Lowsley and Another v Forbes: CA 21 Mar 1996

The statutory time limit under the Limitation Act applied only to the right to take substantive proceedings and had nothing whatever to do with the procedural machinery for enforcing a judgment when one was obtained. The Act of 1875 brought about a fundamental change. The old absolute time bar on execution after 20 years, subsequently reduced to 12 years, was replaced by a discretionary bar after six years. On the making of a charging order, the amount to be secured by it was not limited to 6 years’ interest up to that date.
Garnishee proceedings to enforce a judgment were not subject to the limitation period in s.24(1); that section applied solely to an action to enforce the judgment and not to other procedural methods used to enforce a judgment. Evans LJ said: ‘The distinction between bringing an action to enforce a judgment, to which the Limitation Act applies, and bringing other forms of proceedings to enforce the original judgment, to which it does not, can perhaps be criticised as technical and indicating an out-dated preference for form over substance, but in my view the distinction can be justified. The policy reasons for barring the commencement of actions after a certain period has expired do not apply in the same way to the many different circumstances in which a successful plaintiff may seek to enforce a judgment which the defendant has ignored or failed to comply with for the same or a longer period after the judgment was given.’
Lord Justice Evans, Lord Justice Saville and Lord Justice Morritt
Times 05-Apr-1996, [1996] CLC 1370
Limitation Act 1980 24(1) 24(2), Supreme Court of Judicature (1873) Amendment Act 1875
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedNational Westminster Bank v Powney CA 1990
The limitation period has nothing to do with the procedural machinery of enforcing a judgment when one was obtained. . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromLowsley and Another v Forbes (Trading As I E Design Services) HL 29-Jul-1998
The plaintiffs, with the leave of the court, had obtained garnishee and charging orders nisi against the debtor 11 and a half years after they had obtained a consent judgment.
Held: An application by the judgment debtor to set aside the orders . .
CitedNational Ability Sa v Tinna Oils and Chemicals Ltd CA 11-Dec-2009
Implied promise to pay arbitral award
The parties disputed how limitation affects the enforcement of an arbitration award. More than six years had passed since the award had been made, and the defendant said it was out of time.
Held: A party can enforce an award either by ordinary . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 April 2021; Ref: scu.83229