Matters consequential on main judgment
Spencer J
[2016] EWHC 1507 (QB), [2016] WLR(D) 321
Bailii, WLRD
Contract, Legal Professions
Updated: 18 January 2022; Ref: scu.566256
This appeal raised a question of the proper construction of a conditional fee agreement, and, in particular, whether the outcome of the action represented a ‘win’ for the claimant.
Lord Dyson MR, Floyd, Simon LJJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 1530
Bailii
England and Wales
Legal Professions, Costs
Updated: 17 January 2022; Ref: scu.565661
Appeal by solicitor against decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal
Garnham J
[2016] EWHC 1160 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Legal Professions
Updated: 16 January 2022; Ref: scu.564648
Application for order disallowing a firm from acting for the defendants.
Arnold J
[2016] EWHC 416 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd 1972
The plaintiffs, as purchasers, and the first defendants, as sub-purchasers, were parties to a conveyance of land which provided that the purchasers had the option of re-purchasing if, within the following 20 years, the first defendants wanted to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions
Updated: 16 January 2022; Ref: scu.564438
(New Zealand Court of Appeal) The claimant had agreed to make a loan to X and to take security for it on a yacht. The defendants, who were X’s solicitors, certified to the claimant that the instrument of security executed by X in relation to the yacht was binding on him. In fact, as the defendants knew, it was not binding on him because he was not, and was not intended to become, the owner of the yacht.
Held: The fact that a certificate is sent by a solicitor to a lender confirming the giving of independent advice and that guarantors had signed the guarantee voluntarily may place a duty of care on the solicitor in relation to the lender.
Cooke J said: ‘the relationship between two solicitors acting for their respective clients does not normally of itself impose a duty of care on one solicitor to the client of the other. Normally the relationship is not sufficiently proximate. Each solicitor is entitled to expect that the other party will look to his own solicitor for advice and protection.’
Richardson J said: ‘This is not the ordinary case of two solicitors simply acting for different parties in a commercial transaction. The special feature attracting the prima facie duty of care is the giving of a certificate in circumstances where the [defendants] must have known it was likely to be relied on by the [claimant].’
Cooke J, Richardson J
[1983] NZLR 22
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Connolly-Martin v Davis CA 27-May-1999
A claim was brought by a party against counsel for his opponent who had gone beyond his authority in giving an undertaking for his client.
Held: The claim had no prospect of success, and had been struck out correctly. Counsel offering to the . .
Cited – Steel and Another v NRAM Ltd (Formerly NRAM Plc) SC 28-Feb-2018
The appellant solicitor acted in a land transaction. The land was mortgaged to the respondent bank. She wrote to the bank stating her client’s intention to repay the whole loan. The letter was negligently mistaken and the bankers allowed the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions, Professional Negligence
Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.424848
Rolled up application for permission to apply for judicial review of whether the procedure set out in the Operational Handbook of the Serious Fraud Office for dealing with material potentially subject to legal professional privilege embedded in electronic devices that have been seized using statutory powers, or produced in response to a notice, is lawful.
Held: The claim failed. The defendant’s use of in-house experts to isolate material potentially subject to Legal Professional Privilege was lawful.
Burnett LJ, Irwin J
[2016] EWHC 102 (Admin), [2016] WLR(D) 42
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Criminal Practice, Legal Professions
Updated: 09 January 2022; Ref: scu.559357
Lady Clark of Calton
[2016] ScotCS CSIH – 4
Bailii
Scotland
Legal Professions
Updated: 09 January 2022; Ref: scu.559242
The claimant company said that its now defendant solicitors had acted for them in the purchase of land, but then also to act in a subsale of the land, creating a ransom strip.
Saffman HHJ
[2016] EWHC 96 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales
Legal Professions
Updated: 09 January 2022; Ref: scu.559187
Claim for injunctions requiring the Defendant, the publisher of the ‘Solicitors from Hell’ website (‘the Website’), to cease publication of the Website in its entirety and to restrain him from publishing any similar website.
Tugendhat J
[2011] EWHC 3185 (QB)
Bailii
Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Data Protection Act 1998
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Brett Wilson Llp v Person(s) Unknown, Responsible for The Operation and Publication of The Website www.solicitorsfromhelluk.com QBD 16-Sep-2015
The claimant solicitors sought remedies against the unknown publishers of the respondent website which was said to publish material defamatory of them, and to ampunt to harassment.
Held: The alleged defamatory meanings were not challenged by . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions, Torts – Other, Defamation
Updated: 04 January 2022; Ref: scu.552388
The client and his solicitor had entered into a CFA in 2002 which provided for a success fee of 100% of reasonable costs, plus andpound;50,000 if the claimant recovered damages in excess of andpound;1m. This was a champertous agreement at common law which failed to comply with s 58 of the 1990 Act. In July 2005 the claimant obtained a costs order. He and his solicitors then entered into a Deed of Variation which omitted all reference to the andpound;50,000. Had the agreement been in this form from the outset it would have complied with s 58 and been enforceable.
Held: The Deed was ‘ineffective to rectify the situation as against the paying party . . Following the decision of the Privy Council in Kellar it cannot be right that a Deed of Variation can be used to impose a greater burden on the paying party than existed before judgment. The fact that the client is in agreement is of no assistance. If the position were otherwise it would be open to solicitors and their successful client to, for example, alter the level of success fee late in the day.’
Senior Costs Judge Hurst
[2006] EWHC 90053 (Costs)
Bailii, Gazette
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 58
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Kellar v Williams PC 7-Feb-2000
PC (Turks and Caicos Islands) The parties disputed whether sums paid to the company had been by way of loan or as capital contributions which after payment of debts were distributable among the shareholders.
Cited by:
Cited – Radford and Another v Frade and Others QBD 8-Jul-2016
The court was asked as to the terms on which solicitors and Counsel were retained to act for the defendants. The appeals did not raise any issues concerning costs practice, and were by way of review of the Costs Judge’s rulings, and not by way of . .
Cited – Radford and Another v Frade and Others QBD 8-Jul-2016
The court was asked as to the terms on which solicitors and Counsel were retained to act for the defendants. The appeals did not raise any issues concerning costs practice, and were by way of review of the Costs Judge’s rulings, and not by way of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Costs, Legal Professions
Updated: 28 December 2021; Ref: scu.242321
[2014] EWHC 4553 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Legal Professions
Updated: 27 December 2021; Ref: scu.542538
Investors had paid sums to the appellant solicitors for investment within a scheme run by a client of te firm. No terms were explicit save that the client was to be invested. When the funds were lost by the client, the claimants sued the solicitors, who now appealed against a finding of breach of trust.
Held: The deposits were made without any terms as to safety being promised or required. The appeal succeeded.
Moore-Bick, Underhill, Briggs LJJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 59, [2015] WLR(D) 57
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Legal Professions
Updated: 27 December 2021; Ref: scu.542259
Application relates to a complaint made to the Scottish Legal Complaints Commission (‘SLCC’) by a firm of solicitors. The complaint is about the conduct of another solicitor.
Lady Smith
[2015] ScotCS CSIH – 4
Bailii
Legal Profession and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 2009
Scotland
Legal Professions
Updated: 24 December 2021; Ref: scu.540501
Action for account against the claimants’ former solicitor.
David Richards J
[2014] EWHC 3080 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales
Legal Professions
Updated: 24 December 2021; Ref: scu.540355
[2014] ScotCS CSIH – 94
Bailii
Scotland
Legal Professions
Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.539152
The SRA alleged that the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal had erred in not finding proven some of the serious allegations against the defendant solicitors proven.
Held: Some of the appeals succeeded.
Holman J
[2016] EWHC 3455 (Admin)
Bailii
Solicitors Act 1974
England and Wales
Cited by:
See Also – Solicitors Regulation Authority v Wingate and Another Admn 7-Feb-2017
Orders following principal judgment . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions
Updated: 21 December 2021; Ref: scu.581949
[2014] EWHC 2974 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Legal Professions
Updated: 21 December 2021; Ref: scu.536536
The Bank of England had sought assistance from its lawyers to prepare for a private non-statutory enquiry. The claimant sought disclosure of that advice. The defendant bank claimed legal professional privilege.
Held: Not all advice given by a solicitor to his client attracts privilege. The broad protection which did exist did not extend to situations where the dominant purpose was not the obtaining of legal advice and assistance in relation to legal rights and obligations. What was protected was advice which required a knowledge of the law. Here, the advice was on matters of presentation, though that might have included matters of law. That possibility would not protect the entire range of assistance given. Where the advice was as to how the witness might present his case so as perhaps to avoid criticism, that should not itself attract privilege. The inquiry was not concerned with legal rights and liabilities. The communications did not in general attract privilege.
Lord Justice Longmore Lord Phillips Of Worth Matravers, Mr Lord Justice Thomas
[2004] EWCA Civ 218, Times 03-Mar-2004, Gazette 18-Mar-2004, [2004] 3 All ER 168, [2004] QB 916, [2004] 2 WLR 1065
Bailii
Tribunals of Inquiry Evidence Act 1921 1(3)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Three Rivers District Council and others v The Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 5) CA 3-Apr-2003
Documents had been prepared by the respondent to support a request for legal advice in anticipation of the Bingham enquiry into the collapse of BCCI.
Held: Legal advice privilege attached to the communications between a client and the . .
Appeal from – Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 5) ComC 4-Nov-2003
The defendant bank sought protection from disclosure of advice it had received from its solicitors.
Held: To the extent that the communications were for the purpose of seeking advice as to its legal rights and obligations, the communications . .
Cited – Balabel v Air India CA 1988
When considering claims for legal professional privilege, the court should acknowledge the ‘continuity of communications’. However, where the traditional role of a solicitor had expanded, the scope of legal professional privilege should not be . .
Cited – Greenhough v Gaskell CA 1833
The question arose whether the defendant solicitor, sued for fraudulently concealing that his client was insolvent and thereby inducing the plaintiff to issue a promissory note on the client’s behalf, could claim privilege in respect of . .
Cited – Carpmael v Powis 1846
The court discussed the extent and scope of legal professional privilege: ‘I am of the opinion that the privilege extends to all communications between a solicitor, as such, and his client, relating to matters within the ordinary scope of a . .
Cited – Wheeler v Le Marchant CA 1881
Advice was given to the defendant trustee of the will of a Mr Brett in the course of its administration in the Chancery Division; for the purpose of that advice information was sought from both the former and the current estate-agent and surveyor. . .
Cited – Minter v Priest HL 1930
The House was asked whether a conversation between a person seeking the services of a solicitor in relation to the purchase of real property and the solicitor was privileged in circumstances where the solicitor was being requested to lend the . .
Cited – Great Atlantic Insurance v Home Insurance CA 1981
The defendants sought to enter into evidence one part of a document, but the plaintiffs sought to have the remainder protected through legal professional privilege.
Held: The entirety of the document was privileged, but by disclosing part, the . .
Cited – Wilson v Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co 1872
Lord Selborne LC said: ‘It is of the highest importance . . that all communications between a solicitor and a client upon a subject which may lead to litigation should be privileged, and I think the court is bound to consider that . . almost any . .
Cited by:
Appeal from – Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) HL 11-Nov-2004
The Bank anticipated criticism in an ad hoc enquiry which was called to investigate its handling of a matter involving the claimant. The claimant sought disclosure of the documents created when the solicitors advised employees of the Bank in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Litigation Practice, Legal Professions
Updated: 16 December 2021; Ref: scu.194072
A solicitor sitting as a judge was not obliged to disqualify himself even though his firm might not have been able to act for one of the parties to the case, unless a reasonable third party might properly think that he could not be impartial.
Times 18-May-1999
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Locabail (UK) Ltd, Regina v Bayfield Properties Ltd CA 17-Nov-1999
Adverse Comments by Judge Need not be Show of Bias
In five cases, leave to appeal was sought on the basis that a party had been refused disqualification of judges on grounds of bias. The court considered the circumstances under which a fear of bias in a court may prove to be well founded: ‘The mere . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions, Natural Justice
Updated: 11 December 2021; Ref: scu.83131
A monetary penalty of andpound;1,000 was issued to Andrew Jonathan Crossley, formerly trading as solicitors firm ACS Law, for failing to keep sensitive personal information relating to around 6,000 people secure.
[2011] UKICO 2011-4
Bailii
England and Wales
Information, Legal Professions
Updated: 11 December 2021; Ref: scu.530434
Guidelines for procedures for courts to make wasted costs orders.
Gazette 24-Jun-1992
Costs in Criminal Cases (General) (Amendment) Regulations 1991 (1991 No 789)
England and Wales
Legal Professions
Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.80405
[2014] EWHC 1680 (Admin)
Bailii
Constitutional Reform Act 2005
England and Wales
Legal Professions
Updated: 03 December 2021; Ref: scu.526071
Renewed application for permission to appeal against the dismissal of appeal against the ruling by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal that his complaint against the respondent solicitors disclosed no case to answer.
Patten LJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 1564
Bailii
England and Wales
Legal Professions
Updated: 26 November 2021; Ref: scu.518772
The court was asked whether somebody detained under section 7 of the 2000 Act was entitled to be accompanied by a solicitor during questioning. The claimant was stopped at the airport on his return from Saudi Arabia. Police refused to await the arrival of his solicitor before starting to question him. They proceeded and he was released.
Held: The claim succeeded. Such a person was entitled to consult a solicitor before being questioned and in private ‘in person, in writing or on the telephone’. The right was clear, and existed independently of the question of whether the detention took place at a police station.
Bean J
[2013] EWHC 3397 (Admin), [2014] 1 WLR 239, [2013] WLR(D) 422, [2014] Crim LR 378
Bailii, WLRD
Terrorism Act 2000 7
England and Wales
Police, Legal Professions
Updated: 25 November 2021; Ref: scu.517471
Rose LJ said: ‘Both in principle and pragmatically, whether a solicitor or barrister can properly continue to act is a matter for him or her and not the court, although of course the court can properly make observations on the matter’.
Rose LJ
[2004] 2 Cr App R 37, [2004] EWCA 1368
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – H, Regina v (Interlocutory application: Disclosure) HL 28-Feb-2007
The trial judge had refused an order requested at a preparatory hearing by the defence for the disclosure of documents held by the prosecutor. The House was now asked whether a right of appeal existed against such a refusal.
Held: The practice . .
Cited – Regina v Ulcay CACD 19-Oct-2007
The defendant appealed against his conviction, saying that his counsel and solicitors had withdrawn at the last moment on the grounds of professional embarrassment, the defendant having altered his instructions. New lawyers were unwilling to assist . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Criminal Practice, Legal Professions
Updated: 20 November 2021; Ref: scu.252539
The court was entitled to proceed to hear the case in the absence of the defendant where he had absconded. I was counsel’s prerogative not the judge’s, to decide whether he could continue to represent the defendant.
[1972] 1 WLR 887, [1972] 56 CAR 413
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Delroy Ricketts v The Queen PC 15-Dec-1997
(Jamaica) Special leave was granted to the defendant to appeal his conviction for murder. Counsel had been late for his trial, and the jury empanelled. When counsel arrived he said the defendant had not understood the judge. A trial took place as to . .
Cited – Regina v Ulcay CACD 19-Oct-2007
The defendant appealed against his conviction, saying that his counsel and solicitors had withdrawn at the last moment on the grounds of professional embarrassment, the defendant having altered his instructions. New lawyers were unwilling to assist . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Criminal Practice, Legal Professions
Updated: 20 November 2021; Ref: scu.242117
The solicitor had left the conduct of proceedings largely to his managing clerk. The trial judge held that the solicitor had not been guilty of professional misconduct in allowing the defences to be delivered, but that he had been guilty of such misconduct in allowing the inadequate affidavits of documents to be made. He ordered the solicitor to pay one-third of the plaintiff’s costs of the action and two-thirds of the costs of the application.
Held: (MacKinnon LJ dissenting) Assuming that the acts in question, if done by a solicitor personally, would constitute professional misconduct on his part, the solicitor was not liable as he had appointed a fully qualified clerk to prepare the defences and affidavits of documents, and the acts had been done not by the solicitor himself but by the clerk.
Greer and Slesser LJJ, MacKinnon LJ
[1939] 1 KB 109, [1938] 3 All ER 498
Cited by:
Appeal from – Myers v Elman HL 1939
The solicitor had successfully appealed against an order for a contribution to the other party’s legal costs, after his clerk had filed statements in court which he knew to be misleading. The solicitor’s appeal had been successful.
Held: The . .
Cited – Ridehalgh v Horsefield; Allen v Unigate Dairies Ltd CA 26-Jan-1994
Guidance for Wasted Costs Orders
Guidance was given on the circumstances required for the making of wasted costs orders against legal advisers. A judge invited to make an order arising out of an advocate’s conduct of court proceedings must make full allowance for the fact that an . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions, Costs
Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.279002
The claimant, was a solicitor who had himself been disciplined for misconduct, of disciplinary decisions following findings that his conduct had fallen short of that expected of an ordinary honest individual with his knowledge and experience and that he was guilty of a dishonest assistance in breach of trust. He had requested the defendant tio institute disciplinary proceedings against two barristers, but, having looked at it the Board declined to take it any further. He now made a renewed application for leave to bring judicial review of the decision.
Held: The PCC had adequately investigated the complaints and concluded that they should be dismissed. That was a reasonable conclusion properly open to the PCC. Whilst the complaint was not entirely without merit, applying Samia, it still lacked sufficient merit to warrant being taken further.
Whipple J
[2016] EWHC 2343 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Wasif v The Secretary of State for The Home Department CA 9-Feb-2016
Wide scope for refusal of JR leave
These two appeals have been listed together because they both raise an issue about the proper approach to be taken in considering whether to certify an application for permission to apply for judicial review as ‘totally without merit’.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions, Judicial Review
Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.569626
The claimants had sought to recover from the General Council of the Bar damages for libel in a communication from the head of the Bar Council’s Professional Standards and Legal Services Department to all heads of chambers, their senior clerks and practice managers to the effect that the claimants were not solicitors and were thus not entitled to instruct counsel with the result that it would be improper for members of the Bar to accept work from them. The letter was clearly noth libellous and untrue, but also not malicious. The court was asked when is verification a relevant circumstance in determining whether or not a defamatory communication is protected by qualified privilege?
Held: On the defence of qualified privilege: ‘The argument, as it seems to me, has been much bedevilled by the use of the terms ‘common interest’ and ‘duty-interest’ for all the world as if these are clear-cut categories and any particular case is instantly recognisable as falling within one or other of them. It also seems to me surprising and unsatisfactory that privilege should be thought to attach more readily to communications made in the service of one’s own interests than in the discharge of a duty – as at first blush this distinction would suggest. To my mind an altogether more helpful categorisation is to be found by distinguishing between on the one hand cases where the communicator and the communicatee are in an existing and established relationship (irrespective of whether within that relationship the communications between them relate to reciprocal interests or reciprocal duties or a mixture of both) and on the other hand cases where no such relationship has been established and the communication is between strangers (or at any rate is volunteered otherwise than by reference to their relationship . . Once the distinction is made in this way, moreover, it becomes to my mind understandable that the law should attach privilege more readily to communications within an existing relationship than to those between strangers. The latter present particular problems.’
Mr Justice Keene Lord Justice Mantell Lord Justice Simon Brown
[2003] EWCA Civ 331, [2003] 1 WLR 1357
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Downtex v Flatley CA 2-Oct-2003
The claimants sought damages for defamation and breach of contract. The claimants had purchased a business from the defendant, which contract included a clause requiring the defendant to say nothing damaging about the business. The defendant . .
Cited – Howe and Co v Burden QBD 11-Feb-2004
Defence of consent – no strike out. The precise ambit of the defence of consent in a defamation case is best established at trial on the basis of the tribunal’s findings of fact. . .
Cited – Meade v Pugh and Another QBD 5-Mar-2004
The claimant was a social work student. He attended a work experience placement, and challenged the report given by the defendants on that placement, saying it was discriminatory and defamatory. He appealed a strike out of his claim.
Held: The . .
Cited – Seray-Wurie v The Charity Commission of England and Wales QBD 23-Apr-2008
The defendant sought an order to strike out the claimant’s allegations of defamation and other torts. The defendants claimed qualified privilege in that the statements complained of were contained in a report prepared by it in fulfilment of its . .
Cited – Clift v Slough Borough Council and Another QBD 6-Jul-2009
clift_sloughQBD09
The claimant sought damages for defamation. The council had decided that she had threatened a member of staff and notified various people, and entered her name on a violent persons register. She alleged malice, the council pleaded justification and . .
Cited – Lewis v Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis and Others (Rev 1) QBD 31-Mar-2011
lewis_cpmQBD11
The defendant sought a ruling on the meaning of the words but using section 69(4) of the 1981 Act. The claimant solicitor was acting in complaints as to the unlawful interception of celebrity voicemails by agents of the press. There had been debate . .
Cited – W v Westminster City Council and Others QBD 9-Dec-2004
The claimant sought to bring an action for defamation based upon communications made in a child protection conference. The reference was in a Report for Conference to be held pursuant to the duties imposed on local authorities by the Children Act . .
Cited – Clift v Slough Borough Council CA 21-Dec-2010
The court was asked how, if at all, the Human Rights Act 1998 has affected a local authority’s defence of qualified privilege in defamation cases. The claimant had been placed on the Council’s Violent Persons Register after becoming very upset and . .
Cited – Wood v Chief Constable West Midlands Police CA 8-Dec-2004
The claimant was a director of a limited company. A Detective Chief Inspector with responsibility for crime prevention was investigating a series of car thefts and arrested the claimant’s business partner and, before the accused had even stood his . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions, Defamation
Leading Case
Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.179914
(Inns of Court) The regulation of barristers has been delegated by the judges to the Inns of Court. Five judges sitting as Visitors of the Inns of Court stated that ‘the judges as visitors have always had supervisory powers and their decision, upon an appeal by a barrister or student to them, has always been the final determination of such matter’.
Paull J said: ‘all through the history of the Inns (of Court) . . a call to the bar does not mean a call to the bar of any court. It only means a call to the bar of the particular Inn.’ And further that since 1292 the power to ‘provide and ordain . . attorneys and lawyers . . was left to the discretion of the justices’ so that: ‘from that time onwards for many years not all those who had been called to the bar of their Inns were allowed to practise in the courts at Westminster. From time to time regulations were made by the judges prescribing the period of time which must elapse after call to the bar of an Inn before the right to audience in the courts was exercised. By the middle of the 17th century it was accepted by the judges that, provided the call had been published in the Inn and the oaths of allegiance and supremacy taken, no further qualification was required to entitle the person called to the bar of his Inn to appear in any of the King’s courts for any client who saw fit to retain his services . . It is clear that the judges never passed over the whole control to the Inns. They kept quite a tight rein on the internal affairs of the Inn, particularly in so far as such affairs related to those who might practise before them. This is of great importance because from time to time the word ‘delegation’ appears in reference to the powers of the Inns given to them by the judges. One of the problems is the precise meaning of that word ‘delegation’ in the context in which it has been used.’
Paull J then observed: ‘The latest example of the use of the word ‘delegation’ is in Attorney-General of Gambia v N’Jie . . where Lord Denning uses the words: ‘By the common law of England the judges have the right to determine who shall be admitted to practise as barristers and solicitors: and, as incidental thereto, the judges have the right to suspend or prohibit from practice. In England this power has for a very long time been delegated, so far as barristers are concerned, to the Inns of Court: and, for a much shorter time, so far as solicitors are concerned, to the Law Society.’
It will be noticed that Lord Denning uses the same word ‘delegated’ in regard to the rights of the judges over who should appear before them as advocates in the case of barristers and their rights in the case of solicitors. Clearly the word ‘delegate’ so used cannot have precisely the same meaning in each case, since the rights of solicitors are to some extent governed by Acts of Parliament and solicitors do not appear before High Court judges as advocates.
It seems clear that Lord Mansfield in his use of the word ‘delegate’ was not using that word in the narrow sense in which it is sometimes used today and which is the basis of the doctrine ‘delegatus non potest delegare’; neither was Lord Denning. Both were using it in the sense that, in regard to the Inns, the judges over a long period, from time to time, had concurred in the Inns performing the duty of selecting those persons who were fit and proper persons to be called to the bar and to be entitled to a right of audience in the courts and the duty of suspending or prohibiting such persons from practice. The exercise of these duties has been at all times, and remains, subject to the visitorial jurisdiction of the judges. Further, the judges in relation to their judicial duties as to who should have the right of audience have never divested themselves of those duties, nor could they ever do so.’
Paull, Lloyd-Jones, Stamp, James and Blain JJ
[1970] 1 QB 160
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Mehey and Others, Regina (on The Application of) v Visitors To The Inns of Court and Others CA 16-Dec-2014
The court was asked whether disciplinary proceedings against a number of barristers were invalid on the ground that some of the individuals who heard those proceedings or appeals therefrom were disqualified from sitting.
Held: The appeals . .
Cited – O’Connor v Bar Standards Board SC 6-Dec-2017
The claimant barrister complained of the manner of conduct of the disciplinary proceedings brought against her. She had been cleared of any breach of the Bar Code of Conduct, but her claim was then ruled out of time under section 7(5)(a), time . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions
Leading Case
Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.540219
H sought to restrain W’s solicitors from acting. The firm was one of six firms approached to consider representing H, and he now said that certain matters had been diviluged to the firm.
Held: The legal principles were clear, and it was for H to establish that some confidential material had been given by him in the course of any meeting. He chose to continue the protection of privilege in respect of some elements, as was his right, but had failed to estabish his case. On the balance of probabilities, no meeting had taken place at which confidential material had been diclosed. H’s application failed.
Williams J summarised the applicable principles: ‘(a) the duties arising in confidentiality and legal professional privilege arise whether the information is imparted to a solicitor directly by a principal, or by an agent on behalf of his principal. It would therefore apply to any confidential information or legally privileged material which arose between Raymond Tooth and OE.
(b) the duty arises whether the parties formally entered into a legal relationship or not. The imparting of information in contemplation of such a relationship would suffice. Thus a preliminary meeting between solicitor and client in the course of a beauty parade could suffice, probably even if pro bono or not charged for.
(c) the rules apply in family cases just as much as in civil actions. There is no absolute rule though that a solicitor cannot act in litigation against a former client.
(d) in the first instance it is a matter for the solicitor involved to consider whether, consistent with his professional conduct rules and the proper administration of justice, he can continue to act. If he concludes he cannot, that will usually be the end of the matter. If he concludes he can continue to act then the Court retains the power to grant an injunction to prevent him from acting.
(e) where a former client has imparted information in confidence in the course of a fiduciary relationship, and /or where that information is privileged, there are strong public policy reasons rooted in the proper administration of justice which support the approach that a solicitor in possession of such information should not act in a way that might appear to put that information at risk of coming into the hands of someone with an adverse interest.
(f) it must be established that the confidential or privileged information is relevant or may be relevant to the matter on which the solicitor is now instructed by the person with an adverse interest to that of the former client.
(g) where it is established that a solicitor is in possession of such confidential and/or privileged information, the Court should intervene to prevent the information coming into the hands of anyone with an adverse interest, unless there is no real risk of disclosure. Once it is established that a person is in possession of such information the burden is on them to show that there is no such real risk. In this context ‘real’ means it is not merely fanciful or theoretical, but it does not need to be substantial.
(h) the risk of disclosure may arise from deliberate act, inadvertent disclosure or unconscious influence or subconscious influence. In the latter case in particular it might be quite fact specific whether that risk arises or not.
(i) in the context of family litigation it is hard to conceive of a situation where the risk of disclosure would not satisfy that test where the Court had concluded that detailed, confidential financial information and/or privileged information had been disclosed to a solicitor by one party to a marriage which was, or might be relevant to a potential dispute between them. In most cases that would create a real risk where that solicitor was subsequently instructed by the other party.
(j) a party advancing such an application may decline to waive privilege or confidentiality, or may elect to partially waive privilege. If he partially waives privilege the Court may order full disclosure in relation to that transaction in order to determine an issue such as an application for an injunction like this, and the Court may take steps to ensure that the privilege is not waived for all purposes, but to ensure that the cat can be put back into the bag. In cases such as this the question should be considered at the directions stage, in particular where, as here, partial disclosure in the form of the attendance note has been made.
(k) if the principles on which an order can be made are established an order should usually be made, unless it is established that there are other more significant public policy reasons for not granting it, including that the Court concludes that the injustice to the respondent in granting the order outweighs the injustice to the applicant in not granting it. Relevant considerations might include, firstly, whether the information had been imparted during an exercise designed either wholly or in part to conflict out other solicitors who the respondent might seek to instruct; whether there are other firms who might now be able to act for the respondent; whether the application was made promptly; the additional expense and delay that might be occasioned to the respondent if they were obliged to instruct new solicitors; whether any such expense could appropriately be off-set by the applicant.’
Williams J
[2017] EWHC 2660 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Minter v Priest CA 1929
An issue was whether conversations between a solicitor and his client relating to the business of obtaining a loan for the deposit on the purchase of real estate were privileged from disclosure.
Held: They were privileged. The were within to . .
Cited – Minter v Priest HL 1930
The House was asked whether a conversation between a person seeking the services of a solicitor in relation to the purchase of real property and the solicitor was privileged in circumstances where the solicitor was being requested to lend the . .
Cited – Francis Day and Hunter Ltd v Bron CA 1963
The test of substantial similarity in copyright infringement cases is an objective one. That assessment is for the court with such assistance from the evidence and parties as it can muster. To be an infringement there must be ‘some causal . .
Cited – Great Atlantic Insurance v Home Insurance CA 1981
The defendants sought to enter into evidence one part of a document, but the plaintiffs sought to have the remainder protected through legal professional privilege.
Held: The entirety of the document was privileged, but by disclosing part, the . .
Cited – Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) HL 16-Dec-1998
Conflicts of Duty with former Client
The House was asked as to the duties of the respondent accountants (KPMG). KPMG had information confidential to a former client, the appellant, which might be relevant to instructions which they then accepted from the Brunei Investment Agency, of . .
Cited – Davies v Davies CA 2000
The wife had objected to the instruction by her former husband of a solicitor who had been instructed by her some seven years previously. She withdrew her objection, but the court now considered an appeal as regards costs.
Held: The court . .
Cited – Re T v A, (children, risk of disclosure) 2000
. .
Cited – B and Others Russell McVeagh McKenzie Bartleet and Co v Auckland District Law Society, Gary J Judd PC 19-May-2003
(New Zealand) Solicitors resisted requests to disclose papers in breach of legal professional privilege from their professional body investigating allegations of professional misconduct against them.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The . .
Cited – Fulham Leisure Holdings Ltd v Nicholson Graham and Jones ChD 14-Feb-2006
The defendant solicitors were being sued for professional negligence. The claimants had taken legal advice after termination of the retainer which led to the present action, and sought to rely upon part of counsel’s opinion. The defendants sought . .
Cited – West London Pipeline and Storage Ltd and Another v Total UK Ltd and others Comc 22-Jul-2008
The court was asked whether it could go behind an affidavit sworn by a person claiming litigation privilege, and, if so, in what circumstances and by what means.
Held: The burden of proof is on the party claiming privilege to establish it; An . .
Cited – Re Z (restraining solicitors from acting) FD 21-Dec-2009
Application by a husband, the respondent in the wife’s divorce proceedings, by which he seeks an order that the wife’s solicitors be debarred from acting any further for her in the divorce or financial matters and that they do remove themselves from . .
Cited – G v G FD 24-Apr-2015
(financial remedies, privilege, confidentiality) W wished to re-open finacial remedy prodeedings embodied in a court consent order. She wished to allege non-disclosure by H of two substantial family trusts. He said that she had known of what she . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Family, Legal Professions
Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.599578
The appellant solicitor had entered into an arrangement with a company to receive referrals of personal injury cases. She said that the agreements were deliberately devised to hide the fact that unlawful referral fees were to be paid, by requiring the subcontracting of associated services to a subsidiary of the insurance company at inflated fees levels. Litigation as to these agreements became known to the SRA who brought disciplinary proceedings, against which fine the solicitor now appealed. She said it had not amounted to a fee sharing arrangement.
Held: The appeal failed. The appellant’s case had been presented on a basis that the question related to the lifting or otherwise of the corporate veil. It was not. The question was whether the arrangements properly construed infringed the rules against paying rewards to introducers and against fee-sharing. Here the true person being reqrded was the parent insurance company
Sir Anthony May, Blake J
[2009] EWHC 1183 (Admin)
Bailii
Solicitors’ Introduction and Referral Code
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Smith, Stone and Knight Limited v Birmingham 1939
Implied Agency between Parent and Subsidiary
An application was made to set aside a preliminary determination by an arbitrator. The parties disputed the compensation payable by the respondent for the acquisition of land owned by Smith Stone and held by Birmingham Waste as its tenant on a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions
Leading Case
Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.346858
Barca and Wimpey had been 50/50 joint venturers through the medium of a company called DLW which had provided services to oil companies in the Middle East, including the Aramco Group. Wimpey agreed to buy out Barca’s interest in DLW on terms which included detailed provision for the further conduct of claims against Aramco, including the provision as between Barca and Wimpey of mutual assistance, information, documents and evidence. Acting on DLW’s behalf, Wimpey settled a claim in litigation between DLW and Aramco, and Barca challenged the reasonableness of Wimpey’s settlement. In litigation between Barka and Wimpey, Wimpey claimed legal professional privilege as an answer to the production of documents about the negotiation of the settlement with Aramco.
Held: The claim for privilege was rejected. The terms of the buy-out and cooperation agreement between Barka and Wimpey created such a common interest between those parties in relation to the conduct of the DLW v Aramco proceedings that there could be no confidence or privilege between Wimpey and Barka in relation to the settlement negotiations.
Bridge LJ discussed the position of a solicitor and claims to legal privilege where he had multiple clients: ‘As regards the claim for legal professional privilege, it seems to me that the general principle underlying several authorities to which our attention has been called by Mr Lincoln, can be accurately stated in quite broad terms, and I would put it in this way. If A and B have a common interest in litigation against C and if at that point there is no dispute between A and B then if subsequently A and B fall out and litigate between themselves and the litigation against C is relevant to the disputes between A and B then in the litigation between A and B neither A nor B can claim legal professional privilege for documents which came into existence in relation to the earlier litigation against C.’
Stephenson LJ said: ‘So here, it seems to me, however you define the relationship which their joint interest creates, it is enough to entitle the plaintiffs . . whether as beneficiaries, cestui que trust, or as partners in a joint venture or as principals, to the same inspection of documents relating to the Aramco claims as the defendants themselves had.’
Bridge LJ
[1980] 1 Lloyds Rep 598
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Portsmouth City Football Club v Sellar Properties (Portsmouth) Limited, Singer and Friedlander Properties Plc ChD 17-Sep-2003
Various contracts were entered into for the sale of land, with compensation being paid in certain circumstances. One contract required a calculation of consideration as a set figure less a sum to be calculated as the cost of acquiring land. The sum . .
Cited – Winters v Mishcon De Reya ChD 15-Oct-2008
The claimant sought an injunction to prevent the defendant firm of solicitors acting for his employers against him. He said that they possessed information confidential to him having acted for him in a similar matter previously. The solicitors . .
Cited – Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd v Harrison (‘The Sagheera’) ChD 1997
The dominant purpose test applies in relation to legal advice privilege in a different way from the way it applies in relation to litigation privilege. In legal advice privilege the practical emphasis is upon the purpose of the retainer. If the . .
Cited – Ford, Regina (on The Application of) v The Financial Services Authority Admn 11-Oct-2011
The claimant sought, through judicial review, control over 8 emails sent by them to their lawyers. They claimed legal advice privilege, but the emails contained advice sent by their chartered accountants. The defendant had sought to use them in the . .
Cited – Singla v Stockler and Another ChD 10-May-2012
The claimant appealed against the striking out of his action for an injunction against the defendant solicitors to restrain them for action for a person, saying that whilst there had been no formal retainer, they had informally advised him. The . .
Cited – James-Bowen and Others v Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis SC 25-Jul-2018
The Court was asked whether the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (‘the Commissioner’) owes a duty to her officers, in the conduct of proceedings against her based on their alleged misconduct, to take reasonable care to protect them from . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Damages, Contract, Legal Professions
Leading Case
Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.186486
The Court considered the meaning of ‘integrity’ as that word is used in the SRA’s Code of Conduct and Principles.
Held: Integrity indicated that something higher was expected of a solicitor than simple honesty. It was a useful shorthand for denoting adherence to the ethical standards of the profession, though an unrealistically high standard was not to be required.
Rupert Jackson, Sharp, Singh LJJ
[2018] EWCA Civ 366, [2018] WLR(D) 147
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Legal Professions
Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.605790
ECHR Article 7-1
Nullum crimen sine lege
Interpretation of offence of tax evasion derived by reference to other areas of law: no violation
Article 6
Civil proceedings
Criminal proceedings
Article 6-1
Impartial tribunal
Independent tribunal
Alleged lack of impartiality of trial judge who had already taken procedural decisions adverse to defence and had sat in trial of co-accused: no violation
Article 6-3-b
Adequate facilities
Adequate time
Need for applicants to study large volume of evidence in difficult prison conditions, but supported by highly qualified legal team: no violation
Article 6-3-c
Defence through legal assistance
Systematic perusal by prison authorities and trial judge of communications between accused and their lawyers: violation
Article 6-3-d
Examination of witnesses
Refusal to allow defence to cross-examine expert witnesses called by the prosecution or to call their own expert evidence: violation
Article 8
Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Respect for private life
Imprisonment in penal colonies thousands of kilometres from prisoners’ homes: violation
Article 18
Restrictions for unauthorised purposes
Allegedly politically motivated criminal proceedings against applicants: violation
Article 34
Hinder the exercise of the right of petition
Disciplinary and other measures against the lawyers acting for applicants in case pending before European Court: failure to comply with Article 8
Facts – Before their arrest the applicants were senior managers and major shareholders of a large industrial group which included the Yukos oil company. They were among the richest men in Russia. Mr Khodorkovskiy, the first applicant, was also politically active: he allocated significant funds to support opposition parties and funded several development programmes and NGOs. In addition, Yukos pursued large business projects which went against the official petroleum policy.
In 2003 the applicants were arrested and detained on suspicion of the allegedly fraudulent privatisation of one of the companies in the group. Subsequently tax and enforcement proceedings were brought against Yukos oil company, which was put into liquidation. New charges were brought against the applicants relating to alleged tax evasion through the registration of trading companies, which in fact had no business activities, in a low-tax zone, and through allegedly false income tax returns. In 2005 the applicants were found guilty of most of the charges. They were sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay the State the equivalent of over EUR 500,000,000 in respect of unpaid company taxes. Their prison sentences were reduced to eight years on appeal. Both applicants were sent to serve their sentences in remote colonies, thousands of kilometres from their Moscow homes.
In their applications to the European Court, the applicants complained of various breaches of the Convention, in particular of their right to a fair trial (Article 6 – 1) and of their right not to be tried of an offence that was not an offence when it was committed (Article 7).
Law – Article 6 – 1: Both applicants complained of several distinct breaches of this provision. The first group of their arguments concerned alleged bias on the part of the presiding judge. The second group to procedural unfairness, in particular: a lack of time and facilities to prepare the defence, an inability to enjoy effective legal assistance, and an inability to examine prosecution evidence or adduce evidence for the defence.
(a) Impartiality – The applicants claimed that procedural decisions taken by the judge during their trial were indicative of bias, that the judge had herself been under investigation during their trial and that she was biased because of her previous findings in the case of another top Yukos manager.
As to the first point, the Court had to have stronger evidence of personal bias than a series of procedural decisions unfavourable to the defence. There was nothing in the trial judge’s decisions to reveal any particular predisposition against the applicants. As to the second point, the allegation that the trial judge was herself under investigation was based on rumour, and could not found a claim of impartiality. As to the final point – the fact that the judge had already sat in a case concerning another senior Yukos manager – the Court had previously clarified that the mere fact that a judge had already tried a co-accused was not, in itself, sufficient to cast doubt on the judge’s impartiality. Criminal adjudication frequently involved judges presiding over various trials in which a number of co-accused stood charged and the work of criminal courts would be rendered impossible if, by that fact alone, a judge’s impartiality could be called into question. An examination was, however, needed to determine whether the earlier judgments contained findings that actually prejudged the question of the applicant’s guilt. The judge in the applicants’ case was a professional judge, a priori prepared to disengage herself from her previous experience in the other manager’s trial. The judgment in the manager’s case did not contain findings that prejudged the question of the applicants’ guilt in the subsequent proceedings and the judge was not bound by her previous findings, for example as regards the admissibility of evidence, either legally or otherwise.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
(b) Fairness of the proceedings
(i) Article 6 – 1 in conjunction with Article 6 – 3 (b): Time and facilities for the preparation of the defence – The second applicant had had eight months and twenty days to study over 41,000 pages of his case-file, and the first applicant five months and eighteen days to study over 55,000 pages. The Court noted the complexity of the documents, the need to make notes, compare documents, and discuss the case-file with lawyers. It also took account of the breaks in the schedule of working with the case-file, and of the uncomfortable conditions in which the applicants had had to work (for example, they had been unable to make photocopies in prison or to keep copies of documents in their cells and there had been restrictions on their receiving copies of documents from their lawyers). However, the issue of the adequacy of time and facilities afforded to an accused had to be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each particular case. The applicants were not ordinary defendants: they had been assisted by a team of highly professional lawyers of great renown, all privately retained. Even if they were unable to study each and every document in the case file personally, that task could have been entrusted to their lawyers. Importantly, the applicants were not limited in the number and duration of their meetings with their lawyers. The lawyers were able to make photocopies; the applicants were allowed to take notes from the case-file and keep their notebooks with them. Indeed, the applicants, who both had university degrees, were senior executives of one of the largest oil companies in Russia and knew the business processes at the heart of the case arguably better than anybody else. Thus, although the defence had had to work in difficult conditions at the pre-trial stage, the time allocated to the defence for studying the case file was not such as to affect the essence of the right guaranteed by Article 6 — 1 and 3 (b).
The Court further examined the conditions in which the defence had had to work at the trial and during the appeal proceedings. In particular, at some point the judge had decided to intensify the course of the trial and hold hearings every day. However, it had not been impossible for the applicants to follow the proceedings and the defence had been able to ask for adjournments when necessary.
At the appeal stage the defence had had over three months to draft written pleadings and to prepare for oral argument. Although the defence had had to start preparing their appeal without having the entirety of the trial materials before them and although there had been doubts as to the accuracy of the trial record, the Court was not persuaded that any such inaccuracies had made the conviction unsafe. Furthermore, the defence was aware of the procedural decisions that had been taken during the trial and what materials had been added. They had audio recordings of the trial proceedings and could have relied on them in the preparation of their points of appeal. The difficulties experienced by the defence during the appeal proceedings had thus not affected the overall fairness of the trial.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
(ii) Article 6 – 1 in conjunction with Article 6 – 3 (c): Lawyer-client confidentiality – The applicants had claimed that that their confidential contacts with their lawyers had been seriously hindered. The Court reiterated that any interference with privileged material and, a fortiori, the use of such material against the accused in the proceedings should be exceptional and justified by a pressing need and would always be subjected to the strictest scrutiny.
As to the applicants’ complaint that one of their lawyers had received summonses from the prosecution, the Court noted that the lawyer concerned had refused to testify and that his refusal had not led to any sanctions against him. Accordingly, in the particular circumstances of the present case, lawyer-client confidentiality had not been breached on account of that episode.
In contrast, by carrying out a search of that lawyer’s office and seizing his working files, the authorities had deliberately interfered with the secrecy of lawyer-client contacts. The Court saw no compelling reasons for that interference. The Government had not explained what sort of information the lawyer might have had, how important it was for the investigation, or whether it could have been obtained by other means. At the relevant time the lawyer was not under suspicion of any kind. Most significantly, the search of his office had not been accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards, such as authorisation by a separate court warrant, as required by the law. The search and seizure were thus arbitrary.
Another point of concern was the prison administration’s practice of perusing all written documents exchanged between the applicants and their lawyers during the meetings in the remand prison. Such perusal had no firm basis in the domestic law, which did not specifically regulate such situations. Furthermore, notes, drafts, outlines, action plans and other like documents prepared by the lawyer for or during a meeting with his detained client were to all intents and purposes privileged material. Any exception from the general principle of confidentiality was only permissible if the authorities had reasonable cause to believe that professional privilege was being abused in that the contents of the document concerned might endanger prison security or the safety of others or was otherwise of a criminal nature. In the present case, however, the authorities had taken as their starting point the opposite presumption, namely that all written communications between a prisoner and his lawyer were suspect. Despite there being no ascertainable facts to show that either the applicants or their lawyers might abuse professional privilege, the measures complained of had lasted for over two years. In the circumstances the rule whereby defence working documents were subject to perusal and could be confiscated if not checked by the prison authorities beforehand was unjustified, as were the searches of the applicants’ lawyers.
Finally, as regards the conditions in which the applicants had been able to communicate with their lawyers in the courtroom the trial judge had requested the defence lawyers to show her all written documents they wished to exchange with the applicants in accordance with the prison authorities’ security arrangements. While checking drafts and notes prepared by the defence lawyers or the applicants the judge might have come across information or arguments which the defence would not wish to reveal and which could have affected her opinion about the factual and legal issues in the case. In the Court’s opinion, it would be contrary to the principle of adversarial proceedings if the judge’s decision was influenced by arguments and information which the parties did not present and did not discuss at an open trial. Furthermore, the oral consultations between the applicants and their lawyers could have been overheard by the prison escort officers. During the adjournments the lawyers had had to discuss the case with their clients in close vicinity of the prison guards. In sum, the secrecy of the applicants’ exchanges, both oral and written, with their lawyers had been seriously impaired during the hearings.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
(iii) Article 6 – 1 in conjunction with Article 6 – 3 (d):- Taking and examination of evidence – As regards the applicants’ complaints that evidence from two experts consulted by the prosecution had been admitted without the applicants being able to challenge it, the Court noted, firstly, that the fact that the prosecution had obtained an expert report without any involvement of the defence did not of itself raise any issue under the Convention, provided that the defence subsequently had an opportunity to examine and challenge both the report and the credibility of those who prepared it, through direct questioning before the trial court.
In response to the Government’s submission that the defence had not shown why it had been necessary to question the expert witnesses, the Court stated that, contrary to the situation with defence witnesses, an accused was not required to demonstrate the importance of a prosecution witness. If the prosecution decided to rely on a particular person’s testimony as being a relevant source of information and if the testimony was used by the trial court to support a guilty verdict, the presumption arose that the personal appearance and questioning of the person concerned were necessary, unless the testimony was manifestly irrelevant or redundant. The two experts had clearly been key witnesses since their conclusions went to the heart of some of the charges against the applicants. The defence had taken no part in the preparation of the experts’ report and had not been able to put questions to them at an earlier stage. In addition, the defence had explained to the district court why they needed to question the experts and there were no good reasons for preventing them from coming to the court. Even if there were no major inconsistencies in the report, questioning experts could reveal possible conflicts of interest, insufficiency of the materials at their disposal or flaws in the methods of examination.
The applicants had also complained of the trial court’s refusal to admit expert evidence (both written and oral) proposed by the defence for examination at the trial. The Court noted that the trial court had refused to admit certain expert evidence which it deemed it irrelevant or useless. In that connection, the Court reiterated that the requirement of a fair trial did not impose an obligation on trial courts to order an expert opinion or any other investigative measure merely because a party had sought it and, having examined the nature of the reports in question, the Court was prepared to accept that the primary reason for not admitting certain of them was their lack of relevance or usefulness which matters were within the trial court’s discretion to decide. However, two audit reports (by Ernst and Young and Price Waterhouse Coopers) were in fact rejected for reasons related not to their content but to their form and origins. Unlike the other expert evidence the defence had sought to adduce, these reports were non-legal and concerned essentially the same matters as the reports produced by the prosecution and so were relevant to the accusations against the applicants. By excluding that evidence, the trial court had put the defence in a disadvantageous position as the prosecution had been entitled to select experts, formulate questions and produce expert reports, while the defence had had no such right. Furthermore, in order effectively to challenge a report by an expert the defence had to have the same opportunity to introduce their own expert evidence. The mere right of the defence to ask the court to commission another expert examination did not suffice. In practice, however, the only option that had been available to the applicants under Russian law had been to obtain oral questioning of ‘specialists’ at the trial, but ‘specialists’ had a different procedural status to ‘experts’, as they had no access to primary materials in the case and the trial court refused to consider their written opinions. In the circumstances, the decision to exclude the two audit reports had created an imbalance between the defence and the prosecution in the area of collecting and adducing ‘expert evidence’, thus breaching the equality of arms between the parties.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 7
(a) Alleged procedural obstacles to prosecution – The applicants had claimed that by virtue of a Constitutional Court ruling of 27 May 2003 they could not be held criminally liable for tax evasion before their tax liability had been established in separate proceedings. The Court was not persuaded that the applicants’ understanding of that ruling was correct. It noted, however, that in any event the alleged ‘procedural obstacles’ did not mean that the acts imputed to the applicants were not defined as ‘criminal offences’ when they were committed. There had therefore been no violation of Article 7 on that account.
(b) Novel interpretation of the concept of ‘tax evasion’ – The applicants had argued that they had suffered from a completely novel and unpredictable interpretation of the provisions (Articles 198 and 199 of the Criminal Code) under which they were convicted. The Court observed that while those provisions defined tax evasion in very general terms, by itself such a broad definition did not raise any issue under Article 7. Forms of economic activity were in constant development, and so were methods of tax evasion. In order to define whether particular behaviour amounted to tax evasion in the criminal-law sense the domestic courts could invoke legal concepts from other areas of law. The law in this area could be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new situations, provided it did not become unpredictable. Thus, although in the criminal-law sphere there was no case-law directly applicable to the transfer-pricing arrangements and allegedly sham transactions at the heart of the applicants’ case, the concept of sham transaction was known to Russian law and the courts had the power to apply the ‘substance-over-form’ rule and invalidate a transaction as sham under the Civil and Tax Codes. The Court reiterated that in this area it was not called upon to reassess the domestic courts’ findings, provided they were based on a reasonable assessment of the evidence. In the present case, despite certain flaws, the domestic proceedings could not be characterised as a flagrant denial of justice.
The Court next turned to the question whether the substantive findings of the domestic courts were arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.
(i) Charges under Article 199 of the Criminal Code (trading companies’ operation in the low-tax zone and the technique of ‘transfer pricing’) – While acknowledging that legitimate methods of tax minimisation could exist, the Court noted that the scheme deployed by Yukos was not fully transparent and that some elements of the scheme that might have been crucial for determining the companies’ eligibility for tax cuts had been concealed from the authorities. For instance, the applicants had never informed the tax authorities of their true relation to the trading companies. The benefits of the trading companies had been returned to Yukos indirectly. All business activities which had generated profit were in fact carried out in Moscow, not in a low-tax zone. The trading companies, which existed only on paper, had no real assets or personnel. Tax minimisation was the sole reason for the creation of the trading companies in the low-tax zone. Such behaviour could not be compared to that of a bona fide taxpayer making a genuine mistake. Finally, it was difficult for the Court to imagine that the applicants, as senior executives and co-owners of Yukos, had not been aware of the scheme or that the trading companies’ fiscal reports did not reflect the true nature of their operations. Thus, the applicants’ acts could be reasonably interpreted as submitting false information to the tax authorities, thus constituting the actus reus of the offence of tax evasion.
(ii) Charges under Article 198 of the Criminal Code (personal income-tax evasion) – In so far as the personal income tax evasion was concerned, the applicants had argued that they had given consulting services to foreign firms and that the tax cuts they had received as ‘individual entrepreneurs’ were legitimate. However, the domestic courts had concluded that such service agreements were in fact de facto payments for the applicants’ work in Yukos and its affiliated structures that would normally have been taxable under the general taxation regime and that the applicants had knowingly misinformed the tax authorities about the true nature of their activities. Those conclusions were not unreasonable or arbitrary.
(c) Application of allegedly dormant criminal law – Lastly, the Court did not accept the applicants’ argument that the authorities’ failure to prosecute and/or convict other businessmen who had been using similar tax-minimisation techniques had made such techniques legitimate and excluded criminal liability. While in certain circumstances a long-lasting tolerance of certain conduct, otherwise punishable under the criminal law, could grow into de facto decriminalisation of such conduct, this was not the case here, primarily because the reasons for such tolerance were unclear. It was possible that the authorities had simply not had sufficient information or resources to prosecute the applicants and/or other businessmen for using such schemes. It required a massive criminal investigation to prove that documents submitted to the tax authorities did not reflect the true nature of business operations. Finally, there was no evidence that tax minimisation schemes used by other businessmen had been organised in exactly the same way as that employed by the applicants. The authorities’ attitude could not therefore be said to have amounted to a conscious tolerance of such practices.
In sum, Article 7 of the Convention was not incompatible with judicial law-making and did not outlaw the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that the resultant development was consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen. While the applicants may have fallen victim to a novel interpretation of the concept of tax evasion, it was based on a reasonable interpretation of the domestic law and consistent with the essence of the offence.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
Article 8: The applicants had complained that their transfer to penal colonies situated thousands of kilometres from their homes had made it impossible for them to see their families. The Court accepted that the situation complained of constituted interference with the applicants’ private and family life and was prepared to accept that the interference was lawful and pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and crime and of securing the rights and freedoms of others.
As to whether it was necessary in a democratic society, the Curt noted, firstly, that it was very likely that the rule set out in the Russian Code of Execution of Sentences, which convicts in areas where prisons were overpopulated to be sent to the next closest region (but not several thousand kilometres away), had not been followed in the applicants’ case. It was hardly conceivable that there were no free places for the applicants in any of the many colonies situated closer to Moscow. The Court stressed that the distribution of the prison population must not remain entirely at the discretion of the administrative bodies and that the interests of convicts in maintaining at least some family and social ties had to somehow be taken into account. In the absence of a clear and foreseeable method of distribution of convicts amongst penal colonies, the system had failed to provide a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities and had led to results that were incompatible with respect for the applicants’ private and family lives.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: The first applicant had complained that, after convicting him of corporate-tax evasion, the trial court had made an award of damages which overlapped with the claims for back payment of taxes that had been brought against Yukos. The Court found, firstly, that the first applicant’s obligation to pay certain outstanding taxes could be considered an interference with his possessions falling within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
However, it was unnecessary for the Court to examine separately the first applicant’s claim that the State had been awarded the same amount of outstanding corporate taxes twice, as in any event, the interference did not have a lawful basis. The Court accepted that where a limited-liability company was used merely as a facade for fraudulent actions by its owners or managers, piercing the corporate veil may be an appropriate solution for defending the rights of its creditors, including the State. However, there had to be clear rules allowing the State to do this if the interference was not to be arbitrary. Neither the Russian Tax Code at the material time nor the Civil Code permitted the recovery of a company’s tax debts from its managers. Furthermore, the domestic courts had repeatedly interpreted the law as not allowing liability for unpaid company taxes to be shifted to company executives. Finally, the trial court’s findings regarding the civil claim were extremely short and contained no reference to applicable provisions of the domestic law or any comprehensible calculation of damages, as if it was an insignificant matter. In sum, neither the primary legislation then in force nor the case-law allowed for the imposition of civil liability for unpaid company taxes on the company’s executives. The award of damages in favour of the State had thus been arbitrary.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 18 (alleged political motivation for prosecution): The Court reiterated that the whole structure of the Convention rested on the general assumption that public authorities in the member States acted in good faith. Though rebuttable in theory, that assumption was difficult to overcome in practice: an applicant alleging that his rights and freedoms were limited for an improper reason had to show convincingly that the real aim of the authorities was not the same as that proclaimed. Thus, the Court had to apply a very exacting standard of proof to such allegations.
That standard had not been met in the applicants’ case. While the circumstances surrounding it could be interpreted as supporting the applicants’ claim of improper motives, there was no direct proof of such motives. The Court was prepared to admit that some political groups or government officials had had their own reasons for pushing for the applicants’ prosecution. However, that was insufficient to conclude that the applicants would not have been convicted otherwise. In the final reckoning, none of the accusations against them even remotely concerned their political activities. Elements of ‘improper motivation’ which may have existed in the instant case did not make the applicants’ prosecution illegitimate from beginning to end: the fact remained that the accusations against the applicants of common criminal offences, such as tax evasion and fraud, were serious, that the case against them had a ‘healthy core’, and that even if there was a mixed intent behind their prosecution, this did not grant them immunity from answering the accusations.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
Article 34: The first applicant had further complained that, in order to prevent him from complaining to the European Court, the authorities had harassed his lawyers.
In the Court’s opinion, there was a significant difference between the first applicant’s allegations under Article 18 and those under Article 34. In so far as his prosecution and trial were concerned, the aims of the authorities for bringing the first applicant to trial and convicting him were evident and did not require further explanation. By contrast, the aim of the disciplinary and other measures directed against his lawyers was far from evident. The Court had specifically invited the Government to explain the reasons for the disbarment proceedings, extraordinary tax audit and denial of visas to the first applicant’s foreign lawyers, but the Government had remained silent on those points. In such circumstances it was natural to assume that the measures directed against the first applicant’s lawyers were linked to his case before the Court. In sum, the measures complained of had been directed primarily, even if not exclusively, at intimidating the lawyers working on the first applicant’s case before the Court. Although it was difficult to measure the effect of those measures on his ability to prepare and argue his case, it was not negligible.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
The Court also found, unanimously, a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the fact that the second applicant appeared at his trial in a metal cage and no violation of that provision in respect of the conditions of his detention in the remand prison; a violation of Article 5 – 3 of the Convention in respect of the length of the second applicant’s pre-trial detention and a violation of Article 5 – 4 on account of delays in the review of his detention.
Article 41: EUR 10,000 to the first applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The second applicant’s pecuniary claims were rejected in full.
(See also Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, no. 5829/04, 31 May 2011, Information Note 141; and OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, no. 14902/04, 20 September 2011, Information Note 144)
11082/06 13772/05 – Chamber Judgment, [2013] ECHR 747, 11082/06 13772/05 – Legal Summary, [2013] ECHR 774
Bailii, Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights
Human Rights
Human Rights, Legal Professions, Crime, Prisons
Leading Case
Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.515133
The solicitor who had been admitted to the Roll for two years had disbursed clients money to relatives, as part of the conveyance of property without adequate security but in the expectation that the money would be repaid. The Tribunal found that the solicitor was honest and had not stolen client money ‘in a premeditated fashion’. The Tribunal took the view that ordinarily the conduct would merit striking off but, in light of the facts of the case, it made a more lenient order. The Divisional Court heard fresh evidence of good character and took the view that the suspension was disproportionate, imposing a fine in substitution.
Held: The Disciplinary Tribunal’s decision was re-instated. The court had given insufficient reason for disturbing it. A solicitor who was in breach of the Law Society’s rules should expect severe sanctions. The rules served not just to discipline solicitors, but also to protect the public. The reputation of a profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual mamber. Membership of a profession brings benefits, but also costs.
Sir Thomas Bingham MR said: ‘It is required of lawyers practising in this country that they should discharge their professional duties with integrity, probity and complete trustworthiness.’ and ‘Because orders made by the tribunal are not primarily punitive, it follows that considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect on the exercise of this jurisdiction than on the ordinary run of sentences imposed in criminal cases. It often happens that a solicitor appearing before the tribunal can adduce a wealth of glowing tributes from his professional brethren. He can often show that for him and his family the consequences of striking off or suspension would be little short of tragic.’
As a principle it requires a very strong case to justify interference by the CA in a penalty imposed by the Tribunal, since its members are best qualified to weigh the seriousness of the professional misconduct before them.
. . Any solicitor who is shown to have discharged his professional duties with anything less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness must expect severe sanctions to be imposed upon him by the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal. Lapses from the required high standard may of course take different forms and be of varying degrees. The most serious involves proven dishonesty . . If a solicitor is not shown to have acted dishonestly, but is shown to have fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, his lapse is less serious but it remains very serious indeed in a member of a profession whose reputation depends on trust. A striking off order will not necessarily follow in such a case, but it may well. The decision whether to strike off of suspend will often involve a fine and difficult exercise of judgment . . . on all the facts of the case. Only in a very unusual and venial case of this kind will the Tribunal be likely to regard as appropriate any order less severe than one of suspension. It is important that there should be full understanding of the reasons why the Tribunal makes orders which might otherwise seem harsh. There is in some of these orders a punitive element; a penalty may be visited on a solicitor who has fallen below the standard required of his profession in order to punish him for what he has done and to deter any other solicitor tempted to behave in the same way. Those are traditional objects of punishment. But often the order is not punitive in intention ‘
and ‘In most cases the order of the Tribunal will be primarily directed to one or other or both of two purposes. One is to be sure the offender does not have the opportunity to repeat the offence. This purpose is achieved for a limited period by an order of suspension; plainly it is hoped that experience of suspension will make the offender meticulous in his future compliance with the required standard. The purpose is achieved for a longer period, and quite possibly indefinitely, by an order for striking off. The second purpose is the most fundamental of all: to maintain the reputation of the solicitor’s profession as one in which every member, of whatever standard, may be trusted to the end of the earth. To maintain the reputation and sustain public confidence in the integrity of the profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious lapses are not only expelled but denied readmission. If a member of the public sells his house, very often his largest asset, and entrusts the proceeds to his solicitor, pending reinvestment in another house, he is ordinarily entitled to expect the solicitor will be a person whose trustworthiness is not, and never has been, seriously in question. Otherwise, the whole profession and the public as a whole is injured. A profession’s most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires.’
Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Rose, Waite LJJ
Times 08-Dec-1993, [1994] 1 WLR 512, [1993] EWCA Civ 32, [1994] 2 All ER 486, [1994] COD 295
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – McCoan v General Medical Council PC 1964
The Board advised: ‘Their Lordships are of opinion that Lord Parker CJ may have gone too far in In re a Solicitor [1960] 2 QB 212 when he said that the appellate court would never differ from sentence in cases of professional misconduct, but their . .
Cited by:
Cited – In the Matter of a Solicitor and In the Matter of Solicitors Act 1974 Admn 15-Dec-1997
The appellant solicitor had been found to have appropriated client funds to himself. He appealed an order striking his name from the Roll of solicitors. He had repaid the sums, and said that he had paid them to satisfy a blackmailer.
Held: An . .
Cited – Dr Gosai v The General Medical Council PC 10-Apr-2003
PC (The Professional Conduct Committee of the GMC) The doctor challenged the decision of the committee to invoke its power to restrain him from making further applications to be restored to the register.
Cited – Darby v The Law Society (the Office of the Supervision of Solicitors) QBD 13-Oct-2003
The solicitor appealed findings of misconduct. He had acted for a builder who complained about breaches of confidentiality and a failure to provide written information on costs.
Held: The appeal was by way of a rehearing (Preiss), but should . .
Cited – Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals v General Medical Council and Dr Solanke Admn 30-Apr-2004
The council appealed against what it said was a lenient sentence imposed on a doctor for malpractice.
Held: It was relevant to take account of the way criminal courts dealt with appeals against lenient sentences. The test in relation to an . .
Cited – Singleton v The Law Society QBD 11-Nov-2005
The claimant appealed his striking off the roll of solicitors. He said he had not been dishonest. He was said to have made entries to show receipts into client account to support payments out when such receipts had not occurred. He denied this was . .
Cited – Baxendale-Walker v The Law Society Admn 30-Mar-2006
The solicitor appealed being struck off. He had given a character reference in circumstances where he did not have justification for the assessment.
Held: ‘The appellant knew that Barclays Bank trusted him to provide a truthful reference. . .
Approved – Gupta v The General Medical Council PC 18-Dec-2001
(The Health Committee of the GMC) A doctor had been found guilty of serious professional misconduct by the Professional Conduct Committee of the General Medical Council. She appealed on the basis that they had not given reasons for the factual basis . .
Cited – Baxendale-Walker v Law Society CA 15-Mar-2007
The solicitor appealed a finding that he had given a reference which he knew to be inappropriate, and his consequential striking off. The tribunal had found his evidence manifestly untrue.
Held: There were no grounds for disturbing the . .
Cited – Jideofo v The Law Society; Evans v The Solicitors Regulation Authority 31-Jul-2007
(Master of the Rolls) Each applicant challenged decisions not to allow them to become student members of the Law Society.
Held: The test for character and suitability was a necessarily high one; was one which was not concerned with punishment, . .
Cited – Ali and Another, Re Solicitors No 21 and 22 of 2007 CA 29-Apr-2008
The claimants challenged revocation of their student membership of the Law Society. The revocation had been made on the basis that they had declared work to be their own unaided work when they were said to have colluded on an assignment.
Held: . .
Cited – Mubarak v General Medical Council Admn 20-Nov-2008
The doctor appealed against a finding against him of professional misconduct in the form of a sexualised examination of a female patient.
Held: The reasons given were adequate, and the response of erasure from the register was the only one . .
Cited – Law Society v Salsbury CA 25-Nov-2008
The Society appealed against an order quashing the striking-off of the solicitor.
Held: Bolton was still the leading case though the solicitor must be given an opportunity for a fair trial. Though it was not necessary to show a very strong . .
Cited – Coke-Wallis, Regina (on The Application of) v Institute of Chartered Accountants In England and Wales SC 19-Jan-2011
The appellant chartered accountant had been convicted in Jersey after removing documents from his offices relating to a disputed trust and in breach of an order from his professional institute. The court now considered the relevance and application . .
Cited – Solicitors Regulation Authority v Dennison Admn 22-Feb-2011
The Authority appealed against the sentence imposed on the respondent by the Soicitoirs Discipinary Tribunal. He had been found to have taken undisclosed referral fees in personal injury litigation giving rise to conflicts of interest and to have . .
Cited – Hazelhurst and Others v Solicitors Regulation Authority Admn 11-Mar-2011
The claimants appealed against disciplinary orders. A member of staff had stolen substantial sums from client account. They had admitted breaches of the Accounts and Practice rules, but personally made good all losses. They said that the Solicitors . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions
Leading Case
Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.78479
The House considered the extent of a barrister’s immunity from action in negligence, and particularly whether it covered pre-trial acts or omissions in connection with civil proceedings.
Held: A barrister’s immunity from suit extended only to such pre-trial work as was intimately connected with the conduct of the case in Court as distinct from more remote legal services such as advice (including advice not to go to Court). Barristers have a special status, just as a trial has a special character: some immunity is necessary in the public interest, even if, in some rare cases, an individual may suffer loss. The immunity of barristers from suit could be justified on two other grounds. The analogy of the general immunity from civil liability which attaches to all persons participating in proceedings before a court. Second was the public interest in not permitting decisions to be challenged by collateral proceedings.
Lord Diplock said that a barrister is not liable for an error of judgment ‘unless the error was such as no reasonably well-informed and competent member of that profession could have made.’
He considered the barrister’s overriding duty to the court: ‘The fact that application of the rules that a barrister must observe may in particular cases call for the exercise of finely balanced judgments upon matters about which different members of the profession might take different views, does not in my view provide sufficient reason for granting absolute immunity from liability at common law. No matter what profession it may be, the common law does not impose on those who practise it any liability for damage resulting from what in the result turn out to have been errors of judgment, unless the error was such as no reasonably well-informed and competent member of that profession could have made. So too the common law makes allowance for the difficulties in the circumstances in which professional judgments have to be made and acted upon. The salvor and the surgeon, like the barrister, may be called upon to make immediate decisions which, if in the result they turn out to have been wrong, may have disastrous consequences. Yet neither salvors nor surgeons are immune from liability for negligent conduct of a salvage or surgical operation; nor does it seem that the absence of absolute immunity from negligence has disabled members of professions other than the law from giving their best services to those to whom they are rendered.’
Lord Wilberforce said: ‘Some immunity is necessary in the public interest, even if, in some rare cases, an individual may suffer.’ and ‘In principle, those who undertake to give skilled advice are under a duty to use reasonable care and skill. The immunity as regards litigation is an exception from this and applies only in the area to which it extends. Outside that area, the normal rule must apply.’ and ‘Much if not most of a barrister’s work involves the exercise of judgment – it is in the realm of art not science. Indeed the solicitor normally goes to counsel [for advice] precisely at the point where, as between possible courses, a choice can only be made on the basis of a judgment which is fallible and may turn out to be wrong. Thus in the nature of things, an action against a barrister who acts honestly and carefully is unlikely to succeed.’
Lord Salmon: ‘Lawyers are often faced with finely balanced problems. Diametrically opposed views may [be] and not infrequently are taken by barristers and indeed by judges, each of whom has exercised reasonable, and sometimes far more than reasonable, care and competence. The fact that one of them turns out to be wrong certainly does not mean that he had been negligent.’ However ‘it can only be the rarest of cases that the law confers any immunity upon a barrister against a claim for negligence in respect of any work he has done out of court.’ and ‘The normal rule applied by the law is that if anyone holding himself out as possessing reasonable competence in his vocation undertakes to advise or settle a document, he owes a duty to advise or settle the document with reasonable competence and care.’
Lord Diplock. Lord Salmon, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Keith of Kinkel
[1980] AC 198, [1978] 3 All ER 1033, [1978] 3 WLR 849, [1978] UKHL 6
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Considered – Rondel v Worsley HL 1967
Need for Advocate’s Immunity from Negligence
The appellant had obtained the services of the respondent barrister to defend him on a dock brief, and alleged that the respondent had been negligent in the conduct of his defence.
Held: The House considered the immunity from suit of . .
Cited by:
Cited – Atwell v Perr and Co and Another ChD 27-Jul-1998
Counsel advising during conduct of case has immunity but a wrongful advice on appeal was outside his immunity. Work done before a hearing constituting the formulation of case was within the immunity from suit. . .
Cited – Moy v Pettman Smith (a firm) and another HL 3-Feb-2005
Damages were claimed against a barrister for advice on a settlement given at the door of the court. After substantial litigation, made considerably more difficult by the negligence of the solicitors, the barrister had not advised the claimant at the . .
Cited – Kelley v Corston CA 20-Aug-1997
The plaintiff employed the defendant barrister to pursue her claim for ancillary relief in divorce. She sought to recover damages for his alleged negligence.
Held: A barrister’s immunity from suit for negligence in advocacy extends to . .
Cited – The Football League Ltd v Edge Ellison (A Firm) ChD 23-Jun-2006
The claimants operated football leagues, and asked the defendant solicitors to act in negotiating the sale of television rights to ONdigital. The broadcasts went ahead, but no guarantees were taken for the contract. The claimants alleged . .
Cited – Hicks v Russell Jones and Walker (A Firm) ChD 27-Apr-2007
The claimants sought to pursue an action in negligence against their solicitors saying that they had conducted another case negligently, and thereby they had lost their chance in the action, on the basis that the hotel at the centre of the action . .
Cited – Abrahams v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis CA 8-Dec-2000
The claimant had been arrested for swearing at a police officer. After her arrest, the claimant made admissions to secure a caution, rather than risk prosecution. She later sought to begin a civil action for damages against the police in the course . .
Cited – Awoyomi v Radford and Another QBD 12-Jul-2007
The claimant sought damages from the defendant barristers who had represented her in criminal proceedings. They had not passed on to her the statement made by the judge in chambers that if she pleaded guilty he would not impose a sentence of . .
Cited – Welsh v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police 1993
On conviction for one offence, the plaintiff asked for two other offences to be taken into consideration. He was bailed pending sentence. He was then arrested for the other offences and wrongfully held in custody. The Crown Prosecution Service had . .
Cited – Williams v Thompson Leatherdale (A Firm) and Another QBD 10-Nov-2008
The claimant sought damages from her legal advisers. They had allowed her to settle an ancillary relief application knowing that the case of White v White had been referred to the House of lords, and the settlement proved to have been on . .
Cited – Ridehalgh v Horsefield; Allen v Unigate Dairies Ltd CA 26-Jan-1994
Guidance for Wasted Costs Orders
Guidance was given on the circumstances required for the making of wasted costs orders against legal advisers. A judge invited to make an order arising out of an advocate’s conduct of court proceedings must make full allowance for the fact that an . .
Cited – McFaddens (A Firm) v Platford TCC 30-Jan-2009
The claimant firm of solicitors had been found negligent, and now sought a contribution to the damages awarded from the barrister defendant. They had not managed properly issues as to their clients competence to handle the proceedings.
Held: . .
Cited – Pritchard Joyce and Hinds (A Firm) v Batcup and Another CA 5-May-2009
Standard expected of negligence claim on counsel
The claimant solicitors sought contributory damages from counsel for failing to advise them of the applicable limitation period in an action they were conducting against other solicitors in negligence. Counsel now appealed saying that the judged had . .
Cited – Jones v Kaney SC 30-Mar-2011
An expert witness admitted signing a joint report but without agreeing to it. The claimant who had lost his case now pursued her in negligence. The claimant appealed against a finding that the expert witness was immune from action.
Held: The . .
Cited – Lumsdon and Others, Regina (on The Application of) v Legal Services Board Admn 20-Jan-2014
Four barristers challenged, by a judicial review, a decision by which the LSB approved an application proposed by the BSB jointly with two other approved regulators, the SRA and IPS, to introduce the Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates . .
Cited – Singh v Moorlands Primary School and Another CA 25-Jul-2013
The claimant was a non-white head teacher, alleging that her school governors and local authority had undermined and had ‘deliberately endorsed a targeted campaign of discrimination, bullying, harassment and victimisation’ against her as an Asian . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions, Professional Negligence
Leading Case
Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.181061
Complaint was made that proceedings had been made by the claimant company when the solicitors acted on the instructions of somebody describing himself wrongly as a director of the company.
Held: The defendant’s request for costs against the solicitors failed. There could be no warranty of authority where the litigation was itself about the very issue alleged to have been warranted. The defendant had not relied on the warranty claimed.
William Trower QC
[2016] EWHC 2249 (Ch), [2016] WLR(D) 527
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Aidiniantz v The Sherlock Holmes International Society Ltd ChD 15-Jun-2016
Solicitor does not warrant his client’s case
The company had appealed from an order for its winding up. The solicitors had acted on the instructions of a director, whose authority was now challenged.
Held: The claim for costs against the solicitors failed. They had been properly retained . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Company, Legal Professions
Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.570349
ECJ Reference for a preliminary ruling – Freedom of movement for persons – Access to the profession of lawyer – Possibility of refusing registration in the Bar Council register to nationals of a Member State who have obtained their professional legal qualification in another Member State – Abuse of rights
V. Skouris, P
C-58/13, [2014] EUECJ C-58/13
Bailii
European
Legal Professions
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.534456
In five cases, leave to appeal was sought on the basis that a party had been refused disqualification of judges on grounds of bias. The court considered the circumstances under which a fear of bias in a court may prove to be well founded: ‘The mere fact that a judge, earlier in the same case or in a previous case, had commented adversely on a party or witness, or found the evidence of a party of witness to be unreliable, would not without more found a sustainable objection’ and ‘it would be dangerous and futile to attempt to define or list the factors which may or may not give rise to a real danger of bias. Everything will depend on the facts, which may include the nature of the issue to be decided. We cannot, however, conceive of circumstances in which an objection could be soundly based on the religion, ethnic or national origin, gender, age, class, means or sexual orientation on the judge. Nor, at any rate ordinarily, could an objection be soundly based on the judge’s social or educational or service or employment background or history, nor that of any member of the judge’s family; or previous political associations; or membership of social or sporting or charitable bodies; or Masonic associations; or previous judicial decisions; or extracurricular utterances (whether in textbooks, lectures, speeches, articles, interviews, reports or responses to consultation papers); or previous receipt of instructions to act for or against any party, solicitor or advocate in a case before him; or membership of the same Inn, circuit, local Law Society or chambers’.
Lord Bingham CJ, Lord Woolf MR, Sir William Blackburne VC
[2000] 1 QB 451, [2000] IRLR 96, [2000] 1 All ER 64, [1999] EWCA Civ 3004, [2000] HRLR 290, [2000] 2 WLR 870, 7 BHRC 583, [2000] UKHRR 300
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights,
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal and others HL 26-Jun-1852
The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, owned a substantial shareholding in the defendant canal which was an incorporated body. He sat on appeal from the Vice-Chancellor, whose judgment in favour of the company he affirmed. There was an appeal on the . .
Doubted – Regina v Gough (Robert) HL 1993
The defendant had been convicted of robbery. He appealed, saying that a member of the jury was a neighbour to his brother, and there was therefore a risk of bias. This was of particular significance as the defendant was charged with conspiracy with . .
Cited – Regina v Rand 1866
r_rand1866
A judge with an interest in a case, or is a party to it, will be debarred from hearing it.
Blackburn J said: ‘There is no doubt that any direct pecuniary interest, however small, in the subject of inquiry, does disqualify a person from acting . .
Cited – Regina v Camborne Justices ex parte Pearce QBD 1954
The applicant had been convicted by the Justices on charges of offences under the Food and Drugs Act 1938 which had been brought under the authority of the Health Committee of the Cornwall County Council. The Clerk to the Justices was a councillor . .
See Also – Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd and Others (No 3) ChD 29-Feb-2000
It can be proper to award costs against a third party to an action where his behaviour had fallen short of strictly maintaining the action. Here a husband had funded his wife’s defence knowing that she would be unable to support any order for costs . .
Appeal from – Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd and Another; Locabail (UK) Ltd and Another v Waldorf Investment Corporation and others (No 2) ChD 18-May-1999
A solicitor sitting as a judge was not obliged to disqualify himself even though his firm might not have been able to act for one of the parties to the case, unless a reasonable third party might properly think that he could not be impartial. . .
Cited – Regina v Inner West London Coroner Ex Parte Dallaglio, and Ex Parte Lockwood Croft CA 16-Jun-1994
A coroner’s comment that the deceased’s relative was ‘unhinged’ displayed a bias which was irreparable. ‘The description ‘apparent bias’ traditionally given to this head of bias is not entirely apt, for if despite the appearance of bias the court is . .
Cited – Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) HL 15-Jan-1999
A petition was brought to request that a judgment of the House be set aside because the wife of one their lordships, Lord Hoffmann, was as an unpaid director of a subsidiary of Amnesty International which had in turn been involved in a campaign . .
Cited – Clenae Pty Ltd and Others v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 9-Apr-1999
(Supreme Court of Victoria) The court considered the issue of bias in a judge where he held shares in a company in the trial before him.
Held: The outcome of the litigation could not have realistically affected his judgment. He held a small . .
Cited – Powell v Chief Constable of North Wales Constabulary CA 20-Aug-1999
Application for permission to appeal by the defendant. The defendant had asserted a public interest immunity in refusing to disclose evidence of a witness since it would lead to the revelation of the identity of an informer.
Held: Leave was . .
Cited – Law v Chartered Institute of Patent Agents 1919
Eve J discussed the test for bias in the members of a council making a decision: ‘If he has a bias which renders him otherwise than an impartial judge he is disqualified from performing his duty. Nay, more (so jealous is the policy of our law of the . .
Cited – Rex v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy KBD 9-Nov-1923
Clerk wrongly retired with Justices
There had been a prosecution before the lay magistrates for dangerous driving. Unknown to the defendant and his solicitors, the Clerk to the Justices was a member of the firm of solicitors acting in a civil claim against the defendant arising out of . .
Cited – Vakauta v Kelly 1989
(High Court of Australia) The majority held that the first instance judge fell on the wrong side of ‘an ill-defined line beyond which the expression by a trial judge of preconceived views about the reliability of particular medical witnesses could . .
Cited by:
Cited – Lodwick v London Borough of Southwark CA 18-Mar-2004
The claimant alleged bias on the part of the employment appeal tribunal chairman hearing his appeal. The chairman refused to stand down, saying that he was only one of three tribunal members with an equal vote. The chairman had four year’s . .
Cited – Davidson v Scottish Ministers HL 15-Jul-2004
The claimant had sought damages for the conditions in which he had been held in prison in Scotland. He later discovered that one of the judges had acted as Lord Advocate representing as to the ability of the new Scottish Parliamentary system to . .
Cited – AMEC Capital Projects Ltd v Whitefriars City Estates Ltd CA 28-Oct-2004
Alleged bias and procedural unfairness by an adjudicator appointed to determine a dispute in relation to a construction contract.
Held: The principles of the common law rules of natural justice and procedural fairness were two-fold. A . .
Cited – Birminham City Council and Another v Yardley CA 9-Dec-2004
The litigant was informed before the case that the judge was from the same chambers as counsel for the opposing side.
Held: Such a litigant if he wanted to complain of bias must do so immediately. The judgment had been delivered only in draft . .
Cited – Al-Hasan, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 16-Feb-2005
Prisoners were disciplined after refusing to be squat searched, saying that the procedure was humiliating and that there were no reasonable grounds to suspect them of any offence against prison discipline. The officer who had been involved in . .
See Also – Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd and Others (No 3) ChD 29-Feb-2000
It can be proper to award costs against a third party to an action where his behaviour had fallen short of strictly maintaining the action. Here a husband had funded his wife’s defence knowing that she would be unable to support any order for costs . .
Cited – In Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2); Director General of Fair Trading v Proprietary Association of Great Britain and Proprietary Articles Trade Association CA 21-Dec-2000
The claimants alleged that a connection between a member of the Restrictive Practices Court, who was to hear a complaint and another company, disclosed bias against them. She had not recused herself.
Held: When asking whether material . .
Cited – Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd CA 14-Sep-2005
The club regulated greyhound racing. The claimant had complained that its disciplinary proceedings had been conducted unfairly. He said that a panel member had an interest as veterinary surgeon in the proceedings at the stadium at which the alleged . .
Cited – AWG Group Ltd and Another v Morrison and Another ChD 1-Dec-2005
Application was made for the judge to recuse himself from a forthcoming trial when he indicated that an intended witness was known to him personally.
Held: The test to be applied was to include: ‘all circumstances which have a bearing on the . .
Cited – Morrison and Another v AWG Group Ltd and Another CA 20-Jan-2006
The defendants requested the judge to recuse himself because one witness was well known to the judge. He declined, saying that arrangements had been made for him not to be called. The defendant appealed.
Held: There was no allegation of actual . .
Cited – Port Regis School Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v Gillingham and Shaftesbury Agricultural Society Admn 5-Apr-2006
Complaint was made that the decision of a planning committee had been biased because of the presence on the committee of two freemasons, and where the interests of another Lodge were affected.
Held: The freemasonry interests had been declared. . .
Cited – London Borough of Southwark v Dennett CA 7-Nov-2007
The defendant tenant had been delayed for over five years by the claimant in buying his council house. He stopped paying rent in protest, and the council brought possession proceedings. He then paid his rent and continued in his counterclaim to . .
Cited – Armchair Passenger Transport Ltd v Helical Bar Plc and Another QBD 28-Feb-2003
Objection was made to the use of an expert witness who had formerly been a senior employee of the defendant.
Held: The court set out criteria for testing the independence of a proposed expert witness: ‘i) It is always desirable that an expert . .
Cited – Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Another HL 22-Oct-2008
The appellant, a Palestinian, challenged the involvement of Lady Cosgrove as a judge in her case, saying that Lady Cosgrove’s involvement as a jew in pro-Jewish lobby organisations meant that there was an appearance of bias. The applicant had sought . .
Cited – Roberts, Regina (on the Application of) v The Parole Board Admn 7-Nov-2008
The prisoner was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of three police officers in 1966. He served a longer time than the recommended minimum and had been transferred to an open prison anticipating release on licence. He now complained of . .
Cited – Garrett v Halton Borough Council CA 16-Mar-2007
The defendants argued that the conditional fee agreement in use by the claimant’s solicitors was void and so in breach of the rules.
Held: In assessing whether there was any ‘interest’ for the purposes of the Regulation, the court looked to . .
Cited – Tankard v John Fredricks Plastics Ltd; Jones v Attrill etc CA 11-Dec-2008
The defendants sought to argue that the conditional fee arrangement used by the claimant’s solicitors had been void under the 2000 regulations. They claimed that the solicitors had failed to disclose an interest in the policies sold.
Held: No . .
Cited – Vanttinen-Newton v The GEO Group UK Ltd EAT 23-Jul-2009
EAT UNFAIR DISMISSAL
The Claimant was head chaplain at an immigration removal centre. He was dismissed for giving an unauthorised interview broadcast on a local radio religious broadcast and because ‘there . .
Cited – Regina v KS CACD 17-Nov-2009
The jury had been discharged by the judge after finding jury tampering, and he decided to continue alone. The jury had not known of the earlier convictions of others involved in the alleged conspiracy, but the judge did and he had made reference to . .
Cited – Mireskandari v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 4-May-2010
The claimant sued in defamation, but had failed to make disclosure of documents as ordered. He asked for the ‘unless’ order to be set aside, and the action re-instated saying that he had not had notice of the application for it. He also argued that . .
Cited – MMI Research Ltd v Cellxion Ltd and Others ChD 24-Sep-2007
The claimant had accidentally disclosed a confidential document it should not have done. The defendant argued that there had been a waiver of privilege.
Held: Applying Al Fayed, it could not in these circumstances be said that the mistake was . .
Cited – Oshungbure and Another, Regina v CACD 10-Mar-2005
The defendant appealed against a confiscation order, saying that the judge having previously expressed strong contrary views of the defendant, should have recused himself from the application, because of the appearance of bias. The judge had . .
Cited – Oni v NHS Leicester City EAT 12-Sep-2012
Oni_LeicesterEAT2012
EAT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Costs
The Employment Tribunal should have recused itself from hearing an application for costs, given opinions which it expressed when giving reasons for deciding the case . .
Cited – O’Neill v Her Majesty’s Advocate No 2 SC 13-Jun-2013
The appellants had been convicted of murder, it being said that they had disposed of her body at sea. They now said that the delay between being first questioned and being charged infringed their rights to a trial within a reasonable time, and . .
Cited – Otkritie International Investment Management and Others v Urumov CA 14-Oct-2014
The claimants brought proceedings against several defendants. There had been a series of hearings conducted by a single judge leading to findings that several defendants had been involved in a fraud. The defendants sought recusal of that judge . .
Cited – Roberts and Others v Regina CACD 6-Dec-2018
Sentencing of Political Protesters
The defendants appealed against sentences for causing a public nuisance. They had been protesting against fracking by climbing aboard a lorry and blocking a main road for several days.
Held: The appeals from immediate custodial sentences were . .
Cited – Hayden v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 11-Mar-2020
The claimant alleged defamation by the defendant, and the court now considered the meanings of the words complained of. Another person had been held by police for seven hours after identifying the claimant as a transgendered man.
Held: The . .
Cited – Ameyaw v McGoldrick and Others QBD 6-Jul-2020
Recusal Refused – former Pupil Master
Request for recusal – the judge was said to have been a member of the same chambers as counsel for the claimant and had been his mentor.
Held: Refused: ‘It was untenable to contend that there was an appearance of bias in circumstances where . .
Cited – The Conservative and Unionist Party v The Election Commissioner CA 23-Nov-2010
A losing candidate at a local election alleged corrupt and illegal practices relating to the entry of non-existent people on the electoral roll and using postal votes. The Election Commissioner found this proved and the election void, and awarded . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Human Rights, Natural Justice, Legal Professions
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.136005
The defendant, a Member of Parliament, wrote a letter to the Law Society with a copy to the Lord Chancellor, saying that he had been specifically requested by a constituent to refer the plaintiffs’ solicitors’ firm to the Law Society for investigation. He set out the constituent’s complaints and stated that, contrary to his usual practice he had complied with the request because he had received complaints from other constituents in the past concerning the plaintiffs’ firm. He defended the defamation action, claiming qualified privilege.
Held: Qualified privilege may arise in the making of complaints about public officials or persons with public duties to the relevant authorities.
Geoffrey Lane J said: ‘Finally, have the plaintiffs proved that the defendant was actuated by express malice? Malice includes any spite or ill-will directed from the defendant at the plaintiffs. It also includes any indirect motive. That is to say, any intention on the part of the defendant to use the occasion, not merely for the purpose for which it is a subject of qualified privilege, but for some extraneous purpose of his own not connected with privilege’
. . And ‘it seems contrary to principle that the existence of qualified privilege should depend on the mistaken belief of the defendant’.
Lane J
[1972] 1 QB 14
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Nevill v Fine Arts and General Insurance Co Ltd CA 1895
Lopes LJ said: ‘The effect of the occasion being privileged is to render it incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove malice, that is, to shew some indirect motive not connected with the privilege, so as to take the statement made by the defendant out . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Defamation, Constitutional, Legal Professions
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.539180
(Belize) The applicant complained at his removal as a justice of the Supreme Court, stating it was unconstitutional. The complaint had been decided by a member of the Bar Council which had also recommended his removal, and he said it had been decided in private.
Held: It was not suggested that the chairman had any pecuniary interest. A judge of the Supreme court had to be qualified as a barrister, and therefore be a member of the Bar Council in order to sit. Those framing the constitution must have anticipated this apparent conflict, and a chairman should therefore not be automatically disqualified. Not every proceeding must be held in public. The BAC was not a judicial body. The rules of the BAC were designed to ensure fairness, and they were not impugned by the proceedings, nor their privacy.
Lord Hoffmann, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Carswell
[2005] UKPC 12, Times 20-Apr-2005, [2005] 2 WLR 1307, [2005] 2 AC 513
Bailii, PC
Belize Constitution 98(4)
Commonwealth
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) HL 15-Jan-1999
A petition was brought to request that a judgment of the House be set aside because the wife of one their lordships, Lord Hoffmann, was as an unpaid director of a subsidiary of Amnesty International which had in turn been involved in a campaign . .
Cited – Porter and Weeks v Magill HL 13-Dec-2001
Councillors Liable for Unlawful Purposes Use
The defendant local councillors were accused of having sold rather than let council houses in order to encourage an electorate which would be more likely to be supportive of their political party. They had been advised that the policy would be . .
Cited – Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal and others HL 26-Jun-1852
The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, owned a substantial shareholding in the defendant canal which was an incorporated body. He sat on appeal from the Vice-Chancellor, whose judgment in favour of the company he affirmed. There was an appeal on the . .
Cited – In Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2); Director General of Fair Trading v Proprietary Association of Great Britain and Proprietary Articles Trade Association CA 21-Dec-2000
The claimants alleged that a connection between a member of the Restrictive Practices Court, who was to hear a complaint and another company, disclosed bias against them. She had not recused herself.
Held: When asking whether material . .
Cited – Regina v Gough (Robert) HL 1993
The defendant had been convicted of robbery. He appealed, saying that a member of the jury was a neighbour to his brother, and there was therefore a risk of bias. This was of particular significance as the defendant was charged with conspiracy with . .
Cited – Lawal v Northern Spirit Limited HL 19-Jun-2003
Counsel appearing at the tribunal had previously sat as a judge with a tribunal member. The opposing party asserted bias in the tribunal.
Held: The test in Gough should be restated in part so that the court must first ascertain all the . .
Cited – Leeson v Council of Medical Education and Registration 1889
Mere membership of an association by which proceedings are brought does not disqualify a judge from hearing the case, but active involvement in the institution of the particular proceedings does. Here, mere membership of the Medical Defence Union . .
Cited – Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration 1894
The mere ex officio membership of the committee of the Medical Defence Union was held to be insufficient to disqualify the member from sitting on the disciplinary panel. . .
Cited – Pellegrin v France ECHR 8-Dec-1999
The court modified the approach taken in earlier decisions, that there are excluded from the scope of article 6(1) disputes raised by public servants whose duties typify the specific activities of the public service in so far as the latter is acting . .
Cited – Regina (Holding and Barnes plc) v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the Regions; Regina (Alconbury Developments Ltd and Others) v Same and Others HL 9-May-2001
Power to call in is administrative in nature
The powers of the Secretary of State to call in a planning application for his decision, and certain other planning powers, were essentially an administrative power, and not a judicial one, and therefore it was not a breach of the applicants’ rights . .
Cited – Stewart v Secretary of State for Scotland (Scotland) HL 22-Jan-1998
The dismissal of a Scottish Sheriff ‘for inability’ is not limited in meaning to either mental or physical infirmity, but can also include simple incompetence. The fact that the inquiry into the sherriff’s unfitness was conducted in private was not . .
Cited – Stewart v Secretary of State for Scotland IHCS 1996
The House considered the test of unfitness of a Sherriff: ‘. . what has to be shown is that he is not really capable of performing the proper function of a judge at all.’ . .
Cited by:
Cited – Gillies v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions HL 26-Jan-2006
The claimant said that the medical member of the tribunal which had heard his disability claim was biased. The doctor was on a temporary contract and also worked for an agency which contracted directly the Benfits Agency. The court of session had . .
Cited – Regina v Abdroikof, Regina v Green; Regina v Williamson HL 17-Oct-2007
The House was asked whether a jury in criminal trials containing variously a Crown Prosecution Service solicitor, or a police officer would have the appearance of bias. In Abdroikof, the presence of the police officer on the jury was discovered only . .
Cited – Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Another HL 22-Oct-2008
The appellant, a Palestinian, challenged the involvement of Lady Cosgrove as a judge in her case, saying that Lady Cosgrove’s involvement as a jew in pro-Jewish lobby organisations meant that there was an appearance of bias. The applicant had sought . .
Cited – Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Another HL 22-Oct-2008
The appellant, a Palestinian, challenged the involvement of Lady Cosgrove as a judge in her case, saying that Lady Cosgrove’s involvement as a jew in pro-Jewish lobby organisations meant that there was an appearance of bias. The applicant had sought . .
Cited – Kaur, Regina (on The Application of) v Institute of Legal Executives Appeal Tribunal and Another CA 19-Oct-2011
The claimant appealed against rejection of judicial review of a finding that she had effectively cheated at a professional examination for the Institute. She compained that the presence of a director and the council’s vice-president of the Institute . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions, Constitutional, Natural Justice
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.223880
Application by Pepper (UK) Ltd t/a Engage Credit against Emma Jane Fox practising as Barry Fox, Solicitors for the delivery up of all papers, documents and title deeds in the possession and custody of the Solicitors and belonging to the plaintiff relating to mortgage business in respect of a mortgage and premises in County Tyrone. The solicitors said that certain documents related to advice given to the mortgagor’s wife and were confidential to her. The lender said that having acted for them in the matter, all documents were to be disclosed.
Horner J
[2016] NICh 1
Bailii
Citing:
Cited – Leicester County Council v Michael Faraday and Partners CA 1941
The Court rejected a claim for production of all documents, books, maps and plans in possession of rating valuers who were employed by the County Council to give advice and held that the relationship of the County Council and the valuers was that of . .
Cited – Chantrey Martin v Martin CA 1953
The professional working papers of a firm of accountants were held not to be the property of the client, but letters and other papers created by accountants as agent for client were the client’s property: ‘Working accounts and other papers which . .
Cited – Mortgage Express Ltd v Bowerman and Partners (A Firm) CA 1-Aug-1995
A solicitor acting for both a lender and a borrower was under a duty to disclose relevant information to the lender client. An incident of their duty to exercise reasonable care and skill, solicitors are obliged to advise their lender client in . .
Cited – Nationwide Building Society v Various Solicitors ChD 20-Jul-1999
The case draws a distinction in group and consolidated actions between costs incurred on the general points which have been common to the parties and which brought the actions together and costs incurred in dealing with matters specific to the . .
Cited – The Mortgage Business Plc and Bank of Scotland Plc (T/A Birmingham Midshires) v Thomas Taggart and Sons ChNI 30-Apr-2014
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Northern Ireland, Legal Professions
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.564915
The claimants appealed against disciplinary orders. A member of staff had stolen substantial sums from client account. They had admitted breaches of the Accounts and Practice rules, but personally made good all losses. They said that the Solicitors Discliplinary Tribunal had failed to give adequate reasons for its decisions.
Held: The appeal succeeded: ‘the SDT failed to give any reasons for its apparent refusal to take into account any of the mitigating factors it referred to in its judgment and accordingly allow the first ground of appeal. As the matters relied upon by the appellants in this ground of appeal go to the core of their case, of itself, it provides a sufficient reason for this court to revisit the decision of the SDT.’
The court considered the appropriate penalty and said: ‘The responsibility of the appellants for the breach and the need to maintain public confidence in the profession require the imposition of a sanction. Determination of the appropriate sanction requires account to be taken of the appellants’ conduct. Conduct which positively reflects upon the appellants’ character can be viewed by the public as evidence of their own trustworthiness. I regard their conduct as identified in paragraph 43 above as such evidence. Each appellant has made his own financial reparation; as a result no client has suffered. This latter fact is relevant to the question of whether a financial penalty is appropriate.’
Nicola Davies DBE J
[2011] EWHC 462 (Admin)
Bailii
Solicitors Act 1974
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Bolton v The Law Society CA 8-Dec-1993
The solicitor who had been admitted to the Roll for two years had disbursed clients money to relatives, as part of the conveyance of property without adequate security but in the expectation that the money would be repaid. The Tribunal found that . .
Cited – English v Emery Reimbold and Strick Ltd; etc, (Practice Note) CA 30-Apr-2002
Judge’s Reasons Must Show How Reached
In each case appeals were made, following Flannery, complaining of a lack of reasons given by the judge for his decision.
Held: Human Rights jurisprudence required judges to put parties into a position where they could understand how the . .
Cited – Macleod v The Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (the Disciplinary Committee of the Rcvs) PC 24-Jul-2006
Held: The brevity of the disciplinary committee’s consideration of the issues relating to sanction, as contained in its determination, permitted the court to examine afresh the appropriateness of the penalty imposed. . .
Cited by:
Cited – Bass and Another v Solicitors Regulation Authority Admn 18-Jul-2012
The appellants challenged the decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal finding them in breach of the 1998 Rules in that they had failed to prevent a former partner making unauthorised, if small, withdrawals of residual balances from client . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.430526
The claimant was involved in matrimonial ancillary relief proceedings. His wife was advised by the defendants, her solicitors, to remove his private papers. The claimant now sought permission to appeal against a strike out of his claim against the solicitors for wrongful interference with property by ‘possessing, taking or intercepting the claimant’s correspondence and documents including personal family letters, private and confidential letters concerning business opportunities and documents containing financial information.’ Withers relied on their advice having been given in compliance with Hildebrand.
Held: Leave to appeal was granted, and the claim re-instated. The rule in Hildebrand covered issues as to the use of such material within family proceedings, and not wider issues of property rights: ‘The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 can be invoked to justify admitting the evidence contained in the documents: but one cannot construe the Act as authorising the commission of the torts of trespass or conversion.’ The defendants had taken into possesion and retained original and private documents which had no relevance in the proceedings. The propriety of the solicitor’s conduct was at issue, and could not be swept under the carpet.
The court examined the history and limits of self-help remedies in matters of tort
Ward LJ explained the rule in Hildebrand: ‘It may be appropriate to summarise the Hildebrand rules as they apply in the Family Division as follows. The family courts will not penalise the taking, copying and immediate return of documents but do not sanction the use of any force to obtain the documents, or the interception of documents or the retention of documents nor I would add, though it is not a feature of this case, the removal of any hard disk recording documents electronically. The evidence contained in the documents, even those wrongfully taken will be admitted in evidence because there is an overarching duty on the parties to give full and frank disclosure. The wrongful taking of documents may lead to findings of litigation misconduct or orders for costs.’
Ward, Sedley, Wilson LJJ
[2009] EWCA Civ 1122, [2010] Fam Law 26, [2009] 3 FCR 435 [2009] 3 FCR 435
Bailii
Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Hildebrand v Hildebrand 1992
The parties in ancillary relief proceedings sought orders for discovery. H had been to the wife’s flat surreptitiously on five occasions, and taken photocopies of so many documents obtained by him in the course of those visits (but returned after . .
Cited – White v Withers Llp and Another QBD 19-Nov-2008
The claimant sought damages. The defendant firm of solicitors had represented the claimant’s wife in matrimonial procedings, and had used in evidence documents which the claimant said had been taken from him and were confidential.
Held: The . .
Cited – Ward v Macauley And Another 25-Nov-1791
A having let his house ready furnished to B. cannot maintain trespass against the sheriff for taking the furniture under an execution against B.; though notice were given that the goods belonged to A. The plaintiff was the landlord of a house, which . .
Cited – T v T (Interception of Documents) FD 5-Aug-1994
W feared that the H would seek to understate the true extent of his resources to the court and so she engaged in a number of activities, including opening and taking letters addressed to him and breaking into his office, with the intention of . .
Cited – L v L and Hughes Fowler Carruthers QBD 1-Feb-2007
The parties were engaged in ancillary relief proceedings. The Husband complained that the wife had sought to use unlawfully obtained information, and in these proceedings sought delivery up of the material from the wife and her solicitors. He said . .
Cited – Fouldes v Willoughby 1841
The ferryman who turned the plaintiff’s horses off the Birkenhead to Liverpool ferry was guilty of conversion if he intended to exercise dominion over them, but not otherwise. Scratching the panel of a horse carriage would be a trespass, but it . .
Cited – Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company and Others (Nos 4 and 5) HL 16-May-2002
After the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi government had dissolved Kuwait airlines, and appropriated several airplanes. Four planes were destroyed by Allied bombing, and 6 more were appropriated again by Iran.
Held: The appeal failed. No claim . .
Cited – Marfani and Co Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd CA 1968
A rogue opened a new bank account under a false name with the help of an incorrect reference from a valued customer.
Held: When an account is fraudulently opened with the bank in the name of another person by someone pretending to be that . .
Cited – Southwark London Borough Council v Williams CA 1971
No Defence of Homelessness to Squatters
The defendants, in dire need of housing accommodation entered empty houses owned by the plaintiff local authority as squatters. The court considered the defence of necessity.
Held: The proper use of abandoned council properties is best . .
Cited – Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd and others; similar HL 2-May-2007
In Douglas, the claimants said that the defendants had interfered with their contract to provide exclusive photographs of their wedding to a competing magazine, by arranging for a third party to infiltrate and take and sell unauthorised photographs. . .
Cited – Jones v University of Warwick CA 4-Feb-2003
The claimant appealed a decision to admit in evidence a tape recording, taken by an enquiry agent of the defendant who had entered her house unlawfully.
Held: The situation asked judges to reconcile the irreconcilable. Courts should be . .
Cited – Monsanto Plc v Tilly and Others CA 30-Nov-1999
A group carried out direct action in protesting against GM crops by pulling up the plants. The group’s media liaison officer, while not actually pulling up plants himself, ‘reconnoitred the site the day before. He met the press at a prearranged . .
Cited – Collins v Wilcock QBD 1984
The defendant appealed against her conviction for assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty. He had sought to caution her with regard to activity as a prostitute. The 1959 Act gave no power to detain, but he took hold of her. She . .
Cited – Wilson v Pringle CA 26-Mar-1986
Two boys played in a school yard. D said he had pulled a bag from the other’s shoulder as an ordinary act of horseplay. The plaintiff said it was a battery.
Held: The defendant’s appeal against summary judgment was allowed. A claim of trespass . .
Cited – Brandes Goldschmidt and Co Ltd v Western Transport Ltd CA 1981
Brandon LJ said: ‘Damages in tort are awarded by way of monetary compensation for the loss or losses a plaintiff has actually sustained.’ . .
Cited – Dow Jones and Co Inc v Jameel CA 3-Feb-2005
Presumption of Damage in Defamation is rebuttable
The defendant complained that the presumption in English law that the victim of a libel had suffered damage was incompatible with his right to a fair trial. They said the statements complained of were repetitions of statements made by US . .
Cited – J v V (Disclosure: Offshore Corporations) FD 2003
A prenuptial agreement had been signed on the eve of marriage without advice or disclosure and without allowance for arrival of children. Coleridge J also considered the use of documents recovered by a party by unauthorised or improper means. He . .
Cited by:
Cited – Tchenguiz and Others v Imerman CA 29-Jul-2010
Anticipating a refusal by H to disclose assets in ancillary relief proceedings, W’s brothers wrongfully accessed H’s computers to gather information. The court was asked whether the rule in Hildebrand remained correct. W appealed against an order . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions, Torts – Other, Intellectual Property, Family
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.377238
The solicitor had successfully appealed against an order for a contribution to the other party’s legal costs, after his clerk had filed statements in court which he knew to be misleading. The solicitor’s appeal had been successful.
Held: The Court of Appeal’s decision was reversed. The plaintiff was not asking the court to exercise its disciplinary jurisdiction over officers of the court but, rather, its jurisdiction to order a legal practitioner to pay costs by reason of some misconduct, default or negligence in the course of proceedings, a jurisdiction which could be exercised where the solicitor was merely negligent, so that the solicitor could not ‘shelter himself behind a clerk, for whose actions within the scope of his authority he is liable’
A solicitor’s duty advising his client on discovery is to investigate the position carefully and to ensure so far as is possible that full and proper disclosure of all relevant documents is made. He has overall responsibility for the process and should not leave it all to his client. The House considered and set out the court’s powers to disallow an award of costs, or to award them to be paid by the solicitor personally: ‘The court’s jurisdiction to make a wasted costs order against a solicitor is founded on breach of the duty owed by the solicitor to the court to perform his duty as an officer of the court in promoting within his own sphere the cause of justice.’
and ‘The underlying principle is that the Court has a right and a duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors, and visit with penalties any conduct of a solicitor which is of such a nature as to tend to defeat justice in the very cause in which he is engaged professionally, as was said by Abinger C.B. in Stephens v. Hill. (1) The matter complained of need not be criminal. It need not involve peculation or dishonesty. A mere mistake or error of judgment is not generally sufficient, but a gross neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a solicitor’s duty to ascertain with accuracy may suffice. Thus, a solicitor may be held bound in certain events to satisfy himself that he has a retainer to act, or as to the accuracy of an affidavit which his client swears. It is impossible to enumerate the various contingencies which may call into operation the exercise of this jurisdiction. It need not involve personal obliquity. The term professional misconduct has often been used to describe the ground on which the Court acts. It would perhaps be more accurate to describe it as conduct which involves a failure on the part of a solicitor to fulfil his duty to the Court and to realize his duty to aid in promoting in his own sphere the cause of justice. This summary procedure may often be invoked to save the expense of an action. Thus it may in proper cases take the place of an action for negligence, or an action for breach of warranty of authority brought by the person named as defendant in the writ. The jurisdiction is not merely punitive but compensatory. The order is for payment of costs thrown away or lost because of the conduct complained of. It is frequently, as in this case, exercised in order to compensate the opposite party in the action.’
Viscount Maugham said: ‘My Lords, as I understand the judgment of Greer and Slesser L.JJ., those learned judges were of opinion that the jurisdiction of the Court to order a solicitor to pay the cost of proceedings is a punitive power resting on the personal misconduct of the solicitor and precisely similar to the power of striking a solicitor off the rolls or suspending him from practice . . The jurisdiction to strike off the rolls or to suspend a solicitor seems to me to be of a very different character. Apart from the statutory grounds it is of course true that a solicitor may be struck off the rolls or suspended on the ground of professional misconduct, words which have been properly defined as conduct which would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by solicitors of good repute and competency: in Re a Solicitor. Ex parte The Law Society (1912) 1 K.B. 302. Mere negligence even of a serious character, will not suffice.’ and ‘These cases did not depend on disgraceful or dishonourable conduct by the solicitor, but on mere negligence of a serious character, the result of which was to occasion useless costs to the other parties . . I think the authorities show that the jurisdiction may be exercised where the solicitor is merely negligent.’
Lord Wright said: ‘A solicitor was long ago held to be an officer of the Court on the Roll of which he was entered and as such to be subject to the discipline of that Court. The Court might strike him off or suspend him . . But alongside the jurisdiction to strike off the Roll or to suspend, there existed in the Court the jurisdiction to punish a solicitor or attorney by ordering him to pay costs, sometimes the costs of his own client, sometimes those of the opposite party, sometimes, it may be, of both. The ground of such an order was that the solicitor had been guilty of professional misconduct (as it is generally called) not, however, of so serious a character as to justify striking him off the Roll or suspending him.’
‘The underlying principle is that the court has a right and a duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors, and visit with penalties any conduct of a solicitor which is of such a nature as to tend to defeat justice in the very cause in which he is engaged professionally as was said by Abinger C.B. in Stevens v. Hill [(1842) 10 M.and W. 28]. The matter complained of need not be criminal. It need not involve peculation or dishonesty. A mere mistake or error of judgment is not generally sufficient, but a gross neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a solicitor’s duty to ascertain with accuracy may suffice. Thus, a solicitor may be held bound in certain events to satisfy himself that he has a retainer to act, or as to the accuracy of an affidavit which his client swears. It is impossible to enumerate the various contingencies which may call into operation the exercise of this jurisdiction. It need not involve personal obliquity. The term ‘professional misconduct’ has often been used to describe the ground on which the Court acts. It would perhaps be more accurate to describe it as conduct which involves a failure on the part of a solicitor to fulfil his duty to the Court and to realize his duty to aid in promoting in his own sphere the cause of justice. This summary procedure may often be invoked to save the expense of an action Thus, it may, in proper cases, take the place of an action for negligence, or an action for breach of warranty of authority brought by the person named as defendant in the writ. The jurisdiction is not merely punitive, but compensatory. The order is for payment of costs thrown away or lost because of the conduct complained of. It is frequently, as in this case, exercised in order to compensate the opposite party in the action.’
Lord Wright went on to say that the jurisdiction applied for the costs of either party, and was as to behaviour which was professional misconduct falling short of what might lead to a striking off, and: ‘The underlying principle is that the Court has a right and a duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors and visit with penalties any conduct of a solicitor which is of such a nature as to tend to defeat justice in the very cause in which he is engaged professionally, as was said by Abinger CB in Stephens v Hill (1842) 10 M and W 28. The matter complained of need not be criminal. It need not involve peculation or dishonesty. A mere mistake or error of judgment is not generally sufficient, but a gross neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a solicitor’s duty to ascertain with accuracy may suffice. Thus, a solicitor may be held bound in certain events to satisfy himself that he has a retainer to act, or as to the accuracy of an Affidavit which his client swears. It is impossible to enumerate the various contingencies which may call into operation the exercise of this jurisdiction. It need not involve a personal obliquity. The term professional misconduct has often been used to describe the ground on which the Court acts. It would perhaps be more accurate to describe it as conduct which involves a failure on the part of a solicitor to fulfil his duty to the Court and to realise his duty too. The summary procedure may often be invoked to save the expense of an action. Thus it may in proper cases take the place of an action for negligence or an action for breach of warranty of authority brought by the person named as Defendant in the writ. The jurisdiction is not merely punitive but compensatory. The order is for payment of costs thrown away or lost because of the conduct complained of. It is frequently, as in this case, exercised in order to compensate the opposite party to the action.’
and ‘The summary jurisdiction thus involved a discretion both as to procedure and as to substantive relief ‘
Lord Atkin said: ‘From time immemorial judges have exercised over solicitors . . a disciplinary jurisdiction in cases of misconduct . . If the Court is deceived or the litigant is improperly delayed or put to unnecessary expense, the solicitor on the record will be held responsible and will be admonished or visited with such pecuniary penalty as the Court thinks necessary in the circumstances of the case . . What is the duty of the solicitor? He is at the early stage of the proceedings engaged in putting before the court on the oath of his client information which may afford evidence at the trial. Obviously he must explain to his client what is the meaning of relevance: and equally obviously he must not necessarily be satisfied by the statement of his client that he has no documents or no more than he chooses to disclose. If he has reasonable ground for supposing that there are others, he must investigate the matter; but he need not go beyond taking reasonable steps to ascertain the truth.’
As to the awarding of costs against a solicitor, he considered this to be a disciplinary jurisdiction arising by the solicitor’s failure in its duty to the court itself, and not a form of summary jurisdiction in contract or tort in awarding compensation. As to the standard of misconduct: ‘by misconduct is meant something which would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by solicitors of good repute; for example wilfully misleading the Court in the conduct of a case.’
Viscount Maugham, Lord Wright and Lord Porter
[1940] AC 282, [1939] 4 All ER 484, (1939) 56 TLR 177, (1939) 162 LT 113, (1939) 109 LJKB 105
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Myers v Rothfield CA 1938
The solicitor had left the conduct of proceedings largely to his managing clerk. The trial judge held that the solicitor had not been guilty of professional misconduct in allowing the defences to be delivered, but that he had been guilty of such . .
Cited by:
Cited – Ridehalgh v Horsefield; Allen v Unigate Dairies Ltd CA 26-Jan-1994
Guidance for Wasted Costs Orders
Guidance was given on the circumstances required for the making of wasted costs orders against legal advisers. A judge invited to make an order arising out of an advocate’s conduct of court proceedings must make full allowance for the fact that an . .
Cited – Hedrich and Another v Standard Bank London Ltd and Another CA 30-Jul-2008
Wall LJ said: ‘A cigarette packet carries the warning that smoking can kill you. Solicitors’ standard terms of business should carry a warning that litigation can cost you. For litigation is an inherently risky business: there are no certain . .
Cited – Nelson v Nelson CA 6-Dec-1996
A solicitor appealed against an order requiring him to contribute to the costs of Mareva injunction applied for on behalf of his bankrupt client.
Held: Solicitors were not liable in costs personally for starting proceedings on behalf of a . .
Cited – Ulster Bank Ltd v Fisher and Fisher ChNI 21-Dec-1998
. .
Cited – Medcalf v Mardell, Weatherill and Another HL 27-Jun-2002
The appellants were barristers against whom wasted costs orders had been made. They appealed. They had made allegations of fraud in pleadings, but without being able to provide evidence to support the allegation. This was itself a breach of the Bar . .
Cited – Dempsey v Johnstone CA 30-Jul-2003
The solicitors appealed against a wasted costs order. . .
Cited – Harley v McDonald; Glasgow Harley (A Firm) v McDonald PC 10-Apr-2001
(New Zealand) A solicitor’s duty to the court was not breached merely because he had, on his client’s instructions, pursued a case which was hopeless. It was also inapposite to penalize him for work undertaken before the court had warned him of the . .
Cited – Al-Kandari v J R Brown and Co CA 1988
A solicitor had undertaken to look after certain passports, but failed to do so. The husband had twice previously kidnapped his children whose custody was an issue before the court. Once the husband regained the passports, he again fled with the . .
Cited – Taylor and Taylor v Ribby Hall Leisure Limited and North West Leisure Holdings Limited CA 6-Aug-1997
In supervisory proceedings against lawyers, claims of abuse of process are to be pursued at the substantive hearing and not by way of pre-emptive applications. Delay in bringing an application to enforce a solicitor’s undertaking can be relevant to . .
Cited – Wagstaff v Colls and Another CA 2-Apr-2003
The action had been stayed by an order on agreed terms. The claimant sought a wasted costs order against the defendants’ solicitors on the ground that they had witheld certain facts during the litigation. The defendants argued that they should first . .
Cited – Sprecher Grier Halberstam Llp and Another v Walsh CA 3-Dec-2008
Ward LJ said: ‘a man cannot be deceived if he knows the truth’ . .
Cited – In re P (a Barrister) (Wasted Costs Order) CACD 23-Jul-2001
The procedure for making a wasted costs order was primarily compensatory, for costs wasted, rather than punitive for malpractice. The procedure is summary, and more in line with applications for costs made under the Civil Procedure Rules rule 44.3, . .
Cited – Phillips, Harland (Suing As Administrators of the Estate of Christo Michailidis), Papadimitriou v Symes (A Bankrupt) Robin Symes Limited (In Administrative Receivership) Jean-Louis Domercq ChD 20-Oct-2004
Dr Zamar had given expert evidence in the principal proceedings. It was now said that that evidence had not been given in the proper way, and a remedy was now sought. . .
Cited – Axa Sun Life Services Plc v Cannon and Another QBD 30-Oct-2007
. .
Cited – Mitchells Solicitors v Funkwerk Information Technologies York Ltd EAT 8-Apr-2008
EAT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Costs
After the Claimant’s discrimination claim failed the Respondents sought an order for costs against her or a wasted costs order against her solicitors for pursuing a hopeless . .
Cited – Angel Solicitors v Jenkins O’Dowd and Barth ChD 19-Jan-2009
Actions were brought to enforce undertakings given by solicitors to redeem mortgages on the sale of properties, and as to redemption figures provided by lenders who then refused to release the properties. The solicitors had replied to standard form . .
Cited – Geoffrey Silver and Drake v Baines (trading as Wetherfield Baines and Baines) (a firm) CA 1971
The court’s summary jurisdiction over solicitors is extraordinary, and therefore should only be exercised sparingly (i) if justice requires this procedure to be adopted, as opposed to some other procedure.
There is a recognised jurisdiction to . .
Cited – Coll v Floreat Merchant Banking Ltd and Others QBD 3-Jun-2014
The court was asked whether it was possible to bring contempt proceedings against a solicitor for the breach of an undertaking other than one given to the court. The parties had been employee and employer. On the breakdown of that relationship, the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions, Costs
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.279003
The appellant had obtained the services of the respondent barrister to defend him on a dock brief, and alleged that the respondent had been negligent in the conduct of his defence.
Held: The House considered the immunity from suit of barristers acting in court. An advocate should remain immune from negligence in respect of his actions in court.
Lord Morris of Borth y Gest said that the immunity extended to the ‘conduct and management of a case in court’ by the advocate. The existence of liability in negligence, and indeed the very possibility of making assertions of liability against a barrister, might tend to undermine the willingness of barristers to carry out their duties to the court. An advocate should not be under pressure unwarrantably to subordinate his duty to the court to his duty to the client. The court re-inforced the undesirability of relitigating issues already decided. Also the ‘cab rank’ rule, imposed upon barristers, an obligation to accept instructions from anyone who wishes to engage their services in an area of the law in which they practised.
Lord Reid applied the immunity to the ‘conduct of litigation’ and being ‘engaged in litigation’. These phrases embodied the work covered in drawing pleadings or conducting subsequent stages in the case, and it would also apply to some cases where litigation was ‘impending’ but not to advisory work ‘where that consideration did not apply’.
Lord Reid continued: ‘Every counsel has a duty to his client fearlessly to raise every issue, advance every argument, and ask every question, however distasteful, which he thinks will help his client’s case. But, as an officer of the court concerned in the administration of justice, he has an overriding duty to the court, to the standards of his profession, and to the public, which may and often does lead to a conflict with his client’s wishes or with what the client thinks are his personal interests. Counsel must not mislead the court, he must not lend himself to casting aspersions on the other party or witnesses for which there is no sufficient basis in the information in his possession, he must not withhold authorities or documents which may tell against his clients but which the law or the standards of his profession require him to produce. And by so acting he may well incur the displeasure or worse of his client so that if the case is lost, his client would or might seek legal redress if that were open to him . . So the issue appears to me to be whether the abolition of the rule would probably be attended by such disadvantage to the public interest as to make its retention clearly justifiable. I would not expect any counsel to be influenced by the possibility of an action being raised against him to such an extent that he would knowingly depart from his duty to the court or to his profession. …
Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Upjohn, Lord Pearson
[1969] 1 AC 191, [1967] UKHL 5, [1967] 3 All ER 993 HL(E), [1967] 3 WLR 1666
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Atwell v Perr and Co and Another ChD 27-Jul-1998
Counsel advising during conduct of case has immunity but a wrongful advice on appeal was outside his immunity. Work done before a hearing constituting the formulation of case was within the immunity from suit. . .
Overruled – Arthur JS Hall and Co (A Firm) v Simons; Barratt v Woolf Seddon (A Firm); Harris v Schofield Roberts and Hill (A Firm) HL 20-Jul-2000
Clients sued their solicitors for negligence. The solicitors responded by claiming that, when acting as advocates, they had the same immunities granted to barristers.
Held: The immunity from suit for negligence enjoyed by advocates acting in . .
Considered – Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell and Co (a Firm) HL 1978
Extent of Counsel’s Immunity in Negligence
The House considered the extent of a barrister’s immunity from action in negligence, and particularly whether it covered pre-trial acts or omissions in connection with civil proceedings.
Held: A barrister’s immunity from suit extended only to . .
Cited – Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council CA 1972
The court considered the liability in negligence of a Council whose inspector had approved a building which later proved defective.
Held: The Council had control of the work and with such control came a responsibility to take care in . .
Cited – Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire HL 28-Apr-1987
No General ty of Care Owed by Police
The mother of a victim of the Yorkshire Ripper claimed in negligence against the police alleging that they had failed to satisfy their duty to exercise all reasonable care and skill to apprehend the perpetrator of the murders and to protect members . .
Cited – National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Limited and others HL 30-Jun-2005
Former HL decision in Siebe Gorman overruled
The company had become insolvent. The bank had a debenture and claimed that its charge over the book debts had become a fixed charge. The preferential creditors said that the charge was a floating charge and that they took priority.
Held: The . .
Cited – Kelley v Corston CA 20-Aug-1997
The plaintiff employed the defendant barrister to pursue her claim for ancillary relief in divorce. She sought to recover damages for his alleged negligence.
Held: A barrister’s immunity from suit for negligence in advocacy extends to . .
Cited – Van Colle v Hertfordshire Police QBD 10-Mar-2006
The claimants claimed for the estate of their murdered son. He had been waiting to give evidence in a criminal trial, and had asked the police for support having received threats. Other witnesses had also suffered intimidation including acts of . .
Cited – Van Colle v Hertfordshire Police QBD 10-Mar-2006
The claimants claimed for the estate of their murdered son. He had been waiting to give evidence in a criminal trial, and had asked the police for support having received threats. Other witnesses had also suffered intimidation including acts of . .
Cited – Ridehalgh v Horsefield; Allen v Unigate Dairies Ltd CA 26-Jan-1994
Guidance for Wasted Costs Orders
Guidance was given on the circumstances required for the making of wasted costs orders against legal advisers. A judge invited to make an order arising out of an advocate’s conduct of court proceedings must make full allowance for the fact that an . .
Cited – Jones v Kaney SC 30-Mar-2011
An expert witness admitted signing a joint report but without agreeing to it. The claimant who had lost his case now pursued her in negligence. The claimant appealed against a finding that the expert witness was immune from action.
Held: The . .
Cited – Lumsdon and Others, Regina (on The Application of) v Legal Services Board Admn 20-Jan-2014
Four barristers challenged, by a judicial review, a decision by which the LSB approved an application proposed by the BSB jointly with two other approved regulators, the SRA and IPS, to introduce the Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates . .
Cited – Michael and Others v The Chief Constable of South Wales Police and Another SC 28-Jan-2015
The claimants asserted negligence in the defendant in failing to provide an adequate response to an emergency call, leading, they said to the death of their daughter at the hands of her violent partner. They claimed also under the 1998 Act. The . .
Cited – Singh v Moorlands Primary School and Another CA 25-Jul-2013
The claimant was a non-white head teacher, alleging that her school governors and local authority had undermined and had ‘deliberately endorsed a targeted campaign of discrimination, bullying, harassment and victimisation’ against her as an Asian . .
Applied – Rees v Sinclair 1974
(New Zealand Court of Appeal) The court discussed the indemnity given to witnesses: ‘But I cannot narrow the protection to what is done in court: it must be wider than that and include some pre-trial work. Each piece of before-trial work should, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Professional Negligence, Legal Professions
Leading Case
Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.181060
A loss arising from a solicitor’s failure to pursue a case arose only when the claim was struck out, not earlier when compromised, and even though value already diminished. Accordingly the limitation period began to run from that time.
Hobhouse LJ
Times 03-Nov-1994, Independent 27-Oct-1994, Gazette 07-Dec-1994, [1995] PIQR 43
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Cited by:
Disapproved – Khan v R M Falvey and Co (a Firm) CA 22-Mar-2002
The claimant sought damages from his former solicitors for failing to act to avoid his case being struck out. The second action was itself delayed, and the defendants asserted that the cause of action occurred not when his claim was actually struck . .
Cited – Iqbal v Legal Services Commission CA 10-May-2005
The claimant had been a partner in a firm of solicitors. They came to be suspected by the respondent of overclaiming legal aid payments and sums were withheld. For this and other reasons the practice folded, and the claimant became insolvent. He . .
Cited – Vision Golf Ltd v Weightmans (A Firm) ChD 26-Jul-2005
A lease had been forfeited. The defendant firm of solicitors had negligently failed to apply for relief. They argued that that failure had in fact caused no loss to the claimants, since they would have lost the lease anyway.
Held: The ‘but . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 October 2021; Ref: scu.81467
A solicitor sought to rely on a letter from his client as justifying the presentation of a new and larger bill.
Held: ‘there is the question whether the plaintiff ever required the defendants to deliver to him in lieu of the gross sum bill ‘a bill containing detailed items.’ I cannot see that he has. To require a bill to be taxed is plainly not per se a requirement that a detailed bill should be delivered; for as provisos (b) and (c) to section 64 itself make plain, a lump sum bill may be taxed.’ The court must be concerned with the substance of the request.
Megarry J
[1973] 1 WLR 623
Solicitors Act 1957 64
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Penningtons (a Firm) v Brown CA 30-Apr-1998
The claim concerned the plaintiffs claim for costs having represented the defendant successfully. They delivered a bill which detailed disbursements, and gave a 14 line narrative, but no other detail. The defendant requested more detail, being . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 October 2021; Ref: scu.182996
An undertaking by one solicitor to another to pay costs must be honoured. A client’s fraudulent intent did not vitiate the solicitor’s undertaking.
Times 01-Jul-1993, Ind Summary 13-Sep-1993
England and Wales
Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.88855
Beatson J
[2008] EWHC 843 (Comm), [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 643
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Temple Legal Protection Ltd v QBE Insurance (Europe) Ltd CA 6-Apr-2009
‘In the present case the binder gives Temple certain valuable rights, including a right in Section 27.1 to ‘retain’ commission out of premiums, but they do not include any rights of a security or proprietary nature to which the authority can be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 August 2021; Ref: scu.267064
The court was asked as to use of the solicitor’s equitable lien, whereby equity provided security for the recovery by solicitors of their agreed charges for the successful conduct of litigation, out of the fruits of that litigation. It is a judge-made remedy, motivated not by any fondness for solicitors as fellow lawyers or even as officers of the court, but rather because it promotes access to justice. Specifically it enables solicitors to offer litigation services on credit to clients who, although they have a meritorious case, lack the financial resources to pay up front for its pursuit. It is called a solicitor’s lien because solicitors used to have a virtual monopoly on the pursuit of litigation in the higher courts. The solicitors had taken on personal injury claimants on a conditional fee basis. The appellant insurance company had settled the claims directly with the clients, depriving the solicitors of their costs.
Held: Appeal dismissed (though on differing grounds)
‘ the equity depends upon the solicitor having a claim for his charges against the client, that there must be something in the nature of a fund against which equity can recognise that his claim extends (which is usually a debt owed by the defendant to the solicitor’s client which owes its existence, at least in part, to the solicitor’s services to the client) and that for equity to intervene there must be something sufficiently affecting the conscience of the payer, either in the form of collusion to cheat the solicitor or notice (or, I would add knowledge) of the solicitor’s claim against, or interest in, the fund.’
Lady Hale, President, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Briggs
[2018] UKSC 21, [2018] RTR 22, [2018] 2 Costs LR 347, [2018] PNLR 24, [2018] 3 All ER 273, [2018] 1 WLR 2052, [2018] WLR(D) 241
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, Supreme Court, SC Summary, SC Summary Video, SC 2018 0205 am video, SC 2018 0205 pm video, SC 20180202 am Video, SC 2018 02 06 pm video
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Gavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd CA 2-Dec-2015
Appeal by Edmondson against an Order dismissing Edmondson’s claim against Haven in respect of Haven’s conduct in settling on an inclusive basis personal injury claims directly with six clients of Edmondson with whom Edmondson had concluded . .
Cited – Welsh v Hole 6-Nov-1779
The plaintiff obtained judgment for pounds 20 and costs in a civil claim for assault, but then compromised the claim for a direct payment by the defendant of pounds 10. There was no collusion to defeat the solicitor’s right to payment of his bill. . .
Cited – Read v Dupper 13-Jun-1795
The defendant’s solicitor paid the plaintiff direct, after notice of the plaintiff’s solicitor’s interest, and had to pay again. Lord Kenyon began:
‘The principle by which this application is to be decided was settled long ago, namely that the . .
Cited – Ormerod v Tate 13-May-1801
An attorney has a lien upon a sum awarded in favour of his client, as well as if recovered by judgment: and if after notice to the defendant the latter pay it over to the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s attorney may compel a repayment of it to himself, . .
Cited – Ex Parte Bryant 12-Aug-1815
Person arrested on his return from proving a debt at Guildhall, discharged with costs of application.
Though an order be made on a petition in bankruptcy, directing costs to be paid to the Petitioner personally, this does not take away the . .
Approved – Khans Solicitor (A Firm) v Chifuntwe and Another CA 8-May-2013
C instructed the claimants to bring proceedings. They compromised those proceedings, the defendant agreeing to pay C’s costs. A bill was submitted but before it was paid C withdrew his instructions from his solicitors and accepted the defendant’s . .
Cited – In re the Estate of Fuld, decd (No. 4) 1968
The solicitor sought to exercise a lien for his costs over money paid direct to his client.
Held: The solicitor’s right exists over both the amount of a judgment in favour of the client, and the amount of an order for costs in favour of the . .
Cited – Gould v Davis 1831
. .
Cited – In Re Moss 2-Jun-1866
Lord Romilly MR said: ‘I think it of great importance to preserve the lien of solicitors. That is the real security for solicitors engaged in business. It is also beneficial to the suitors. It would frequently happen, but for the lien which . .
Cited – Barker v St Quintin, Esq 22-Jan-1844
A solicitor’s the equitable lien operates by way of security or charge.
Baron Parke said: ‘The lien which an attorney is said to have on a judgment (which is, perhaps, an incorrect expression) is merely a claim to the equitable interference of . .
These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 18 July 2021; Ref: scu.608733
The defendant firm of solicitors had acted for the claimant and 30000 others in a claim for personal injuries from the leaking of a tanker. The claim was settled but before damages could be paid, another group obtained orders against the sums received. The result was that the claimant received nothing. She now claimed in professional negligence.
Andrew Smith J
[2016] EWHC 1324 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Updated: 14 July 2021; Ref: scu.565796
Where documents with the benefit of legal professional privilege come into the hands of the opposing side, the court should be ready to grant an injunction to prevent their misuse.
Browne-Wilkinson VC J
(1987) NLJ 148, Times 22-Jan-1987, [1988] FSR 232
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Lord Ashburton v Pape CA 1913
Pape’s bankruptcy discharge was opposed by Lord Ashburton. He subpoenaed Brooks, a clerk to Lord Ashburton’s solicitor and obtained privileged letters written by Lord Ashburton to Mr Nocton, which Pape proposed to use. Pape and Brooks had colluded. . .
Cited – Goddard v Nationwide Building Society CA 1986
A solicitor had acted for both purchaser and lender in a purchase transaction. The purchaser later sought to recover from the defendant for a negligent valuation. The solicitor had however discussed the issue with the plaintiff before the purchase, . .
Cited by:
Cited – Derby and Co Ltd v Weldon (No 8) CA 27-Jul-1990
There had been a lengthy and contentious process of discovery. Certain documents with legal professional privilege had also been handed over inadvertently. The plaintiff sought their return and an order against them being used.
Held: The . .
Cited – Stiedl v Enyo Law Llp and Others ComC 18-Oct-2011
The applicant, defendant in the main proceedings, sought an injunction to restrain the solicitors from acting for the claimant and from making any use of documents which had come into their privileged possession whilst acting for him. . .
These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 June 2021; Ref: scu.193603
A solicitor had failed to register an option as a land charge over property. The court was asked what steps should have been taken by a solicitor in the conduct of a claim: ‘Mr Harman [leading counsel for the plaintiff] sought to rely upon the fact that Mr Stubbs was Geoffrey’s solicitor under some sort of general retainer imposing a duty to consider all aspects of his interest generally whenever he was consulted, but that cannot be. There is no such thing as a general retainer in that sense. The expression ‘my solicitor’ is as meaningless as the expression ‘my tailor’ or ‘my bookmaker’ in establishing any general duty apart from that arising out of a particular matter in which his services are retained. The extent of his duties depends upon the terms and limits of that retainer and any duty of care to be implied must be related to what he is instructed to do.
While No doubt the duties owed by a solicitor to his client are high in the sense that he holds himself out as practising a highly skilled and exacting profession. But I think that the court must beware of imposing upon solicitors – or upon professional men in other spheres – duties which go beyond the scope of what they are requested and undertake to do. It may be that a particularly meticulous and conscientious practitioner would, in his client’s general interest, take it upon himself to pursue a line of enquiry beyond the strict limits comprehended by his instructions. But that is not the test. The test is what the reasonably competent practitioner would do having regard to the standards normally adopted in his profession, and cases . . demonstrate that the duty is directly related to the confines of the retainer.’ The solicitors accepted ‘a common law duty not to injure their client by failing to do what they had undertaken to do and which, at their invitation, he relied on them to do.’
References: [1979] Ch 384, [1978] 3 All ER 571, [1978] 3 WLR 167, [1955-95] PNLR 95
Judges: Oliver J
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:
This case is cited by:
These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.190233
References: [1973] 1 WLR 115
Coram: Caulfield J
Ratio: The judge at trial had refused to set aside a subpoena to produce documents which had been served on behalf of the accused in a criminal trial.
Held: Caulfield J said: ‘I think the correct principle is this, and I think it must be restricted to these particular facts in a criminal trial, and the principle I am going to enunciate is not supported by any authority that has been cited to me, and I am just working on what I conceive to be the rules of natural justice. If there are documents in the possession or control of a solicitor which, on production, help to further the defence of an accused man, then in my judgment no privilege attaches. I cannot conceive that our law would permit a solicitor or other person to screen from a jury information which, if disclosed to the jury, would perhaps enable a man either to establish his innocence or to resist an allegation made by the Crown.’
This case is cited by:
(This list may be incomplete)
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
Last Update: 19-Mar-17
Ref: 580911
References: Times 20-Aug-1999
Ratio: When a barrister had accepted a brief, the duty to appear on a fixed date hearing could only be set aside by conflict with another professional duty. Counsel, who were also Members of Parliament, attending at votes in the House of Commons were not, in that act, attending to such a professional duty, and so breached the Code if they failed to attend at court.
Statutes: Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales 1990
Last Update: 30-Aug-16
Ref: 81348
References: [1993] Crim LR 962
Coram: Watkins LJ, Auld LJ
Ratio: A special material warrant was quashed, partly because it was too widely drawn. It was suspected that there had been thefts from the solicitor’s firms client account. Watkins LJ discussed the need for a judge to give reasons for a decision under section 9 of the 1984 Act allowing the police to have access to special procedure materials: ‘The Act does not require a circuit judge to give reasons when making an order inter partes or issuing a warrant ex parte for access to special procedure material. However, challenges to decisions of circuit judges which have come before this Court demonstrate, in my opinion, especially as to ex parte applications, the need for this to be done. Reasons need not be elaborate, but they should be recorded and be sufficient to identify the substance of any relevant information or representation put before the judge in addition to the written information. They should set out what inferences he has drawn from the material relevant to the statutory conditions governing the content and form of the order or warrant sought. Where he has considered the question of legal privilege he should explain why, if he does, he has included in the order or warrant material which is prima facie privileged, or why he has excluded material as subject to privilege. In the latter case, where the excluded material consists of particular documents or categories of documents which might otherwise be included in the material to which access is given, he should explain why, if he does, he has included in the order or warrant material which is prima facie privileged, or why he has excluded material as subject to privilege. In the latter case, where the excluded material consists of particular documents or categories of documents which might otherwise be included in the material to which access is given, he should carefully describe and identify them in the order or warrant.
These requirements may seem onerous for the exercise of a power to which the police often seek recourse as a matter of urgency. But a Circuit Judge has a responsibility not only to assist the effective investigation of crime, but also to protect as needs be the holder of and the person in respect of whom he holds material in confidence from unjustified intrusion into their private affairs.’
Auld LJ said: ‘the fact that a solicitor is himself under investigation is not of itself necessarily a sufficient reason for ordering such an intrusion into his affairs and those of his clients. All the circumstances of the individual application must be taken into account, including, for example, the seriousness of the matter being investigated, the evidence already available to the police to found a prosecution based on it, and the extent to which the solicitor has already been put on notice of interest on his affairs such as might have caused him to hide or destroy or otherwise interfere with incriminating documents.’
Statutes: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 9
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(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 05-Aug-16
Ref: 260138
References: [1849] EngR 639, (1849) 7 CB 875, (1849) 137 ER 347
Links: Commonlii
Ratio Assumpsit against several defendants for work and labour by the plaintiff as an attorney, with counts for money paid, &e. Plea,-by one of the defendants,-to the whole declaration, that the action was commenced, after the 6 & 7 Vict. e. 73, for the recovery of fees, charges, and disbursements due to the plaintiff as an attorney, as in the first count mentioned, and that no signed bill had been delivered to the defendant, or sent by the post to, or left for him at, his counting-house, office of business, dwelling-house, or last known place of abode :-Held, on special demurrer, that the word ‘disbursements’ applied to the count for money paid; and that the plea sufficiently negatived the delivery of a bill of costs within the terms of the statute
Last Update: 16-May-16
Ref: 298944
References: [1803] EngR 697, (1803) 4 East 190, (1803) 102 ER 803
Links: Commonlii
A contract entered into by a practising attorney to relinquish his business and recommend his clients t0 two other attornies for a valuable consideration, and that he would not himself practise in such business within certain limits, and would permit them to make use of his name in their firm for a certain time, but without his interference, &c was holden to be valid in law.
Last Update: 12-Dec-15 Ref: 344738
References: (1997) 188 CLR 449, [1997] HCA 23, (1997) 144 ALR 729, (1997) 71 ALJR 781
Links: Austlii
Coram: Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby JJ
High Court of Australia – Equity – Fiduciary duties – Solicitor and client relationship – Mortgage by clients in favour of solicitors – Ascertainment of particular fiduciary duties.
Equity – Equitable remedies – Rescission – Relevance of causal connection between breach of fiduciary duty and execution of mortgage – Scope of equity for rescission – Whether clients required to ‘do equity’ by honouring contractual obligation to pay principal and interest secured by mortgage – Rate of interest payable on principal sum outstanding under mortgage.
Legal practitioners – Solicitor and client relationship – Mortgage by clients in favour of solicitors – Fiduciary duties – Equitable remedies.
‘In Australia, the measure of compensation in respect of losses sustained by reason of breach of duty by a trustee or other fiduciary is determined by equitable principles and . . these do not necessarily reflect the rules for assessment of damages in tort or contract.’
This case is cited by:
(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 05-Nov-15 Ref: 554208
References: [2005] ScotSC 40
Links: Bailii
Last Update: 29-Sep-15 Ref: 229235
References: [1842] EngR 397, (1841,1842) 8 Cl & Fin 657, (1842) 8 ER 256
Links: Commonlii
The employment of counsel as confidential legal adviser disables him from purchasing for his own benefit charges on his client’s etates, without his permission ; and although the confidential employment ceases, the disability continues as long as the reasons on which it is founded continue to operate.
C, a barrister, who had been for several years confidential and advising couunsel to P, and had, by reason of that relation, acquired an intimate knowledge of his property and liabilities, and was particularly consulted as to a compromise of securities given by P for a debt which C considered not to be recoverable for the full amount, purchased these securities for less than their nominal amount, without notice to P after ceasing to be his counsel.
Held: that C’s purchase, while the compromise proposed by P was feasible, was in trust for P ; and that C was entitled only to the sum he had paid, with interest according to the course of the Court.
This case is cited by:
References: [1865] EngR 589, (1865) 2 Dr & Sm 549, (1865) 62 ER 728
Links: Commonlii
Trustees took counsel’s opinion as to whether they should exercise a discretionary power to advance part of their trust fund for the benefit of some of the cestuis que trust: and others of the cestuis que trust having filed a bill to restrain them from exercising such discretion, they took a second opinion as to their defence in the
suit.
Upon summons for production by the Plaintiffs :
Held, that, the first case and opinion having reference to the dealings with the trust estate, all the cestuis que trust had a right to inspection, and the Court ordered them to be produced ; but that the second case and opinion being after suit instituted, the Plaintiffs had no right to production.
This case cites:
This case is cited by:
References: [2007] EWHC 2868 (Ch)
Links: Bailii
References: (2006) 94 SASR 64, [2006] SASC 42
Links: Austlii
Coram: The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Debelle and The Honourable Justice White
(Supreme Court of South Australia – full Court) Appeals against two decisions – Whether legal professional privilege applies to eleven documents discovered by the defendant – if privilege existed whether it had been waived – Whether defendant entitled to injunction restraining the use of the same documents which were already in the plaintiff’s possession on the ground of an equitable obligation of confidence and public interest immunity – Where confidential information in one document had already been disclosed to a third party – Whether the defendant suffered detriment – Whether misapplication of iniquity rule – Whether the documents were the subject of public interest immunity – Discussion of the principles regarding equitable doctrine of restraining use or publication of confidential information.
Held: It is the circumstances by which the person in possession of the confidential information has acquired that possession rather than the circumstances in which the information was imparted to the initial recipient that is the relevant consideration in considering whether there was a breach of confidence – No conditions of confidentiality attached to disclosure of 10 of the documents – Recipient unaware a mistake had been made if the confidential information had been disclosed unintentionally – No obligation of confidence arose – Unnecessary to consider issues of detriment or application of the iniquity rule – No error by trial judge in failing to find documents subject to public interest immunity – Even if confidentiality had not been lost, trial judge correct to find waiver of privilege – Both appeals allowed for the limited purpose of having the claim of confidentiality with respect to one document remitted to the trial judge for further consideration – Otherwise each appeal dismissed.
This case cites:
References: [1852] EngR 271, (1851-1852) 9 Hare 556, (1852) 68 ER 633
Links: Commonlii
A and B and the son of B entered into partnership as solicitors, and by articles agreed that the partners were diligently and faithfully to employ themselves in carrying on and managing all the professional business in which they or either of them might be employed or concerned; that B should use his best endeavours to obtain the appointment of the partnership firm to three offices or clerkships, which were then held by B, and such offices should be partnership appointments; that all other compatible offices should be obtained, if possible, in the name of the firm, and the emoluments treated as part of the profits of the partnership; that, if B or his son should retire, or A or B or his son should die, the share of the deceased partner should accrue to the surviving partners : that if B or his son retired they were to use their best endeavours to secure the practice to the continuing partners, and such retiring partner shouId not practise within 30 miles ; that, if either partner should not diligently and faithfully employ himself in carrying on the said partnership practice, and should, on receiving monies, bills, notes, &c., knowingly or wilfully omit immediately to make entries thereof, or if A. or the son of B should absent himself more than two months in one year, the others or other of the partners, if they or he should think fit, should be at liberty to dissolve the partnership, by giving to the offending partner a notice to that effect, and the partnership should from that time, or the time specified in the notice, be dissolved in the same manner and with the same consequences as if it had determined by the voluntary retirement of the offending partner. B. and his son subsequently prooured their own appointment, or the appointment of one of them, to the offices or clerkships, and did not endeavour to procure the appointment of A. It was afterwards discovered that B. was greatly involved in debt, and he absconded in January 1849, and did not return to the business, In May 1849 A, served a notice, in the manner pointed out by the articles, on B. and his son to dissolve the partnership from that date ; and he then filed his bill against B. and his son to have the dissolution declared by the Court, an injunction to restrain them from practising within 30 miles, and a decree that they should resign the several offices or clerkships. Held, that the Plaintiff was entitled to dissolve the partnership as to B., but not as against the other partner (the son of B.), and that he was not entitled to dissolve it by notice under the 16th clause without the concurrence of his co-partner (the son).
That B., not having procured or endeavoured to procure for the partnership firm the appointments to the several offices or clerkships, so as to give the Plaintiff at the dissolution either a share of the profits of the offices or the chance of competing for them, but such appointments having been procured for B. and his son to the exclusion of the Plaintiff, B. and his son were not to be allowed to retain the offices for their exclusive benefit.
That,inasmuch as, from the nature of the offices, they could not be sold, nor could any manager or receiver be appointed to carry them on, the Defendants ought to be charged with the value of the offices in the partnership accounts.
That, the Plaintiff having given a notice of dissolution (acting under the 16th clause), and his co-partner having adopted it, the partnership should be treated as dissolved from the time of the notice, although not with the consequences attaching to a dissolution under the 15th clause.
That, the consequences of a dissolution uncler the 15th clause not having attached, the Plaintiff, therefore, was not entitled to the injunction to restrain the Defendants from practising within 30 miles.
An agreement that, if any of several partners should not diligently and faithfully employ himself in carrying on the partnership practice, the others might give notice of dissolution, construed to refer to the diligent and faithful discharge by each partner of the portion of business carried on by him.
This case is cited by:
References: , [1835] EngR 741, (1835) 3 Ad & E 404, (1835) 111 ER 467 (A)
Links: Commonlii
Thie Court will not, in a summary way compel an attorney of the Court to pay over money to a party entitled to it, though the attorney has received it from a client to be paid to such party, if the application is not made on behalf of the client.
References: [2004] EWCA Civ 218, Times 03-Mar-2004, Gazette 18-Mar-2004, [2004] 3 All ER 168, [2004] QB 916, [2004] 2 WLR 1065
Links: Bailii
Coram: Lord Justice Longmore Lord Phillips Of Worth Matravers, Mr Lord Justice Thomas
The Bank of England had sought assistance from its lawyers to prepare for a private non-statutory enquiry. The claimant sought disclosure of that advice. The defendant bank claimed legal professional privilege.
Held: Not all advice given by a solicitor to his client attracts privilege. The broad protection which did exist did not extend to situations where the dominant purpose was not the obtaining of legal advice and assistance in relation to legal rights and obligations. What was protected was advice which required a knowledge of the law. Here, the advice was on matters of presentation, though that might have included matters of law. That possibility would not protect the entire range of assistance given. Where the advice was as to how the witness might present his case so as perhaps to avoid criticism, that should not itself attract privilege. The inquiry was not concerned with legal rights and liabilities. The communications did not in general attract privilege.
Statutes: Tribunals of Inquiry Evidence Act 1921 1(3)
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This case is cited by:
References: [1981] USSC 7, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584
Links: Worldlii
Coram: Justice Rehnqist
Worldlii United States Supreme Court – When the General Counsel for petitioner pharmaceutical manufacturing corporation (hereafter petitioner) was informed that one of its foreign subsidiaries had made questionable payments to foreign government officials in order to secure government business, an internal investigation of such payments was initiated. As part of this investigation, petitioner’s attorneys sent a questionnaire to all foreign managers seeking detailed information concerning such payments, and the responses were returned to the General Counsel. The General Counsel and outside counsel also interviewed the recipients of the questionnaire and other company officers and employees. Subsequently, based on a report voluntarily submitted by petitioner disclosing the questionable payments, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began an investigation to determine the tax consequences of such payments and issued a summons pursuant to 26 U.S.C. – 7602 demanding production of, inter alia, the questionnaires and the memoranda and notes of the interviews. Petitioner refused to produce the documents on the grounds that they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and constituted the work product of attorneys prepared in anticipation of litigation. The United States then filed a petition in Federal District Court seeking enforcement of the summons. That court adopted the Magistrate’s recommendation that the summons should be enforced, the Magistrate having concluded, inter alia, that the attorney-client privilege had been waived and that the Government had made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome the protection of the work-product doctrine. The Court of Appeals rejected the Magistrate’s finding of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, but held that under the so-called ‘control group test’ the privilege did not apply ‘[t]o the extent that the communications were made by officers and agents not responsible for directing [petitioner’s] actions in response to legal advice . . for the simple reason that the communications were not the ‘client’s.’ ‘ The court also held that the work-product doctrine did not apply to IRS summonses.
Held:
1. The communications by petitioner’s employees to counsel are covered by the attorney-client privilege insofar as the responses to the questionnaires and any notes reflecting responses to interview questions are concerned.
(a) The control group test overlooks the fact that such privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice. While in the case of the individual client the provider of information and the person who acts on the lawyer’s advice are one and the same, in the corporate context it will frequently be employees beyond the control group (as defined by the Court of Appeals) who will possess the information needed by the corporation’s lawyers. Middle-level – and indeed lower-level employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties.
(b) The control group test thus frustrates the very purpose of the attorney-client privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of the client corporation to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client. The attorney’s advice will also frequently be more significant to noncontrol employees than to those who officially sanction the advice, and the control group test makes it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the employees who will put into effect the client corporation’s policy.
(c) The narrow scope given the attorney-client privilege by the Court of Appeals not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the law.
(d) Here, the communications at issue were made by petitioner’s employees to counsel for petitioner acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel. Information not available from upper-echelon management was needed to supply a basis for legal advice concerning compliance with securities and tax laws, foreign laws, currency regulations, duties to shareholders, and potential litigation in each of these areas. The communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees’ corporate duties, and the employees themselves were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice
2. The work-product doctrine applies to IRS summonses.
(a) The obligation imposed by a tax summons remains subject to the traditional privileges and limitations, and nothing in the language or legislative history of the IRS summons provisions suggests an intent on the part of Congress to preclude application of the work-product doctrine.
(b) The Magistrate applied the wrong standard when he concluded that the Government had made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome the protections of the work-product doctrine. The notes and memoranda sought by the Government constitute work product based on oral statements. If they reveal communications, they are protected by the attorney-client privilege. To the extent they do not reveal communications they reveal attorneys’ mental processes in evaluating the communications. As Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which accords special protection from disclosure to work product revealing an attorney’s mental processes, and Hickman v. Taylor, [1947] USSC 5; 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451, make clear, such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial need or inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.
This case is cited by:
References: , [1832] EngR 869, (1832) 9 Bing 403, (1832) 131 ER 667
Links: Commonlii
An attorney is not compelled to proceed to the end of a suit in order to be entitled to his costs, but may, upon reasonable cause and reasonable notice, abandon the conduct of the suit, and in such case may recover his costs for the period during which he was employed.
This case is cited by:
References: , [1833] EngR 333, (1833) 1 My & K 98, (1833) 39 ER 618
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Lord Brougham LC
On a bill which sought to charge a solicitor with a fraud practised on the Plaintiffs in the course of proceedings on his client’s behalf, the Court refused to order the production of entries and memorandums contained in the Defendant’s books, or of written communications, made or received by him, relating to those proceedings, and admitted by the answer to he in the Defendant’s custody.
And, generally, it seems that a solicitor cannot be compelled, at the instance of a third party, to clisclose matters which have come to his knowledge in the conduct of professional business for a client, even though such business had no reference to legal proceedings, either existing or in contemplation.
Lord Brougham LC said: ‘The foundation of this rule is not difficult to discover. It is not (as has sometimes been said) on account of any particular importance which the law attributes to the business of legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford them protection, though certainly it may not be very easy to discover why a like privilege has been refused to others, and especially to medical advisers. But it is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the Courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If the privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal resources; deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult any skilful person, or would only dare to tell his counsellor half his case. If the privilege were confined to communications connected with suits begun, or intended, or expected, or apprehended, no one could safely adopt such precautions as might eventually render any proceedings successful, or all proceedings superfluous.’
This case is cited by:
References: [1815] EngR 511, (1815) 19 Ves Jun 261, (1815) 34 ER 515
Links: Commonlii
An Attorney or solicitor cannot give up his client, and act for the opposite party, in any suit between them.
This case cites:
This case is cited by:
References: [1815] EngR 448, (1815) G Coop 80, (1815) 35 ER 484
Links: Commonlii
A solicitor for one of the parties in a suit cannot become the solicitor for the opposite party, though he is separated from the partnership which jointly were so employed on the other side, and the remaining partner still continues so employed, and the deed of dissolution stipulated that he should not act as solicitor for that party.
This case cites:
This case is cited by:
References: , [1837] EngR 984, (1837) 1 Curt 614, (1837) 163 ER 215
Links: Commonlii
(Prerogative Court) A will being drawn by a solicitor, in which a considerable legacy was given to himself and to the medical man and butler of the deceased, excluding an only son, the presumption of law is strong against the act, and the Court requires strong evidence to satisfy it that the act is the real and voluntary act of the testator. Under the circumstances sufficient evidence being given of the capacity of the deceased and of his knowledge of the contents of the instrument, the Court pronounced for the will and condemned the son in costs from the time of giving in his allegatian.
This case cites:
This case is cited by:
References: [1857] EngR 761, 7 Vict c 73, (1857) 69 ER 1214
Links: Commonlii
The Act 10 & 11 Vict. s. 69 does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to order taxation of a solicitor’s bill of costs for Parliamentary business. To entitle a client to an order for taxation of his solicitor’s bill of costs after the expiration of twelve months from its delivery he must shew either pressure or gross overcharge, amounting to what this Court designates as fraud. But it is not necessary to shew both.
References: [1851] EngR 898, (1851) 9 Hare 384, (1851) 68 ER 556
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Turner V-C
A, who was an equitable mortgagee by deposit of deeds ot property belonging to the estate of B, was paid off by C, on an agreement with the executors of B. (as their solicitor stated) that proceedings should be taken in A’s name to enforce the mortage security, and thereby to effect a sale of the whole or part of the mortgaged property; and the solicitor of the executors filed a claim for foreclosure in the name of A against the representatives of B. A denied that he had given authority to file the claim in his name, and moved that it might be taken off the file. Held that, there being only assertion against assertion, and the solicitor alone stating that the instructions were given in the presence of A, the case was to be governed by Allen v. Bone, and the claim was dismissed, with costs, to be paid by the solicitor.
That, in such a case, the Court could not adjudicate between the solicitor, by whom the claim was filed, and the Defendants, the representatives of B, by whom the instructions were given to file the claim in A’s name; and the Court left the solieitor to any legal remedy he might have against such parties.
This case is cited by:
References: [2011] EWHC B22 (Mercantile)
Links: Bailii
Coram: Simon Brown QC J
(Birmingham Mercantile Court) The claimant lender alleged tortious involvement by the defendant firm of solicitors in a mortgage frauds committed by their clients.
References: Unreported, 22 November 1996
Coram: Chadwick LJ
The court considered a solicitor’s duties to avoid a conflict of interest in a conveyancing transaction as between a lay client and a lender. Chadwick LJ said: ‘In my view, the words ‘if in the course of doing the work he is instructed to do’ reflect an important and significant qualification to the solicitor’s duty to disclose information relevant to the lending risk. A solicitor is obliged to disclose information which comes into his possession in the course of doing the work which the lender has instructed him to do; but he is not obliged to disclose information which has come into his possession independently of any work which the lender has instructed him to do – including, for example, information which has come into his possession as a result of earlier transactions in which he has been retained by the borrower.’
This case is cited by:
References: [2002] NSWSC 215, 168 FLR 116, (2002) 194 ALR 101, 20 ACLC 909
Links: Austlii
Coram: Campbell J
Austlii (Supreme Court of New South Wales) CORPORATIONS – winding up – liquidator’s examination – circumstances in which liquidator entitled to ask questions relating to legal advice given to company in liquidation – EVIDENCE – liquidator’s examinations – whether evidence given at is governed by Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) – EVIDENCE – legal professional privilege – circumstances in which joint retainer of solicitor exists – EVIDENCE – procedure to adopt when deciding whether legal professional privilege does not exist – EVIDENCE – waiver of client legal privilege – disclosure of substance of advice – disclosure made knowingly and voluntarily – disclosure by agent or employee authorised to make it – disclosure made under compulsion of law
This case is cited by:
References: [2013] UKFTT 2012_0198 (GRC)
Links: Bailii
Coram: Farrer QC
Legal professional privilege – Disclosure of environmental information adversely affecting the course of justice
References: Unreported, 10 July 2001
Coram: Judge Wakerley QC
Ratio Judge Wakerley QC expressed his concern at the numbers of applications for transfer of representation in the Crown Court. The court has a duty to bear in mind the cost to the taxpayer and that, as a result, good reason must be established before a representation order was transferred. He emphasised that the court will insist on strict compliance with the provisions of Regulation 16 which meant that the grounds of the application and full particulars need to be specified by the existing representative.
He observed: ‘This court will insist on strict compliance with the provisions of Regulation 16 . . The grounds of the application and full particulars need to be specified by the existing representatives. Next, the substantial compelling reason under subparagraph 2(4), if relied on, needs to be specified so that I can identify it. It will not generally be sufficient to allege a lack of care or competence of existing representatives . . only in extremely rare cases, and where full particulars are given in the application, will a general ground of loss of confidence or incompetence be entertained. It must further be pointed out that it will not be sufficient simply to say that there is a breakdown in the relationship between solicitor and client. Many breakdowns are imagined rather than real or as a result of proper advice’
Statutes: Criminal Defence Service (General)(No.2) Regulations 2001 16
This case is cited by:
(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 20-May-16
Ref: 449711
References: Unreported, 16 May 1997
Legal professional privilege might be taken to be waived if it would be unfair to allow a client to maintain it.
This case is cited by:
References: Unreported, 20 December 1999
The Law Society intervened in the solicitor’s practice where there were considerable grounds to suspect that the solicitor was knowingly allowing his firm to be used in connection with a large fraud, even if he was not a participant in the fraud himself.
Statutes: Solicitors Act 1974
This case is cited by:
References: [1996] 39 NSWLR 601, 14 ACLC 1
Links: Austlii
Coram: Meagher, Sheller JJA, Waddell AJA
Austlii (Court of Appeal of New South Wales) COMPANY LAW – s556 (1) Companies (NSW) Code; s592 (1) Corporations Law; liability of directors for debt of company – legal professional privilege – distinction between joint and common interest privilege – waiver.
This case is cited by:
References: [1852] EngR 485, (1852) 12 CB 154, (1852) 138 ER 860
Links: Commonlii
A warrant of attorney was attested by an attorney introduced by the plaintiff, and who had on one former occasion acted professionally for the plaintiff, and who afterwards acted as the plaintiff’s attorney in entering up judgment and issuing execution upon the warrant of atttorney : The court set it aside. In such a case, the court will not impose upon the defendant the terms of bringing no action.
References: Unreported, 17 March 1994
Coram: Latham J
The court considered the management of the statutory Solicitors Compensation Fund: ‘Given, however, what I have already said about the statutory purpose of the compensation fund, it seems to me that it is appropriate to say that the clearest case in which a grant will be made, pursuant to an application for compensation, will be where the solicitor himself has been dishonest and obtained money himself from the applicant which the applicant has thereby lost. That being the general rule, it seems to me that the Law Society is entitled to say that the further the application departs from that particular set of circumstances, the more cautious the Law Society should be in making a grant. It follows that any circumstance which takes the facts behind an application outside that general rule will be a relevant consideration for the Law Society to take into account. ‘
Statutes: Solicitors Act 1974 36
This case is cited by:
References: [1852] EngR 796 (A), (1852) 5 De G & Sm 622
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Sir James Parker VC
In a suit by a trustee against his co-trustee, a solicitor, and the parties beneficially interested under a will, some of them being infants, the costs of all parties had been ordered to be taxed and paid. It appeared that the Defendant trustee, the solicitor, had conducted his defence by his partner. The Taxing Master allowed the solicitor trustee costs out of pocket only. Held, that the rule which had allowed to solicitor trustees costs out of pocket only being well established, the Court would not, with reference to the question of costs, inquire whether the conduct of the suit by the partner of the solicitor trustee was beneficial for all parties, though no party objected to such inquiry, but that all costs beyond those out of pocket must be disallowed.
References: [2005] HCA 12, (2005) 223 CLR 1, (2005) 214 ALR 92, (2005) 79 ALJR 755
Links: Austlii
(High Court of Australia) Legal practitioners – Negligence – Immunity from suit – Applicant sought legal assistance from first respondent, a statutory corporation deemed to be a firm of solicitors, in defence of criminal prosecution – First respondent retained second respondent, a barrister, to appear for applicant at committal proceedings – Applicant pleaded guilty at committal proceedings but subsequently pleaded not guilty and stood trial – Evidence of guilty plea led at first trial – Applicant convicted but verdict quashed on appeal and new trial ordered – Applicant acquitted on retrial – Respondents alleged to have been negligent in advising applicant to plead guilty at committal – Advice allegedly tendered at a conference two days prior to committal proceeding and at a further conference on day of committal proceeding – Whether advocate’s immunity available to respondents – Whether advocate’s immunity applied in respect of advice allegedly given in conference.
Legal practitioners – Immunity from suit – Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 (Vic) – Barristers liable for negligence to same extent as solicitor as at 1891 – Extent of solicitor’s liability for negligence in 1891.
Courts – Judicial process – Judicial process as an aspect of government – Nature of the judicial process – The need for finality of judicial determination – Whether advocate’s immunity necessary to ensure finality of judicial process.
Courts – Abuse of process – Whether rules about abuse of process provide sufficient satisfaction of the finality principle – Nature of client’s complaint – Whether distinction exists between civil and criminal proceedings – Whether distinction to be drawn between challenging the final outcome of litigation and challenging an intermediate outcome.
High Court – Whether Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543 should be reconsidered – Relevance of statutory changes since Giannarelli v Wraith – Relevance of developments in common law in England and Wales – Relevance of experience in other jurisdictions.
Courts – Practice and procedure – Summary determination of action without trial – Whether claim revealed an arguable cause of action.
This case is cited by:
References: [1849] EngR 1058 (B), (1849) 4 Exch 492
Links: Commonlii
A solicitor or attorney cannot recover for business done by him in that character, unless he have obtained a certificate which was in force for the period the work was done – Where a solicitor applied for and paid for a certificate for the period between October, 1847, and November, 1848, and the officer, by mistake, dated it October, 1848, and November, 1819 – Held, that the solicitor was not enititled to recover for business done in 1849
References: [1854] EngR 361, (1854) 4 HLC 1091, (1854) 10 ER 790
Links: Commonlii
The intention of the 11th and 12th Vict. c. 45 (the Winding Up Act of 1848), was to provide for debts recoverable only in equity, as well as for those recoverable at law ; and the Master has an uncontrolled discretion (subject to appeal) to allow or disallow, or to allow as a claim only, according to the proofs adduced before him, any demand against a Company.
Certain persons proposed to form a company; they employed A. as their solicitor; he was so named, on provisional registration, under the joint Stock Company’s Act; the Directors were not to be personally liable to the officers of the Company ; the solicitor was continuously employed, until after the company had been completely formed and registered, and until it was wound up. The 44th article of the deed of settlement declared, that ‘a sufficient part of the funds of the Company should, upon complete registration, be appropriated in payment of the expenses of and incidental to the formation of the Company, including those of or having reference to the preparation and execution of that deed.’ When the Company was before the Master on the Winding-up Act, the solicitor presented a demand for services from the earliest period up to that time. The Master allowed the demand as a claim only, and not as a debt, leaving the solicitor to proceed at law : Held, reversing an order of Vice Chancellor Kindersley which had permitted the order of the Master to stand, that the Master ought to have allowed this demand as a debt, but subject to proof that the items came under the description contained in the 44th article, and subject also to taxation. As the solicitor had omitted to bring the 44th article to the notice of the Vice Chancellor, his order, though reversed, was reversed without costs.
Statutes: Winding Up Act of 1848
References: [2005] 1 WLR 3019
Coram: Colman J, Clark, Nathan
(Visitors to the Inns of Court) A Disciplinary Tribunal was convened by the President of COIC pursuant to the 2000 Regulations. It found the barrister guilty of misconduct and suspended her from practice for three months. The Visitors appointed to hear the barrister’s appeal included N, who was also a member of the Bar’s Professional Conduct and Complaints Committee. That Committee was responsible for prosecuting allegations of misconduct, although N had not been involved in prosecuting the current case. The appellant barrister objected to N’s participation: ‘Ms N would be a judge in her own cause. This would also be a situation of apparent bias for, although it was accepted that she had taken no part in the particular decision of the PCCC to prosecute the Appellant and that there was no actual bias on her part, there was nevertheless a real apprehension or danger or possibility or suspicion of bias by reason of her membership of the PCCC.’
Held: The objection succeeded. N was obliged to recuse herself both on common law principles and in order to secure compliance with ECHR article 6. The decision was rendered under the doctrine that no one must be a judge in his own cause, rendering it unnecessary to consider whether the doctrine of apparent bias was also an impediment to Ms Nathan’s participation. However, the judgment expressed the firm view that the doctrine of apparent bias did also require Ms Nathan’s recusal.
‘The decision by the PCCC to institute proceedings against a barrister thus imposes upon the PCCC as agent for the Bar Council a duty to prosecute that person and, consistently with the applicable procedure, to present the case against the barrister in a manner designed to procure conviction. Whereas it is undoubtedly true that the proceedings in which the charges are prosecuted must be fairly and justly conducted, those representing the Bar Council have a duty as its agents to procure conviction or in the case of appeals before Visitors to defeat an appeal. They do not have the function of a neutral amicus. Their interest is conviction or dismissal of appeals . .
In considering whether a lay representative on a Visitors Panel shares the interest of the PCCC, of which that person is a member, in the appeal being dismissed, an analysis of the quality of that particular member’s ability to maintain objectivity is nothing to the point. Nobody called in question Lord Hoffmann’s personal ability to be objective and impartial. Nor, in our judgment, does the fact that the purpose of including lay representatives on the PCCC and as members of the Visitors panel, have the effect of insulating such persons from having the appearance of sharing the interest of the PCCC as a prosecutor. Lord Hoffmann’s judicial oath could provide no such insulation. Nor do we find that a lay representative’s non-participation in meetings relating to the prosecution in question, cuts off that person from the responsibility which, as a member of the PCCC, that lay representative bears together with its other members for taking forward and facilitating the prosecution. Lord Hoffmann was not a decision-taker at either Amnesty International or AICL with regard to participation in the proceedings . .
Accordingly, the perception of impartiality is to be based on that which is open to view and not on facts which would be hidden from an outside fair-minded observer.
If therefore one assumes that the scope of the hypothetical fair-minded observer’s knowledge is confined to the Code of Conduct of the Bar, the Disciplinary Tribunal Regulations, the Complaints Rules and the Hearings before the Visitors Rules and does not extend to the methods of selection of the members of the PCCC or, except in so far as they should not have attended the relevant meeting of the PCCC, the Visitors panels or to the attendance records of lay representatives at meetings of the PCCC, we consider that even taking account of the high calibre of lay representatives generally and of their function in representing the public interest, there would be a perception to the fair-minded observer of a real possibility of subconscious lack of impartiality by reason of exposure to influence by such prosecuting policies as might exist amongst PCCC members generally.’
Statutes: European Convention on Human Rights 6
This case cites:
This case is cited by:
References: [1857] EngR 716 (C), (1857) 23 Beav 609
Links: Commonlii
An annuity was granted free of all taxes ‘ except the property tax,’ and the deed contained a proviso, that in cwe the income tax should be reduced, the reduction should enure to the benefit of the grantor. This proviso was omitted in the memorial.
Held: that the memorial was sufficient.
If a solicitor purchase from his client, and institute a suit against third parties to enforce his right, the objection to the transaction, on the ground of its being a purchase by a solicitor from his client, cannot be maintained by such third parties.
References: [1997] EWCA Civ 1685
Links: Bailii
The applicant appealed a decision of the Joint Regulation Committee. He had been admitted, and had practised as a barrister in Pakistan. He had qualifications and experience which he asserted should give some exemption from the normal examination and pupillage requirements for admission to the English Bar. The Visitors pointed out that the academic qualifications had not been recognised by the Committee. Although the applicant did indeed have considerable experience, the court could not criticise the decision of the Committee as unreasonable. They faced clear requirements which the applicant did not meet.