The claimant, a transgender chef and food blogger claimed in defamation against the defendant journalist in respect of two tweets. The court now set out to decide the meanings, whether they were defamatory by nature, and whether the serious harm requirement had been met.
Held: ‘Ms Monroe complains of the natural and ordinary meaning. That is not the same as a literal meaning. The literal meaning, that Ms Monroe had herself scrawled on and vandalised a memorial, would be rejected by the reasonable reader, having regard to the context. The reader would see the tweet as having an element of metaphor. But it is, to my mind, an inescapable conclusion that the ordinary reasonable reader of the First Tweet would understand it to mean that Ms Monroe ‘condoned and approved of scrawling on war memorials, vandalising monuments commemorating those who fought for her freedom.’ That is a meaning that emerges clearly enough, making full allowance for everything that seems to me relevant by way of context: the characteristics of Ms Hopkins and Ms Monroe, the nature of Twitter, and the immediately surrounding contextual material on Twitter. ‘

Judges:

Warby J

Citations:

[2017] EWHC 433 (QB), [2017] WLR(D) 188

Links:

Bailii, WLRD

Statutes:

Defamation Act 2013 81

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Fulham (orse Fullam) v Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd and Another CA 1977
A local newspaper circulating in Teesside, where the claimant had been appointed deputy headmaster of a school, published an article in 1973 saying of the claimant that he was a former Roman Catholic priest who had left his parish in the Salford . .
Cited – Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd and Another CA 31-Jan-2008
Whether Statement defamatory at common law
The claimant appealed against a striking out of her claim for defamation on finding that the words did not have the defamatory meaning complained of, namely that she was transgendered or transsexual.
Held: The appeal failed.
Sir Anthony . .
Cited – Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD 26-Jul-2011
The claimant alleged defamation and malicious falsehood in an article published and written by the defendants. She complained that she was said to have fabricated an interview with the second defendant for her book. An interview of sorts had now . .
Cited – Modi and Another v Clarke CA 29-Jul-2011
The claimants, organisers of the Indian Premier cricket League, met with organisations in England seeking to establish a similar league in the Northern Hemisphere. A copy of a note came to the defendant, chairman of the England and Wales Cricket . .
Cited – McAlpine v Bercow QBD 24-May-2013
The claimant alleged defamation in a tweet by the defendant. The court now decided as a preliminary point, the meaning of the words: ‘Why is Lord McAlpine trending? *Innocent face*’. There had been other but widespread (mistaken) allegations against . .
Cited – McAlpine v Bercow QBD 2014
The claimant alleged defamation by the defendant in making a false allegation against him.
Held: The second Jeynes principle does not mean that the court must always choose the least defamatory meaning available. Where there are two possible . .
Cited – Waterson v Lloyd and Another QBD 26-Jul-2013
When looking at a political speech, the court should be careful of over-elaborate analysis. . .
Cited – Simpson v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd CA 26-Jul-2016
When looking for a defamatory meaning, the court should adopt a neutral approach . .
Cited – Dee v Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD 28-Apr-2010
The newspaper sought summary judgment in its defence of the defamation claim. The article labelled the claimant as the world’s worst professional tennis player. The paper said he had no prospect of succeeding once the second article in the same . .
Cited – Barron MP and Another v Vines QBD 29-Apr-2015
The court considered the damages to be awarded afer a libellous television broadcast on Sky TV. The claimants were MPs for Rotherham. There had been a large scale abuse of children, and they had been accused of not responding properly to it by the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 24 March 2022; Ref: scu.581317

The plaintiffs, British Coal Corporation, claim damages for libel against the National Union of Mineworkers (Yorkshire area) and also against one of the union’s senior officials. The alleged libel was published in the ‘Yorkshire Miner’, a monthly magazine distributed by the NUM, and the issue in question was that for April, 1992. The defendants said that the action in defamation could not be brought by the plaintiff because of its public status.

Judges:

French J

Citations:

[1996] EWHC 380 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 31 January 2022; Ref: scu.575313

Complaint of defamation at a private meeting of trustees of a Hindu charity.

Judges:

Sir David Eady

Citations:

[2017] EWHC 183 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 29 January 2022; Ref: scu.574092

Defamation proceedings after divorce.
Sharp LJ said this about the use of dictionaries as a means of deciding the meaning to be given to a statement alleged to be defamatory: ‘The use of dictionaries does not form part of the process of determining the natural and ordinary meaning of words, because what matters is the impression conveyed by the words to the ordinary reader when they are read, and it is this that the judge must identify. As it happened however no harm was done in this case. The judge told counsel during the course of submissions that he had looked at the OED definitions and what they said, so the parties had the opportunity to address him about it; the judge, as he then said, merely used the dictionary definitions as a check, and no more; those definitions were in substance the rival ones contended for by the parties, and in the event, the judge’s ultimate reasoning, not dependent on dictionaries, was sound.’

Judges:

McFarlane,Sharp DBE, LJJ Sir John Laws

Citations:

[2018] EWCA Civ 170, [2018] 1 FCR 763, [2018] EMLR 15, [2019] 2 WLR 1033

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

See Also – Stocker v Stocker CA 24-Mar-2015
Application for leave to appeal . .
Appeal from – Stocker v Stocker QBD 10-Jun-2015
The claimant alleged defamation by his former wife in a post on facebook. The posting and associatedeEmails were said falsely to have accused him of serious abuse, and that the accusations had undermined his relationship with his new partner.
See Also – Stocker v Stocker QBD 29-Jan-2016
Application on pre-trial review . .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Stocker v Stocker SC 3-Apr-2019
The parties had been married and divorced. Mrs S told M S’s new partner on Facebook that he had tried to strangle her and made other allegations. Mrs S now appealed from a finding that she had defamed him. Lord Kerr restated the approach to meaning . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 29 January 2022; Ref: scu.605191

Appeal from strike out of defamation claim, based upon press release by the respondent in a charging announcement. The claim had been struck out on the basis that the words complained of did not have the defamatory meaning alleged.
Held: Dismissed Simon LJ said that the propositions which were made omitted ‘an important principle [namely] . . the context and circumstances of the publication . .’

Judges:

Gross, Simon, Peter Jackson LJJ

Citations:

[2017] EWCA 1529 Civ, [2018] 4 WLR 13, [2018] EMLR 5

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Stocker v Stocker SC 3-Apr-2019
The parties had been married and divorced. Mrs S told M S’s new partner on Facebook that he had tried to strangle her and made other allegations. Mrs S now appealed from a finding that she had defamed him. Lord Kerr restated the approach to meaning . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 29 January 2022; Ref: scu.596085

Judges:

Warby J

Citations:

[2017] EWHC 76 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 29 January 2022; Ref: scu.573625

Judges:

Patten, King, Simon LJJ

Citations:

[2017] EWCA Civ 29

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 29 January 2022; Ref: scu.573609

Sir David Eady
[2016] EWHC 3110 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 27 January 2022; Ref: scu.572349

The claimants alleged defamation, the defendant offered amends, and the court now assessed damages.

Sir David Eady
[2016] EWHC 2761 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 25 January 2022; Ref: scu.570922

The claimant, a Chief Immam, sued in defamation in respect of a broadcast of the Sunday Politics, suggesting that his mosque had served as ‘the venue for a number of extremist speakers and speakers who espouse extremist positions.’ The defendant pleaded justification.
Held: The claim failed: ‘the cumulative effect of [the claimant’s] speeches is consistent with an extremist Salafist Islamist worldview, with positions articulated on the particular issue of jihad that are violently extreme, and these speeches would be regarded by the vast majority of the Muslim community as theologically extreme. ‘

Haddon-Cave J
[2016] EWHC 2688 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 24 January 2022; Ref: scu.570722

Claimant’s application for summary judgment saying that the defence pleadings did not amount to a sufficient defence of the case brought.

Warby J
[2016] EWHC 2704 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 24 January 2022; Ref: scu.570723

Sir David Eady
[2016] EWHC 2332 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 23 January 2022; Ref: scu.569594

Application allowed before criminal court for discovery of complaints documents.

Gazette 30-Sep-1992
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 22 January 2022; Ref: scu.86230

The court discussed the differing responsibilities of the judge and jury in defamation cases: ‘It is not, however, open to the judge to say that the words do bear a defamatory meaning, that is for the jury, but the jury must have evidence upon which they can found their verdict and if there is no evidence upon which they can find that the words were not defamatory, or if it can be conclusively proved that they have not exercised any reasonable discretion at all, an Appellate Court may grant a new trial.’

Sankey LJ
(1928) 44 TLR 339
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Safeway Stores Plc v Albert Tate CA 18-Dec-2000
The respondent, a neighbour of the claimant, had fallen into dispute with the claimant, and issued a leaflet and signs alleging fraud. The claimants obtained an injunction, and in the absence of a substantive defence, judgement. He claimed that the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 22 January 2022; Ref: scu.182788

The claimant had been convicted of the murder of his girlfriend. On his acquittal on appeal, the police criticised the CPS decision not to retry the claimant, in effect, the claimant now said, continuing the accusation against him, and so defaming him. The defendant pleaded justification.
Held: The prosecution case rested in substantial part on now discredited evidence that the deceased was carrying a bag when last seen, which bag had later been found with the claimant, and ‘while it is possible that Mr Bento killed Kamila, the balance of probabilities is that he did not and that she committed suicide. The defence of justification therefore fails.’
As to qualified privilege, no case had been found where this had been sought for a statement by one public body as to the actions of anoher. The defence of qualified privilege failed.
Judgment was given for the claimant in the sum of andpound;125,000.

Bean J
[2012] EWHC 1525 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Not followed – Halford v Brookes CA 1991
The plaintiff, the mother and administratrix of the estate of a 16 year old girl, alleged that her daughter had been murdered by one or both of the Defendants. The claim was for damages for battery. Rougier J at first instance had decided that: . .
Cited – In re H and R (Minors) (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) HL 14-Dec-1995
Evidence allowed – Care Application after Abuse
Children had made allegations of serious sexual abuse against their step-father. He was acquitted at trial, but the local authority went ahead with care proceedings. The parents appealed against a finding that a likely risk to the children had still . .
Cited – AN, Regina (on the Application of) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region) and others CA 21-Dec-2005
The appellant was detained under section 37 of the 1983 Act as a mental patient with a restriction under section 41. He sought his release.
Held: The standard of proof in such applications remained the balance of probabilities, but that . .
Cited – In re D; Doherty, Re (Northern Ireland); Life Sentence Review Commissioners v D HL 11-Jun-2008
The Sentence Review Commissioners had decided not to order the release of the prisoner, who was serving a life sentence. He had been released on licence from a life sentence and then committed further serious sexual offences against under-age girls . .
Approved – Alexander v Arts Council of Wales QBD 20-Jul-2000
A representative of the Arts Council of Wales was held to have been protected by qualified privilege in making statements at a press conference held to explain the Council’s refusal of a particular application for arts funding, and after the . .
Cited – Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and others HL 28-Oct-1999
Fair Coment on Political Activities
The defendant newspaper had published articles wrongly accusing the claimant, the former Prime Minister of Ireland of duplicity. The paper now appealed, saying that it should have had available to it a defence of qualified privilege because of the . .
Doubted – Bhatt v Chelsea and Westminster NHS Trust QBD 16-Oct-1997
The defendant trust’s press officer had issued information to the press which was defamatory of the claimant in response to inquiries from the press indicating that articles based on the claimant’s criticisms of the trust were about to be published. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.459899

Mr Hartley operated a news agency, and provided to the publisher of the Sunday Mirror, MGN Ltd, allegations of racism that had been levelled at the claimant company by former employees. The allegations were reported in an article headed ”KKK chants’ and racist abuse claim at top firm But recruitment bosses fight 3 black workers’ tribunal case’. The claimant sued the defendant, but not MGN, and sought to strike out the defendant’s claims of qualified privilege and abuse of process. The employees substantially withdrew their allegations. Apologies had been forwarded and printed. The defendant now argued that the action was being pursued by the claimant only to avoid a costs order.
Held: The continued action was to be stayed as an abuse. The only human rights element at issue, given that the claimant was a company, was the defendant’s Article 10 right of freedom of speech. The company had discontinued its claim against the newspaper anticipatng a Reynold’s defence. The main action being settled, there was now no prospect of any continued claim recovering anything beyond nominal damages, and a judgment could not significantly add to the vindication already given in the public statement.
The Reynolds defence might be available to someone who contributed to the publication of a newspaper article: The Defendant’s practice, which he followed in this case, is to seek to filter out stories which are obviously false, and to forward them on to another journalist to be given further investigation. . . The Defendant does not assume all the tasks that would have to be performed before publication to the world at large could be held to be responsible journalism. For example, he does not check the story with the subject of the story whom might be defamed. He has established relationships with other journalists. He does not publish to the world at large, and his understanding with the journalists to whom he does publish stories is that they, or the organisations for which they work, will carry out the tasks necessary to be performed if publication to the world is to be counted as responsible journalism. He published the words complained of to the Journalist and through him to MGN on that understanding. They agreed that MGN would need to take legal advice. He was justified by events: MGN did publish to the world, and they did so in a form which met the requirement of responsible journalism.
it is not necessary for the Defendant to have acted as if he was the person who made the publication to the world at large. He acted responsibly in confining his publication to one publishee in the circumstances and on the understanding set out above. That is sufficient. The Strasbourg Court has recognised the need to give protection to sources in the different context of disclosure of sources. But the same principles require Reynolds privilege to be afforded to at least an intermediate source such as the Defendant. See Financial Times v UK Application no 821/03 [2009] ECHR 2065 59′ and ‘ it is necessary to consider what might have happened if the corporate defendant D1 had succeeded, on the basis that (acting through its representatives) it had satisfied the requirements of responsible journalism. Suppose the individual defendants worked on the story performing different roles, so that only one of the individual defendants D2 had taken steps to verify the information and sought comment from the subject of the story, while the other D3 had done neither of these things, but had confined himself to receiving information from the source or sources. The appeals of D1 and D2 would then have succeeded. Would the appeal of D3 failed? My provisional view is that that would be contrary to the principles that the House of Lords was formulating. I see no principle on the basis of which each defendant has individually to satisfy all the criteria for responsible journalism, regardless of whether he is one of a number of individuals contributing to the final publication in circumstances where the roles are shared out or the tasks distributed. If that provisional view is right, the next question arising is: would it make any difference if D3 was not employed by D1, but freelance, or if (like the Defendant) he was providing a service to the source?
That as it seems to me is the question that is raised in this case. This is a point which is an important one and may be fact sensitive.’

Tugendhat J
[2010] EWHC 1068 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Collins Stewart Ltd and Another v The Financial Times Ltd QBD 25-Feb-2005
The court considered whether damages in a defamation action pursued in respect of one publication were to be increased by subsequent publications not themselves the subject of a claim. . .
Cited – Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd CA 1977
Claims for Collateral Purpose treated as abuse
The plaintiff commenced proceedings for damages for libel and an injunction against the publishers, the editors and the main distributors of Private Eye. In addition, he issued writs against a large number of other wholesale and retail distributors . .
Cited – Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl HL 11-Oct-2006
The House was asked as to the capacity of a limited company to sue for damage to its reputation, where it had no trading activity within the jurisdiction, and as to the extent of the Reynolds defence. The defendants/appellants had published an . .
Cited – Dow Jones and Co Inc v Jameel CA 3-Feb-2005
Presumption of Damage in Defamation is rebuttable
The defendant complained that the presumption in English law that the victim of a libel had suffered damage was incompatible with his right to a fair trial. They said the statements complained of were repetitions of statements made by US . .
Mentioned – Duke of Brunswick v Harmer QBD 2-Nov-1849
On 19 September 1830 an article was published in the Weekly Dispatch. The limitation period for libel was six years. The article defamed the Duke of Brunswick. Seventeen years after its publication an agent of the Duke purchased a back number . .
Cited – In re Majory, a debtor CA 1955
The debtor challenged the bankruptcy petition and receiving order saying that the creditor had attempted in connection with the proceedings to extort andpound;8 15s from the debtor in excess of the sums lawfully due under a court judgment. He said . .
Cited – Shackleton v Swift CA 1913
The Act gave special protection to officers and others acting under its powers in cases where, although they might have misconstrued the Act, and although they might have done things which they had no jurisdiction to do, they had acted in good faith . .
Cited – McManus and others v Beckham CA 4-Jul-2002
The claimant sought damages from the defendant who was a pop star, and had vociferously, publicly, and wrongly accused the claimant of selling pictures with fake autographs of her husband. The defendant obtained an order striking out the claim on . .
Cited – Dee v Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD 28-Apr-2010
The newspaper sought summary judgment in its defence of the defamation claim. The article labelled the claimant as the world’s worst professional tennis player. The paper said he had no prospect of succeeding once the second article in the same . .

Cited by:
Cited – Lewis v Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis and Others (Rev 1) QBD 31-Mar-2011
The defendant sought a ruling on the meaning of the words but using section 69(4) of the 1981 Act. The claimant solicitor was acting in complaints as to the unlawful interception of celebrity voicemails by agents of the press. There had been debate . .
Cited – Citation Plc v Ellis Whittam Ltd CA 8-Mar-2013
The parties competed in providing employment law services. The claimant complained of slanderous comments said to have been made by the defendant in discussions with a firm of solicitors seeking to select a firm. The claimant now appealed against . .
Cited – Economou v De Freitas QBD 27-Jul-2016
Failed action for defamation on rape allegations
The claimant had been accused by the defendant’s daughter of rape. He was never charged but sought to prosecute her alleging intent to pervert the course of justice. She later killed herself. The defendant sought to have the inquest extended to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.415097

Green J
[2016] EWHC 1775 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd SC 20-Feb-2019
The Court was asked in what circumstances is it permissible to sue an unnamed defendant? The respondent was injured when her car collided with another. The care was insured but by a driver giving a false name. The car owner refused to identify him. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 10 January 2022; Ref: scu.567069

The Court heard preliminary issues both as to the defamatory meaning of the words used and as to whether publication of those words had caused or was likely to cause serious harm pursuant to s.1 (1) of the 2013 Act.
Held: Following Cooke and Lachaux: ‘Depending on the circumstances of the case, the claimant may be able to satisfy s.1 without calling any evidence, by relying on the inferences of serious harm to reputation properly to be drawn from the level of the defamatory meaning of the words and the nature and extent of their publication . . It is important to bear in mind that s.1 is essentially a threshold requirement, intended by Parliament to weed out those undeserving libel claims otherwise technically viable, but which do not involve actual serious harm to reputation or likely serious harm to reputation in the future. Once that threshold has been passed, no useful purpose is served at this early stage of the proceedings by going on to consider evidence which is really material only to the quantum of damage if liability is proved.’
He later observed that the body of evidence, which included oral evidence, adduced before him in terms of whether the case crossed the threshold of serious harm ‘neither adds nor subtracts very much from the inference one would normally draw from the fact of publication in a case of this kind.’ He pointed out that under s.1(1) pecuniary loss is not a requirement for an individual claimant. He was concerned that the present case demonstrated a ‘further escalation’ in the conduct of such hearings, at huge cost: ‘In the result, the hearing of evidence has added little or nothing to the conclusions that an experienced defamation judge would have drawn simply from reading the email and considering the agreed distribution list.
The reason for this is that s.1 sets a threshold test; and the threshold is simply that there shall have been serious harm to reputation. Once that level is passed, further evidence goes to quantum only. Throughout this trial, my sense has been that that distinction was in danger of becoming blurred or lost sight of.
Assuming this action now goes to a final trial, there is a likelihood that there will be a wasteful duplication of evidence and cross-examination already carried out before me and/or that the ultimate trial judge will be vexed with submissions about what has or has not been determined in the course of this phase of the trial.’

Judge Moloney QC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
[2015] EWHC 3769 (QB)
Bailii
Defamation Act 2013 1
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd QBD 30-Jul-2015
The claimant brought defamation claims as to articles making allegations said to imply that the claimant had mistreated his wife. The defendant contended that, while inferences might sometimes suffice, s.1 (1) nevertheless required a claimant to . .
Cited – Cooke and Another v MGN Ltd and Another QBD 13-Aug-2014
The claimants made a television programme about the lives of people on benefits. The defendant published an article critical of many, and included a statement ‘Three more homes in the road where residents claim they have been portrayed as scroungers . .

Cited by:
Approved – Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (1) CA 12-Sep-2017
Defamation – presumption of damage after 2013 Act
The claimant said that the defendant had published defamatory statements which were part of a campaign of defamation brought by his former wife. The court now considered the requirement for substantiality in the 2013 Act.
Held: The defendant’s . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 09 January 2022; Ref: scu.558749

Claim for alleged defamation in TV programme.

Haddon-Cave J
[2015] EWHC 2917 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 07 January 2022; Ref: scu.556486

Libel claim brought by a member of the boyband group One Direction, in respect of articles published in the Daily Star and on the Daily Star website and on what was described as the Daily Star YouTube channel. Mr Horan claims that the articles were defamatory of him because, either in their natural and ordinary meaning or by way of true innuendo, ‘the articles meant and were understood to mean that during an evening spent with Justin Bieber and Cody Simpson the Claimant had used hard drugs, namely crystal meth or crack’. The defendants denied that the words bore the meanings claimed. The court now heard an application as to whether the words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning (not whether the meaning was so carried).
Held: ‘the statement is capable of having the meaning attributed to it in the Particulars of Claim, and that the statement is capable of being defamatory of the Claimant.’

Dingemans J
[2015] EWHC 3550 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 07 January 2022; Ref: scu.556488

Extra Division – Inner House

Lady Dorran
[2015] ScotCS CSIH – 55, 2015 GWD 23-410, 2015 SLT 501
Bailii
Scotland

Defamation

Updated: 02 January 2022; Ref: scu.550104

Sir David Eady
[2015] EWHC 1839 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 01 January 2022; Ref: scu.549564

The newspaper had been sued in defamation, and it had been agreed that a statement would be made. The parties however differed as to the form of statement to be read out in court.
Held: The appeal failed: ‘The allegation complained of is that the claimant had given a knowingly false account of her time as a single mother in which she falsely and inexcusably accused her fellow churchgoers of behaving badly towards her. This pleaded meaning is accurately and unambiguously set out in the draft statement, where, as can be seen, it is stated in terms that this is what the article alleged (defined as ‘the Allegations’). It is plain beyond sensible argument, as Mr Rushbrooke QC for the claimant submits, that anyone hearing the statement being read, or reading it could be in no doubt that this is the meaning complained of. Nor would such a notional third party be misled as to the defendant’s position. A later passage from the unilateral statement, about which the defendant does not complain, expressly records that the defendant accepts as ‘completely false and indefensible’ ‘the Allegations’ i.e. the accurately recorded pleaded meaning. The premise of the defendant’s argument on this appeal is therefore a flawed one.’

Longmore, Ryder, Sharp LJJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 488
Bailii
Defamation Act 1996 3
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Winslet v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 3-Nov-2009
The parties had compromised a defamation claim with an offer of amends, but the claimant wished to read out a statement in accordance with the rules, being unhappy with the apology offered. The defendant objected, saying that she had no entitlement . .
Appeal from – Murray v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 15-Apr-2014
Application to read unilateral statement in satisfaction of defamation claim.
Held: It follows from the terms of section 3 of the 1996 Act that the court should not regard as normal an oral hearing of submissions by a defendant that a claimant . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.546825

The claimant, a litigant in person, was absent from the hearing of a defamation action arising from a dispute between the parties in their capacities as committee members of the Crawley Boxing Club.
Held: The court gave its reasons for refusing to vacate the hearing.

Warby J
[2015] EWHC 1170 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd QBD 1-Apr-2015
The claimant alleged defamation by the three defendant news organisations. The defendants now sought trial of certain preliminary issues, and particularly whether the claimant had suffered any serious harm to his reputation.
Held: The court . .

Cited by:
Cited – Barron and Others v Collins MEP QBD 22-Dec-2016
The defendant MEP had had adjourned the claim against her for defamation, claiming that her actions has been as an MEP and therefore exempt from proceedings. The chair of the European Parliament Legal Affairs Committee had received and rejected her . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.546269

Trial of preliminary issue as to meaning of the words complaned of.

Sir Michael Tugendhat
[2014] EWHC 3823 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 24 December 2021; Ref: scu.539346

Remedies after judgment in default, defendants being in breach of unless order and debarred from defending

Sir David Eady
[2014] EWHC B24 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.538723

The claimant, a doctor, alleged defamation by the newspaper. The paper had said that the doctor had without cause reported a patient as having drinking problems to the DVLA resuling in the suspension of his driving licence. The court was now asked as to the meaings of the published article.

Dingemans
[2014] EWHC 3137 (QB)
Bailii

Defamation

Updated: 22 December 2021; Ref: scu.537356

Action for defamation struck out after repeated failure by claimants to comply with court orders.

Sharp DBE J
[2010] EWHC 3144 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal From – Hayden and Another v Charlton CA 7-Jul-2011
Appeal from order striking out defamation claims for failure to comply with court orders. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 20 December 2021; Ref: scu.426915

[1998] EWCA Civ 1
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – McDonald’s Corporation, McDonald’s Restaurants Limited v Helen Marie Steel, David Morris QBD 19-Jun-1997
(Summary of judgment) . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 18 December 2021; Ref: scu.143479

[2014] EWHC 2361 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 17 December 2021; Ref: scu.534432

Tugendhat J
[2014] EWHC 1518 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 03 December 2021; Ref: scu.525805

Bean J
[2014] EWHC 1226 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 03 December 2021; Ref: scu.525162

[2014] EWHC 130 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 29 November 2021; Ref: scu.521124

Application for order for specific disclosure against the appellant third party.

Tugendhat J
[2013] EWHC 4012 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 27 November 2021; Ref: scu.519230

The claimant sought damages in defamation against the defendant in respect of its web-site. It said that the use of hyperlinks to third party sites was sufficient to identify the claimant and associate it with the allegations made.
Held: The words complained of were capable of being taken as references to the claimant. A reader clicking on the link given would be capable of making the connection between those referred to in the two articles.

Tugendhat J
[2010] EWHC 2011 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Hird v Wood CA 1894
A defamatory placard was placed at the side of the road. The defendant sat by it, pointing it out to passers by, but there was no direct evidence as to who had placed the placard there.
Held: This was evidence of his publishing it. . .
Cited – Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd and Another CA 31-Jan-2008
Whether Statement defamatory at common law
The claimant appealed against a striking out of her claim for defamation on finding that the words did not have the defamatory meaning complained of, namely that she was transgendered or transsexual.
Held: The appeal failed.
Sir Anthony . .
Cited – Crookes v Wikimedia Foundation Inc 27-Oct-2008
(Supreme Court of British Columbia) The claimant sought damages in defamation from an article published by the defendant on the internet. The court was asked whether the contents of an article to which a hyper-link was provided should be taken into . .
Cited – Ali v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 27-Jan-2010
The claimant sought damages in defamation, saying that a combination of publications identified him.
Held: Eady J briefly discussed the effect of hyperlinks in the context of a dispute about meaning or reference in a defamation case. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 12 November 2021; Ref: scu.421262

Public Interest Discussion Can Excuse Defamation

The right of free discussion on a subject of public interest excuses the pubication of defamatory matter, provided it appears to have been published not in that unfair or improper spirit – that is in the spirit of intemperate and inconsiderate imputation, which implies malice in a legal sense – but in the spirit of fair discussion. And the right of free discussion extends to comments in a journal upon sworn evidence given on a subject of public interest, even to the extent of imputing that such evidence is unfounded, or even unfounded or careless, but if it is imputed, apparently without any fair foundation, that it is wilfully, ‘maliciously,’ or ‘recklessly’ false, then there is an excess, which is evidence of what the law deems malice, and which takes away the protection or excuse arising from the exercise of the right of free discussion.

Cockburn CJ
[1865] EngR 23, (1865) 4 F and F 225, (1865) 176 ER 541
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Dee v Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD 28-Apr-2010
The newspaper sought summary judgment in its defence of the defamation claim. The article labelled the claimant as the world’s worst professional tennis player. The paper said he had no prospect of succeeding once the second article in the same . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.280935

The defendant wrote to their customers saying ‘Henty and Sons hereby give notice that they will not receive in payment cheques drawn on any of the branches of the Capital and Counties Bank.’ The contents of the circular became known and there was a run on the bank. The bank claimed they had been defamed.
Held: The plaintiff’s appeal failed. In their natural meaning the words were not capable in law of being defamatory. Lord Selborne LC said: ‘The test, according to the authorities, is, whether under the circumstances in which the writing was published, reasonable men, to whom the publication was made, would be likely to understand it in a libellous sense.’
It was held that there was no case to go to the jury. Lord Blackburn said: ‘1. The plaintiffs are bankers, and the defendants are brewers. 2. The defendants falsely and maliciously wrote and published of the plaintiffs the letter following: ‘Messrs. Henty and Sons hereby give notice that they will not receive in payment cheques drawn on any of the branches of the Capital and Counties Bank (late the Hampshire and North Wilts). Westgate, Chichester, 2nd December, 1878.’ Meaning thereby that the plaintiffs were not to be relied upon to meet the cheques drawn on them, and that their position was such that they were not to be trusted to cash the cheques of their customers.’ and
‘In construing the words to see whether they are a libel, the Court is, where nothing is alleged to give them an extended sense, to put that meaning on them which the words would be understood by ordinary persons to bear, and say whether the words so understood are calculated to convey an injurious imputation. The question is not whether the defendant intended to convey that imputation; for if he, without excuse or justification, did what he knew or ought to have known was calculated to injure the plaintiff, he must (at least civilly) be responsible for the consequences, though his object might have been to injure another person than the plaintiff, or though he may have written in levity only. As was said in the opinion of the judges delivered in the House of Lords during the discussion of Fox’s Bill, I think quite justly, no one can cast about firebrands and death, and then escape from being responsible by saying he was in sport. ‘ Applying the principle to the facts: ‘There can be no doubt that the defendants were not required to take cheques drawn on this bank . . and had a right to refuse to do so. No reason was needed to justify such a refusal . . there are so many reasons why a person may refuse to take on account the cheques drawn on a particular bank, that . . the Court could not say that the letter, which in terms goes no further than merely to state the fact, was libellous, as tending to impute a doubt of the credit of the bank. No doubt some people might guess that the refusal was on that ground, but . . it is unreasonable that when there are a number of good interpretations, the only bad one should be seized upon to give a defamatory sense to the document. I do not think it libellous by itself to state the fact.’

Lord Selborne LC, Lord Blackburn
(1882) 7 App Cas 741
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Russell v Stubbs Limited HL 1913
The plaintiff said that the defendants, publishers of a trade magazine providing inter alia credit references, had slandered it. The defendants appealed against an order requiring it to provide details of others to whom the slander had been . .
Cited – Mccann v Scottish Media Newspapers Ltd SCS 18-Feb-1999
Three articles which appeared in one edition of a newspaper had to be read together and treated as ‘constituting a whole’ for the purposes of determining meaning, where the first ended with a cross-reference to the second, and the second ended with . .
Cited – Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe Sas v Asda Stores Ltd QBD 15-Jul-2009
ajinomoto_asdaQBD2009
The claimant said that the defendant’s characterisation of its own products as ‘Good for You’ by reference to a description saying that it did not include the claimant’s product as a component, was a malicious falsehood. The defendant sold other . .
Cited – Berkoff v Burchill and and Times Newspapers Limited CA 31-Jul-1996
The plaintiff actor said that an article by the defendant labelling him ugly was defamatory. The defendant denied that the words were defamatory.
Held: It is for the jury to decide in what context the words complained of were used and whether . .
Cited – Rhodes v OPO and Another SC 20-May-2015
The mother sought to prevent a father from publishing a book about her child’s life. It was to contain passages she said may cause psychological harm to the 12 year old son. Mother and son lived in the USA and the family court here had no . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.236346

Bane and Antidote Doctrine – Take them as One

The court considered the bane and antidote doctrine in defamation. B Alderson said: ‘But the question here is, whether the matter be slanderous or not, which is a question of the Jury; who are to take the whole together and say whether the result of the whole is calculated to injure Plaintiffs character. In one part of this publication something disreputable to the Plaintiff is stated but that is removed by the conclusion: the bane and the antidote must be taken together.’

B Alderson
[1835] 2 Cr MandR 156, [1835] EngR 38, (1835) 2 CrM and R 156, (1835) 150 ER 67
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd and others QBD 14-Oct-2005
The court decided the issue of what meaning the words complained of would have been understood to bear. The ordinary reader of an article may well not think in legalistic terms such as ‘strong grounds to suspect’ or ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ . .
Cited – Charleston and Another v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Another HL 31-Mar-1995
The plaintiffs were actors playing Harold and Madge Bishop in the Australian soap series ‘Neighbours’. They sued on a tabloid newspaper article which showed their faces superimposed on the near-naked bodies of models apparently engaged in sexual . .
Cited – Curistan v Times Newspapers Ltd CA 30-Apr-2008
The court considered the availability of qualified privilege for reporting of statements made in parliament and the actionable meaning of the article, which comprised in part those statements and in part other factual material representing the . .
Cited – Stern v Piper and Others CA 21-May-1996
The defendant newspaper said that allegations had been made against the plaintiff that he was not paying his debts. In their defence they pleaded justification and the fact that he was being sued for debt.
Held: A defamation was not to be . .
Cited – Dee v Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD 28-Apr-2010
The newspaper sought summary judgment in its defence of the defamation claim. The article labelled the claimant as the world’s worst professional tennis player. The paper said he had no prospect of succeeding once the second article in the same . .
Cited – Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe Sas v Asda Stores Ltd CA 2-Jun-2010
The claimant sold a sweetener ingredient. The defendant shop advertised its own health foods range with the label ‘no hidden nasties’ and in a situation which, the claimant said, suggested that its ingredient was a ‘nasty’, and it claimed under . .
Cited – Caplin v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 20-Jun-2011
The defendant sought clarification through the court as to the meanings inherent in the words complained of.
Held: The application failed. ‘I do not consider the ordinary reasonable reader would be perverse to conclude that the suspicions . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.199770

The court should decide on whether an article is ‘fact or comment’ purely by reference to the article itself, and not taking into account any of the earlier background coverage. It is the obligation of the relevant commentator to make clear that the content of his or her communication is comment rather than fact. As to the need to set out the matter commented on: ‘if the court is not entitled to look at the material on which it is alleged that the words complained of were commenting, it would unduly restrict the defence of fair comment. Indeed, it would diminish and impair this vitally important right, by whittling it down by a wholly unjustified legal refinement. If the criticism of an article published in a newspaper on a subject matter of public importance is to be confined to passages actually set out in the criticism, then the freedom to comment on a matter of public importance becomes, from a practical point of view, illusory or non-existent. The ability of a defendant to comment should not depend on whether or not the reader is aware of the material which is the subject of the comment. ‘

Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Templeman, Lord Ackner, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton
[1992] 2 AC 343, [1992] UKHL 2
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Telnikoff v Matusevitch CA 1991
The court considered the element of malice in a defamation defence: ‘If a piece of evidence is equally consistent with malice and the absence of malice, it cannot as a matter of law provide evidence on which the jury could find malice. The judge . .
At first instance – Telnikoff v Matusevitch 24-May-1989
The plaintiff claimed in libel. Drake J upheld a submission that there was no case to go before the jury, in respect that (1) any reasonable jury properly directed would be bound to sustain the defence of fair comment, and (2) there was no evidence . .
Cited – Merivale v Carson CA 1887
A published criticism of a play made reference to one of the characters being ‘a naughty wife’, though in fact there was no adulterous wife in the play.
Held: The defence of fair comment is open to a commentator however prejudiced he might be, . .
Cited – Merivale v Carson CA 1887
A published criticism of a play made reference to one of the characters being ‘a naughty wife’, though in fact there was no adulterous wife in the play.
Held: The defence of fair comment is open to a commentator however prejudiced he might be, . .
Cited – Kemsley v Foot HL 25-Feb-1952
Fair Comment Crticism of Newspaper Publisher
The plaintiff alleged that the headline to an article written by the defendant which criticised the behaviour of the Beaverbrook Press, and which read ‘Lower than Kemsley’ was defamatory. The defendant pleaded fair comment. The plaintiff appealed. . .
Cited – Chernesky v Armadale Publishers Ltd 1978
(Supreme Court of Canada) The defendants were the editor and the owner and publisher of a newspaper which had published a letter to the editor in which the writers accused the plaintiff of holding racist views. The writers of the letter did not give . .
Cited – Lyon v The Daily Telegraph Ltd CA 1943
Scott LJ said: ‘The reason why, once a plea of fair comment is established, there is no libel, is that it is in the public interest to have free discussion of matters of public interest.’ and ‘It [the right of fair comment] is one of the fundamental . .
Cited – Turner v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (MGM) HL 1950
A letter was published which criticised a film critic’s review of the week’s films.
Held: A person (including a corporation) whose character or conduct has been attacked is entitled to answer the attack, and the answer will be protected by . .
Cited – Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd CA 1968
Courts to Settle upon a single meaning if disputed
The ‘single meaning’ rule adopted in the law of defamation is in one sense highly artificial, given the range of meanings the impugned words sometimes bear. The law of defamation ‘has passed beyond redemption by the courts’. Where in a libel action . .
Cited – Broadway Approvals Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd (No 2) CA 1965
A company’s mind is not to be assessed on the totality of knowledge of its employees. Malice was not to be established by forensic imagination however eloquently and subtly expressed.
Russell LJ said: ‘the law of libel seems to have . .

Cited by:
Cited – Keays v Guardian Newspapers Limited, Alton, Sarler QBD 1-Jul-2003
The claimant asserted defamation by the defendant. The parties sought a decision on whether the article at issue was a comment piece, in which case the defendant could plead fair comment, or one asserting fact, in which case that defence would not . .
Cited – Keays v Guardian Newspapers Limited, Alton, Sarler QBD 1-Jul-2003
The claimant asserted defamation by the defendant. The parties sought a decision on whether the article at issue was a comment piece, in which case the defendant could plead fair comment, or one asserting fact, in which case that defence would not . .
Cited – Alexander v Arts Council of Wales CA 9-Apr-2001
In a defamation action, where the judge considered that, taken at their highest, the allegations made by the claimant would be insufficient to establish the claim, he could grant summary judgment for the defence. If the judge considered that a . .
Cited – Associated Newspapers Ltd v Burstein CA 22-Jun-2007
The newspaper appealed an award of damages for defamation after its theatre critic’s review of an opera written by the claimant. The author said the article made him appear to sympathise with terrorism.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Keene LJ . .
Cited – Bray v Deutsche Bank Ag QBD 12-Jun-2008
A former employee of the defendant bank sued in defamation after the bank published a press release about its results which he said was critical of him.
Held: Where there is a real issue as to whether the words are defamatory of the claimant, . .
Cited – Henderson v London Borough of Hackney and Another QBD 5-Jul-2010
The claimant alleged defamation by the defendant in a referral letter sent to a third party. She had been dismissed from a non-teaching post after having been found using school computers to access pornography. The letter had reported the findings . .
Cited – Spiller and Another v Joseph and Others SC 1-Dec-2010
The defendants had published remarks on its website about the reliability of the claimant. When sued in defamation, they pleaded fair comment, but that was rejected by the Court of Appeal.
Held: The defendants’ appeal succeeded, and the fair . .
Cited – Tilbrook v Parr QBD 13-Jul-2012
The claimant, chair of a political party, the English Democrats, said that a blog written and published on the Internet by the defendant was defamatory and contained malicious falsehoods. The blog was said to associate the claimant’s party with . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.184403

Qualified Privilege of Bona Fide Words Under Duty

The defence of qualified privilege arises where the statement in question was bona fide and without malicious intent to injure: ‘In general, an action lies for the malicious publication of statements which are false in fact, and injurious to the character of another (within the well-known limits as to verbal slander), and the law considers such publication as malicious, unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned. In such cases, the occasion prevents the inference of malice, which the law draws from unauthorised communications, and affords a qualified defence depending upon the absence of actual malice. If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the right to make them within any narrow limits.’

Parke B
(1834) 1 CM and R 181, [1834] EngR 363, (1834) 1 CrM and R 181, (1834) 149 ER 1044
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Downtex v Flatley CA 2-Oct-2003
The claimants sought damages for defamation and breach of contract. The claimants had purchased a business from the defendant, which contract included a clause requiring the defendant to say nothing damaging about the business. The defendant . .
Cited – Loveless v Earl; Capital and Counties (Financial Services) Limited CA 4-Nov-1998
When a defendant claimed qualified privilege and the Plaintiff alleged that the words complained of were issued with malice, the defendant will not prevented from reliance on qualified privilege if it can show that the words have an honestly . .
Cited – Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and others HL 28-Oct-1999
Fair Coment on Political Activities
The defendant newspaper had published articles wrongly accusing the claimant, the former Prime Minister of Ireland of duplicity. The paper now appealed, saying that it should have had available to it a defence of qualified privilege because of the . .
Cited – Watts v Times Newspapers Ltd, Neil, Palmer and Schilling and Lom CA 28-Jul-1995
The plaintiff author had claimed damages for defamation, saying that he had been accused of plagiarism. An apology had been given in the form requested – no qualified privilege. The plaintiff brought an associated case against his lawyer, saying . .
Cited – Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Limited (No 2) CA 12-Mar-2001
The defendants appealed against a refusal to allow them to amend their pleadings. They wished to include allegations as to matters which were unknown to the journalist at the time of publication.
Held: It is necessary for the defendants to . .
Cited – Clift v Slough Borough Council and Another QBD 6-Jul-2009
clift_sloughQBD09
The claimant sought damages for defamation. The council had decided that she had threatened a member of staff and notified various people, and entered her name on a violent persons register. She alleged malice, the council pleaded justification and . .
Cited – Clift v Slough Borough Council CA 21-Dec-2010
The court was asked how, if at all, the Human Rights Act 1998 has affected a local authority’s defence of qualified privilege in defamation cases. The claimant had been placed on the Council’s Violent Persons Register after becoming very upset and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.186628

Dingemans J considered the effect of s 1 of the 201 Act: ‘first, a claimant must now establish, in addition to the requirements of the common law relating to defamatory statements, that the statement complained of has in fact caused or is likely to cause serious harm to his reputation. ‘Serious’ is an ordinary word in common usage. Section 1 requires the claimant to prove as a fact, on the balance of probabilities, that the statement complained of has caused or will probably cause serious harm to the claimant’s reputation. It should be noted that unless serious harm to reputation can be established an injury to feelings alone, however grave, will not be sufficient.
Secondly it is open to the claimant to call evidence in support of his case on serious harm and it is open to the defendant to call evidence to demonstrate that no serious harm has occurred or is likely to do so. However, a Court determining the issue of serious harm is, as in all cases, entitled to draw inferences based on the admitted evidence. Mass media publications of very serious defamatory allegations are likely to render the need for evidence of serious harm unnecessary. This does not mean that the issue of serious harm is a ‘numbers game’. Reported cases have shown that very serious harm to a reputation can be caused by the publication of a defamatory statement to one person.
Thirdly there are obvious difficulties in getting witnesses to say that they read the words and thought badly of the claimant, compare Ames v The Spamhouse Project [2015] EWHC 127 (QB) . . This is because the claimant will have an understandable desire not to spread the contents of the article complained of by asking persons if they have read it and what they think of the claimant, and because persons who think badly of the claimant are not likely to co-operate in providing evidence.
Fourthly, where there are publications about the same subject matter which are not the subject of complaint (because of limitation issues or because of jurisdictional issues) there can be difficult points of causation which arise: see Tesla Motors v BBC [2013] EWCA (Civ) 152 and Karpov v Browder and others [2013] EMLR 3071 (QB); [2014] EMLR 8. The decision of the House of Lords in Associated Newspapers v Dingle [1964] AC 371 does not prevent these difficulties. That decision was not a decision on causation. The decision in Dingle prevents a defendant from relying in mitigation of damages for libel on the fact that the same or similar defamatory material has been published in other newspapers about the same claimant. Dingle does not address the issue of whether a publication has caused serious harm.
Fifthly, as Bingham LJ stated in Slipper v BBC [1991] QB 283 at 300, the law would part company with the realities of life if it held that the damage caused by publication of a libel began and ended with publication to the original publishee. Defamatory statements are objectionable not least because of their propensity ‘to percolate through underground channels and contaminate hidden springs’ through what has sometimes been called ‘the grapevine effect’. . . ‘

Dingemans J
[2016] EWHC 66 (QB), [2016] EMLR 12
Bailii
Defamation Act 2013 1
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Economou v De Freitas QBD 27-Jul-2016
Failed action for defamation on rape allegations
The claimant had been accused by the defendant’s daughter of rape. He was never charged but sought to prosecute her alleging intent to pervert the course of justice. She later killed herself. The defendant sought to have the inquest extended to . .
Cited – Turley v Unite The Union and Another QBD 19-Dec-2019
Defamation of Labour MP by Unite and Blogger
The claimant now a former MP had alleged that a posting on a website supported by the first defendant was false and defamatory. The posting suggested that the claimant had acted dishonestly in applying online for a category of membership of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.559169

The plaintiff complained of an alleged slander spoken at a meeting of the Town Council. The council meeting was an occasion attracting qualified privilege. The judge at trial found that the councillor honestly believed that what he had said in the meeting was true but he had become so anxious to have the other councillor removed from a Committee that he did not consider fairly and objectively whether the evidence he had in his possession justified his conclusions or comments. It followed that the statements were published maliciously and the defence of qualified privilege failed. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant’s appeal.
Held: The CA decision was upheld. An allegation of malice is a very serious allegation and is generally tantamount to dishonesty. The House considered the circumstances under which a defendant in a defamation case can establish the defence of qualified privilege.
Lord Diplock said: ‘as a general rule English law gives effect to the ninth commandment that a man shall not speak evil falsely of his neighbour. It supplies a temporal sanction: if he cannot prove that defamatory matter which he published was true, he is liable in damages to whomever he has defamed, except where publication is oral only, causes no damage and falls outside the categories of slander actionable per se. The public interest that the law should provide an effective means whereby a man can vindicate his reputation against calumny has nevertheless to be accommodated to the competing public interest in permitting men to communicate frankly and freely with one another about matters in respect of which the law recognises that they have a duty to perform or an interest to protect in doing so. What is published in good faith on matters of these kinds is published on a privileged occasion. It is not actionable even though it be defamatory and turns out to be untrue. With some exceptions which are irrelevant to the instant appeal, the privilege is not absolute but qualified. It is lost if the occasion which gives rise to it is misused. For in all cases of qualified privilege there is some special reason of public policy why the law accords immunity from suit – the existence of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, on the part of the maker of the defamatory statement which justifies his communicating it or of some interest of his own which he is entitled to protect by doing so. If he uses the occasion for some other reason he loses the protection of the privilege.’
Indifference to truth is not to be equated with carelessness, impulsiveness or irrationality in arriving at a positive belief that what is said is true: ‘In ordinary life it is rare indeed for people to form their beliefs by a process of logical deduction from facts ascertained by a rigorous search for all available evidence and a judicious assessment of its probative value. In greater or in less degree according to their temperaments, their training, their intelligence, they are swayed by prejudice, rely on intuition instead of reasoning, leap to conclusions on inadequate evidence and fail to recognise the cogency of material which might cast doubt on the validity of the conclusions they reach. But despite the imperfection of the mental process by which the belief is arrived at it may still be ‘honest’, that is, a positive belief that the conclusions they have reached are true. The law demands no more.’
and
‘The exception is where what is published incorporates defamatory matter that is not really necessary to fulfilment of the particular duty or the protection of the particular interest upon which the privilege is founded. Logically it might be said that such irrelevant matter falls outside the privilege altogether. But if this were so it would involve application by the court of an objective test of relevance to every part of the defamatory matter published on the privileged occasion; whereas, as everyone knows, ordinary human beings vary in their ability to distinguish that which is logically relevant from that which is not and few, apart from lawyers, have had any training which qualifies them to do so. So the protection afforded by the privilege would be illusory if it were lost in respect of any defamatory matter which upon logical analysis could be shown to be irrelevant to the fulfilment of the duty or the protection of the right upon which the privilege was founded . . As regards irrelevant matter the test is not whether it is logically relevant but whether, in all the circumstances, it can be inferred that the defendant either did not believe it to be true or, though believing it to be true, realised that it had nothing to do with the particular duty or interest on which the privilege was based, but nevertheless seized the opportunity to drag in irrelevant defamatory matter to vent his personal spite, or for some other improper motive. Here, too, judges and juries should be slow to draw this inference.’

Lord Diplock
[1975] AC 135, [1974] 1 All ER 662
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Adam v Ward HL 1917
The plaintiff, Major Adam MP, falsely attacked General Scobell in a speech in the House of Commons, thus bringing his charge into the national arena. The Army Council investigated the charge, rejected it and directed their secretary, Sir E Ward, the . .

Cited by:
Cited – Halford v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary, Curtis CA 13-Feb-2003
The claimant appealed orders in favour of the defendant that statements, which he claimed were defamatory, were made in situations attracting qualified privilege. Allegations had been made by his step-children that the claimant had assaulted them. . .
Cited – Branson v Bower QBD 2001
The objective test for fair comment is whether it would be perverse for a jury to hold that the comments are not such that an honest person could express them in the light of the facts known by the Defendants at the date of publication. Hard-hitting . .
Cited – Meade v Pugh and Another QBD 5-Mar-2004
The claimant was a social work student. He attended a work experience placement, and challenged the report given by the defendants on that placement, saying it was discriminatory and defamatory. He appealed a strike out of his claim.
Held: The . .
Cited – Alexander v Arts Council of Wales CA 9-Apr-2001
In a defamation action, where the judge considered that, taken at their highest, the allegations made by the claimant would be insufficient to establish the claim, he could grant summary judgment for the defence. If the judge considered that a . .
Cited – Heath v Humphreys 21-May-1990
The court considered the circumstances under which malice could be established so as to defeat a claim of qualified privilege. Malice is not to be inferred from the hypothetical untruth of a proposition derived from a misconstruction of a . .
Cited – Loveless v Earl; Capital and Counties (Financial Services) Limited CA 4-Nov-1998
When a defendant claimed qualified privilege and the Plaintiff alleged that the words complained of were issued with malice, the defendant will not prevented from reliance on qualified privilege if it can show that the words have an honestly . .
Cited – Fraser v Mirza HL 29-Mar-1993
A complaint made against a police officer may be libellous if it was made with an improper motive: ‘The motive with which a person made a defamatory communication can only be ascertained from an examination of his state of mind at the time he made . .
Cited – Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and others HL 28-Oct-1999
Fair Coment on Political Activities
The defendant newspaper had published articles wrongly accusing the claimant, the former Prime Minister of Ireland of duplicity. The paper now appealed, saying that it should have had available to it a defence of qualified privilege because of the . .
Cited – Street v Derbyshire Unemployed Workers’ Centre CA 21-Jul-2004
The claimant alleged that she had been dismissed for making qualifying disclosures about her employers. The employer said that her actions had not been in good faith. The claimant answered that her motive was irrelevant. The claimant appealed . .
Cited – Milne v Express Newspapers CA 28-May-2004
The claimant, having not accepted an offer to make amends, wanted to proceed to a jury trial. To be permitted to do so, he had to seek to establish that the defendants ‘knew or had reason to believe that the statement complained of . . was both . .
Cited – Nail and Another v News Group Newspapers Ltd and others CA 20-Dec-2004
The claimant appealed the award of damages in his claim for defamation. The defendants had variously issued apologies. The claimant had not complained initially as to one publication.
Held: In defamation proceedings the damage to feelings is . .
Cited – Jameel and Another v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl (No 2) CA 3-Feb-2005
The claimant sought damages for an article published by the defendant, who argued that as a corporation, the claimant corporation needed to show special damage, and also that the publication had qualified privilege.
Held: ‘It is an established . .
Cited – Panday v Gordon PC 5-Oct-2005
(Trinidad and Tobago) A senior politician had accused an opponent of pseudo-racism. The defendant asserted that he had a defence under the constitution, allowing freedom of political speech.
Held: The appeal failed. The statements were . .
Cited – Bray v Deutsche Bank Ag QBD 12-Jun-2008
A former employee of the defendant bank sued in defamation after the bank published a press release about its results which he said was critical of him.
Held: Where there is a real issue as to whether the words are defamatory of the claimant, . .
Cited – Tesco Stores Ltd v Guardian News and Media Ltd and Another QBD 29-Jul-2008
The defendant newspaper published articles making allegations as to the use of offshore tax avoidance arrangements. The claimant sought damages also in malicious falsehood. The defendants sought to rely on an offer of amends served only a few . .
Cited – Quinton v Peirce and Another QBD 30-Apr-2009
One election candidate said that another had defamed him in an election leaflet. Additional claims were made in injurious falsehood and under the Data Protection Act.
Held: The claim in defamation failed. There were no special privileges in . .
Distinguished – Clift v Slough Borough Council and Another QBD 6-Jul-2009
clift_sloughQBD09
The claimant sought damages for defamation. The council had decided that she had threatened a member of staff and notified various people, and entered her name on a violent persons register. She alleged malice, the council pleaded justification and . .
Cited – Watts v Times Newspapers Ltd, Neil, Palmer and Schilling and Lom CA 28-Jul-1995
The plaintiff author had claimed damages for defamation, saying that he had been accused of plagiarism. An apology had been given in the form requested – no qualified privilege. The plaintiff brought an associated case against his lawyer, saying . .
Cited – KJO v XIM QBD 7-Jul-2011
The claimant had, some 20 years previously, been convicted and sentenced for forgery of a will. The defendants, relatives, had ever since written to those with whom he had dealings to tell them of the conviction and facts. The claimant, unable to . .
Cited – Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD 26-Jul-2011
The claimant alleged defamation and malicious falsehood in an article published and written by the defendants. She complained that she was said to have fabricated an interview with the second defendant for her book. An interview of sorts had now . .
Cited – Tilbrook v Parr QBD 13-Jul-2012
The claimant, chair of a political party, the English Democrats, said that a blog written and published on the Internet by the defendant was defamatory and contained malicious falsehoods. The blog was said to associate the claimant’s party with . .
Cited – Seray-Wurie v The Charity Commission of England and Wales CA 3-Feb-2009
The claimant appealed against the striking out of his claim for defamation in a reort prepared by the defendants criticising his actions as chairman of a CAB. The action had been struck out on the basis of qualified privilege, and the claimant’s . .
Cited – Makudi v Baron Triesman of Tottenham In London Borough of Haringey QBD 1-Feb-2013
makudi_triesmanQBD2013
The claimant, former chairman of the Thailand Football Association, claimed in defamation against the defendant who had been chairman of the English Football Association. The defendant asked the court to strike out the claim, saying that some of the . .
Cited – Khader v Aziz and Others CA 23-Jun-2010
The claimant brought defamation proceedings after she had found and returned a valuable necklace belonging to the first respondent. The claim had been dismissed as an abuse of process.
Held: The claimant’s appeal failed: ‘there is such a . .
Cited – Greenstein v Campaign Against Antisemitism CA 9-Jul-2021
Failure to plead decisive malice allegation
Appeal by the claimant against an order following a judgment striking out particulars of malice pleaded in the amended reply, among other determinations. Judgment was then entered in favour of the Campaign Against Antisemitsm in respect of a claim . .
Cited – Herbage v Pressdram Ltd CA 1984
There was a publication of articles which referred to convictions which were spent under the 1974 Act. The court restated the principle in Bonnard v Perryman: ‘These principles have evolved because of the value the court has placed on freedom of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.179329

The claimant sought damages alleging defamation by the defendant in its allegation against her of child sexual abuse.
Warby J
[2017] EWHC 1650 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 26 October 2021; Ref: scu.589918

Action for slander for accusing the plaintiff’s wife that she would have cut her husband’s throat, and did attempt to do it.
Held: No action lay for the words, ‘she would have cut her husband’s throat’, but that an action was maintainable for the remaining words which charged an attempt
Hutton Sgt
[1605] EngR 41, (1605-1611) Lane 98, (1605) 145 ER 331 (A)
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Dhir v Saddler QBD 6-Dec-2017
Slander damages reduced for conduct
Claim in slander. The defendant was said, at a church meeting to have accused the client of threatening to slit her throat. The defendant argued that the audience of 80 was not large enough.
Held: ‘the authorities demonstrate that it is the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 October 2021; Ref: scu.424364

Pearce LJ discussed the importance of the use of extrinsic facts in determining meaning in defamation cases, saying: ‘any innuendo (that is, any allegation that the words were used in a defamatory sense other than their ordinary meaning) cannot rely on a mere interpretation of the words of the libel itself but must be supported by extrinsic facts or matters. Thus, there is one cause of action for the libel itself, based on whatever imputations or implications can reasonably be derived from the words themselves, and there is another different cause of action, namely, the innuendo, based not merely on the libel itself but on an extended meaning created by a conjunction of the words with something outside them. The latter cause of action cannot come into existence unless there is some extrinsic fact to create the extended meaning.’
Pearce LJ
[1963] 1 QB 309
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe Sas v Asda Stores Ltd QBD 15-Jul-2009
ajinomoto_asdaQBD2009
The claimant said that the defendant’s characterisation of its own products as ‘Good for You’ by reference to a description saying that it did not include the claimant’s product as a component, was a malicious falsehood. The defendant sold other . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 October 2021; Ref: scu.374704

The plaintiff complained of the words ‘Sir Thomas Holt struck his cook on the head with a cleaver, and cleaved his head; the one part lay on the one shoulder and the other on the other’.
Held: It was moved in arrest of judgement that the words were not actionable, because it was not averred that the cook was killed, but argumentative.
(1608) Cro Jac 184
England and Wales

Updated: 19 October 2021; Ref: scu.221968

‘Et fuit tenu auxi par le Court que un libeller est punishable, comment que le matter del libel soit vray’ (And was held also by the court that a libeller is punishable, even if the matter be true)
(1601) Moore 628, (1601) 72 ER 802
England and Wales

Updated: 19 October 2021; Ref: scu.221965

The defendant newspaper published an article describing the attendance at a motor race at Dieppe. It described the antics, intending to refer to a fictitious person, of one Artemus Jones, and said of him that he was ‘with a woman who is not his wife, who must be, you know – the other thing!’ It added: ‘Really, is it not surprising how certain of our fellow-countrymen behave when they come abroad? Who would suppose, by his goings on, that he was a churchwarden at Peckham?’ The real Artemus Jones was not, of course, a churchwarden at Peckham or anywhere else. He was a barrister on the North Wales Circuit.
Held: His claim in defamation succeeded.
The meaning of the words intended by the publisher or the absence of any intention to harm the plaintiff is irrelevant to the inquiry as to their meaning to a reader: ‘A person charged with libel cannot defend himself by showing that he intended in his own breast not to defame, or that he intended not to defame the plaintiff, if in fact he did both.’ The defendants remedy ‘is to abstain from defamatory words.’
Lord Loreburn LC said: ‘A person charged with libel cannot defend himself by shewing that he intended in his own breast not to defame, or that he intended not to defame the plaintiff, if in fact he did both. He has none the less imputed something disgraceful and has none the less injured the plaintiff. A man in good faith may publish a libel believing it to be true, and it may be found by the jury that he acted in good faith believing it to be true, and reasonably believing it to be true, but that in fact the statement was false. Under those circumstances he has no defence to the action, however excellent his intention. If the intention of the writer be immaterial in considering whether the matter written is defamatory, I do not see why it need be relevant in considering whether it is defamatory of the plaintiff. The writing, according to the old form, must be malicious, and it must be of and concerning the plaintiff. Just as the defendant could not excuse himself from malice by proving that he wrote it in the most benevolent spirit, so he cannot shew that the libel was not of and concerning the plaintiff by proving that he never heard of the plaintiff.’
The test was not whether the defendant intended to refer to the plaintiff but whether the words published were understood by reasonable people who knew the plaintiff to refer to him. Defamation is a tort of strict liability and does not depend upon the intention of the publisher.
A witness may be called to testify that they understood, from reading the libel in the light of the facts and circumstances narrated and described, and their acquaintance with, and knowledge of, the plaintiff, that he was the person referred to.
Lord Chancellor (Loreburn), Lords Atkinson, Gorell, and Shaw
[1909] 2 KB 444, 26 TLR 128, [1910] AC 20, [1908-10] All ER 29, [1909] UKHL 591, 47 SLR 591
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Emmens v Pottle CA 1885
A subordinate distributor, here a vendor of newspapers, can plead the common law defence to defamation, of innocent dissemination.
Held: The vendor was prima facie liable, and therefore had to demonstrate the defence to avoid liability. He . .
Appeal from – Jones v E Hulton and Co CA 26-May-1909
The defendants, who were the proprietors and publishers of a newspaper, published in an article in their paper defamatory statements of a named person believed by the writer of the article and by the defendants to be a fictitious personage with an . .

Cited by:
Cited – The Financial Conduct Authority v Macris CA 19-May-2015
Appeal by the Authority against a decision by the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) deciding, as a preliminary issue determined in accordance with Rule 5(3)(e) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, that the respondent to . .
Cited – Angiolini v Green SCS 19-Dec-2013
A procedure roll at the instance of the pursuer in terms of which the court was moved to sustain the pursuer’s first plea-in-law and to grant interdict in terms of the fourth conclusion of the summons. . .
Cited – Irvine v Sunday Newspapers Ltd QBNI 6-Dec-2013
The plaintiff has sued the defendant for defamation arising out of an article published in the Sunday World on the 28 October 2012 under the heading ‘Fury over UVF’s Nice Little Board’s Earner ‘. . .
Cited – Baturina v Times Newspapers Ltd CA 23-Mar-2011
The claimant appealed against directions given in her defamation action against the defendant. It had been said that she owned a house, and the defendant said that this was not defamatory. The claimant said that as the wife of the Mayor of Moscow . .
Cited – Cassell and Co Ltd v Broome and Another HL 23-Feb-1972
Exemplary Damages Award in Defamation
The plaintiff had been awarded damages for defamation. The defendants pleaded justification. Before the trial the plaintiff gave notice that he wanted additional, exemplary, damages. The trial judge said that such a claim had to have been pleaded. . .
Cited – O’Shea v MGN Ltd and Free4Internet Net Limited QBD 4-May-2001
The defendant newspaper published a lawful advertisement for an adult internet service featuring, with her agreement, a photograph of a young woman, who very closely resembled the claimant.
Held: The claim in defamation failed. Morland J . .
Cited – Dow Jones and Co Inc v Jameel CA 3-Feb-2005
Presumption of Damage in Defamation is rebuttable
The defendant complained that the presumption in English law that the victim of a libel had suffered damage was incompatible with his right to a fair trial. They said the statements complained of were repetitions of statements made by US . .
Cited – Baturina v Times Newspapers Ltd QBD 31-Mar-2010
The claimant sought damages in defamation in respect of an article published by the defendant newspaper. She was the wife of the Mayor of Moscow, and was required to disclose on a public list assets held by her. The defendant said that she owned a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 September 2021; Ref: scu.620597

Nicklin J explained how circumstantial evidence might be admissible to prove the truth of a Chase level 2 meaning: ‘The ‘conduct rule’ and ‘circumstantial evidence’ have been further elucidated.
(i) While it is an essential requisite of a Chase level 2 defence . . that the particulars must focus on the conduct of the claimant said to give rise to the suspicion, in a complicated case it may be necessary to portray some of the background and to connect the main facts relied upon. But the fundamental – and ultimate – question is: whether taken as a whole the particulars demonstrate conduct of the claimant that gives rise to the suspicion: in other words, on the facts pleaded, a person could suspect that the claimant was implicated: Miller -v- Associated Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 3721 (QB) per Sharp J; and Miah -v- British Broadcasting Corpn [2018] EWHC 1054 (QB) [33]-[34] per Warby J.
(ii) In JSC BTA Bank -v- Ablyazov (No.8) [2013] 1 WLR 1331, Rix LJ said:
‘It is, however, the essence of a successful case of circumstantial evidence that the whole is stronger than individual parts. It becomes a net from which there is no escape. That is why a jury is often directed to avoid piecemeal consideration of a circumstantial case: R -v- Hillier (2007) 233 ALR 634 . . Or, as Lord Simon of Glaisdale put it in R -v- Kilbourne [1973] AC 729, 758, ‘Circumstantial evidence . . works by cumulatively, in geometrical progression, eliminating other possibilities’.’
I have no difficulty with the interplay between circumstantial evidence and the ‘conduct rule’. To take an example, in a drugs importation conspiracy it is usual for the prosecution to rely upon a number of sources of evidence including, typically: (1) cell-site analysis showing the presence of mobile telephones at various locations; (2) calls and messages passing between those telephones; and (3) ANPR and CCTV ‘hits’ of various vehicles at particular places. If the same factual issues arose in defence of a libel claim, including alleged facts from these three categories, there would be some evidence in each that did not focus on the conduct of the claimant; indeed, there is likely to be evidence relating to the activities of the other alleged conspirators. However, the strength of the case, and why it gives rise to suspicion falling on the claimant is that, cumulatively and taken together, the evidence implicates the claimant because of his connection to the evidence as a whole. What matters, and what would be essential for the truth defence to have a realistic prospect of success, is the evidential link to the claimant. Without that, the rest of the evidence cannot give rise to a reasonable suspicion.
Nicklin J
[2018] EWHC 2032 (QB), [2018] WLR(D) 502, [2019] 2 WLR 232, [2019] EMLR 6, [2019] QB 861
Bailii, WLRD
Defamation Act 2013
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Bokova v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 21-Feb-2018
. .

Cited by:
Cited – Turley v Unite The Union and Another QBD 19-Dec-2019
Defamation of Labour MP by Unite and Blogger
The claimant now a former MP had alleged that a posting on a website supported by the first defendant was false and defamatory. The posting suggested that the claimant had acted dishonestly in applying online for a category of membership of the . .
Cited – Hijazi v Yaxley-Lennon (Orse Tommy Robinson) QBD 22-Jul-2021
No Valid Evidence to Support Serious Accusations
The claimant was filmed being assaulted in the school playground. The film was published on the internet, and the defendant right wing politician re-published it, but falsely said that the claimant had himself been violent.
Held: The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 July 2021; Ref: scu.620611

Nicola Davies DBE J
[2017] EWHC 56 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
See Also – Hourani v Thomson and Others QBD 10-Mar-2017
Warby J identified the three issues on which the claimant bore the burden of proof in relation to each defendant on a claim of harassment as: (1) Did the defendant engage in a course of conduct? (2) Did any such course of conduct amount to . .
See Also – Hourani v Thomson and Others QBD 6-Feb-2017
Applications for inspection of documents in claim for defamation and harassment. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 July 2021; Ref: scu.573383

kemsley_footCA51
References: [1951] 2 KB 34
Coram: Birkett LJ, Somervell LJ
Ratio: The plaintiff complained that the defendant had defamed him with a headline to an article ‘Lower than Hemsley’ which otherwise had no connection with the plaintiff. He said it suggested that he was a byword for poor journalism.
Held: Criticism of a newspaper owner as to the presentation of news by the paper was to be treated on a par with criticism of a book or play. The critic is not prevented from relying upon fair comment as a defence only because he does not particularise the conduct of which he complains. He need only state plainly the subject-matter of the complaint.
Birkett LJ said: ‘It is clear, therefore, and indeed it was not contended otherwise, that ALL the facts need not be stated, but when the matter is submitted to the judgment of a jury particulars of the facts relied on must be supplied’
and ‘I do not think it is possible to lay down any rule of universal application. If, for example, a defamatory statement is made about a private individual who is quite unknown to the general public, and he has never taken any part in public affairs, and the statement takes the form of comment only and is capable of being construed as comment and no facts of any kind are given, while it is conceivable that the comment may be made on a matter of public interest, nevertheless the defence of fair comment might not be open to a defendant in that case. It is almost certain that a naked comment of that kind in those circumstances would be decided to be a question of fact and could be justified as such if that defence were pleaded. But if the matter is before the public, as in the case of a book, a play, a film, or a newspaper, then I think different considerations apply. Comment may then be made without setting out the facts on which the comment is based if the subject-matter of the comment is plainly stated. This seems to me to accord with good sense and the true public interest.’
Somervell LJ identified two cases where a publisher may not be obliged to set out the factual basis of his comment in detail: where the subject matter was a work of art placed before the public for comment, and where the subject was a public figure subject in any event to vigorous discussion and where a detailed recital of the facts would be unwelcome. In contradistinction: ‘At the other end of the scale one may imagine a comment reflecting on the integrity of a subordinate official, whose activities had so far received no publicity, where it might be held that the defence was not available unless the facts relied on were substantially set out or indicated.’
This case cites:

• Approved – Carr v Hood QBD ([1808] 1 Camp 354)
  Lord Ellenborough said: ‘it is not libellous to ridicule a literary composition, or the author of it, in so far as he has embodied himself with his work.
  Every man who publishes a book commits himself to the judgment of the public, and anyone . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

• Appeal from – Kemsley v Foot HL ([1952] AC 345)
  The plaintiff alleged that the headline to an article written by the defendant which criticised the behaviour of the Beaverbrook Press, and which read ‘Lower than Hemsley’ was defamatory. The defendant pleaded fair comment.
  Held: The article . .
• Cited – Lowe v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD ([2006] 3 All ER 357, Bailii, [2006] EWHC 320 (QB), Times 29-Mar-06, [2007] QB 580)
  The defendant sought to defend the claim for defamation by claiming fair comment. The claimant said that the relevant facts were not known to the defendant at the time of the publication.
  Held: To claim facts in aid of a defence of fair . .
• Cited – Associated Newspapers Ltd v Burstein CA (Bailii, [2007] EWCA Civ 600, [2007] EMLR 21, [2007] EMLR 571, [2007] 4 All ER 319, [2001] 1 WLR 579)
  The newspaper appealed an award of damages for defamation after its theatre critic’s review of an opera written by the claimant. The author said the article made him appear to sympathise with terrorism.
  Held: The appeal succeeded. Keene LJ . .
• Cited – Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD (Bailii, [2009] EWHC 2863 (QB))
  The claimant sought damages for an article in the defendant’s newspaper, a review of her book which said she had falsely claimed to have interviewed artists including the review author and that the claimant allowed interviewees control over what was . .
• Cited – Spiller and Another v Joseph and Others SC (Bailii, [2010] UKSC 53, UKSC 2009/0210, SC Summary, SC, [2010] WLR (D) 310, WLRD, [2010] 3 WLR 1791, Bailii Summary, [2011] 1 All ER 947, [2011] ICR 1, [2011] EMLR 11)
  The defendants had published remarks on its website about the reliability of the claimant. When sued in defamation, they pleaded fair comment, but that was rejected by the Court of Appeal.
  Held: The defendants’ appeal succeeded, and the fair . .
• Cited – Cook v Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD (Bailii, [2011] EWHC 763 (QB))
  The claimant, an MP, complained in defamation of the defendant’s description of his rejected expenses claim regarding an assistant’s charitable donation. The paper pleaded a Reynolds defence. The claimant said that when published the defendant knew . .

(This list may be incomplete)
Leading Case
Last Update: 18 March 2019
Ref: 240314

References: [1849] EngR 741, (1849) 4 Exch 262, (1849) 154 ER 1209
Links: Commonlii
Ratio Evidence of publication

Last Update: 16-May-16
Ref: 299046

References: [1860] EngR 756, (1860) 8 CB NS 597, (1860) 144 ER 1300
Links: Commonlii
The defendant, bona fide believing that the plaintiff, who was a clerk to one M, a customer of the defendant’s. and who had been sent to the defendant’s shop bv M had while there stolen a box from an inner room, went to M., and, after telling him of his loss, intimated his suspicion of the plaintiff, saying, ‘There was no one else in the room, and he must have taken it:’-Held, that the communication was privileged by the occasion. Where slanderous words are uttered in a foreign language, the declaration should aver that the persons in whose presence they were spoken understood the language.
Last Update: 03-Feb-16 Ref: 285595

References: [1829] 5 Bing 392, [1829] EngR 350, (1829) 5 Bing 392, (1829) 130 ER 1112
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Best CJ
In an action for a libel, it is no plea, that the defendant had the libellous statement from another, and upon publication disclosed the author’s name.
This case is cited by:

• Cited – Stern -v- Piper and Others CA (Gazette 12-Jun-96, Times 30-May-96, [1997] QB 123, Bailii, [1996] EWCA Civ 1291, [1996] 3 WLR 715, [1996] EMLR 413, [1996] 3 All ER 385)
  The defendant newspaper said that allegations had been made against the plaintiff that he was not paying his debts. In their defence they pleaded justification and the fact that he was being sued for debt.
  Held: A defamation was not to be . .
• Cited – Watkin -v- Hall ([1868] LR 3 QB 396, (1868) 9 B&S 279, [1868] 37 LJQB 125, [1868] 18 LT 561, [1868] 32 JP 485, [1868] 16 WR 857, [1861-73] All ER 275)
  The plaintiff was chairman of a railway company. He claimed in defamation after the defendant said there was a rumour of his having failed, thus explaining the fall in the company’s share value.
  Held: It was no defence to say that it was true . .
• Cited – Lewis -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd HL ([1964] AC 235)
  The House considered a libel action arising out of an article headlined ‘Fraud squad probe firm’.
  Held: The House defined the general principles for the ascertainment of the meaning of words in defamation proceedings. The test to be applied is . .
• Cited – Stern -v- Piper and Others CA (Gazette 12-Jun-96, Times 30-May-96, [1997] QB 123, Bailii, [1996] EWCA Civ 1291, [1996] 3 WLR 715, [1996] EMLR 413, [1996] 3 All ER 385)
  The defendant newspaper said that allegations had been made against the plaintiff that he was not paying his debts. In their defence they pleaded justification and the fact that he was being sued for debt.
  Held: A defamation was not to be . .
• Cited – Curistan -v- Times Newspapers Ltd CA (Bailii, [2008] EWCA Civ 432, Times 06-May-08, [2009] 2 WLR 149, [2008] 3 All ER 923, [2008] EMLR 17)
  The court considered the availability of qualified privilege for reporting of statements made in parliament and the actionable meaning of the article, which comprised in part those statements and in part other factual material representing the . .

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 09-Nov-15 Ref: 270506

References: Unreported, 24-May-89
Coram: Drake J
The plaintiff claimed in libel. Drake J upheld a submission that there was no case to go before the jury, in respect that (1) any reasonable jury properly directed would be bound to sustain the defence of fair comment, and (2) there was no evidence of express malice.
This case is cited by:

• Appeal from – Telnikoff -v- Matusevitch CA ([1991] 1 QB 102)
  The court considered the element of malice in a defamation defence: ‘If a piece of evidence is equally consistent with malice and the absence of malice, it cannot as a matter of law provide evidence on which the jury could find malice. The judge . .
• At first instance – Telnikoff -v- Matusevitch HL ([1992] 2 AC 343, Bailii, [1992] UKHL 2)
  The court should decide on whether an article is ‘fact or comment’ purely by reference to the article itself, and not taking into account any of the earlier background coverage. It is the obligation of the relevant commentator to make clear that the . .

References: [1829] EngR 459, (1829) 9 B & C 403, (1829) 109 ER 150
Links: Commonlii
In an action for libel, it appeared that the defendant, with whom the plaintiff had lived as servant, in answer to inquiries respecting her character, wrote a letter imputing misconduct to her whilst in that service, and after she left it; and the defendant also made similar parol statements to two persons that had recommended the plaintiff to her: Held, that neither the letter itself nor the parol statements proved malice, and that, consequently the letter was a privileged communication, and the plaintiff not entitled to recover.

References: [1905] AC 480
Coram: Earl of Halsbury LC
Privilege is given to those making witness statements in court proceedings from subsequent actions for defamation.
The Earl of Halsbury said: ‘It appears to me that the privilege which surrounds the evidence actually given in a Court of justice necessarily involves the same privilege in the case of making a statement to a solicitor and other persons who are engaged in the conduct of proceedings in Courts of justice when what is intended to be stated in a Court of justice is narrated to them – that is, to the solicitor or writer to the Signet. If it were otherwise, I think what one of the learned counsel has with great cogency pointed out would apply – that from time to time in these various efforts which have been made to make actual witnesses responsible in the shape of an action against them for the evidence they have given, the difficulty in the way of those who were bringing the action would have been removed at once by saying, ‘I do not bring the action against you for what you said in the witness-box, but I bring the action against you for what you told the solicitor you were about to say in the witness-box.’ If that could be done the object for which the privilege exists is gone, because then no witness could be called; no one would know whether what he was going to say was relevant to the question in debate between the parties. A witness would only have to say, ‘I shall not tell you anything; I may have an action brought against me to-morrow if I do; therefore I shall not give you any information at all.’ It is very obvious that the public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary for the administration of justice must as a necessary consequence involve that which is a step towards and is part of the administration of justice – namely, the preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove. It may be that to some extent it seems to impose a hardship, but after all the hardship is not to be compared with that which would arise if it were impossible to administer justice, because people would be afraid to give their testimony.’
This case is cited by:

• Cited – Buckley -v- Dalziel QBD (Bailii, [2007] EWHC 1025 (QB), Times 07-Jun-07)
  There was a heated dispute between neighbours, culminating in some generous or perhaps over-generous pruning by the claimant of the defendant’s trees and shrubs on the boundaries. The defendants reported the matter to the police. Both Mr and Mrs . .
• Cited – Westcott -v- Westcott QBD (Bailii, [2007] EWHC 2501 (QB))
  The claimant said that his daughter in law had defamed him. She answered that the publication was protected by absolute privilege. She had complained to the police that he had hit her and her infant son.
  Held: ‘the process of taking a witness . .
• Cited – Lincoln -v- Daniels CA ([1962] 1 QB 237, [1961] 3 WLR 866, [1961] 3 All ER 740, (1961) 105 Sol Jo 647)
  The defendant claimed absolute immunity in respect of communications sent by him to the Bar Council alleging professional misconduct by the plaintiff, a Queen’s Counsel.
  Held: Initial communications sent to the secretary of the Bar Council . .
• Cited – Iqbal -v- Mansoor and Others QBD (Bailii, [2011] EWHC 2261 (QB))
  The claimant sought the disapplication of the limitation period in order to pursue the defendant solicitors, his former employers, in defamation. . .