltd CA 1932
Scrutton LJ said: ‘In my experience the Court has always refused to allow a party or a cause of action to be added where, if it were allowed, the defence of the Statute of Limitations would be defeated. The Court has never treated it as just to . .
CitedHaq v Singh and Another CA 25-May-2001
The claimant had been made bankrupt, and when she sued the defendant, was challenged as to her standing. She obtained an assignment of the right of action from her trustee in bankruptcy. She then sought to amend her pleadings under the rule. It was . .
CitedHarmer v Armstrong CA 1934
The court considered the position where the assignor of a contract was required to attend court as a party when the assignee sought to enforce the debt.
Held: A beneficiary under a bare trust could bring proceedings in his own name and, where . .
CitedRoyal Brunei Airlines SDN BHD v Tan PC 24-May-1995
(Brunei) The defendants were a one-man company, BLT, and the one man, Mr Tan. A dishonest third party to a breach of trust was liable to make good a resulting loss even though he had received no trust property. The test of knowledge was an objective . .
CitedHayim v Citibank NA PC 1987
(Hong Kong) The plaintiffs were the testator’s sons, who were beneficiaries under his American will. He also executed a Hong Kong will under which the residue of his property outside the United States was to be held on trust for sale on the trusts . .
CitedLiff v Peasley CA 1980
The court will not add a person as a defendant to an existing action if the claim was already statute-barred and he wished to rely on that defence, and if the court allows such addition ex parte it will not, on objection allow the addition to stand. . .
CitedOates v Consolidated Capital Services Pty Ltd 3-Jul-2009
Austlii (Supreme Court of New South Wales – Court of Appeal) CORPORATIONS – derivative action – sections 236 and 237 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – meaning of ‘proceedings on behalf of a company’ – whether using a . .
CitedCooke v Gill CCP 11-Jan-1873
What constitutes a cause of action is ‘every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed.’ . .
CitedIngall v Moran CA 1944
The plaintiff had issued a writ in 1942 as administrator of his deceased son’s estate. However, he did not take out letters of administration until the November. It was said that proceedings instituted by an applicant who at the time had no standing . .
CitedSmith v Henniker-Major and Co CA 22-Jul-2002
The claimant appealed the strike-out of his claim for professional negligence against the respondent solicitors. He claimed that the solicitors had acted in breach of their duty, and he then called a company meeting. Only he attended. He mistakenly . .
CitedWallersteiner v Moir (No 2) CA 1975
The court was asked whether Moir would be entitled to legal aid to bring a derivative action on behalf of a company against its majority shareholder.
Held: A minority shareholder bringing a derivative action on behalf of a company could obtain . .
CitedHilton v Sutton Steam Laundry CA 1946
. .
CitedBrickfield Properties Ltd v Newton CA 1971
Court’s Investigation of Construction Claims
The court heard an application to amend pleadings to add a claim about negligent supervision of a construction. Sachs LJ said: ‘Where there are found in completed buildings serious defects of the type here under review the facts relating to design, . .
CitedLucy v W T Henleys Telegraph Works Co Ltd (ICI Ltd, third party) 1970
Megaw LJ discussed the application of O 15 r 1(4): ‘Paragraph (2) of that rule provides that a court may allow a party to amend the writ ‘after any period of limitation current at the date of the issue of the writ has expired’ but this is expressly . .
CitedBurns v Campbell 1951
An action commenced by a plaintiff in a representative capacity which the plaintiff does not in fact possess is a nullity, and, further, that it makes no difference that the claim made in such an action is a claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts . .
CitedFinnegan v Cementation Co Ltd CA 1953
The plaintiff had obtained Letters of Administration in Southern Ireland only but sought to bring an action under the Fatal Accidents Act in England. There were two separate bases upon which the plaintiff (the widow of a workman killed in a work . .
CitedDavies v Elsby Brothers Ltd CA 1961
The writ was issued within the limitation period for the claim against ‘Elsby Brothers (a firm)’. In fact, the firm’s business had been taken over by Elsby Brothers Ltd before the proceedings had been issued. By the time the plaintiff applied for . .
CitedLetang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .
CitedChatsworth Investments Ltd v Cussins (Contractors) Ltd CA 1969
. .
CitedBraniff v Holland and Hannen and Cubitts (Southern) Ltd CA 1969
Widgery LJ said: ‘Again, I think that it would only complicate matters if I attempted to deal with the facts, but one thing is perfectly clear, namely, that in the view of Megaw J. the fact that in certain cases under Order 20 rule 5, amendments . .
CitedBickley v Dorrington 12-Nov-1737
A bill was brought by creditors, and by one of the residuary legatees of the testator, against his executors, the other residuary legatee, and the former partner of the testator to recover from the former partner money owing to the estate.
CitedAlsager v Rowley 16-Mar-1802
Lord Eldon LC said: ‘The established rule of the Court is certainly . . that in ordinary cases a debtor to the estate cannot be made a party to a bill against the executor: but there must be, as the cases express it, collusion or insolvency. That . .
CitedBowsher v Watkins CA 16-Feb-1830
Residuary legatees brought suit against the estate executors and a surviving partner of the testator for an account. It was argued that there were no special circumstances justifying the action by legatees.
Held: Collusion between the executor . .
CitedDavies v Davies CA 12-Jun-1837
Residuary legatees filed a bill against the executor and the surviving partner of the testator for an account of partnership transactions.
Held: In the absence of a charge of fraud or collusion, there were no special circumstances justifying . .
CitedBarker v Birch 19-Jul-1847
There may be circumstances under which the Court will, at the suit of universal legatees under a will, direct an account against a debtor to the testator’s estate, without collusion being established between the debtor and the personal . .
CitedIn re Field 1971
The plaintiff had an order for maintenance against the deceased’s estate. She brought proceedings in her own name against an insurance company which had wrongly paid a claim to the widow and not to the estate. The insurer sought a strike out. The . .
CitedMilne v Milne; Travis v Milne 29-May-1851
A suit by parties beneficially interested in the estate of a deceased partner could not be maintained against both his executors and surviving partners, in the absence of special circumstances; but collusion was not the only ground for such a suit; . .
CitedYeatman v Yeatman 1877
An action was brought by a residuary legatee against her mother-in-law’s executors and another member of the family, who it was alleged, had failed to account for partnership monies to the mother-in-law.
Held: A beneficiary of a trust could . .
CitedBradstock Trustee Services Ltd v Nabarro Nathanson ChD 1995
The plaintiffs were trustees of an occupational pension scheme. It began professional negligence proceedings to recover an expected surplus paid to the employer by the solicitors whose advice had been acted on. The anticipated costs were . .
CitedMorrison v Morrison’s Executors 1912
Lord Skerrington said: ‘A decree in such an action would be res judicata, provided always that the whole trustees and beneficiaries had been called as defenders.’ . .
CitedArmour v Glasgow Royal Infirmary 1909
Lord Ordinary, Lord Skerrington said that in the ordinary case the action could be brought only at the instance of the trustees. But the testamentary trustees had been called as defenders, and concurred with the Infirmary in maintaining that the . .
CitedRae v Meek HL 1889
The beneficiaries under a trust created by a marriage contract sued a trustee for having lost trust money which had been lent on the security of unfinished houses in a building speculation. The trustee was held liable to restore the trust fund. The . .
CitedKonamaneni v Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) Limited ChD 20-Dec-2001
The claimants founded their action on the assertion that the defendants had been corrupt in obtaining contracts in India. The defendants argued that the English courts had no jurisdiction. The claimants held various small shareholdings in a company . .
CitedE M Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith and Co 1904
Where an equitable assignee sues a third party, the assignor must be joined as a defendant. The Plaintiff as the equitable owner of a patent was given liberty to amend its pleading by joining the legal owner, (failing which the Plaintiff’s case . .
CitedIn Re Selectmove Ltd CA 21-Dec-1993
Promisse to Pay Tax due is not Consideration
The company appealed against an order for its winding up, saying that the debt was disputed, an accomodation having been reached with the Revenue.
Held: The court declined to regard a promise to the Revenue by a company to pay its existing . .
CitedNurcombe v Nurcombe CA 1985
The court discussed a minority shareholder’s action to enforce the company’s claim as a derivative claim. Browne-Wilkinson LJ said that such an action, where a courts in equity permitted a person interested to bring an action to enforce the . .
CitedVandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corp. of New York PC 1933
The plaintiff was injured in a motor accident. He failed in a direct claim against the insurers of the negligent defendant driver. The insurance was effected by the father (Mr Berry) of the negligent driver and provided that an indemnity would be . .
CitedWilliam Brandt’s Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co HL 1905
The court was asked whether instructions given by the bank’s customer to purchasers of rubber to make payment to its bank directly, amounted to an equitable assignment of debts, so that the bank could sue for their recovery. The bank sued the . .
CitedWeddell v JA Pearce and Major 1988
A cause of action in negligence was assigned in February 1986. The writ was issued by the assignee alone on 2 May 1986, at which time no notice of the assignment had been given to the defendants. It was argued that the action was a nullity.
CitedRobinson v Unicos Property Corpn Ltd CA 1962
The plaintiff sought an additional averment (unsuccessfully objected to as constituting the addition of a new cause of action) to plead that the first plaintiff sued as equitable assignee of the benefit of a contract made with the defendant (the . .
CitedCentral Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corpn (The Aiolos) CA 1983
Where an insurer indemnifies the assured, he is entitled to exercise, through subrogation, any claim the assured may have against the person who caused the losses. Absent an assignment of the claim, it belongs to the assured and the insurer does not . .
CitedRed Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA and Others PC 21-Jul-1994
Lex loci delicti (the law of the jurisdiction in which the act complained of took place) can exceptionally be used when the lex fori (the jurisdiction formally assigned) gives no remedy. In the case of a claim under a foreign tort, the double . .
CitedRed Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA and Others 1993
Hong Kong . .
CitedWilliam Brandt’s Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co HL 1905
The court was asked whether instructions given by the bank’s customer to purchasers of rubber to make payment to its bank directly, amounted to an equitable assignment of debts, so that the bank could sue for their recovery. The bank sued the . .
CitedThree Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of Bank of England CA 6-Dec-1994
Equitable assignors of a deposit cannot pursue a claim for recovery of the assigned debt without joining in the assignee as a party, though it can sue in its own name. . .
CitedWelsh Development Agency v Redpath Dorman Long Ltd CA 4-Apr-1994
A new claim was not deemed to have been made until the pleading was actually amended for limitation purposes, and should not be allowed after the limitation period had expired. The date of the application for leave to amend was not at issue. The . .

Cited by:
CitedNML Capital Ltd v Argentina SC 6-Jul-2011
The respondent had issued bonds but in 2001 had declared a moratorium on paying them. The appellant hedge fund later bought the bonds, heavily discounted. Judgment was obtained in New York, which the appellants now sought to enforce against assets . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.415923

Ministry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians: SC 12 May 2016

Iraqi citizens claimed to have suffered unlawful detention and/or physical maltreatment from British armed forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. The claims were brought in tort in England against the Ministry of Defence, but the torts were governed by Iraqi law. Under the 1984 Act where a claim is brought in England but governed by foreign law, the English courts are to apply the foreign law of limitation. In many of these cases the action was begun more than three years after the relevant claimant became aware of the injury and the person who caused it, and was therefore time-barred under article 232 of the Iraqi Civil Code.
Held: The appeal failed.
‘The real question is whether it is legally relevant when the claimants have brought proceedings in England what impediments might have prevented similar proceedings in Iraq. The judge, as I have observed, regarded that as depending on the territorial ambit of article 435 as a matter of Iraqi law. On that footing it is obvious that a procedural time-bar arising under Iraqi law applied only in Iraq. But in my opinion, this was not a question of Iraqi law but of English law. In English proceedings, the relevant law is the Foreign Limitation Periods Act. Where the cause of action is governed by a foreign law, the Act requires an English court to ascertain the relevant rules of the foreign law of limitation and then to apply it to proceedings in England. Because the foreign law of limitation will have been designed for foreign proceedings, that necessarily involves a process of transposition. There may be facts which the foreign law of limitation would treat as relevant to foreign proceedings but which are irrelevant to proceedings in England.’
and ‘ The claimants’ submission, if accepted, would mean that there was no limitation period at all affecting the present proceedings in England, by reason of a consideration (CPA Order 17) which had no relevance to English proceedings because it has no application outside Iraq and has never impeded resort to the English court. The main argument advanced in support of it was that an English court applying the Act of 1984 must give effect to the whole of the relevant Iraqi law of limitation, and not just to part of it. This point was reinforced by reference to section 2 of the Act of 1984. Section 2(1) disapplies the relevant foreign law of limitation so far as its application would conflict with English public policy, and section 2(3) disapplies it so far as it suspends the running of time on account of ‘the absence of a party to the action or proceedings from any specified jurisdiction or country’. The point made is that where the Act disapplies some part of the foreign law of limitation, it does so expressly, thereby impliedly excluding its disapplication in any other circumstances. I reject the submission because it assumes that because the Iraqi law of limitation would treat certain facts as relevant to Iraqi proceedings, to treat those facts as irrelevant to English proceedings involves disapplying part of Iraqi law. It does not. It simply involves applying the same principles of Iraqi law to different facts. The facts relevant to proceedings in England are not necessarily the same as those which would be relevant to proceedings in Iraq.’

Lord Neuberger, President, Lady Hale, Deputy President, Lord Mance, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed
[2016] UKSC 25, [2016] 1 WLR 2001, [2016] WLR(D) 261, UKSC 2015/0126
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC, SC Summary
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984
England and Wales
Citing:
At QBDIraqi Civilian Litigation v Ministry of Defence QBD 26-Jan-2015
The court considered limitation issues as an interim issue in this claim and particularly as it was affected by Iraqi law.
Held: The effective period of CPA 17 ended on 31 December 2008. No claim had been brought relating to any alleged act or . .
Appeal from CAMinistry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians CA 9-Dec-2015
‘This appeal raises a short but elusive point concerning the manner in which the English Court applies a foreign law relating to limitation when required to do so by section 1 of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984’ . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

International, Limitation

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.563387

Peacock and Another v Custins and Another: CA 14 Nov 2000

The conveyance of a field constituting the dominant land to the claimants was expressed to be subject to the benefit of a right of way over land owned by the defendants, enabling the claimants to reach the dominant land ‘at all times and for all purposes in connection with the use and enjoyment of the property hereby conveyed’. The purchaser came to farm the purchased field as one unit with another field, and sought a declaration that the right of way was for the benefit of both fields.
Held: In construing such a grant the court was concerned with the identity of the land, and purpose of the grant, not with the extent of its use. Nevertheless, the declaration sought to identify different land and must not be granted.
Schiemann LJ said: ‘where a court is being asked to declare whether the right to use a way comprises a right to use it to facilitate the cultivation of land other than the dominant tenement, the court is not concerned with any comparison between the amount of use made or to be made of the servient tenement and the amount of use made or that might lawfully be made within the scope of the grant. It is concerned with declaring the scope of the grant, having regard to its purposes and the identity of the dominant tenement. The authorities indicate that the burden on the owner of the servient tenement is not to be increased without his consent. But burden in this context does not refer to the number of journeys or the weight of the vehicles. Any use of the way is, in contemplation of law, a burden and one must ask whether the grantor agreed to the grantee making use of the way for that purpose all three judges (in Harris) were addressing not the question of additional user, but the different question: whether the white land was being used for purposes which were not merely adjuncts to the honest use of the pink land (the dominant tenement); or, rephrasing the same question, whether the way was being used for the purposes of the white land as well as the dominant tenement.
It is in our judgment clear that the grantor did not authorise the use of the way for the purpose of cultivating the blue land. This can not sensibly be described as ancillary to the cultivation of [Whiteacre].’

Schiemann, Mance LJJ, Smith J
Gazette 15-Dec-2000, Times 15-Dec-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 1958, [2001] 2 All ER 827, [2002] 1 WLR 1815
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
AffirmedHarris v Flower CA 1904
The servient land-owner alleged an excessive user by which it was attempted to impose an additional burden on the servient tenement in the use of a right of way for obtaining access to a factory erected partly on the land to which the right of way . .
CitedSkull And Another v Glenister And Others 1864
A right of way appurtenant to land passes to the tenant by a parol demise of the land, though nothiiig is said about it at the time of the demise. – A, having a right of way to D close, demised the close to B. The latter, being possessed of an . .
CitedInverugie Investments Ltd v Hackett PC 1995
The plaintiff was the lessee of 30 apartments within a hotel complex. The defendants ejected the plaintiff and for some years used the apartments as part of the hotel with an average occupancy rate of not more than 40%.
Held: The defendants . .
CitedStoke-on-Trent City Council v W and J Wass Ltd CA 1988
The council had operated open markets on its land under statutory authority. In breach of the statute, the defendant operated a market on a different day, but within the excluded area. This was a nuisance actionable on proof of damage. The council . .

Cited by:
CitedSargeant and Another v Macepark (Whittlebury) Ltd ChD 5-Mar-2003
The servient owner granted a lease of easements to the dominant owner, to provide a means of access to the dominant land, and from the dominant land (an hotel) to the Silverstone racing circuit. Subsequently the hotel owner negotiated a more direct . .
CitedWall v Collins and Another CA 17-May-2007
Properties, when leasehold, had acquired rights of way by prescription over neighbouring land. The freehold interests were acquired, and the claimant now appealed a decision that the right of way acquired under his lease had disappeared.
Held: . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.145437

David T Morrison and Co Ltd (T/A Gael Home Interiors) v ICL Plastics Ltd and Others: SC 30 Jul 2014

The claimant sought damages after an explosion at the defender’s nearby premises damaged its shop. The defender said that the claim was out of time, and now appealed against a decision that time had not begun to run under the 1973 Act.
Held: (Lord Hodge and Lord Toulson dissenting) The appeal was allowed. The natural meaning of the words ’caused as aforesaid’ in section 11(3) was adjectival: they described the loss with which the provision was concerned, but did not have the effect of postponing the running of time until the creditor was aware that the loss had been caused by a breach of duty. Properly construed, section 11(3) was concerned with latent damage. Construing it subjectively, as was in practice being suggested, would be anomalous. For the prescriptive period to begin under section 11(3) of the 1973 Act, the creditor needed to be aware (actually or constructively, if the creditor could with reasonable diligence have been aware) only of the occurrence of the loss or damage and not of its cause.

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, Lord Toulson , Lord Hodge
[2014] UKSC 48, 2014 GWD 25-5, 2014 SLT 791, UKSC 2013/0104
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 6(1) 11(3), Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954
Scotland
Citing:
See AlsoICL Plastics Ltd and Others, Re Application for Judicial Review SCS 11-Mar-2005
The applicants were concerned at the decision to exclude them from their premises to investigate the cause of an explosion leading to the collapse of the factory. . .
At Outer HouseDavid T Morrison and Co Ltd v ICL Plastics Ltd and Others SCS 9-Mar-2012
Outer House – Opinion – In May 2004 an explosion at the defenders factory caused nine deaths. A pipeline carrying LPG gas had not been assessed for risks. Morrison owned neighbouring premises which were damaged. They began an action for damages. The . .
CitedGlasper v Rodger SCS 1996
First Division – Inner House – Lord President Hope said: ‘In our opinion the lack of awareness which requires to be established for the purposes of section 11(3) of the 1973 Act is a lack of awareness that a loss has occurred caused by an act, . .
CitedWatson v Fram Reinforced Concrete Co (Scotland) Ltd HL 1960
A workman had been injured through the breaking of a defective part in the machine with which he was working. He brought an action of damages against his employers, and later convened as second defenders the manufacturers of the machine, who had . .
CitedDunlop v McGowans HL 6-Mar-1980
The landlord of a block of flats needed vacant possession to pursue redevelopment. The respondent solicitors failed to give the necessary notice in good time, delaying the development by a year. The landlord appellant delayed five years before . .
CitedGreater Glasgow Health Board v Baxter Clark and Paul SCS 1990
Outer House Court of Session – Lord Clyde held (obiter) that the ordinary and natural meaning of the phrase ’caused as aforesaid’ included the distinct ingredient of causation by negligence: ‘The question is one of the interpretation of section . .
CitedKirk Care Housing Association Ltd v Crerar and Partners SCS 1996
Outer House – Lord Clyde reiterated his view, rejecting a challenge by counsel for the defenders, that section 11(3) was concerned only with awareness of loss, a matter of fact, and not with matters of legal liability. . .
CitedGhaidan v Godin-Mendoza HL 21-Jun-2004
Same Sex Partner Entitled to tenancy Succession
The protected tenant had died. His same-sex partner sought a statutory inheritance of the tenancy.
Held: His appeal succeeded. The Fitzpatrick case referred to the position before the 1998 Act: ‘Discriminatory law undermines the rule of law . .
CitedAMN Group Ltd v Gilcomston North Ltd and others SCS 20-Jun-2008
Outer House – The phrase ‘aware . . that loss, injury or damage caused as aforesaid had occurred’ as meaning ‘aware . . that a stateable prima facie claim . . could properly be advanced against someone’ the resolution of that issue will ultimately . .
CitedPelagic Freezing Ltd v Lovie Construction SCS 28-Oct-2010
Outer House . .
CitedGhani v Peter T McCann and Co 2002
. .
CitedHenderson v Henderson 20-Jul-1843
Abuse of Process and Re-litigation
The court set down the principles to be applied in abuse of process cases, where a matter was raised again which should have been dealt with in earlier proceedings.
Sir James Wigram VC said: ‘In trying this question I believe I state the rule . .

Cited by:
CitedGordon and Others v Campbell Riddell Breeze Paterson Llp SCS 8-Mar-2016
(Extra Division, Inner House) The claimant trustees appealed from rejection of their claims of professional negligence against the defendant solicitors as out of time. The parties disputed whether the limitation period ran from the service of . .
CitedGordon and Others (Trustees of The Inter Vivos Trust) v Campbell Riddell Breeze Paterson Llp SC 15-Nov-2017
The claimants appealed from rejection of their claims for losses saying that such losses had been caused by their solicitors in failing properly to identify the tenant and the relevant lease when issuing notices to quit. The solicitors argued that . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Negligence, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.535437

Cave v Robinson Jarvis and Rolf (a Firm): HL 25 Apr 2002

An action for negligence against a solicitor was defended by saying that the claim was out of time. The claimant responded that the solicitor had not told him of the circumstances which would lead to the claim, and that deliberate concealment should extend the limitation period.
Held: Brocklesby was wrongly decided. Section 32 should deprive a defendant of his limitation defence where either he took active steps to conceal his failure, or the failure itself was deliberate and the concealment might not be discovered for sometime. Where the failing was non-deliberate negligence, a failure to disclose was not concealment. Deliberate commission did not require unconscionable behaviour, but was still to be contrasted with behaviour which was accidental, or inadvertent.
Lord Millettt said: ‘As I have explained, in enacting the 1980 Act Parliament substituted ‘deliberate concealment’ for ‘concealed fraud’. This is a different and more appropriate concept. It cannot be assumed that the law remained the same. But reference to the old law explains why Parliament enacted section 32(2) and did not rely on section 32(1)(b) alone to cover the whole ground. With all reference to fraud or conscious impropriety omitted, there was an obvious risk that ‘deliberate concealment’ might be construed in its natural sense as meaning ‘active concealment’ and not as embracing mere non-disclosure. Section 32(2) was therefore enacted to cover cases where active concealment should not be required. But such cases were limited in two respects: first, the defendant must have been guilty of a deliberate commission of a breach of duty; and secondly, the circumstances must make it unlikely that the breach of duty will be discovered for some time.
Given that section 32(2) is (or at least may be) required to cover cases of non-disclosure rather than active concealment, the reason for limiting it to the deliberate commission of a breach of duty becomes clear. It is only where the defendant is aware of his own deliberate wrongdoing that it is appropriate to penalise him for failing to disclose it.
In my opinion, section 32 deprives a defendant of a limitation defence in two situations: (i) where he takes active steps to conceal his own breach of duty after he has become aware of it; and (ii) where he is guilty of deliberate wrongdoing and conceals or fails to disclose it in circumstances where it is unlikely to be discovered for some time. But it does not deprive a defendant of a limitation defence where he is charged with negligence if, being unaware of his error or that he has failed to take proper care, there has been nothing for him to disclose.’
Lord Scott said: ‘If the claimant can show that the defendant knew he was committing a breach of duty, or intended to commit the breach of duty – I can discern no difference between the two formulations; each would constitute, in my opinion, a deliberate commission of the breach – then, if the circumstances are such that the claimant is unlikely to discover for some time that the breach of duty has been committed, the facts involved in the breach are taken to have been deliberately concealed for subsection (1)(b) purposes.
Morritt LJ said, in [Brocklesby v Armitage and Guest (Note) [2002] 1 WLR 598], that in general a person is assumed to know the legal consequences of his actions and that, therefore, if an act has been done intentionally, the actor’s unawareness of its legal consequences would be immaterial and no defence. The premise is, in my opinion, much too wide to constitute a satisfactory approach to construction of a statutory provision such as section 32(2). A person may or may not know that an act of his or an omission to do or say something or other constitutes a breach of tortious or contractual duty. His knowledge or lack of it may well be immaterial to the question whether a cause of action for which he is liable has accrued to the person injured by the act or omission. But that is no reason at all why Parliament, in prescribing the circumstances in which the person injured by the act or omission can escape from a Limitation Act defence, should not distinguish between the case where the actor knows he is committing a breach of duty and the case where he does not. The clear words of section 32(2) – ‘deliberate commission of a breach of duty’ – show that Parliament has made that distinction.
It follows that, in my opinion, the construction of section 32(2) adopted in the Brocklesby case was wrong.’

Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Lord Millett and Lord Scott of Foscote
Times 07-May-2002, [2002] UKHL 18, [2003] 1 AC 384, [2002] 2 WLR 1107, [2002] 19 EGCS 146, (2002) 81 Con LR 25, [2002] 2 All ER 641, [2002] PNLR 25, [2003] 1 CLC 101, [2002] 19 EGCS 146, 81 Con LR 25, [2003] 1 CLC 101
House of Lords, Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 32(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
OverruledJames Brocklesby v Armitage and Guest (a Firm) CA 9-Jul-1999
A failure by an adviser to make his position clear when he thought he had been negligent, could constitute a ‘deliberate’ act within section 32 even if the defendant’s actions were not motivated by any intention to deceive the claimant: ‘it is not . .
CitedBeaman v ARTS Ltd CA 1949
The italian plaintiff had left Egland in 1935 leaving certain valuables with the defendants for safe keeping. During the war, the property was released to the authorities as alien property, who, informed by the defemdant that they were of no value, . .
Appeal fromCave v Robinson Jarvis and Rolf CA 20-Feb-2001
The court was asked as to the meaning of the word ‘deliberate’ as it appeared in section 32(2) of the 1980 Act. . .

Cited by:
CitedWilliams v Fanshaw Porter and Hazelhurst CA 18-Feb-2004
The claimant alleged that her solicitors had concealed from her the fact that they had entered a consent order which dismissed her claim for medical negligence.
Held: The solicitor had failed to inform the client that her original claim . .
CitedChagos Islanders v Attorney-General and Another CA 22-Jul-2004
The claimants sought leave to appeal against a finding that they had no cause of action for their expulsion from their islands.
Held: ‘Exile without colour of law is forbidden by Magna Carta. That it can amount to a public law wrong is already . .
CitedThe Law Society v Sephton and Co and others CA 13-Dec-2004
The Society appealed dismissal for limitation of its claim against the defendant firm of accountants arising from alleged fraud in approval of a solicitor’s accounts.
Held: The liability did not arise until the Society decided to make . .
CitedPolley v Warner Goodman and Streat (A Firm) CA 30-Jun-2003
A cause of action in negligence is complete once the claimant has suffered loss as a result of the negligence, even if the existence of the loss (and indeed of the negligence) is not, and could not be, known to him, and even where that loss is much . .
CitedDenekamp v Denekamp CA 8-Dec-2005
Appeal against striking out of claim and civil restraint order. . .
CitedMortgage Express v Abensons Solicitors (A Firm) ChD 20-Apr-2012
The claimant lender sought damages against the defendant solicitors alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by them in acting for them on mortgage advances. The defendants now argued that the allowance of an amendment to add the allegation . .
CitedBurnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding and Another CA 17-Jun-2016
The company, now in liquidation sought to claim for the alledged misapplication by former directors of its funds in 2007. It now appealed against a summary rejection of its claim as time barred.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Section 21(1)(b) . .
CitedSiddiqui v University of Oxford QBD 5-Dec-2016
The University applied to have struck out the claim by the claimant for damages alleging negligence in its teaching leading to a lower class degree than he said he should have been awarded.
Held: Strike out on the basis that the claim was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Professional Negligence

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.170275

Forbes v Wandsworth Health Authority: CA 21 Mar 1996

The plaintiff had a history of circulatory problems in his legs. He underwent surgery losing his leg. The question was when he should have sought advice as to why an attempted by-pass operation had resulted in one leg having to be amputated. He enquired why only some 10 years after the event. He was told that it was because the operation had been unsuccessful and resulted in a loss of blood supply which threatened gangrene. This was not itself negligent, but the surgeon had made a second unsuccessful attempt to operate on the following day and the plaintiff was advised that he would have had a better chance of success if he had tried again earlier.
Held: The plaintiff did not have constructive knowledge that the loss of his leg was caused by any act or omission on the part of the surgeon. He trusted the surgeon (who had performed two previous successful operations on his legs) and thought he had simply suffered a misfortune. The limitation period begins to run after the Plaintiff has recovered sufficiently to be able to see need to take legal advice. The court applied a wholly objective test, holding that the average patient would have investigated the matter earlier, and doubted that the individual character and intelligence of the plaintiff was relevant to the inquiry: ‘It does not seem to me that the fact that a plaintiff is more trusting, incurious, indolent, resigned or uncomplaining by nature can be a relevant characteristic, since this too undermines any objective approach.’ and ‘In my judgment, a reasonable man in the position of the deceased, who knew that the operation had been unsuccessful, that he had suffered a major injury which would seriously affect his enjoyment of life in the future, would affect his employability on the labour market, if he had any, and would impose substantial burdens on his wife and family in looking after him, if he was minded to make a claim at any time, should and would take advice reasonably promptly.’
Evans LJ: ‘Since there is a wide discretionary power to extend the period in circumstances which Parliament has defined in section 33, there is no clear requirement to construe the knowledge provisions in section 14 narrowly or in favour of individual plaintiffs. I therefore consider that they should be interpreted neutrally so that in respect of constructive knowledge under section 14(3) an objective standard applies.’

Stuart-Smith LJ, Evans LJ
Gazette 24-Apr-1996, Times 21-Mar-1996, [1996/7] MLR 175, [1997] QB 402, [1996] EWCA Civ 1318, [1996] 3 WLR 1108, [1996] 7 Med LR 175, [1996] 4 All ER 881
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 11(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
DoubtedNash v Eli Lilly and Co CA 1993
The court considered whether a solicitor acting for a potential plaintiff was considered to be an expert for the purposes of the section.
Held: Purchas LJ said: ‘Of course as advice from a solicitor as to the legal consequences of the act or . .

Cited by:
CitedO’Driscoll v Dudley Health Authority CA 30-Apr-1998
The plaintiff sought damages for the negligence of the respondent in her care at birth. Years later the family concluded that her condition was a result of negligence. They waited until she was 21, when they mistakenly believed that she became an . .
PersuasiveAdams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council HL 17-Jun-2004
A attended the defendant’s schools between 1977 and 1988. He had always experienced difficulties with reading and writing and as an adult found those difficulties to be an impediment in his employment. He believed them to be the cause of the . .
CitedSmith v Leicestershire Health Authority CA 29-Jan-1998
The plaintiff appealed a finding that she had sufficient knowledge of her possible claim for medical negligence against the defendants, and that she was out of time. She had known of her condition, but said she had no sufficient reason to see that . .
CitedMcCoubrey v Ministry of Defence CA 24-Jan-2007
The defendant appealed a decision allowing a claim to proceed more than ten years after it had been suffered. The claimant’s hearing had been damaged after an officer threw a thunderflash into his trench on an exercise.
Held: The defendant’s . .
CitedBuckler v J F Finnegan Ltd CA 21-Jun-2004
The claimant sought damages for personal injuries after ingesting asbestos while employed as a joiner by the defendant. The defendant appealed an order allowing the claim to go ahead despite being out of time. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Negligence

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.80628

Dowson and Others v Northumbria Police: QBD 30 Apr 2009

Nine police officers claimed damages for alleged harassment under the 1997 Act by a senior officer in having bullied them and ordered them to carry out unlawful procedures. Amendments were sought which were alleged to be out of time and to have arisen from different facts.
Held: Amendments were allowed where they arose from the facts and events already pleaded. Those rasing other issues which were now out of time were rejected.

Coulson J
[2009] EWHC 907 (QB)
Bailii
Protection From Harassment Act 1997, Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBrookfield Properties Limited v Newton 1971
An allegation of negligence against an architect in the design of a building arose out of the same or substantially the same facts as an allegation of negligence against him in respect of the supervision of the construction of the same building, so . .
CitedParagon Finance Plc (Formerly Known As National Home Loans Corporation Plc v D B Thakerar and Co (a Firm); Ranga and Co (a Firm) and Sterling Financial Services Limited CA 21-Jul-1998
Where an action had been begun on basis of allegations of negligence and breach of trust, new allegations of fraud where quite separate new causes of claim, and went beyond amendments and were disallowed outside the relevant limitation period. . .
CitedThe Convergence Group Plc and Another v Chantrey Vellacott (a Firm) CA 16-Mar-2005
An accountant sought payment of his professional fees. The defendants had sought to re-amend their defence and counterclaim. Appeals had variously been allowed to go ahead or denied after the master had not been able to deal with all of them for . .
CitedHughes and others (By Their Litigation Friend) v Richards (Trading As Colin Richards and Co ) CA 9-Mar-2004
Parents and their children claimed against a tax adviser for negligence in relation to setting up an offshore trust. The defendant applied to strike out the children’s claim on the basis that the defendant owed them no duty of care and only the . .
CitedPalmer (Administratrix of the Estate of Rose Frances Palmer) v Tees Health Authority and Hartlepool and East Durham NHS Trust CA 2-Jun-1999
A claim for damages on behalf of a murdered child’s estate and the child’s mother for psychiatric damage against a health authority for negligence in having failed to manage a psychiatric outpatient who had abducted and murdered the child, was bound . .
CitedCobbold v London Borough of Greenwich CA 9-Aug-1999
The tenant had sought an order against the council landlord for failure to repair her dwelling. The defendant appealed refusal of leave to amend the pleadings in anticipation of the trial, now due to start on the following day.
Held: Leave was . .
CitedAldi Stores Ltd v Holmes Buildings Plc CA 1-Dec-2003
What makes a claim a ‘new claim’ as defined in section 35(2) of the Limitation Act 1980 is not the newness of the case according to the type or quantum of the remedy claimed, but the newness of the cause of action that it involves. A cause of action . .
CitedSavings and Investment Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v Fincken CA 14-Nov-2003
Parties to litigation had made without prejudice disclosures. One party sought to give evidence contradicting the dsclosure, and the other now applied for leave to amend based upon the without prejudice statements to be admitted to demonstrate the . .
CitedHarris v Bolt Burdon (A Firm) CA 2-Feb-2000
A case is suitable for striking out which raises an unwinnable case, where continuance of the proceedings is without any possible benefit and would waste resources on both sides. . .
CitedSenior and Another v Pearson and Ward (A Firm) CA 26-Jan-2001
An amendment outside the limitation period against solicitors alleging a failure to advise was permitted, where the original allegation was simply that the solicitors had acted without or in disregard of instructions. . .
CitedE D and F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel and Another CA 4-Apr-2003
The rules contained two occasions on which a court would consider dismissal of a claim as having ‘no real prospect’ of success.
Held: The only significant difference between CPR 24.2 and 13.3(1), is that under the first the overall burden of . .
CitedHoechst United Kingdom Ltd v Inland Revenue ChD 11-Apr-2003
If an amendment to a pleading proposes a new claim which does not arise out of the same or substantially the same facts, the court has no discretion and may not allow the amendment. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Limitation, Litigation Practice

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.341875

Hopkins v Mackenzie: CA 27 Oct 1994

A loss arising from a solicitor’s failure to pursue a case arose only when the claim was struck out, not earlier when compromised, and even though value already diminished. Accordingly the limitation period began to run from that time.
Hobhouse LJ
Times 03-Nov-1994, Independent 27-Oct-1994, Gazette 07-Dec-1994, [1995] PIQR 43
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Cited by:
DisapprovedKhan v R M Falvey and Co (a Firm) CA 22-Mar-2002
The claimant sought damages from his former solicitors for failing to act to avoid his case being struck out. The second action was itself delayed, and the defendants asserted that the cause of action occurred not when his claim was actually struck . .
CitedIqbal v Legal Services Commission CA 10-May-2005
The claimant had been a partner in a firm of solicitors. They came to be suspected by the respondent of overclaiming legal aid payments and sums were withheld. For this and other reasons the practice folded, and the claimant became insolvent. He . .
CitedVision Golf Ltd v Weightmans (A Firm) ChD 26-Jul-2005
A lease had been forfeited. The defendant firm of solicitors had negligently failed to apply for relief. They argued that that failure had in fact caused no loss to the claimants, since they would have lost the lease anyway.
Held: The ‘but . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 October 2021; Ref: scu.81467

Re Farmizer (Products) Ltd: ChD 19 Jun 1995

The limitation period for an action for wrongful trading under insolvency legislation is six years. Where the statute relied upon enables the court to give relief in monetary or non-monetary form the court should look to see what is actually claimed
Ind Summary 19-Jun-1995, [1997] 1 BCLC 589
Insolvency Act 1986 214, Limitation Act 1980 9(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedHill (As Trustee In Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v Spread Trustee Company Ltd and Another CA 12-May-2006
The defendants sought relief for transactions entered into at an undervalue. The bankrupt had entered into charges and an assignment of a loan account in their favour before his bankruptcy, and the trustee had obtained an order for them to be set . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.85776

J A Pye and Another v Graham and Another: ChD 14 Mar 2000

The fact alone of being prepared to take a licence of land would not defeat an application for adverse possession, but a request for a licence would be relevant. The adverse possession commenced from the time when the licence expired, given that a sufficient animus was then established. The reference in the section to the taking of action did not apply to an application to warn off the cautions made to the Land Registry which was not a court, and the application was not an application to recover land. Since the Grahams enjoyed factual possession of the land from January 1984, and adverse possession took effect from September 1984, the applicant company’s title was extinguished pursuant to the 1980 Act, and the Grahams were entitled to be registered as proprietors of the land. ‘[The Grahams] sought rights to graze or cut grass on the land after the summer of 1984, and were quite prepared to pay. When Pye failed to respond they did what any other farmer in their position would have done: they continued to farm the land. They were not at fault. But the result of Pye’s inaction was that they enjoyed the full use of the land without payment for 12 years. As if that were not gain enough, they are then rewarded by obtaining title to this considerable area of valuable land without any obligation to compensate the former owner in any way at all. In the case of unregistered land, and in the days before registration became the norm, such a result could no doubt be justified as avoiding protracted uncertainty where the title to land lay. But where land is registered it is difficult to see any justification for a legal rule which compels such an apparently unjust result, and even harder to see why the party gaining title should not be required to pay some compensation at least to the party losing it. It is reassuring to learn that the Land Registration Act 2002 has addressed the risk that a registered owner may lose his title through inadvertence. But the main provisions of that Act have not yet been brought into effect, and even if they had it would not assist Pye, whose title had been lost before the passing of the Act. While I am satisfied that the appeal must be allowed for the reasons given by my noble and learned friend, this is a conclusion which I (like the judge [Neuberger J]…) ‘arrive at with no enthusiasm’.’
Neuberger J
Gazette 17-Feb-2000, Gazette 24-Feb-2000, Times 14-Mar-2000, [2000] Ch 676, [2000] 3 All ER 865
Limitation Act 1980 15(1) 17
England and Wales
Citing:
DistinguishedWalters v Webb 1870
. .
CitedVandeleur v Sloane 1919
. .

Cited by:
Appeal fromJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Caroline Graham and Another CA 6-Feb-2001
Where a tenant under a grazing license had stayed over after the end of the tenancy, and had been refused a renewed licence, and had continued to graze the land for over twelve years, the mere overstaying was not enough to evidence an animus . .
At first instanceJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
At first instanceJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Nov-2005
The claimants had been the registered proprietors of land, they lost it through the adverse possession of former tenants holding over. They claimed that the law had dispossessed them of their lawful rights.
Held: The cumulative effect of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.85085

Martin v Kaisary and Another (1): CA 16 Mar 2005

Substitution of other party after limitation period expiry. The court considered the Law Committee’s recommendations on limitation and noted the intention to allow the addition of defendants out of time where this might validate a claim.
Brooke LJ
[2006] PIQR 5, [2005] EWCA Civ 594
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Cited by:
See AlsoMartin v Kaisary and Another QBD 5-Apr-2005
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 September 2021; Ref: scu.226044

Sheldon and Others v R H M Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd: QBD 8 Dec 1993

Deliberate concealment could prevent the limitation period from running.
Times 08-Dec-1993
Limitation Act 1980 32
England and Wales
Citing:
Appealed toSheldon and Others v R H Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd and Others CA 1-Jul-1994
Concealment by Defendant after the event does not stop time running against Plaintiff. . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromSheldon and Others v R H Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd and Others CA 1-Jul-1994
Concealment by Defendant after the event does not stop time running against Plaintiff. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 August 2021; Ref: scu.89214

Preston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others, Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank Plc (No 2): HL 8 Feb 2001

Part-time workers claimed that they had been unlawfully excluded from occupational pension schemes because membership was dependent on an employee working a minimum number of hours per week and that that was discriminatory because a considerably higher proportion of part-time workers were women.
Held: The restriction on claims under the Act for membership of a pension scheme to a period of two years was incompatible with Community law, since it would deprive many of any substantial opportunity to claim. The effect was disproportionate in its effect on women. The limitation period requiring a claim to be made within six months was not incompatible in the same way or at all.
Lord Slynn explained the meaning of the ECJ judgment: ‘A stable employment relationship
The employees concerned in these appeals were variously employed, some under consecutive, but separate, contracts of service with breaks in between (e.g. teachers on a termly or academic year contract); some were regularly employed over a long period on this basis, others were not regularly employed but were employed from time to time and in that category some had what has been called an ‘umbrella’ contract. Where there is an ‘umbrella’ contract there is an ongoing contractual relationship but in the other cases there are separate contracts of employment. The Employment Appeal Tribunal . . and the Court of Appeal . . held that s 2(4) was dealing with specific contracts so that as a matter of interpretation a claim could only be brought in respect of employment in existence within the six months preceding the reference of the claim to the industrial tribunal. Your Lordships . . agreed with that interpretation but the question inevitably arose as to whether or not such interpretation meant that s 2(4) was incompatible with art 119. The Court of Justice, whilst accepting that time limits could be imposed in the interests of legal certainty, considered: ‘Whilst it is true that legal certainty also requires that it be possible to fix precisely the starting point of a limitation period, the fact nevertheless remains that, in the case of successive short-term contracts of the kind referred to in the third question, setting the starting point of the limitation period at the end of each contract renders the exercise of the right conferred by article 119 of the Treaty excessively difficult.
Where, however, there is a stable relationship resulting from a succession of short-term contracts concluded at regular intervals in respect of the same employment to which the same pension scheme applies, it is possible to fix a precise starting point for the limitation period.
There is no reason why that starting point should not be fixed as the date on which the sequence of such contracts has been interrupted through the absence of one or more of the features that characterise a stable employment relationship of that kind, either because the periodicity of such contracts has been broken or because the new contract does not relate to the same employment as that to which the same pension scheme applies.’
Accordingly, it is clear that where there are intermittent contracts of service without a stable employment relationship, the period of six months runs from the end of each contract of service, but where such contracts are concluded at regular intervals in respect of the same employment regularly in a stable employment relationship, the period runs from the end of the last contract forming part of that relationship.’
Lord Slynn of Hadley Lord Goff of Chieveley Lord Nolan Lord Hope of Craighead Lord Clyde
Gazette 08-Mar-2001, Times 09-Feb-2001, [2001] UKHL 5, [2001] 2 WLR 448, [2001] ICR 217, [2001] Emp LR 256, [2001] 3 All ER 947, [2001] 2 AC 455, [2001] IRLR 237, [2001] Pens LR 39, [2001] OPLR 1, [2001] 1 CMLR 46
House of Lords, Bailii
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 Sch 1 Part 1, Occupational Pension Schemes (Equal Access to Membership) Regulations 1976 (1976 No 142) 12, ECTreaty (OJ 1992 C 224, p 6) Art 119, Equal Pay Act 1970 2(4) 2(5)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRewe-Zentralfinanz eG v Landwirtschaftskammer fur das Saarland (Judgment) ECJ 16-Dec-1976
‘the right of individuals to rely on the directly effective provisions of the Treaty before national courts is only a minimum guarantee and is not sufficient in itself to ensure the full and complete implementation of the Treaty’ . .
See AlsoFletcher and others and Preston and others v Midland Bank Plc and Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust Secretary of State for Health and others EAT 24-Jun-1996
EAT Equal Pay Act – Addendum to principal judgment. Part timers’ claims for membership of pension schemes only made out of time.
EAT Equal Pay Act – (no sub-topic). . .
Returned from ECJPreston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others; Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank plc ECJ 16-May-2000
ECJ Social policy – Men and women – Equal pay – Membership of an occupational pension scheme – Part-time workers – Exclusion – National procedural rules – Principle of effectiveness – Principle of equivalence. . .
See AlsoPreston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS and Others; Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank Plc HL 26-Feb-1998
‘Employment’ in context of a sex discrimination claim referred to a current employment contract even in context of there having been a series of repeated contracts of employment. The question was referred to the European Court of Justice. . .
See AlsoPreston and others v Wolverhampton Healthcare Trust Secretary of State for Health CA 13-Feb-1997
. .

Cited by:
At HLPreston and others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and others EAT 3-Nov-2003
EAT Judge McMullen QC adopted a limited view of the scope of the new principle of stable employment set out at the ECJ and HL. He thought it was intended ‘to rescue employees who do not have a permanent job’; and . .
See AlsoPreston and others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others (No 3) CA 7-Oct-2004
The claimants had had their employments transferred to another body under TUPE. They complained that their pension rights had been discriminatory. The employer appealed a finding that their claim had not been out of time.
Held: The effect of . .
See AlsoPowerhouse Retail Ltd and others v Burroughs and others; Preston and others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and others (No 3) HL 8-Mar-2006
The appellants said they had been had been discriminated against on the grounds of their sex by the TUPE Regulations. Their discrimination cases had been dismissed as out of time.
Held: The employees’ appeals were dismissed: ‘A statute cannot . .
At HLBainbridge and others v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council EAT 23-Mar-2007
EAT Practice and Procedure – Compromise
Equal Pay Act – Work rated equivalent; Damages/Compensation
This case raises three issues, two of which are of particular significance in the field of equal . .
CitedNorth Cumbria University Hospitals NHS Trust v Fox and Others CA 30-Jun-2010
ncumbria_foxA10
The employer had altered existing employment contracts. The claimants having commenced discrimination claims then sought to add to the existing proceedings comparators from different job groups. The tribunal had been asked whether, given that this . .
CitedAbdulla and Others v Birmingham City Council QBD 17-Dec-2010
The defendant applied for an order declaring that the claim would better be brought in an employment tribunal and that accordingly the County court should decline jurisdiction.
Held: The application was dismissed: ‘ I reject the submission by . .
CitedBirmingham City Council v Abdulla and Others SC 24-Oct-2012
Former employees wished to argue that they had been discriminated against whilst employed by the Council. Being out of time for Employment Tribunal Proceedings, they sought to bring their cases in the ordinary courts. The Council now appealed . .
CitedTotel Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 26-Jul-2018
The taxpayer challenged the ‘pay first’ rule under VAT which required them, before challenging a VAT assessment, first to deposit the VAT said to be due under the assessment.
Held: The appeal failed. There had not been shown any true . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 August 2021; Ref: scu.85027

Housemaker Services Ltd v Cole and Another: ChD 7 Apr 2017

Part 8 Claim seeking a direction from the Court that the period of 608 days from November 2014 to July 2016, during which it was struck off the register and thus ceased to exist, should be discounted for the purposes of limitation in relation to the Claimant’s claim against the Defendants in respect of unpaid invoices delivered for building services.
Matthews HHJ
[2017] EWHC 753 (Ch)
Bailii
Companies Act 2006 1028(3)
England and Wales
Cited by:
See AlsoHousemaker Services Ltd and Another v Cole and Another ChD 26-Apr-2017
Appeal from limitation direction, and third party costs order: ‘in order to make it just to order a director to pay the costs of unsuccessful company litigation, it is necessary to show something more. This might be, for example, that the claim is . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 July 2021; Ref: scu.581734

Siddiqui v The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of The University of Oxford: QBD 7 Feb 2018

[2018] EWHC 184 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoSiddiqui v University of Oxford QBD 2016
Kerr J refused an application for him to recuse himself based inter alia on the fact that counsel for the Defendant before him was a member of his former chambers: ‘It is true that I was a member of the same chambers of Mr Milford until June 2015. . .
See AlsoSiddiqui v University of Oxford QBD 5-Dec-2016
The University applied to have struck out the claim by the claimant for damages alleging negligence in its teaching leading to a lower class degree than he said he should have been awarded.
Held: Strike out on the basis that the claim was . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 June 2021; Ref: scu.604813

Re A Debtor: 1977

Corporate insolvency proceedings based on a statutory demand for monies due under a previous judgment are an ‘action on a judgment’ within s 24 rather than a method of enforcing or executing the judgment. They are barred by s 24 if brought more than six years after the judgment was obtained. S 24(1) of the 1980 Act bars after six years rights of action including proceedings in the form of bankruptcy proceedings, based on an earlier judgment.
HHJ Paul Baker QC
[1977] Ch 310
Limitation Act 1980 24(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedE D and F Man (Sugar) Ltd v Haryanto ChD 24-Nov-1995
Enforcement by judgment on co-ordinate jurisdiction judgment is discretionary: ‘ . . having regard to the decision in Re A Debtor [1977] Ch 310 that s 24(1) of the 1980 Act bars after six years rights of action including proceedings in the form of . .
CitedBennett v The Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland CA 23-Jul-2004
The bank had obtained judgment against the defendant, but had failed to act upon it, and the judgment became unenforceable. It then began later proceedings on the original debt (still within the applicable limitation period). The defendant said this . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 02 June 2021; Ref: scu.199356

First National Comercial Bank plc v Humberts: CA 27 Jan 1995

The plaintiff loaned money on the basis of a negligent survey by the defendant. The borrower subsequently defaulted, and the lender issued a writ. The defendant said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The court allowed the plaintiff’s appeal. A cause of action against surveyor arose only when the loss was sustained and crystalised, and it was not sustained on the survey.
Saville LJ said: ‘To my mind it would be wrong simply to take the debit side of the deal and to describe it as loss or damage flowing from the breach of duty without taking into account the credit side of the deal. The reason for this is that the inquiry is as to what loss or damage (if any) has been sustained through making the deal and when such loss or damage has been incurred. On this basis, on the evidence, I am quite unpersuaded that in July 1983 the plaintiffs were, to put it colloquially, out of pocket in respect of these expenses as a result of making the deal. They had no doubt incurred some expenditure but they had also received some benefit and there is nothing to show that the former exceeded the latter.’ and
‘At the hearing and in the judgment much reliance was placed on the cases where the claimant entered into a transaction which through a breach of duty owed to the claimant provided the claimant with less rights than should have been secured, or imposed liabilities or obligations on the claimant which should not have been imposed. Examples of these cases are: Forster v Outred and Co [1982] 1 WLR 86, Iron Trade Mutual Insurance Co Ltd v J K Buckenham Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 808, and Bell v Peter Browne and Co. [1990] 2 QB 495. In all those cases, however, the court was able to conclude that the transaction then and there caused the claimant loss, on the basis that if the injured party had been put in the position he would have occupied but for the breach of duty, the transaction in question would have provided greater rights, or imposed lesser liabilities or obligations than was the case; and that the difference between these two states of affairs could be quantified in money terms at the date of the transaction.’
‘At the hearing and in the judgment much reliance was placed on the cases where the claimant entered into a transaction which through a breach of duty owed to the claimant provided the claimant with less rights than should have been secured, or imposed liabilities or obligations on the claimant which should not have been imposed. Examples of these cases are: Forster v Outred and Co (a firm) [1982] 1 WLR 86, Iron Trade Mutual Insurance Co Ltd v J K Buckenham Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 808 and Bell v Peter Browne and Co (a firm) [1990] 2 QB 495. In all those cases, however, the court was able to conclude that the transaction then and there caused the claimant loss, on the basis that if the injured party had been put in the position he would have occupied but for the breach of duty, the transaction in question would have provided greater rights, or imposed lesser liabilities or obligations than was the case; and that the difference between these two states of affairs could be quantified in money terms at the date of the transaction. By contrast, in the present case, as in UBAF Ltd v European American Banking Corp [1984] QB 713 (and indeed Wardley Australia Ltd v State of Western Australia (1992) 109 ALR 247) it seems to me that whichever of the legally recognised kinds of loss is examined, it is impossible on the material available to conclude that the plaintiffs suffered such loss at any time more than six years from the date of their writ. For the reasons given, it has not been shown that they lost the amount of their advances at that time, or incurred expenses in respect of which they were out of pocket at that time; or at that time lost other transactions or the opportunity to make other transactions of a value greater than the deal they made.’ and ‘It is the law that a cause of action for the tort of negligence only arises when there has been a breach of duty resulting in actual (as opposed to potential or prospective) loss or damage of a kind recognised by the law.’
Saville LJ
Times 27-Jan-1995, Independent 14-Feb-1995, [1995] 2 All ER 673
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedForster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .
CitedIron Trade Mutual Insurance Co Ltd v J K Buckenham Ltd 1990
The negligence of the plaintiffs’ insurance brokers led to the insurance policies being voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The plaintiffs suffered immediate damage on entering into the policies because they did not get the protection they . .
CitedBell v Peter Browne and Co CA 1990
Mr Bell asked his solicitors to transfer the matrimonial home into his wife’s sole name. He was to receive a one-sixth interest of the gross proceeds on a sale. His interests were to be protected by a trust deed or mortgage. The solicitor drafted . .

Cited by:
HelpfulLaw Society v Sephton and Co (a Firm) and Others HL 10-May-2006
A firm of solicitors had a member involved in a substantial fraud. The defendant firm of accountants certified the firm’s accounts. There were later many calls upon the compensation fund operated by the claimants, who sought recovery in turn from . .
CitedPegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
CitedAxa Insurance Ltd v Akther and Darby Solicitors and Others CA 12-Nov-2009
The court considered the application of the limitation period to answering when damage occurred when it arises under an unsecured contingent liability. The claimant insurance company had provided after the event litigation insurance policies to the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 02 June 2021; Ref: scu.80562

Hallam-Eames and Others v Merrett Syndicates Ltd and Others: CA 25 Jan 1995

Members of Lloyd’s who faced re-insurance underwriting liabilities alleged negligence on the part of the active underwriter, their members’ agents and their syndicates’ managing agents. Limitation defences were raised.
Held: Mere knowledge of the damage of which complaint is later made, is not sufficient to start time running. Hoffmann LJ emphasised the statutory words ‘attributable . . to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence’ and explained: ‘In other words the act or omission of which the plaintiff must have knowledge must be that which is causally relevant for the purposes of an allegation of negligence . . It is this idea of causal relevance which various judges of this court have tried to express by saying the plaintiff must know ‘the essence of the act or omission to which the injury is attributable’ (Purchas LJ in Nash v Eli Lilly and Co [1993] 1WLR 782 at 799) or ‘the essential thrust of the case’ (Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. in Dobbie [1994] 1WLR 1238) or that ‘one should look at the way the plaintiff puts his case, distil what he is complaining about and ask whether he had in broad terms knowledge of the facts on which that complaint is based’ (Hoffmann LJ in Broadley [1993] 4 Med LR 328, 332)’.
Hoffmann LJ
Independent 25-Jan-1995, Times 25-Jan-1995, [2001] Lloyd’s Rep PN 178, [1995] 7 Med LR 122
Limitation Act 1980 14A
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedHaward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
CitedSmith v Leicestershire Health Authority CA 29-Jan-1998
The plaintiff appealed a finding that she had sufficient knowledge of her possible claim for medical negligence against the defendants, and that she was out of time. She had known of her condition, but said she had no sufficient reason to see that . .
CitedPierce v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council QBD 13-Dec-2007
The claimant sought damages, saying that the local authority had failed to protect him when he was a child against abuse by his parents.
Held: The claimant had been known to the authority since he was a young child, and they owed him a duty of . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 02 June 2021; Ref: scu.81173

Denty and Another v Hussein: ChD 26 May 1999

The parties owned adjoining premises. The plaintiffs sought relief, alledging that their rights of way had been infringed. The defendant had erected fences and gates across a service road.
Held: Where a party erected a fence obstructing a right of way, the court was able to differentiate between rights of way by foot and vehicular rights of way. The right of way by car had begun only within the prior 20 years. That particular right of way could be enforced by injunction, but not for the extent of use claimed.
D L Mackie QC
Gazette 16-Jun-1999, [1999] 96 (24) LSG 40
Prescription Act 1832
England and Wales

Updated: 01 June 2021; Ref: scu.79903

Robinson v Adair: QBD 2 Mar 1995

The Truro Crown Court had allowed Mr Adair’s appeal against his conviction for obstructing a highway. The prosecutor appealed.
Held: It had to be decided whether a particular road had become by presumed dedication a public highway. The use relied on constituted an offence under section 34(1) of the 1988 Act. A claim of long user which was based upon acts prohibited by statute cannot found a claim for a public right of way. The court could see no rational distinction between acquisition of a private easement by presumed grant after long illegal user and the presumed dedication of a highway after long illegal user.
Dyson J
Times 02-Mar-1995, [1995] NPC 30
Highways Act 1980 137, Road Traffic Act 1988 34(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedHanning and Others v Top Deck Travel Group Ltd CA 9-Jun-1993
The owner of a common appealed a finding that the neighbouring land owner had acquired by prescription a right of way across the common to use a track for commercial vehicles (buses) to get to the property (the bus depot).
Held: An easement . .

Cited by:
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedHereford and Worcester County Council v Pick 1-Apr-1995
The issue was whether a presumed dedication of a road as a public highway could result from twenty years or more of uninterrupted public use in breach of section 34(1) of the 1988 Act. The court was considering whether a footpath, alleged to have . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 May 2021; Ref: scu.88823

Sion v Hampstead Health Authority: CA 27 May 1994

An amendment to pleadings was allowed after the limitation period had expired in order to add a claim based on the same facts. The claim was brought by the father of a young man injured in a motor cycle accident. For fourteen days the father stayed at his son’s bedside, watching him deteriorate in health and fall into a coma and then die. The father now appealed against an order striking out his claim.
Held: Appeal dismissed, finding that there was no trace in the medical report of ‘shock’ no sudden appreciation by sight or sound of a horrifying event. The report described a process continuing for some time, from first arrival at the hospital to the appreciation of medical negligence after the inquest. In particular the son’s death when it occurred was not surprising but expected. There was no reason in logic why a breach of duty causing an incident involving no violence or suddenness, such as where the wrong medicine is negligently given to a hospital patient, could not lead to a claim for damages for nervous shock, for example where the negligence has fatal results and a visiting close relative, wholly unprepared for what has occurred, finds the body and thereby sustains a sudden and unexpected shock to the nervous system.
Peter Gibson LJ, Staughton LJ, Waite LJ
Times 10-Jun-1994, [1994] 5 Med LR 170, [1994] EWCA Civ 26
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedNorth Glamorgan NHS Trust v Walters CA 6-Dec-2002
A new mother woke in hospital to see her baby (E) fitting. E suffered a major epileptic seizure leading to coma and irreparable brain damage. E was transferred to a London hospital and the following day the claimant was told by a consultant that E’s . .
CitedTaylor v A Novo (UK) Ltd CA 18-Mar-2013
The deceased had suffered a head injury at work from the defendant’s admitted negligence. She had been making a good recovery but then collapsed and died at home from pulmonary emboli, and thrombosis which were a consequence of the injury. The . .
CitedPaul and Another v The Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust QBD 4-Jun-2020
Nervous shock – liability to third parties
The claimants witnessed the death of their father from a heart attack. They said that the defendant’s negligent treatment allowed the attack to take place. Difficult point of law about the circumstances in which a defendant who owes a duty of care . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 May 2021; Ref: scu.89280

Woodeson and Another v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd: CA 17 May 2018

Appeal from a decision to grant the defendant bank summary judgment in respect of certain of the claimants’ claims. The result of the judgment is that the claimants can pursue a claim in deceit and contend that such claim is neither time-barred nor precluded by anti-set off provisions in their contract with the bank. No other claim is permissible. That is because it is arguable that the time for a deceit claim (as opposed to claims for negligent advice or breach of statutory duty) is extended pursuant to section 32 of the 1980 Act and that the anti-set off provisions may be unreasonable clauses within the relevant statutory provisions, on which the bank may not rely.
Longmore, Leggatt LJJ
[2018] EWCA Civ 1103
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 32
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBoyse (International) Ltd v Natwest Markets Plc and Another ChD 27-May-2020
Claim alleging misselling of interest rate hedging products. The court considered the defendants strike out application, and applications for leave to amend pleadings.
Held: it will normally be appropriate for summary judgment to be pursued on . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 May 2021; Ref: scu.616341

O’Connor v Bar Standards Board: SC 6 Dec 2017

The claimant barrister complained of the manner of conduct of the disciplinary proceedings brought against her. She had been cleared of any breach of the Bar Code of Conduct, but her claim was then ruled out of time under section 7(5)(a), time having begun on the initial ruling against her.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The Appellant’s challenge was to the disciplinary proceedings against her, not to an alleged state of affairs in which BME lawyers were more likely to be the subject of such proceedings. Therefore, the bringing and pursuit of the disciplinary proceedings must be the focus of the investigation in terms of section 7(5)(a) of the 1998 Act. That section must not be read narrowly and must be allowed to provide an affective and workable remedy, particularly where what was complained of was a course of conduct. Here, there had been a single and continuing action. It had not been Parliament’s intention to have limitation calculated individually from each element of the process. The period ran from when the process ceased, not from when it began, and in this case it was from the time when the Visitors eventually allowed her appeal.
Lady Hale, President, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson, Lady Black, Lord Lloyd-Jones
[2017] UKSC 78, [2018] 2 All ER 779, [2017] WLR(D) 813, [2017] 1 WLR 4833, [2018] HRLR 2, UKSC 2016/0174
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary, SC Videos Summary, SC 2017 Oct 04 am Video, SC 2017 Oct 04 pm Video
European Convention on Human Rights 14
England and Wales
Citing:
At QBDO’Connor v Bar Standards Board QBD 18-Dec-2014
Appeal against an order of Deputy Master Eyre by which he struck out the appellant’s statements of case and dismissed the action with judgment for the defendant with costs. The claimant said that the procedures adopted by the Board in disciplinary . .
Appeal fromO’Connor v Bar Standards Board CA 25-Jul-2016
The appellant said that the Board had infringed her human rights in its approach to disciplinary proceedings brought against her. She had been cleared and now sought a remedy. The Board successfully argued that her claims were out of time.
CitedDH v Czech Repiublic ECHR 13-Nov-2007
(Grand Chamber) The applicants complained that their children had been moved to special schools which did not reflect their needs from ordinary schools without them being consulted.
Held: The Court noted that, at the relevant time, the . .
CitedRehman v The Bar Standards Board Admn 29-Jul-2016
The barrister appealed against two findingd of the Disciplinary Tribunal of the Council of the Inns of Court. . .
CitedLincoln v Daniels CA 1961
The defendant claimed absolute immunity in respect of communications sent by him to the Bar Council alleging professional misconduct by the plaintiff, a Queen’s Counsel.
Held: Initial communications sent to the secretary of the Bar Council . .
CitedIn re S (A Barrister) 1970
(Inns of Court) The regulation of barristers has been delegated by the judges to the Inns of Court. Five judges sitting as Visitors of the Inns of Court stated that ‘the judges as visitors have always had supervisory powers and their decision, upon . .
CitedDelcourt v Belgium ECHR 17-Jan-1970
The applicant had failed in appeals against conviction and sentence for offences of fraud and forgery before the Belgian Cour de Cassation. He complained that he had not enjoyed the right to a fair trial recognised by Article 6(1) of the Convention . .
CitedSampanis and Others v Greece ECHR 8-Aug-2011
Resolution as to execution of judgment . .
CitedOrsus And Others v Croatia ECHR 16-Mar-2010
(Grand Chamber) Fifteen Croatians of Roma origin complained that they were victims of racial discrimination in that they were segregated into Roma-only classes and consequently suffered educational, psychological and emotional damage.
Held: . .
CitedEckle v Germany ECHR 15-Jul-1982
Two fraud prosecutions against the claimants had lasted for 15 and 20 years respectively.
Held: Article 6.1 applies to all stages of criminal proceedings, including sentencing and any appeal. The ‘reasonable time’ in criminal matters, . .
CitedRegina v Visitors to the Inns of Court ex parte Calder CA 1993
Two barristers had been struck off for disciplinary offences. Their appeals were heard by three High Court judges sitting as Visitors, who dismissed the appeals. The barristers now sought judicial review of that decision.
Held: Justices . .
CitedSomerville v Scottish Ministers HL 24-Oct-2007
The claimants complained of their segregation while in prison. Several preliminary questions were to be decided: whether damages might be payable for breach of a Convention Right; wheher the act of a prison governor was the act of the executive; . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 May 2021; Ref: scu.599756

Gordon and Others (Trustees of The Inter Vivos Trust) v Campbell Riddell Breeze Paterson Llp: SC 15 Nov 2017

The claimants appealed from rejection of their claims for losses saying that such losses had been caused by their solicitors in failing properly to identify the tenant and the relevant lease when issuing notices to quit. The solicitors argued that the losses occurred when the defective notices were served, and by that date, the claims were debarred as out of time.
Held: The appeal failed. Section 11(3) does not postpone the start of the prescriptive period until a creditor of an obligation is aware actually or constructively that he or she has suffered a detriment in the sense that something has gone awry rendering the creditor poorer or otherwise at a disadvantage. The creditor does not have to know that he or she has a head of loss. It is sufficient that a creditor is aware that he or she has not obtained something which the creditor had sought or that he or she has incurred expenditure.
The Court accepted that the result may be harsh for some suffering loss, but also acknowledged that reform was being discussed.
Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, Lord Hodge
[2017] UKSC 75, UKSC 2016/0142
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary, SC Videos Summary, SC 2017 Jul 19am Video
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973
Scotland
Citing:
Appeal fromGordon and Others v Campbell Riddell Breeze Paterson Llp SCS 8-Mar-2016
(Extra Division, Inner House) The claimant trustees appealed from rejection of their claims of professional negligence against the defendant solicitors as out of time. The parties disputed whether the limitation period ran from the service of . .
CitedDavid T Morrison and Co Ltd (T/A Gael Home Interiors) v ICL Plastics Ltd and Others SC 30-Jul-2014
The claimant sought damages after an explosion at the defender’s nearby premises damaged its shop. The defender said that the claim was out of time, and now appealed against a decision that time had not begun to run under the 1973 Act.
Held: . .
At Outer HouseThe Inter-Vivos Trust of The Late William Strathdee Gordon v Campbell Riddle Breeze Paterson Llp SCS 25-Mar-2015
(Outer House) The trustees said they had suffered losses from the negligence of the defendant solicitors in serving incorrect notices to quit under leases. The solicitors said that the claim was time barred.
Held: After hearing evidence in a . .
CitedDunlop v McGowans HL 6-Mar-1980
The landlord of a block of flats needed vacant possession to pursue redevelopment. The respondent solicitors failed to give the necessary notice in good time, delaying the development by a year. The landlord appellant delayed five years before . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 May 2021; Ref: scu.599381

Armstrong and others v British Coal Corporation: CA 28 Nov 1996

Liability for vibration white finger damage was foreseeable from 1973, but liability began in 1975 when precautions became available against the consequences and so the employer was able to protect his employees.
Times 06-Dec-1996, [1996] EWCA Civ 1049
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBaker v Quantum Clothing Group Ltd and Others SC 13-Apr-2011
The court was asked as to the liability of employers in the knitting industry for hearing losses suffered by employees before the 1989 Regulations came into effect. The claimant had worked in a factory between 1971 and 2001, sustaining noise induced . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 April 2021; Ref: scu.140916

Hamlin and Another v Edwin Evans (A Firm): CA 15 Jul 1996

The plaintiffs had discovered that the defendant surveyors had negligently failed to observe that there was dry rot but did not start proceedings until other negligence was discovered more than six years later.
Held: Although the negligent survey had led to two heads of loss there was only one cause of action. Since the plaintiffs had discovered the dry rot over six years previously, the action was statute barred. Only one cause of action arises from a negligent survey; and there is only one applicable limitation period.
Gazette 17-Jul-1996, Times 15-Jul-1996, [1996] PNLR 398
Limitation Act 1980 14A
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedWatkins and Another v Jones Maidment Wilson (A Firm) CA 4-Mar-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence by the defendant solicitors in advising them to agree to a postponment of a completion. The defendants raised as a preliminary issue the question of limitation. The claimant said that the limitation . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 April 2021; Ref: scu.81199

Lowsley and Another v Forbes: CA 21 Mar 1996

The statutory time limit under the Limitation Act applied only to the right to take substantive proceedings and had nothing whatever to do with the procedural machinery for enforcing a judgment when one was obtained. The Act of 1875 brought about a fundamental change. The old absolute time bar on execution after 20 years, subsequently reduced to 12 years, was replaced by a discretionary bar after six years. On the making of a charging order, the amount to be secured by it was not limited to 6 years’ interest up to that date.
Garnishee proceedings to enforce a judgment were not subject to the limitation period in s.24(1); that section applied solely to an action to enforce the judgment and not to other procedural methods used to enforce a judgment. Evans LJ said: ‘The distinction between bringing an action to enforce a judgment, to which the Limitation Act applies, and bringing other forms of proceedings to enforce the original judgment, to which it does not, can perhaps be criticised as technical and indicating an out-dated preference for form over substance, but in my view the distinction can be justified. The policy reasons for barring the commencement of actions after a certain period has expired do not apply in the same way to the many different circumstances in which a successful plaintiff may seek to enforce a judgment which the defendant has ignored or failed to comply with for the same or a longer period after the judgment was given.’
Lord Justice Evans, Lord Justice Saville and Lord Justice Morritt
Times 05-Apr-1996, [1996] CLC 1370
Limitation Act 1980 24(1) 24(2), Supreme Court of Judicature (1873) Amendment Act 1875
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedNational Westminster Bank v Powney CA 1990
The limitation period has nothing to do with the procedural machinery of enforcing a judgment when one was obtained. . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromLowsley and Another v Forbes (Trading As I E Design Services) HL 29-Jul-1998
The plaintiffs, with the leave of the court, had obtained garnishee and charging orders nisi against the debtor 11 and a half years after they had obtained a consent judgment.
Held: An application by the judgment debtor to set aside the orders . .
CitedNational Ability Sa v Tinna Oils and Chemicals Ltd CA 11-Dec-2009
Implied promise to pay arbitral award
The parties disputed how limitation affects the enforcement of an arbitration award. More than six years had passed since the award had been made, and the defendant said it was out of time.
Held: A party can enforce an award either by ordinary . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 April 2021; Ref: scu.83229

Customs and Excise Commissioners v Le Rififi Ltd: CA 14 Dec 1994

One paper assessment covering several tax periods need always not be treated as just one assessment. This was a question of fact to be decided on the particular circumstances.
Times 14-Dec-1994, Gazette 15-Feb-1995
Finance Act 1985 22(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appealed fromCommissioners of Customs and Excise v Le Rififi Ltd QBD 2-Aug-1993
One assessment covering numerous accounting periods constitutes a single global assessment. If any part of a global VAT assessment is time barred, then the whole assessment fails. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 April 2021; Ref: scu.79334

Sheldon and Others v R H Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd and Others: CA 1 Jul 1994

Concealment by Defendant after the event does not stop time running against Plaintiff.
Times 01-Jul-1994, Independent 08-Jul-1994
Limitation Act 1980 32(1)(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromSheldon and Others v R H M Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd QBD 8-Dec-1993
Deliberate concealment could prevent the limitation period from running. . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromSheldon and Others v R H M Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd and Others HL 5-May-1995
The limitation period did not run whilst relevant facts were deliberately concealed after the damage had been concealed. Section 32 could apply where the concealment of the relevant fact took place after the event as well as at the time of it. The . .
Appealed toSheldon and Others v R H M Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd QBD 8-Dec-1993
Deliberate concealment could prevent the limitation period from running. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 April 2021; Ref: scu.89210

Restick v Crickmore: CA 3 Dec 1993

The High Court can transfer proceedings wrongly started in High Court to the County Court as an alternative to its jurisdiction to strike out the claim. Stuart-Smith LJ said: ‘. . provided proceedings are started within the time permitted by the statute of limitations, are not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court and disclose a cause of action, they will not as a rule be struck out because of some mistake in procedure on the part of the plaintiff or his advisers. Save where there has been a contumelious disobedience of the court’s order, the draconian sanction of striking out an otherwise properly constituted action, simply to punish the party who has failed to comply with the rules of court, is not part of the court’s function . .’
Stuart-Smith LJ
Times 03-Dec-1993, Ind Summary 20-Dec-1993, Gazette 26-Jan-1994, [1994] 1 WLR 420
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 2(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBirmingham City Council v Abdulla and Others CA 29-Nov-2011
The Council appealed against an order dismissing its application for the claimants’ claims under equal pay legislation to be struck out for want of jurisdiction. The claims had been brought in the High Court rather than te hEmployment Tribunal, thus . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 April 2021; Ref: scu.88744

Hughes v Cook and Another: CA 14 Feb 1994

Adverse possession will accrue even if the claimant believed and acted on the mistaken belief that the land was already his. That belief was inconsistent with ownership by others. Beldam LJ said that counsel’s argument was fallacious: ‘. . in the failure to distinguish between an intention to possess, which is required, and an intention to dispossess, which is not.’
Saville LJ said: ‘The learned judge appears to have held that it is impossible for someone who believes himself to be the true owner to acquire title by adverse possession since such a person cannot, ex hypothesi, have an intention to exclude or oust the true owner. If this were the law then only those who knew they were trespassing, that is to say doing something illegal, could require such a title, whilst those who did not realise that they were doing anything wrong would acquire no right at all. I can see no reason why, as a matter of justice or common sense, the former but not the latter should be able to acquire title in this way. What the law requires is factual possession i.e. an exclusive dealing with the land as an occupying owner might be expected to deal with it, together with a manifested intention to treat the land as belonging to the possessor to the exclusion of everyone else. Obviously if the possessor knows or believes someone else has the paper title to the land he must intend to exclude that person along with everyone else. But in the absence of such knowledge or belief it is in my judgment sufficient for this part of the second requirement simply to establish a manifest intention to exclude everyone.’
Beldam LJ, Saville LJ
Ind Summary 21-Mar-1994
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 April 2021; Ref: scu.81520

Dobbie v Medway Health Authority: CA 11 May 1994

The plaintiff had a lump on her breast. The surgeon, without first subjecting the lump to a microscopic examination in order to determine whether it was cancerous or benign, removed the breast. This was in 1973. The lump was subsequently found to be benign. The patient knew very soon after the operation that the lump was benign but did not know until 1988 that that meant her breast need not have been removed. She began proceedings for negligence in 1989.
Held: Time began to run from the date of knowledge of the cause of an injury, not the date when the claimant knew that the cause was tortious. Sir Thomas Bingham MR considered the test of knowledge: ‘This test is not in my judgment hard to apply. It involves ascertaining the personal injury on which the claim is founded and asking when the claimant knew of it. In the case of an insidious disease or a delayed result of a surgical mishap, this knowledge may come well after the suffering of the disease or the performance of the surgery. But more usually the claimant knows that he has suffered personal injury as soon or almost as soon as he does so’. ‘The word ‘attributable’ in section 14(1) (b) does not mean ’caused by’. It merely means ‘capable of being attributed”.
Sir Thomas Bingham MR said: ‘The personal injury on which the plaintiff seeks to found her claim is the removal of her breast and the psychological and physical harm which followed. She knew of this injury within hours, days or months of the operation and she at all times reasonably considered it to be significant. She knew from the beginning that this injury was capable of being attributed to, or more bluntly was the clear and direct result of, an act or omission of the health authority. What she did not appreciate until later was that the health authority’s act or omission was (arguably) negligent or blameworthy. But her want of that knowledge did not stop time beginning to run.’
As to the meaning of ‘significant injury’: ‘The requirement that the injury of which a plaintiff has knowledge should be ‘significant’ is in my view directed solely to the quantum of the injury and not to the plaintiff’s evaluation of its cause, nature or usualness. Time does not run against a plaintiff, even if he is aware of the injury, if he would reasonably have considered it insufficiently serious to justify proceedings against an acquiescent and credit-worthy defendant, if (in other words) he would reasonably have accepted it as a fact of life or not worth bothering about. It is otherwise if the injury is reasonably to be considered as sufficiently serious within the statutory definition: time then runs (subject to the requirement of attributability) even if the plaintiff believes the injury to be normal or properly caused.’
Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Steyn LJ
Ind Summary 06-Jun-1994, Times 18-May-1994, [1994] 1 WLR 1234, 1994 5 MEDLR 160, [1994] EWCA Civ 13, [1994] 4 All ER 450, [1994] PIQR 353
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 11(4)(b) 14(1)(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedHalford v Brookes CA 1991
The plaintiff, the mother and administratrix of the estate of a 16 year old girl, alleged that her daughter had been murdered by one or both of the Defendants. The claim was for damages for battery. Rougier J at first instance had decided that: . .

Cited by:
CitedRowbottom v Royal Masonic Hospital CA 12-Feb-2002
The claimant sought damages for the negligent failure to administer antibiotics. Earlier proceedings had been discontinued, and the hospital resisted subsequent proceedings, claiming them to be time-barred. The claimant asserted that he knew of the . .
CitedO’Driscoll v Dudley Health Authority CA 30-Apr-1998
The plaintiff sought damages for the negligence of the respondent in her care at birth. Years later the family concluded that her condition was a result of negligence. They waited until she was 21, when they mistakenly believed that she became an . .
CitedLinda Anne Roberts v Adrian John Winbow (3) CA 4-Dec-1998
The plaintiff was treated for depression by the defendant by prescription of drugs. She sufferred a reaction, but now claimed that the doctor’s slow reaction caused her to suffer lasting injury. The question on appeal was, if a plaintiff suffers . .
CitedHaward and others v Fawcetts HL 1-Mar-2006
The claimant sought damages from his accountants, claiming negligence. The accountants pleaded limitation. They had advised him in connection with an investment in a company which investment went wrong.
Held: It was argued that the limitation . .
CitedKR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 10-Jun-2003
The court considered an extension of the time for claiming damages for personal injuries after the claimants said they had been sexually abused as children in the care of the defendants.
Held: The test to be applied under section 14(2) was . .
CitedMcCoubrey v Ministry of Defence CA 24-Jan-2007
The defendant appealed a decision allowing a claim to proceed more than ten years after it had been suffered. The claimant’s hearing had been damaged after an officer threw a thunderflash into his trench on an exercise.
Held: The defendant’s . .
CitedPierce v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council QBD 13-Dec-2007
The claimant sought damages, saying that the local authority had failed to protect him when he was a child against abuse by his parents.
Held: The claimant had been known to the authority since he was a young child, and they owed him a duty of . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 April 2021; Ref: scu.80075

Broadley and Guy v Chapman and Co: CA 26 Jul 1993

The limitation period starts when the plaintiff realizes that her injury may have been caused by the failure of the medical practitioner. ‘Attributable to’ means ‘capable of being attributed to’ and not ’caused by’. ‘Act or omission’ does not equate with ‘negligence’, ‘actionable’ or ‘tortious’.
Ind Summary 26-Jul-1993, Times 06-Jul-1993, [1993] 4 Med L R 328
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedO’Driscoll v Dudley Health Authority CA 30-Apr-1998
The plaintiff sought damages for the negligence of the respondent in her care at birth. Years later the family concluded that her condition was a result of negligence. They waited until she was 21, when they mistakenly believed that she became an . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 April 2021; Ref: scu.78661

In re Pantone 485 Ltd: ChD 29 Nov 2001

The respondent Bain was a director of a number of connected companies, including Smarturgent and Pantone, both of which he indirectly controlled. The liquidator of both companies brought proceedings against Bain on a number of claims for breach of duty as a director, including that he had caused Smarturgent to spend a total of over andpound;86,000 for the benefit of Pantone. It was argued on behalf of Bain that this claim was time-barred, but the liquidator relied on section 21(1)(b).
Held: Field QC responded to the submission saying: ‘The claim against Mr Bain is not that he transferred Smarturgent’s money to himself but that he caused the company’s money to be spent not for Smarturgent’s benefit but for Pantone’s. Mr Shaw submitted that the fact that the machine was acquired and the rentals paid for the benefit of Pantone, a company in which Mr Bain had an indirect controlling interest through his shareholding in AS2 meant that he was to be regarded as having received the trust property . . In my judgment, as a matter of basic principle where a fiduciary uses his beneficiary’s money to confer a benefit on a company he controls he is denying the beneficiary’s title to the money for his own purposes and this amounts to a conversion for his own use. The same is true where a fiduciary causes his beneficiary to incur a liability for the benefit of a company which the fiduciary controls. Since this is what the applicant is in substance alleging under the MOVP claim, I hold that this claim is within section 21(1)(b) of the Limitation Act and is therefore not statute barred.’
Richard Field QC HHJ
[2001] EWHC 705 (Ch), [2002] 1 BCLC 266, [2001] 2 EGLR 103
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 2(1)(b)
England and Wales
Cited by:
ApprovedBurnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding and Another CA 17-Jun-2016
The company, now in liquidation sought to claim for the alledged misapplication by former directors of its funds in 2007. It now appealed against a summary rejection of its claim as time barred.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Section 21(1)(b) . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 04 April 2021; Ref: scu.372690

Eagle v Redlime Ltd: QBD 4 Apr 2011

The builder replied to a claim in negligence that it was out of time. They had built a concrete base for a kennels. The claimant said that they had not constructed proper foundations, and that he had come to know this only within the limitation period when it began to crack.
Eder J
[2011] EWHC 838 (QB)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 14A
England and Wales

Updated: 07 March 2021; Ref: scu.431736

O’Donovan v Manchester (Ringway) Airport Plc: UTLC 26 Aug 2009

COMPENSATION – limitation – Land Compensation Act 1973 – whether proceedings brought when notice of reference sent to Tribunal – whether notice of reference a nullity if failing to identify all persons interested in the land – held claim not statute barred – 1973 Act s 16, Limitation Act 1980 s 9(1), Lands Tribunal Rules 1996 rr 10 and 11
[2009] UKUT 164 (LC), [2009] RVR 358
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 25 February 2021; Ref: scu.415021

Uniplex (UK) Limited v Uniplex (Law Relating To Undertakings): ECJ 29 Oct 2009

ECJ Public procurement Directive 89/665/EEC – Review procedure under national law – Effective legal protection -Limitation periods – Point at which time starts running – Whether the applicant knew or ‘ought to have’ known of the breach of procurement law Requirement that proceedings be brought ‘promptly’.
C-406/08, [2009] EUECJ C-406/08 – O
Bailii
European
Cited by:
See AlsoUniplex (UK) Limited v Uniplex ECJ 28-Jan-2010
ECJ Directive 89/665/EEC – Procedures for review of the award of public contracts – Period within which proceedings must be brought – Date from which the period for bringing proceedings starts to run. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 February 2021; Ref: scu.380310

Nolan v Wright: CA 15 Oct 2009

Action for the recovery of a very large sum of money from the defendant borrower pursuant to an unregulated credit agreement and a legal charge. The defendant seeks to set aside the loan documentation as a sham or procured by undue influence or misrepresentation.
Lloyd LJ
[2009] EWCA Civ 1131
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 19 February 2021; Ref: scu.377533

Jim Ennis Construction Ltd v Premier Asphalt Ltd: TCC 24 Jul 2009

The court was asked as to the date of accrual of the cause of action where a losing party to an adjudication brought under Part II of the 1996 Act later begins proceedings to seek a final determination of the matters decided by the adjudicator with a view to recovering monies paid to the winning party in compliance with the adjudicator’s decision. ‘The Claimant contends that the cause of action is separate and distinct from the cause of action in respect of the dispute referred to adjudication, and does not arise until the date of payment in compliance with the decision, whereas the Defendant contends that the cause of action is no different from the dispute referred to adjudication and thus arises at the same time as that underlying cause of action.’
Held: There was an implied term of the construction contract that an unsuccessful party to an adjudication was entitled to be repaid all sums paid by it in compliance with an adjudication if they were subsequently decided or agreed not to be due and that the cause of action for such sums accrued at the date of the original payment.
HHJ Stephen Davies
[2009] EWHC 1906 (TCC)
Bailii
Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, Limitation Act 1980
Cited by:
CitedAspect Contracts (Asbetos) Ltd v Higgins Construction Plc SC 17-Jun-2015
Aspect had claimed the return of funds paid by it to the appellant Higgins under an adjudication award in a construction contract disute. The claimant had been asked to prpare asbestos surveys and reports on maisonettes which Higgins was to acquire . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 February 2021; Ref: scu.361479

Harris v Bolt Burdon (A Firm): CA 2 Feb 2000

A case is suitable for striking out which raises an unwinnable case, where continuance of the proceedings is without any possible benefit and would waste resources on both sides.
[2000] EWCA Civ 3037, [2000] CP Rep 70, [2000] CPLR 9
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedDowson and Others v Northumbria Police QBD 30-Apr-2009
Nine police officers claimed damages for alleged harassment under the 1997 Act by a senior officer in having bullied them and ordered them to carry out unlawful procedures. Amendments were sought which were alleged to be out of time and to have . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 February 2021; Ref: scu.342142

Berezovsky v Abramovich: ComC 22 May 2008

Applications were made to amend pleadings and for consequential orders. The claimant sought damages of $4.3 billion alleging breach of trust. The claimant sought to add claims which the defendant said were out of time.
Held: The proposed amendment was refused. ‘It is open to the Claimant to bring claims for breach of trust or of fiduciary duty more than six years after the causes of action arose but only for those explicitly based on and limited to fraud. The current proposed amendment is not explicit about fraud.’
Mackie J QC
[2008] EWHC 1138 (Comm)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 21(1)(a)
Citing:
CitedCobbold v London Borough of Greenwich CA 9-Aug-1999
cobbold_greenwichCA1999
The tenant had sought an order against the council landlord for failure to repair her dwelling. The defendant appealed refusal of leave to amend the pleadings in anticipation of the trial, now due to start on the following day.
Held: Leave was . .
CitedArmitage v Nurse; etc CA 19-Mar-1997
A clause in a trust deed may validly excuse trustees from personal liability for even gross negligence. The trustee was exempted from liability for loss or damage ‘unless such loss or damage shall be caused by his own actual fraud’.
Held: The . .
CitedParagon v Thakerer 1993
A claim for fraudulent or intentional breach of trust/fiduciary duty is a different cause of action from a claim for breach of trust/fiduciary duty generally and must be separately and distinctly pleaded. . .
CitedGiles v Rhind CA 28-Feb-2008
. .
CitedDEG-Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v Koshy and Other (No 3); Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (in receivership) v Same (No 3) CA 28-Jul-2003
The company sought to recover damages from a director who had acted dishonestly, by concealing a financial interest in a different company which had made loans to the claimant company. He replied that the claim was out of time. At first instance the . .
CitedGoode v Martin CA 13-Dec-2001
The claimant had sought to amend her claim for damages for personal injuries. The application had been rejected as introducing a claim not based on the same facts. She had suffered severe head injuries, and had no memory of the accident. She served . .
CitedWelsh Development Agency v Redpath Dorman Long Ltd CA 4-Apr-1994
A new claim was not deemed to have been made until the pleading was actually amended for limitation purposes, and should not be allowed after the limitation period had expired. The date of the application for leave to amend was not at issue. The . .
CitedThe Convergence Group Plc and Another v Chantrey Vellacott (a Firm) CA 16-Mar-2005
An accountant sought payment of his professional fees. The defendants had sought to re-amend their defence and counterclaim. Appeals had variously been allowed to go ahead or denied after the master had not been able to deal with all of them for . .
CitedNomura International Plc v Granada Group Ltd and others ComC 23-Mar-2007
To fulfil the requirement in CPR Part 16.2.1(a) ‘it is necessary at least to give some idea or indication of the duty which it is alleged the defendant has failed to perform.’ . .
CitedP and O Nedloyd BV v Arab Metals Co and Others (‘The UB Tiger’) QBD 22-Jun-2005
The claimants sought to amend their particulars of claim to add a request for declarations with regard to a bill of lading and contract for carriage.
Held: The application to amend was made more than six years after the cause of action . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 February 2021; Ref: scu.268005

Bradford and Bingley Plc v Cutler: CA 18 Jan 2008

The borrower fell into arrears when he lost his job. Benefits payments were made toward the debt under the 1992 Act. Those stopped, and the house was repossessed. The property was sold, and the claimant eventually sought to recover the shortfall. They relied on the last benefits payment as acknowledgement of the debt, saying it was paid as agent for the borrower. The borrower said that their was no relationship of agency.
Held: The Benefits Agency payments went to reduce the borrower’s liability and were for his benefit. They were made as his agent and constituted an acknowledgment of the debt.
[2008] EWCA Civ 74
Bailii
Social Security (Mortgage Interest Payments) Act 1992, Limitation Act 1980 29(5)
England and Wales

Updated: 06 February 2021; Ref: scu.264658

Ofulue and Another v Bossert: CA 29 Jan 2008

The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to deny the claimants’ title.
Held: The appeal failed. A finding by the ECHR that a particular area falls within the contracting states’ margin of appreciation is therefore a signal to the national judge that the decision of the national authorities as to the content of rights within that area should receive appropriate respect. The court was to apply Pye -v- United Kingdom. The margin of appreciation given to a national court was not something to be retested on each adverse possession case. A person believing himself to be a tenant may still be in adverse possession, even if his belief that he is a tenant is incorrect. The statement in the pleadings did not amount to an acknowledgement.
Arden LJ, May LJ, Sir Martin Nourse
[2008] EWCA Civ 7, [2008] HRLR 20, [2008] 3 WLR 1253, [2008] UKHRR 447, [2009] Ch 1, [2008] NPC 8
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 29, Land Registration Act 1925 75(1), Human Rights Act 1998 2
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
AppliedJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 30-Aug-2007
UK Advers Possession Law – Not Compliant
The claimant had said that the UK law which allowed it to lose land by virtue of twelve year’s occupation by a squatter, interfered with its right to ownership of property.
Held: The UK law on adverse possession did comply with the Convention. . .
CitedJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Nov-2005
The claimants had been the registered proprietors of land, they lost it through the adverse possession of former tenants holding over. They claimed that the law had dispossessed them of their lawful rights.
Held: The cumulative effect of the . .
CitedBelfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd HL 25-Apr-2007
Belfast had failed to license sex shops. The company sought review of the decision not to grant a licence.
Held: The council’s appeal succeeded. The refusal was not a denial of the company’s human rights: ‘If article 10 and article 1 of . .
CitedRegina v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene and others HL 28-Oct-1999
(Orse Kebeline) The DPP’s appeal succeeded. A decision by the DPP to authorise a prosecution could not be judicially reviewed unless dishonesty, bad faith, or some other exceptional circumstance could be shown. A suggestion that the offence for . .
CitedMiailhe v France (No 2) ECHR 26-Sep-1996
Hudoc Preliminary objection joined to merits (victim); Preliminary objection rejected (victim); Preliminary objection rejected (non-exhaustion); Preliminary objection rejected (ratione materiae); No violation of . .
No longer correctBeaulane Properties Ltd v Palmer ChD 23-Mar-2005
The paper owner sought possession of land. The defendant said he had acquired a possessory title. The land was registered.
Held: The claimant’s human rights under article 1 were engaged. To be justifiable, the interference in that right had to . .
CitedPowell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the . .
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedLodge (T/A JD Lodge) v Wakefield Metropolitan Council CA 21-Mar-1995
The plaintiff had formerly been a tenant of the defendant under an informal tenancy. No rent had been paid since 1974. He claimed to have acquired the land by adverse possession. He gave evidence at trial that if he had been asked to pay rent at any . .
CitedRe Flynn (no 2) 1969
An acknowledgement of title to restart a limitation period must be precisely focused on a disputed right. . .
CitedSurrendra Overseas Ltd v Government of Sri Lanka 1977
A debtor can only be held to have acknowledged the claim if he has in effect admitted his legal liability to pay that which the plaintiff seeks to recover. An acknowledgement of part only of a debt cannot operate to acknowledge more.
Kerr J . .
CitedMarkfield Investments Ltd v Evans CA 9-Nov-2000
The claimants were paper owners of land occupied by the defendant. The claimant said the acquiescence had been interrupted by an abortive court action by the claimant’s predecessor in title.
Held: With regard to any particular action the . .
CitedBP Properties Ltd v Buckler CA 31-Jul-1987
The putative owner of the paper title wrote to the defendant who occupied the relevant property in October 1974 as follows: ‘Since we wish to help you as much as possible we are prepared to allow you to remain in occupation of the house and garden . .
CitedHorner v Cartwright CA 11-Jul-1989
Stuart Smith LJ discussed the status of pleadings in a limitation as an acknowledgement: ‘It is unnecessary for the purpose of this judgment to deal with Mr. Horner’s submission that a statement in an action once it is contained in a pleading enures . .
CitedRush and Tomkins Ltd v Greater London Council HL 3-Nov-1988
The parties had entered into contracts for the construction of dwellings. The contractors sought payment. The council alleged shortcomings in the works. The principal parties had settled the dispute, but a sub-contractor now sought disclosure of the . .
CitedRe Gee and Co (Woolwich) Ltd 1975
Company accounts can acknowledge the company’s liability for debts as at the date at which the accounts are drawn up even if they are not finalised and signed until after that date. . .
CitedHandyside v The United Kingdom ECHR 7-Dec-1976
The appellant had published a ‘Little Red Schoolbook’. He was convicted under the 1959 and 1964 Acts on the basis that the book was obscene, it tending to deprave and corrupt its target audience, children. The book claimed that it was intended to . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromOfulue and Another v Bossert HL 11-Mar-2009
The parties disputed ownership of land, one claiming adverse possession. In the course of negotations, the possessor made a without prejudice offer to purchase the paper owner’s title. The paper owner claimed that this was an acknowledgement under . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 06 February 2021; Ref: scu.264011

Brecknell v The United Kingdom: ECHR 27 Nov 2007

Allegations had been made about police collusion with killings in Northern Ireland.
Held: Where there was credible information as to a possible perpetrator of an unlawful killing, there was a duty to investigate that evidence. Here the original investigations had lacked the characteristic of independence of the subjects of the investigation.
The court said that: ‘it may be that sometime later, information purportedly casting new light on the circumstances of the death comes into the public domain’ and that ‘[t]he issue then arises as to whether, and in what form, the procedural obligation to investigate is revived’. It then gave examples including ‘deliberate concealment of evidence’ which only subsequently comes to light, or later items of evidence which ‘cast doubt on the effectiveness of the original investigation and trial’. However in para 70 the court accepted that it was not right to say that ‘any assertion or allegation can trigger a fresh investigative obligation under article 2’, but emphasised that ‘state authorities must be sensitive to any information or material which has the potential either to undermine the conclusions of an earlier investigation or to allow an earlier inconclusive investigation to be pursued further’.
[2007] ECHR 989, Times 12-Dec-2007, 32457/04
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights
Human Rights
Citing:
See AlsoBrecknell v The United Kingdom ECHR 6-Mar-2007
. .

Cited by:
CitedMGN Limited v United Kingdom ECHR 18-Jan-2011
The applicant publisher said that the finding against it of breach of confidence and the system of success fees infringed it Article 10 rights to freedom of speech. It had published an article about a model’s attendance at Narcotics anonymous . .
CitedMcCaughey and Another, Re Application forJudicial Review SC 18-May-2011
The claimants sought a fuller inquest into deaths at the hands of the British Army in 1990 in Northern Ireland. On opening the inquest, the coroner had declined to undertake to hold a hearing compliant with article 2, and it had not made progress. . .
CitedKeyu and Others v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Another SC 25-Nov-2015
The Court was asked whether the respondents should be required to hold a public inquiry into a controversial series of events in 1948, when a Scots Guards patrol was alleged to shot and killed 24 unarmed civilians in a village called Batang Kali, in . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 05 February 2021; Ref: scu.262977

Allen v Matthews: CA 13 Mar 2007

The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. As such it was an admission of title. The requirement that the possession be adverse requires only that the possession was not pursuant to a licence, whether express or implied, from the owner. This is because possession is not adverse if it is enjoyed under a legal title. Whether a person with limited permission to use or occupy land might rely on more extensive activity to claim adverse possession is a question of fact turning on the circumstances of the case.
Ward LJ, Moore-Bick LJ, Lawrence Collins LJ
[2007] EWCA Civ 216
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .
CitedRichardson v Younger 1871
When there are two joint claimants to possessory title, and it is said that they had acknowledged the paper owner’s title, the acknowledgment must be given by or on behalf of both of them. . .
CitedEdginton v Clark CA 1964
An offer to purchase the paper owner’s interest, even if made ‘subject to contract’, can be a sufficient acknowledgement of his title to defeat a claim for adverse possession. Upjohn LJ said: ‘If a man makes an offer to purchase freehold property, . .
CitedAsbury v Asbury 1898
A defendant to a claim for adverse possession made by two joint claimants, and who asserts an acknowledgement of his title must show that the acknowledgement was by both claimants. . .
CitedJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedPowell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘In the absence of evidence to the . .
CitedRiyad Bank and others v Ahli United Bank (Uk) Plc CA 23-Nov-2005
A renewed application for leave to appeal was made as regards a valuation element of the judgment. New expert evidence was sought to be admitted.
Held: Leave was refused: ‘the Court of Appeal should be particularly cautious where what is . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 02 February 2021; Ref: scu.249954

Forsyth v A F Stoddard and Co Ltd: OHCS 1985

An action for damages by an employee against his employer was raised 48 days after the expiry of the triennium due to an oversight by an assistant with the pursuer’s solicitors. The sheriff refused to allow the action to be brought, the Sheriff Principal allowed it and on appeal the Second Division reversed the decision of the Sheriff Principal.
Held: A pursuer in such circumstances has to accept responsibility for the sins of omission or commission of his solicitor as ‘the correct exposition of the law’. since the pursuer was legally aided, the defenders would probably have to pay their own expenses, win or lose, whereas if the pursuer were refused the indulgence which he sought the defenders would not be placed in that position, was a relevant consideration: ‘In every case of this nature there is a common theme. If the pursuer is granted the court’s indulgence the defender loses a cast iron case, since but for that he would be legally free from the claim, and he is faced with the risk of losing the case with the consequential financial repercussions. That is a factor to be taken into account. He has no way out of that. On the other hand, if the pursuer is not granted the court’s indulgence his claim against the defender comes to an end, and the defender is freed and relieved of a claim which might have been a perfectly justifiable one. However, the pursuer might have, as here, an action against his solicitors for professional negligence which might or might not recoup him in whole or in part for the damages which he could no longer obtain from the defender. There are imponderables about such an alternative, and its outcome can vary from case to case. Neither of these contrasting considerations is in itself conclusive, and the weights to be applied to them respectively will again depend on the circumstances. In my opinion it is not illegitimate to have in consideration the strength of the case against the third party and the likelihood of a successful prosecution of such a case, but again that is just a factor. Another consideration (although the Sheriff Principal rejected it – wrongly in my view), even if it only carries a little weight, is the burden of the expenses the defenders have to bear even if they are successful, since the pursuer is a legally assisted person. This in a way is merely consequential on the major issue, but it is entitled to be taken into account for what it is worth.’
Lord Justice Clerk Wheatley
1985 SLT 51
Scotland
Citing:
ApprovedDonald v Rutherford IHCS 1984
A pedestrian was injured in a road traffic accident on 3 November 1975 but only raised an action on 13 February 1981. The failure to raise a timeous action was attributable to the fault of his former solicitors.
Held: He was allowed to proceed . .

Cited by:
CitedDavid Lannigan v Glasgow City Council OHCS 12-Aug-2004
The pursuer said the teachers employed by the defendant had failed to identify that was dyslexic, leading him to suffer damage. The defenders said the claim was time barred, which the pursuer admitted, but then said that the claim ought to go ahead . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 January 2021; Ref: scu.200279

Jacqueline Adam v Rasal Ali: CA 21 Feb 2006

The defendant sought damages against the defendant for personal injury from his alleged negligence. Her action was struck out and she recommenced the action. The defendant pleaded that she was out of time. The claimant said that the first action having been struck out, the judge retained his discretion to disapply the limitation period, following Walkley.
Held: ‘I simply do not understand how it can be argued that because the first action brought out of time would not have been prejudiced by section 11 if the defendants did not or would not successfully have taken the limitation point, therefore the second action is not prejudiced by section 11. The second action is under direct threat of being defeated by a time-bar defence. ‘ Walkley was anomalous and should be confined to its facts. ‘Because the judge misdirected himself in material respects, we must exercise our own discretion. The question is whether it is equitable to allow the action to proceed. The answer is given by balancing the prejudice to the plaintiff against the prejudice to the defendant having regard to the specific factors and all the circumstances of the case. In summary this is a long delay, some of it unexplained. That delay is, however, mitigated by the fact that the defendant had very early notice of the claim, admitted liability and was well on the road to preparing to meet the damages claim when the guillotine fell. ‘
Lady Justice Arden DBE Lord Justice Ward Lord Justice Dyson
[2006] EWCA Civ 91, Times 06-Mar-2006, [2006] 1 WLR 1330
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 11(4)
England and Wales
Citing:
Confined to its factsWalkley v Precision Forgings Ltd HL 1979
The plaintiff tried to bring a second action in respect of an industrial injury claim outside the limitation period so as to overcome the likelihood that his first action, although timeous, would be dismissed for want of prosecution.
Held: He . .
CitedChappell v Cooper CA 1980
The plaintiff’s writ had not been served within the required time, and it had become too late to extend its validity. The plaintiff isued a second writ. The defendant argued limitation. Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to distinguish Walkley on the . .
CitedThompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd HL 1981
The plaintiff’s solicitors, out of negligence, failed to issue a writ until one month after the limitation period had expired. The application to extend the period was rejected at first instance since he had an unanswerable claim against his . .
CitedRe Workvale Ltd (In Liquidation) CA 8-Apr-1992
A limited company was correctly restored to the register from dissolution so that its insurers could face an arguable claim. Where a first writ issued within the primary limitation period was ineffective (although not a nullity) through having been . .
CitedWhite v Glass CA 17-Feb-1989
The plaintiff had sued his club under its name, but it was an unincorporated association, and the action was stricken out as improperly constituted. The first writ issued within the primary limitation period but was ineffective. The defendant . .
CitedDeerness v John R Keeble and Son (Brantham) Ltd HL 1983
The plaintiff suffered very serious injuries as a passenger in a car, and a writ was issued within the three-year period against the driver and the owner of the car whose insurers made a substantial interim payment. The writ was not served, nor . .
CitedShapland v W Palmer CA 23-Mar-1999
The plaintiff’s car was struck by a company car driven by the defendant in the course of her employment and she sought damages. Her action, against the employer, was struck out as late under the 1980 Act. She then commenced an action against the . .
CitedBarry Young (Deceased) v Western Power Distribution (South West) Plc CA 18-Jul-2003
The deceased had begun an action on becoming ill after exposure to asbestos by the defendant. He withdrew his action after receiving expert evidence that his illness was unrelated. A post-mortem examination showed this evidence to be mistaken. His . .
CitedKR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 12-Feb-2003
kr_bryn2CA2003
The respondent appealed decisions by the court to allow claims for personal injury out of time. The claims involved cases of sexual abuse inflicted by its employees going back over many years.
Held: The judge had misapplied the test laid down . .
CitedDonovan v Gwentoys Ltd HL 1990
The plaintiff, then a 16 year old girl slipped and fell whilst employed at the defendant’s factory. The limitation period expired on her 21st birthday. She commenced proceedings five and a half months after that date. The judge extended time under . .

Cited by:
CitedHorton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 January 2021; Ref: scu.238659

Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc and Another v Yeda Research and Development Co Ltd: ChD 16 Feb 2006

The patent application had been presented to the European Patent Office and granted only after 13 years. The claimant now appealed refusal to allow amendment of its claim to allow a claim in its sole name. The defendant argued that it was out of time.
Held: The appeal succeeded: ‘ the long-standing rule of practice is that the new claim should be advanced in a new action, where the defence can be tested. If (as the Hearing Officer rightly concluded) CPR 17.4 did not apply, then the long standing rule of practice was the relevant default rule. ‘ ‘Section 72 (2) bars the making of an application outside the two year limit, not merely the making of an order. In addition, section 74 (4) precludes the raising (outside the two year time limit) of invalidity on the ground that the patent was granted to a person not entitled to it in infringement proceedings (among others). ‘ and ‘section 37 (5) bars the making of a claim outside the two year time limit; not merely the grant of a particular remedy. ‘ The tribunal had its own inherent power to manage its afairs, but the rules gave the Comptroller his own discretion and limited its use. In that circumstance, the inherent power was not to be relied upon to restore a discretion withheld by parliament. There was a fundamental difference between carrying on existing proceedings as a result of a devolution of title once the proceedings have started and an enlargement of the scope of a dispute as a result of an amendment. If an amendment adding a new party or a new cause of action is made to a rule 54 statement, the amendment will not relate back to the date of the original reference, but (where the amendment is made in order to raise a claim of the kind contemplated by Article 23 of the CPC) will take effect from the time it was made. The underlying principles are: i) That permission to amend to introduce new parties or a new claim should not be granted where there is a clear limitation defence; and ii) Where the limitation defence is arguable, it should be tested in fresh proceedings.
Lewison J
[2006] EWHC 160 (Ch), [2006] RPC 24
Bailii
Patents Act 1977 37(5), Patents Rules 1995, Civil Procedure Rules 17
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedOcean Estates Ltd v Pinder HL 1969
The court asked whether the sufficiency of adverse possession might be qualified either by the intentions of the paper owner or the squatter’s willingness to pay for their occupation if asked. Lord Diplock: ‘Where questions of title to land arise in . .
CitedBoake Allen Ltd and others v HM Revenue and Customs CA 31-Jan-2006
The claimant companies had paid corporation tax under rules which had later been found to be discriminatory. They now sought repayment by virtue of double taxation agreements with the countries in which the parent companies were based.
Held: . .
CitedLangley v North West Water Authority 1991
A tribunal has an inherent power (subject to constraints) to regulate the procedure to be followed before it. . .
CitedPharmedica GMBH’s Trade Mark Application ChD 2000
The tribunal was asked whether an assignee of a trademark should be substituted in existing opposition proceedings for the assignor. The assignment had taken place after the proceedings had begun.
Held: A tribunal has an inherent power to . .
CitedMarkem Corporation and Another v Zipher Ltd CA 22-Mar-2005
A patent which was applied for as a result of a breach of confidence may be capable of giving the victim of the breach the benefit of an interest in the patent. In the UK at least the basis of an entitlement claim must be a breach of the claimant’s . .
CitedRegina v Comptroller-General of Patents Designs and Trademarks ex parte Ash and Lacey Building Products Ltd 2002
Revocation was sought on the ground that the patent was invalid because of anticipation by prior publication. The court considered its powers under section 77 in the context of such a revocation application: ‘ . . the power to revoke arises in . .
CitedParsons and Another v George and Another CA 13-Jul-2004
The claimant sought to begin proceedings to renew his business tenancy, but the proceedings were issued in the wrong name. He sought to amend the proceedings to substitute the correct defendant, but that application was out of time.
Held: . .
CitedLoveridge and Loveridge v Healey CA 20-Feb-2004
The landowner sought to recover possession of land occupied under an agreement by a mobile home owner.
Held: It was necessary for the land owner to show that he had complied with the requirements under the Act. It was insufficient for the . .
CitedGoode v Martin CA 13-Dec-2001
The claimant had sought to amend her claim for damages for personal injuries. The application had been rejected as introducing a claim not based on the same facts. She had suffered severe head injuries, and had no memory of the accident. She served . .
CitedCobbold v London Borough of Greenwich CA 9-Aug-1999
cobbold_greenwichCA1999
The tenant had sought an order against the council landlord for failure to repair her dwelling. The defendant appealed refusal of leave to amend the pleadings in anticipation of the trial, now due to start on the following day.
Held: Leave was . .
CitedWelsh Development Agency v Redpath Dorman Long Ltd CA 4-Apr-1994
A new claim was not deemed to have been made until the pleading was actually amended for limitation purposes, and should not be allowed after the limitation period had expired. The date of the application for leave to amend was not at issue. The . .
CitedAldi Stores Ltd v Holmes Buildings Plc CA 1-Dec-2003
What makes a claim a ‘new claim’ as defined in section 35(2) of the Limitation Act 1980 is not the newness of the case according to the type or quantum of the remedy claimed, but the newness of the cause of action that it involves. A cause of action . .
CitedLloyds Bank Plc v Rogers CA 16-Jul-1999
Where a claim had been made for possession of property under a legal charge, but no claim had been made for financial relief, and a later claim for such relief was made through an amended claim, the loss of the possible defence of limitation was a . .

Cited by:
CitedYeda Research and Development Co Ltd v Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc and others CA 31-Jul-2006
The claimants sought to amend their claim which had previously been on the basis of a joint ownership, to one of sole ownership.
Held: The application for the amendment being made more han two years after the grant, the amendment could not be . .
Appeal fromYeda Research and Development Co Ltd v Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc and others CA 31-Jul-2006
The claimants sought to amend their claim which had previously been on the basis of a joint ownership, to one of sole ownership.
Held: The application for the amendment being made more han two years after the grant, the amendment could not be . .
At First InstanceYeda Research and Development Company Ltd v Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc and others HL 24-Oct-2007
The claimants said that the defendant had misused confidential information sent to him to found an application for a patent, claiming wrongly to have been its inventor. The claimant appealed a refusal by the court to allow amendments to the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 January 2021; Ref: scu.238685

Kuenyehia and others v International Hospitals Group Ltd: CA 25 Jan 2006

Service of litigation documents by fax was not an acceptabe departure from the rules where the party being served had not beforehand given consent to service in this manner. The mere advertisement of a fax number did not amount to such consent. Such service could not be characterised as no more than a minor departure from the rules.
Neuberger LJ said: ‘we do not consider that the claimants can rely on the absence of prejudice to the defendant as a reason for letting the Judge’s decision to stand. In our view . . the time limits in the CPR, especially with regard to service of the claim form where the limitation period may have expired, are to be strictly observed, and extensions and other dispensations are to be sparingly accorded, especially when applied for after time has expired. While there may be exceptional cases, we consider that prejudice is only relevant in this sort of case to assist a defendant, where the court would otherwise think it right to dispense with service. In other words, prejudice to the defendant is a reason for not dispensing with service, but the absence of prejudice cannot usually, if ever, be a reason for dispensing with service’ and ‘Service on the defendant’s solicitors was ineffective under the CPR, and it cannot be said to have been a ‘minor departure’ from the permitted methods of service to serve on solicitors who had not been nominated by the defendant. In any event, for the reasons already given, this would not have been an exceptional case. Quite apart from any other point, it can fairly be said that it would have been only too easy for the claimants’ solicitors to ask the defendant, with whom they had been in fairly close contact, to nominate its solicitors’ address as its address for service in accordance with r.6.5(2), but they never did so.’
Lord Justice Waller Lord Justice Dyson Lord Justice Neuberger
[2006] EWCA Civ 21, Times 17-Feb-2006
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBrown and Others v InnovatorOne Plc and Others ComC 19-Jun-2009
The claimants served proceedings by fax. The defendants denied that it was effective saying that they had not confirmed that they were instructed to accept service or that as required by the rules they had confirmed that they would accept service by . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 January 2021; Ref: scu.238134

P and O Nedloyd BV v Arab Metals Co and Others (‘The UB Tiger’): QBD 22 Jun 2005

The claimants sought to amend their particulars of claim to add a request for declarations with regard to a bill of lading and contract for carriage.
Held: The application to amend was made more than six years after the cause of action accrued. It was in its nature a new claim. The additional possibility that the new facts are substantially the same as those already relied on is limited to: ‘something going no further than minor differences likely to be the subject of enquiry but not involving any major investigation and/or differences merely collateral to the main substance of the new claim, proof of which would not necessarily be essential to its success.’ Though a declaration was discretionary claim, it was not an equitable one, and did not fall within section 36(1).
Colman J
[2005] EWHC 1276 (Comm), Times 03-Aug-2005, [2005] 1 WLR 3733
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 36(1), Civil Procedure Rules 17.4(2)
Cited by:
Appeal fromP and O Nedlloyd Bv v Arab Metals Co and others CA 28-Mar-2006
. .
CitedBerezovsky v Abramovich ComC 22-May-2008
Applications were made to amend pleadings and for consequential orders. The claimant sought damages of $4.3 billion alleging breach of trust. The claimant sought to add claims which the defendant said were out of time.
Held: The proposed . .
CitedAspect Contracts (Asbetos) Ltd v Higgins Construction Plc SC 17-Jun-2015
Aspect had claimed the return of funds paid by it to the appellant Higgins under an adjudication award in a construction contract disute. The claimant had been asked to prpare asbestos surveys and reports on maisonettes which Higgins was to acquire . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 January 2021; Ref: scu.231184

Generay Ltd v Containerised Storage Company Ltd: CA 23 Mar 2005

Peter Gibson, Neuberger LJJ, Sir Martin Nourse
[2005] EWCA Civ 478
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedChambers v London Borough of Havering CA 20-Dec-2011
chambers-HaveringCA2011
The defendant appealed against an order for him to surrender possession of land he had claimed by adverse possession. The Council was the registered proprietor. The defendant said he had used the land since 1981 for dumping of motor vehicle parts. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 January 2021; Ref: scu.224775

Green and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased: ChD 18 Mar 2005

The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal representative began to run only after one year, the executor’s year, after the grant. No right of action arose until the executor became under a duty to distribute.
‘As regards the application for removal under Administration of Justice Act 1985, section 50, it is a matter for the discretion of the court, and that it is reasonable for the court to take a pragmatic approach, to consider the views of the beneficiaries and the interests of the estate as a whole.’
The family members disputed whether there had been a compromise of a dispute over the assets in their father’s estate.
Lawrence Collins J
[2005] EWHC 406 (Ch), Times 28-Mar-2005, [2005] 2 All ER 700, [2005] 1 WLR 1890
Bailii
Real Property Limitation Act 1860 13, Limitation Act 1980 21(3), Administration of Justice Act 1985 50
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re Diplock’s estate CA 1948
re_diplockCA1948
After considering a situation in which trust money had been applied in making alterations to the property of an innocent third party but had not added to the value of the property,
Held: The origin of the equitable rules of tracing were . .
CitedSevcon Ltd v Lucas CAV Ltd HL 1986
A claim was brought for the infringement of a patent. It was brought after the specification had been published, but before the patent had been sealed.
Held: Time might run from a date before the plaintiff was entitled to sue. The cause of . .
DistingusihedHornsey Local Board v Monarch Investment Building Society CA 1889
The local authority had incurred expense in paving a street. They were entitled to apportion those expenses amongst the owners of the properties fronting onto that street and summarily to recover from the respective owners the amounts so . .
AppliedIn Re Johnson, Sly v Blake 1855
The commencement of the limitation period against a beneficiary ran from the time when he acquired a present right to receive the inheritance. Time ran from the end of the executor’s year when the interest fell into possession.
Chitty J said: . .
CitedLetterstedt v Broers PC 22-Mar-1884
(Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope) Lack of harmony may be of itself a good reason for a trustee to resign or be dismissed. Lord Blackburn approved a passage in Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, s 1289: ‘But in cases of positive misconduct, courts . .
CitedMinistry of Health v Simpson; In re Diplock dec HL 1950
The will of Cable Diplock purported to make a gift to charity, and was distributed accordingly. The house however found the gift to be invalid.
Held: A personal remedy existed for the recovery of amounts wrongly paid in the distribution of an . .
CitedRe Pauling’s Settlement Trusts (No.1) CA 29-May-1963
Property had been placed in trust for the daughter of the family, fearing that she might fritter it away. The trust was managed by the bank. The judge had found that, having misunderstood the powers of advancement given, the bank was liable to repay . .
CitedNelson v Rye and Another ChD 5-Dec-1995
The claimant, a solo musician appointed the defendant to be his manager collecting the fees and royalties due to him and paying his expenses. Rye was to account to him annually for his net income after deducting his own commission. When the . .
CitedEvans v Westcombe; re Evans ChD 10-Mar-1999
Where available, missing beneficiary insurance was the preferred way of dealing with the problem, rather than applications to the court for Benjamin or other similar orders. Insurance should be cheaper and more certain for the personal . .
CitedAnne Hyde Earnshaw; Marion Robinson and Lucy Hyde Fielden v Josephine Hyde Hartley CA 31-Mar-1999
An administrator de son tort, who was also a beneficiary, held the estate property on trust, and so could not establish adverse possession against the estate during the period of trusteeship. He held a sufficient interest in the assets already. A . .
CitedGwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (In Receivership) v Koshy and Others ChD 8-Feb-2000
A company could give several people the power to appoint a receiver in respect of different elements of its assets. If this was done there was no fundamental reason why such appointments should not be put in effect. The appointment of one receiver . .
CitedDEG-Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v Koshy and Other (No 3); Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (in receivership) v Same (No 3) CA 28-Jul-2003
The company sought to recover damages from a director who had acted dishonestly, by concealing a financial interest in a different company which had made loans to the claimant company. He replied that the claim was out of time. At first instance the . .

Cited by:
CitedDoodes v Gotham, Perry ChD 17-Nov-2005
The trustee in bankruptcy had taken a charge on the property in 1992 to support the bankruptcy in 1988. He sought to enforce it in 2005. The chargor appealed an order which denied he was protected by limitation.
Held: The appeal succeeded. . .
CitedGotham v Doodes CA 25-Jul-2006
gotham_doodesCA2008
The former bankrupt resisted sale of his property by the trustee, saying that enforcement was barred by limitation. He and his wife bought the property in early 1988, and he was made bankrupt in October 1988. He was dischaged from bankruptcy in . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 January 2021; Ref: scu.223691

The Convergence Group Plc and Another v Chantrey Vellacott (a Firm): CA 16 Mar 2005

An accountant sought payment of his professional fees. The defendants had sought to re-amend their defence and counterclaim. Appeals had variously been allowed to go ahead or denied after the master had not been able to deal with all of them for lack of time.
Held: The several appeals raised common issues. Some were first appeals and some second. The applicable test for such appeals when heard together was that in CPR 52.3(6), treating them as first appeals. The new allegations arose out of the same or substantially the same facts as those already pleaded, so that permission to amend was granted.
Clarke, Jonathan Parker LJJ
[2005] EWCA Civ 290, Times 25-Apr-2005
Bailii
Civil Procedure Rules 52.13(2) 52.3(6)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedUphill v BRB (Residuary) Ltd CA 3-Feb-2005
The court considered an application for leave for a second appeal.
Held: Pursuant to the Practice Direction, the court certified that though this was an application for leave, it could be cited: ‘the reference in CPR 52.13(2)(a) to ‘an . .

Cited by:
CitedBerezovsky v Abramovich ComC 22-May-2008
Applications were made to amend pleadings and for consequential orders. The claimant sought damages of $4.3 billion alleging breach of trust. The claimant sought to add claims which the defendant said were out of time.
Held: The proposed . .
CitedDowson and Others v Northumbria Police QBD 30-Apr-2009
Nine police officers claimed damages for alleged harassment under the 1997 Act by a senior officer in having bullied them and ordered them to carry out unlawful procedures. Amendments were sought which were alleged to be out of time and to have . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 January 2021; Ref: scu.223578

Morgan EST (Scotland) Ltd v Hanson Concrete Products Ltd: TCC 22 Jul 2004

[2004] EWHC 1778 (TCC)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 35
England and Wales
Citing:
Appealed toMorgan Est (Scotland) Ltd v Hanson Concrete Products Ltd CA 17-Feb-2005
The defendant appealed an order adding two new claimants.
Held: Cases decided under the old RSC were not apposite for matters covered by the new Civil Procedure Rules. The court was not bound by the Sardinia Sulcis rules: ‘The Sardinia Sulcis . .

Cited by:
On appeal fromMorgan Est (Scotland) Ltd v Hanson Concrete Products Ltd CA 17-Feb-2005
The defendant appealed an order adding two new claimants.
Held: Cases decided under the old RSC were not apposite for matters covered by the new Civil Procedure Rules. The court was not bound by the Sardinia Sulcis rules: ‘The Sardinia Sulcis . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 January 2021; Ref: scu.218883