The defendant, a Member of Parliament, wrote a letter to the Law Society with a copy to the Lord Chancellor, saying that he had been specifically requested by a constituent to refer the plaintiffs’ solicitors’ firm to the Law Society for investigation. He set out the constituent’s complaints and stated that, contrary to his usual practice he had complied with the request because he had received complaints from other constituents in the past concerning the plaintiffs’ firm. He defended the defamation action, claiming qualified privilege.
Held: Qualified privilege may arise in the making of complaints about public officials or persons with public duties to the relevant authorities.
Geoffrey Lane J said: ‘Finally, have the plaintiffs proved that the defendant was actuated by express malice? Malice includes any spite or ill-will directed from the defendant at the plaintiffs. It also includes any indirect motive. That is to say, any intention on the part of the defendant to use the occasion, not merely for the purpose for which it is a subject of qualified privilege, but for some extraneous purpose of his own not connected with privilege’
. . And ‘it seems contrary to principle that the existence of qualified privilege should depend on the mistaken belief of the defendant’.
Lane J
[1972] 1 QB 14
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Nevill v Fine Arts and General Insurance Co Ltd CA 1895
Lopes LJ said: ‘The effect of the occasion being privileged is to render it incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove malice, that is, to shew some indirect motive not connected with the privilege, so as to take the statement made by the defendant out . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Defamation, Constitutional, Legal Professions
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.539180
