Re a Debtor: ChD 1997

The creditor appealed the decision to set aside a statutory demand as statute barred.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. Bankruptcy proceedings based on a statutory demand for moneys due under a previous default judgment constituted ‘an action upon a judgment’ within s24(1). Insolvency proceedings constituted a fresh action or proceeding newly brought, of the kind described in Lamb, rather than a proceeding under the judgment previously obtained. Bankruptcy proceedings were not, the judge held, a method of, nor were they akin to, enforcing or executing a judgment outside s24(1). As more than 6 years had elapsed since the default judgment became enforceable, bankruptcy proceedings based on it in the statutory demand would be statute barred by s24(1). It was held that the statutory demand had been rightly set aside by the district judge.


Baker J


[1997] Ch 310


Limitation Act 1980 24(1)

Cited by:

CitedRidgeway Motors (Isleworth) Ltd v Alts Ltd CA 10-Feb-2005
The company appelaed a refusal of the judge to strike out a winding up petition. They said the petition was based upon a judgment which was now time barred. The petitioner replied that such a petition was not an action under the section.
Held: . .
DisapprovedRidgeway Motors (Isleworth) Ltd v Altis ChD 21-May-2004
The company sought to strike out a winding up petition presented by the respondents, saying a winding up petition was by way of an action, and was barred by statute after six years.
Held: A winding up petition was not an action within the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Limitation

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.223039