Wheeler v Le Marchant: CA 1881

Advice was given to the defendant trustee of the will of a Mr Brett in the course of its administration in the Chancery Division; for the purpose of that advice information was sought from both the former and the current estate-agent and surveyor. Part of the estate consisted of land in respect of which the defendant made an agreement with Mr Wheeler that he (Mr Wheeler) was to erect certain buildings and then be granted a lease of that land. The parties fell out. Mr Wheeler brought an action for specific performance and the defendant trustee claimed privilege for the reports of the estate-agent/surveyor made to the solicitors in the course of the administration of the estate.
Held: While the communications between the defendant and the estate’s solicitors were privileged, the reports of the estate-agent/surveyor were not.
Cotton LJ: ‘Hitherto such communications have only been protected when they have been in contemplation of some litigation, or for the purpose of giving advice or obtaining evidence with reference to it. And that is reasonable, because then the solicitor is preparing for the defence or for bringing the action, and all communications he makes for that purpose, and the communications made to him for the purpose of giving him the information, are, in fact, the brief in the action, and ought to be protected. But here we are asked to extend the principle to a very different class of cases, and it is not necessary, in order to enable persons freely to communicate with their solicitors and obtain their legal advice, that any privilege should be extended to communications such as these.’
Brett LJ: ‘The rule as to the non-production of communications between solicitor and client is a rule which has been established upon grounds of general or public policy. It is confined entirely to communications which take place for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from professional persons. It is so confined in terms, it seems to me it is so confined in principle, and it does not extend to the suggested case.’ and ‘Hitherto such communications have only been protected when they have been in contemplation of some litigation, or for the purpose of giving advice or obtaining evidence with reference to it. And that is reasonable, because then the solicitor is preparing for the defence or for bringing the action, and all the communications he makes for that purpose, and the communications made to him for the purpose of giving him the information, are, in fact, the brief in the action, and ought to be protected.’
Jessel MR: ‘What they contended for was that documents communicated to the solicitors of the Defendants by third parties, though not communicated by such third parties as agents of the clients seeking advice, should be protected, because those documents contained information required or asked for by the solicitors, for the purpose of enabling them the better to advise the clients. The cases, no doubt, establish that such documents are protected where they have come into existence after litigation commenced or in contemplation, and when they have been made with a view to such litigation, either for the purpose of obtaining advice as to such litigation, or of obtaining evidence to be used in such litigation, or of obtaining information which might lead to the obtaining of such evidence, but it has never hitherto been decided that documents are protected merely because they are produced by a third person in answer to an inquiry made by the solicitor.’ and ‘It must not be supposed that there is any principle which says that every confidential communication which it is necessary to make in order to carry on the ordinary business of life is protected. The protection is of a very limited character, and in this country is restricted to the obtaining the assistance of lawyers, as regards the conduct of litigation or the rights to property. It has never gone beyond the obtaining legal advice and assistance, and all things reasonably necessary in the shape of communication to the legal advisers are protected from production or discovery in order that that legal advice may be obtained safely and sufficiently.’

Judges:

Cotton LJ, Sir George Jessel MR, Brett LJ

Citations:

(1881) 17 Ch D 675

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedThree Rivers District Council and others v The Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 6) CA 1-Mar-2004
The Bank of England had sought assistance from its lawyers to prepare for a private non-statutory enquiry. The claimant sought disclosure of that advice. The defendant bank claimed legal professional privilege.
Held: Not all advice given by a . .
CitedUnited States of America v Philip Morris Inc and Others and British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd CA 23-Mar-2004
The defendants appealed orders requiring them to produce evidence for use in the courts in the US.
Held: It was the pleasure and duty of British courts to respond positively to a letter of request. Public interest required that a court should . .
CitedSumitomo Corporation v Credit Lyonnais Rouse Limited CA 20-Jul-2001
Documents had been translated from the Japanese, for the purposes of the litigation. The claimant refused disclosure, arguing that they were privileged, and protected from disclosure, having been prepared for the court proceedings.
Held: The . .
CitedThree Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) HL 11-Nov-2004
The Bank anticipated criticism in an ad hoc enquiry which was called to investigate its handling of a matter involving the claimant. The claimant sought disclosure of the documents created when the solicitors advised employees of the Bank in . .
CitedFord, Regina (on The Application of) v The Financial Services Authority Admn 11-Oct-2011
The claimant sought, through judicial review, control over 8 emails sent by them to their lawyers. They claimed legal advice privilege, but the emails contained advice sent by their chartered accountants. The defendant had sought to use them in the . .
CitedPrudential Plc and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax and Another SC 23-Jan-2013
The appellants resisted disclosure to the revenue of advice it had received. It claimed legal advice privilege (LAP), though the advice was from its accountants.
Held: (Lords Sumption and Clarke dissenting) LAP applies to all communications . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Legal Professions, Litigation Practice

Updated: 27 April 2022; Ref: scu.180862