Chai v Peng: FD 1 May 2014

The court was severely critical of the practice in divorce proceedings of uissuing a petition for divorce but then not serving it for some time. Holman J referred to a colourful metaphor deployed by leading counsel for the husband: ‘To file [a divorce petition] prematurely is the equivalent of laying one’s towel at dawn upon the sun lounger of the English court and returning at high noon to bask in the warmth of the law of England and Wales on divorce and financial remedies.’

Holman J
[2014] EWHC 1519 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoChai v Peng FD 13-Mar-2014
Application for further maintenance pending suit. . .

Cited by:
See AlsoChai v Peng (1) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .
See AlsoChai v Peng (2) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .
See AlsoChai v Peng CA 12-Jun-2015
Application to adjourn full hearing of appeal. . .
CitedThum v Thum FC 21-Oct-2016
No abuse of process in service error
The husband claimed that the W was guilty of abuse of process by issuing the divorce petion, but then not serving it for many months in an attempt to gain a tactical jurisdictional advantage under Brussels II.
Held: H’s application was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 03 December 2021; Ref: scu.525862

Chai v Peng: FD 13 Mar 2014

Application for further maintenance pending suit.

Holman J
[2014] EWHC 750 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
See AlsoChai v Peng FD 1-May-2014
The court was severely critical of the practice in divorce proceedings of uissuing a petition for divorce but then not serving it for some time. Holman J referred to a colourful metaphor deployed by leading counsel for the husband: ‘To file [a . .
See AlsoChai v Peng (1) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .
See AlsoChai v Peng (2) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .
See AlsoChai v Peng CA 12-Jun-2015
Application to adjourn full hearing of appeal. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 01 December 2021; Ref: scu.522559

Ellis-Carr v Levy (Home Rights : Requirements To Establish Interest): LRA 19 Nov 2013

LRA Family Law Act 1996 – home rights notice – meaning and effect of ‘intention’ in statute – Applicant’s evidence – property never occupied as a matrimonial home – whether husband ever had entitlement to occupy by virtue of a beneficial estate or interest or application – application opposed by Applicant’s husband’s trustee in bankruptcy – effect of orders relating to property made by Registrar Derrett in the bankruptcy upheld by Norris J on appeal – Mental Capacity Act 2005 – CPR 21 – s283A Insolvency Act – s261 Enterprise Act 2002

Judge Hargreaves
[2013] LRAD 2012 – 1122
Bailii
Family Law Act 1996

Registered Land, Family, Human Rights, Insolvency

Updated: 01 December 2021; Ref: scu.521988

Regina v Secretary of State for Health, Ex Parte Lally: QBD 26 Oct 2000

Tight restrictions had been placed on the circumstances under which children might visit prisoners in high security hospitals who were seen to be a risk to them having been convicted of murder or similar or who were schedule 1 offenders. The restrictions were valid, since they always allowed visits where a court had ordered contact, and there was no clear line to be drawn between different classes of convicted murderers. Contact was to be assessed in accordance with the child’s best interests, and breaks in contact with remoter family members such as nephews and nieces, need not be considered interference with family life.

Times 26-Oct-2000
European Convention on Human Rights
England and Wales

Children, Human Rights, Family

Updated: 29 November 2021; Ref: scu.85486

Vallianatos And Others v Greece: ECHR 7 Nov 2013

Grand Chamber Judgment. The applicants alleged that the fact that the ‘civil unions’ introduced by the respondent were designed only for couples composed of different-sex adults had infringed their right to respect for their private and family life and amounted to unjustified discrimination between different-sex and same-sex couples, to the detriment of the latter.
Held: The introduction of registered partnerships only for different sex couples, to exist alongside marriage which was also only open to different sex couples, constituted a breach of article 14 read with article 8 of the Convention

Dean Spielmann, P
29381/09, [2013] ECHR 1110, 32684/09, 36 BHRC 149, (2014) 59 EHRR 12
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8 14
Human Rights
Citing:
Legal SummaryVallianatos And Others v Greece (LS) ECHR 7-Nov-2013
ECHR (Grand Chamber) Article 14
Discrimination
Exclusion of same-sex couples from ‘civil unions’: violation
Facts – The first application was lodged by two Greek nationals, and the second by six . .

Cited by:
CitedSteinfeld and Another v Secretary of State for Education CA 21-Feb-2017
Hetero Partnerships – wait and see proportionate
The claimants, a heterosexual couple complained that their inability to have a civil partnership was an unlawful discrimination against them and a denial of their Article 8 rights. The argument that the appellants’ case did not come within the ambit . .
CitedSteinfeld and Keidan, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for International Development (In Substitution for The Home Secretary and The Education Secretary) SC 27-Jun-2018
The applicants, an heterosexual couple wished to enter into a civil partnership under the 2004 Act, rather than a marriage. They complained that had they been a same sex couple they would have had that choice under the 2013 Act.
Held: The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Family, Discrimination

Updated: 25 November 2021; Ref: scu.517642

Rubin v Rubin: FD 10 Mar 2014

The court heard an application by the wife for a legal services payment order.

Mostyn J
[2014] EWHC 611 (Fam)
Bailii
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedTL v ML and others FD 9-Dec-2005
. .
CitedCurrey v Currey CA 18-Oct-2006
Where one party in an ancillary relief claim was not entitled to legal aid, but showed a need for legal representation which he or she could not afford, the court could make an order requiring the other party to make a costs allowance. The nature of . .
CitedMakarskaya v Korchagin FD 21-Jun-2013
. .

Cited by:
CitedMG v AR FD 16-Nov-2021
Family Case: Costs Security depends on Case Merits
Application for security for costs in family cases.
Held: In contrast to civil cases generally, in a family case the merits of the application and the strength of the defence necessarily have to be carefully considered. It is only by . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Costs

Updated: 22 November 2021; Ref: scu.522292

Burns v Burns: CA 30 Jul 2004

Application for leave to appeal against ancillary relief order.

[2004] EWCA Civ 1258, [2004] 3 FCR 263
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
MentionedHeyer v Newby CA 19-Oct-2005
The parties had settled their ancillary relief case by consent, but shortly afterwards, shares in the husband’s company were sold creating a very substantial windfall in his favour. The former wife sought to vary the order. The husband appealed an . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.276322

Richards v Dove: ChD 1974

[1974] 1 All ER 888
Cited by:
AppliedBurns v Burns CA 1984
Long Relationship Not Enough for Interest in Home
The parties lived together for 17 years but were not married. The woman took the man’s name, but beyond taking on usual household duties, she made no direct financial contribution to the house. She brought up their two children over 17 years. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Trusts

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.198162

In re A (A Child) (Vulnerable Witness): FD 17 Jun 2013

Pauffley J said: ‘Once more in these long running private law proceedings it is necessary to consider competing Convention rights so as to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, achieving justice and, on the other, protecting a vulnerable young woman from the potential for further and perhaps very considerable physical as well as psychological harm. The key question is as to whether, imminently, steps should be taken which could lead to the giving, in some form or another, of oral evidence by that vulnerable individual. ‘

Pauffley J
[2013] EWHC 1694 (Fam)
Bailii

Family, Litigation Practice

Updated: 15 November 2021; Ref: scu.512056

Prest v Prest: CA 7 Jul 2015

H appealed against an order made under the 1869 Act as respects arrears under a maintenance order.

McFarlane, Gloster LJJ, Blake J
[2015] EWCA Civ 714
Bailii
Debtors Act 1869 5, Administration of Justice Act l960 13
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoPrest v Prest and Others CA 16-Feb-2012
. .
See AlsoPrest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and Others SC 12-Jun-2013
In the course of ancillary relief proceedings in a divorce, questions arose regarding company assets owned by the husband. The court was asked as to the power of the court to order the transfer of assets owned entirely in the company’s names. The . .
See AlsoPrest v Prest FD 28-Jul-2014
W sought H’s committal to prison for failing to pay sums due under the provisions an Order for the payment of periodical payments to the wife for her own benefit and for the benefit of the children of the parties, so accordingly maintenance orders. . .
CitedPrest v Prest FD 29-Jul-2014
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 12 November 2021; Ref: scu.549776

Evans v United Kingdom: ECHR 7 Mar 2006

The claimant had entered into fertilisation treatment with her boyfriend. They both signed an agreement under which the fertilised sperm were only later to be implanted with the agreement of both. The couple separated, and the potential father withdrew his consent to the treatment, and the woman was refused implantation. She complained of interference with her article 8 rights.
Held: Her claim failed. The Court will generally allow the national authorities a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to striking a balance between competing Convention rights.
The 1990 Act had been passed after detailed consideration and consultation. It had been explained to the applicant that the completion of the treatment depended upon the continuing consent of her partner, and she had signed to agree to this. An embryo did not itself have a right to life. Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will be restricted.

C.L. Rozakis, P
Times 17-Mar-2006, 6339/05, [2006] ECHR 200, [2007] ECHR 264, [2007] ECHR 265, (2008) 46 EHRR 34, [2007] 2 FCR 5, [2007] 1 FLR 1990, (2007) 95 BMLR 107, [2007] Fam Law 588, 22 BHRC 190
Worldlii, Bailii, Bailii, Bailii PR
European Convention on Human Rights 8, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990
Human Rights
Cited by:
See AlsoEvans v The United Kingdom ECHR 22-Nov-2006
. .
See AlsoEvans v United Kingdom ECHR 10-Apr-2007
The claimant said that the English law on assisted conception infringed her right to family life. She had began treatment with her partner, and was given a cycle of in-vitro fertilisation before her cancerous condition required removal of her . .
CitedEweida And Others v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Jan-2013
Eweida_ukECHR2013
The named claimant had been employed by British Airways. She was a committed Christian and wished to wear a small crucifix on a chain around her neck. This breached the then dress code and she was dismissed. Her appeals had failed. Other claimants . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Family, Health

Leading Case

Updated: 12 November 2021; Ref: scu.239579

Steinfeld and Another v Secretary of State for Education: CA 21 Feb 2017

Hetero Partnerships – wait and see proportionate

The claimants, a heterosexual couple complained that their inability to have a civil partnership was an unlawful discrimination against them and a denial of their Article 8 rights. The argument that the appellants’ case did not come within the ambit of article 8 was maintained by the respondent.
Held: (Arden LJ dissenting) The appeal failed. However, there was no need first to show an infringement of the claimants’ article 8 rights before complaining of discrimination under article 14. It was enough to show that the complaint fell within the ambit of article 8. Nevertheless, the policy of the government to wait and see as to the development of demand for civil partnerships was proportionate. There remained an impasse but this could not be left indefinitely. The interference with the appellants’ rights under article 8, read together with article 14 was, at least for the time being, justified.
Beatson LJ said: ‘In my view, at present, the Secretary of State’s position is objectively justified. The future of the legal status of civil partnerships is an important matter of social policy that government is entitled to consider carefully. At the hearing the Secretary of State’s approach was described as a ‘wait and see’ approach, although it would be more accurate to describe it as a ‘wait and evaluate’ approach. Whatever term is used to describe the approach, it would not have been available to the Secretary of State prior to the enactment and coming into force of the 2013 Act. This is because it would not have been possible at that time to determine how many people would continue to enter into civil partnerships or want to do so because they share the appellants’ sincere objections to marriage. The relevant start date for consideration is thus 13 March 2014 when the provisions extending marriage to same sex couples came into force.’
and ‘I can well understand the frustration which must be felt by the appellants and those different sex couples who share their view about marriage, about what they regard as the Government’s slow progress on this issue. Some couples in their position may suffer serious fiscal disadvantage if, for example, one of them dies before they can form a civil partnership. This is a factor in the proportionality balance, and because this is a case of differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation, that balance must command anxious scrutiny. But against the background of a serious but unresolved difficulty which affects the public as a whole, and the practicable impossibility of some interim measure, such as temporarily opening civil partnership to different sex couples when the eventual decision may be to abolish it, I am unable to regard the Secretary of State’s current policy of ‘wait and evaluate’ as a disproportionate response.’
Briggs LJ said: ‘I can well understand the frustration which must be felt by the appellants and those different sex couples who share their view about marriage, about what they regard as the Government’s slow progress on this issue. Some couples in their position may suffer serious fiscal disadvantage if, for example, one of them dies before they can form a civil partnership. This is a factor in the proportionality balance, and because this is a case of differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation, that balance must command anxious scrutiny. But against the background of a serious but unresolved difficulty which affects the public as a whole, and the practicable impossibility of some interim measure, such as temporarily opening civil partnership to different sex couples when the eventual decision may be to abolish it, I am unable to regard the Secretary of State’s current policy of ‘wait and evaluate’ as a disproportionate response.’
Arden LJ found that the interference with the appellants’ article 8 and article 14 rights was not justified, but considered that it pursued a legitimate aim, saying that the state had the option to eliminate the discrimination ‘in any way it sees fit’ and therefore must be entitled to ‘some time to make its choice.’

Arden, Beatson, Briggs LJJ
[2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] WLR(D) 123, [2017] HRLR 3, [2018] QB 519, [2017] 4 All ER 47, [2017] 2 FLR 692, [2017] 3 WLR 1237, [2017] 2 FCR 324
Bailii, WLRD
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, Civil Partnership Act 2004, European Convention on Human Rights 8 14, Human Rights Act 1998
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromSteinfeld and Another v The Secretary of State for Education Admn 29-Jan-2016
The claimant heterosexual couple wanted to enter into a civil partnership rather than to marry.
Held: The request for judicial review failed. On the authorities, the bar did not fall within the scope or ambit of Article 8. The appellants could . .
CitedOliari And Others v Italy ECHR 21-Jul-2015
The claimants complained of the ban in Italy on the recognition of same sex relationships. Despite several rulings of the Italian Constitutional Court that they had a constitutional right to have their relationships recognised by the law, the . .
CitedPetrovic v Austria ECHR 27-Mar-1998
The applicant was refused a grant of parental leave allowance in 1989. At that time parental leave allowance was available only to mothers. The applicant complained that this violated article 14 taken together with article 8.
Held: The . .
CitedSchalk and Kopf v Austria ECHR 22-Nov-2010
The applicants, a same sex couple sought the right to marry.
Held: The application failed. Same-sex couples are in a relevantly similar situation to different-sex couples as regards their need for legal recognition and protection of their . .
CitedVallianatos And Others v Greece (LS) ECHR 7-Nov-2013
ECHR (Grand Chamber) Article 14
Discrimination
Exclusion of same-sex couples from ‘civil unions’: violation
Facts – The first application was lodged by two Greek nationals, and the second by six . .
CitedVallianatos And Others v Greece ECHR 7-Nov-2013
Grand Chamber Judgment. The applicants alleged that the fact that the ‘civil unions’ introduced by the respondent were designed only for couples composed of different-sex adults had infringed their right to respect for their private and family life . .
CitedPajic v Croatia ECHR 23-Feb-2016
The applicant alleged discrimination on the grounds of her sexual orientation in obtaining a residence permit in Croatia, contrary to Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. . .
CitedRegina v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene and others HL 28-Oct-1999
(Orse Kebeline) The DPP’s appeal succeeded. A decision by the DPP to authorise a prosecution could not be judicially reviewed unless dishonesty, bad faith, or some other exceptional circumstance could be shown. A suggestion that the offence for . .
CitedGhaidan v Godin-Mendoza HL 21-Jun-2004
Same Sex Partner Entitled to tenancy Succession
The protected tenant had died. His same-sex partner sought a statutory inheritance of the tenancy.
Held: His appeal succeeded. The Fitzpatrick case referred to the position before the 1998 Act: ‘Discriminatory law undermines the rule of law . .
CitedSecretary of State for Work and Pensions v M HL 8-Mar-2006
The respondent’s child lived with the estranged father for most of each week. She was obliged to contribute child support. She now lived with a woman, and complained that because her relationship was homosexual, she had been asked to pay more than . .
CitedWilkinson v Kitzinger and others FD 31-Jul-2006
The parties had gone through a ceremony of marriage in Columbia, being both women. After the relationship failed, the claimant sought a declaration that the witholding of the recognition of same-sex marriages recoginised in a foreign jurisdiction . .
CitedClift, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 13-Dec-2006
The claimants were former serving prisoners who complained that the early release provisions discriminated against them unjustifiably. Each was subject to a deportation requirement, and said that in their cases the control on the time for their . .
CitedCountryside Alliance and others, Regina (on the Application of) v Attorney General and Another HL 28-Nov-2007
The appellants said that the 2004 Act infringed their rights under articles 8 11 and 14 and Art 1 of protocol 1.
Held: Article 8 protected the right to private and family life. Its purpose was to protect individuals from unjustified intrusion . .
CitedIn re P and Others, (Adoption: Unmarried couple) (Northern Ireland); In re G HL 18-Jun-2008
The applicants complained that as an unmarried couple they had been excluded from consideration as adopters.
Held: Northern Ireland legislation had not moved in the same way as it had for other jurisdictions within the UK. The greater . .
CitedHooper and Others, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions HL 5-May-2005
Widowers claimed that, in denying them benefits which would have been payable to widows, the Secretary of State had acted incompatibly with their rights under article 14 read with article 1 of Protocol 1 and article 8 of the ECHR.
Held: The . .

Cited by:
At CASteinfeld and Keidan, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for International Development (In Substitution for The Home Secretary and The Education Secretary) SC 27-Jun-2018
The applicants, an heterosexual couple wished to enter into a civil partnership under the 2004 Act, rather than a marriage. They complained that had they been a same sex couple they would have had that choice under the 2013 Act.
Held: The . .
CitedHuman Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland : Abortion) SC 7-Jun-2018
The Commission challenged the compatibility of the NI law relating to banning nearly all abortions with Human Rights Law. It now challenged a decision that it did not have standing to bring the case.
Held: (Lady Hale, Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Human Rights

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.575337

Grasso v Naik (Twenty-One Irregular Divorces): FD 8 Nov 2017

Deceit in address avoided divorce petitions

The Queen’s Proctor applied to have set aside as fraudulent 21 petitions for divorce. It was said that false addresses had been used in order to give the court the appearance that it had jurisdiction.
Held: The decrees obtained by fraud were void and not just voidable, even here parties had remarried. It appeared that a particular person, a former practising barrister might be involved in each case, and the costs issues should be put to him.

Sir James Munby P
[2017] EWHC 2789 (Fam)
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 8, Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926 1(4)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSheldon v Sheldon (The Queen’s Proctor Intervening) 28-Jan-1865
Practice. – Dismissal of Petition – No Evidence produced -The Queen’s Proctor intervened in a suit for dissolution in which the respondent did not appear, and alleged collusion and the petitioner’s adultery. No evidence being tendered in support of . .
CitedCrowden v Crowden (The King’s Proctor showing cause) 1906
The normal practice of the Queen’s Proctor is not to adduce evidence in support of the plea on intervening in a divorce petition, and there is no need for him to do so where there is no answer to the plea. . .
CitedClutterbuck v Clutterbuck and Reynolds (Queen’s Proctor showing cause) 1961
The court considered the proper practice where the Proctor intervened in a divorce petition, but no answer was received from the parties. . .
CitedRapisarda v Colladon (Irregular Divorces) FC 30-Sep-2014
The court considered applications to set aside some 180 petitions for divorce on the grounds that they appeared to be attempts to pervert the course of justice by wrongfully asserting residence in order to benefit from the UK jurisdiction.
CitedSisojeva And Others v Latvia ECHR 15-Jan-2007
Grand Chamber – There was insufficient evidence that the questioning by security police in the circumstances: ‘should be regarded as a form of ‘pressure’, ‘intimidation’ or ‘harassment’ which might have induced the applicants to withdraw or modify . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.598967

Wachtel v Wachtel: CA 8 Feb 1973

The court described the 1969 and 1970 Acts as ‘a reforming statute designed to facilitate the granting of ancillary relief in cases where marriages have been dissolved . . We regard the provisions of sections 2,3, 4 and 5 of the Act of 1970 as designed to accord to the courts the widest possible powers in readjusting the financial position of the parties and to afford the courts the necessary machinery to that end . .’ Relevant misconduct so as to affect an ancillary relief order should be confined to those cases where the conduct was ‘obvious and gross’.
Lord Denning MR said that the phrase ‘family assets’: ‘ refers to those things which are acquired by one or other or both of the parties, with the intention that there should be continuing provision for them and their children during their joint lives, and used for the benefit of the family as a whole.’

Lord Denning MR, Phillimore, Roskill LJJ
[1973] Fam 72, [1973] EWCA Civ 10, [1973] Fam 72, [1973] 2 WLR 366
Bailii, FLW
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, Divorce Reform Act 1969
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedLivingstone-Stallard v Livingstone-Stallard FD 1974
Section 1(2)(b) is expressed in very simple language, and ‘is . . quite easy for a layman to understand’. The court considered the necessary test for whether unreasonable behaviour had reached a point such as to allow a decree of divorce.
Dunn . .
Appeal fromWachtel v Wachtel FD 3-Oct-1972
Mr. Justice Ormrod ordered the husband to pay to his wife (i) a lump sum of pounds 10,000, or half the value of the former matrimonial home in Norwood, South London, whichever be the less: (ii) a periodical payment of pounds 1,500 per annum, less . .

Cited by:
CitedMcFarlane v McFarlane; Parlour v Parlour CA 7-Jul-2004
Appeals were made against orders for periodical payments made against high earning husbands. The argument was that if the case of White had decided that capital should be distributed equally, the same should apply also to income.
Held: The . .
CitedRobinson v Robinson (Practice Note) CA 2-Jan-1982
The husband was a serving soldier who had had various postings abroad. The wife returned home, where she discovered that she was pregnant. He followed her home, but she left him, and applied for maintenance. The justices found that she had deserted . .
CitedO’Neill v O’Neill CA 1975
The court considered the level of unreasonable behaviour necessary to found a decree of divorce.
Cairns LJ said: ‘The right test is, in my opinion, accurately stated in Rayden on Divorce . . ‘The words ‘reasonably be expected’ prima facie . .
CitedKyte v Kyte CA 22-Jul-1987
The parties disputed an ancillary relief claim on their divorce. The husband had been suicidally depressed. The wife had committed adultery over a long time and also assisted her husband’s failed suicide. The husband now sought to rely upon her . .
CitedMiller v Miller; M v M (Short Marriage: Clean Break) CA 29-Jul-2005
The parties contested ancillary relief where there had been only a short marriage, but where here were considerable family assets available for division. The wife sought to rely upn the husband’s behaviour to counter any argument as to the shortness . .
CitedMiller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane HL 24-May-2006
Fairness on Division of Family Capital
The House faced the question of how to achieve fairness in the division of property following a divorce. In the one case there were substantial assets but a short marriage, and in the other a high income, but low capital.
Held: The 1973 Act . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.198593

ZS v FS (Application To Prevent Solicitor Acting): FD 24 Oct 2017

Discosure of Confidences must be at risk

H sought to restrain W’s solicitors from acting. The firm was one of six firms approached to consider representing H, and he now said that certain matters had been diviluged to the firm.
Held: The legal principles were clear, and it was for H to establish that some confidential material had been given by him in the course of any meeting. He chose to continue the protection of privilege in respect of some elements, as was his right, but had failed to estabish his case. On the balance of probabilities, no meeting had taken place at which confidential material had been diclosed. H’s application failed.
Williams J summarised the applicable principles: ‘(a) the duties arising in confidentiality and legal professional privilege arise whether the information is imparted to a solicitor directly by a principal, or by an agent on behalf of his principal. It would therefore apply to any confidential information or legally privileged material which arose between Raymond Tooth and OE.
(b) the duty arises whether the parties formally entered into a legal relationship or not. The imparting of information in contemplation of such a relationship would suffice. Thus a preliminary meeting between solicitor and client in the course of a beauty parade could suffice, probably even if pro bono or not charged for.
(c) the rules apply in family cases just as much as in civil actions. There is no absolute rule though that a solicitor cannot act in litigation against a former client.
(d) in the first instance it is a matter for the solicitor involved to consider whether, consistent with his professional conduct rules and the proper administration of justice, he can continue to act. If he concludes he cannot, that will usually be the end of the matter. If he concludes he can continue to act then the Court retains the power to grant an injunction to prevent him from acting.
(e) where a former client has imparted information in confidence in the course of a fiduciary relationship, and /or where that information is privileged, there are strong public policy reasons rooted in the proper administration of justice which support the approach that a solicitor in possession of such information should not act in a way that might appear to put that information at risk of coming into the hands of someone with an adverse interest.
(f) it must be established that the confidential or privileged information is relevant or may be relevant to the matter on which the solicitor is now instructed by the person with an adverse interest to that of the former client.
(g) where it is established that a solicitor is in possession of such confidential and/or privileged information, the Court should intervene to prevent the information coming into the hands of anyone with an adverse interest, unless there is no real risk of disclosure. Once it is established that a person is in possession of such information the burden is on them to show that there is no such real risk. In this context ‘real’ means it is not merely fanciful or theoretical, but it does not need to be substantial.
(h) the risk of disclosure may arise from deliberate act, inadvertent disclosure or unconscious influence or subconscious influence. In the latter case in particular it might be quite fact specific whether that risk arises or not.
(i) in the context of family litigation it is hard to conceive of a situation where the risk of disclosure would not satisfy that test where the Court had concluded that detailed, confidential financial information and/or privileged information had been disclosed to a solicitor by one party to a marriage which was, or might be relevant to a potential dispute between them. In most cases that would create a real risk where that solicitor was subsequently instructed by the other party.
(j) a party advancing such an application may decline to waive privilege or confidentiality, or may elect to partially waive privilege. If he partially waives privilege the Court may order full disclosure in relation to that transaction in order to determine an issue such as an application for an injunction like this, and the Court may take steps to ensure that the privilege is not waived for all purposes, but to ensure that the cat can be put back into the bag. In cases such as this the question should be considered at the directions stage, in particular where, as here, partial disclosure in the form of the attendance note has been made.
(k) if the principles on which an order can be made are established an order should usually be made, unless it is established that there are other more significant public policy reasons for not granting it, including that the Court concludes that the injustice to the respondent in granting the order outweighs the injustice to the applicant in not granting it. Relevant considerations might include, firstly, whether the information had been imparted during an exercise designed either wholly or in part to conflict out other solicitors who the respondent might seek to instruct; whether there are other firms who might now be able to act for the respondent; whether the application was made promptly; the additional expense and delay that might be occasioned to the respondent if they were obliged to instruct new solicitors; whether any such expense could appropriately be off-set by the applicant.’

Williams J
[2017] EWHC 2660 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedMinter v Priest CA 1929
An issue was whether conversations between a solicitor and his client relating to the business of obtaining a loan for the deposit on the purchase of real estate were privileged from disclosure.
Held: They were privileged. The were within to . .
CitedMinter v Priest HL 1930
The House was asked whether a conversation between a person seeking the services of a solicitor in relation to the purchase of real property and the solicitor was privileged in circumstances where the solicitor was being requested to lend the . .
CitedFrancis Day and Hunter Ltd v Bron CA 1963
The test of substantial similarity in copyright infringement cases is an objective one. That assessment is for the court with such assistance from the evidence and parties as it can muster. To be an infringement there must be ‘some causal . .
CitedGreat Atlantic Insurance v Home Insurance CA 1981
The defendants sought to enter into evidence one part of a document, but the plaintiffs sought to have the remainder protected through legal professional privilege.
Held: The entirety of the document was privileged, but by disclosing part, the . .
CitedPrince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) HL 16-Dec-1998
Conflicts of Duty with former Client
The House was asked as to the duties of the respondent accountants (KPMG). KPMG had information confidential to a former client, the appellant, which might be relevant to instructions which they then accepted from the Brunei Investment Agency, of . .
CitedDavies v Davies CA 2000
The wife had objected to the instruction by her former husband of a solicitor who had been instructed by her some seven years previously. She withdrew her objection, but the court now considered an appeal as regards costs.
Held: The court . .
CitedRe T v A, (children, risk of disclosure) 2000
. .
CitedB and Others Russell McVeagh McKenzie Bartleet and Co v Auckland District Law Society, Gary J Judd PC 19-May-2003
(New Zealand) Solicitors resisted requests to disclose papers in breach of legal professional privilege from their professional body investigating allegations of professional misconduct against them.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The . .
CitedFulham Leisure Holdings Ltd v Nicholson Graham and Jones ChD 14-Feb-2006
The defendant solicitors were being sued for professional negligence. The claimants had taken legal advice after termination of the retainer which led to the present action, and sought to rely upon part of counsel’s opinion. The defendants sought . .
CitedWest London Pipeline and Storage Ltd and Another v Total UK Ltd and others Comc 22-Jul-2008
The court was asked whether it could go behind an affidavit sworn by a person claiming litigation privilege, and, if so, in what circumstances and by what means.
Held: The burden of proof is on the party claiming privilege to establish it; An . .
CitedRe Z (restraining solicitors from acting) FD 21-Dec-2009
Application by a husband, the respondent in the wife’s divorce proceedings, by which he seeks an order that the wife’s solicitors be debarred from acting any further for her in the divorce or financial matters and that they do remove themselves from . .
CitedG v G FD 24-Apr-2015
(financial remedies, privilege, confidentiality) W wished to re-open finacial remedy prodeedings embodied in a court consent order. She wished to allege non-disclosure by H of two substantial family trusts. He said that she had known of what she . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Legal Professions

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.599578

Sheffield City Council v E; Re E (An Alleged Patient): FD 2 Dec 2004

The council sought an order to prevent E, a patient from contracting a marriage which it considered unwise. As a preliminary issue the parties sought guidance as to the questions to be put to the expert as to capacity.
Held: The woman suffered disabillities including functioning at the equivalent age of 13. The man had a serious record of sexual violence. Nevertheless the issue on whether she could marry was only whether she understood the marriage contract and its nature and duties. Whether others would make the same choice in wisdom was not the issue. The doctrine of necessity has no place in relation to marriage, which depended exclusively upon consent. A persons’ best interests were not at issue. Questions of capacity are always issue specific.
Munby J said: ‘An adult either has capacity [in relation to a particular matter] or he does not. If he does, then, at least in relation to that issue, the Family Division cannot exercise its inherent declaratory jurisdiction, because it is fundamental that this jurisdiction can be exercised only in relation to those who lack the relevant capacity.’ and ‘There is, so far as I can see, no hint in any of the cases on the point – and I have gone through them all – that the question of capacity to marry has ever been considered by reference to a person’s ability to understand or evaluate the characteristics of some particular spouse or intended spouse. In all the cases, as we have seen, the question has always been formulated in a general and non-specific form: Is there capacity to understand the nature of the contract of marriage?’ and ‘In relation to her marriage the only question for the court is whether E has capacity to marry. The court is not concerned – has no jurisdiction – to consider whether it is in E’s best interests to marry or to marry S. The court is concerned with her capacity to marry, not with the wisdom of her marriage in general or her marriage to S in particular.’

Munby J
Times 20-Jan-2005, [2005] 2 WLR 953, [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam), [2005] 1 FLR 965
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re Estate of Park (deceased), Park v Park CA 2-Jan-1953
The deceased had remarried. His beneficiaries asserted that he had lacked capacity and that the marriage was ineffective.
Held: The test of capacity to marry is whether he or she was capable of understanding the nature of the contract, was . .
CitedMasterman-Lister v Brutton and Co, Jewell and Home Counties Dairies (No 1) CA 19-Dec-2002
Capacity for Litigation
The claimant appealed against dismissal of his claims. He had earlier settled a claim for damages, but now sought to re-open it, and to claim in negligence against his former solicitors, saying that he had not had sufficient mental capacity at the . .
CitedDurham v Durham, Hunter v Edney (Orse Hunter), Cannon v Smalley (Orse Cannon) 1885
The burden of establishing that a party to a marriage had lacked capacity through insanity, lay on the party making the assertion. The court is to decide whether the respondent was capable of understanding the nature of the contract, and the duties . .
DistinguishedIn re MB (Medical Treatment) CA 26-Mar-1997
The patient was due to deliver a child. A delivery by cesarean section was necessary, but the mother had a great fear of needles, and despite consenting to the operation, refused the necessary consent to anesthesia in any workable form.
Held: . .
CitedIn Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) CA 26-May-2000
The court should decide what is in the best interests of a patient where she was unable to give consent herself. The test of whether what was proposed was within the range of what reasonable and competent medical practitioners might propose, got the . .

Cited by:
CitedE v Channel Four, News International Ltd and St Helens Borough Council FD 1-Jun-2005
The applicant sought an order restraining publication by the defendants of material, saying she did not have capacity to consent to the publication. She suffered a multiple personality disorder. She did herself however clearly wish the film to be . .
CitedD Borough Council v AB CoP 28-Jan-2011
The court was asked whether A, an adult male with learning disability had capacity to consent to sexual relations, and in particular what test was to be applied. . .
CitedPC and Another v City of York Council CA 1-May-2013
It had been decided that PC, a 43 year old woman, had capacity to marry, but the LA now argued that she did not have the capacity to decide to live with her partner, a man who had old convictions for serious sexual assault.
Held: Decisions as . .
CitedAMDC v AG and Another CoP 18-Nov-2020
Guidance for Expert Witnesses on Capacity
The court was asked as to the preparation and use of expert reports as to the capacity of a patient litigant.
Held: Poole J discussed what was need of expert witness in such cases: ‘it will benefit the court if the expert bears in mind the . .
AppliedPH v A Local Authority CoP 30-Jun-2011
The Court was asked whether PH, a forty-nine year old man, suffering from Huntingdon’s Disease had capacity to make decisions about his residence, care and treatment. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Health

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.231165

Re B (Litigants In Person: Timely Service of Documents): FD 30 Sep 2016

Respect for litigants in person – proper service

The court considered the situation where in an international child abduction application, papers were served at the door of the court on a party who was unrepresented, and who had little English.
Held: This was plainly wrong. In such cases it was vital to compky with the Practice Directio as to the timely service of documents. The Father should have been given an adjournment: ‘These are minimum service requirements that should be adapted in individual cases to protect the rights of LIPs. The need for earlier preparation and service places obligations on advocates and those who instruct them, but that is necessary to prevent the intrinsic unfairness to LIPs that may arise from late service.’
Peter Jackson J said: ‘ the right to a fair trial includes the right to know the case one has to meet. Court hearings are already difficult for LIPs, but many, being inexperienced, are hesitant to complain about matters such as late service. In child abduction cases, the applicant is entitled to unconditional legal aid while the respondent is only entitled to means and merits-based legal aid. In consequence, it is common for the court to be faced with an applicant, appropriately represented by specialist solicitors and counsel, while the respondent has no legal advice or representation at all and in many cases cannot speak English.’

Peter Jackson J
[2016] EWHC 2365 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re K (A Child) CA 25-Nov-2010
F brought proceedings here to seek the return of the child K to Poland from where she had been removed by M. F appealed against refusal of an order for K’s return, citing F’s delay.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The judge had not allowed for F’s . .
CitedPH v AH FD 9-May-2016
In this action for the return of a child alleged to have been removed to this country, Holman J dicussed the inequality of the availability of legal aid to the parties: ‘Let me say at once that if the mother had been present today, the fact that she . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Litigation Practice

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.569861

Jones v Padavatton: CA 29 Nov 1968

A mother had persuaded her daughter to come to England to study for the Bar, promising to allow her to stay in her house Several years later, the daughter had still not passed any Bar examinations. They fell out, and the mother sought possession of the house. The daughter said that there had been a contract.
Held: There was a presumption that cohabitants would not intend to create enforceable contractual obligations between themselves. Fenton Atkinson LJ said: ‘At the time when the first arrangement was made, the mother and daughter were ‘very close’. I am satisfied that neither party at that time intended to enter into a legally binding contract.’ The daughter was unable to establish that the mother had contracted to let her to stay in the house until she finished her Bar studies.

Fenton Atkinson, Danckwerts, Salmon J
LJJ
[1969] 1 WLR 328, [1969] 2 All ER 616, [1968] EWCA Civ 4
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBalfour v Balfour CA 1919
Mr Balfour had set out in an apparently formal legal way, an agreement to give his wife pounds 30 a month by way of maintenance while he was away in Ceylon. Mrs Balfour sought to enforce the agreement.
Held: Within a family there is a . .

Cited by:
CitedMerritt v Merritt CA 1970
H and W owned their house jointly. When H left for another woman, he signed an agreement to pay Mrs Merritt a monthly sum, and eventually to transfer the house to her if Mrs M kept up the monthly mortgage payments. When the mortgage was paid off Mr . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Contract

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.251174

Uddin v Choudhury and Others: CA 21 Oct 2009

Renewed application for permission to appeal and for an extension of time for bringing an appeal. Action to recover gifts made on a marriage, and against order for payment of a dowry. A muslim religious ceremony had taken place but no civil ceremony. The marriage was not consummated, and a nikah decree of divorce pronounced only shortly after.
Held: Leave to appeal was refused. The arrangements were by way of an enforceable contract. Under Sharia law, the gifts and arrangements were absolute and not returnable or deductible. The judge had also clearly preferred the evidence of the respondents.

Mummery LJ
[2009] EWCA Civ 1205
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.380342

Re N: FD 8 Jun 2016

The parties who had undertaken fertility treatment leading to the birth of the child, but where the clinic had failed to carry out the necessary admministrative procedures sought ratification of their status as the legal parents.

Sir James Munby P FD
[2016] EWHC 1329 (Fam)
Bailii, Judiciary
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoRe J FD 8-Jun-2016
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.565535

K, Regina v: CACD 28 Jul 2009

The defendant appealed against orders allowing the use in evidence against him of information provided by him in ancillary relief proceedings, and without prejudice negotations with his wife’s solicitors.
Held: The information provided through the formal ancillary relief process had been obtained under compulsion, and the rules had been intended to require full disclosure and to have abrogated the privilege against self-incrimination within those proceedings. That so, the information should not be admissible in criminal proceedings: ‘the admission of evidence obtained from the accused under threat of imprisonment was not a reasonable and proportionate response to the social need to punish and deter tax evasion so as to justify such an infringement of the right of the accused not to incriminate himself.’ As to the without prejudice material, that was admissible since the crown had not been a party to those negotiations. Here the public interest in prosecuting crime was sufficiently strong to justify the setting aside the protection of the information disclosed in those negotiations. If particular circumstances would make its admission unfair, a trial judge might still exclude it under the 1984 Act.

Lord Justice Moore-Bick, Mr Justice Holman and Mrs Justice Rafferty
[2009] EWCA Crim 1640, Times 19-Aug-2009, [2009] STI 2197, [2010] 2 WLR 905, [2010] QB 343, [2010] 1 Cr App Rep 3, [2009] STC 2553, [2009] 3 FCR 341, [2009] Lloyd’s Rep FC 644, [2009] Fam Law 1136, [2010] 1 QB 343
Bailii
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 29(1), Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 23 24, Family Proceedings Rules 1991 (SI 1991 No 1247), Criminal Justice Act 2003 118(1), European Convention on Human Rights 6, police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 78
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSaunders v The United Kingdom ECHR 17-Dec-1996
(Grand Chamber) The subsequent use against a defendant in a prosecution, of evidence which had been obtained under compulsion in company insolvency procedures was a convention breach of Art 6. Although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice, Family, Human Rights

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.365623

M v B (Ancillary Proceedings: Lump Sum): CA 15 Oct 1997

The couple had two children aged 10 and 6 and the question was whether the wife should have a house which cost pounds 210,000, leaving the husband without enough to buy a property of his own, or a house costing pounds 135,000, leaving the husband pounds 75,000 to buy a property of his own.
Held: When apportioning property where children in family, both parents are to be provided with a home if at all possible: ‘In all these cases it is one of the paramount considerations, in applying the section 25 criteria, to endeavour to stretch what is available to cover the need of each for a home, particularly where there are young children involved. Obviously the primary carer needs whatever is available to make the main home for the children, but it is of importance, albeit it is of lesser importance, that the other parent should have a home of his own where the children can enjoy their contact time with him. Of course there are cases where there is not enough to provide a home for either. Of course there are cases where there is only enough to provide one. But in any case where there is, by stretch and a degree of risk-taking, the possibility of a division to enable both to rehouse themselves, that is an exceptionally important consideration and one which will almost invariably have a decisive impact on outcome.’

Thorpe LJ
Times 15-Oct-1997, [1998] 1 FLR 53
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedPiglowska v Piglowski HL 24-Jun-1999
No Presumption of House for both Parties
When looking to the needs of parties in a divorce, there is no presumption that both parties are to be left able to purchase alternative homes. The order of sub-clauses in the Act implies nothing as to their relative importance. Courts should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.83258

Van den Boogaard v Laumen: ECJ 27 Feb 1997

ECJ If the reasoning of a decision rendered in divorce proceedings shows that the provision which it awards is designed to enable one spouse to provide for himself or herself, or if the needs and resources of each of the spouses are taken into consideration in the determination of its amount, the decision will be concerned with maintenance, and will therefore fall within the scope of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial matters, as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic. On the other hand, where the provision awarded is solely concerned with dividing property between the spouses, the decision will be concerned with rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship and will not therefore be enforceable under the Brussels Convention. A decision which does both these things may, in accordance with Article 42 of the Brussels Convention, be enforced in part if it clearly shows the aims to which the different parts of the judicial provision correspond.
It follows that a decision rendered in divorce proceedings ordering payment of a lump sum and transfer of ownership in certain property by one party to his or her former spouse must be regarded as relating to maintenance and therefore as falling within the scope of the Convention if its purpose is to ensure the former spouse’s maintenance. The fact that in its decision the court of origin disregarded a marriage contract is of no account in this regard.

C-220/95, [1997] ECR I-1147, [1997] QB 759, 1997] 3 WLR 284, [1997] ILPr 278
Bailii
Cited by:
CitedMoore v Moore CA 20-Apr-2007
The family were wealthy, and had lived for some time in Spain. On the breakdown of the marriage, the wife returned to the UK, and sought ancillary relief here, though the divorce had been in Spain. The husband argued that this should be dealt with . .
CitedRadmacher (Formerly Granatino) v Granatino SC 20-Oct-2010
The parties, from Germany and France married and lived at first in England. They had signed a pre-nuptial agreement in Germany which would have been valid in either country of origin. H now appealed against a judgment which bound him to it, . .
CitedTraversa v Freddi CA 14-Feb-2011
Jurisdiction in Cross border divorce
The parties had divorced in Italy. After the wife sought possession of her house in London where H lived, he appealed against refusal of leave to apply for an order under the 1984 Act, the court having found insufficient substantial grounds for . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, Family

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.161617

Brewster, Re Application for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland): SC 8 Feb 2017

Survivor of unmarried partner entitled to pension

The claimant appealed against the rejection of her claim to the survivor’s pension after the death of her longstanding partner, even though they had not been married. The rules said that she had to have been nominated by her partner, but he had not done this.
Held: Her appeal was dismissed. The state was to secure for her equal enjoyment of article 14 rights without discrimination for status without some objective justification for any denial of the associate right. This required more than just a proactive role, and the state was to respect a Convention right. The justification required an objective assessment and a court could not substitute its own view, and more so where the decision-maker was the legislature, that would normally be respected unless demonstrably unfounded. If the assessment was not directly by the legislature, a court might be less reluctant to interfere, and even more so when the claimed justification had not been present when the decision was made.
The weight given to the claimant’s self-chosen status rather than from an immutable characteristic, would depend on the context and the particular case

Lady Hale (Deputy President), Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson, Lord Reed, Lord Dyson
[2017] UKSC 8, [2017] WLR(D) 88, [2017] 1 WLR 519, [2017] ICR 434, [2017] 2 All ER 1001, [2017] IRLR 366, UKSC 2014/0180
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC, SC Summary, SC Summary Video
Local Government Pension Scheme (Benefits, Membership
and Contributions) Regulations 2009
, European Convention on Human Rights 14
Northern Ireland
Citing:
At First InstanceBrewster, Re Judicial Review QBNI 9-Nov-2012
The applicant challenged the decision of the respondent Northern Ireland Local Government Officers’ Superannuation Committee (‘NILGOSC’) made on 1 July 2011, by which it declined to pay a survivor’s pension to the applicant following the death of . .
Appeal fromBrewster v Northern Ireland Local Government Officers’ Superannuation Committee CANI 1-Oct-2013
Appeal by the Committee and the Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland from a decision allowing the respondent’s application for judicial review of a decision by the Superannuation Committee not to pay a survivor’s pension to the . .
CitedMarckx v Belgium ECHR 13-Jun-1979
Recognition of illegitimate children
The complaint related to the manner in which parents were required to adopt their own illegitimate child in order to increase his rights. Under Belgian law, no legal bond between an unmarried mother and her child results from the mere fact of birth. . .
CitedKopecky v Slovakia ECHR 28-Sep-2004
(Grand Chamber) The court said of the practice of the Convention institutions under A1 P1: ‘An applicant can allege a violation of article 1 of Protocol 1 only in so far as the impugned decisions related to his ‘possessions’ within the meaning of . .
CitedBegum (otherwise SB), Regina (on the Application of) v Denbigh High School HL 22-Mar-2006
The student, a Muslim wished to wear a full Islamic dress, the jilbab, but this was not consistent with the school’s uniform policy. She complained that this interfered with her right to express her religion.
Held: The school’s appeal . .
CitedIn re P and Others, (Adoption: Unmarried couple) (Northern Ireland); In re G HL 18-Jun-2008
The applicants complained that as an unmarried couple they had been excluded from consideration as adopters.
Held: Northern Ireland legislation had not moved in the same way as it had for other jurisdictions within the UK. The greater . .
CitedSwift v Secretary of State for Justice CA 18-Mar-2013
The claimant appealed against refusal of a declaration that the 1976 Act infringed her human rights. She had been cohabiting for six months, when her partner was killed in an accident at work for which a third party was liable. Because she had not . .
CitedStec and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 12-Apr-2006
(Grand Chamber) The claimants said that differences between the sexes in the payment of reduced earning allowances and retirement allowances were sex discrimination.
Held: The differences were not infringing sex discrimination. The differences . .
CitedTigere, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills SC 29-Jul-2015
After increasing university fees, the student loan system was part funded by the government. They introduced limits to the availability of such loans, and a student must have been lawfully ordinarily resident in the UK for three years before the day . .
CitedHumphreys v Revenue and Customs SC 16-May-2012
Separated parents shared the care of their child. The father complained that all the Child Tax Credit was given to the mother.
Held: The appeal failed. Although the rule does happen to be indirectly discriminatory against fathers, the . .
CitedBelfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd HL 25-Apr-2007
Belfast had failed to license sex shops. The company sought review of the decision not to grant a licence.
Held: The council’s appeal succeeded. The refusal was not a denial of the company’s human rights: ‘If article 10 and article 1 of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Financial Services, Family, Discrimination, Human Rights

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.573900

Nield-Moir v Freeman: ChD 21 Feb 2018

Valid requirement for DNA test in estate claim

The Court now ruled on the human rights implications of an order for DNA testing to establish whether the claimant was indeed the daughter of the deceased.
Held: The inherent jurisdiction of the court extends to directing that a party to proceedings give a saliva sample by way of mouth swab for the purposes of establishing paternity in a case where paternity is in issue.

Paul Matthews HHJ
[2018] EWHC 299 (Ch), [2018] WLR(D) 109
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales

Wills and Probate, Family, Human Rights

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.605342

Edgar v Edgar: CA 23 Jul 1980

H and W separated and in 1976, without any pressure H and at the instigation of W, signed a deed of separation negotiated through solicitors. H agreed to purchase a house for W, to confer on her capital benefits worth approximately andpound;100,000, to pay her andpound;16,000 a year and to make periodical payments for the children of the marriage. W agreed that if she obtained a divorce she would not seek a lump sum or property transfer orders. H did as agreed in the separation deed but, in 1978, W petitioned for divorce and applied for ancillary relief, including a lump sum payment.
Held: No good reason had been shown not to hold the wife to her agreement. The court set out the extent to which a contractual agreement for a clean break provision on a divorce is to be reflected in the subsequent exercise of judicial discretion. There is a proper public interest in the court overseeing arrangements made in the throes of marital breakdown when emotional pressures on the parties are high and their judgment clouded.
Ormrod LJ discussed the weight to be given to the separation agreement: ‘To decide what weight should be given, in order to reach a just result, to a prior agreement not to claim a lump sum, regard must be had to the conduct of both parties, leading up to the prior agreement, and to their subsequent conduct, in consequence of it. It is not necessary in this connection to think in formal legal terms, such as misrepresentation or estoppel; all the circumstances as they affect each of two human beings must be considered in the complex relationship of marriage. So, the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement are relevant. Undue pressure by one side, exploitation of a dominant position to secure an unreasonable advantage, inadequate knowledge, possibly bad legal advice, an important change of circumstances, unforeseen or overlooked at the time of making the agreement, are all relevant to the question of justice between the parties. Important too is the general proposition that formal agreements, properly and fairly arrived at with competent legal advice, should not be displaced unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that an injustice will be done by holding the parties to the terms of their agreement. There may well be other considerations which affect the justice of this case; the above list is not intended to be an exclusive catalogue.
I agree with Sir Gordon Willmer in Wright v Wright [1970] 1WLR 1219, 1224, that the existence of an agreement, ‘at least makes it necessary for the wife, if she is to justify an award of maintenance, to offer prima facie proof that there have been unforeseen circumstances, in the true sense, which make it impossible for her to work or otherwise maintain herself.’ Adapting that statement to the present case, it means that the wife here must offer prima facie evidence of material facts which show that justice requires that she should be relieved from the effects of her covenant in clause 8 of the deed of separation, and awarded further capital provision.’
Oliver LJ said: ‘in a consideration of what is just to be done in the exercise of the court’s powers under the Act of 1973 in the light of the conduct of the parties, the court must, I think, start from the position that a solemn and freely negotiated bargain by which a party defines her own requirements ought to be adhered to unless some clear and compelling reason, such as, for instance, a drastic change of circumstances, is shown to the contrary.’

Ormrod and Oliver LJJ
[1980] 1 WLR 1410, [1980] 3 All ER 887, [1980] EWCA Civ 2, [1980] 2 FLR 19
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBrockwell v Brockwell CA 5-Nov-1975
Ormrod LJ said: ‘But it must be a matter entirely for the judge to look at all the facts and the financial situation of each party and taking into account the fact that they made this agreement which to my mind is a very important piece of conduct . .
CitedWright v Wright 1970
In the course of a settlement of divorce proceedings, a wife agreed to withdraw her claim for maintenance. She sought to re-open it.
Held: the principle of Hyman v. Hyman applied, notwithstanding that the agreement between the parties had been . .

Cited by:
CitedA v B (Ancillary relief: Separation agreement) FD 17-Jan-2005
The husband appealed against an ancillary relief order, saying that the judge had applied the terms of a separation agreement without acknowledging that that agreement had been entered into without full disclosure having been made. Had the judge . .
CitedXydhias v Xydhias CA 21-Dec-1998
The principles of contract law are of little use when looking at the course of negotiations in divorce ancillary proceedings. In the case of a dispute the court must use its own discretion to determine whether agreement had been reached. Thorpe LJ . .
CitedMorgan v Hill CA 28-Nov-2006
The father appealed an award of periodical payments to a former partner. She had a child by an earlier relationship. The father was immensely rich and during the relationship made financial provision for the child by the earlier relationship also. . .
CitedNorth v North CA 25-Jul-2007
The husband appealed a consent order for payment of pounds 202,000 to commute a varied nominal maintenance order. The original order had been made many years before. In the meantime, the former husband had grown wealthy, and she had suffered . .
CitedSutton v Sutton 1984
The husband and his wife agreed that in consideration, inter alia, of the wife consenting to the husband divorcing her on the ground of two years’ separation and consent, he would transfer the matrimonial home to her, and she would take over . .
CitedSoulsbury v Soulsbury CA 10-Oct-2007
The claimant was the first wife of the deceased. She said that the deceased had promised her a substantial cash sum in his will in return for not pursuing him for arrears of maintenance. The will made no such provision, and she sought payment from . .
CitedHaines v Hill and Another CA 5-Dec-2007
On the divorce, the husband was ordered to transfer his share in the house to the wife. On his bankruptcy shortly after, the order was confirmed. After the wife sold the property at a profit, the trustee in bankruptcy applied to set the transfer . .
CitedWilliams v Thompson Leatherdale (A Firm) and Another QBD 10-Nov-2008
The claimant sought damages from her legal advisers. They had allowed her to settle an ancillary relief application knowing that the case of White v White had been referred to the House of lords, and the settlement proved to have been on . .
CitedRadmacher v Granatino CA 2-Jul-2009
Husband and wife, neither English, had married in England. Beforehand they had signed a prenuptial agreement in Germany agreeing that neither should claim against the other on divorce. The wife appealed against an order to pay a lump sum to the . .
CitedRadmacher (Formerly Granatino) v Granatino SC 20-Oct-2010
The parties, from Germany and France married and lived at first in England. They had signed a pre-nuptial agreement in Germany which would have been valid in either country of origin. H now appealed against a judgment which bound him to it, . .
CitedS v S FD 14-Jan-2014
The court was asked to approve a settlement reached under the IFLA arbitration scheme.
Held: The order was approved, but the court took the opportunity to give guidance. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.224380

Blyth v Blyth: HL 1966

The House was asked as to the standard of proof required to establish that adultery had been condoned under the subsection.
Held: Lord Denning said: ‘In short it comes to this: so far as the grounds for divorce are concerned, the case, like any civil case, may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear. So far as the bars to divorce are concerned, like connivance or condonation, the petitioner need only show that on balance of probability he did not connive or condone as the case may be’
Lord Pearson said: ‘The phrase ‘is satisfied’ means, in my view, simply ‘makes up its mind’; the court on the evidence comes to a conclusion which, in conjunction with other conclusions, will lead to the judicial decision.’

Lord Denning
[1966] AC 643
Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 4(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBater v Bater CA 1951
The wife petitioned for divorce, alleging cruelty.
Held: It had not been a misdirection for the petitioner to have to prove her case beyond reasonable doubt: ‘A high standard of proof’ was required because of the importance of such a case to . .
CitedHornal v Neuberger Products Ltd CA 1956
Proof Standard for Misrepresentation
The court was asked what was the standard of proof required to establish the tort of misrepresentation, and it contrasted the different standards of proof applicable in civil and criminal cases.
Held: The standard was the balance of . .

Cited by:
CitedAN, Regina (on the Application of) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region) and others CA 21-Dec-2005
The appellant was detained under section 37 of the 1983 Act as a mental patient with a restriction under section 41. He sought his release.
Held: The standard of proof in such applications remained the balance of probabilities, but that . .
CitedIn re D; Doherty, Re (Northern Ireland); Life Sentence Review Commissioners v D HL 11-Jun-2008
The Sentence Review Commissioners had decided not to order the release of the prisoner, who was serving a life sentence. He had been released on licence from a life sentence and then committed further serious sexual offences against under-age girls . .
CitedIn re H and R (Minors) (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) HL 14-Dec-1995
Evidence allowed – Care Application after Abuse
Children had made allegations of serious sexual abuse against their step-father. He was acquitted at trial, but the local authority went ahead with care proceedings. The parents appealed against a finding that a likely risk to the children had still . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Evidence, Family

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.237706

Myers v Myers and Orhers: FD 3 Aug 2004

The court ordered, from a very large estate, provision which included housing, but he did so by way not of an outright capital sum but of a life interest in a trust fund together with power of advancement designed to cater for the possibility of care expenses in advanced old age. If housing is provided by way of maintenance, it is likely more often to be provided by such a life interest rather than by a capital sum.

Munvy J
[2005] WTLR 851, [2004] EWHC 1944 (Fam)
Bailii
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedIlott v The Blue Cross and Others SC 15-Mar-2017
What is reasonable provision for daughter
The deceased had left her estate in her will to several animal charities. The claimant, her daughter, had been estranged from her mother for many years, and sought reasonable provision from her estate under the 1975 Act. The district judge had . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Wills and Probate

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.581090

Stodgell v Stodgell FD: FD 18 Jul 2008

The parties were involved in ancillary relief proceedings. At the same time the husband was in prison after having hidden earnings from his business, and was subject to an unsatisfied confiscation order. The guardian had had doubts about the mother’s suitability to have full responsibility for the care of their 11 year old son. The revenue contended that the matter should not be delayed so that the confiscation order could be enforced.
Held: The fraudulent activities of the husband did constitute conduct which it would be inequitable to disregard within the meaning of paragraph (g). He has brought shame upon himself, despair to the wife, and destroyed the economy of this family. However the family needs in this case could not be given priority over the duty to satisfy the confiscation order: the court cannot protect every child from every consequence of their parents’ behaviour.

Holman J
[2008] EWHC 1925 (Fam)
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 25(g)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedH M Customs and Excise and Another v MCA and Another; A v A; Re MCA CA 22-Jul-2002
The husband and wife divorced and a property adjustment order applied for. The husband had been convicted and a drugs proceeds order made under the 1994 Act. The order had not been satisfied, and the receiver applied for money from the matrimonial . .
CitedThe Serious Fraud Office v Lexi Holdings Plc CACD 10-Jul-2008
Application was made for the variation of a restraint order made under the 2002 Act to enable payment to be made to a judgment creditor in advance of any confiscation order being made, or indeed before any criminal charges had even been preferred. . .
CitedIn re Peters CA 1988
After the defendant was arrested for drugs offences a restraint order was made to prevent dissipation of his assets. Orders were made to vary the restraint to allow payment of his sons school fees, and in family proceedings for a payment to his . .

Cited by:
See AlsoStodgell v Stodgell Admn Admn 18-Jul-2008
The court heard divorce ancillary relief applications against the background of an impending criminal confiscation order against the husband. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Children

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.276702

Dennis v Dennis: CA 17 Mar 1955

The petitioner sought a divorce alleging cruelty. A decree had been granted by the judge and the husband now appealed saying that the acts alleged fell short of cruelty.
Held: ‘The finding that the husband had been guilty of acts of violence towards his wife on four occasions in the year 1952 is ample to warrant the granting of a Decree on the ground of cruelty unless there be something to show that, in all the circumstances, a Decree ought not to have been granted either because the acts were not serious acts, or for some other reason. Acts of violence by a husband towards his wife such as were found in this case must be regarded seriously. There may be some excuse in some cases of tempers up when the man loses control of himself, but it in difficult to see that there can be any excuse for the acts which, on the Commissioner’s finding, were committed by the husband against the wife in this case, and those acts of violence followed a course of conduct which showed an unpleasant steak somewhere if, an I think it was, the evidence of the wife was believed.’

Singleton, Hodson, Moris LJJ
[1955] EWCA Civ 2, [1955] 2 WLR 817, [1955] P 153, [1955] 2 All ER 51
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.262838

White v Withers Llp and Dearle: CA 27 Oct 2009

The claimant was involved in matrimonial ancillary relief proceedings. His wife was advised by the defendants, her solicitors, to remove his private papers. The claimant now sought permission to appeal against a strike out of his claim against the solicitors for wrongful interference with property by ‘possessing, taking or intercepting the claimant’s correspondence and documents including personal family letters, private and confidential letters concerning business opportunities and documents containing financial information.’ Withers relied on their advice having been given in compliance with Hildebrand.
Held: Leave to appeal was granted, and the claim re-instated. The rule in Hildebrand covered issues as to the use of such material within family proceedings, and not wider issues of property rights: ‘The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 can be invoked to justify admitting the evidence contained in the documents: but one cannot construe the Act as authorising the commission of the torts of trespass or conversion.’ The defendants had taken into possesion and retained original and private documents which had no relevance in the proceedings. The propriety of the solicitor’s conduct was at issue, and could not be swept under the carpet.
The court examined the history and limits of self-help remedies in matters of tort
Ward LJ explained the rule in Hildebrand: ‘It may be appropriate to summarise the Hildebrand rules as they apply in the Family Division as follows. The family courts will not penalise the taking, copying and immediate return of documents but do not sanction the use of any force to obtain the documents, or the interception of documents or the retention of documents nor I would add, though it is not a feature of this case, the removal of any hard disk recording documents electronically. The evidence contained in the documents, even those wrongfully taken will be admitted in evidence because there is an overarching duty on the parties to give full and frank disclosure. The wrongful taking of documents may lead to findings of litigation misconduct or orders for costs.’

Ward, Sedley, Wilson LJJ
[2009] EWCA Civ 1122, [2010] Fam Law 26, [2009] 3 FCR 435 [2009] 3 FCR 435
Bailii
Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedHildebrand v Hildebrand 1992
The parties in ancillary relief proceedings sought orders for discovery. H had been to the wife’s flat surreptitiously on five occasions, and taken photocopies of so many documents obtained by him in the course of those visits (but returned after . .
CitedWhite v Withers Llp and Another QBD 19-Nov-2008
The claimant sought damages. The defendant firm of solicitors had represented the claimant’s wife in matrimonial procedings, and had used in evidence documents which the claimant said had been taken from him and were confidential.
Held: The . .
CitedWard v Macauley And Another 25-Nov-1791
A having let his house ready furnished to B. cannot maintain trespass against the sheriff for taking the furniture under an execution against B.; though notice were given that the goods belonged to A. The plaintiff was the landlord of a house, which . .
CitedT v T (Interception of Documents) FD 5-Aug-1994
W feared that the H would seek to understate the true extent of his resources to the court and so she engaged in a number of activities, including opening and taking letters addressed to him and breaking into his office, with the intention of . .
CitedL v L and Hughes Fowler Carruthers QBD 1-Feb-2007
The parties were engaged in ancillary relief proceedings. The Husband complained that the wife had sought to use unlawfully obtained information, and in these proceedings sought delivery up of the material from the wife and her solicitors. He said . .
CitedFouldes v Willoughby 1841
The ferryman who turned the plaintiff’s horses off the Birkenhead to Liverpool ferry was guilty of conversion if he intended to exercise dominion over them, but not otherwise. Scratching the panel of a horse carriage would be a trespass, but it . .
CitedKuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company and Others (Nos 4 and 5) HL 16-May-2002
After the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi government had dissolved Kuwait airlines, and appropriated several airplanes. Four planes were destroyed by Allied bombing, and 6 more were appropriated again by Iran.
Held: The appeal failed. No claim . .
CitedMarfani and Co Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd CA 1968
A rogue opened a new bank account under a false name with the help of an incorrect reference from a valued customer.
Held: When an account is fraudulently opened with the bank in the name of another person by someone pretending to be that . .
CitedSouthwark London Borough Council v Williams CA 1971
No Defence of Homelessness to Squatters
The defendants, in dire need of housing accommodation entered empty houses owned by the plaintiff local authority as squatters. The court considered the defence of necessity.
Held: The proper use of abandoned council properties is best . .
CitedDouglas and others v Hello! Ltd and others; similar HL 2-May-2007
In Douglas, the claimants said that the defendants had interfered with their contract to provide exclusive photographs of their wedding to a competing magazine, by arranging for a third party to infiltrate and take and sell unauthorised photographs. . .
CitedJones v University of Warwick CA 4-Feb-2003
The claimant appealed a decision to admit in evidence a tape recording, taken by an enquiry agent of the defendant who had entered her house unlawfully.
Held: The situation asked judges to reconcile the irreconcilable. Courts should be . .
CitedMonsanto Plc v Tilly and Others CA 30-Nov-1999
A group carried out direct action in protesting against GM crops by pulling up the plants. The group’s media liaison officer, while not actually pulling up plants himself, ‘reconnoitred the site the day before. He met the press at a prearranged . .
CitedCollins v Wilcock QBD 1984
The defendant appealed against her conviction for assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty. He had sought to caution her with regard to activity as a prostitute. The 1959 Act gave no power to detain, but he took hold of her. She . .
CitedWilson v Pringle CA 26-Mar-1986
Two boys played in a school yard. D said he had pulled a bag from the other’s shoulder as an ordinary act of horseplay. The plaintiff said it was a battery.
Held: The defendant’s appeal against summary judgment was allowed. A claim of trespass . .
CitedBrandes Goldschmidt and Co Ltd v Western Transport Ltd CA 1981
Brandon LJ said: ‘Damages in tort are awarded by way of monetary compensation for the loss or losses a plaintiff has actually sustained.’ . .
CitedDow Jones and Co Inc v Jameel CA 3-Feb-2005
Presumption of Damage in Defamation is rebuttable
The defendant complained that the presumption in English law that the victim of a libel had suffered damage was incompatible with his right to a fair trial. They said the statements complained of were repetitions of statements made by US . .
CitedJ v V (Disclosure: Offshore Corporations) FD 2003
A prenuptial agreement had been signed on the eve of marriage without advice or disclosure and without allowance for arrival of children. Coleridge J also considered the use of documents recovered by a party by unauthorised or improper means. He . .

Cited by:
CitedTchenguiz and Others v Imerman CA 29-Jul-2010
Anticipating a refusal by H to disclose assets in ancillary relief proceedings, W’s brothers wrongfully accessed H’s computers to gather information. The court was asked whether the rule in Hildebrand remained correct. W appealed against an order . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Legal Professions, Torts – Other, Intellectual Property, Family

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.377238

S v S (Matrimonial Proceedings: Appropriate Forum) (Divorce: Staying Proceedings): FD 27 Mar 1997

Fairness is the test for choice of forum for staying divorce proceedings. As to prenuptial agreements, Wilson J suggested that there might come a case: ‘where the circumstances surrounding the prenuptial agreement and the provision therein contained might, when viewed in the context of the other circumstances of the case, prove influential or even crucial. Where other jurisdictions, both in the United States and in the European Community, have been persuaded that there are cases where justice can only be served by confining parties to their rights under prenuptial agreements, we should be cautious about too categorically asserting the contrary. I can find nothing in section 25 to compel a conclusion, so much at odds with personal freedoms to make arrangements for ourselves, that escape from solemn bargains, carefully struck by informed adults, is readily available here.’
Wilson J said: ‘I am aware of a growing belief that, in the despatch of a claim for ancillary relief in this jurisdiction, no significant weight will be afforded to a prenuptial agreement, whatever the circumstances. I would like to sound a cautionary note in that respect. No one could have more profound respect than I for the observations of Thorpe L.J. In F. v. F. (Ancillary Relief: Substantial Assets) [1995] 2 FLR 45, 66 he said:
‘In this jurisdiction [prenuptial agreements] must be of very limited significance. The rights and responsibilities of those whose financial affairs are regulated by statute cannot be much influenced by contractual terms which were devised for the control and limitation of standards that are intended to be of universal application throughout our society.’
There is a danger that these wide words might be taken out of context. There is no doubt that, where the English court proceeds to determine an application for ancillary relief, section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 precludes any choice of foreign law, however vividly the circumstances of the case might protest its relevance. So the application is of English law and under section 25(1) regard must be had to all the circumstances of the case. In F. v. F. itself, the result of a strict application of the effect of the prenuptial agreements would have been, as the judge said, ‘ridiculous.’ In those circumstances they inevitably constituted circumstances of negligible significance. But there will come a case-were I to refuse a stay, might this be it?-where the circumstances surrounding the prenuptial agreement and the provision therein contained might, when viewed in the context of the other circumstances of the case, prove influential or even crucial. Where other jurisdictions, both in the United States and in the European Community, have been persuaded that there are cases where justice can only be served by confining parties to their rights under prenuptial agreements, we should be cautious about too categorically asserting the contrary. I can find nothing in section 25 to compel a conclusion, so much at odds with personal freedoms to make arrangements for ourselves, that escape from solemn bargains, carefully struck by informed adults, is readily available here. It all depends. The matter must be left open and on the footing that, were she to be enabled to claim ancillary relief in England, the wife might secure an award of substantial further provision. In what follows my duty is to appraise the relevance of the prenuptial agreement to the determination not of the wife’s potential application for ancillary relief but of the entirely different issue as to forum.’

Wilson J
Times 16-Apr-1997, Times 27-Mar-1997, [1997] 1 WLR 1200
Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRadmacher v Granatino CA 2-Jul-2009
Husband and wife, neither English, had married in England. Beforehand they had signed a prenuptial agreement in Germany agreeing that neither should claim against the other on divorce. The wife appealed against an order to pay a lump sum to the . .
CitedRadmacher (Formerly Granatino) v Granatino SC 20-Oct-2010
The parties, from Germany and France married and lived at first in England. They had signed a pre-nuptial agreement in Germany which would have been valid in either country of origin. H now appealed against a judgment which bound him to it, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.88958

N v N (Jurisdiction: Pre-Nuptial Agreement): FD 12 Jul 1999

A pre-nuptial agreement to abide by the decisions of the Beth Din Rabbinical Court could not be enforced so as to prevent a civil divorce proceeding through to its termination, but where the agreement required the husband first to obtain a Get, and a delay would not prejudice the child, there remained a discretion in the court to delay contact proceedings until the Get had been applied for. Although they were unenforceable as such, ante-nuptial agreements might have evidential weight in subsequent proceedings for divorce.

Wall J
Times 12-Jul-1999, Gazette 11-Aug-1999, [1999] EWHC Fam 838, [1999] 2 FLR 745, [1999] Fam Law 691, [1999] 2 FCR 583
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRadmacher (Formerly Granatino) v Granatino SC 20-Oct-2010
The parties, from Germany and France married and lived at first in England. They had signed a pre-nuptial agreement in Germany which would have been valid in either country of origin. H now appealed against a judgment which bound him to it, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Ecclesiastical

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.84148

Dyson Holdings Ltd v Fox: CA 17 Oct 1975

The defendant had lived with the tenant for 21 years until his death. They were unmarried and had no children. Reversing the County Court judge, the Court of Appeal ruled that she was a member of his family. It was absurd to distinguish between two couples on the basis that one had children and the other did not. (Lord Denning) and ‘The popular meaning given to the word ‘family’ is not fixed once and for all time. I have no doubt that with the passage of years it has changed. The cases reveal that it is not restricted to blood relationships and those created by the marriage ceremony. It can include de facto as well as de jure relationships. The popular meaning of ‘family’ in 1975 would, according to the answer of the ordinary man, include the defendant as a member of Mr. Wright’s family. This is not to say that every mistress should be so regarded. Relationships of a casual or intermittent character and those bearing indications of impermanence would not come within the popular concept of a family unit.’ per James LJ, and ‘Now, it is, I think, not putting it too high to say that between 1950 and 1975 there has been a complete revolution in society’s attitude to unmarried partnerships of the kind under consideration. Such unions are far commoner than they used to be. The social stigma that once attached to them has almost, if not entirely, disappeared. The inaccurate but expressive phrases ‘common law wife’ and ‘common law husband’ have come into general use to describe them. The ordinary man in 1975 would, in my opinion, certainly say that the parties to such a union, provided it had the appropriate degree of apparent permanence and stability, were members of a single family whether they had children or not.’ (Bridge LJ)

Lord Denning MR, James LJ, Bridge LJ
[1976] QB 503, [1975] EWCA Civ 8
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
DisapprovedGammans v Ekins CA 1950
The plaintiff had lived with a woman tenant for over 20 years and they had been regarded in the neighbourhood as man and wife.
Held: He could not thereby be deemed a member of her family for the Act of 1920. If their relationship was sexual . .

Cited by:
Confined to its factsHelby v Rafferty CA 1979
The court declined to hold that a man who had lived with a woman tenant for five years before her death were part of the same family because they had deliberately opted to retain their formal independence and they had not been recognised as being . .
Confined to its factsWatson v Lucas CA 1980
A woman who had lived with a man, although he remained married to his wife, was a member of his family for the purpose of Schedule 1 to the Act of 1977 because of the lasting relationship between them. . .
CitedCarega Properties SA (formerly Joram Developments Ltd) v Sharratt HL 1979
A widow aged 75 had developed a platonic relationship with a young man aged 24. He lived in her flat for nearly 20 years until she died. They treated themselves as aunt and nephew. The trial judge held that through their relationship this elderly . .
CitedFitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd HL 28-Oct-1999
Same Sex Paartner to Inherit as Family Member
The claimant had lived with the original tenant in a stable and long standing homosexual relationship at the deceased’s flat. After the tenant’s death he sought a statutory tenancy as a spouse of the deceased. The Act had been extended to include as . .
CitedSecretary of State for Work and Pensions v M HL 8-Mar-2006
The respondent’s child lived with the estranged father for most of each week. She was obliged to contribute child support. She now lived with a woman, and complained that because her relationship was homosexual, she had been asked to pay more than . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Housing

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.215911

Liaw v Lee (Recognition of Divorce): FD 3 Jun 2015

The applicant sought that the decrees nisi and absolute of divorce issued by the High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam in favour of the respondent husband be refused recognition in England and Wales.
Held: The application was granted: ‘the husband and his solicitor engaged in sharp practice in obtaining the divorce in Malaysia. A petition was filed which was knowingly false. The case that the wife had effectively disappeared and that there was no alternative means of effecting service on her was again knowingly false. The reasons for expediting Decree Absolute were spurious and again represent a deliberate misleading of the Malaysian Court: the true reason was to prevent the wife from applying in the waiting period to set aside the decree nisi.’
The Court examined the underused Council Regulation finding that it was given a discretion. There were balancing interests: ‘Militating against refusal is the fact that it is undesirable to have two different decrees absolute in different places in relation to the same marriage. A decree absolute is a matter of status and it is undesirable that the parties should have inconsistent decisions as to when their marriage was finally ended.’ and ‘ to decline to refuse recognition in this case would be grossly unjust and would in effect reward dishonesty and sharp practice. It would send out a signal that conduct such as I have described is tolerable.’
The wife was entitled to her decree Nisi, and the court and judge in Malaysia should notified of the decision.

Mostyn J
[2015] EWHC 1462 (Fam)
Bailii
Family Law Act 1986 51(3)(a), Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 22(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRex v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy KBD 9-Nov-1923
Clerk wrongly retired with Justices
There had been a prosecution before the lay magistrates for dangerous driving. Unknown to the defendant and his solicitors, the Clerk to the Justices was a member of the firm of solicitors acting in a civil claim against the defendant arising out of . .
CitedDuhur-Johnson v Duhur-Johnson FD 3-May-2005
The husband sought to stay divorce proceedings commenced here by his wife, saying that they had already been divorced in Nigeria. The wife said the Nigerian proceedings should not be recognised in English law.
Held: The cases established: 1) . .
CitedIvleva v Yates FD 4-Mar-2014
By an application Mrs Ivleva (formerly Yates) sought (i) recognition in this jurisdiction of a divorce granted in Ukraine in respect of her marriage to Mr Yates and (ii) the dismissal of divorce proceedings brought in this jurisdiction by Mr Yates. . .
CitedOlafisoye v Olafisoye FD 28-Jul-2010
The court was asked to consider the recognition here of a foreign divorce.
Held: Holman J said: ‘I observe and stress at the outset the following matters. First, in this case, and probably in all such cases, the issue is very fact specific and . .
CitedGolubovich v Golubovich CA 30-Mar-2011
The court considered an application under 51(3)(c) of the 1986 Act to refuse to recognise a foreign decree of divorce.
Held: The appeal was allowed against the non-recognition of a Russian divorce that followed proceedings between Russian . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, International

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.547552

Agyarko and Ikuga, Regina (on The Applications of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department: SC 22 Feb 2017

Applications were made by foreign nationals, residing unlawfully in the UK, for leave to remain as the partners of British citizens with whom they had formed relationships during their unlawful residence, relying primarily on the duty imposed on the Secretary of State by the 1998 Act to act compatibly with the right to respect for family life guaranteed by article 8 of the ECHR. In each case, the Secretary of State concluded that the appellant did not qualify for leave to remain under the applicable provisions of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules and that, applying the Immigration Directorate Instructions, ‘Family Members Under the Immigration Rules, Section FM 1.0, Partner and ECHR Article 8 Guidance’ there were no exceptional circumstances warranting the grant of leave to remain outside the Rules.
Held: The appeals failed. The Rules and Instructions applied in these cases were consistent with the proper application of article 8.
In the first case, there was no evidence placed before the respondent that there were exceptional circumstances. Ms Agyarko’s claim could not be regarded as very strong or compelling.
As to Ms Ikuga, part of the decision was incorrectly based. However, looking at the decision taken, the result would have been the same, and she not having put forward anything which might constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’ as defined in the Instructions, that is unjustifiably harsh consequences for the individual such that the refusal of the application would not be proportionate.
The ground of challenge under Article 20 EU failed. If a situation were to arise in which the refusal of a third-country national’s application for leave to remain in the UK would force his or her British partner to leave the EU, in breach of article 20 TFEU, such a situation could be addressed under the Rules as one where there were ‘insurmountable obstacles’, or in any event under the Instructions as one where there were ‘exceptional circumstances’. Typically, however the British citizen would not be forced to leave the EU, any more than in the case of Dereci, and the third-country national would not, therefore, derive any rights from article 20 .
Lady Hale, Deputy President
Lord Kerr
Lord Wilson
Lord Reed
Lord Carnwath
Lord Hughes
Lord Hodge
[2017] UKSC 11, [2017] WLR(D) 126, [2017] 3 CMLR 3, [2017] 1 WLR 823, [2017] Imm AR 764, [2017] INLR 548, UKSC 2015/0129
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC, SC Summary, SC Summary Video
Human Rights Act 1998, European Convention on Human Rights 8
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromAgyarko and Others, Regina (on The Application of) v The Secretary of State for The Home Department CA 6-May-2015
Appeals against orders for removal after applicants had each married after expiry of the period of their lawful stay. A conceded that her application fell outside the Rules, but said that it was an appropriate case for the exercise of discretion. . .
CitedHuang v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 21-Mar-2007
Appellate Roles – Human Rights – Families Split
The House considered the decision making role of immigration appellate authorities when deciding appeals on Human Rights grounds, against refusal of leave to enter or remain, under section 65. In each case the asylum applicant had had his own . .
CitedChikwamba v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 25-Jun-2008
The appellant had fled Zimbabwe. Though her asylum application was refused, she was not returned for the temporary suspension of such orders to Zimbabwe. In the meantime she married and had a child. She now appealed an order for her removal citing . .
CitedRuiz Zambrano (European Citizenship) ECJ 8-Mar-2011
ECJ Citizenship of the Union – Article 20 TFEU – Grant of right of residence under European Union law to a minor child on the territory of the Member State of which that child is a national, irrespective of the . .
CitedMunir and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 18-Jul-2012
The claimants were subject to deportation, but had settled here and begun a family. An earlier concession would have allowed him to stay, but it was withdrawn. The court was now asked whether statements by the Secretary of State of her policy as . .
CitedJeunesse v The Netherlands ECHR 3-Oct-2014
(Grand Chamber) Although the applicant had married and had three children while her immigration status in the Netherlands was precarious, there were exceptional circumstances such that a fair balance had not been struck between the competing . .
CitedSen v The Netherlands ECHR 21-Dec-2001
. .
CitedRegina v Sectretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Razgar etc HL 17-Jun-2004
The claimant resisted removal after failure of his claim for asylum, saying that this would have serious adverse consequences to his mental health, infringing his rights under article 8. He appealed the respondent’s certificate that his claim was . .
CitedTuquabo-Tekle and Others v The Netherlands ECHR 1-Dec-2005
ECHR Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) – Preliminary objection dismissed (estoppel); Violation of Art. 8; Pecuniary damage – claim dismissed; Non-pecuniary damage – financial award; Costs and expenses . .
CitedSezen v The Netherlands ECHR 31-Jan-2006
The case concerned ‘a functioning family unit where the parents and children are living together’. The court considered wehether a deportation would infringe the human rights of te applicant: ‘The Court has previously held that domestic measures . .
CitedEB (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 25-Jun-2008
The claimant arrived as a child from Kosovo in 1999. He said that the decision after so long, it would breach his human rights now to order his return.
Held: The adjudicator had failed to address the effect of delay. That was a relevant . .
CitedMF (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for The Home Department CA 8-Oct-2013
The court was asked: ‘How is the reference in rule 398 to ‘exceptional circumstances’ to be understood, compatibly with Convention rights?’
Held: The Court of Appeal accepted the submission made on behalf of the Secretary of State that the . .
CitedHesham Ali (Iraq) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 16-Nov-2016
The appellant, an Iraqi national had arrived in 2000 as a child, and stayed unlawfully after failure of his asylum claim. He was convicted twice of drugs offences. On release he was considered a low risk of re-offending. He had been in a serious . .
CitedDereci and Others (European Citizenship) ECJ 15-Nov-2011
ECJ Grand Chamber – Citizenship of the Union – Right of residence of nationals of third countries who are family members of Union citizens – Refusal based on the citizen’s failure to exercise the right to freedom . .
CitedSecretary Of State For The Home Department v CS (Judgment : Citizenship Of The Union) ECJ 13-Sep-2016
The Court of Justice held: ‘that there are very specific situations in which, despite the fact that the secondary law on the right of residence of third-country nationals does not apply and the Union citizen concerned has not made use of his freedom . .
CitedAlokpa and Moudoulou v Ministre Du Travail, De L’Emploi Et De L’Immigration ECJ 10-Oct-2013
ECJ Citizenship of the Union – Articles 20 TFEU and 21 TFEU – Directive 2004/38/EC – Right of residence of a third-country national who is a direct relative in the ascending line of Union citizens who are minor . .
CitedIida v Stadt Ulm ECJ 8-Nov-2012
ECJ Articles 20 TFEU and 21 TFEU – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Article 51 – Directive 2003/109/EC – Third-country nationals – Right of residence in a Member State – Directive 2004/38/EC . .

Cited by:
CitedHC, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions SC 15-Nov-2017
This appeal concerns the rights of so-called ‘Zambrano carers’ and their children to financial support from the state. The appellant, an Algerian national married and had children here, but was refused housing after the break up the marriage. HC . .
CitedRhuppiah v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 14-Nov-2018
Ms R had overstayed, but resisted deportation claiming a long term relationship with a man for who she cared. Her leave was continued 11 times. A Seventh Day Adventist, the care she provided was as a friend. Indefinite leave to remain was refused . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 18 October 2021; Ref: scu.575309

McDonnell v McDonnell: CA 1977

In family proceedings, a costs letter had been written in the form suggested in Calderbank.
Held: The court accepted and endorsed the practice suggested by Cairns LJ. Ormrod LJ said: ‘The important factor which distinguishes this case is the fact that the appellant husband’s solicitors took advantage of a recent decision of this court in Calderbank v. Calderbank. On December 16, 1975, shortly after serving the notice of appeal, they wrote a letter to the wife’s solicitors offering to withdraw the appeal altogether if the wife would agree to a modification of Mrs. Justice Lane’s order in respect of the house. In accordance with the procedure suggested in Calderbank, they headed the letter ‘Without Prejudice’ but reserved the right to bring it to the attention of the court after judgment on the question of costs.’
and ‘Clearly this is a very important consideration in exercising the court’s discretion with regard to costs.It would be wrong, in my judgment, to equate an offer of compromise in proceedings such as these [ancillary proceedings following a divorce] precisely to a payment into court. I see no advantage in the court surrendering its discretion in these matters as it has to all intents and purposes done where a payment into court has been made. A Calderbank offer should influence but not govern the exercise of the discretion. The question to my mind is whether, on the basis of the facts known to the wife and her advisers and without the advantage of hindsight, she ought reasonably to have accepted the proposals in the letter of December 16, bearing always in mind the difficulty of making accurate forecasts in cases such as this. On the other hand, parties who are exposed to the full impact of costs need some protection against those who can continue to litigate with impunity under a civil aid certificate.’
Ormrod LJ
[1977] 1 WLR 34
England and Wales
Citing:
ApprovedCalderbank v Calderbank CA 5-Jun-1975
Letter Without Prejudice Save as to Costs
Husband and wife disputed provision under 1973 Act, and a summons under section 17 of the 1882 Act. The wife had offered to transfer a house to H occupied by his mother, worth about pounds 12,000, in return for him leaving the matrimonial home. He . .

Cited by:
CitedButcher v Wolfe and Another CA 30-Oct-1998
The parties had been partners in a family farm. On dissolution there was a dispute as to apportionment of costs. An offer had been ‘without prejudice save as to costs’.
Held: Costs may be denied to a plaintiff who had received a Calderbank . .
CitedNorris v Norris, Haskins v Haskins CA 28-Jul-2003
The court considered how orders for costs were to be made in ‘big money’ cases.
Held: There were two sets of rules. Cases should be considered by first applying the Civil Procedure Rules. This would allow the court to consider the full range . .
CitedGojkovic v Gojkovic (No 2) CA 1-Apr-1991
In ancillary relief proceedings, the husband had not made frank disclosure of his assets. The final Calderbank offer of andpound;600,000 was made only the day before the substantive hearing. The offer was rejected. The judge awarded the wife a lump . .
CitedCutts v Head and Another CA 7-Dec-1983
There had been a trial of 35 days regarding rights of way over land, which had proved fruitless, and where some orders had been made without jurisdiction. The result had been inconclusive. The costs order was now appealed, the plaintiff complaining . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 October 2021; Ref: scu.186057

Norris v Norris, Haskins v Haskins: CA 28 Jul 2003

The court considered how orders for costs were to be made in ‘big money’ cases.
Held: There were two sets of rules. Cases should be considered by first applying the Civil Procedure Rules. This would allow the court to consider the full range of circumstances of each case. The court required a full discretion, and that should be retained. When looking at Calderbank offers, the court could make fuller use of the provisions of the 1999 Rules, GW -v- RW needs rethinking, and the rules should be amended.
Dame Butler Sloss, Thorpe and Mantell LJJ
[2003] EWCA Civ 1084, Times 26-Aug-2003
Bailii
Family Proceedings (Amendment No 2) Rules 1999 (1999 No 3491) 2.69B, Civil Procedure Rules 44.3
England and Wales
Citing:
DoubtedGW v RW (Financial Provision: Departure from Equality) FD 18-Mar-2003
An entitlement to an equal division must reflect not only the parties’ respective contributions ‘but also an accrual over time’, and it would be ‘fundamentally unfair’ that a party who has made domestic contributions during a marriage of 12 years . .
CitedGojkovic v Gojkovic (No 2) CA 1-Apr-1991
In ancillary relief proceedings, the husband had not made frank disclosure of his assets. The final Calderbank offer of andpound;600,000 was made only the day before the substantive hearing. The offer was rejected. The judge awarded the wife a lump . .
CitedCalderbank v Calderbank CA 5-Jun-1975
Letter Without Prejudice Save as to Costs
Husband and wife disputed provision under 1973 Act, and a summons under section 17 of the 1882 Act. The wife had offered to transfer a house to H occupied by his mother, worth about pounds 12,000, in return for him leaving the matrimonial home. He . .
CitedMcDonnell v McDonnell CA 1977
In family proceedings, a costs letter had been written in the form suggested in Calderbank.
Held: The court accepted and endorsed the practice suggested by Cairns LJ. Ormrod LJ said: ‘The important factor which distinguishes this case is the . .
CitedCutts v Head and Another CA 7-Dec-1983
There had been a trial of 35 days regarding rights of way over land, which had proved fruitless, and where some orders had been made without jurisdiction. The result had been inconclusive. The costs order was now appealed, the plaintiff complaining . .
CitedButcher v Wolfe and Another CA 30-Oct-1998
The parties had been partners in a family farm. On dissolution there was a dispute as to apportionment of costs. An offer had been ‘without prejudice save as to costs’.
Held: Costs may be denied to a plaintiff who had received a Calderbank . .
CitedSinger (formerly Sharegin) v Sharegin 1984
In family proceedings, the starting point for the award of costs is that they prima facie follow the event but that presumption may be displaced much more easily than, and in circumstances which would not apply, in other divisions of the High Court. . .

Cited by:
CitedVaughan v Vaughan CA 2-Nov-2007
H appealed an ancillary relief order giving certain extra rights in the family property on its sale.
Held: ‘the case demonstrates that, in an ancillary relief appeal, even the most conscientious appellate judge can fall into error if, having . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 October 2021; Ref: scu.184906

Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No 2): CA 1 Apr 1991

In ancillary relief proceedings, the husband had not made frank disclosure of his assets. The final Calderbank offer of andpound;600,000 was made only the day before the substantive hearing. The offer was rejected. The judge awarded the wife a lump sum of andpound;1 million. The judge made no order as to costs after the date when the wife’s solicitors had rejected an earlier, lower, offer by the husband. From that date both sides had acted reasonably. The wife appealed. No counter-offer had been made by the wife.
Held: The starting point, is that costs prima facie follow the event but in family cases this rule may be displaced more easily, and it is unusual to order costs in children cases. For financial relief the applicant has to make the application in order to obtain an order. Orders by consent; usually include the applicant’s costs. If contested and the applicant succeeds, where money available and no special factors, the applicant spouse is likely to obtain an order for costs. The behaviour of one party, such as in material non-disclosure of documents, may be a material factor. In some few cases the assets are substantial and an order for costs can (if appropriate) be made. The court rules reflect the need for Calderbank offers, subject to conditions, to have teeth. The respondent must make a serious offer worthy of consideration. If he does so, the applicant should accept or reject the offer and make clear any counter-offer. Both should negotiate. There is a very wide discretion in the court in awarding costs. Many reasons may affect costs including material non-disclosure, and delay or excessive zeal. The need to use all the available money to house the spouse and children of the family may be constraints. It would be inappropriate to constrain that wide of discretion. But the starting point in a case where there has been an offer is that, prima facie, if the applicant receives no more or less than the offer made, she/he is at risk not only of not being awarded costs, but also of paying the costs of the other party after communication of the offer and a reasonable time to consider it. ‘I cannot, for my part, see why there is any difference in principle between the position of a party who fails to obtain an order equal to the offer made and pays the costs, and a party who fails by the offer to meet the award made by the court. In the latter case prima facie costs should follow the event, as they would do in a payment into court, with the proviso that other factors in the Family Division may alter that prima facie position.’
Russell LJ: ‘In his opening submissions to this court, counsel for the husband invited us to lay down guidelines which would, he said, be of assistance to those charged with the responsibility of deciding what, after divorce, is the appropriate level of lump sum payments in cases where very substantial capital assets are available. I do not think that such an exercise is possible. The guidelines already exist. Section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 is the enabling provision for an order for the payment of a lump sum. Section 25, as amended by the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, in terms, requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case and subsection (2), under no less than eight sub-paragraphs, sets out the matters to which the court in particular shall have regard.
In the individual case, some of those matters will assume greater importance than others and, indeed, the facts of this case well illustrate that proposition. In my judgment in this case we are concerned with a wholly exceptional set of circumstances . . . . ‘
Butler-Sloss LJ, Russell LJ
[1991] 2 FLR 233, [1992] Fam 40, Times 01-May-1991, [1992] 1 All ER 267
Citing:
CitedCalderbank v Calderbank CA 5-Jun-1975
Letter Without Prejudice Save as to Costs
Husband and wife disputed provision under 1973 Act, and a summons under section 17 of the 1882 Act. The wife had offered to transfer a house to H occupied by his mother, worth about pounds 12,000, in return for him leaving the matrimonial home. He . .
CitedSinger (formerly Sharegin) v Sharegin 1984
In family proceedings, the starting point for the award of costs is that they prima facie follow the event but that presumption may be displaced much more easily than, and in circumstances which would not apply, in other divisions of the High Court. . .
CitedMcDonnell v McDonnell CA 1977
In family proceedings, a costs letter had been written in the form suggested in Calderbank.
Held: The court accepted and endorsed the practice suggested by Cairns LJ. Ormrod LJ said: ‘The important factor which distinguishes this case is the . .

Cited by:
CitedButcher v Wolfe and Another CA 30-Oct-1998
The parties had been partners in a family farm. On dissolution there was a dispute as to apportionment of costs. An offer had been ‘without prejudice save as to costs’.
Held: Costs may be denied to a plaintiff who had received a Calderbank . .
CitedNorris v Norris, Haskins v Haskins CA 28-Jul-2003
The court considered how orders for costs were to be made in ‘big money’ cases.
Held: There were two sets of rules. Cases should be considered by first applying the Civil Procedure Rules. This would allow the court to consider the full range . .
CitedCorner House Research, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry CA 1-Mar-2005
The applicant sought to bring an action to challenge new rules on approval of export credit guarantees. The company was non-profit and founded to support investigation of bribery. It had applied for a protected costs order to support the . .
CitedIn re T (Children) SC 25-Jul-2012
The local authority had commenced care proceedings, alleging abuse. After lengthy proceedings, of seven men and two grandparents, all but one were exonerated. The grandparents had not been entitled to legal aid, and had had to mortgage their house . .
CitedRe S (A Child) SC 25-Mar-2015
The Court was asked as to the proper approach to ordering the unsuccessful party to pay the costs of a successful appeal in cases about the care and upbringing of children. It arises in the specific context of a parent’s successful appeal to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 October 2021; Ref: scu.182186

Owens v Owens: SC 25 Jul 2018

W petitioned for divorce alleging that he ‘has behaved in such a way that [she] cannot reasonably be expected to live with [him]’. H defended, and the petition was rejected as inadequate in the behaviour alleged. She said that the section should be interpreted by reference not to his behaviour, but rather to the effect upon her.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The point upon which the appeal had been permitted was novel, and now withdrawn by the petitioner.
Lord Wilson said: ”Unreasonable behaviour’ has always been the family lawyer’s shorthand description for the content of the subsection. But it is wrong. The subsection requires not that the behaviour should have been unreasonable but that the expectation of continued life together should be unreasonable. ‘
Section 1 of the 1973 Act does not require the behaviour under the subsection to have caused the breakdown of the marriage.
Lady Hale, President, Lord Mance, Lord Wilson, Lord Hodge, Lady Black
[2018] UKSC 41, [2018] 3 WLR 634, [2018] 4 All ER 721, [2018] 2 FCR 796, [2018] WLR(D) 485, [2018] 2 FLR 1067, [2018] AC 899, UKSC 2017/0077, SC 2018 May 17 pm Video
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC, SC Summary, SC Summary Video, SC 2018 May 17 am Video
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 1(2)(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
At CAOwens v Owens CA 24-Mar-2017
Unreasonable Behaviour must reach criteria
W appealed against the judge’s refusal to grant a decree of divorce. He found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, but did not find that H had behaved iin such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with H.
Held: . .
CitedPheasant v Pheasant FD 1972
H petitioned for divorce pursuant to section 2(1)(b) of the Divorce Reform Act 1969, which came into force on 1 January 1971. The husband’s case was that the wife had been unable to give him the demonstrative affection which he needed.
Held: . .
CitedLivingstone-Stallard v Livingstone-Stallard FD 1974
Section 1(2)(b) is expressed in very simple language, and ‘is . . quite easy for a layman to understand’. The court considered the necessary test for whether unreasonable behaviour had reached a point such as to allow a decree of divorce.
Dunn . .
CitedThurlow v Thurlow FD 1976
A husband’s petition under the subsection was based on the wife’s failure to contribute to the running of the home and on her increasingly erratic behaviour, both of which were the result of a severe neurological condition. Rees J noted that, before . .
CitedBalraj v Balraj CA 1980
The husband’s petition was based on section 1(2)(e) of the 1973 Act, namely that he and the wife had lived apart for at least five years. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s rejection of the wife’s opposition to the grant of a decree, which was . .
CitedStevens v Stevens FD 1979
Sheldon J considered whether the divorce petitioner had established that she should not be expected to continue to live with her husband. An earlier behaviour petition by her had been rejected as making insufficient allegations against H.
UnsustainableAsh v Ash FD 2-Feb-1972
The court considered the standard of behaviour which would support an allegation that a petitioner spouse should not reasonably be expected to live with the other spouse.
Held: Tthe court will have regard to the particular petitioner and the . .
CitedRegina v Secretary of State for Health ex parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) HL 13-Mar-2003
Court to seek and Apply Parliamentary Intention
The appellant challenged the practice of permitting cell nuclear replacement (CNR), saying it was either outside the scope of the Act, or was for a purpose which could not be licensed under the Act.
Held: The challenge failed. The court was to . .
CitedMiller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane HL 24-May-2006
Fairness on Division of Family Capital
The House faced the question of how to achieve fairness in the division of property following a divorce. In the one case there were substantial assets but a short marriage, and in the other a high income, but low capital.
Held: The 1973 Act . .
UnsustainablePriday v Priday FD 1970
Cumming-Bruce J dismissed a husband’s petition for divorce on the ground of the wife’s cruelty under section 1(1)(a)(iii) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965. But, in recounting the history of the marriage, the judge also commented at p 557 on the . .
CitedMiller Smith v Miller Smith CA 2-Dec-2009
The married couple owned a property as tenants in common. The husband had moved out and, anticipating divorce proceedings, sought an order for the sale of the house citing his inability to sustain the very considerable mortgage payments. The wife . .
CitedJamieson v Jamieson HL 1952
The house discussed the test for relevancy of a pursuer’s averments.
Held: A case should only be dismissed on grounds of relevancy and specification if it would necessarily fail at proof.
The House reversed the decision of the Court of . .
CitedMiller Smith v Miller Smith CA 2-Dec-2009
The married couple owned a property as tenants in common. The husband had moved out and, anticipating divorce proceedings, sought an order for the sale of the house citing his inability to sustain the very considerable mortgage payments. The wife . .
CitedKatz v Katz 1972
Misuse of the phrase ‘unreasonable behaviour’ . .
CitedBannister v Bannister CA 1980
The Court allowed a wife’s appeal against the dismissal of her petition for divorce, Ormrod LJ observed: ‘The learned judge, I am afraid, fell into the linguistic trap which is waiting for all of us when we speak of ‘unreasonable behaviour’ in . .
CitedUkegheson v Haringey London Borough Council EAT 21-May-2015
EAT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Striking-out/dismissal
RACE DISCRIMINATION
VICTIMISATION DISCRIMINATION
HARASSMENT
UNFAIR DISMISSAL – Constructive dismissal
The Claimant resigned. In a . .

Cited by:
CitedHer Majesty’s Attorney General v Akhter and Another CA 14-Feb-2020
Islamic Nikah Ceremony did not create a marriage
The parties had undertaken, in 1998, an Islamic marriage ceremony, a Nikah. They both knew at the time that to be effective in UK law, there would need to be a civil ceremony, and intended but did not achieve one. The parties having settled their . .
CitedYorston and Others, Re (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973: Improper Petitions) FC 10-Sep-2021
Petitions with Identical Particulars Dismissed
28 divorce petitions had particulars including the exact same form of words for the allegations. The court could not accept that the behaviour had been identical and concluded that the petitions were improper.
Held: The petitions were . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 13 October 2021; Ref: scu.620138

Steinfeld and Keidan, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for International Development (In Substitution for The Home Secretary and The Education Secretary): SC 27 Jun 2018

The applicants, an heterosexual couple wished to enter into a civil partnership under the 2004 Act, rather than a marriage. They complained that had they been a same sex couple they would have had that choice under the 2013 Act.
Held: The appeal failed. Section 3(1) was a potential violation of the claimants’ Article 8 and 14 Rights. A clear obligation existed
‘. . the approach of the ECtHR to the question of what margin of appreciation member states should be accorded is not mirrored by the exercise which a national court is required to carry out in deciding whether an interference with a Convention right is justified . . a national court must confront the interference with a Convention right and decide whether the justification claimed for it has been made out. It cannot avoid that obligation by reference to a margin of appreciation to be allowed the government or Parliament, (at least not in the sense that the expression has been used by ECtHR)’
Lady Hale, President

Lord Kerr

Lord Wilson

Lord Reed

Lady Black
[2018] UKSC 32, 45 BHRC 169, [2018] 4 All ER 1, [2020] AC 1, [2018] 2 FCR 691, [2018] 3 WLR 415, [2018] WLR(D) 403, [2018] 2 FLR 906, UKSC 2017/0060
Bailii, SC Summary, WLRD, SC, SC Summary, SC Video Summary, SC 2018 May 15 am Video, SC2018 May 15 pm Video
Civil Partnership Act 2004, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, European Convention on Human Rights 8
England and Wales
Citing:
At AdmnSteinfeld and Another v The Secretary of State for Education Admn 29-Jan-2016
The claimant heterosexual couple wanted to enter into a civil partnership rather than to marry.
Held: The request for judicial review failed. On the authorities, the bar did not fall within the scope or ambit of Article 8. The appellants could . .
At CASteinfeld and Another v Secretary of State for Education CA 21-Feb-2017
Hetero Partnerships – wait and see proportionate
The claimants, a heterosexual couple complained that their inability to have a civil partnership was an unlawful discrimination against them and a denial of their Article 8 rights. The argument that the appellants’ case did not come within the ambit . .
CitedSalgueiro Da Silva Mouta v Portugal ECHR 21-Dec-1999
There was a difference in treatment between the applicant and a comparator based on the applicant’s sexual orientation, a concept which is undoubtedly covered by Article 14. The list set out in this provision is of an indicative nature and is not . .
CitedPetrovic v Austria ECHR 27-Mar-1998
The applicant was refused a grant of parental leave allowance in 1989. At that time parental leave allowance was available only to mothers. The applicant complained that this violated article 14 taken together with article 8.
Held: The . .
CitedSalgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal ECHR 1-Dec-1998
A homosexual claimed that an award of custody of his daughter to her mother was an unjustified interference with his right to respect for family life, and also with his right to respect for his private life since he was required in respect of his . .
CitedGhaidan v Godin-Mendoza HL 21-Jun-2004
Same Sex Partner Entitled to tenancy Succession
The protected tenant had died. His same-sex partner sought a statutory inheritance of the tenancy.
Held: His appeal succeeded. The Fitzpatrick case referred to the position before the 1998 Act: ‘Discriminatory law undermines the rule of law . .
CitedSchalk and Kopf v Austria ECHR 24-Jun-2010
The applicants alleged discrimination in that as a same sex couple they were not allowed to marry.
Held: There was no violation.
The Court cannot but note that there is an emerging European consensus towards legal recognition of same-sex . .
CitedVallianatos And Others v Greece ECHR 7-Nov-2013
Grand Chamber Judgment. The applicants alleged that the fact that the ‘civil unions’ introduced by the respondent were designed only for couples composed of different-sex adults had infringed their right to respect for their private and family life . .
CitedKarner v Austria ECHR 24-Jul-2003
A surviving same-sex partner sought a right of succession to a tenancy (of their previously shared flat). Interveners ‘pointed out that a growing number of national courts in European and other democratic societies require equal treatment of . .
CitedA v Secretary of State for the Home Department, and X v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 16-Dec-2004
The applicants had been imprisoned and held without trial, being suspected of international terrorism. No criminal charges were intended to be brought. They were foreigners and free to return home if they wished, but feared for their lives if they . .
CitedEB v France ECHR 22-Jan-2008
The claimant, a homosexual woman, complained that her homosexuality had meant her disqualification from adopting a child.
Held: There is no right to foster, but the provision was an unlawful discrimination. The denial of adoption to a woman in . .
CitedIn re P and Others, (Adoption: Unmarried couple) (Northern Ireland); In re G HL 18-Jun-2008
The applicants complained that as an unmarried couple they had been excluded from consideration as adopters.
Held: Northern Ireland legislation had not moved in the same way as it had for other jurisdictions within the UK. The greater . .
CitedAL (Serbia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Rudi v Same HL 25-Jun-2008
Each claimant had arrived here with their parents, and stayed for several years. They were excluded from the scheme allowing families who had been here more than three years to stay here, because they had attained 18 and were no longer dependant on . .
CitedQuila and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 12-Oct-2011
Parties challenged the rule allowing the respondent to deny the right to enter or remain here to non EU citizens marrying a person settled and present here where either party was under the age of 21. The aim of the rule was to deter forced . .
CitedBank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 1) SC 19-Jun-2013
Closed Material before Supreme Court
Under the 2009 order, the appellant Bank had been effectively shut down as to its operations within the UK. It sought to use the appeal procedure, and now objected to the use of closed material procedure. The Supreme Court asked itself whether it . .
CitedTigere, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills SC 29-Jul-2015
After increasing university fees, the student loan system was part funded by the government. They introduced limits to the availability of such loans, and a student must have been lawfully ordinarily resident in the UK for three years before the day . .

Cited by:
CitedElan-Cane, Regina (on The Application of) v The Secretary of State for The Home Department and Another CA 10-Mar-2020
No right to non-gendered passport
The claimant sought judicial review of the police of the respondent’s policy requiring a passport applicant to identify themselves as either male or female. The claimant began life as a female, but, with surgery, asserted a non-gendered identity. . .
CitedMcLaughlin, Re Judicial Review SC 30-Aug-2018
The applicant a differently sexed couple sought to marry under the Civil Partnership Act 2004, but complained that they would lose the benefits of widowed parent’s allowance. Parliament had decided to delay such rules to allow assessment of reaction . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 06 September 2021; Ref: scu.618853

Bellinger v Bellinger: FD 22 Nov 2000

The test for what sex somebody was for the purposes of validating a marriage was the sex as decided and set out on the birth registration certificate. Though increasing recognition has been given to the complexities of gender identity over the years, this was an area which, if it was to be reformed, must be reformed by parliament and as a comprehensive whole, not piecemeal by judges. Johnson J said: ‘There is now a distinct possibility that were it possible to do so, examination of the brain of a living individual would reveal further indications of gender. But that is not yet possible and the practical reality is that whatever may ultimately emerge from advances in medical science, the only criteria for determining the gender of an individual remain those identified in Corbett.’
Johnson J
Times 22-Nov-2000, [2001] 1 FLR 389
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 11
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedCorbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) FD 1-Feb-1970
There had been a purported marriage in 1963 between a man and a male to female trans-sexual.
Held: Because marriage is essentially a union between a man and a woman, the relationship depended on sex, and not on gender. The law should adopt the . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromBellinger v Bellinger CA 17-Jul-2001
Transgender Male may not marry as Female
Despite gender re-assignment, a person born and registered a male, remained biologically a male, and so was not a woman for the purposes of the law of marriage. The birth registration in this case had been correct. The words ‘male and female’ in the . .
At first instanceBellinger v Bellinger HL 10-Apr-2003
Transgendered Male/Female not to marry as Female
The parties had gone through a form of marriage, but Mrs B had previously undergone gender re-assignment surgery. Section 11(c) of the 1973 Act required a marriage to be between a male and a female. It was argued that the section was incompatible . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.78325

Stevens v Stevens: FD 1979

Sheldon J considered whether the divorce petitioner had established that she should not be expected to continue to live with her husband. An earlier behaviour petition by her had been rejected as making insufficient allegations against H.
Held: Sheldon J said: ‘the wife would be entitled to a decree in the present suit if she could establish (a) that their marriage remained irretrievably broken down . . and (b) that since March 16, 1976, he has behaved in such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with him. In my judgment, moreover, it is not necessary for her to establish . . that the husband’s behaviour, of which she now complains, was in any way responsible for the breakdown of the marriage.
On the other hand, of course, the facts that the marriage had clearly broken down and, a fortiori, that the breakdown was due to the fault of the wife are or may be matters in determining whether the husband’s behaviour since has been unreasonable in this context. The court must have regard to the whole history of the matrimonial relationship.
Sheldon J
[1979] 1 WLR 885
England and Wales
Citing:
AdoptedWelfare v Welfare FD 12-Oct-1977
Bush J heard a defended divorce petion sand said: ‘Conduct of a respondent could not be looked at in isolation but had to be viewed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, including the degree of provocation.’ He continued to adopt the . .

Cited by:
CitedOwens v Owens CA 24-Mar-2017
Unreasonable Behaviour must reach criteria
W appealed against the judge’s refusal to grant a decree of divorce. He found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, but did not find that H had behaved iin such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with H.
Held: . .
CitedOwens v Owens SC 25-Jul-2018
W petitioned for divorce alleging that he ‘has behaved in such a way that [she] cannot reasonably be expected to live with [him]’. H defended, and the petition was rejected as inadequate in the behaviour alleged. She said that the section should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.581084

Dunbar’s Trustees v Dunbar: HL 11 Apr 1905

By an antenuptial marriage-contract executed in 1848 the wife bound herself to convey to the trustees the whole funds and estate, real and personal, which she then had or might thereafter ‘conquest and acquire by purchase, succession, or otherwise.’ The trustees were directed to pay the annual income of the trust estate to the wife during her life for her separate use, exclusive of the jus mariti. Held that the clause of conquest did not extend to estate which consisted of, or was purchased with, savings made by the wife from her separate income during the subsistence of the marriage.
Lord Macnaghten in the Chair, Lord Davey, Lord Robertson, and Lord Lindley
[1905] UKHL 553, 42 SLR 553
Bailii
Scotland

Updated: 06 August 2021; Ref: scu.621176

Mills v Mills: SC 18 Jul 2018

The Court was asked: ‘In circumstances in which at the time of a divorce a spouse, say a wife, is awarded capital which enables her to purchase a home but later she exhausts the capital by entry into a series of unwise transactions and so develops a need to pay rent, is the court entitled to decline to increase the order for the husband to make periodical payments to her so as to fund payment of all (or perhaps even any) of her rent even if he could afford to do so?’ On their divorce, the parties agreed a consent order involving capital and maintenance payments. They anticipated that the capital would buy a house, but W also obtained a mortgage, and now sought an increase in the maintenance payments to allow her to make the payments. The judge refused her application saying that it was a choice she had made. The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal, and H appealed now in turn.
Held: The Court of Appeal had erred. The judge had given proper reasons, and had made a decision properly within his discretion.
Lady Hale, President, Lord Wilson, Lord Carnwath, Lord Hughes, Lord Hodge
[2018] UKSC 38, UKSC 2017/0040
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary, SC Summary Video, SC 2018Jun 06 am Video, SC 2018 May 08 pm Video
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 31(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
At CAM v M CA 1-Feb-2017
. .
CitedPearce v Pearce CA 28-Jul-2003
The financial claims on divorce had been settled by a compromise recorded in a court order. The order included periodical payments to the former wife. After she suffered financial losses, she sought an increase, and the former husband sought an . .
CitedNorth v North CA 25-Jul-2007
The husband appealed a consent order for payment of pounds 202,000 to commute a varied nominal maintenance order. The original order had been made many years before. In the meantime, the former husband had grown wealthy, and she had suffered . .
CitedYates v Yates CA 28-Mar-2012
Under a consent order the wife had received a substantial lump sum on the basis that she would use half of it in discharging a mortgage on her home. In the event she had repaid only part of the mortgage debt and had invested in a non-income-bearing . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 31 July 2021; Ref: scu.620137

M v M: CA 1 Feb 2017

Sir Ernest Ryder SPT
[2017] EWCA Civ 129
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 31(3)
England and Wales
Cited by:
At CAMills v Mills SC 18-Jul-2018
The Court was asked: ‘In circumstances in which at the time of a divorce a spouse, say a wife, is awarded capital which enables her to purchase a home but later she exhausts the capital by entry into a series of unwise transactions and so develops a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 July 2021; Ref: scu.620142

A v United Kingdom: ECHR 8 Oct 1982

A disabled UK citizen living on benefits complained of the denial of entry clearance to his Filippino fiancee whom he had never met but wished to marry here. The ground of refusal was that she would be a charge on public funds.
Held: The right to marry did not in principle include the right to choose the geographical location of the marriage and the refusal of entry was justified. The case did not involve a genuine marriage between two persons already in the jurisdiction.
(1983) 5 EHRR CD296, 9054/80, [1982] ECHR 15
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8
Human Rights
Cited by:
CitedBaiai and others, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 30-Jul-2008
In order to prevent marriages of convenience in the UK the Secretary of State introduced a scheme under which certain persons subject to immigration control required her written permission to marry and would not receive it unless they were present . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 July 2021; Ref: scu.272206

Padolecchia v Padolecchia: FD 1968

Ante-nuptial domicile sets capacity law

The husband domiciled in Italy was divorced from his first wife in Mexico. The divorce was not recognised in Italy. The husband then went to live in Denmark and during a one day visit to England went through a ceremony of marriage with a woman domiciled in Denmark. Following the ceremony, the parties returned to Denmark to live.
Held: The law governing the capacity of a party for marriage is governed by their ante-nuptial domicile. As the Mexican divorce was not recognised in Italy the husband had no capacity to marry by the law of his domicile and therefore the marriage was void.
Sir Jocelyn Simon P
[1968] P 314
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedWilkinson v Kitzinger and others FD 31-Jul-2006
The parties had gone through a ceremony of marriage in Columbia, being both women. After the relationship failed, the claimant sought a declaration that the witholding of the recognition of same-sex marriages recoginised in a foreign jurisdiction . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 02 June 2021; Ref: scu.244722

Drake v Whipp: CA 30 Nov 1995

The parties, an unmarried cohabiting couple, disputed their respective shares in a property held in the man’s sole name. Both had made direct contributions both to the purchase of a barn and to its expensive conversion into a home. The plaintiff appealed against a finding that she had only a 14.9% interest on a resulting trust, in the house she and the defendant had occupied together. The property had been purchased for andpound;61,000 of which she had contributed andpound;24,000, with later additional contributions to conversion works. She complained that working on a resulting trust, the costs of acquisition were given undue emphasis.
Held: A beneficial interest in a family home could be presumed from the intention of the parties and their acting in detriment. There was a constructive trust. There was undisputed evidence that she was to have an interest in the property, and she had acted to further that intention and to her detriment. The appeal was allowed, and her interest set at one third. ‘it is not easy to reconcile every judicial utterance in this well-travelled area of the law. A potent source of confusion, to my mind, has been suggestions that it matters not whether the terminology used is that of the constructive trust, to which the intention, actual or imputed, of the parties is crucial, or that of the resulting trust which operates on a presumed intention of the contributing party in the absence of rebutting evidence of actual intention.’
Peter Gibson LJ, Lord Justice Hirst and Mr Justice Forbes
Times 19-Dec-1995, [1996] 2 FCR 296, [1995] EWCA Civ 25, (1996) 28 HLR 531, [1996] CLY 5780
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedLloyds Bank plc v Rosset HL 29-Mar-1990
The house had been bought during the marriage but in the husband’s sole name. The plaintiff’s charge secured the husband’s overdraft. The bank issued possession proceedings. Mr Rosset had left, but Mrs Rosset claimed, as against the bank an interest . .
CitedDyer v Dyer 27-Nov-1988
Where property is purchased by one person in the name of another there is a presumption that a resulting trust is created: ‘The clear result of all the cases, without a single exception is that the trust of a legal estate, whether freehold, copyhold . .

Cited by:
CitedOxley v Hiscock CA 6-May-2004
oxley_hiscockCA2004
The parties were not married, but had brought together their resources to purchase a home in the name of one of them. Nothing had been said about the respective shares on which the property was to be held.
Held: The shares were to be assessed . .
CitedStack v Dowden HL 25-Apr-2007
The parties had cohabited for a long time, in a home bought by Ms Dowden. After the breakdown of the relationship, Mr Stack claimed an equal interest in the second family home, which they had bought in joint names. The House was asked whether, when . .
CitedJones v Kernott SC 9-Nov-2011
Unmarried Couple – Equal division displaced
The parties were unmarried but had lived together. They now disputed the shares in which they had held the family home. It had been bought in joint names, but after Mr Kernott (K) left in 1993, Ms Jones (J) had made all payments on the house. She . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 02 June 2021; Ref: scu.80130

Sharland v Sharland: CA 10 Feb 2014

Appeal against the order of Sir Hugh Bennett dismissing the application of the appellant wife to resume the hearing of her claim for financial provision following her divorce from the respondent.
Held: (Briggs LJ dissenting) The appeal failed. Moore-Bick LJ said: It may be unusual for a judge to conclude that despite a deliberate failure by one party to give full and frank disclosure the resulting order should not be set aside, but ultimately that must depend on the nature of the non-disclosure and its effect on the outcome of the proceedings. In this case the husband’s non-disclosure was deliberate and dishonest, but because of the rather unusual circumstances there were good reasons for concluding that it had not resulted in an order significantly different from that which the court would otherwise have made at the conclusion of the proceedings. In my view the judge was entitled to hold that the wife had not made out sufficient grounds for re-opening the hearing. That called for an exercise of judgment on his part and in my view his decision was one that was open to him.’
Briggs LJ thought having found the deceit, ‘fraud unravels all’ and the ‘the husband’s fraud undermined both the parties’ agreement and the consent order which followed ought to have been the end of the matter, and to have led to the setting aside of the consent order, and an order for a new (or perhaps resumed) hearing.’
Macur LJ said: ‘the audacity and extensive practice of a deceit cannot be determinative of the degree of its materiality to the substance of an order of the Court. It may be material in negotiations between the parties to an action or a contract or within the hearing, not least in terms of the integrity of the participants, but, applying the ratio in Livesey v Jenkins as I consider it to be, entirely in accordance with the exposition by my Lord, Lord Justice Moore-Bick, it will not necessarily undermine the rationale or content of an order made, whether by consent or after hearing in matrimonial proceedings.
In this case Sir Hugh, not being functus officio, considered the matter having directed and received further evidence from the husband and submissions from Counsel, and determined that ultimately it did not.’
Macur LJ placed particular emphasis on the wife’s failure to cross examine the husband on his affidavit.
Moore-Bick, Briggs, Macur LJJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 95, [2014] 2 FCR 189
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedJenkins v Livesey (formerly Jenkins) HL 1985
The parties had negotiated through solicitors a compromise of ancillary relief claims on their divorce. They agreed that the house should be transferred to the wife in consideration of her release of all other financial claims. The wife however . .
Appeal fromS v S FD 29-Apr-2013
W sought to re-open a sttlement of the financial arrangement on her divorce, saying that there had been substantial non-disclosure by H.
Held: ‘any order which would have been made if proper disclosure had taken place would not have been . .
CitedXydhias v Xydhias CA 21-Dec-1998
The principles of contract law are of little use when looking at the course of negotiations in divorce ancillary proceedings. In the case of a dispute the court must use its own discretion to determine whether agreement had been reached. Thorpe LJ . .
CitedBokor-Ingram v Bokor-Ingram CA 4-Mar-2009
W sought to re-open the financial settlement on her divorce. Within a few days of the order, H resigned and took on a new employment at a significant increase in pay. That had not been disclosed. . .
CitedOwens v Noble CA 10-Mar-2010
The respondent had been awarded substantial damages after an accident for which the appellant was responsible. The appellant now said that the claimant had exaggerated his injuries and misled the judge. The defendant argued that the correct approach . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromSharland v Sharland SC 14-Oct-2015
The Court considered the impact of fraud upon a financial settlement agreed between divorcing parties where that agreement is later embodied in a court order? Does ‘fraud unravel all’, as is normally the case when agreements are embodied in court . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 June 2021; Ref: scu.521110

N v N and Another: FD 16 Dec 2005

Coleridge J
[2005] EWHC 2908 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 856
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 24(1)(c)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBen Hashem v Ali Shayif and Another FD 22-Sep-2008
The court was asked to pierce the veil of incorporation of a company in the course of ancillary relief proceedings in a divorce. H had failed to co-operate with the court.
After a comprehensive review of all the authorities, Munby J said: ‘The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 May 2021; Ref: scu.279013

Whig v Whig: FD 23 Jul 2007

The court heard ancillary relief and bankruptcy proceedings together.
Held: Munby J refused to annul the husband’s bankruptcy.
Munby J
[2007] EWHC 1856 (Fam), [2008] 1 FLR 453
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBen Hashem v Ali Shayif and Another FD 22-Sep-2008
The court was asked to pierce the veil of incorporation of a company in the course of ancillary relief proceedings in a divorce. H had failed to co-operate with the court.
After a comprehensive review of all the authorities, Munby J said: ‘The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 May 2021; Ref: scu.260013

Smith v Smith: FD 2000

Ancillary relief
Thorpe J
[2000] 3 FCR 374
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedA v B (Ancillary relief: Separation agreement) FD 17-Jan-2005
The husband appealed against an ancillary relief order, saying that the judge had applied the terms of a separation agreement without acknowledging that that agreement had been entered into without full disclosure having been made. Had the judge . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 May 2021; Ref: scu.224379

C v C (Ancillary Relief: Nuptial Settlement): FD 2 Apr 2004

Application for ancillary relief to vary post-nuptial settlement.
[2004] EWHC 742 (Fam), [2004] Fam 141
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 24(1)(c)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRadmacher v Granatino CA 2-Jul-2009
Husband and wife, neither English, had married in England. Beforehand they had signed a prenuptial agreement in Germany agreeing that neither should claim against the other on divorce. The wife appealed against an order to pay a lump sum to the . .
LeaveCharalambous v Charalambous; C v C (Ancillary Relief: Nuptial Settlement) CA 30-Jul-2004
The parties had been wealthy. Whilst still married, substantial sums had been placed in a trust. Their business interests had crashed and both faced personal bankruptcy. The husband appealed an order setting aside the trust.
Held: A clause in . .
CitedBen Hashem v Ali Shayif and Another FD 22-Sep-2008
The court was asked to pierce the veil of incorporation of a company in the course of ancillary relief proceedings in a divorce. H had failed to co-operate with the court.
After a comprehensive review of all the authorities, Munby J said: ‘The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 May 2021; Ref: scu.221039

Prescott v Fellowes: CA 1958

The court considered whether a deed of trust created a post nuptial settlement within the 1950 Act: ‘Inasmuch as the deed vested no property in trustees and created no successive legal or beneficial interests it had none of the attributes of a settlement which are familiar to conveyancing practitioners. It has, however, long since been established by decisions which are binding on this court that a disposition of property may a ‘settlement’ for the purposes of section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950, notwithstanding that it would not be regarded as a settlement of property for any other purpose. The liberality with which this legislation has been construed is sufficiently exemplified by Bosworthick v. Bosworthick. In that case a wife executed, a few years after her marriage, a bond which secured to her husband an annuity for his life. The marriage was dissolved in 1925 and the wife applied to the court for an order extinguishing her liability under the bond. This court, affirming the decision of Lord Merrivale P., held that the bond was a post-nuptial settlement for the purposes of section 5 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1859, and section 192 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925; and the wife’s application succeeded. In the course of his judgment Romer J., who was sitting as a member of this court, said that the authorities established ‘that where a ‘husband has made a provision for his wife, or a wife for her husband, in the nature of periodical payments, that amounts to a settlement within the meaning of the sections. That may appear to be a very liberal construction of the sections, but I think that it is no more liberal a construction than should be given to them having regard to the obvious purposes for which they were enacted by the legislature.’
Romer LJ
[1958] P 260
Matriimonial Cause Act 1950
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedCharalambous v Charalambous; C v C (Ancillary Relief: Nuptial Settlement) CA 30-Jul-2004
The parties had been wealthy. Whilst still married, substantial sums had been placed in a trust. Their business interests had crashed and both faced personal bankruptcy. The husband appealed an order setting aside the trust.
Held: A clause in . .
CitedBen Hashem v Ali Shayif and Another FD 22-Sep-2008
The court was asked to pierce the veil of incorporation of a company in the course of ancillary relief proceedings in a divorce. H had failed to co-operate with the court.
After a comprehensive review of all the authorities, Munby J said: ‘The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 May 2021; Ref: scu.199724

Saeed and Another v Ibrahim and Others: ChD 9 Jan 2018

The court considered the overlap between CPR 3.4(2)(a) and CPR 24.2
Marsh CM
[2018] EWHC 3 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
See AlsoSaeed and Another v Ibrahim and Others ChD 3-Aug-2018
. .
CitedBoyse (International) Ltd v Natwest Markets Plc and Another ChD 27-May-2020
Claim alleging misselling of interest rate hedging products. The court considered the defendants strike out application, and applications for leave to amend pleadings.
Held: it will normally be appropriate for summary judgment to be pursued on . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 May 2021; Ref: scu.602625

Holmes v The United Kingdom: ECHR 10 Feb 2009

The applicant complained under Article 6 – 1 of the Convention that the ancillary relief proceedings were not dealt with within a reasonable time, that he was not given a real opportunity to present his case and that some of the judges involved in the proceedings were not impartial.
Lech Garlicki, P
5787/06, [2009] ECHR 429
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights
Human Rights

Updated: 08 May 2021; Ref: scu.317935

JR38, Re Application for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland): SC 1 Jul 2015

The appellant was now 18 years old. In July 2010 two newspapers published an image of him. He was at that time barely 14 years old. These photographs had been published by the newspapers at the request of the police. The publication of the appellant’s photographs and those of others who had been involved in public disorder in Londonderry was part of a police campaign known as ‘Operation Exposure’ which was designed to counteract sectarian rioting at what are called ‘interface areas’ in parts of Derry. Interface areas are situated at the boundaries of parts of the city which are predominantly inhabited by one or other of the two main communities.
The appellant argues that publication of photographs of him constituted a violation of his article 8 rights. ‘
Held: The appeal failed. The publication of his photograph was not an infringement of the applicant’s human rights.
There was, per Lords Kerr and Wilson, in interference in his rights, but that interference was proportionate and justified.
Lords Toulson, Clarke, and Hodge did not think that there had been an interference with the appellant’s human rights, because in the circumstances there had been no expectation of privacy.
Lord Toulson JSC said: ‘ In Campbell’s case Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said at para 21 that ‘Essentially the touchstone of private life is whether in respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy’. He also warned that courts need to be on guard against using as a touchstone a test which brings into account considerations which should more properly be considered at the later stage of proportionality. Applying Campbell’s case, Sir Anthony Clarke MR said in Murray’s case at para 35 that ‘The first question is whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy’. He said at para 36 that the question is a broad one which takes account of all the circumstances of the case, including the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the claimant was involved, the place at which it was happening, and the nature and purpose of the intrusion. The principled reason for the ‘touchstone’ is that it focuses on the sensibilities of a reasonable person in the position of the person who is the subject of the conduct complained about in considering whether the conduct falls within the sphere of article 8 . If there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy, or legitimate expectation of protection, it is hard to see how there could nevertheless be a lack of respect for their article 8 rights.”
Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord Toulson, Lord Hodge
[2015] HRLR 13, [2015] UKSC 42, [2015] WLR(D) 280, [2016] AC 1131, [2015] 3 WLR 155, [2015] EMLR 25, [2015] 4 All ER 90, UKSC 2013/0181
Bailii, WLRD, SC, SC Summary, Bailii Summary
European Convention on Human Rights 8
Northern Ireland
Citing:
Appeal fromJR 38, Re Judicial Review QBNI 21-Mar-2013
Application for judicial review of a decision by the PSNI to release to local newspapers for publication images of persons suspected of being involved in sectarian rioting and violent offending at an interface area at Fountain Street/Bishop Street . .
CitedX v Iceland ECHR 18-May-1976
The right to respect for private life was held to ‘comprise also, to a certain degree, the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings’. . .
CitedNiemietz v Germany ECHR 16-Dec-1992
A lawyer complained that a search of his offices was an interference with his private life.
Held: In construing the term ‘private life’, ‘it would be too restrictive to limit the notion of an ‘inner circle’ in which the individual may live his . .
CitedRotaru v Romania ECHR 4-May-2000
Grand Chamber – The applicant, a lawyer, complained of a violation of his right to respect for his private life on account of the use against him by the Romanian Intelligence Service of a file which contained information about his conviction for . .
CitedPG and JH v The United Kingdom ECHR 25-Sep-2001
The use of covert listening devices within a police station was an infringement of the right to privacy, since there was no system of law regulating such practices. That need not affect the right to a fair trial. The prosecution had a duty to . .
CitedCampbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd (MGN) (No 1) HL 6-May-2004
The claimant appealed against the denial of her claim that the defendant had infringed her right to respect for her private life. She was a model who had proclaimed publicly that she did not take drugs, but the defendant had published a story . .
CitedSidabras And Dziautas v Lithuania ECHR 27-Jul-2004
Former KGB officers complained that they were banned, not only from public sector employment, but also from many private sector posts. This ‘affected [their] ability to develop relationships with the outside world to a very significant degree, and . .
CitedSciacca v Italy ECHR 11-Jan-2005
The court was asked whether the applicant’s rights under Article 8 had been infringed by the release to the press of an identity photograph taken of her by the Italian Revenue Police while she was under arrest and investigation for various criminal . .
CitedCemalettin Canli v Turkey ECHR 18-Nov-2008
The Court found interference in the applicant’s right to respect of his private life in that the police prepared and submitted to a domestic court an inaccurate report in the context of criminal proceedings against him. . .
CitedReklos and Davourlis v Greece ECHR 15-Jan-2009
(Press release) The court considered the rights when photographs were taken in public: ‘the court finds that it is not insignificant that the photographer was able to keep the negatives of the offending photographs, in spite of the express request . .
CitedWood v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis CA 21-May-2009
The appellant had been ostentatiously photographed by the police as he left a company general meeting. He was a peaceful and lawful objector to the Arms Trade. He appealed against refusal of an order for the records to be destroyed. The police had . .

Cited by:
CitedWeller and Others v Associated Newspapers Ltd CA 20-Nov-2015
The three children of a musician complained of the publication of photographs taken of them in a public place in California. . .
CitedNT 1 and NT 2 v Google Llc QBD 13-Apr-2018
Right to be Forgotten is not absolute
The two claimants separately had criminal convictions from years before. They objected to the defendant indexing third party web pages which included personal data in the form of information about those convictions, which were now spent. The claims . .
CitedRichard v The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Another ChD 18-Jul-2018
Police suspect has outweighable Art 8 rights
Police (the second defendant) had searched the claimant’s home in his absence in the course of investigating allegations of historic sexual assault. The raid was filmed and broadcast widely by the first defendant. No charges were brought against the . .
CitedZXC v Bloomberg Lp CA 15-May-2020
Privacy Expecation during police investigations
Appeal from a judgment finding that the Defendant had breached the Claimant’s privacy rights. He made an award of damages for the infraction of those rights and granted an injunction restraining Bloomberg from publishing information which further . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 May 2021; Ref: scu.549907

In Re H (A Minor) (Chambers Proceedings: Mckenzie Friend): CA 6 May 1997

A father sought ex parte, permission to appeal against orders in the county court. The first had refused to allow him to have a McKenzie friend in an application for contact to his daughter. The Recorder had taken the view that because the proceedings were in chambers it was inappropriate to have anyone other than the parties and the lawyers present.
Held: Leave was given. It was proper for the court to allow a McKenzie friend for a litigant in person to help in chambers as in open court.
Ward LJ said: ‘The father seeks leave to appeal against that part of the recorder’s order which excluded his McKenzie Friend. I would easily come to the conclusion, not only that that was arguable, but that it was probably plainly wrong. The recorder ought not to have taken the view that a McKenzie friend should be removed, even if the matter proceeds in chambers as a matter affecting a child. Provided the McKenzie friend does not more than a McKenzie friend is entitled to do, that is to sit and advise and quietly to offer help, I for my part can see no objection to that whatever. I note with approval that when the matter next came to the court before his Honour Judge Paul Clarke the judge correctly and promptly , without question, permitted the presence of the friend who was then there to assist the father.’
Ward LJ, Millett LJ
Times 06-May-1997, [1997] EWCA Civ 1436, [1997] 2 FLR 423
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedO and others (Children); In re O (Children), In re W-R (a Child), In re W (Children) CA 22-Jun-2005
In each case litigants in person had sought to be allowed to have the assistance and services of a Mackenzie friend in children cases. In one case, the court had not allowed confidential documents to be disclosed to the friend.
Held: The . .
CitedRe M (Contact: Family Assistance: McKenzie Friend) CA 1999
A father appealed a refual of consent for him to be allowed assistance from a McKenzie Friend.
Held: He should have been allowed assistance on the contact and other applications. It was ‘a matter of regret’ that the father had been denied the . .
CitedRegina v Bow County Court, Ex Parte Pelling CA 17-Dec-1999
Access to the court given to a McKenzie Friend should normally be given in matters in open court, but when it came to matters being heard in chambers, the judge had discretion as to who he would hear. The right is in any event that of the litigant, . .
Not bindingRegina v Bow County Court Ex parte Pelling QBD 8-Mar-1999
Mr Pelling sought to act as a McKenzie friend. On being refused he sought judicial review of he decision to exclude him.
Held: Review was refused. A McKenzie friend has himself no locus to challenge a decision by a county court judge not to . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 April 2021; Ref: scu.81919

S v S-T (Formerly J): CA 25 Nov 1996

The parties had gone through a form of marriage, but the purported husband was many years later revealed to be a female to male transsexual. The marriage had been annulled. There was now an application for ancillary relief.
Held: Ancillary relief might be available to a trans-sexual whose marriage is annulled. The principle of public policy identified was not determinative, but on the facts, and in the light of Mr. J’s conduct, no court could properly have exercised its discretion to grant him ancillary relief.
CS Potter LJ: ‘By s 11(c) of the 1973 Act, a marriage is void if the parties are not respectively male and female. It is plain that the use of the word ‘marriage’ in such a case is no more than convenient shorthand for a purported ceremony of marriage. . . . For the purpose of determining whether a particular human being is of a particular sex, the criteria are biological: see Corbett v Corbett (orse Ashley) [1970] 2 All ER 33 at 48, [1971] P 83 at 106 and Rees v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 429 (App 9532/81), (1986) 9 EHRR 56 and Cossey v UK (1990) 13 EHRR 622. While it may be that the advance of medical science may lead to a shift in the criteria applied by the English courts, it is plain that at present, the position is that laid down in Corbett v Corbett and that, even in jurisdictions which have extended the criteria in the case of transsexuals, a ‘female to male’ transsexual is not generally regarded as having satisfied the criteria of masculinity unless endowed (by surgery or otherwise) with apparent male genitalia. In those circumstances it is also plain that the defendant was well advised not to defend the suit for nullity brought against him by the plaintiff.
However, although a marriage void for the reason that the two parties are of the same sex is not merely a void but a meretricious marriage which cannot give rise to anything remotely matrimonial in character, this has not historically prevented a party from seeking a decree of nullity in respect of it.’
Ward LJ (dissenting) took the view that the principle of public policy that no one should profit from their own wrong applied. He also commented on the fact that they had received fertility treatment together: ‘The apparent ease with which they were able to obtain this treatment without the truth being disclosed or discovered is, for me, one of the puzzling and, I feel bound to add, unsatisfactory features of the case.’ and
‘It is suggested that the Act has made a subtle but perhaps important change to the terminology. What governed Ormrod J’s decision in Corbett’s case, based as it was on ecclesiastical principles, was whether the parties were ‘ a man and a woman’. It may be – but I express no view about it – that the choice ‘male and female’ has left the way open for a future court, relying on the developments of medical knowledge, to place greater emphasis on gender than on sex in deciding whether a person is to be regarded as male or female. There is a body of very respectable academic opinion making that point: see, for example, Cretney and Masson Principles of Family Law, 5th ed (1990) pp 46-48; S Poulter ‘The Definition of marriage in English Law’ (1979) 42 M.L.R. 409, 421-425 and A. Bradney, ‘Transsexuals and the Law’ [1987] Fam. Law 350.’
Sir Brian Neill said: ‘It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to consider whether the decision of Ormrod J in Corbett v Corbett … requires re-examination in the light of modern medical advances and in the light of decisions in other jurisdictions, or whether it is distinguishable because the words used in section 11(c) of the Act of 1973 are ‘male’ and ‘female’ which, I suppose, it might be argued, indicate a test of gender rather than sex.’
Ward and Potter LJJ and Sir Brian Neill
Times 25-Nov-1996, [1998] Fam 103, [1997] 3 WLR 1287
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 25(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied reluctantlyCorbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) FD 1-Feb-1970
There had been a purported marriage in 1963 between a man and a male to female trans-sexual.
Held: Because marriage is essentially a union between a man and a woman, the relationship depended on sex, and not on gender. The law should adopt the . .

Cited by:
CitedBellinger v Bellinger HL 10-Apr-2003
Transgendered Male/Female not to marry as Female
The parties had gone through a form of marriage, but Mrs B had previously undergone gender re-assignment surgery. Section 11(c) of the 1973 Act required a marriage to be between a male and a female. It was argued that the section was incompatible . .
See AlsoJ v C and E (a Child) (Void Marriage: Status of Children) CA 15-May-2006
The parties had lived together as a married couple. They had had a child together by artificial insemination. It was then revealed that Mr J was a woman. The parties split up, and Mr J applied for an order for contact with the child.
Held: The . .
CitedBellinger v Bellinger CA 17-Jul-2001
Transgender Male may not marry as Female
Despite gender re-assignment, a person born and registered a male, remained biologically a male, and so was not a woman for the purposes of the law of marriage. The birth registration in this case had been correct. The words ‘male and female’ in the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 April 2021; Ref: scu.88963

Dart v Dart: CA 2 Jul 1996

A strictly mathematical approach to calculating ancillary relief can be inappropriate in large sum cases. The statutory jurisdiction has to provide for all applications for ancillary financial relief, from the poverty stricken to the multi-millionaire.
Held: The court to reconcile existing practice wit the statute. Reasonable requirements are more extensive than needs. What a person requires is likely to be greater than what that person needs. The objective appraisal of what the applicant requires must have regard to the other criteria of the section, including what is available, the parties’ accustomed standard of living, their age and state of health and ‘perhaps less obviously’ the duration of the marriage, contributions and pension rights: ‘Used thus the consideration of needs ceases to be paramount or determinative but an elastic consideration that does not exclude the influence of any of the others. . . in a big money case where the wife has played an equal part in creating the family fortune it would not be unreasonable for her to require what might be even an equal share.’ Other court members questioned the correctness of an approach which determines the quantum of an award by reference only to the reasonable requirements of the applicant. Butler-Sloss LJ: if spouses are in business together, the traditional ‘reasonable requirements’ approach to a wife’s application for ancillary relief is not the most appropriate method to arrive at the post-divorce adjustment of family finances.
Butler-Sloss LJ, Thorpe LJ, Peter Gibson LJ
Gazette 02-Aug-1996, [1997] 1 FCR 286, [1996] 2 FLR 286, [1996] Fam Law 607, [1996] EWCA Civ 1343
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedPage v Page CA 1981
In an ancillary relief application, there was enough capital to provide adequately for both husband and wife.
Held: When considering the needs and obligations of the parties a broad view could be taken: (Ormrod LJ) ‘In a case such as this . .
FollowedThyssen-Bornemisza v Thyssen-Bornemisza (No 2) 1985
. .

Cited by:
CitedWhite v White HL 26-Oct-2000
The couple going through the divorce each had substantial farms and wished to continue farming. It had been a long marriage.
Held: Where a division of the assets of a family would satisfy the reasonable needs of either party on an ancillary . .
ConsideredConran v Conran FD 14-Jul-1997
In deciding financial settlement, the court can consider contribution made by the Wife through her own special skills to the husband’s business. One could not sensibly fit an allowance for contribution into an analysis of a wife’s needs. That would . .
CitedWilliams v Thompson Leatherdale (A Firm) and Another QBD 10-Nov-2008
The claimant sought damages from her legal advisers. They had allowed her to settle an ancillary relief application knowing that the case of White v White had been referred to the House of lords, and the settlement proved to have been on . .
CitedRadmacher v Granatino CA 2-Jul-2009
Husband and wife, neither English, had married in England. Beforehand they had signed a prenuptial agreement in Germany agreeing that neither should claim against the other on divorce. The wife appealed against an order to pay a lump sum to the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 April 2021; Ref: scu.79813

Marsh v Marsh: CA 1 Mar 1993

Appeals under the Family Proceedings Rules had to be read in conjunction with the CCR Order 37 r 6, and the judge hearing the appeal had discretion to substitute his own view for that of the court below. This is different from what applies on appeal to the Court of Appeal. In particular the judge may choose to hear fresh evidence: ‘No party shall be entitled as of right to adduce further evidence or oral evidence but the judge may in his discretion admit such further or oral evidence as he thinks relevant and just upon such terms as he thinks fit.’
Sir Stephen Brown P
Ind Summary 01-Mar-1993, Times 16-Feb-1993, [1993] 1 WLR 744
Family Proceedings Rules 1991 8.1(2) 8.1(3) 4.23, County Court Rules 1981 Order 37 Rule 6, Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
England and Wales
Cited by:
ReconsideredCordle v Cordle CA 15-Nov-2001
The former practice in ancillary relief applications where a circuit judge hearing an appeal from a district judge could admit new evidence and hear the case de novo should not survive the new rules, and should cease. An appeal to the circuit judge . .
CitedPiglowska v Piglowski HL 24-Jun-1999
When looking to the needs of parties in a divorce, there is no presumption that both parties are to be left able to purchase alternative homes. The order of sub-clauses in the Act implies nothing as to their relative importance. Courts should be . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 April 2021; Ref: scu.83425

Pounds v Pounds: CA 24 Feb 1994

Consent orders giving effect to financial settlements are to be drafted and dated with care. The one in this case mistakenly pre-dated the decree nisi. It was amended under the slip rule.
Neill LJ, Hoffmann LJ, Waite LJ
Times 17-Mar-1994, Independent 03-Mar-1994, [1994] EWCA Civ 10, [1994] 1 WLR 1535, [1994] 2 FCR 1055, [1994] 1 FLR 775
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRadmacher v Granatino CA 2-Jul-2009
Husband and wife, neither English, had married in England. Beforehand they had signed a prenuptial agreement in Germany agreeing that neither should claim against the other on divorce. The wife appealed against an order to pay a lump sum to the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 April 2021; Ref: scu.84818