Capital Investments Ltd v Wednesfield Urban District Council: ChD 12 Feb 1964

The council set out to acquire two plots of land for development for housing. After the process had begun, it was decided that some of the land should be uised for educational purposes. A Land Charge had been served but the matter not completed. A subsequent owner of the land contested that the land should be released since it was no longer required for the original purpose, and sought a declaration that the notice to treat was void.
Held: Applying Simpson Motors, the use for other purposes was liable to be ultra vires, but that did not make the notice to treat void. It was wrong to treat the order for this land in isolation from the intentions for the entire development, and in that context, the use for educational purposes was ancillary. The normal pattern for compulsory purchase will be for the authority to enter following notice to treat and notice of entry, and for compensation to be agreed or determined by the Lands Tribunal, following which there is the equivalent of a contract for the sale of the land which can be specifically enforced.
Wilberforce J, as to the proposition that a notice to treat constitutes, under s10 of the 1925 Act, a contract: ‘In my judgment, however, that is clearly not so. First of all, there is the matter of principle. There is, by the mere service of a notice to treat, no consensus between the parties, because at this point the price has not been fixed. A notice to treat does nothing more than establish conditions in which a contract might come into existence, either a voluntary contract or a statutory contract. As a matter of authority, it seems to me that the position is clearly established in Haynes v Haynes and also stated by Fry on Specific Performance, 6th ed., p.62, both of which, to my mind, make it plain that a contract does not come into existence by the mere service of a notice to treat before the compensation has been determined. It has been said that for certain purposes and to a certain extent the notice to treat constitutes the relation of vendor and purchaser, but in the same passages in which this statement has been made it has also been made clear that the notice does not constitute a contract but only a preliminary step bringing the parties together either to agree or to refer the matter to a jury or other tribunal. I refer to Adams v London and Blackwall Railway Co., per Lord Cottenham and also to Haynes v Haynes.’
Wilberforce J
[1965] Ch 774, (1964) 108 SJ 377, [1964] 2 WLR 932, [1964] 1 All ER 655, (1964) 128 JP 287, (1964) 62 LGR 566, (1964) 15 P and CR 435
Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 9, Housing Act 1957 91 93 96 97 105, Housing Act 1937, Housing Act 1936 74, Land Charges Act 1925 10 813
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedAdams v London and Blackwall Railway Co 1850
. .
CitedSimpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation (No 1) CA 1962
The use of land purchased under compulsory powers for a different purpose was ultra vires, but did not undermine the original notice to treat. There was no reason not to use a compendious description of the range of purposes for which land was to be . .
CitedRolls v London School Board ChD 1884
. .
CitedHE Green and Sons v Minister of Health (No 2) 1947
The plaintiff challenged a compulsory purchase order, saying that the purpose of the order went beyond the statutory purpose.
Held: The provision of ‘houses’ must be taken to include the provision of ancillary facilities. Denning J said that . .

Cited by:
CitedBP Oil UK Ltd v Kent County Council CA 13-Jun-2003
BP sought compensation after its land had been acquired compulsorily. The council said its claim was time barred. BP appealed from the Lands Tribunal, saying an agreement with the Authority had kept its claim alive.
Held: The fact of entry did . .
CitedRhondda Cynon Taff Borough Council v Watkins CA 12-Feb-2003
Land had been purchased compulsorily, but the respondent unlawfully returned to possession in 1966, and now claimed title by adverse possession. The Council executed a vesting deed poll in 1988. The Council asserted that he could not be in adverse . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 18 August 2021; Ref: scu.183503