Batchelor v Marlow and Another: ChD 25 May 2000

The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement. If an easement was capable of arising by virtue of a deed of grant, it could also be acquired by prescription. This was such an easement. Use in the absence of planning permission did not vitiate the acquisition by prescription, since the use did not become unlawful until a planning enforcement notice had been served.

Citations:

Times 07-Jun-2000, Gazette 25-May-2000, Gazette 08-Jun-2000, (2001) 82 P and CR 36

Cited by:

Cited – P and S Platt Ltd v Crouch and Another CA 25-Jul-2003
The claimant sought a declaration that certain easements had been included by implication in a conveyance of part of land to him.
Held: Since the easements were capable of subsisting at law, and existed as quasi-easements at the time, and did . .
Appeal from – Batchelor v Marlow and Another CA 12-Jul-2001
The applicant claimed parking rights as an easement acquired by prescription. At first instance the rights were recognised as an easement. The rights included parking during daylight hours during weekdays. The land-owner appealed on the ground that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Road Traffic, Limitation

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78277

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.179839

Cited by:

Dissenting dicta approved – Central Electricity Generating Board v Halifax Corporation HL 1963
Under the 1947 Act, the assets of electricity undertakings were transferred to to electricity boards. Property held by local authorities as authorised undertakers should, on vesting day, vest in the relevant board. A question arose as to whether . .
Cited – Legal Services Commission v Henthorn QBD 4-Feb-2011
The claimant sought to recover overpayments said to have been made to the defendant barrister in the early 1990s. Interim payments on account had been made, but these were not followed by final accounts. The defendant, now retired, said that the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.430595

Limitation Act 1980 33(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited by:

Limitation

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.185756

England and Wales

Times 26-Nov-1999, Gazette 01-Dec-1999

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980 25, Rules of the Supreme Cour Order 20

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Litigation Practice, Limitation

Updated: 28 April 2022; Ref: scu.84701

Times 09-Aug-1996

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Limitation

Updated: 14 April 2022; Ref: scu.89444

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appealed from – Customs and Excise Commissioners v Le Rififi Ltd CA 14-Dec-1994
One paper assessment covering several tax periods need always not be treated as just one assessment. This was a question of fact to be decided on the particular circumstances. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

VAT, Limitation

Updated: 08 April 2022; Ref: scu.79335

Citing:

Cited – Swansea City Council v Glass CA 1992
The defendant had failed himself to repair his property, and the Local Authority carried out the work itself under the 1957 Act. It sought to recover the associated costs from the defendant, but he said that their claim was time barred, being more . .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Khan and Another CA 16-Jan-2002
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 05 April 2022; Ref: scu.605193

Judges:

Ryder SPT, Lindblom, Thirlwall LJJ

Citations:

[2017] EWCA Civ 1711

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Limitation, Personal Injury

Updated: 01 April 2022; Ref: scu.599374

Judges:

Andrew Baker J

Citations:

[2017] EWHC 6 (Comm)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Limitation

Updated: 29 January 2022; Ref: scu.573745

Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority v Hutton and Others: CA 20 Dec 2016

Gross, Rafferty, Flyd LJJ
[2016] EWCA Civ 1305
Bailii
England and Wales

Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 27 January 2022; Ref: scu.572736

KXL and Others v Murphy and Another: QBD 2 Dec 2016

Wilkie J
[2016] EWHC 3102 (QB)
Bailii
Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984
England and Wales

Limitation, Torts – Other

Updated: 27 January 2022; Ref: scu.572347

Rudall v The Crown Prosecution Service and Another: QBD 14 Nov 2016

The claimant solicitor alleged that the repeated and failed prosecutions of him and the obtaining of search warrants had been an improper attempt to stop him practising.

Phillips J
[2016] EWHC 2884 (QB)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 32
England and Wales

Administrative, Limitation, Torts – Other

Updated: 25 January 2022; Ref: scu.571115

Spire Healthcare Ltd v Brooke: QBD 11 Nov 2016

The claimant, Spire, claimed an indemnity or contribution from the defendantin respect of damages and costs which it, Spire, has paid to Mr Jellett in settlement of a personal injuries claim brought by Mr Jellett against both Spire and Mr Brooke

Morris J
[2016] EWHC 2828 (QB)
Bailii
Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978
England and Wales

Limitation, Estoppel

Updated: 25 January 2022; Ref: scu.571117

Dixon and Another v Radley House Partnership (A Firm) and Others: TCC 17 Oct 2016

The court considered a limitation challenge to the proceedings where the court fee had not been paid in time delaying the issue of proceedings by the court. There had been a dispute as to the correct fee payable

Stuart-Smith J
[2016] EWHC 2511 (TCC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Limitation

Updated: 24 January 2022; Ref: scu.570603

Lokhova v Longmuir: QBD 20 Oct 2016

Application for permission to amend the Particulars of Claim in this action for defamation. The claimant presently complains of seven defamatory statements published in 2011. By an application notice issued nearly a year ago, in November 2015, she now seeks to add three further causes of action: two in libel arising from emails sent by the defendant in May 2011, and one in slander, arising from words allegedly spoken in February 2014. At the same time, the claimant seeks to expand by amendment her case on damages, by adding details of matters to be relied on in aggravation.

Warby J
[2016] EWHC 2579 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation, Limitation

Updated: 24 January 2022; Ref: scu.570515

Rath v CS Lawrence and Partners (PJ Cook and Co) (a Firm) (Third Party): CA 1991

The plaintiff bought the property in 1982, relying on the defendant’s survey, which later proved incorrect having failed to identify subsidence. The writ was issued in 1984. Delays before the expiry of the limitation period led the defendant to apply to dismiss the claim for inordinate and inexcusable delay.
Held: The plaintiff’s appeal against dismissal failed. Once the claim was issued, the plaintiff was under a duty to proceed with reasonable diligence, and delay after issue, and even within the limitation period could justify dismissal.

[1991] 1 WLR 399
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Birkett v James HL 1977
Exercise of Power to Strike Out
The court has an inherent power to strike out an action for want of prosecution, and the House set down the conditions for its exercise. The power is discretionary and exercisable only where (a) there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay and . .

Cited by:
Cited – Hopkinson and Others and Birmingham Mid-Shires Building Society v Tupper CA 30-Jan-1997
The plaintiffs appealed from an order striking out their claim for want of prosecution. The defendant’s property had been sold by the mortgagees, and the plaintiffs as assignees of their debt sought to recover the balance outstanding from the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Contract

Updated: 22 January 2022; Ref: scu.261927

Hornsey Local Board v Monarch Investment Building Society: CA 1889

The local authority had incurred expense in paving a street. They were entitled to apportion those expenses amongst the owners of the properties fronting onto that street and summarily to recover from the respective owners the amounts so apportioned. In addition statute provided that such expenses should be charged on the premises in respect of which they were incurred with interest thereon at the rate of 5% until payment. It was not necessary for the amount due to be ascertained on the sale of a house before the Society had a right to receive it. The charge was imposed when the paving works were completed in 1875. The expenses were not apportioned until 1885. In 1887 a demand for payment was made on the defendant and in 1888 the local board sought to enforce the statutory charge against the defendant. The county court judge granted the order, but the Queen’s Bench Division reversed him.
Held: The appeal failed. The limitation period for a local authority to recover paving expenses ran from the time of imposition even though the charge had not yet been apportioned between the frontagers. The right to receive payment had arisen even though it could not yet enforce payment.
Lord Esher MR ‘It was strongly argued that the words ‘present right to receive the same’ in this section are equivalent to ‘present right to enforce payment of the same’. If there were some overwhelming reason why that construction should be given to the words; if that were the only construction that would render the procedure sensible, I think possibly the words might receive that construction, but I do not think it would be their ordinary meaning in the English language. A present right to receive is not in ordinary English the same as a present right to enforce payment. Then is there any overwhelming reason why we should read the words otherwise than in their natural sense? So far from that, I think that in the present case to read the words in the way suggested for the plaintiffs would raise insuperable difficulties, whereas to read them in their natural sense makes the whole legislation sensible and easier application. The difficulty that arises on the plaintiffs’ construction has been pointed out, viz., that the Board, who have to receive the money, and also to apportion the amount, would have the power to delay the application of the Statute of Limitation for any time they please. When that difficulty was presented, the plaintiffs’ Counsel endeavoured to meet it by the ingenious suggestion that, if the apportionment were not made within a reasonable time, the making of it might be enforced by mandamus; and other modes were suggested of meeting the difficulty. But why should we embark on such questions and invent means of overcoming this difficulty, when by reading the words in their ordinary sense no such difficulty arises? . . .
‘The charge exists, though the exact amount charged may not be ascertained. It is suggested that a person in whose favour a charge is imposed cannot be entitled to receive an amount which is not ascertained. I do not see why this should be so. A sum may be offered to him, which the person offering it thinks to be the right sum, and which he may also think to be the right sum, although the actual calculation of the exact amount has not been made. What is there in law, or reason, or business, to shew that he is not entitled to receive the sum when so offered to him? I cannot see any difficulty in saying that there is a present right to receive the expenses. In the case where a person has only a reversionary right to receive money, or for some other reason the time when he is entitled to receive the money has not yet arrived, it would be different, and there would be no present right to receive the money. . .
So, reading the words of the section in their ordinary sense, it seems to me that in the present case the Local Board were a body of persons in whose favour a charge existed for a sum of money, who were entitled to receive it, and who were capable of giving a receipt or discharge for it . . . It seems to me therefore that the case comes within the words of the section read in their ordinary sense and that there is no reason for giving them any other construction. Consequently the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by the Statute of Limitations.’
Lindley LJ said that expression, a ‘present right to receive’ was ‘a little ambiguous’, but agreed with Lord Esher: ‘. . . and as distinguishable, as apparently it is meant to be, from ‘present right to sue’, everything works out harmoniously; the moment the time of the coming into existence of the charge is ascertained, the period of limitation will begin to run: whereas, if the opposite construction is adopted, we are at once landed in the curious anomaly that the creditor, that is to say, the person who is entitled to the charge, can by his own act postpone his right to sue indefinitely . . .
The section is dealing with charges on land, and it must be borne in mind that such charges are present charges and future charges, reversionary charges, charges in remainder, and such like. One general form of expression is used to include the whole, and that expression is ‘present right to receive.’ It seems to me clear that the meaning is that in each case the moment to be looked to is the moment when the charge comes into present operation; for instance, when reversionary charges are being dealt with, the moment to be looked to is the moment when the reversion falls in and the charge takes effect in possession.’
Lopes LJ said that the right to receive what was secured by a charge arose concurrently with the charge: ‘When, then, does the right accrue to the person or persons in whose favour the charge is imposed to receive the amount secured by the charge? It appears to me that it accrues the moment the charge is imposed on the premises by the statute, that is when the expenses have been incurred and the works completed. It may be that certain things have to be done before the right can be enforced, but the right to receive what is secured by the charge arises concurrently with the charge. The words are ‘present right to receive’ not ‘present right to recover’. The right to receive may exist though the definite sum to be received has not yet been ascertained. There are cases where the legislature requires a notice to be given before an action can be maintained. The right of action however exists as soon as an actionable wrong has been committed, though it cannot be successfully enforced until the statutory requirements are complied with.’

Lord Esher MR, Lopes LJ, Lindley LJ
[1889] 24 QBD 1
Real Property Limitation Act 1874 8
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Farran v Beresford HL 30-Aug-1843
The House considered the nature of scire facias, and in particular whether scire facias created a new right, or whether it only operated as a continuation of the original judgment. ‘The present right to receive the same’ was understood by Tindal . .
Cited – Earle v Bellingham 24-Jul-1857
The right to receive legacies charged on a reversionary legacy payable under the will of another was not a present right to receive them until the reversionary legacy fell into possession on the death of the life tenant. . .

Cited by:
Cited – The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Amanullah Khan and The Wellcome Trust ChD 13-Jun-2001
The authority had served notices on the second defendant, requiring him to execute works to bring a property up to a habitable condition. Eventually the authority executed the works themselves, and sought repayment from him of the costs. He resisted . .
Cited – Wilkinson and Another v West Bromwich Building Society CA 30-Jul-2004
The Society had repossessed and sold the mortgagors’ house in 1990. It knew then that there was a shortfall, but took no further recovery proceedings until 2002. What was the date from which the relevant limitation period began to run? Though the . .
Distingusihed – Green and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
Cited – West Bromwich Building Society v Wilkinson HL 30-Jun-2005
The Society had taken possession of a property in 1989. It located the defendants many years later and sought payment of the excess after deduction of the proceeds of sale, and for interest. The borrowers claimed the debt was expired by limitation . .
Cited – Doodes v Gotham, Perry ChD 17-Nov-2005
The trustee in bankruptcy had taken a charge on the property in 1992 to support the bankruptcy in 1988. He sought to enforce it in 2005. The chargor appealed an order which denied he was protected by limitation.
Held: The appeal succeeded. . .
Cited – Gotham v Doodes CA 25-Jul-2006
The former bankrupt resisted sale of his property by the trustee, saying that enforcement was barred by limitation. He and his wife bought the property in early 1988, and he was made bankrupt in October 1988. He was dischaged from bankruptcy in . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Local Government

Updated: 22 January 2022; Ref: scu.182787

Thyssen Inc v Calypso Shipping Corp Sa: ComC 23 Jun 2000

Application by the Claimants, who were receivers of a steel cargo, for a declaration that their claim against the Respondents, who were the owners of the carrying ship, is not time-barred. In the alternative, the Claimants seek an extension of time to commence arbitration proceedings pursuant to Section 12 of the Arbitration Act 1996.

David Steel J
[2000] EWHC B20 (Comm)
Bailii

Transport, Limitation

Updated: 21 January 2022; Ref: scu.568024

Glenluce Fishing Company Ltd v Watermota Ltd: TCC 21 Jul 2016

Application by the Claimant to amend the Claim Form to reflect the sums now claimed in the Particulars of Claim. This application is resisted upon the basis that with due diligence the claim now put forward could and should have been recognised in the Claim Form. It is said that that not having happened, an inappropriate fee was paid when the proceedings were commenced, with the consequence that the amendment to introduce a new head of claim outside the limitation period should not be allowed.

Roger ter Haar QC DHCJ
[2016] EWHC 1807 (TCC)
Bailii

Litigation Practice, Limitation

Updated: 20 January 2022; Ref: scu.567834

Brecknell v The United Kingdom: ECHR 27 Nov 2007

Allegations had been made about police collusion with killings in Northern Ireland.
Held: Where there was credible information as to a possible perpetrator of an unlawful killing, there was a duty to investigate that evidence. Here the original investigations had lacked the characteristic of independence of the subjects of the investigation.
The court said that: ‘it may be that sometime later, information purportedly casting new light on the circumstances of the death comes into the public domain’ and that ‘[t]he issue then arises as to whether, and in what form, the procedural obligation to investigate is revived’. It then gave examples including ‘deliberate concealment of evidence’ which only subsequently comes to light, or later items of evidence which ‘cast doubt on the effectiveness of the original investigation and trial’. However in para 70 the court accepted that it was not right to say that ‘any assertion or allegation can trigger a fresh investigative obligation under article 2’, but emphasised that ‘state authorities must be sensitive to any information or material which has the potential either to undermine the conclusions of an earlier investigation or to allow an earlier inconclusive investigation to be pursued further’.

[2007] ECHR 989, Times 12-Dec-2007, 32457/04
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights
Human Rights
Citing:
See Also – Brecknell v The United Kingdom ECHR 6-Mar-2007
. .

Cited by:
Cited – MGN Limited v United Kingdom ECHR 18-Jan-2011
The applicant publisher said that the finding against it of breach of confidence and the system of success fees infringed it Article 10 rights to freedom of speech. It had published an article about a model’s attendance at Narcotics anonymous . .
Cited – McCaughey and Another, Re Application forJudicial Review SC 18-May-2011
The claimants sought a fuller inquest into deaths at the hands of the British Army in 1990 in Northern Ireland. On opening the inquest, the coroner had declined to undertake to hold a hearing compliant with article 2, and it had not made progress. . .
Cited – Keyu and Others v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Another SC 25-Nov-2015
The Court was asked whether the respondents should be required to hold a public inquiry into a controversial series of events in 1948, when a Scots Guards patrol was alleged to shot and killed 24 unarmed civilians in a village called Batang Kali, in . .
Cited – Finucane, Re Application for Judicial Review SC 27-Feb-2019
(Northern Ireland) The deceased solicitor was murdered in his home in 1989, allegedly by loyalists. They had never been identified, though collusion between security forces and a loyalist paramilitary was established. The ECHR and a judge led . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Limitation

Updated: 16 January 2022; Ref: scu.262977

Feest v South West Strategic Health Authority and Others: QBD 7 Feb 2014

The claimant sustained a serious spinal injury whilst a passenger on board a 9 metre RIB (rigid inflatable boat) called the Celtic Pioneer. She and 10 work colleagues were participating in a 1 hour boat trip in the Bristol Channel as part of a corporate team building exercise.

Havelock Allen QC HHJ
[2014] EWHC 177 (QB), [2014] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 419
Bailii
Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea

Transport, Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 14 January 2022; Ref: scu.563235

Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding and Another: SC 28 Feb 2018

Lord Kerr, Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Briggs
[2018] UKSC 14, [2018] 2 BCLC 311, [2018] WLR(D) 130
Bailii, Bailii Summary
Limitation Act 1980 21 32
England and Wales

Limitation

Updated: 13 January 2022; Ref: scu.605620

GB v Stoke City Football Club Ltd and Another: QBD 30 Oct 2015

Historic allegations of assault.

Butler HHJ
[2015] EWHC 2862 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Limitation, Personal Injury, Torts – Other

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.554124

JN v Staatssecretaris Van Veiligheid En Justitie: ECJ 15 Feb 2016

ECJ Reference for a preliminary ruling – Urgent preliminary ruling procedure – Standards for the reception of applicants for international protection – Directive 2008/115/EC – Lawful residence – Directive 2013/32/EU – Article 9 – Right to remain in a Member State – Directive 2013/33/EU – Point (e) of the first subparagraph of Article 8(3) – Detention – Protection of national security or public order – Validity – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Articles 6 and 52 – Limitation – Proportionality

ECLI:EU:C:2016:84, [2016] EUECJ C-601/15, [2016] WLR(D) 166, [2016] 1 WLR 3027
Bailii, WLRD
Directive 2013/32/EU 9, Directive 2013/33/EU 8(3)(e), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 6 52
European

Immigration, Human Rights, Limitation

Updated: 10 January 2022; Ref: scu.559879

Patrick Davidson of Woodmiln v Alexander Watson of Glentarkie: HL 4 Dec 1740

Found that the act does not apply to actions for the aliment of minors.

[1740] UKHL 1 – Paton – 288
Bailii
Prescription Act 1579
Scotland

Limitation, Children

Updated: 06 January 2022; Ref: scu.554893

Burrell v Clifford: ChD 14 Jul 2015

Defendant’s request for strike out of claim under limitation and Jameel

Mann J
[2015] EWHC 2001 (Ch), [2015] 6 Costs LO 719, [2016] EMLR 1
Bailii
England and Wales

Limitation

Updated: 05 January 2022; Ref: scu.554295

Blakemores Ldp v Scott and Another: CA 7 Oct 2015

The court was asked whether the judge was right to grant summary judgment striking down the first and third appellants’ negligence claims against their solicitors on the grounds that they were issued more than 3 years after they acquired ‘the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage’ within the meaning of sections 14A(5) and (6) of the Limitation Act 1980.

Moore-Bick, Underhill, Voss LJJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 999
Bailii
England and Wales

Limitation, Professional Negligence

Updated: 04 January 2022; Ref: scu.553110

Sunrider Corporation (T/A Sunrider International) v Vitasoy International Holdings Ltd: ChD 22 Jan 2007

An application had been made to have the trade mark declared invalid. The owner replied saying that the five year period during which a mark might be challenged had expired.
Held: The five year period commenced not from the date when the application for registration of the mark was made, but from the date when the registration was entered. Accordingly the challenge was not out of time.

Warren J
[2007] EWHC 37 (Ch), Times 27-Feb-2007
Bailii
Trade Marks Act 1994 40(3), Council Directive 89/104/EEV (OJ 1989 L40/1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Budejovicky Budvar Narodni Podnik v Anheuser-Busch Inc CA 20-Oct-2009
The parties had long disputed the use of the trade marks ‘Bud’ and ‘Budweiser’ for their beers. The claimant now said that the defendants had made an abusive registration under the 1994 Act, by requesting a declaration that the registration by the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Intellectual Property, Limitation

Updated: 04 January 2022; Ref: scu.248254

Schweppe v Closier and Another: TCC 26 Jun 2017

Defendant’s application to strike out for limitation

Coulson J
[2017] EWHC 1486 (TCC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Limitation

Updated: 28 December 2021; Ref: scu.589009

Powell v McFarlane: ChD 1977

Intention to Establish Adverse Possession of Land

A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘It will be convenient to begin by restating a few basic principles relating to the concept of possession under English law: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the owner of land with the paper title is deemed to be in possession of the land, as being the person with the prima facie right to possession. The law will thus, without reluctance, ascribe possession either to the paper owner or to the persons who can establish a title as claiming through the paper owner.
If the law is to attribute possession of land to a person who can establish no paper title to possession, he must be shown to have both factual possession and the requisite intention to possess (‘animus possidendi’).
The animus possidendi, which is also necessary to constitute possession, was defined by Lindley M.R., in Littledale v. Liverpool College (a case involving an alleged adverse possession) as ‘the intention of excluding the owner as well as other people.’ This concept is to some extent an artificial one, because in the ordinary case the squatter on property such as agricultural land will realise that, at least until he acquires a statutory title by long possession and thus can invoke the processes of the law to exclude the owner with the paper title, he will not for practical purposes be in a position to exclude him. What is really meant, in my judgment, is that the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow.
The question of animus possidendi is, in my judgment, one of crucial importance in the present case. An owner or other person with the right to possession of land will be readily assumed to have the requisite intention to possess, unless the contrary is clearly proved. This, in my judgment, is why the slightest acts done by or on behalf of an owner in possession will be found to negative discontinuance of possession. The position, however, is quite different from a case where the question is whether a trespasser has acquired possession. In such a situation the courts will, in my judgment, require clear and affirmative evidence that the trespasser, claiming that he has acquired possession, not only had the requisite intention to possess, but made such intention clear to the world. If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made it perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner.
Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single [exclusive] possession, though there can be a single possession exercised by or on behalf of several persons jointly. Thus an owner of land and a person intruding on that land without his consent cannot be both in possession of the land at the same time. The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed . . Everything must depend on the particular circumstances, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so.
The question of animus possidendi is, in my judgment, one of crucial importance in the present case. An owner or other person with a right to possession of land will be readily assumed to have the requisite intention to possess, unless the contrary is clearly proved. This, in my judgment, is why the slightest acts done by or on behalf of an owner in possession will be found to negative discontinuance of possession. The position, however, is quite different from a case where the question is whether a trespasser has acquired possession. In such a situation the courts will, in my judgment, require clear and affirmative evidence that the trespasser, claiming that he has acquired possession, not only had the requisite intention to possess, but made such intention clear to the world. If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made it perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner.’
Slade J said: ‘In view of the drastic results of a change of possession, however, a person seeking to dispossess an owner must, in my judgment, at least make his intention sufficiently clear so that the owner, if present at the land, would clearly appreciate that the claimant is not merely a persistent trespasser, but is actually seeking to dispossess him.’ and
‘What is really meant, in my judgment, is that the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow.’ and
‘Whether or not acts of possession done on parts of an area establish title to the whole area must, however, be a matter of degree. It is impossible to generalise with any precision as to what acts will or will not suffice to evidence factual possession.’

Slade J
(1977) 38 P and CR 452
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Seddon v Smith 1877
Adverse possession was claimed over land subject to a private grant of a right of way. The defendant had a paper title to a strip of land along Molyneux Lane. The plaintiff sought damages for trespass, claiming for wrongful abstraction of coal from . .

Cited by:
Approved ‘Remarkable’ – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
Cited – Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .
Cited – Topplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
Cited – London Borough of Lambeth v Blackburn CA 14-Jun-2001
The appellant had broken into an empty council owned flat, and subsequently occupied it. After twelve years the authority obtained a court order for possession. The court had held that the appellant had not had a sufficient animus possidendi since . .
Cited – Tower Hamlets v Barrett and Another CA 19-Jul-2005
The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been . .
Cited – Chapman and Another v Godinn Properties Ltd and others CA 27-Jun-2005
Dispute over right of way over land subject to claim for possessory title. ‘But each case must turn on its own facts. In a case of this nature, the court must ask itself what it is that would be expected of somebody in possession of land of this . .
Cited – Inglewood Investments Company Ltd v Baker CA 8-Nov-2002
The court considered a claim for the adverse possesion of land.
Held: Dyson LJ said: ‘to establish a claim of adverse possession for the requisite period of 12 years it is necessary to establish: (1) actual possession; (2) an intention to . .
Cited – Allen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .
Cited – Godmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs HL 20-Jun-2007
The house was asked about whether continuous use of an apparent right of way by the public would create a public right of way after 20 years, and also whether a non overt act by a landowner was sufficient to prove his intention not to dedicate the . .
Cited – Clear Channel United Kingdom Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 14-Oct-2004
The claimant sought a declaration that it had a tenancy for its occupation by an advertising station, and that it had protection under the 1954 Act. The defendant council said that only a licence had been granted.
Held: The grants included the . .
Cited – Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
Cited – Lodge (T/A JD Lodge) v Wakefield Metropolitan Council CA 21-Mar-1995
The plaintiff had formerly been a tenant of the defendant under an informal tenancy. No rent had been paid since 1974. He claimed to have acquired the land by adverse possession. He gave evidence at trial that if he had been asked to pay rent at any . .
Cited – Ofulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
Cited – Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
Cited – Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
Cited – Smith, Regina (on the Application of) v The Land Registry (Peterborough Office) Admn 13-Feb-2009
The applicant sought judicial review of the cancellation of his application for first registration of land by adverse possession. The application had been rejected because a public right of way existed through it, and the claimant had not shown the . .
Cited – The Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
Cited – Wilson and Another v Grainger ChD 4-Dec-2009
The claimants appealed against a decision of the Adjudicator that they had not acquired a piece of their neighbour’s land by adverse possession, on the basis that their use had been by virtue of an oral licence. The judge had found the occupation to . .
Cited – Star Energy Weald Basin Ltd and Another v Bocardo Sa SC 28-Jul-2010
The defendant had obtained a licence to extract oil from its land. In order to do so it had to drill out and deep under the Bocardo’s land. No damage at all was caused to B’s land at or near the surface. B claimed in trespass for damages. It now . .
Cited – Balevents Ltd v Sartori ChD 29-Sep-2011
A strip of land had at one point been left aside for an anticipated road widening which never took place. The defendant had eventually obtained a registered possessory title to it. The claimant, owner of a neighbouring plot, now challenged that . .
Cited – Zarb and Another v Parry and Another CA 15-Nov-2011
The parties disputed the position of the boundary between their neighbouring properties. The appellant Z had succeeded in establishing that the the boundary was as they decribed on paper, but the respondents had succeeded in their claim for adverse . .
Cited – Chambers v London Borough of Havering CA 20-Dec-2011
The defendant appealed against an order for him to surrender possession of land he had claimed by adverse possession. The Council was the registered proprietor. The defendant said he had used the land since 1981 for dumping of motor vehicle parts. . .
Cited – City of London v Samede and Others QBD 18-Jan-2012
The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either . .
Cited – London Borough of Southwark and Another v Transport for London SC 5-Dec-2018
Question as to the meaning of the GLA Roads and Side Roads (Transfer of Property etc) Order 2000. When the highway was transferred was only the working surfaces, the road surface and the airspace and subsoil necessary for the operation, maintenance . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.182281

Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran: CA 13 Feb 1989

The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and using the land for their own purposes. The evidence was that the Plaintiff, the owner of the paper title, had no immediate use for the land but intended in due course to dedicate it for the purposes of a road diversion. Accordingly, the use made of the disputed land by the Defendants did not interfere with the proposed future use to which the true owner intended to devote the land.
Held: The Defendant had established a title by adverse possession, and the fact that the acts of ownership relied upon to establish his claim to adverse possession were not inconsistent with the use to which the true owner intended to put the land in the future was irrelevant. ‘Possession of land would never be ‘adverse’ within the meaning of the Act if it is enjoyed under a lawful title. If, therefore, a person occupies or uses land by licence of the owner with the paper title, and his licence has not been duly determined, he can not be treated as having been in ‘adverse possession’ as against the owner with the paper title.’
Nourse LJ said: ‘The essential difference between prescription and limitation is that in the former case title can be acquired only be possession as of right. That is the antithesis of what is required for limitation, which perhaps can be described as possession as of wrong. It can readily be understood that with prescription the intention of the true owner may be of decisive importance, it being impossible to presume a grant by someone whose intention is shown to have been against it. But with limitation it is the intention of the squatter which is decisive. He must intend to possess the land to the exclusion of all the world, including the true owner, while the intention of the latter is, with one exception, entirely beside the point. In order that title to land may be acquired by limitation, (1) the true owner must either (a) have been dispossessed, or (b) have discontinued his possession, of the land; and (2) the squatter must have been in adverse possession of it for the statutory period before action brought . .’ Hoffmann LJ said that what is required is ‘not an intention to own or even an intention to acquire ownership but an intention to possess.’
Slade LJ referred to Powell v MacFarlane and said: ‘I agree with the judge that ‘what is required for this purpose is not an intention to own or even an intention to acquire ownership but an intention to possess’ – that is to say, an intention for the time being to possess the land to the exclusion of all other persons, including the owner with the paper title. No authorities cited to us establish the contrary proposition.’

Slade LJ, Nourse LJ, Butler-Sloss LJ
[1990] 1 Ch 623, [1989] EWCA Civ 11, [1990] Ch 632, [1989] 2 All ER 255
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15
England and Wales
Citing:
Disapproved – Leigh v Jack CA 11-Dec-1879
The plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Mr Leigh) had laid out part of his estate as proposed streets to be known as Grundy Street and Napier Place. He conveyed to the defendant certain land described as being ‘bounded by’ Grundy Street and Napier . .
Cited – Wallis’s Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd CA 10-Jul-1974
A strip of land between a holiday camp and a garage had been conveyed as an intended roadway. It had not been fenced. A plot of land was sold by the previous farmer to the garage. Later the plaintiffs bought the farm, excluding the roadway, and the . .
Cited – In Re Daintrey, Ex Parte Holt QBD 8-May-1893
The court was asked whether a letter could be admitted in evidence and relied upon as an act of bankruptcy. The letter was sent by the debtor to the creditor at a time when there was no dispute, headed ‘without prejudice’. It contained an offer of . .
Cited – South Shropshire District Council v Amos CA 1986
Lord Justice Parker said that the use of the words ‘without prejudice’ prima facie meant that a letter was intended to be a part of negotiation. A letter which purported to initiate some sort of negotiation (‘an opening shot’) is not necessarily . .
Cited – Rains v Buxton 1880
rains_buxtonChD1880
Fry J said: ‘The difference between dispossession and the discontinuance of possession might be expressed in this way: the one is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession, the other case is where the person in possession . .
Cited – Rush and Tomkins Ltd v Greater London Council HL 3-Nov-1988
The parties had entered into contracts for the construction of dwellings. The contractors sought payment. The council alleged shortcomings in the works. The principal parties had settled the dispute, but a sub-contractor now sought disclosure of the . .
Cited – Treloar v Nute CA 1976
The judge in the County Court had rejected a claim to adverse possession by a defendant who together with his father had done a number of acts, some more trivial than others, in and around a disputed gully and adjacent land leading eventually to the . .
Cited – Powell v McFarlane ChD 1977
Intention to Establish Adverse Possession of Land
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘It will be convenient to begin by . .

Cited by:
Approved – Rhondda Cynon Taff Borough Council v Watkins CA 12-Feb-2003
Land had been purchased compulsorily, but the respondent unlawfully returned to possession in 1966, and now claimed title by adverse possession. The Council executed a vesting deed poll in 1988. The Council asserted that he could not be in adverse . .
Cited – Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .
Cited – Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton CA 19-Mar-1997
The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar . .
Cited – Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton CA 19-Mar-1997
The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar . .
Cited – Topplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
Cited – Chapman and Another v Godinn Properties Ltd and others CA 27-Jun-2005
Dispute over right of way over land subject to claim for possessory title. ‘But each case must turn on its own facts. In a case of this nature, the court must ask itself what it is that would be expected of somebody in possession of land of this . .
Cited – Allen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .
Cited – Long v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council ChD 20-Mar-1996
The parties had agreed for a lease, and the tenant entered possession, but no formal lease was executed. The tenant stopped paying rent in 1977 or 1984. He now claimed rectification of the registers to show him as proprietor. The landlord argued . .
Cited – Ofulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
Cited – Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
Cited – Sze To Chun Keung v Kung Kwok Wai David and Lam Chak Man Estate Limited PC 27-Jun-1997
(Hong Kong) The respondents were registered owners of land occupied by the appellant who claim title by adverse possession after entry in 1955. Subsequently the claim resided with the Crown.
Held: ‘on the facts as pleaded, the land has been . .
Cited – Williams v Hull ChD 19-Nov-2009
The parties had bought a house together, but disputed the shares on which it was held. The appeal was on the basis that a without prejudice letter had been redacte and then wrongly admitted as not in fact without prejudice, an as an unambiguous . .
Cited – The Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
Cited – City of London v Samede and Others QBD 18-Jan-2012
The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.259373

Ofulue and Another v Bossert: HL 11 Mar 2009

The parties disputed ownership of land, one claiming adverse possession. In the course of negotations, the possessor made a without prejudice offer to purchase the paper owner’s title. The paper owner claimed that this was an acknowledgement under section 29.
Held: The letter should not be admitted. Any admission in the first letter could not be treated as a continuing acknowledgement, and it could not now be relied upon. The House emphasised the vital importance of the without prejudice system.
Lord Hope said: ‘Where a letter is written ‘without prejudice’ during negotiations with a view to a compromise, the protection that these words claim will be given to it unless the other party can show that there is a good reason for not doing so.’ and ‘The essence of it lies in the nature of the protection that is given to parties when they are attempting to negotiate a compromise. It is the ability to speak freely that indicates where the limits of the rule should lie. Far from being mechanistic, the rule is generous in its application. It recognises that unseen dangers may lurk behind things said or written during this period, and it removes the inhibiting effect that this may have in the interests of promoting attempts to achieve a settlement. It is not to be defeated by other considerations of public policy which may emerge later, such as those suggested in this case, that would deny them that protection.’
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry said: ‘it is that parties and their representatives who are trying to settle a dispute should be able to negotiate openly, without having to worry that what they say may be used against them subsequently, whether in their current dispute or in some different situation.’
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe agreed with Lord Rodger and said: ‘As a matter of principle I would not restrict the without prejudice rule unless justice clearly demands it. In England the rule has developed vigorously (more vigorously, probably, than in other common law jurisdictions, and more vigorously than some overseas scholars, notably J H Wigmore approved.)’

Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
[2009] UKHL 16, [2009] 2 WLR 749, [2009] 2 All ER 223, [2009] 11 EG 119, [2009] NPC 40, [2009] 1 WLR 718, [2009] 2 Cr App R 2, [2009] 1 AC 990
Bailii, Times, HL
Limitation Act 1980& 29(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Whiffen v Hartwright 15-Apr-1848
The court refused to order the production of letters which had passed ‘without prejudice’. Lord Langdale MR observed that he ‘did not see how the plaintiff could get over this express agreement, though he did not agree, that the right of discovery . .
Cited – Waldridge v Kennison 1794
A without prejudice admission that a document was in the handwriting of one of the parties was received in evidence because it was independent of the merits of the case. . .
Cited – Jones v Foxall CA 27-Mar-1852
Romilly MR deplored attempts to convert offers of compromise into admissions of acts prejudicial to the party making them, saying: ‘I find that the offers were in fact made without prejudice to the rights of the parties; and I shall, as far as I am . .
Appeal from – Ofulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
Cited – Hoghton v Hoghton CA 16-Apr-1852
When a person has made a large voluntary disposition the burden is thrown on the party benefitting to show that the disposition was made fairly and honestly and in full understanding of the nature and consequences of the transaction. Romilly MR . .
Cited – In Re Daintrey, Ex Parte Holt QBD 8-May-1893
The court was asked whether a letter could be admitted in evidence and relied upon as an act of bankruptcy. The letter was sent by the debtor to the creditor at a time when there was no dispute, headed ‘without prejudice’. It contained an offer of . .
Cited – Bradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid HL 12-Jul-2006
Disapplication of Without Prejudice Rules
The House was asked whether a letter sent during without prejudice negotiations which acknowledged a debt was admissible to restart the limitation period. An advice centre, acting for the borrower had written, in answer to a claim by the lender for . .
Cited – Tomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd CA 1969
Without prejudice material can be admitted if the issue is whether or not the negotiations resulted in an agreed settlement. Without considering the communications in question it would be impossible to decide whether there was a concluded settlement . .
Cited – Unilever plc v Procter and Gamble Company CA 4-Nov-1999
The defendant’s negotiators had asserted in an expressly ‘without prejudice’ meeting, that the plaintiff was infringing its patent and they threatened to bring an action for infringement. The plaintiff sought to bring a threat action under section . .
Limited – Muller and Another v Linsley and Mortimer (A Firm) CA 8-Dec-1994
The plaintiff sued his former solicitors for professional negligence. The damages he sought to recover related to loss he suffered when dismissed as a director of a private company leading to a forced sale of his shares in the company. The plaintiff . .
Cited – Rush and Tomkins Ltd v Greater London Council HL 3-Nov-1988
The parties had entered into contracts for the construction of dwellings. The contractors sought payment. The council alleged shortcomings in the works. The principal parties had settled the dispute, but a sub-contractor now sought disclosure of the . .
Cited – Cutts v Head and Another CA 7-Dec-1983
There had been a trial of 35 days regarding rights of way over land, which had proved fruitless, and where some orders had been made without jurisdiction. The result had been inconclusive. The costs order was now appealed, the plaintiff complaining . .
Cited – Whiffen v Hartwright 15-Apr-1848
The court refused to order the production of letters which had passed ‘without prejudice’. Lord Langdale MR observed that he ‘did not see how the plaintiff could get over this express agreement, though he did not agree, that the right of discovery . .

Cited by:
Cited – Kohli v Lit and Others ChD 13-Nov-2009
The claimant asserted that the other shareholders had acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to her within the company.
Held: The claimant was allowed to bring in without prejudice correspondence to contradict evidence by the defendant which . .
Cited – Oceanbulk Shipping and Trading Sa v TMT Asia Ltd CA 15-Feb-2010
The parties had settled their disagreement, but now disputed the interpretation of the settlement. The defendant sought to be allowed to give in evidence correspondence leading up to the settlement which had been conducted on a without prejudice . .
Cited – Oceanbulk Shipping and Trading Sa v TMT Asia Ltd and Others SC 27-Oct-2010
The court was asked whether facts which (a) are communicated between the parties in the course of without prejudice negotiations and (b) would, but for the without prejudice rule, be admissible as part of the factual matrix or surrounding . .
Cited – Berkeley Square Holdings and Others v Lancer Property Asset Management Ltd and Others ChD 1-May-2020
Application by the Claimants to strike out parts of the Defence as an abuse of process and an application by the Defendants to amend their Defence. However, both applications turn on the question whether certain facts on which the Defendants seek to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice, Evidence

Leading Case

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.317966

Prudential Assurance Company Ltd v Waterloo Real Estate Inc: ChD 13 May 1998

The owner of a party wall who had allowed a neighbour exclusive use of it without objection for a period over twelve years, could lose his interest in the wall by the adverse possession of that neighbour.

Times 13-May-1998
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal From – Prudential Assurance Company Limited v Waterloo Real Estate Inc CA 22-Jan-1999
Where title to land was to be established by adverse possession, the claim had to be unequivocal only in the sense that the intention to possess was clear to the world. It was unnecessary for the dispossessed party to know of the title he lost. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 05 December 2021; Ref: scu.85071