Halstead v Council of City of Manchester: CA 23 Oct 1997

Land had been compulsorily purchased, and the compensation agreed, but after long delays in payment, not as to the calculation of interest.
Held: Interest would be payable from the date of entry. The limitation period arose only once the amount of interest payable was agreed.

[1997] EWCA Civ 2555, [1998] 1 All ER 33
Bailii
Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 11(1), Limitation Act 1980 9(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRiches v Westminster Bank Ltd HL 1947
The amount of interest payable on compulsory purchase of land depends upon the value given to the land and the length of the period from the time of entry until reinstatement, the period during which the claimant is dispossessed. During that time, . .
CitedWest Midland Baptist (Trust) Association (Inc) v Birmingham Corporation HL 1970
The mere fact that an enactment shows that Parliament must have thought that the law was one thing, does not preclude the courts from deciding that the law was in fact something different. The position would be different if the provisions of the . .
CitedDirector of Buildings and Lands v Shun Fung Ironworks Ltd PC 20-Feb-1995
Compensation is payable for losses properly anticipating resumption of possession of the land. The principle of equivalence gives rise to the statutory right to interest under section 11(1). The council explained the conceptual foundation of the . .
CitedMoore and Another v Gadd and Another CA 5-Feb-1997
The normal limitation period applies to directors’ disqualification applications. . .
CitedHillingdon London Borough Council v ARC Ltd ChD 12-Jun-1997
The Council had taken possession of the company’s land under compulsory purchase powers, but the company delayed its claim for compensation, and the Council now said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The claim was indeed time barred. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Damages, Limitation

Updated: 17 January 2022; Ref: scu.142954

Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy: ECHR 17 Jan 2002

The applicants’ baby had died shortly after birth in 1987. They complained about the medical care. The complaint was not investigated speedily by the authority, resulting in a criminal complaint becoming time barred after a conviction in 1994 was set aside.
Held: The state is required to seek to protect a person from death as a result of incompetent medical treatment or care by its effective operation of a system of professional and other regulation. Though the claim was admissible, the applicants’ rights had not been violated. The periods involved no extended or unreasonable delays, and the limitation period was not unreasonable, though ‘Article 2 . . enjoins the State not only to refrain from the ‘intentional’ taking of life, but also to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.’
When referring to the State’s obligations to protect life, the Court said: ‘Those principles apply in the public-health sphere too. The aforementioned positive obligations therefore require States to make regulations compelling hospitals, whether public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of their patients’ lives.’

32967/96, [2002] ECHR 3
Worldlii, Bailii
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1953 (1953 Cmd 8969) Art 25
Human Rights
Citing:
CitedIsiltan v Turkey ECHR 22-May-1995
(Commission) . .

Cited by:
CitedKhan, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Health CA 10-Oct-2003
The claimant’s child had died as a result of negligence in hospital. The parents had been told the result of police investigation and decision not to prosecute, and the hospital’s own investigation, but had not been sufficiently involved. There . .
CitedMiddleton, Regina (on the Application of) v Coroner for the Western District of Somerset HL 11-Mar-2004
The deceased had committed suicide in prison. His family felt that the risk should have been known to the prison authorities, and that they had failed to guard against that risk. The coroner had requested an explanatory note from the jury.
CitedGoodson v HM Coroner for Bedfordshire and Luton Admn 17-Dec-2004
A patient had died in hospital following an operation. The NHS Trust submitted that ‘There is a real distinction between cases of medical negligence, which were specifically addressed as a discrete area in Calvelli, and cases of intentional killing . .
CitedD, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Admn 28-Apr-2005
D was undergoing trial for offences and was held in prison. He self-harmed repeatedly, and was recorded to require extra vigilance. He attempted to hang himself. Prison staff saved his life, but he was left paraplegic, and was then detained under . .
CitedPlymouth City Council v HM Coroner for the County of Devon and Another Admn 27-May-2005
The local authority in whose care the deceased child had been held challenged a decision by the coroner not to limit his inquiry to the last few days of the child’s life. The coroner had decided that he had an obligation to conduct a wider enquiry . .
CitedTakoushis, Regina (on the Application of) v HM Coroner for Inner North London and others CA 30-Nov-2005
Relatives sought judicial review of the coroner’s decision not to allow a jury, and against allowance of an expert witness. The deceased had been a mental patient but had been arrested with a view to being hospitalised. He was taken first to the . .
CitedHertfordshire Police v Van Colle; Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police HL 30-Jul-2008
Police Obligations to Witnesses is Limited
A prosecution witness was murdered by the accused shortly before his trial. The parents of the deceased alleged that the failure of the police to protect their son was a breach of article 2.
Held: The House was asked ‘If the police are alerted . .
CitedRabone and Another v Pennine Care NHS Foundation SC 8-Feb-2012
The claimant’s daughter had committed suicide whilst on home leave from a hospital where she had stayed as a voluntary patient with depression. Her admission had followed a suicide attempt. The hospital admitted negligence but denied that it owed . .
CitedBirks, Regina (On the Application of) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Admn 25-Sep-2014
The claimant police officer sought judicial review of a decision to continue his suspension. He had been investigated and cleared after a death in custody. He sought to join the Church of England Ministry and was offered a post. He was re-assured . .
CitedCommissioner of Police of The Metropolis v DSD and Another SC 21-Feb-2018
Two claimants had each been sexually assaulted by a later notorious, multiple rapist. Each had made complaints to police about their assaults but said that no effective steps had been taken to investigate the serious complaints.
Held: The . .
CitedFinucane, Re Application for Judicial Review SC 27-Feb-2019
(Northern Ireland) The deceased solicitor was murdered in his home in 1989, allegedly by loyalists. They had never been identified, though collusion between security forces and a loyalist paramilitary was established. The ECHR and a judge led . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Limitation

Updated: 16 January 2022; Ref: scu.167388

Brecknell v The United Kingdom: ECHR 27 Nov 2007

Allegations had been made about police collusion with killings in Northern Ireland.
Held: Where there was credible information as to a possible perpetrator of an unlawful killing, there was a duty to investigate that evidence. Here the original investigations had lacked the characteristic of independence of the subjects of the investigation.
The court said that: ‘it may be that sometime later, information purportedly casting new light on the circumstances of the death comes into the public domain’ and that ‘[t]he issue then arises as to whether, and in what form, the procedural obligation to investigate is revived’. It then gave examples including ‘deliberate concealment of evidence’ which only subsequently comes to light, or later items of evidence which ‘cast doubt on the effectiveness of the original investigation and trial’. However in para 70 the court accepted that it was not right to say that ‘any assertion or allegation can trigger a fresh investigative obligation under article 2’, but emphasised that ‘state authorities must be sensitive to any information or material which has the potential either to undermine the conclusions of an earlier investigation or to allow an earlier inconclusive investigation to be pursued further’.

[2007] ECHR 989, Times 12-Dec-2007, 32457/04
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights
Human Rights
Citing:
See AlsoBrecknell v The United Kingdom ECHR 6-Mar-2007
. .

Cited by:
CitedMGN Limited v United Kingdom ECHR 18-Jan-2011
The applicant publisher said that the finding against it of breach of confidence and the system of success fees infringed it Article 10 rights to freedom of speech. It had published an article about a model’s attendance at Narcotics anonymous . .
CitedMcCaughey and Another, Re Application forJudicial Review SC 18-May-2011
The claimants sought a fuller inquest into deaths at the hands of the British Army in 1990 in Northern Ireland. On opening the inquest, the coroner had declined to undertake to hold a hearing compliant with article 2, and it had not made progress. . .
CitedKeyu and Others v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Another SC 25-Nov-2015
The Court was asked whether the respondents should be required to hold a public inquiry into a controversial series of events in 1948, when a Scots Guards patrol was alleged to shot and killed 24 unarmed civilians in a village called Batang Kali, in . .
CitedFinucane, Re Application for Judicial Review SC 27-Feb-2019
(Northern Ireland) The deceased solicitor was murdered in his home in 1989, allegedly by loyalists. They had never been identified, though collusion between security forces and a loyalist paramilitary was established. The ECHR and a judge led . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Limitation

Updated: 16 January 2022; Ref: scu.262977

Feest v South West Strategic Health Authority and Others: QBD 7 Feb 2014

The claimant sustained a serious spinal injury whilst a passenger on board a 9 metre RIB (rigid inflatable boat) called the Celtic Pioneer. She and 10 work colleagues were participating in a 1 hour boat trip in the Bristol Channel as part of a corporate team building exercise.

Havelock Allen QC HHJ
[2014] EWHC 177 (QB), [2014] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 419
Bailii
Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea

Transport, Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 14 January 2022; Ref: scu.563235

Scottish Equitable Plc v Thompson and Another: CA 6 Feb 2003

The mortgage deed, which was a second mortgage, did not contain any express covenant to repay the principal sum, but only for monthly interest instalments with no element of capital repayment, since the principal was to be paid from an insurance policy. The property was re-possessed and sold, leaving nothing for the second mortgagee after the first mortgage was repaid. At first instance ir was found that the relevant cause of action for the shortfall, which occurred on the sale by the mortgagee, was not an action on a specialty within s8, but a simple contract debt governed by section 5 of the 1980 Act and that the claim was statute barred after 6 years from the accrual of the cause of action.
Held: Bartlett applied. s20(1) was of no relevance, as the property had been sold and the principal sum was no longer secured by a mortgage on property. With no express covenant to repay the whole of the principal sum on a particular date or in a specified event, no date for the actual repayment of the principal sum could be identified in the mortgage deed. The claim for the shortfall was a simple contract debt, which became statute barred after 6 years.

Pill, Mummery, Latham LJJ
[2003] EWCA Civ 211, [2003] HLR 48
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 8 5
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedBristol and West plc v Bartlett and Another; Paragon Finance plc v Banks; Halifax plc v Grant CA 31-Jul-2002
The defendants resisted claims by lenders for the payment of mortgage debts. In each case the lender had exercised the power of sale before issuing proceedings for possession. The defendants queried the limitation period applicable.
Held: The . .

Cited by:
CitedWilkinson and Another v West Bromwich Building Society CA 30-Jul-2004
The Society had repossessed and sold the mortgagors’ house in 1990. It knew then that there was a shortfall, but took no further recovery proceedings until 2002. What was the date from which the relevant limitation period began to run? Though the . .
CitedWest Bromwich Building Society v Wilkinson HL 30-Jun-2005
The Society had taken possession of a property in 1989. It located the defendants many years later and sought payment of the excess after deduction of the proceeds of sale, and for interest. The borrowers claimed the debt was expired by limitation . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 13 January 2022; Ref: scu.181304

Rowe v Kingston-Upon-Hull City Council and Another: CA 24 Jul 2003

The claimant sought damages for a breach of duty by his teachers which had happened before 1991. He argued that 3(1) of the HRA should affect the construction of section 14(1) of the 1980 Act.

[2003] EWCA Civ 1281, [2003] ELR 771
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 14 33, Human Rights Act 1980 14(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedA v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Negligence, Human Rights

Updated: 13 January 2022; Ref: scu.186542

Prudential Assurance Company Limited v Waterloo Real Estate Inc: CA 22 Jan 1999

Where title to land was to be established by adverse possession, the claim had to be unequivocal only in the sense that the intention to possess was clear to the world. It was unnecessary for the dispossessed party to know of the title he lost.

Times 08-Feb-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 642
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal FromPrudential Assurance Company Ltd v Waterloo Real Estate Inc ChD 13-May-1998
The owner of a party wall who had allowed a neighbour exclusive use of it without objection for a period over twelve years, could lose his interest in the wall by the adverse possession of that neighbour. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.145557

RAR v GGC: QBD 10 Aug 2012

The claimant alleged that the defendant, her stepfather, had sexually and otherwise assaulted her when she was a child. He had pleaded guilty to one charge in 1978, and now said that the claim was out of time. The claimant sought the extension of time for the claim on a just and equitable basis under section 33.
Held: The claim should be allowed to proceed. The abuse had given rise to psychological issue for the claimant which contributed to the delay. The defendant’s prosecution had caused him to reconsider his actions allowing the detailed defence he had in fact filed. The evidence of both parties remained cogent.
The defendant was unable to deny his conviction. He had been legally represented and had admitted the offence, and his plea now that it was entered under duress was ineffective. The issue was governed by section 11(2) of the 1968 Act.
The claim succeeded.The court awarded a total of andpound;470,034 damages including aggravated damages and interest.

Nicola Davies J
[2012] EWHC 2338 (QB)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 33, Civil Evidence Act 1968 11(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
Reversed by HoareStubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .
CitedA v Hoare HL 30-Jan-2008
Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend . .
AppliedMcCauley v Vine 1999
Sir Patrick Russell considered the effect of section 11 of the 1968 Act, saying: ‘The closing words of that section ‘unless the contrary is proved’ provides in my judgment, the clearest possible mandate to a defendant in a road traffic accident case . .
CitedMcCauley v Vine 1999
Sir Patrick Russell considered the effect of section 11 of the 1968 Act, saying: ‘The closing words of that section ‘unless the contrary is proved’ provides in my judgment, the clearest possible mandate to a defendant in a road traffic accident case . .
CitedABB and Others v Milton Keynes Council QBD 21-Oct-2011
The claimants, now adults, each claimed that as children, the defendant had known of the prolonged and serious sexual abuse they had suffered at the hands of their father when children, and that it had failed to protect them from it. . .
CitedAT and others v Dulghieru and Another QBD 19-Feb-2009
The claimants had been subject to unlawful human trafficking. Their abductors had been imprisoned, and they now sought damages. The court was asked now to assess the damages to be awarded for sexual enslavement. Each claimant suffered chronic post . .
CitedBJM v Eyre and Others QBD 12-Nov-2010
The claimant (in respect of whom an anonymity order had been made) claimed damages against the four defendants for personal injuries and financial loss arising from sexual and physical abuse of the claimant which took place between 2001 and 2003. . .
CitedEB v Haughton QBD 17-Feb-2011
The claimant alleged sexual assualt on her by the defendant when she was a child. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Torts – Other, Limitation, Evidence, Damages

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.463642

Legal Services Commission v Henthorn: QBD 4 Feb 2011

The claimant sought to recover overpayments said to have been made to the defendant barrister in the early 1990s. Interim payments on account had been made, but these were not followed by final accounts. The defendant, now retired, said that the claims were defeated by limitation and laches and were an abuse of process because of long delay by the claimant.
Held: The case of Rasool was on point and settled it that the relation between the lawyer and his client under the legal aid system remained the same despite the funding arrangement under legal aid. Under that arrangement the claimant could have begun its claim, time ran from the date that the work under the certificate was actually completed and all but two of the claims were time barred.
The claimant also claimed in restitution. However, ‘the exclusive remedy available to the LSC is that provided for by regulation 100(8)’ and no restitutionary claim could arise on the basis of the claims pleaded, and if it were available it would now be defeated by laches and limitation. Similarly the claimant had been unreasonable or unfair in its use of its powers in this way. The claim for abuse of process succeeded.
‘the Regulations gave the LSC full powers to obtain all necessary information and also provided strict time limits for the assessment process. What regrettably occurred throughout the 1990s was a culture of acquiescence in which the LSC did not seek regular reports on stale cases, did not exercise its powers of discharge when cases went to sleep and were not reported on, did not ensure that bills that were lodged for taxation outside the three month period permitted by the RSC were subject to penalties so as to discourage such delays and did not require solicitors who delayed in lodging bills of costs to lodge them under threat of discharge and consequent non-payment. In any event, it is not possible to identify the ingredients of the relevant cause of action by reference to the relaxed way in which the regulations were implemented.’

Anthony Thornton QC J
[2010] EWHC 3329 (QB)
Bailii
Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989, Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedCoburn v Colledge CA 1897
A solicitor commenced an action on June 12th, 1896 for his fees for work which had been completed on May 30th 1889.
Held: A period of limitation runs from the date on which the ingredients of the cause of action are complete. The statute of . .
CitedLondon Borough of Hillingdon v ARC Limited CA 7-Apr-1998
The company sought compensation for land taken under compulsory purchase powers by the defendants several years before. It now appealed against the defeat of its claim as time-barred.
Held: The appeal failed. The limitation period for a claim . .
CitedLegal Services Commission v Rasool CA 5-Mar-2008
The defendant had in 1993 obtained legal aid. Work was done but the certificate was then revoked. The Commission sought repayment of the sums paid on account to his solicitors. He replied that the claim was out of time. The Commission argued that . .
CitedLeivers v Barber Walker and Co Ltd CA 1943
Goddard LJ (dissenting) said that section 2(1)(d) of the 1939 Act changed the former position altogether, leaving the provision for limitation as regards specialties to apply only to deeds and other documents under seal (or to claims other than for . .
CitedCentral Electricity Generating Board v Halifax Corporation HL 1963
Under the 1947 Act, the assets of electricity undertakings were transferred to to electricity boards. Property held by local authorities as authorised undertakers should, on vesting day, vest in the relevant board. A question arose as to whether . .
CitedThe Child Poverty Action Group v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions SC 8-Dec-2010
The Action Group had obtained a declaration that, where an overpayment of benefits had arisen due to a miscalculation by the officers of the Department, any process of recovering the overpayment must be by the Act, and that the Department could not . .
CitedChild Poverty Action Group, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary Of State for Work and Pensions CA 14-Oct-2009
CPAG appealed against a refusal of a declaration that the respondent could use only the 1992 Act to recover overpayment of benefits where there had been neither misrepresentation nor non-disclosure.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and the court . .
CitedDoherty and others v Birmingham City Council HL 30-Jul-2008
The House was asked ‘whether a local authority can obtain a summary order for possession against an occupier of a site which it owns and has been used for many years as a gipsy and travellers’ caravan site. His licence to occupy the site has come to . .
CitedBarber v London Borough of Croydon CA 11-Feb-2010
The tenant who suffered learning and behavioural difficulties appealed against an order for possession of his council flat. He had become aggressive with the caretaker. The council sought possession, and he defended the claim saying that the council . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromLegal Services Commission v Henthorn CA 30-Nov-2011
The Commission sought to recover what it said were payments made on account to the respondent barrister, but only after many years had passed. The Commission argued that time only began to run once it requested repayment.
Held: The appeal . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Legal Professions, Equity, Limitation, Legal Aid

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.428706

Spargo v North Essex District Health Authority: QBD 1996

A plaintiff’s knowledge that her injury could be attributed to hypoxia, is not knowledge that the injury is attributable to the act or omission alleged to constitute negligence as might be pleaded in a statement of claim and no ordinary plaintiff could be expected to know that a birth injury was attributable to acts or omissions of that sort until advised by an expert.

Collins J
[1996] 7 Med LR 219
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromSpargo v North Essex District Health Authority CA 13-Mar-1997
The test of ‘When a plaintiff became aware of the cause of an injury’ is a subjective test of what passed through plaintiff’s mind. ‘(1) the knowledge required to satisfy s14(1)(b) is a broad knowledge of the essence of the causally relevant act or . .
CitedO’Driscoll v Dudley Health Authority CA 30-Apr-1998
The plaintiff sought damages for the negligence of the respondent in her care at birth. Years later the family concluded that her condition was a result of negligence. They waited until she was 21, when they mistakenly believed that she became an . .
CitedFarraj and Another v King’s Healthcare NHS Trust and Another QBD 26-May-2006
The claimants sought damages after the birth of their child with a severe hereditary disease which they said the defendant hospital had failed to diagnose after testing for that disease. The hospital sought a contribution from the company CSL who . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Professional Negligence

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.186436

Duke of Brunswick v Harmer: QBD 2 Nov 1849

On 19 September 1830 an article was published in the Weekly Dispatch. The limitation period for libel was six years. The article defamed the Duke of Brunswick. Seventeen years after its publication an agent of the Duke purchased a back number containing the article from the Weekly Dispatch’s office. Another copy was obtained from the British Museum. The Duke sued on those two publications. The defendant contended that the cause of action was time barred, relying on the original publication date.
Held: The delivery of a copy of the newspaper to the plaintiff’s agent constituted a separate publication in respect of which suit could be brought, and it was not necessary to tell the jury, in estimating the damages as to such matter, to take into consideration the fact that the only publication proved had been the sale to the agent: ‘The defendant, who, on the application of a stranger, delivers to him the writing which libels a third person, publishes the libellous matter to him, though he may have been sent for the purpose of procuring the work by that third person. So far as in him lies, he lowers the reputation of the principal in the mind of the agent, which, although that of an agent, is as capable of being affected by the assertions as if he were a stranger. The act is complete by the delivery: and its legal character is not altered, either by the plaintiff’s procurement or by the subsequent handing over of the writing to him.’

Coleridge J
(1849) 14 QB 185, [1849] EngR 915, (1849) 117 ER 75
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLoutchansky v The Times Newspapers Ltd and Others (Nos 2 to 5) CA 5-Dec-2001
Two actions for defamation were brought by the claimant against the defendant. The publication reported in detail allegations made against the claimant of criminal activities including money-laundering on a vast scale. They admitted the defamatory . .
CitedGutnick v Dow Jones 10-Dec-2002
(High Court of Australia) The Court rejected a challenge, in the context of Internet libel, to the applicability of such established principles as that vouchsafed in Duke of Brunswick: ‘It was suggested that the World Wide Web was different from . .
No longer Good lawDow Jones and Co Inc v Jameel CA 3-Feb-2005
Presumption of Damage in Defamation is rebuttable
The defendant complained that the presumption in English law that the victim of a libel had suffered damage was incompatible with his right to a fair trial. They said the statements complained of were repetitions of statements made by US . .
MentionedSteinberg v Pritchard Englefield (A Firm) and Another CA 3-Mar-2005
The defendant appealed dismissal of his defence to an action in defamation.
Held: The court proceeded in his absence, discerning two grounds of appeal from the papers. He had suggested that he awaited pro bono representation but was by . .
CitedBerezovsky v Forbes Inc and Michaels; Glouchkov v Same HL 16-May-2000
Plaintiffs who lived in Russia sought damages for defamation against an American magazine with a small distribution in England. Both plaintiffs had real connections with and reputations in England. A judgment in Russia would do nothing to repair the . .
See AlsoThe Duke Of Brunswick v Harmer 21-Jun-1850
If JH and MY be registered at the stamp office as ‘the sole proprietors’ of a newspaper, ‘that is to say, the said JH as legal owner as mortgagee, and MY as owner of the equity of redemption,’ this is sufficient to fix JH as a proprietor of the . .
CitedTimes Newspapers Ltd (Nos. 1 And 2) v The United Kingdom ECHR 10-Mar-2009
The applicant alleged that the rule under United Kingdom law whereby each time material is downloaded from the Internet a new cause of action in libel proceedings accrued (‘the Internet publication rule’) constituted an unjustifiable and . .
OutmodedGregoire v GP Putnam’s Sons 1948
(New York Court of Appeals) A book had been placed on sale in 1941, but was still being reprinted and sold in 1946.
Held: The rule in Duke of Brunswick v Harmer was formulated ‘in an era which long antedated the modern process of mass . .
CitedFlood v Times Newspapers Ltd QBD 2-Oct-2009
The defendant had published a story in its newspaper. At that time it attracted Reynolds qualified privilege. After the circumstances changed, the paper offered an updating item. That offer was rejected as inadequate.
Held: The qualified . .
MentionedHays Plc v Hartley QBD 17-May-2010
Mr Hartley operated a news agency, and provided to the publisher of the Sunday Mirror, MGN Ltd, allegations of racism that had been levelled at the claimant company by former employees. The allegations were reported in an article headed ”KKK . .
CitedReed Elsevier Uk Ltd (T/A Lexisnexis) and Another v Bewry CA 30-Oct-2014
Appeal from a decision granting the claimant’s application made pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the limitation period in his proceedings for libel and dismissing the defendants’ application to strike out the claimant’s . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation, Limitation, Damages

Leading Case

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.181216

John Gordon of Auchanachy, and Alexander Gordon, His Trustee v Miss Grizel Ogilvie: HL 22 Mar 1762

Reduction – Transaction – Res Judicata – Representation – Prescription.-
Circumstances in which transaction with predecessor, was held to bar the challenge of the heir, though the deed of renunciation embodying this transaction was also sought to be reduced; and the heir insisted that he was not bound by his mother’s deed, he not representing her, but passing by and claiming right from a more remote predecessor. Also, that res judicata barred action; but plea of prescription repelled, in respect of interruption.

[1762] UKHL 2 – Paton – 61, (1762) 2 Paton 61
Bailii
Scotland

Limitation, Litigation Practice

Updated: 11 January 2022; Ref: scu.560600

Bewry v Reed Elseveir (UK) Ltd and Another: QBD 10 Oct 2013

The claimant had begin proceedings against the defendant legal publishers, saying that their summary of a cash had brought was defamatory. He now sought leave to extend the limitation period for his claim, and the defendants argued that, given the very limited publication, the case was not worth pursuing.
Held: There had been considerable delay, but this was largely explained by the material being available only to subscribers. The delay had not created any significant prejudice to the defendant. Similarly, the Jameel application failed.

Moloney QC HHJ
[2013] EWHC 3182 (QB)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 32A
Citing:
See AlsoBewry, Regina (on The Application of) v Norfolk County Council Admn 6-Oct-2010
The claimant had had foster care of two children. They were with temporary respite placements when the respondent decided to place in a different foster setting but without consulting the claimant or otherwise giving him notice.
Held: (ex . .
CitedSteedman, Clohosy, Smith, Kiernan, Newman, Creevy, Anderson v The British Broadcasting Corporation CA 23-Oct-2001
The claimants had issued defamation proceedings. The defendant said they were out of time, having begun the action more than one year after the alleged publication, but accepted that they had not been prejudiced in their defence. The court refused . .
CitedBuckley v Dalziel QBD 3-May-2007
There was a heated dispute between neighbours, culminating in some generous or perhaps over-generous pruning by the claimant of the defendant’s trees and shrubs on the boundaries. The defendants reported the matter to the police. Both Mr and Mrs . .
CitedAdelson and Another v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 19-Dec-2007
Applications were launched with in defamation proceedings to seek to recover damages for parties who had not previously been part of the proceedings.
Held: The amendments were refused. The new claimants were now out of time, and it was clear . .
CitedBrady v Norman QBD 26-May-2010
The claimant appealed against refusal of the Master to extend the 12 month limitation period in his proposed defamation claim. The allegations related to a dispute at an Aslef barbecue, and later of forgery. The claimant was a former General . .

Cited by:
Appeal fromReed Elsevier Uk Ltd (T/A Lexisnexis) and Another v Bewry CA 30-Oct-2014
Appeal from a decision granting the claimant’s application made pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the limitation period in his proceedings for libel and dismissing the defendants’ application to strike out the claimant’s . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation, Limitation

Updated: 10 January 2022; Ref: scu.560108

JN v Staatssecretaris Van Veiligheid En Justitie: ECJ 15 Feb 2016

ECJ Reference for a preliminary ruling – Urgent preliminary ruling procedure – Standards for the reception of applicants for international protection – Directive 2008/115/EC – Lawful residence – Directive 2013/32/EU – Article 9 – Right to remain in a Member State – Directive 2013/33/EU – Point (e) of the first subparagraph of Article 8(3) – Detention – Protection of national security or public order – Validity – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Articles 6 and 52 – Limitation – Proportionality

ECLI:EU:C:2016:84, [2016] EUECJ C-601/15, [2016] WLR(D) 166, [2016] 1 WLR 3027
Bailii, WLRD
Directive 2013/32/EU 9, Directive 2013/33/EU 8(3)(e), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 6 52
European

Immigration, Human Rights, Limitation

Updated: 10 January 2022; Ref: scu.559879

Barton v Wright Hassall Llp: SC 21 Feb 2018

The claimant, a litigant in person purported to serve his statement of claim by email, but had not first sought the defendant’s agreement as required. The solicitors allowed the limitation period to expire without acknowledging service. The claimant now appealed against his claim being struck out for limitation.
Held: The appeal failed. The decision was one made in the discretion of the court. What constitutes ‘good reason’ for validating the non-compliant service of a claim form is essentially a matter of factual evaluation. The main factors, the weight of which will vary with the circumstances, are likely to be: (i) whether the claimant took reasonable steps to serve in accordance with the rules; (ii) whether the defendant or his solicitor knew of the contents of the claim form when it expired; (iii) what, if any, prejudice the defendant would suffer from validation of the non-compliant service.
‘there is a disciplinary factor in the decision whether to impose or relieve from sanctions for non-compliance with rules or orders of the court, which has become increasingly significant in recent years with the growing pressure of business in the courts. CPR rule 6.15 is rather different. It is directed specifically to the rules governing service of a claim form. They give rise to special considerations which do not necessarily apply to other formal documents or to other rules or orders of the court. The main difference is that the disciplinary factor is less important. The rules governing service of a claim form do not impose duties, in the sense in which, say, the rules governing the time for the service of evidence, impose a duty. They are simply conditions on which the court will take cognisance of the matter at all. Although the court may dispense with service altogether or make interlocutory orders before it has happened if necessary, as a general rule service of originating process is the act by which the defendant is subjected to the court’s jurisdiction.’
Otherwise: Barton v Wright Hassal Llp

Baroness Hale of Richmond, PSC Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath, Lord Briggs JJSC
[2018] UKSC 12, [2018] 1 WLR 1119, [2018] WLR(D) 116, [2018] 3 All ER 487, UKSC 2016/0136
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary, SC Summary Video, Video 22 Nov 2017 am, Video 22 Nov 2017 pm, WLRD
Human Rights Act 1998
England and Wales
Citing:
Application for LeaveBarton v Wright Hassall Solicitors Llp CA 16-Jun-2015
Application for leave to appeal . .
At CABarton v Wright Hassall Llp CA 23-Mar-2016
Application under CPR 6.15(2) for an order that steps already taken to bring a claim form to the attention of the defendant, but falling short of good service under the CPR, shall count as good service. . .
CitedPrince Abdulaziz v Apex Global Management Ltd and Another SC 26-Nov-2014
The appellant was involved in very substantial litigation with the respondents. As a member of the Saudi Royal family he said that by convention he was not allowed to sign a witness statement, and appealed inter alia against orders requiring him to . .
CitedDenton and Others v TH White Ltd and Others CA 4-Jul-2014
(De Laval Ltd, Part 20 defendant) (Practice Note) Several parties applied for relief from sanctions, having been refused at first instance:
Held: The court identified a three stage process. It should first calculate the seriousness and or . .
CitedElmes v Hygrade Food Products Plc CA 24-Jan-2001
Where a claim form is served in time but is incorrectly served (in this case on the defendants’ insurers instead of on the defendants themselves), there is no power in the court under CPR 3.10(b) (remedy of errors of procedure) or CPR 6.8 (service . .
CitedAbela and Others v Baadarani SC 26-Jun-2013
The claimants sought damages alleging fraud in a company share purchase. They said that their lawyer had secretly been working for the sellers. The claim form had been issued, but the claimant had delayed in requesting permission for its service . .
CitedPower v Meloy Whittle Robinson Solicitors CA 2-Jul-2014
The court itself had failed to effect proper service because of an administrative error.
Held: The Court rejected the submission that the claimant need not necessarily demonstrate that there was no way in which he could have effected service . .
CitedNata Lee Ltd v Abid and Another CA 18-Dec-2014
The Court pointed to the need to treat litigants in person in the same was as others: ‘ the fact that a party (whether an individual or a corporate body) is not professionally represented is not of itself a reason for the disapplication of rules, . .
CitedHysaj v Secretary of State for The Home Department CA 16-Dec-2014
Applications for extensions of time to file an appeal should be taken the same as for applications for relief from sanctions, and should attract the same rigorous approach. There is no good reason to have a different approach for public law cases. . .

Cited by:
CitedCameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd SC 20-Feb-2019
The Court was asked in what circumstances is it permissible to sue an unnamed defendant? The respondent was injured when her car collided with another. The care was insured but by a driver giving a false name. The car owner refused to identify him. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Human Rights, Limitation

Updated: 10 January 2022; Ref: scu.605315

His Majesty’s Advocate, on Behalf of His Majesty and The Public v Jean Hay, Widow of John Cuthbert of Castlehill, and Her Children: HL 24 Apr 1758

Wadset – Prescription – Interruption.-
A bond was granted to a party, and had lain over until within a few months of 40 years, when decree cognitionis causa, followed by decree of adjudication, were obtained. A claim was made on this debt 40 years after the date of this adjudication: Held, that calling the creditor in an action of reduction, declarator, and extinction of the debt, raised by a co-creditor, to which the debtor was no party, within the 40 years, and appearance of the creditor made therein, with production of his bond and adjudication to support his debt, were not sufficient to interrupt the negative prescription, in terms of the statute thereanent.

[1758] UKHL 2 – Paton – 266
Bailii
Scotland

Limitation

Updated: 09 January 2022; Ref: scu.558249

Abela and Others v Baadarani and Another: ChD 28 Jan 2011

The claimant sought damages alleging inter alia fraud by the defendant in a company sale between the parties. The defendant now sought to have set aside the service on him in Lebanon, saying that The English court was not the forum coveniens. He also said that the claim was out of time.
Held: The application was rejected. Pursuant to CPR 6.37(5)(b) and/or 6.15(2), the steps taken to bring the claim form to the attention of the respondent amounted to good service of the claim form.

Sir Edward Evans-Lombe
[2011] EWHC 116 (Ch)
Bailii
Civil Procedure Rules 6.37(5)(b) 6.1592), Limitation Act 1980 32(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromAbela and Others v Baadarani CA 15-Dec-2011
The claimant alleged fraud against the defendant. The defendant now appealed against an order allowing service of the proceedings on him in Lebanon. . .
At first instanceAbela and Others v Baadarani SC 26-Jun-2013
The claimants sought damages alleging fraud in a company share purchase. They said that their lawyer had secretly been working for the sellers. The claim form had been issued, but the claimant had delayed in requesting permission for its service . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Litigation Practice, Limitation

Updated: 08 January 2022; Ref: scu.428371

Lilley v Chartered Institute of Management Accountants: ChD 15 Mar 2013

The claimant had submitted articles to a magazine for publication by the defendants, but now alleged that further publications by the defendant infringed ghis copyright. The defendant argued that the claims were time-barred.
Held: Certain claims were struck out.

Roth J
[2013] EWHC 1354 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales

Intellectual Property, Limitation

Updated: 08 January 2022; Ref: scu.556826

County Leasing Asset Management Ltd and Others v Hawkes: CA 4 Dec 2015

The court was asked as to the principles applicable to the court’s discretion, when making an order for the restoration to the register of a dissolved company, to order that the running of time for the bringing of claims by the company for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 should be suspended during all or part of the period when the company was dissolved.

Jackson, Briggs, King LJJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 1251
Bailii
Companies Act 2006 1029, Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales

Company, Limitation

Updated: 08 January 2022; Ref: scu.556787

Ministry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians: CA 9 Dec 2015

‘This appeal raises a short but elusive point concerning the manner in which the English Court applies a foreign law relating to limitation when required to do so by section 1 of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984’

Lord Dyson MR, Tomplinson, Vos LJJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 1241, [2015] WLR(D) 515, [2016] 1 WLR 1290, [2016] 2 All ER 300
Bailii, WLRD
Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from QBDIraqi Civilian Litigation v Ministry of Defence QBD 26-Jan-2015
The court considered limitation issues as an interim issue in this claim and particularly as it was affected by Iraqi law.
Held: The effective period of CPA 17 ended on 31 December 2008. No claim had been brought relating to any alleged act or . .

Cited by:
Appeal from CAMinistry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians SC 12-May-2016
Iraqi citizens claimed to have suffered unlawful detention and/or physical maltreatment from British armed forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. The claims were brought in tort in England against the Ministry of Defence, but the torts were governed . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

International, Limitation

Updated: 08 January 2022; Ref: scu.556790

Mortgage Express v Countrywide Surveyors Ltd: CA 29 Oct 2015

This appeal turns on a short point of construction of a written agreement between the First Claimant and the Defendant (the ‘Standstill Agreement’). This provided that time would be suspended for the purposes of any limitation defence in relation to claims made by the Claimants.

Arden, Gloster, Simon LJJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 1110
Bailii
England and Wales

Contract, Limitation

Updated: 05 January 2022; Ref: scu.554106

Blakemores Ldp v Scott and Another: CA 7 Oct 2015

The court was asked whether the judge was right to grant summary judgment striking down the first and third appellants’ negligence claims against their solicitors on the grounds that they were issued more than 3 years after they acquired ‘the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage’ within the meaning of sections 14A(5) and (6) of the Limitation Act 1980.

Moore-Bick, Underhill, Voss LJJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 999
Bailii
England and Wales

Limitation, Professional Negligence

Updated: 04 January 2022; Ref: scu.553110

Parissis v Blair Court St Johns Wood Management Ltd: UTLC 11 Nov 2014

UTLC LANDLORD AND TENANT – service charges – application by tenant under section 27A of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 for a determination of the service charges payable in respect of periods more than six years prior to the date of application – preliminary decision of LVT finding appellant time barred on basis of unreasonable delay – whether laches or Limitation Act 1980 applies to bar the application

Huskinson HHJ
[2014] UKUT 503 (LC)
Bailii
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 27A
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedWarwickshire Hamlets Ltd and Another v Gedden and Others UTLC 26-Mar-2010
UTLC SERVICE CHARGES – jurisdiction of leasehold valuation tribunal – construction of lease – whether rent payable by a management company in respect of the common parts recoverable as part of the service charge . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Limitation

Updated: 04 January 2022; Ref: scu.552345

Sunrider Corporation (T/A Sunrider International) v Vitasoy International Holdings Ltd: ChD 22 Jan 2007

An application had been made to have the trade mark declared invalid. The owner replied saying that the five year period during which a mark might be challenged had expired.
Held: The five year period commenced not from the date when the application for registration of the mark was made, but from the date when the registration was entered. Accordingly the challenge was not out of time.

Warren J
[2007] EWHC 37 (Ch), Times 27-Feb-2007
Bailii
Trade Marks Act 1994 40(3), Council Directive 89/104/EEV (OJ 1989 L40/1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBudejovicky Budvar Narodni Podnik v Anheuser-Busch Inc CA 20-Oct-2009
The parties had long disputed the use of the trade marks ‘Bud’ and ‘Budweiser’ for their beers. The claimant now said that the defendants had made an abusive registration under the 1994 Act, by requesting a declaration that the registration by the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Intellectual Property, Limitation

Updated: 04 January 2022; Ref: scu.248254

Arcadia Group Brands Ltd and Others v Visa Inc and Others: CA 5 Aug 2015

Appeal by the claimants from the order of Simon J by which he ordered on summary judgment applications by the defendants that (1) the claimants are not entitled to rely on section 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980; and the claims are time barred pursuant to sections 2 and 9 of the 1980 Act insofar as they seek damages or restitution in respect of a period earlier than six years prior to the commencement of the proceedings and are dismissed; and (2) references to any earlier claims, dates and periods are struck out pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) or amended pursuant to CPR 17.1(2).

Sir Terence Etherton Ch, Richards, Patten LJJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 883, [2015] WLR(D) 35
Bailii, WLRD
Limitation Act 1980 3291)(b), Civil Procedure Rules 3.4(2)(a) 17.1(2)
England and Wales

Limitation, Litigation Practice

Updated: 03 January 2022; Ref: scu.551018

Expofrut Sa and Others v Melville Services Inc and Another: ComC 8 Jul 2015

Application by the Claimants for an extension of time of some three years and eight months in respect of the expiry of the one year Hague/Hague Visby limitation period in accordance with the terms of Arbitration Clause 19 in the relevant Charter Party incorporated by the relevant Bills of Lading. The Claimants pursued their claims in respect of damage to a consignment of fresh pears shipped from Argentina to Antwerp on board the AFRICA REEFER in the Belgian courts, which have now found that the claims were required to be brought in arbitration.

Burton J
[2015] EWHC 1950 (Comm)
Bailii

Arbitration, Limitation

Updated: 02 January 2022; Ref: scu.550070

Chinnock v Wasbrough and Another: CA 7 May 2015

Appeal against a decision that (a) the barrister and solicitors who advised the claimant to abandon an earlier clinical negligence claim were not negligent and (b) the claimant’s present proceedings are statute barred.

Longmore, Jackson LJJ, Roth J
[2015] EWCA Civ 441
Bailii
England and Wales

Professional Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.546454

Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis v Meekey: Admn 12 Jan 2021

The claimant had been convicted and served his time for possession of a large collection of obsolete or antique firearms. He now sought their return. The police replied that he was in any event out of time.
Held: ‘Section 3(2) of the 1980 Act is, at least in the context of that Act, a somewhat unusual provision. Rather than simply providing a defendant with a defence to a claim (see and compare for example, the effect of sections 2 and 5 of the 1980 Act), section 3(2) goes further: where goods have been converted, and the period of limitation has expired, the owner’s title to the goods is removed. In this way, section 3(2) of the 1980 Act has an effect going beyond the law of tort, and beyond affecting only the parties to a claim for conversion.’ He was therefore no longer the owner so as to assert a claim under the 1897 Act.

Mr Justice Swift
[2021] EWHC 34 (Admin), [2021] 2 WLR 648, [2021] QB 773
Bailii
Firearms Act 1968 21(1), Police (Property) Act 1897 1(1), Limitation Act 1980 3
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSchwarzschild v Harrods Ltd QBD 19-Mar-2008
The Claimant alleged against Harrods Limited the tort of conversion in accordance with s.2(2) of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977. The claim relates to certain personal items (principally jewellery) which she inherited and which for many . .
CitedSullivan v Earl of Caithness QBD 1976
The defendant who lived in Oxfordshire stored his guns at his mother’s property in Surrey because it was more secure. The magistrates held that he was not in possession of the guns in Oxfordshire. The prosecutor appealed.
Held: The appeal . .
CitedRegina v North CACD 9-Mar-2001
The present appeal turns on the meaning and scope of the concept ‘has in his possession’ in the subsection.
Held: The court applied the conclusion stated in Sullivan, stating that the notion of what amounted to possession ought to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.657315

Schwarzschild v Harrods Ltd: QBD 19 Mar 2008

The Claimant alleged against Harrods Limited the tort of conversion in accordance with s.2(2) of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977. The claim relates to certain personal items (principally jewellery) which she inherited and which for many years remained in a safe deposit box on the Defendant’s premises.
Held: On the facts, Eady J concluded that the letter relied on as the relevant demand was not a demand at all, both because it was not an unequivocal request for return of the property and because the request was not ‘ . . specific as to the property being sought. It was not, for example, possible at that stage even to define the items compendiously, by reference to the ‘the contents of the box’, since they had been removed and mixed with other property more than three years before’

The Honourable Mr Justice Eady
[2008] EWHC 521 (QB)
Bailii
Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedCommissioner of Police of The Metropolis v Meekey Admn 12-Jan-2021
The claimant had been convicted and served his time for possession of a large collection of obsolete or antique firearms. He now sought their return. The police replied that he was in any event out of time.
Held: ‘Section 3(2) of the 1980 Act . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Limitation

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.266529

Tesco Stores Ltd and Others v Mastercard Incorporated and Others: ChD 24 Apr 2015

The claimant alleged breach by the several defendants of EU and domestic competion law in relation to the MasterCard Defendants’ imposition of multilateral interchange fees (‘MIFs’) in the course of operating the MasterCard credit card system. Four of the defendants now sought the summary striking out of the claim as being without hope of success and out of time.

Asplin DBE J
[2015] EWHC 1145 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales

Commercial, Limitation

Updated: 29 December 2021; Ref: scu.545926

Heron Bros Ltd v Central Bedfordshire Council: TCC 20 Mar 2015

Application to strike out a claim on the ground that the claim form was not served within the prescribed time limit. The claim is a procurement challenge in which the Claimant claims damages and a declaration of ineffectiveness in respect of the award of a contract by the Defendant for the construction of a leisure centre in its area. The contract has been signed and construction is underway.
Held: Though bad in form the failings were properly to be cured by amendment.

Edwards-Stuart J
[2015] EWHC 604 (TCC), [2015] PTSR 1146, [2015] WLR(D) 137
Bailii, WLRD
Public Contracts Regulations 2006
England and Wales
Cited by:
See AlsoHeron Bros Ltd v Central Bedfordshire Council (No 2) TCC 17-Apr-2015
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Construction, Local Government, Limitation

Updated: 29 December 2021; Ref: scu.544615

Khan v Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive (T/A Nexus): UTLC 27 Jan 2015

UTLC COMPENSATION – LIMITATION – whether acquiring authority estopped from relying on limitation defence by continuation of negotiations and advance payment made after expiry of limitation period – section 9, Limitation Act 1980 – notice of reference dismissed

[2015] UKUT 43 (LC)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 9
England and Wales

Land, Limitation

Updated: 27 December 2021; Ref: scu.542518

G-Star Raw Cv v Rhodi Ltd and Others: ChD 6 Feb 2015

G-Star sought injunctions, orders for delivery up, an inquiry as to damages or an account of profits, and other relief in respect of alleged infringement of the United Kingdom unregistered design rights in the design of a pair of contemporary jean trousers known as the ‘Arc Pant’. The Defendants contended that the rights in question entered the licence of right period under section 237 of the CDPA on 1 January 2014, such that no injunction restraining infringement is now available to G-Star on any view.

Richard Spearman QC
[2015] EWHC 216 (Ch)
Bailii
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 237

Intellectual Property, Limitation

Updated: 27 December 2021; Ref: scu.542314

Iraqi Civilian Litigation v Ministry of Defence: QBD 26 Jan 2015

The court considered limitation issues as an interim issue in this claim and particularly as it was affected by Iraqi law.
Held: The effective period of CPA 17 ended on 31 December 2008. No claim had been brought relating to any alleged act or omission of British Forces after 31 December 2008. It was agreed that the jurisdictional immunity which CPA 17 afforded for acts which occurred before 31 December 2008 was of enduring effect. It therefore it was been impossible for any of the Claimants in this litigation to bring their claims in the Iraqi courts.

Leggatt J
[2015] EWHC 116 (QB)
Bailii
Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from QBDMinistry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians CA 9-Dec-2015
‘This appeal raises a short but elusive point concerning the manner in which the English Court applies a foreign law relating to limitation when required to do so by section 1 of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984’ . .
At QBDMinistry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians SC 12-May-2016
Iraqi citizens claimed to have suffered unlawful detention and/or physical maltreatment from British armed forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. The claims were brought in tort in England against the Ministry of Defence, but the torts were governed . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, International

Updated: 27 December 2021; Ref: scu.541766

Yorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another: CA 24 Oct 2008

The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order by normal means is not barred by section 20(1), and unlike the position under a legal mortgage, the creditor’s rights are not barred after 12 years because the holder of a charging order does not have a right to possession such that time can run against it under section 15, and extinction of title cannot therefore occur under section 17. There was no need to distinguish between legal and equitable mortgages and Ezekiel v Orakpo was binding. The defendant’s argument failed.

[2008] EWCA Civ 1156, [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 164, [2009] BPIR 200, [2009] CP Rep 7, [2008] 3 EGLR 7, [2008] 43 EG 195, [2008] 50 EG 74, [2009] 1 P and CR 16
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 20(1)20(5) 24, Charging Orders Act 1979 1(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedEzekiel v Orakpo CA 16-Sep-1996
A charging order was made in 1982 to secure pounds 20,000 under a judgment given in 1979. The judgment creditor did not seek to enforce the charging order until almost 12 years had elapsed since the making of the charging order. An order for . .
CitedNational Westminster Bank Plc v Ashe (Trustee In Bankruptcy of Djabar Babai) CA 8-Feb-2008
The mortgagees had made no payments under the charge for more than twelve years, and had remained in possession throughout. They argued that the bank were prevented from now seeking to enforce the charge. The bank argued that the possession had not . .
CitedEdmunds v Waugh 1866
. .
CitedHolmes v Cowcher ChD 1970
The court accepted the proposition put forward by counsel for the mortgagee that on an application by the mortgagor to redeem the mortgage, all the arrears of interest (amounting to almost 10 years) had to be paid as a condition of redemption, not . .
CitedLowsley and Another v Forbes (Trading As I E Design Services) HL 29-Jul-1998
The plaintiffs, with the leave of the court, had obtained garnishee and charging orders nisi against the debtor 11 and a half years after they had obtained a consent judgment.
Held: An application by the judgment debtor to set aside the orders . .
CitedHughes v Kelly 1843
(Ireland) . .
CitedPoole Corporation v Moody CA 1945
In relation to a power of sale, the subsection was treated by the Court solely as a provision which excluded the operation of section 2 in claims for equitable relief, without any mention of the possibility of it applying the section by analogy. . .
CitedGotham v Doodes CA 25-Jul-2006
The former bankrupt resisted sale of his property by the trustee, saying that enforcement was barred by limitation. He and his wife bought the property in early 1988, and he was made bankrupt in October 1988. He was dischaged from bankruptcy in . .
CitedDesnousse v London Borough of Newham and others CA 17-May-2006
The occupier had been granted a temporary licence by the authority under the homelessness provisions whilst it made its assessment. The assessment concluded that she had become homeless intentionally, and therefore terminated the licence and set out . .
CitedCroydon Unique Ltd v Wright and Crombie, and Crombie Intervenors CA 29-Jul-1999
The beneficiary of a charging order had standing to intervene in proceedings leading to the forfeiture of a lease even several years after the lease had been forfeit. It was an interest derived from the lessee’s interest and a proper basis. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Land

Updated: 25 December 2021; Ref: scu.277146

Reed Elsevier Uk Ltd (T/A Lexisnexis) and Another v Bewry: CA 30 Oct 2014

Appeal from a decision granting the claimant’s application made pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the limitation period in his proceedings for libel and dismissing the defendants’ application to strike out the claimant’s claim under CPR rule 3.4(2).
Held: The defendant’s appeal succeeded.
The judge had incorrectly assessed the reasons for the delay. The requirement on a claimant to justify an extension of the limitation period was substantial, and the claimant had failed to discharge the burden.
As to the Jameel application, the appeal succeeded: ‘There are a miniscule number of publications, it cannot be said that the claim is brought to vindicate his reputation in respect of those publications, or that any vindication would inure if he did so. Damages would be minimal. The publications complained of have long since been taken down, and the defendants have made it clear they will not be republished. There is no threat therefore of any wider publication and there can be no question of any need for an injunction.’

Lewison, Macur, Sharp LJJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 1411, [2015] EMLR 6, [2014] WLR(D) 474, [2015] 1 WLR 2565
Bailii, WLRD
Limitation Act 1980 32A
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromBewry v Reed Elseveir (UK) Ltd and Another QBD 10-Oct-2013
The claimant had begin proceedings against the defendant legal publishers, saying that their summary of a cash had brought was defamatory. He now sought leave to extend the limitation period for his claim, and the defendants argued that, given the . .
CitedDuke of Brunswick v Harmer QBD 2-Nov-1849
brunswick_harmerQBD1849
On 19 September 1830 an article was published in the Weekly Dispatch. The limitation period for libel was six years. The article defamed the Duke of Brunswick. Seventeen years after its publication an agent of the Duke purchased a back number . .
CitedSteedman, Clohosy, Smith, Kiernan, Newman, Creevy, Anderson v The British Broadcasting Corporation CA 23-Oct-2001
The claimants had issued defamation proceedings. The defendant said they were out of time, having begun the action more than one year after the alleged publication, but accepted that they had not been prejudiced in their defence. The court refused . .
CitedDow Jones and Co Inc v Jameel CA 3-Feb-2005
Presumption of Damage in Defamation is rebuttable
The defendant complained that the presumption in English law that the victim of a libel had suffered damage was incompatible with his right to a fair trial. They said the statements complained of were repetitions of statements made by US . .
CitedHalford v Brooks CA 1991
The defendant had been tried for murder. The plaintiff now sought civil damages. The defendant replied that the case was brought out of time, and now appealed against the court’s extension of the time limit on the basis that the plaintiff had not . .
CitedCoad v Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Health Authority CA 17-Jul-1996
A nurse suffered a back injury in 1983 in the course of her employment. She left the employment of the health authority in either 1990 or 1991. The judge had accepted her evidence that she did not know that she had a right of action against her . .
CitedBrady v Norman CA 9-Feb-2011
The claimant sought to have disapplied the limitation period in his defamation claim. The claimant said that in the case of Cain, the Steedman case had not been cited, and that the decisions were incompatible, and that Cain was to be prefered.
Defamation, Limitation

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.538192

Attorney-General v Tomline (No 3): ChD 1877

For more than 20 years the Crown had been in possession of land forming part of a manor in Suffolk owned in fee simple by Colonel Tomline, who then entered the land in order to dig out mineral material (coprolites-fossilised dinosaur dung). The Crown had entered the land upon the expiry of a licence granted to the Lieutenant-Governor of a nearby fort, Alexander Mair, for life if he so long continued governor, which he ceased to be in 1811. The Crown was in possession of the land for more than forty years and claimed possessory title, and te right to control extraction of coprolites. .
Held: The claim succeeded. Colonel Tomline, as lord of the manor, had an absolute power of veto over the digging up of the coprolites, and ‘The value of that veto appears to me to be the value of the coprolites less so much money as would induce a third person to get them, that is, the measure of damages would be the net returns from the sale of the coprolites less such a sum of money by way of profit as would induce a third person to undertake the enterprise. That I consider to be the proper measure of damage in this case.’

Fry J
(1877) 5 Ch D 750
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRoberts v Crown Estate Commissioners CA 20-Feb-2008
The commissioners sought to claim title to a foreshore by adverse possession. The claimant asserted that he had acquired title in his capacity of Lord Marcher of Magor which had owned the bed of the estuary since the Norman Conquest, and that the . .
Appeal FromAttorney-General v Tomline (No 3) CA 1880
The Crown claimed land by adverse possession. It had continued in possession for many years after a licence had expired.
Held: The Crown had acquired a fee simple by adverse possession, and not simply a copyhold title. James LJ: ‘From the time . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation, Constitutional

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.264651

Statek Corporation v Alford and Another: ChD 17 Jan 2008

Evans-Lombe J said: ‘In my judgment, section 21(1) of the Limitation Act 1980, following the decision of Mr Justice Danckwerts in the G.L. Baker Ltd case and the obiter dicta of Lord Esher and Bowen LJ in Soar v Ashwell, is to be construed as applying to accessories to the fraudulent breaches of trust of others with the result that no period of limitation is applicable to claims against them. I do not read the decision of the House of Lords in the Dubai Aluminium case as authority to the contrary.’

Evans-Lombe J
[2008] EWHC 32 (Ch)
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 21(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria QBD 8-Apr-2011
The claimant had been defrauded by a customer of the defendant bank. He brought a claim against the bank, saying that they knew or ought to have known of the fraudster’s activities, and were liable. The Bank denied that the UK courts had . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Company, Limitation

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.263773

Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding and Another: ChD 5 Sep 2014

The company sought to recover from the defendants, two former directors.
Held: The claim was statute barred.
Hodge QC dealt with the claimant’s reliance on section 32: ‘That leaves the claimant’s reliance upon section 32. There the difficulties that the claimant faces are that there are no facts sufficiently asserted to give rise, in my judgment, to any realistic prospect of relying upon either limb of section 32 of the 1980 Act. Given the knowledge and involvement on the part, in particular of the company’s auditors, I fail to see how it can be asserted either (1) that there was any deliberate commission of a breach of duty on the part of the defendants; or (2) that there had been any deliberate concealment from the claimant company of facts relevant to the claimant’s alleged right of action. I am afraid, from Mr Latimer’s point of view, that I just do not see how the claimant company can begin to get home in relation to either of those matters. In view of the involvement of the accountants and solicitors, there is no realistic prospect of establishing either the deliberate commission of a breach of duty or the deliberate concealment of any fact relevant to the claimant’s right of action.’

Hodge QC HHJ
[2014] EWHC 3356 (Ch)
Bailii
Companies Act 2006, Limitation Act 1980 2(1)(b) 32
Cited by:
Appeal fromBurnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding and Another CA 17-Jun-2016
The company, now in liquidation sought to claim for the alledged misapplication by former directors of its funds in 2007. It now appealed against a summary rejection of its claim as time barred.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Section 21(1)(b) . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Trusts, Limitation

Updated: 22 December 2021; Ref: scu.538050

OT Computers Ltd v Infineon Technologies Ag and Another: CA 14 Apr 2021

‘This appeal is concerned with the words ‘until the plaintiff has discovered the . . concealment . . or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it’ in section 32(1) of the Limitation Act 1980. Specifically, how does that section apply when the defendant deliberately conceals a relevant fact so that (1) it cannot reasonably be discovered by the claimant at the time of the concealment, (2) by the time it could be discovered by a person carrying on business of the relevant kind (here, the assembly and sale of computers), the claimant is in administration, and (3) the matters which would have put a person who continued to carry on such a business on notice of the need for further enquiry would not have come to the notice of a reasonably diligent insolvency practitioner?’

Lord Justice Males
[2021] EWCA Civ 501, [2021] 3 WLR 61, [2021] QB 1183
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 32(1)
England and Wales

Limitation, Insolvency

Updated: 21 December 2021; Ref: scu.661906

Mercer Ltd and Another v Ballinger and Another: CA 17 Jul 2014

The court was asked as to the circumstances in which the court could allow an amendment of pleadings so as to allow an additional claim where the action would otherwise be outside the limitation period.

Dyson L MR, Tomlinson, Briggs LJJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 996, [2014] WLR(D) 335
Bailii, WLRD
Limitation Act 1980 35
England and Wales

Limitation, Professional Negligence

Updated: 17 December 2021; Ref: scu.534418

Davis v Ministry of Defence: CA 26 Jul 1985

May LJ said: ‘Knowledge’ is an ordinary English word with a clear meaning to which one must give full effect; ‘reasonable belief’ or ‘suspicion’ is not enough. The relevant question merits repetition – ‘when did the appellant first know that his dermatitis was capable of being attributed to his conditions at work?.’

May LJ
Unreported, 26 July 1985
Limitation Act 1980 14(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedO’Driscoll v Dudley Health Authority CA 30-Apr-1998
The plaintiff sought damages for the negligence of the respondent in her care at birth. Years later the family concluded that her condition was a result of negligence. They waited until she was 21, when they mistakenly believed that she became an . .
CitedMinistry of Defence v AB and Others SC 14-Mar-2012
The respondent Ministry had, in 1958, conducted experimental atmospheric explosions of atomic weapons. The claimants had been obliged as servicemen to observe the explosions, and appealed against dismissal of their claims for radiation sickness . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 11 December 2021; Ref: scu.186434

McCafferty v Metropolitan Police Receiver: CA 1977

The test of whether a plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to justify the start of time running against her takes into account her subjective characteristics but then applies an outsider’s view of what she should have thought.
Geoffrey Lane LJ said in relation to section 2A(7): ‘[I]t is clear that the test is partly a subjective test, namely: ‘would this plaintiff have considered the injury sufficiently serious?’ and partly an objective test, namely: ‘would he have been reasonable if he did not regard it as sufficiently serious?’ It seems to me that the subsection is directed at the nature of the injury as known to the plaintiff at that time. Taking that plaintiff, with that plaintiff’s intelligence, would he have been reasonable in considering the injury not sufficiently serious to justify instituting proceedings for damages? I do not consider that it is permissible under this section to look into such problems as whether it would have been politic in the circumstances for the plaintiff to sue his employers at that time for fear of losing his job. Such considerations arise, if at all, under the new section 2D.’

Geoffrey Lane LJ, Megaw LJ
[1977] 1 WLR 1073, [1977] 2 All ER 756
Limitation Act 1939 2A 2B 2C 2D
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRoberts vWinbow (3) CA 4-Dec-1998
The plaintiff was treated for depression by the defendant by prescription of drugs. She sufferred a reaction, but now claimed that the doctor’s slow reaction caused her to suffer lasting injury. The question on appeal was, if a plaintiff suffers . .
CitedKR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 10-Jun-2003
The court considered an extension of the time for claiming damages for personal injuries after the claimants said they had been sexually abused as children in the care of the defendants.
Held: The test to be applied under section 14(2) was . .
Not FollowedMcCoubrey v Ministry of Defence CA 24-Jan-2007
The defendant appealed a decision allowing a claim to proceed more than ten years after it had been suffered. The claimant’s hearing had been damaged after an officer threw a thunderflash into his trench on an exercise.
Held: The defendant’s . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 11 December 2021; Ref: scu.186441

Halford v Brooks: CA 1991

The defendant had been tried for murder. The plaintiff now sought civil damages. The defendant replied that the case was brought out of time, and now appealed against the court’s extension of the time limit on the basis that the plaintiff had not known of the possibility of civil action.
Held: It was no reproach to a plaintiff that he has received the wrong legal advice.
Lord Donaldson MR discussed the meaning of ‘knowledge’ within section 33 as: ‘The word has to be construed in the context of the purpose of the section, which is to determine a period of time within which a plaintiff can be required to start any proceedings. In this context ‘knowledge’ clearly does not mean ‘know for certain and beyond possibility of contradiction’. It does, however, mean ‘know with sufficient confidence to justify embarking on the preliminaries to the issue of a writ, such as submitting a claim to the proposed defendant, taking legal and other advice, and collecting evidence’. Suspicion, particularly if it is vague and unsupported, will indeed not be enough, but reasonable belief will normally suffice. It is probably only in an exceptional case such as Davis v Ministry of Defence that it will not, because there is some other countervailing factor.’
Nourse LJ said that the court must carry out: ‘one composite exercise in which the material factors are identified and weighed and a balance is then struck’

Russell LJ, Lord Donaldson MR, Nourse LJ
[1991] 1 WLR 428, [1991] 3 All ER 559
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedCoad v Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Health Authority CA 17-Jul-1996
A nurse suffered a back injury in 1983 in the course of her employment. She left the employment of the health authority in either 1990 or 1991. The judge had accepted her evidence that she did not know that she had a right of action against her . .
CitedReed Elsevier Uk Ltd (T/A Lexisnexis) and Another v Bewry CA 30-Oct-2014
Appeal from a decision granting the claimant’s application made pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the limitation period in his proceedings for libel and dismissing the defendants’ application to strike out the claimant’s . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.262980

Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran: CA 13 Feb 1989

The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and using the land for their own purposes. The evidence was that the Plaintiff, the owner of the paper title, had no immediate use for the land but intended in due course to dedicate it for the purposes of a road diversion. Accordingly, the use made of the disputed land by the Defendants did not interfere with the proposed future use to which the true owner intended to devote the land.
Held: The Defendant had established a title by adverse possession, and the fact that the acts of ownership relied upon to establish his claim to adverse possession were not inconsistent with the use to which the true owner intended to put the land in the future was irrelevant. ‘Possession of land would never be ‘adverse’ within the meaning of the Act if it is enjoyed under a lawful title. If, therefore, a person occupies or uses land by licence of the owner with the paper title, and his licence has not been duly determined, he can not be treated as having been in ‘adverse possession’ as against the owner with the paper title.’
Nourse LJ said: ‘The essential difference between prescription and limitation is that in the former case title can be acquired only be possession as of right. That is the antithesis of what is required for limitation, which perhaps can be described as possession as of wrong. It can readily be understood that with prescription the intention of the true owner may be of decisive importance, it being impossible to presume a grant by someone whose intention is shown to have been against it. But with limitation it is the intention of the squatter which is decisive. He must intend to possess the land to the exclusion of all the world, including the true owner, while the intention of the latter is, with one exception, entirely beside the point. In order that title to land may be acquired by limitation, (1) the true owner must either (a) have been dispossessed, or (b) have discontinued his possession, of the land; and (2) the squatter must have been in adverse possession of it for the statutory period before action brought . .’ Hoffmann LJ said that what is required is ‘not an intention to own or even an intention to acquire ownership but an intention to possess.’
Slade LJ referred to Powell v MacFarlane and said: ‘I agree with the judge that ‘what is required for this purpose is not an intention to own or even an intention to acquire ownership but an intention to possess’ – that is to say, an intention for the time being to possess the land to the exclusion of all other persons, including the owner with the paper title. No authorities cited to us establish the contrary proposition.’

Slade LJ, Nourse LJ, Butler-Sloss LJ
[1990] 1 Ch 623, [1989] EWCA Civ 11, [1990] Ch 632, [1989] 2 All ER 255
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15
England and Wales
Citing:
DisapprovedLeigh v Jack CA 11-Dec-1879
The plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Mr Leigh) had laid out part of his estate as proposed streets to be known as Grundy Street and Napier Place. He conveyed to the defendant certain land described as being ‘bounded by’ Grundy Street and Napier . .
CitedWallis’s Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd CA 10-Jul-1974
A strip of land between a holiday camp and a garage had been conveyed as an intended roadway. It had not been fenced. A plot of land was sold by the previous farmer to the garage. Later the plaintiffs bought the farm, excluding the roadway, and the . .
CitedIn Re Daintrey, Ex Parte Holt QBD 8-May-1893
The court was asked whether a letter could be admitted in evidence and relied upon as an act of bankruptcy. The letter was sent by the debtor to the creditor at a time when there was no dispute, headed ‘without prejudice’. It contained an offer of . .
CitedSouth Shropshire District Council v Amos CA 1986
Lord Justice Parker said that the use of the words ‘without prejudice’ prima facie meant that a letter was intended to be a part of negotiation. A letter which purported to initiate some sort of negotiation (‘an opening shot’) is not necessarily . .
CitedRains v Buxton 1880
rains_buxtonChD1880
Fry J said: ‘The difference between dispossession and the discontinuance of possession might be expressed in this way: the one is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession, the other case is where the person in possession . .
CitedRush and Tomkins Ltd v Greater London Council HL 3-Nov-1988
The parties had entered into contracts for the construction of dwellings. The contractors sought payment. The council alleged shortcomings in the works. The principal parties had settled the dispute, but a sub-contractor now sought disclosure of the . .
CitedTreloar v Nute CA 1976
The judge in the County Court had rejected a claim to adverse possession by a defendant who together with his father had done a number of acts, some more trivial than others, in and around a disputed gully and adjacent land leading eventually to the . .
CitedPowell v McFarlane ChD 1977
Intention to Establish Adverse Possession of Land
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘It will be convenient to begin by . .

Cited by:
ApprovedRhondda Cynon Taff Borough Council v Watkins CA 12-Feb-2003
Land had been purchased compulsorily, but the respondent unlawfully returned to possession in 1966, and now claimed title by adverse possession. The Council executed a vesting deed poll in 1988. The Council asserted that he could not be in adverse . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton CA 19-Mar-1997
The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton CA 19-Mar-1997
The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar . .
CitedTopplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
CitedChapman and Another v Godinn Properties Ltd and others CA 27-Jun-2005
Dispute over right of way over land subject to claim for possessory title. ‘But each case must turn on its own facts. In a case of this nature, the court must ask itself what it is that would be expected of somebody in possession of land of this . .
CitedAllen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .
CitedLong v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council ChD 20-Mar-1996
The parties had agreed for a lease, and the tenant entered possession, but no formal lease was executed. The tenant stopped paying rent in 1977 or 1984. He now claimed rectification of the registers to show him as proprietor. The landlord argued . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedSze To Chun Keung v Kung Kwok Wai David and Lam Chak Man Estate Limited PC 27-Jun-1997
(Hong Kong) The respondents were registered owners of land occupied by the appellant who claim title by adverse possession after entry in 1955. Subsequently the claim resided with the Crown.
Held: ‘on the facts as pleaded, the land has been . .
CitedWilliams v Hull ChD 19-Nov-2009
The parties had bought a house together, but disputed the shares on which it was held. The appeal was on the basis that a without prejudice letter had been redacte and then wrongly admitted as not in fact without prejudice, an as an unambiguous . .
CitedThe Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
CitedCity of London v Samede and Others QBD 18-Jan-2012
The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.259373

Treloar v Nute: CA 1976

The judge in the County Court had rejected a claim to adverse possession by a defendant who together with his father had done a number of acts, some more trivial than others, in and around a disputed gully and adjacent land leading eventually to the commencement of construction of a bungalow which precipitated the proceedings. Acts relied upon included the tipping of soil into the gully and the levelling of uneven ground. The judge had rejected the defendant’s claim as his actions and those of his predecessor had not initially inconvenienced the plaintiff title owner.
Held: The judge had found that the defendant’s father had taken possession as early as 1961 and, looked at overall, there had been sufficient possession over the period in issue to defeat the plaintiff’s paper title. The defendant’s appeal was allowed. If the paper owner was at one stage in possession of the land, but the squatter’s subsequent occupation of it in law constitutes possession, the squatter must have ‘dispossessed’ the true owner for the purposes of Schedule 1, paragraph 1.
Sir John Pennycuick said: ‘The particular acts found by the judge are we think rather on the borderline of what can properly be regarded as constituting possession, always apart from the consideration of adverse possession. Whether or not a person has taken possession of land is a question of fact depending on all the particular circumstances . . In the present case the disputed land is extremely small, about one-seventh of an acre and admitted of very limited agricultural use, but would be a convenient site for a small house or bungalow. The defendant’s father did put it to some small agricultural use by grazing two cows and a yearling. Much more important, in our view, is the change in the surface of the land by placing soil in the gully, thereby setting in train the levelling of the land upon which a bungalow could be built. It seems to us that these acts were sufficient to support a finding of possession and indeed on the material before us we would be disposed to reach the same conclusion. The other acts relied upon are of very little weight.’ And ‘if a squatter takes possession of land belonging to another and remains in possession for 12 years to the exclusion of the owner, that represents adverse possession and accordingly at the end of the 12 years the title of the owner is extinguished. That is the plain meaning of the statutory provisions’ ‘

Stamp and Ormrod LJJ and Sir John Pennycuick
[1976] 1 WLR 1295
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedLord Advocate v Lord Lovat 1880
Lord O’Hagan considered the nature of possession as regards land: ‘As to possession, it must be considered in every case with reference to the peculiar circumstances. The acts, implying possession in one case, may be wholly inadequate to prove it in . .

Cited by:
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedBowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.259702

Powell v McFarlane: ChD 1977

Intention to Establish Adverse Possession of Land

A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘It will be convenient to begin by restating a few basic principles relating to the concept of possession under English law: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the owner of land with the paper title is deemed to be in possession of the land, as being the person with the prima facie right to possession. The law will thus, without reluctance, ascribe possession either to the paper owner or to the persons who can establish a title as claiming through the paper owner.
If the law is to attribute possession of land to a person who can establish no paper title to possession, he must be shown to have both factual possession and the requisite intention to possess (‘animus possidendi’).
The animus possidendi, which is also necessary to constitute possession, was defined by Lindley M.R., in Littledale v. Liverpool College (a case involving an alleged adverse possession) as ‘the intention of excluding the owner as well as other people.’ This concept is to some extent an artificial one, because in the ordinary case the squatter on property such as agricultural land will realise that, at least until he acquires a statutory title by long possession and thus can invoke the processes of the law to exclude the owner with the paper title, he will not for practical purposes be in a position to exclude him. What is really meant, in my judgment, is that the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow.
The question of animus possidendi is, in my judgment, one of crucial importance in the present case. An owner or other person with the right to possession of land will be readily assumed to have the requisite intention to possess, unless the contrary is clearly proved. This, in my judgment, is why the slightest acts done by or on behalf of an owner in possession will be found to negative discontinuance of possession. The position, however, is quite different from a case where the question is whether a trespasser has acquired possession. In such a situation the courts will, in my judgment, require clear and affirmative evidence that the trespasser, claiming that he has acquired possession, not only had the requisite intention to possess, but made such intention clear to the world. If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made it perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner.
Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single [exclusive] possession, though there can be a single possession exercised by or on behalf of several persons jointly. Thus an owner of land and a person intruding on that land without his consent cannot be both in possession of the land at the same time. The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed . . Everything must depend on the particular circumstances, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so.
The question of animus possidendi is, in my judgment, one of crucial importance in the present case. An owner or other person with a right to possession of land will be readily assumed to have the requisite intention to possess, unless the contrary is clearly proved. This, in my judgment, is why the slightest acts done by or on behalf of an owner in possession will be found to negative discontinuance of possession. The position, however, is quite different from a case where the question is whether a trespasser has acquired possession. In such a situation the courts will, in my judgment, require clear and affirmative evidence that the trespasser, claiming that he has acquired possession, not only had the requisite intention to possess, but made such intention clear to the world. If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made it perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner.’
Slade J said: ‘In view of the drastic results of a change of possession, however, a person seeking to dispossess an owner must, in my judgment, at least make his intention sufficiently clear so that the owner, if present at the land, would clearly appreciate that the claimant is not merely a persistent trespasser, but is actually seeking to dispossess him.’ and
‘What is really meant, in my judgment, is that the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow.’ and
‘Whether or not acts of possession done on parts of an area establish title to the whole area must, however, be a matter of degree. It is impossible to generalise with any precision as to what acts will or will not suffice to evidence factual possession.’

Slade J
(1977) 38 P and CR 452
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSeddon v Smith 1877
Adverse possession was claimed over land subject to a private grant of a right of way. The defendant had a paper title to a strip of land along Molyneux Lane. The plaintiff sought damages for trespass, claiming for wrongful abstraction of coal from . .

Cited by:
Approved ‘Remarkable’J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .
CitedTopplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
CitedLondon Borough of Lambeth v Blackburn CA 14-Jun-2001
The appellant had broken into an empty council owned flat, and subsequently occupied it. After twelve years the authority obtained a court order for possession. The court had held that the appellant had not had a sufficient animus possidendi since . .
CitedTower Hamlets v Barrett and Another CA 19-Jul-2005
The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been . .
CitedChapman and Another v Godinn Properties Ltd and others CA 27-Jun-2005
Dispute over right of way over land subject to claim for possessory title. ‘But each case must turn on its own facts. In a case of this nature, the court must ask itself what it is that would be expected of somebody in possession of land of this . .
CitedInglewood Investments Company Ltd v Baker CA 8-Nov-2002
The court considered a claim for the adverse possesion of land.
Held: Dyson LJ said: ‘to establish a claim of adverse possession for the requisite period of 12 years it is necessary to establish: (1) actual possession; (2) an intention to . .
CitedAllen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .
CitedGodmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs HL 20-Jun-2007
The house was asked about whether continuous use of an apparent right of way by the public would create a public right of way after 20 years, and also whether a non overt act by a landowner was sufficient to prove his intention not to dedicate the . .
CitedClear Channel United Kingdom Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 14-Oct-2004
The claimant sought a declaration that it had a tenancy for its occupation by an advertising station, and that it had protection under the 1954 Act. The defendant council said that only a licence had been granted.
Held: The grants included the . .
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedLodge (T/A JD Lodge) v Wakefield Metropolitan Council CA 21-Mar-1995
The plaintiff had formerly been a tenant of the defendant under an informal tenancy. No rent had been paid since 1974. He claimed to have acquired the land by adverse possession. He gave evidence at trial that if he had been asked to pay rent at any . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on the Application of) v The Land Registry (Peterborough Office) Admn 13-Feb-2009
The applicant sought judicial review of the cancellation of his application for first registration of land by adverse possession. The application had been rejected because a public right of way existed through it, and the claimant had not shown the . .
CitedThe Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
CitedWilson and Another v Grainger ChD 4-Dec-2009
The claimants appealed against a decision of the Adjudicator that they had not acquired a piece of their neighbour’s land by adverse possession, on the basis that their use had been by virtue of an oral licence. The judge had found the occupation to . .
CitedStar Energy Weald Basin Ltd and Another v Bocardo Sa SC 28-Jul-2010
The defendant had obtained a licence to extract oil from its land. In order to do so it had to drill out and deep under the Bocardo’s land. No damage at all was caused to B’s land at or near the surface. B claimed in trespass for damages. It now . .
CitedBalevents Ltd v Sartori ChD 29-Sep-2011
A strip of land had at one point been left aside for an anticipated road widening which never took place. The defendant had eventually obtained a registered possessory title to it. The claimant, owner of a neighbouring plot, now challenged that . .
CitedZarb and Another v Parry and Another CA 15-Nov-2011
The parties disputed the position of the boundary between their neighbouring properties. The appellant Z had succeeded in establishing that the the boundary was as they decribed on paper, but the respondents had succeeded in their claim for adverse . .
CitedChambers v London Borough of Havering CA 20-Dec-2011
The defendant appealed against an order for him to surrender possession of land he had claimed by adverse possession. The Council was the registered proprietor. The defendant said he had used the land since 1981 for dumping of motor vehicle parts. . .
CitedCity of London v Samede and Others QBD 18-Jan-2012
The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either . .
CitedLondon Borough of Southwark and Another v Transport for London SC 5-Dec-2018
Question as to the meaning of the GLA Roads and Side Roads (Transfer of Property etc) Order 2000. When the highway was transferred was only the working surfaces, the road surface and the airspace and subsoil necessary for the operation, maintenance . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.182281

Bradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid: HL 12 Jul 2006

Disapplication of Without Prejudice Rules

The House was asked whether a letter sent during without prejudice negotiations which acknowledged a debt was admissible to restart the limitation period. An advice centre, acting for the borrower had written, in answer to a claim by the lender for the sum still due after the sale of the mortgaged property fell short of the debt, that the respondent was not in a position to pay ‘the outstanding balance, owed to you.’
Held: The letter was sufficient to constitute an admission. The lender’s appeal was allowed. ‘the without prejudice rule has no application to apparently open communications, such as those here, designed only to discuss the repayment of an admitted liability rather than to negotiate and compromise a disputed liability.’
Lord Hoffmann said: ‘This limitation on the scope of the without prejudice rule, confining it to admissions which can be construed as made hypothetically rather than without qualification, is not limited to the use of these admissions as acknowledgements under section 29(5) or its Scottish equivalent. It is entirely general. As such . . it goes too far. There is nothing in the modern English authorities to encourage a dissection of correspondence or, still worse, conversations, to ascertain whether admissions of fact were made hypothetically or without qualification.’ and ‘the without prejudice rule, so far as it is based upon general public policy and not upon some agreement of the parties, does not apply at all to the use of a statement as an acknowledgement for the purposes of section 29(5).’
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood said: ‘In my opinion the without prejudice rule has no application to apparently open communications, such as those here, designed only to discuss the repayment of an admitted liability rather than to negotiate and compromise a disputed liability. I find it impossible to regard the correspondence here as constituting ‘negotiations genuinely aimed at settlement’ (Lord Griffiths in Rush and Tompkins v GLC [1989] AC 1280 at 1299) or ‘an attempt to compromise actual or impending litigation’ (Sir Robert Megarry V-C in Chocoladenfabriken Lindt and Sprungli AG v Nestle Co Ltd. [1978] RPC 287). Nor does the underlying public policy justification for the rule appear to have any application in circumstances such as these. That justification, as Oliver LJ observed in Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 at 306 ‘essentially rests on the desirability of preventing statements or offers made in the course of negotiations for settlement being brought before the court of trial as admissions on the question of liability’. No ‘statements or offers’ were made here with a view to settling a dispute. Since the debt was admitted, there was no dispute. As Mr Fenwick aptly put it in argument, Mr Rashid was simply asking for a concession; he was not giving one.’
Lord Mance said: ‘The existence of a dispute and of an attempt to compromise it are at the heart of the rule whereby evidence may be excluded (or disclosure of material precluded) as ‘without prejudice’ . . the rule does not of course depend upon disputants already being engaged in litigation. But there must as a matter of law be a real dispute capable of settlement in the sense of compromise (rather than in the sense of simple payment or satisfaction).’

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, Lord Mance
[2006] 1 WLR 2066, Times 14-Jul-2006, [2006] UKHL 37, [2006] 4 All ER 705, [2006] 29 EG 132, [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 951
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 29(5)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSpencer v Hemmerde HL 1922
A barrister borrowed 1,000 pounds for two months in 1910 but did not repay it. In 1915 the creditor pressed for payment and the debtor wrote to acknowledge the debt but asked for more time. The creditor ‘stayed his hand’. When proceedings were . .
Appeal fromBradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid CA 22-Jul-2005
The claimant sought recovery of a shortfall having sold the defendant’s house for a sum insufficient to clear the mortgage debt, and produced two letters which they claimed acknowledged the debt and restarted the limitation period running. The . .
CitedDaks Simpson Group plc v Kuiper 1994
The creditor sought summary judgment for an account for commissions earned. In a ‘without prejudice’ letter the defendant’s director said that he was prepared to accept that he had received such commissions in stated amounts.
Held: Lord . .
CitedWatson-Towers Ltd v McPhail 1986
The pursuer submitted a motion for summary judgment for the value of goods which had been supplied subject to a reservation of title clause. The pursuer’s evidence consisted of a letter from the defender making an offer expressed to be without . .
CitedTurner v Railton 1796
Evidence was admitted that the defendant’s former attorney had admitted the debt claimed and made an offer on the defendant’s behalf to pay a certain sum on account. Lord Kenyon said: ‘Concessions made for the purpose of settling the business for . .
CitedKirschbaum v ‘Our Voices’ Publishing Co 1971
(Ontario High Court) The court was asked whether discovery of letters written without prejudice should be permitted so that the parties might explore the question whether they contained admissions of fact which could be taken into account at the . .
CitedDungate v Dungate CA 1965
A claim was made against the widow and administratrix of the deceased’s estate by his surviving brother. The widow wrote to the creditor: ‘Keep a check on totals and amounts I owe you and we will have account now and then . . .Sorry I cannot do you . .
CitedPhillips v Rogers 1945
The creditor argued that the limitation period was extended anew when the debtor wrote: ‘Re your correspondence re Mr C H Phillips claim $1300 which he is prepared to settle November 1st for $700. Please thank Mr Phillips for the kind offer. I have . .
CitedIn Re Daintrey, Ex Parte Holt QBD 8-May-1893
The court was asked whether a letter could be admitted in evidence and relied upon as an act of bankruptcy. The letter was sent by the debtor to the creditor at a time when there was no dispute, headed ‘without prejudice’. It contained an offer of . .
CitedSubramaniam v Director of Public Prosecutions PC 1956
(Malaysia) The defendant sought to advance a defence of duress under a section of the Penal Code of the Federated Malay States which provided that, with certain exceptions, ‘nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it . .
CitedUnilever plc v Procter and Gamble Company CA 4-Nov-1999
The defendant’s negotiators had asserted in an expressly ‘without prejudice’ meeting, that the plaintiff was infringing its patent and they threatened to bring an action for infringement. The plaintiff sought to bring a threat action under section . .
CitedMuller and Another v Linsley and Mortimer (A Firm) CA 8-Dec-1994
The plaintiff sued his former solicitors for professional negligence. The damages he sought to recover related to loss he suffered when dismissed as a director of a private company leading to a forced sale of his shares in the company. The plaintiff . .
CitedSurrendra Overseas Ltd v Government of Sri Lanka 1977
A debtor can only be held to have acknowledged the claim if he has in effect admitted his legal liability to pay that which the plaintiff seeks to recover. An acknowledgement of part only of a debt cannot operate to acknowledge more.
Kerr J . .
CitedChocoladefabriken Lindt and Sprungli AG and another v The Nestle Co Ltd 1978
Megarry V-C said that the mere failure to use the expression ‘without prejudice’ is not decisive of whether the letter is such. The question is whether the letters were written in an attempt to compromise actual or pending litigation and, if so, . .
CitedCutts v Head and Another CA 7-Dec-1983
There had been a trial of 35 days regarding rights of way over land, which had proved fruitless, and where some orders had been made without jurisdiction. The result had been inconclusive. The costs order was now appealed, the plaintiff complaining . .
CitedSavings and Investment Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v Fincken CA 14-Nov-2003
Parties to litigation had made without prejudice disclosures. One party sought to give evidence contradicting the dsclosure, and the other now applied for leave to amend based upon the without prejudice statements to be admitted to demonstrate the . .
CitedJones v Foxall CA 27-Mar-1852
Romilly MR deplored attempts to convert offers of compromise into admissions of acts prejudicial to the party making them, saying: ‘I find that the offers were in fact made without prejudice to the rights of the parties; and I shall, as far as I am . .
CitedRichardson v Quercus Limited IHCS 24-Dec-1998
The pursuer owned a flat on the second and top floors of a building damaged by renovation works carried out by the defenders to the basement and ground floor of the same building. He relied on a letter by the defenders’ loss adjusters confirming . .
CitedKapeller v Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van Suid-Afrika Bpk 1964
(South Africa) A clear admission by an insurer of liability in the course of without prejudice negotiations about quantum was sufficient to restart the limitation period. . .
CitedGood v Parry CA 1963
A letter discussed first the writer’s proposed purchase of the house (offering andpound;1,350 subject to contract), and continued: ‘The question of outstanding rent can be settled as a separate agreement as soon as you present your account.’
CitedRatten v The Queen PC 1-Jul-1971
Res Gestae to admit circumstances of complaint
(Victoria) Evidence had been admitted under the res gestae rule, that a woman making a telephone call was in a hysterical state.
Held: It was properly used. Where a statement is made either by the victim of an attack or by a bystander, which . .
CitedWest Bromwich Building Society v Wilkinson HL 30-Jun-2005
The Society had taken possession of a property in 1989. It located the defendants many years later and sought payment of the excess after deduction of the proceeds of sale, and for interest. The borrowers claimed the debt was expired by limitation . .
CitedThomson v Austen 1823
Evidence of an admitted cross-debt was in part excluded: ‘We also think that the evidence which was refused was not indicative of any intention to make a compromise, for if it had been so, he would have offered some concession, some sacrifice for . .
CitedRush and Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council and Another HL 1988
Use of ‘Without Prejudice Save as to Costs”
A sub-contractor sought payment from the appellants under a construction contract for additional expenses incurred through disruption and delay. The appellants said they were liable to pay the costs, and were entitled to re-imbursement from the . .
CitedFoakes v Beer HL 16-May-1884
Mrs Beer had obtained judgment against Dr Foakes for andpound;2,090 19s. He asked for time to pay and they agreed with him, acknowledging the debt, and paying part immediately and undertaking to pay the balance over a period of time. In . .
CitedD and C Builders Ltd v Rees CA 1966
The plaintiff builders had been chasing payment of their undisputed invoice. Knowing that the builders were in financial difficulties, the defendant offered rather less, saying that if it was not accepted, she would pay nothing. She made the payment . .
CitedCory v Bretton 1830
The provision in a letter that it was ‘not to be used in prejudice of my rights . . .’ was read as meaning that an apparent acknowledgement of indebtedness in the same letter was ‘clearly a conditional statement’. . .
CitedIn re River Steamer Company 1871
A without prejudice letter was written by a person claiming adverse possession of land to the paper owner offering to purchase the land. The paper owner said this was an acknowledgment of his title.
Held: The letter was written in the context . .
CitedOliver v Nautilus Steam Shipping Co Ltd 1903
Where an employee was injured at work, but by an outside person, section 6 of the 1897 Act provides that the worker could ‘at his option, proceed, either at law against that person to recover damages, or against his employer for compensation under . .
CitedUnsworth v Elder Dempster Lines Ltd HL 1940
Shippers of cargo on a chartered ship brought an action against the shipowners for damage caused to the cargo by bad stowage, for which the shipowners were responsible. The cargo was shipped under charterers’ bills of lading, so that the contract of . .
CitedCook v Swinfen 1966
. .
CitedIn re Brisbane City Council and White 1981
The use of the the phrase ‘without prejudice’ was ‘futile’ in the context of an originating process. . .

Cited by:
CitedAmwell View School v Dogherty EAT 15-Sep-2006
amwell_dogherty
The claimant had secretly recorded the disciplinary hearings and also the deliberations of the disciplinary panel after their retirement. The tribunal had at a case management hearing admitted the recordings as evidence, and the defendant appealed, . .
CitedFramlington Group Ltd and Another v Barnetson CA 24-May-2007
The defendant had sought an order requiring the claimant to remove from a witness statement elements referring to without prejudice discussions between the parties before litigation began.
Held: The defendant’s appeal succeeded. The test for . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert HL 11-Mar-2009
The parties disputed ownership of land, one claiming adverse possession. In the course of negotations, the possessor made a without prejudice offer to purchase the paper owner’s title. The paper owner claimed that this was an acknowledgement under . .
CitedWilliams v Hull ChD 19-Nov-2009
The parties had bought a house together, but disputed the shares on which it was held. The appeal was on the basis that a without prejudice letter had been redacte and then wrongly admitted as not in fact without prejudice, an as an unambiguous . .
AppliedShepherd Construction Ltd v Berners (BVI) Ltd and Another TCC 25-Mar-2010
The defendants sought a release from an asset freezing order, saying that there was no good reason to anticipate any dissipation of assets. An action between the parties had been settled on terms, but the defendant had not met payments. The . .
CitedAvonwick Holdings Ltd v Webinvest Ltd and Another ChD 10-Oct-2014
Application by the claimant that certain correspondence between the parties and their solicitors in April-May 2014 should be admissible as evidence, notwithstanding that most of it was headed ‘without prejudice and subject to contract’. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice

Leading Case

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.243079

Ofulue and Another v Bossert: HL 11 Mar 2009

The parties disputed ownership of land, one claiming adverse possession. In the course of negotations, the possessor made a without prejudice offer to purchase the paper owner’s title. The paper owner claimed that this was an acknowledgement under section 29.
Held: The letter should not be admitted. Any admission in the first letter could not be treated as a continuing acknowledgement, and it could not now be relied upon. The House emphasised the vital importance of the without prejudice system.
Lord Hope said: ‘Where a letter is written ‘without prejudice’ during negotiations with a view to a compromise, the protection that these words claim will be given to it unless the other party can show that there is a good reason for not doing so.’ and ‘The essence of it lies in the nature of the protection that is given to parties when they are attempting to negotiate a compromise. It is the ability to speak freely that indicates where the limits of the rule should lie. Far from being mechanistic, the rule is generous in its application. It recognises that unseen dangers may lurk behind things said or written during this period, and it removes the inhibiting effect that this may have in the interests of promoting attempts to achieve a settlement. It is not to be defeated by other considerations of public policy which may emerge later, such as those suggested in this case, that would deny them that protection.’
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry said: ‘it is that parties and their representatives who are trying to settle a dispute should be able to negotiate openly, without having to worry that what they say may be used against them subsequently, whether in their current dispute or in some different situation.’
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe agreed with Lord Rodger and said: ‘As a matter of principle I would not restrict the without prejudice rule unless justice clearly demands it. In England the rule has developed vigorously (more vigorously, probably, than in other common law jurisdictions, and more vigorously than some overseas scholars, notably J H Wigmore approved.)’

Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
[2009] UKHL 16, [2009] 2 WLR 749, [2009] 2 All ER 223, [2009] 11 EG 119, [2009] NPC 40, [2009] 1 WLR 718, [2009] 2 Cr App R 2, [2009] 1 AC 990
Bailii, Times, HL
Limitation Act 1980& 29(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedWhiffen v Hartwright 15-Apr-1848
The court refused to order the production of letters which had passed ‘without prejudice’. Lord Langdale MR observed that he ‘did not see how the plaintiff could get over this express agreement, though he did not agree, that the right of discovery . .
CitedWaldridge v Kennison 1794
A without prejudice admission that a document was in the handwriting of one of the parties was received in evidence because it was independent of the merits of the case. . .
CitedJones v Foxall CA 27-Mar-1852
Romilly MR deplored attempts to convert offers of compromise into admissions of acts prejudicial to the party making them, saying: ‘I find that the offers were in fact made without prejudice to the rights of the parties; and I shall, as far as I am . .
Appeal fromOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedHoghton v Hoghton CA 16-Apr-1852
When a person has made a large voluntary disposition the burden is thrown on the party benefitting to show that the disposition was made fairly and honestly and in full understanding of the nature and consequences of the transaction. Romilly MR . .
CitedIn Re Daintrey, Ex Parte Holt QBD 8-May-1893
The court was asked whether a letter could be admitted in evidence and relied upon as an act of bankruptcy. The letter was sent by the debtor to the creditor at a time when there was no dispute, headed ‘without prejudice’. It contained an offer of . .
CitedBradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid HL 12-Jul-2006
Disapplication of Without Prejudice Rules
The House was asked whether a letter sent during without prejudice negotiations which acknowledged a debt was admissible to restart the limitation period. An advice centre, acting for the borrower had written, in answer to a claim by the lender for . .
CitedTomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd CA 1969
Without prejudice material can be admitted if the issue is whether or not the negotiations resulted in an agreed settlement. Without considering the communications in question it would be impossible to decide whether there was a concluded settlement . .
CitedUnilever plc v Procter and Gamble Company CA 4-Nov-1999
The defendant’s negotiators had asserted in an expressly ‘without prejudice’ meeting, that the plaintiff was infringing its patent and they threatened to bring an action for infringement. The plaintiff sought to bring a threat action under section . .
LimitedMuller and Another v Linsley and Mortimer (A Firm) CA 8-Dec-1994
The plaintiff sued his former solicitors for professional negligence. The damages he sought to recover related to loss he suffered when dismissed as a director of a private company leading to a forced sale of his shares in the company. The plaintiff . .
CitedRush and Tomkins Ltd v Greater London Council HL 3-Nov-1988
The parties had entered into contracts for the construction of dwellings. The contractors sought payment. The council alleged shortcomings in the works. The principal parties had settled the dispute, but a sub-contractor now sought disclosure of the . .
CitedCutts v Head and Another CA 7-Dec-1983
There had been a trial of 35 days regarding rights of way over land, which had proved fruitless, and where some orders had been made without jurisdiction. The result had been inconclusive. The costs order was now appealed, the plaintiff complaining . .
CitedWhiffen v Hartwright 15-Apr-1848
The court refused to order the production of letters which had passed ‘without prejudice’. Lord Langdale MR observed that he ‘did not see how the plaintiff could get over this express agreement, though he did not agree, that the right of discovery . .

Cited by:
CitedKohli v Lit and Others ChD 13-Nov-2009
The claimant asserted that the other shareholders had acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to her within the company.
Held: The claimant was allowed to bring in without prejudice correspondence to contradict evidence by the defendant which . .
CitedOceanbulk Shipping and Trading Sa v TMT Asia Ltd CA 15-Feb-2010
The parties had settled their disagreement, but now disputed the interpretation of the settlement. The defendant sought to be allowed to give in evidence correspondence leading up to the settlement which had been conducted on a without prejudice . .
CitedOceanbulk Shipping and Trading Sa v TMT Asia Ltd and Others SC 27-Oct-2010
The court was asked whether facts which (a) are communicated between the parties in the course of without prejudice negotiations and (b) would, but for the without prejudice rule, be admissible as part of the factual matrix or surrounding . .
CitedBerkeley Square Holdings and Others v Lancer Property Asset Management Ltd and Others ChD 1-May-2020
Application by the Claimants to strike out parts of the Defence as an abuse of process and an application by the Defendants to amend their Defence. However, both applications turn on the question whether certain facts on which the Defendants seek to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Litigation Practice, Evidence

Leading Case

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.317966

Regina v City of Sunderland ex parte Beresford: HL 13 Nov 2003

Land had been used as a park for many years. The council land owner refused to register it as a common, saying that by maintaining the park it had indicated that the use was by consent and licence, and that prescription did not apply.
Held: Qualifying user having been found, there was nothing in the material before the council to support the conclusion that such user had been otherwise than as of right within the meaning of section 22 of the 1965 Act. ‘The fact that the . . Council were willing for the land to be used as an area for informal sports and games, and provided some minimal facilities (now decaying) in the form of benches and a single hard cricket pitch, cannot be regarded as overt acts communicating permission to enter. Nor could the regular cutting of the grass, which was a natural action for any responsible landowner. To treat these acts as amounting to an implied licence, permission or consent would involve a fiction’ User can be as of right even though it is not adverse to the landowner’s interests.

Lord Bingham of Cornhill Lord Hutton Lord Scott of Foscote Lord Rodger of Earlsferry Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe
[2003] UKHL 60, Times 14-Nov-2003, [2003] 3 WLR 1306, [2004] 1 AC 889, [2004] 1 All ER 160, [2004] 2 P and CR 23, [2004] JPL 1106, [2003] NPC 139, [2003] 47 EGCS 155, [2004] 1 EGLR 94
House of Lords, Bailii
Commons Registration Act 1965 22, Open Spaces Act 1906
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromRegina (on the application of Beresford) v The City of Sunderland CA 26-Jul-2001
Local inhabitants requested the alteration of the Town and Village Green register to include land over which they claimed use as of right for more than twenty years. The difference between acquiescence, which would allow the claim, and tolerance or . .
CitedMills and Another v Silver and others CA 6-Jul-1990
A farm’s only vehicular access was over land which was only useable occasionally when dry. The defendants laid a stone track to facilitate constant access. At first instance it was held that the earlier use had been too intermittent to allow a . .
CitedRegina v Suffolk County Council Ex Parte Steed and Another CA 2-Aug-1996
Customary rights over land were not defeated by failure to register as common. ‘As of right’ meant that the right must be exercised in the belief that it is a right enjoyed by the inhabitants of the village to the exclusion of all other people. ‘it . .
CitedCumbernauld and Kilsyth District Council v Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd SCS 1992
(Inner House) When Cumbernauld town centre was built, a walkway was provided between the shopping centre and residential areas. It was used for many years, but then closed to prevent crime. The authority sought an interdict to keep it open as a . .
CitedCumbernauld and Kilsyth District Council v Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd HL 22-Jul-1993
A walkway had existed from the town centre to residential areas. When the land was acquired the defendant new owners sought to close the walkway. The authority asserted that a public right of way had been acquired.
Held: There was no need to . .
CitedAttorney-General v Poole 1938
Open space land had been conveyed to Poole Corporation ‘in fee simple to the intent that the same may for ever hereafter be preserved and used as an open space or as a pleasure or recreation ground for the public use.’
Held: There was no . .
CitedBridges v Mees ChD 1957
An overriding interest, namely an estate contract, was protected under s. 70(1) of the Act even though it could have been protected by a caution under s. 59. . .
CitedE R Ives Investments Ltd v High CA 14-Dec-1966
One exception to the requirement that an easement must be granted by a deed is that if permission to enjoy a right, capable of constituting an easement, is given by the landowner in terms likely to lead, and that do lead, the beneficiary of the . .
CitedGardner v Hodgson’s Kingston Brewery Co HL 1903
The party claiming a right of way through the yard of a neighbouring inn, and her predecessors in title, had for well over 40 years used the inn yard (the only means of access with carts and horses to her premises) and had paid the annual sum of 15 . .
CitedBurrows v Lang 1901
Discussing the book de legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae by Bracton, and its discussion of the meaning of ‘precario’ saying it was the same as de gratia, of grace, and in the context of a watercourse. The court asked ‘What is precarious?’ and . .
CitedNapier’s Trustees v Morrison 1851
Dealing with a public right of way, and holding that the defenders had possessed a road ‘by no trespass or tolerance, but as a public road’the court deprecated the citation in the Court of Session of authorities from England. He really wished, he . .
CitedSturges v Bridgman CA 1879
The character of the neighbourhood in which the plaintiff lives should, for the law of nuisance, include established features: ‘whether anything is a nuisance or not is a question to be determined, not merely by an abstract consideration of the . .
CitedMann v Brodie HL 1885
The court analysed the differences between Scottish and English land law with regard to rights acquired by prescription. Although in both countries a right of public way may be acquired by prescription, it was in England never practically necessary . .
CitedScottish Property Investment Company Building Society v Horne 1881
To warrant the remedy of summary ejection, the defender’s possession of premises has to be vicious, that is obtained by fraud or force, or precarious possession: ‘A precarious possession is a possession by tolerance merely.’ . .
CitedCumbernauld and Kilsyth District Council v Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd HL 22-Jul-1993
A walkway had existed from the town centre to residential areas. When the land was acquired the defendant new owners sought to close the walkway. The authority asserted that a public right of way had been acquired.
Held: There was no need to . .
CitedDalton v Henry Angus and Co HL 14-Jun-1881
The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some . .
CitedBeckett (Alfred F) v Lyons 1967
A claim was made that the inhabitants of the County Palatine of Durham had the right to take coal from the seashore.
Held: Dedication of a public right must be to the public at large or a sufficiently large section of the public at large and . .
CitedBritish Railways Board v Herrington HL 16-Feb-1972
Land-owner’s Possible Duty to Trespassers
The plaintiff, a child had gone through a fence onto the railway line, and been badly injured. The Board knew of the broken fence, but argued that they owed no duty to a trespasser.
Held: Whilst a land-owner owes no general duty of care to a . .
CitedHall v Beckenham Corporation 1949
A claim was made in nuisance against the local authority, the owner of a public park, in which members of the public flew noisy model aircraft.
Held: The local authority were not liable as the occupiers of the park for an alleged nuisance that . .
At First InstanceRegina v City of Sunderland, ex parte Beresford Admn 14-Nov-2000
A recreational area was claimed to be a common. The council considered that there was evidence, which it accepted, of an implied licence, thus enabling the inference to be drawn that the use by local inhabitants for statutory purposes had not been . .

Cited by:
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council and others HL 24-May-2006
Application had been made to register as a town or village green an area of land which was largely a boggy marsh. The local authority resisted the application wanting to use the land instead for housing. It then rejected advice it received from a . .
CitedLewis, Regina (on The Application of) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council and Another SC 3-Mar-2010
The claimants sought to have land belonging to the council registered as a village green to prevent it being developed. They said that it had for more than twenty years been used by the community for various sports. The council replied that it had . .
CitedLondon Tara Hotel Ltd v Kensington Close Hotel Ltd ChD 1-Nov-2010
The defendant asserted that it had acquired the right to use a private access road over the claimant’s land. There had been a licence granted under which an earlier owner had been said to have used the land. The defendant claimed under the 1832 Act . .
CitedPaddico (267) Ltd v Kirklees Metropolitan Council and Others ChD 23-Jun-2011
The company sought the rectification of the register of village greens to remove an entry relating to its land, saying that the Council had not properly considered the need properly to identify the locality which was said to have enjoyed the rights . .
CitedBarkas v North Yorkshire County Council CA 23-Oct-2012
The court was asked: ‘When local inhabitants indulge in lawful sports and pastimes on a recreation ground which has been provided for that purpose by a local authority in the exercise of its statutory powers, do they do so ‘by right’ or ‘as of . .
CitedAdamson and Others v Paddico (267) Ltd SC 5-Feb-2014
Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
Held: The appeal were solely as to . .
Not to be relied onBarkas, Regina (on The Application of) v North Yorkshire County Council and Scarborough Council Admn 20-Dec-2011
The claimants sought to have registered as a town or village green land in Whitby which had been provided as a playing field by the Local Authority since 1934. The inspector had found that the use had not been ‘as of right’ as required by the 2006 . .
OverruledBarkas, Regina (on The Application of ) v North Yorkshire County Council and Another SC 6-Mar-2014
The Court was asked as to the registration of a playing field as a ‘town or village green’. Local residents asserted that their use of the land, having been ‘as of right’ required the registration. They now appealed against rejection of that . .
CitedNewhaven Port and Properties Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v East Sussex County Council and Another SC 25-Feb-2015
The court was asked: ‘whether East Sussex County Council . . was wrong in law to decide to register an area . . known as West Beach at Newhaven . . as a village green pursuant to the provisions of the Commons Act 2006. The points of principle raised . .
CitedAdamson, Regina (on The Application of) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council CA 18-Feb-2020
Appropriation was not in sufficient form
The claimants had challenged an order supporting the decision of the Council to use their allotments for a new primary school, saying that the land had be appropriated as allotment land, and that therefore the consent of the minister was needed.
CitedBowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.187760

Gotham v Doodes: CA 25 Jul 2006

The former bankrupt resisted sale of his property by the trustee, saying that enforcement was barred by limitation. He and his wife bought the property in early 1988, and he was made bankrupt in October 1988. He was dischaged from bankruptcy in October 1991. In December 1990 the court answered an application for the sale of the property by the trustee with a charging order made absolute in May 1992. In 2004, the trustee again applied for possession and sale. The defendant pleaded limitation.
Held: A charge imposed under s313 of the 1986 Act secured a future obligation, and until the obligation became a present one, no right to receive the sum secured arose. Therefore time ran from the date of the order for sale, not from the date of the charge.

[2006] EWCA Civ 1080, Times 14-Aug-2006, [2007] 1 WLR 86
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 20(1), Insolvency Act 1986 313, Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 14
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedHornsey Local Board v Monarch Investment Building Society CA 1889
The local authority had incurred expense in paving a street. They were entitled to apportion those expenses amongst the owners of the properties fronting onto that street and summarily to recover from the respective owners the amounts so . .
Appeal fromDoodes v Gotham, Perry ChD 17-Nov-2005
The trustee in bankruptcy had taken a charge on the property in 1992 to support the bankruptcy in 1988. He sought to enforce it in 2005. The chargor appealed an order which denied he was protected by limitation.
Held: The appeal succeeded. . .
CitedRe Citro, Lloyds Bank plc v Byrne and Byrne, Abbey National plc v Moss and others and Barclays Bank plc v Hendricks CA 1991
Trustees in bankruptcy of bankrupt husbands successfully appealed for the removal of provisos delaying the operation of orders for sale made under s30 in respect of each husband’s matrimonial home for the benefit of that husband’s wife who had been . .
CitedMidland Bank plc v Pike 1988
. .
CitedFarran v Beresford HL 30-Aug-1843
The House considered the nature of scire facias, and in particular whether scire facias created a new right, or whether it only operated as a continuation of the original judgment. ‘The present right to receive the same’ was understood by Tindal . .
CitedEarle v Bellingham 24-Jul-1857
The right to receive legacies charged on a reversionary legacy payable under the will of another was not a present right to receive them until the reversionary legacy fell into possession on the death of the life tenant. . .
CitedGreen and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
CitedWilkinson and Another v West Bromwich Building Society CA 30-Jul-2004
The Society had repossessed and sold the mortgagors’ house in 1990. It knew then that there was a shortfall, but took no further recovery proceedings until 2002. What was the date from which the relevant limitation period began to run? Though the . .
CitedSwiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd 1979
A subjective test was applied as to whether the court could find an intention to interfere with contractual relations. . .
CitedSwiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd CA 1981
An equitable charge is created when property is expressly or constructively made liable to the discharge of a debt or some other obligation, and the charge confers on the chargee a right of realisation by judicial process such as a sale order. . .
CitedRe Owen 1894
Legacies were charged on land after the death of the life tenant. The life tenant died in 1880. It was not suggested that time ran from the death of the testator in 1854. . .

Cited by:
CitedYorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Limitation

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.243398

Hornsey Local Board v Monarch Investment Building Society: CA 1889

The local authority had incurred expense in paving a street. They were entitled to apportion those expenses amongst the owners of the properties fronting onto that street and summarily to recover from the respective owners the amounts so apportioned. In addition statute provided that such expenses should be charged on the premises in respect of which they were incurred with interest thereon at the rate of 5% until payment. It was not necessary for the amount due to be ascertained on the sale of a house before the Society had a right to receive it. The charge was imposed when the paving works were completed in 1875. The expenses were not apportioned until 1885. In 1887 a demand for payment was made on the defendant and in 1888 the local board sought to enforce the statutory charge against the defendant. The county court judge granted the order, but the Queen’s Bench Division reversed him.
Held: The appeal failed. The limitation period for a local authority to recover paving expenses ran from the time of imposition even though the charge had not yet been apportioned between the frontagers. The right to receive payment had arisen even though it could not yet enforce payment.
Lord Esher MR ‘It was strongly argued that the words ‘present right to receive the same’ in this section are equivalent to ‘present right to enforce payment of the same’. If there were some overwhelming reason why that construction should be given to the words; if that were the only construction that would render the procedure sensible, I think possibly the words might receive that construction, but I do not think it would be their ordinary meaning in the English language. A present right to receive is not in ordinary English the same as a present right to enforce payment. Then is there any overwhelming reason why we should read the words otherwise than in their natural sense? So far from that, I think that in the present case to read the words in the way suggested for the plaintiffs would raise insuperable difficulties, whereas to read them in their natural sense makes the whole legislation sensible and easier application. The difficulty that arises on the plaintiffs’ construction has been pointed out, viz., that the Board, who have to receive the money, and also to apportion the amount, would have the power to delay the application of the Statute of Limitation for any time they please. When that difficulty was presented, the plaintiffs’ Counsel endeavoured to meet it by the ingenious suggestion that, if the apportionment were not made within a reasonable time, the making of it might be enforced by mandamus; and other modes were suggested of meeting the difficulty. But why should we embark on such questions and invent means of overcoming this difficulty, when by reading the words in their ordinary sense no such difficulty arises? . . .
‘The charge exists, though the exact amount charged may not be ascertained. It is suggested that a person in whose favour a charge is imposed cannot be entitled to receive an amount which is not ascertained. I do not see why this should be so. A sum may be offered to him, which the person offering it thinks to be the right sum, and which he may also think to be the right sum, although the actual calculation of the exact amount has not been made. What is there in law, or reason, or business, to shew that he is not entitled to receive the sum when so offered to him? I cannot see any difficulty in saying that there is a present right to receive the expenses. In the case where a person has only a reversionary right to receive money, or for some other reason the time when he is entitled to receive the money has not yet arrived, it would be different, and there would be no present right to receive the money. . .
So, reading the words of the section in their ordinary sense, it seems to me that in the present case the Local Board were a body of persons in whose favour a charge existed for a sum of money, who were entitled to receive it, and who were capable of giving a receipt or discharge for it . . . It seems to me therefore that the case comes within the words of the section read in their ordinary sense and that there is no reason for giving them any other construction. Consequently the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by the Statute of Limitations.’
Lindley LJ said that expression, a ‘present right to receive’ was ‘a little ambiguous’, but agreed with Lord Esher: ‘. . . and as distinguishable, as apparently it is meant to be, from ‘present right to sue’, everything works out harmoniously; the moment the time of the coming into existence of the charge is ascertained, the period of limitation will begin to run: whereas, if the opposite construction is adopted, we are at once landed in the curious anomaly that the creditor, that is to say, the person who is entitled to the charge, can by his own act postpone his right to sue indefinitely . . .
The section is dealing with charges on land, and it must be borne in mind that such charges are present charges and future charges, reversionary charges, charges in remainder, and such like. One general form of expression is used to include the whole, and that expression is ‘present right to receive.’ It seems to me clear that the meaning is that in each case the moment to be looked to is the moment when the charge comes into present operation; for instance, when reversionary charges are being dealt with, the moment to be looked to is the moment when the reversion falls in and the charge takes effect in possession.’
Lopes LJ said that the right to receive what was secured by a charge arose concurrently with the charge: ‘When, then, does the right accrue to the person or persons in whose favour the charge is imposed to receive the amount secured by the charge? It appears to me that it accrues the moment the charge is imposed on the premises by the statute, that is when the expenses have been incurred and the works completed. It may be that certain things have to be done before the right can be enforced, but the right to receive what is secured by the charge arises concurrently with the charge. The words are ‘present right to receive’ not ‘present right to recover’. The right to receive may exist though the definite sum to be received has not yet been ascertained. There are cases where the legislature requires a notice to be given before an action can be maintained. The right of action however exists as soon as an actionable wrong has been committed, though it cannot be successfully enforced until the statutory requirements are complied with.’

Lord Esher MR, Lopes LJ, Lindley LJ
[1889] 24 QBD 1
Real Property Limitation Act 1874 8
Citing:
CitedFarran v Beresford HL 30-Aug-1843
The House considered the nature of scire facias, and in particular whether scire facias created a new right, or whether it only operated as a continuation of the original judgment. ‘The present right to receive the same’ was understood by Tindal . .
CitedEarle v Bellingham 24-Jul-1857
The right to receive legacies charged on a reversionary legacy payable under the will of another was not a present right to receive them until the reversionary legacy fell into possession on the death of the life tenant. . .

Cited by:
CitedThe Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Amanullah Khan and The Wellcome Trust ChD 13-Jun-2001
The authority had served notices on the second defendant, requiring him to execute works to bring a property up to a habitable condition. Eventually the authority executed the works themselves, and sought repayment from him of the costs. He resisted . .
CitedWilkinson and Another v West Bromwich Building Society CA 30-Jul-2004
The Society had repossessed and sold the mortgagors’ house in 1990. It knew then that there was a shortfall, but took no further recovery proceedings until 2002. What was the date from which the relevant limitation period began to run? Though the . .
DistingusihedGreen and others v Gaul and Another; In re Loftus deceased ChD 18-Mar-2005
The claimants began an action in January 2003 to seek to set aside the appointment of an administrator from December 1991, and to have set aside transfers of property made within the estate.
Held: The limitation period against a personal . .
CitedWest Bromwich Building Society v Wilkinson HL 30-Jun-2005
The Society had taken possession of a property in 1989. It located the defendants many years later and sought payment of the excess after deduction of the proceeds of sale, and for interest. The borrowers claimed the debt was expired by limitation . .
CitedDoodes v Gotham, Perry ChD 17-Nov-2005
The trustee in bankruptcy had taken a charge on the property in 1992 to support the bankruptcy in 1988. He sought to enforce it in 2005. The chargor appealed an order which denied he was protected by limitation.
Held: The appeal succeeded. . .
CitedGotham v Doodes CA 25-Jul-2006
The former bankrupt resisted sale of his property by the trustee, saying that enforcement was barred by limitation. He and his wife bought the property in early 1988, and he was made bankrupt in October 1988. He was dischaged from bankruptcy in . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Local Government

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.182787

St Marylebone Property Co Ltd v Fairweather: HL 16 Apr 1962

To defeat a defence of adverse possession, the plaintiff must succeed in an action which itself had been commenced within the twelve year period. A squatter does not succeed to the title that he has disturbed: by sufficiently long adverse possession he obtains a title of his own, but ‘his possession only defeats the rights of those to whom it has been adverse’. Therefore, said Lord Radcliffe: ‘the effect of the ‘extinguishment’ sections of the Limitation Acts is not to destroy the lessee’s estate as between himself and the lessor; and that it would be incorrect to say that if he offers a surrender to the lessor he has nothing to surrender to him in respect of the land in the possession of the squatter. What the lessee surrendered in this case was the incumbrance on the fee simple in possession which was represented by the term of years . . Now if the landlord then goes to the lessee and gets him to surrender the outstanding term, which incumbers his fee simple in possession, then the squatter’s defence against the landlord disappears and, since he has not completed adverse possession against the landlord, he must give way to the rightful owner’s claim to the land.’
Lord Denning said: ‘the title of the leaseholder is extinguished as against the squatter, but remains good as against the freeholder.’ and ‘The only reason, it seems to me, which can be urged against this conclusion is that it means that a squatter’s title can be destroyed by the leaseholder and freeholder putting their heads together. It is said that they can by a surrender – or by a surrender and regrant – destroy the squatter’s title completely and get rid of him. So be it. There is no way of preventing it.’

Lord Radcliffe, Lord Denning
[1963] AC 510, [1962] UKHL 1, [1962] 2 WLR 1020, [1962] 2 All ER 288
Bailii
Land Registration Act 1925 75(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Wrongly decidedWalter v Yalden KBD 19-Jun-1902
Where a trespasser on land let on lease has as against the lessee acquired a title under the Statutes of Limitations, and the lessee subsequently surrenders the lease to the lessor, the lessor has no right of re-entry, and the period of. limitation . .

Cited by:
DistinguishedChung Ping Kwan and others v Lam Island Development Company Limited PC 8-Jul-1996
(Hong Kong) Various provisions had been made for the termination of long leases in Hong Kong. Land had come to be occupied by adverse possession. At first instance the judge had given judgment against the squatters, but then retracted after a later . .
CitedMarkfield Investments Ltd v Evans CA 9-Nov-2000
The claimants were paper owners of land occupied by the defendant. The claimant said the acquiescence had been interrupted by an abortive court action by the claimant’s predecessor in title.
Held: With regard to any particular action the . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on The Application of) v Land Registry (Peterborough Office) and Another CA 10-Mar-2010
The appellant had lived in a caravan on the verge of a byway and had been here for more than twelve years. He appealed against rejection of his request for possessory title. He said that there was no support in law for the maxim that adverse . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Registered Land, Limitation

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.191153

IGE USA Investments Ltd and Others v Revenue and Customs: CA 14 Apr 2021

Whether the six-year limitation period for claims founded on the tort of deceit, under section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980 (‘LA 1980’ or ‘the 1980 Act’), at least arguably applies ‘by analogy’, pursuant to section 36(1) of the 1980 Act, to a claim for equitable rescission of a contract for fraudulent misrepresentation.

Lord Justice Henderson,
Lady Justice Asplin,
And,
Lord Justice Birss
[2021] EWCA Civ 534, [2021] WLR(D) 199, [2021] 3 WLR 313, [2021] Ch 423
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales

Limitation, Torts – Other

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.670129

Mills and Another v Silver and others: CA 6 Jul 1990

A farm’s only vehicular access was over land which was only useable occasionally when dry. The defendants laid a stone track to facilitate constant access. At first instance it was held that the earlier use had been too intermittent to allow a prescriptive right, and the use had been by consent.
Held: The use was established by the doctrine of lost modern grant. Tolerance of the use was not sufficient to defeat the acquisition of the right. The earlier use had been by right, and a prescriptive right was acquired.
Dillon LJ said: ‘It would be easy to say . . that there is an established principle of law that no prescriptive right can be acquired if the user by the dominant owner of the servient tenement in the particular manner for the appropriate number of years has been tolerated without objection by the servient owner. But there cannot be any such principle of law because it is, with rights of way, fundamentally inconsistent with the whole notion of acquisition of rights by prescription. It is difficult to see how, if there is such a principle, there could ever be a prescriptive right of way.’ and
‘It is to be noted that a prescriptive right arises where there has been user as of right in which the servient owner has, with the requisite degree of knowledge, which is not in issue in the present case, acquiesced. Therefore mere acquiescence in or tolerance of the user by the servient owner cannot prevent the user being as of right for purposes of prescription. Equally, where Lord Lindley says that the enjoyment must be inconsistent with any other reasonable inference than that it has been as of right in the sense he has explained, he cannot be regarding user with the acquiescence or tolerance of the servient owner as an alternative reasonable inference which would preclude enjoyment as of right from being established. A priori, user in which the servient owner has acquiesced or which he has tolerated is not inconsistent with the concept of user as of right. To put it another way, user is not ‘precario’ for the purposes of prescription just because until 20 years have run, the servient owner could stop it at any time by issuing his writ and asking for an injunction.’
Parker LJ said: ‘The true approach is to determine the character of the acts of user or enjoyment relied on. If they are sufficient to amount to an assertion of a continuous right, continue for the requisite period, are actually or presumptively known to the owner of the servient tenement and such owner does nothing that is sufficient . . I add only this, that any statement that the enjoyment must be against the will of the servient owner cannot mean more than ‘without objection by the servient owner’. If it did, a claimant would have to prove that the right was contested and thereby defeat his own claim.’

Dillon LJ, Parker LJ, Stocker LJ
[1991] Ch 271, [1991] 2 WLR 324, [1991] 1 All ER 449, [1990] EWCA Civ 12
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedSturges v Bridgman CA 1879
The character of the neighbourhood in which the plaintiff lives should, for the law of nuisance, include established features: ‘whether anything is a nuisance or not is a question to be determined, not merely by an abstract consideration of the . .
AppliedDavies v Du Paver CA 1953
The court accepted that local farmers could identify which sheep belonged to what person on the owner’s land but the owner of the land was not able to do so and, not sharing that common knowledge, did not have knowledge of the user, and court denied . .
ConsidereredGardner v Hodgson’s Kingston Brewery Co HL 1903
The party claiming a right of way through the yard of a neighbouring inn, and her predecessors in title, had for well over 40 years used the inn yard (the only means of access with carts and horses to her premises) and had paid the annual sum of 15 . .
DistinguishedBeckett (Alfred F) v Lyons 1967
A claim was made that the inhabitants of the County Palatine of Durham had the right to take coal from the seashore.
Held: Dedication of a public right must be to the public at large or a sufficiently large section of the public at large and . .
DistinguishedPatel v Smith (WH) (Eziot) 1987
. .

Cited by:
CitedRegina v City of Sunderland ex parte Beresford HL 13-Nov-2003
Land had been used as a park for many years. The council land owner refused to register it as a common, saying that by maintaining the park it had indicated that the use was by consent and licence, and that prescription did not apply.
Held: . .
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
CitedOdey and Others v Barber ChD 29-Nov-2006
The claimants sought a declaration that they had two rights of way over a neighbour’s land. One was claimed by continuous use for twenty years, and the second was said to have been implied under the 1925 Act. No express grant was suggested. . .
CitedPolo Woods Foundation v Shelton-Agar and Another ChD 17-Jun-2009
The court considered whether the claimant had established a profit a prendre against the defendant neighbour’s land in the form of a right of pasturage, acquired either by lost modern grant or by prescription.
Held: The appeal succeeded, but . .
CitedLondon Tara Hotel Ltd v Kensington Close Hotel Ltd ChD 1-Nov-2010
The defendant asserted that it had acquired the right to use a private access road over the claimant’s land. There had been a licence granted under which an earlier owner had been said to have used the land. The defendant claimed under the 1832 Act . .
CitedLawrence and Another v Fen Tigers Ltd and Others QBD 4-Mar-2011
The claimants had complained that motor-cycle and other racing activities on neighbouring lands were a noise nuisance, but the court also considered that agents of the defendants had sought to intimidate the claimants into not pursuing their action. . .
CitedBarkas, Regina (on The Application of ) v North Yorkshire County Council and Another SC 6-Mar-2014
The Court was asked as to the registration of a playing field as a ‘town or village green’. Local residents asserted that their use of the land, having been ‘as of right’ required the registration. They now appealed against rejection of that . .
CitedNewhaven Port and Properties Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v East Sussex County Council and Another SC 25-Feb-2015
The court was asked: ‘whether East Sussex County Council . . was wrong in law to decide to register an area . . known as West Beach at Newhaven . . as a village green pursuant to the provisions of the Commons Act 2006. The points of principle raised . .
CitedBramwell and Others v Robinson ChD 21-Oct-2016
Interference with right of way
Neighbour dispute as to right of way.
Held: The defendant had failed to establish the ‘swing space’ he asserted, but otherwise the claimant had in several ways behaved unreasonably and interfered with the use of the right and harrassed the . .
CitedBowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.187763

Agbenowossi-Koffi v Donvand Ltd (T/A Gullivers Travel Associates): CA 24 Jun 2014

The claimant, of Black African origin, was publicly described as a ‘monkey in silk’ which led to her suffering depression. The company responded that her claim was out of time.

Lord Dyson MR, Sullivan, Sharp LJJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 855, [2014] ICR D27, [2014] WLR(D) 282
Bailii, WLRD
Equality Act 2010 123
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromAgbenowossi-Koffi v Donvand Ltd (T/A Gullivers Travel Associates) EAT 6-Sep-2013
EAT Practice and Procedure : Striking-out/dismissal
Estoppel or abuse of process
The Claimant issued her form ET1 in which she relied on an act of racial discrimination. The primary time limit had . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Discrimination, Limitation

Updated: 05 December 2021; Ref: scu.526985

J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another: HL 4 Jul 2002

The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had overstayed the expiration of a grazing tenancy, and been asked to leave but had not been dispossessed.
Held: The claimant’s appeal was allowed. The issue was only whether or not the claimant had been in actual possession of the land – had the defendant squatter dispossessed the paper owner by going into ordinary possession of the land for the requisite period without the owner’s consent? Older cases relating to an idea of ‘non-adverse possession’ should not be followed. Actual possession for one own or another’s benefit was required. The intention needed was to possess, not necessarily to ‘own’ the land. The only question after the 1833 Act was whether the squatter had been in possession in the ordinary sense of that word for the requisite period without the consent of the owner. The requirement that the land is in the possession of a person in whose favour time can run is not directed to the nature of the possession, but to the capacity of the squatter or other person in possession of the land.
An offer to purchase the paper owner’s interest need not defeat a claim (Ocean Estates).
Lord Hope of Craighead discussed the claim under Human Rights. That question: ‘….is not an easy one, as one would have expected the law – in the context of a statutory regime where compensation is not available – to lean in favour of the protection of a registered proprietor against the actions of persons who cannot show a competing title on the register. Fortunately…….a much more rigorous regime has now been enacted in Schedule 6 to the 2002 Act. Its effect will be to make it much harder for a squatter who is in possession of registered land to obtain title against the wishes of the proprietor. The unfairness in the old regime which this case has demonstrated lies not in the absence of compensation, although that is an important factor, but in the lack of safeguards against oversight or inadvertence on the part of the registered proprietor.’

Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Hutton
Times 05-Jul-2002, [2002] UKHL 30, [2002] 3 All ER 865, [2002] 3 WLR 221, [2003] 1 AC 419, [2002] NPC 92, [2002] HRLR 34, [2003] 1 P and CR 10, [2002] 28 EGCS 129, [2002] 2 P and CR DG22
House of Lords, Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 15 Sch 1 para 1 Sch 1 para 8, European Convention on Human Rights 1
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved ‘Remarkable’Powell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘It will be convenient to begin by . .
DisapprovedLittledale v Liverpool College CA 1900
The mere storage of items in a property was insufficient to demonstrate the necessary intention to dispossess the rightful owner. It was a mere exercise of the rights under an easement. Enclosure of land is not necessarily decisive. Lord Lindley MR . .
DisapprovedLeigh v Jack CA 11-Dec-1879
The plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Mr Leigh) had laid out part of his estate as proposed streets to be known as Grundy Street and Napier Place. He conveyed to the defendant certain land described as being ‘bounded by’ Grundy Street and Napier . .
CitedOcean Estates Ltd v Pinder HL 1969
The court asked whether the sufficiency of adverse possession might be qualified either by the intentions of the paper owner or the squatter’s willingness to pay for their occupation if asked. Lord Diplock: ‘Where questions of title to land arise in . .
Appeal fromJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Caroline Graham and Another CA 6-Feb-2001
Where a tenant under a grazing license had stayed over after the end of the tenancy, and had been refused a renewed licence, and had continued to graze the land for over twelve years, the mere overstaying was not enough to evidence an animus . .
At first instanceJ A Pye and Another v Graham and Another ChD 14-Mar-2000
The fact alone of being prepared to take a licence of land would not defeat an application for adverse possession, but a request for a licence would be relevant. The adverse possession commenced from the time when the licence expired, given that a . .

Cited by:
Appealed toJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v South Gloucestershire District Council and Others CA 29-Mar-2001
Where there was an agreement between an applicant and the planning authority under section 106 of the new Act, with respect the undertaking of work in return for the grant of planning permission, there was no requirement for there to be a direct . .
CitedTopplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
CitedTower Hamlets v Barrett and Another CA 19-Jul-2005
The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been . .
CitedChapman and Another v Godinn Properties Ltd and others CA 27-Jun-2005
Dispute over right of way over land subject to claim for possessory title. ‘But each case must turn on its own facts. In a case of this nature, the court must ask itself what it is that would be expected of somebody in possession of land of this . .
At House of LordsJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Nov-2005
The claimants had been the registered proprietors of land, they lost it through the adverse possession of former tenants holding over. They claimed that the law had dispossessed them of their lawful rights.
Held: The cumulative effect of the . .
CitedInglewood Investments Company Ltd v Baker CA 8-Nov-2002
The court considered a claim for the adverse possesion of land.
Held: Dyson LJ said: ‘to establish a claim of adverse possession for the requisite period of 12 years it is necessary to establish: (1) actual possession; (2) an intention to . .
CitedAllen v Matthews CA 13-Mar-2007
The defendants appealed an order refusing title by adverse possession to registered land. They denied that the limitation period had been restarted by their solicitor’s letter acknowledging the title.
Held: The letter must be read as a whole. . .
CitedGodmanchester Town Council, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs HL 20-Jun-2007
The house was asked about whether continuous use of an apparent right of way by the public would create a public right of way after 20 years, and also whether a non overt act by a landowner was sufficient to prove his intention not to dedicate the . .
CitedClear Channel United Kingdom Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 14-Oct-2004
The claimant sought a declaration that it had a tenancy for its occupation by an advertising station, and that it had protection under the 1954 Act. The defendant council said that only a licence had been granted.
Held: The grants included the . .
CitedJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 30-Aug-2007
UK Advers Possession Law – Not Compliant
The claimant had said that the UK law which allowed it to lose land by virtue of twelve year’s occupation by a squatter, interfered with its right to ownership of property.
Held: The UK law on adverse possession did comply with the Convention. . .
CitedOfulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
CitedNational Westminster Bank Plc v Ashe (Trustee In Bankruptcy of Djabar Babai) CA 8-Feb-2008
The mortgagees had made no payments under the charge for more than twelve years, and had remained in possession throughout. They argued that the bank were prevented from now seeking to enforce the charge. The bank argued that the possession had not . .
CitedRoberts v Crown Estate Commissioners CA 20-Feb-2008
The commissioners sought to claim title to a foreshore by adverse possession. The claimant asserted that he had acquired title in his capacity of Lord Marcher of Magor which had owned the bed of the estuary since the Norman Conquest, and that the . .
CitedRoberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
CitedJohn Laing Construction Ltd v Amber Pass Ltd ChD 7-Apr-2004
The landlord resisted the exercise of a break clause saying that the entire premises had not been vacated. The difference was as to whether mere vacation was enough, or whether the tenant had to do some further positive act. The tenant had left . .
CitedJones v London Borough of Merton CA 16-Jun-2008
The court was asked ‘If a former secure tenant of a dwelling-house who has become a ‘tolerated trespasser’ in it decides to cease to occupy it, does his liability to pay mesne profits to his former landlord in respect of the dwelling-house cease . .
CitedLancashire County Council v Buchanan Admn 7-Nov-2007
The defendant estate agent was prosecuted for misdescribing the ability of his client to convey good title to the land offered. The seller did not initially have a registered possessory title to part of the land.
Held: The agent’s appeal . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on the Application of) v The Land Registry (Peterborough Office) Admn 13-Feb-2009
The applicant sought judicial review of the cancellation of his application for first registration of land by adverse possession. The application had been rejected because a public right of way existed through it, and the claimant had not shown the . .
CitedClarence House Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc CA 8-Dec-2009
The defendant tenants, anticipating that the landlord might delay or refuse consent to a subletting entered into a ‘virtual assignment’ of the lease, an assignment in everything but the deed and with no registration. The lease contained a standard . .
CitedBaxter v Mannion ChD 18-Mar-2010
B appealed against an order for rectification against him of the land register returning ownership to M. B had obtained registration with possessory title, claiming to have kept horses on the field for many years in adverse possession of it. M had . .
CitedWilson and Another v Grainger ChD 4-Dec-2009
The claimants appealed against a decision of the Adjudicator that they had not acquired a piece of their neighbour’s land by adverse possession, on the basis that their use had been by virtue of an oral licence. The judge had found the occupation to . .
CitedThe Port of London Authority v Ashmore CA 4-Feb-2010
The Port sought to register ownership of the river bed and tidal foreshore. The defendant’s boat had been moored at a wharf, and he claimed adverse possession. The court was asked whether it was possible to acquire any title by adverse possession to . .
CitedStar Energy Weald Basin Ltd and Another v Bocardo Sa SC 28-Jul-2010
The defendant had obtained a licence to extract oil from its land. In order to do so it had to drill out and deep under the Bocardo’s land. No damage at all was caused to B’s land at or near the surface. B claimed in trespass for damages. It now . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on The Application of) v Land Registry (Peterborough Office) and Another CA 10-Mar-2010
The appellant had lived in a caravan on the verge of a byway and had been here for more than twelve years. He appealed against rejection of his request for possessory title. He said that there was no support in law for the maxim that adverse . .
CitedBalevents Ltd v Sartori ChD 29-Sep-2011
A strip of land had at one point been left aside for an anticipated road widening which never took place. The defendant had eventually obtained a registered possessory title to it. The claimant, owner of a neighbouring plot, now challenged that . .
CitedZarb and Another v Parry and Another CA 15-Nov-2011
The parties disputed the position of the boundary between their neighbouring properties. The appellant Z had succeeded in establishing that the the boundary was as they decribed on paper, but the respondents had succeeded in their claim for adverse . .
CitedChambers v London Borough of Havering CA 20-Dec-2011
The defendant appealed against an order for him to surrender possession of land he had claimed by adverse possession. The Council was the registered proprietor. The defendant said he had used the land since 1981 for dumping of motor vehicle parts. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 05 December 2021; Ref: scu.174187

Prudential Assurance Company Ltd v Waterloo Real Estate Inc: ChD 13 May 1998

The owner of a party wall who had allowed a neighbour exclusive use of it without objection for a period over twelve years, could lose his interest in the wall by the adverse possession of that neighbour.

Times 13-May-1998
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal FromPrudential Assurance Company Limited v Waterloo Real Estate Inc CA 22-Jan-1999
Where title to land was to be established by adverse possession, the claim had to be unequivocal only in the sense that the intention to possess was clear to the world. It was unnecessary for the dispossessed party to know of the title he lost. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 05 December 2021; Ref: scu.85071

Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton: CA 19 Mar 1997

The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar was a sufficient trespass to allow an action, and was therefore sufficient to found a claim for adverse possession. Having acquired a title by adverse possession, the claimant does not lose it by going out of possession, unless the original owner retakes possession. Enclosure is strong evidence of possession.

Lord Justice Butler-Sloss, Lord Justice Millett, Lord Justice Thorpe
[1997] EWCA Civ 1277, (1997) 74 P and CR 221
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedPulleyn v Hall Aggregates (Thames Valley) Ltd 1993
. .
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedLeigh v Jack CA 11-Dec-1879
The plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Mr Leigh) had laid out part of his estate as proposed streets to be known as Grundy Street and Napier Place. He conveyed to the defendant certain land described as being ‘bounded by’ Grundy Street and Napier . .
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedGray v Wykeham Martin and Goode 17-Jan-1977
. .
CitedKynoch Limited v Rowlands 1912
The parties owned adjoining agricultural land divided by a dry ditch. The Plaintiffs built an enclosing wall on their own side of the ditch, cutting themselves off from access to the ditch.
Held: The true boundary between the properties lay . .

Cited by:
CitedTower Hamlets v Barrett and Another CA 19-Jul-2005
The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 05 December 2021; Ref: scu.141673

Topplan Estates Ltd v David Townley: CA 27 Oct 2004

The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and the land sold, but he did not vacate the land. The new owner granted a further annual licence to the claimant’s father, but not after his death in 1982. The claimant continued his occupation, taking off grass crops and grazing the land. The land was sold again, but the purchaser inspected the land in December when the cows had been taken off the land. A part of the land had been used whilst a road was widened, and the claimant had not objected. The appellant said this use was not continuous and apparent.
Held: There was no obligation on a claimant to notify the paper owner of his presence: ‘there can be no obligation in law on a squatter to draw the true owner’s attention to the fact that time is running against him.’ ‘. . . the epithet ‘adverse’ in the expression ‘adverse possession’ in paragraph 8 of Part I of Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act 1980 refers not to the quality of the possession but to the capacity of the party claiming possessory title (‘the squatter’) as being a person ‘in whose favour the period of limitation can run’. . . In particular, it does not connote any element of aggression, hostility or subterfuge. ‘ and ‘the word ‘possession’ in the expression ‘adverse possession’ means no more than ‘ordinary possession of the land’ (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at para 36: see para 39 above). However, in order to establish possession in this context, the squatter must prove (a) sufficient objective acts to constitute physical possession (‘factual possession’) coupled with (b) an intention to possess (animus possidendi). ‘Occupation of the land alone is not enough, nor is an intention to occupy which is not put into effect by action.’ and ‘an intention to possess must be distinguished from an intention to own: it is only the former which is relevant in the context of adverse possession’ and ‘a squatter will establish factual possession if he can show that he used the land in the way one would expect him to use it if he were the true owner and in such a way that the owner is excluded ‘ and ‘Just as the issue as to factual possession depends crucially on the facts of the particular case, so also, in my judgment, must the issue as to the existence of the requisite intention to possess. In particular, whether the existence of factual possession is sufficient in itself to establish the existence of the requisite intention to possess, or whether some further evidence of intention is required, must depend on the particular facts of the case. ‘

Mr Justice Hooper Lord Justice Pill Lord Justice Parker
[2004] EWCA Civ 1369, Times 15-Nov-2004
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedPowell v McFarlane ChD 1977
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘It will be convenient to begin by . .
CitedJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
HeresyLeigh v Jack CA 11-Dec-1879
The plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Mr Leigh) had laid out part of his estate as proposed streets to be known as Grundy Street and Napier Place. He conveyed to the defendant certain land described as being ‘bounded by’ Grundy Street and Napier . .
CitedLondon Borough of Lambeth v Blackburn CA 14-Jun-2001
The appellant had broken into an empty council owned flat, and subsequently occupied it. After twelve years the authority obtained a court order for possession. The court had held that the appellant had not had a sufficient animus possidendi since . .
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedPurbrick v Hackney London Borough Council ChD 26-Jun-2003
The property fell into disrepair. The claimant began to use it for storage, carrying out some refurbishment. He now claimed to own the property by adverse possession.
Held: Littledale was not to be followed unless the facts were strictly on . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Registered Land, Limitation

Updated: 05 December 2021; Ref: scu.219126

Wallis’s Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd: CA 10 Jul 1974

A strip of land between a holiday camp and a garage had been conveyed as an intended roadway. It had not been fenced. A plot of land was sold by the previous farmer to the garage. Later the plaintiffs bought the farm, excluding the roadway, and the disputed land. They farmed the disputed land for several years. The garage was sold to the defendants, but the land remained unidentified, and the plaintiffs continued to farm it. The new road was abandoned, and the defendants tried to sell the disputed land to the plaintiffs. When they sought to fence the land, the action was begun, claiming possessory title, but failed. The plaintiffs appealed.
Held: The owners of the disputed land had left it unoccupied for the purposes of eventual use in connection with the proposed new road and there had been no sufficient ouster of the owners so as to create 12 years’ adverse possession within the Limitation Act 1939. The appeal failed.

Lord Denning MR, Stamp and Ormrod L.JJ.
[1974] 3 WLR 387, [1975] QB 94
lip
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedLeigh v Jack CA 11-Dec-1879
The plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Mr Leigh) had laid out part of his estate as proposed streets to be known as Grundy Street and Napier Place. He conveyed to the defendant certain land described as being ‘bounded by’ Grundy Street and Napier . .
AppliedWilliams Brothers Direct Supply Ltd v Raftery CA 1957
In a claim for the adverse possession of land, the court is to determine whether the acts of user do or do not amount to dispossession of the owner, the character of the land, the nature of the acts done on it and the intention of the squatter must . .

Cited by:
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 05 December 2021; Ref: scu.174048

Leigh v Jack: CA 11 Dec 1879

The plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Mr Leigh) had laid out part of his estate as proposed streets to be known as Grundy Street and Napier Place. He conveyed to the defendant certain land described as being ‘bounded by’ Grundy Street and Napier Place, therefore the intention to use the adjoining land for streets was known to all parties. Within the 20-year limitation period, both Mr Leigh and the defendant had carried out work on a fence separating Grundy Street from other land of Mr Leigh, Regent Road. From 1854 onwards the defendant had placed on Grundy Street and Napier Place old graving dock materials, screw propellers, boilers and refuse from his foundry. In 1872 (four years before action brought) the defendant completely enclosed Grundy Street and Napier Place.
Held: The defendant had not acquired title to the enclosed land under the Limitation Act 1833.
Bramwell LJ said: ‘I do not think that there was any dispossession of the plaintiff by the acts of the defendant: acts of user are not enough to take the soil out of the plaintiff and her predecessors in title and to vest it in the defendant; in order to defeat a title by dispossessing the former owner, acts must be done which are inconsistent with his enjoyment of the soil for the purposes for which he intended to use it.’
Cockburn CJ explained the rationale for the presumption: ‘It is presumed that those who were seised of the neighbouring land devoted the surface of their soil to the public, in order to confer a common benefit on all those desirous of using the highway, without, however, parting with the ownership of the soil itself.’

Bramwell LJ, Cockburn CJ
(1879) 5 Ex D 264, (1879-80) LR 5 Ex D 264, [1879] UKLawRpExch 53
Commonlii
Limitation Act 1833
England and Wales
Cited by:
AppliedWallis’s Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd CA 10-Jul-1974
A strip of land between a holiday camp and a garage had been conveyed as an intended roadway. It had not been fenced. A plot of land was sold by the previous farmer to the garage. Later the plaintiffs bought the farm, excluding the roadway, and the . .
DisapprovedJ A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
DisapprovedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .
CitedMayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Hounslow v Anne Minchinton CA 19-Mar-1997
The defendant asserted title to a strip of land by adverse possession. The judge had held that the occupation by the claimant had been insufficient to establish possession.
Held: The use of the land as a garden for compost heaps and similar . .
HeresyTopplan Estates Ltd v David Townley CA 27-Oct-2004
The registered proprietor of land appealed a finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of their land. The claimant had occupied it as part of his farm. Originally there had been a grazing tenancy. The tenancy was terminated, and . .
CitedChambers v London Borough of Havering CA 20-Dec-2011
The defendant appealed against an order for him to surrender possession of land he had claimed by adverse possession. The Council was the registered proprietor. The defendant said he had used the land since 1981 for dumping of motor vehicle parts. . .
CitedFortune and Others v Wiltshire Council and Another CA 20-Mar-2012
The court considered the contnuation of public rights of way against the new system of the ending of certain unrecorded rights.
Held: he appeal failed. ‘As a matter of plain language, section 67(2)(b) does not, in our judgment, require the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 05 December 2021; Ref: scu.180920

Collins v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills and Others: CA 23 May 2014

The claimant appealed against rejection of his claim for personal injury which had been rejected on basis that it was out of time. He had contracted cancer in 2002, but had recovered. He later came to attribute this to exposure to asbestos at work in the docks up to 1967. He made his claim in 2012. The court was asked to what extent the court should take account of a delay between 1947 and 2003, the date of his constructive knowledge of the injury.
Held: Jackson LJ said: ‘Because the test in section 14 (3) is an objective one, the practical consequence is that some injured persons fail to make reasonable and timeous inquiries, with the result that they are time-barred. This is unsurprising. Sections 11 to 14 of the Limitation Act strike a balance between the interests of (a) persons who, having suffered latent injuries, seek compensation late in the day and (b) tortfeasors who, despite their wrongdoings, ultimately need closure. Parliament has struck that balance by means of an objective test. Parliament has also provided a safety net in the form of section 33 so as to prevent injustice arising.’ In this case a reasonable man in the claimant’s position would have been asking as to the causes of his condition by mid-2003. The judge had correctly fixed the date of his construcive knowledge

Jackson, Lewison, Macur LJJJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 717
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 11(4) 14 33
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSpargo v North Essex District Health Authority CA 13-Mar-1997
The test of ‘When a plaintiff became aware of the cause of an injury’ is a subjective test of what passed through plaintiff’s mind. ‘(1) the knowledge required to satisfy s14(1)(b) is a broad knowledge of the essence of the causally relevant act or . .
Appeal fromCollins v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills QBD 2-May-2013
The claimant was seriously ill and claimed that this arose from exposure to asbestos fibres working for the defendant many years before. He now sought an extension of time to make the claim.
Held: The court upheld the limitation defences of . .
CitedAdams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council HL 17-Jun-2004
A attended the defendant’s schools between 1977 and 1988. He had always experienced difficulties with reading and writing and as an adult found those difficulties to be an impediment in his employment. He believed them to be the cause of the . .
CitedJohnson v Ministry of Defence and Another CA 21-Nov-2012
The claimant said that he had been exposed him to excessive noise during the course of his employment, causing his deafness. He noticed his hearing problems in 2001. He was also aware that exposure to noise could cause hearing loss, but did not . .
CitedPrice v United Engineering Steels Limited; J J Habershon and Sons Limited CA 12-Dec-1997
The plaintiff sought damages for deafness following exposure to excessive noise during his employment with the first and second defendants some 20 to 35 years previously. He issued his writ six years after the date of knowledge under LA section 14 . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Personal Injury

Updated: 03 December 2021; Ref: scu.525867

Hill and Another v Transport for London: ChD 16 May 2005

The claimants sought to establish title to land by adverse possession. The land was former Crown land. They had occupied the land since 1985. The defendants acquired the land from the Crown in 2000.
Held: Part II of the 1980 Act need to be read as a whole. The Crown had up to 30 years to claim from when the right of action first accrued. The successor to the Crown had the same rights. The claim failed.
Claim for land by adverse possession.

Rimer J
Times 30-May-2005, [2005] EWHC 856 (Ch), [2005] Ch 379, [2005] 3 All ER 677, [2005] 3 WLR 471
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 8Sch 1 PII p12
England and Wales

Land, Limitation

Updated: 01 December 2021; Ref: scu.226738

Williams v Mersey Docks and Harbour Board: CA 1905

The deceased suffered an injury in December 1902 which would have entitled him to institute proceedings against the harbour board within the special statutory period of six months pursuant to the 1893 Act. No such action was brought by the deceased, so that this action was statute-barred. Following his death in December 1904, his widow instituted proceedings under the 1846 Act in February 1905 to recover damages arising out of the death of her husband.
Held: The action could not be maintained. The right of action of the deceased, if he were still alive would have been barred by the provisions of the Act of 1893 which fixed a six-month time limit from the happening of the event.
Mathew L.J. stated: ‘The cases appear to establish the general principle that, where an action could not have been brought by the deceased person, it cannot be maintained in. respect of the same accident by his representative. In this case the deceased could not have maintained an action against the defendants at the time of his death, or at any time more than six months after the neglect which was said to have caused the injury to him.’

Mathew LJ
[1905] 1 KB 805
Fatal Accidents Act 1846, Public Authorities Protection Act 1893
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedPickett v British Rail Engineering HL 2-Nov-1978
Lost Earnings claim Continues after Death
The claimant, suffering from mesothelioma, had claimed against his employers and won, but his claim for loss of earnings consequent upon his anticipated premature death was not allowed. He began an appeal, but then died. His personal representatives . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 30 November 2021; Ref: scu.654043

UBAF Ltd v European American Banking Corporation: CA 1984

The defendant invited the plaintiff to take part in a syndicated loan. The defendant’s assistant secretary signed a letter to the plaintiff making representations, now claimed to be fraudulent. The defendant succeeded at first instance arguing that the signature was not that of the bank, and that even if it was, the action would be statute barred.
Held: The court refused to strike out the claim. A company itself made a representation, if it produced a document which was signed by an authorised officer or agent acting within the scope of his actual authority. This applied to bind the defendant bank. The nature of a syndicated loan was a fiduciary arrangement, and the obligations on a lead bank were continuing for limitation purposes, time did not run, and the obligation was not time barred. The issue would be settled at trial when it was established when the defendant could be said to have come to know of the alleged deceit.

Ackner LJ
[1984] QB 713, [1984] 1 WLR 508, [1984] CLY 1579
England and Wales
Citing:
ExplainedSwift v Jewsbury and Goddard 1874
. .
ExplainedHirst v West Riding Banking Co CA 1901
The representation on which the claim made was was in a letter signed by the branch manager of the defendant bank and the court evidently assumed that this could not be equated with the bank’s own signature.
Held: The action against the bank . .
ConsideredForster v Outred and Co CA 1981
A mother signed a mortgage deed charging her property to H as security for a loan to her son. She claimed the solicitor had been negligent in his advice. The solicitor replied that the claim was out of time. The loss accrued not when demand for . .

Cited by:
CitedNykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
CitedPegasus Management Holdings Sca and Another v Ernst and Young (A Firm) and Another ChD 11-Nov-2008
The claimants alleged professional negligence in advice given by the defendant on a share purchase, saying that it should have been structured to reduce Capital Gains Tax. The defendants denied negligence and said the claim was statute barred.
Banking, Limitation, Torts – Other, Company

Updated: 29 November 2021; Ref: scu.181338

Jetivia Sa and Another v Bilta (UK) Ltd and Others: SC 22 Apr 2015

The liquidators of Bilta had brought proceedings against former directors and the appellant alleging that they were party to an unlawful means conspiracy which had damaged the company by engaging in a carousel fraud with carbon credits. On the pleaded facts, Mr Chopra and Mr Nazir were the directing organ of Bilta under its constitution. They constituted the board. Mr Chopra was also the sole shareholder. As between Bilta and Jetivia it was common ground on the pleadings that they were the ‘directing mind and will’ of Bilta for all purposes, and certainly in relation to those of its functions which are relevant in these proceedings.
Held: The defendant company and director failed in their appeals, both in relation to the illegality defence and in relation to section 213. The plea of ex turpi causa non oritur actio was not available to the directors of a company in a defence to an action against them by the company for acts involvig breaches of their duties as directors.
Lord Mance said: ‘ it is certainly unjust and absurd to suggest that the answer to a claim for breach of a director’s (or any employee’s) duty could lie in attributing to the company the very misconduct by which the director or employee has damaged it. A company has its own separate legal personality and interests. Duties are owed to it by those officers who constitute its directing mind and will, similarly to the way in which they are owed by other more ordinary employees or agents. All the shareholders of a solvent company acting unanimously may in certain circumstances (which need not here be considered, since it is not suggested that they may apply) be able to authorise what might otherwise be misconduct towards the company. But even the shareholders of a company which is insolvent or facing insolvency cannot do this to the prejudice of its creditors, and the company’s officers owe a particular duty to safeguard the interest of such creditors. There is no basis for regarding the various statutory remedies available to a liquidator against defaulting officers as making this duty or its enforcement redundant.’

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath, Lord Toulson, Lord Hodge
[2015] UKSC 23, [2015] WLR(D) 182, UKSC 2013/0206, [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61, [2015] 1 BCLC 443, [2015] 2 All ER (Comm) 281, [2015] BVC 20, [2015] 2 WLR 1168, [2015] BCC 343, [2015] 2 All ER 1083
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC Summary, SC
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromJetivia Sa and Another v Bilta (UK) Ltd and Others CA 31-Jul-2013
Defendants appealed against refusal of their request for a summary striking out for lack of jurisdiction, of the claims against them arising from their management of the insolvency of the first defendant. . .
CitedBowman v Secular Society Limited HL 1917
The plantiff argued that the the objects of the Secular Society Ltd, which had been registered under the Companies Acts, were unlawful.
Held: The House referred to ‘the last persons to go to the stake in this country pro salute animae’ in 1612 . .
At first Instance (1)Bilta (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Nazir and Others ChD 17-May-2010
The sixth defendant resisted a claim against it saying that matters between them were governed by a framework agreement which provided for matters to be resolved by arbitration. The claimant resisted, denying the arbitration agreement and saying . .
At first Instance (2)Bilta (Uk) Ltd v Nazir and Others ChD 24-Nov-2010
The company had been wound up by the Revenue on the basis that it had been used for a substantial VAT fraud. The liquidators now sued those said to have participated. A defendant denied the jurisdiction because of a disputed arbitration agreement. . .
Appeal fromBilta (UK) Ltd and Others v Nazir and Others ChD 30-Jul-2012
The company was said to have engaged in a fraud based on false European Trading Scheme Allowances, and had been wound up by the Revenue. The liquidators, in the company name, now sought recovery from former directors and associates.
Held: The . .
CitedAbrath v North Eastern Railway Co HL 15-Mar-1886
The plaintiff had brought an action against the company of malicious prosecution. It was rejected by the jury and again on appeal.
Held: The appeal failed. In an action for damages for the tort of malicious prosecution one of the elements of . .
CitedThe Citizens Life Assurance Company Limited v Brown PC 6-May-1904
(New South Wales) A malicious libel was alleged. The life assurance company was vicariously liable in respect of a libel contained in a circular sent out by a person who was employed by the company under a written agreement as its ‘superintendent of . .
CitedWest Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodds CA 1988
If a company continues to trade whilst insolvent but in the expectation that it would return to profitability, it should be regarded as trading not for the benefit of the shareholders, but for the creditors also. If there is a possibility of . .
CitedTinsley v Milligan CA 1992
The court considered the defence of illegal user to a claim to have established an easement by prescription: ‘These authorities seem to me to establish that when applying the ‘ex turpi causa’ maxim in a case in which a defence of illegality has been . .
CitedLennard’s Carrying Company Limited v Asiatic Petroleum Company Limited HL 1915
The House was asked as to when the acts of an individual became those of his employer under section 502 (‘any loss or damage happening without (the ship owner’s) actual fault or privity’).
Held: Viscount Haldane LC said: ‘It must be upon the . .
CitedEl Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc and Another ChD 3-Jan-1993
A non active director may still be company’s ‘directing mind’. The doctrine of attributing the actions of individuals to a company is that ‘Their minds are its mind; their intention its intention; their knowledge its knowledge.’
Tracing was no . .
CitedTinsley v Milligan HL 28-Jun-1993
Two women parties used funds generated by a joint business venture to buy a house in which they lived together. It was vested in the sole name of the plaintiff but on the understanding that they were joint beneficial owners. The purpose of the . .
CitedEl Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd CA 2-Dec-1993
The court was asked whether, for the purposes of establishing a company’s liability under the knowing receipt head of constructive trust, the knowledge of one of its directors can be treated as having been the knowledge of the company.
Held: . .
CitedMeridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v The Securities Commission Co PC 26-Jun-1995
(New Zealand) Lord Hofmann said: ‘There is in fact no such thing as the company as such, no ‘ding an sich’, only the applicable rules. To say that a company cannot do something means only that there is no one whose doing of that act would, under the . .
Not to be followedMoore Stephens (A Firm) v Stone Rolls Ltd (in liquidation) HL 30-Jul-2009
The appellants had audited the books of the respondent company, but had failed to identify substantial frauds by an employee of the respondent. The auditors appealed a finding of professional negligence, relying on the maxim ex turpi causa non . .
CitedHounga v Allen and Another SC 30-Jul-2014
The appellant, of Nigerian origin had been brought here at the age of 14 with false identity papers, and was put to work caring for the respondent’s children. In 2008 she was dismissed and ejected from the house. She brought proceedings alleging . .
CitedLes Laboratoires Servier and Another v Apotex Inc and Others SC 29-Oct-2014
Ex turpi causa explained
The parties had disputed the validity a patent and the production of infringing preparations. The english patent had failed and damages were to be awarded, but a Canadian patent remained the defendant now challenged the calculation of damages for . .
CitedAbrath v North Eastern Railway Company CA 22-Jun-1883
A claim was brought against the company for malicious prosecution. The jury acquitted it. And the plaintiff appealed.
Held: The judge’s direction had been correct.
Bowen LJ said: ‘Wherever a person asserts affirmatively as part of his . .
CitedJC Houghton and Co v Northard, Lowe and Wills HL 1927
The court was asked whether the knowledge of the directors of the latter company should be attributed to it, with the effect that the latter company could and should be treated as estopped from denying that it had consented to a particular . .
CitedRegina v ICR Haulage Ltd KBD 1944
A company can be guilty of conspiracy, in this case to defraud. Both the managing director and, through him, the haulage company were convicted of conspiracy to defraud. His acts ‘were the acts of the company and the fraud of that person was the . .
CitedMoore v I Bresler Ltd KBD 1944
The company had been required to make a return for revenue purposes (purchase tax) and the statute made it an offence to make a false return with intent to deceive. The company was charged with such, but responded that the action was of employees . . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd 1945
The court considered the liability of a company under provisions being, ‘with intent to deceive, made use . . of a document which was false in a material particular’
Held: The General Manager was capable of acting or speaking as the company; . .
CitedBelmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd CA 1979
The company directors operated an elaborate scheme to extract value from Belmont by causing it to buy the shares of a company called Maximum at a considerable overvalue. This was a breach of the fiduciary duties of the directors. They sought to . .
CitedRe Hampshire Land Company 9-Jul-1896
A company had borrowed from a building society. The borrowing was not properly authorised by resolution of the shareholders in general meeting The court was asked whether whether the knowledge of the company secretary common to both the company and . .
CitedLloyd v Grace, Smith and Co HL 1912
Mrs Lloyd delivered the title deeds of her cottages at Ellesmere Port to the solicitors’ managing clerk, who defrauded her.
Held: Vicarious liability can extend to fraudulent acts or omissions if those were carried out in the course of the . .
CitedTesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass HL 31-Mar-1971
Identification of Company’s Directing Mind
In a prosecution under the 1968 Act, the court discussed how to identify the directing mind and will of a company, and whether employees remained liable when proper instructions had been given to those in charge of a local store.
Held: ‘In the . .
CitedAshmore, Benson, Pease and Co v A V Dawson Ltd CA 1973
By acquiescing in the overloading of the hauliers’ lorries, the consignors’ assistant transport manager and his assistant made the haulage contract unenforceable at the instance of the consignors, who were unable to recover when a lorry toppled over . .
CitedAttorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1982) CACD 1984
Two men were charged with theft from a company which they wholly owned and controlled. The court considered the actions of company directors in dishonestly appropriating the property of the company, and whether since the title to the goods was . .
CitedRoyal Brunei Airlines SDN BHD v Tan PC 24-May-1995
(Brunei) The defendants were a one-man company, BLT, and the one man, Mr Tan. A dishonest third party to a breach of trust was liable to make good a resulting loss even though he had received no trust property. The test of knowledge was an objective . .
CitedLancashire County Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd CA 3-Apr-1996
The defendant agreed to indemnify the insured ‘in respect of all sums which the insured shall become legally liable to pay as compensation arising out of’ various matters including wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. The . .
CitedLister and Others v Hesley Hall Ltd HL 3-May-2001
A school board employed staff to manage a residential school for vulnerable children. The staff committed sexual abuse of the children. The school denied vicarious liability for the acts of the teachers.
Held: ‘Vicarious liability is legal . .
CitedSafeway Stores Ltd and Others v Twigger and Others CA 21-Dec-2010
The court was asked whether, when a company had been fined for anti-competitive practices, the company could then recover the penalties from the directors and senior employees involved.
Held: The undertaking was not entitled to recover the . .
CitedAberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers HL 1854
The plaintiff needed a large quantity of iron chairs (rail sockets) and contracted for their supply over an 18-month period with Blaikie Bros a partnership. Thomas Blaikie was the managing partner of Blaikie Bros and a director and the chairman of . .
CitedSalomon v A Salomon and Company Ltd HL 16-Nov-1896
A Company and its Directors are not same paersons
Mr Salomon had incorporated his long standing personal business of shoe manufacture into a limited company. He held nearly all the shares, and had received debentures on the transfer into the company of his former business. The business failed, and . .
CitedBowman v Secular Society Limited HL 1917
The plantiff argued that the the objects of the Secular Society Ltd, which had been registered under the Companies Acts, were unlawful.
Held: The House referred to ‘the last persons to go to the stake in this country pro salute animae’ in 1612 . .
CitedBrink’s Mat Ltd v Noye CA 1991
The proceeds of the theft of gold bullion from a warehouse owned by the plaintiffs were laundered through the bank account of a company called Scadlynn Ltd with Barclays Bank. The directors and sole shareholders of Scadlynn were signatories of the . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Gomez HL 3-Dec-1992
The defendant worked as a shop assistant. He had persuaded the manager to accept in payment for goods, two cheques which he knew to be stolen. The CA had decided that since the ownership of the goods was transferred on the sale, no appropriation of . .
CitedHall v Hebert 29-Apr-1993
(Canadian Supreme Court) After they had been drinking heavily together, Mr Hebert, who owned a car, allowed Mr Hall to drive it, including initially to give it a rolling start down a road on one side of which there was a steep slope. The car . .
CitedSouth Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd etc HL 24-Jun-1996
Limits of Damages for Negligent Valuations
Damages for negligent valuations are limited to the foreseeable consequences of advice, and do not include losses arising from a general fall in values. Valuation is seldom an exact science, and within a band of figures valuers may differ without . .
CitedMarks and Spencer Plc v Palmer CA 9-Oct-2001
The claimant had tripped against a weather strip which protruded by less than 1 cm above the surface of doorway of the staff exit from one of the defendant’s stores. It was a permanent fixture and, as such, was part of the construction of the floor. . .
CitedMarks and Spencer plc v Palmer CA 9-Oct-2001
A shopper carrying some heavy bags tripped and fell over a weather strip, which was proud of the floor at an exit door to the extent of some 8 to 9.5 mm high. The recorder had said that, once he was satisfied that the claimant came into contact with . .
CitedGray v Thames Trains and Others HL 17-Jun-2009
The claimant suffered severe psychiatric injured in a rail crash caused by the defendant’s negligence. Under this condition of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, the claimant had gone on to kill another person, and he had been detained under section . .
CitedRalph Schmid (Acting As Liquidator of The Assets of Aletta Zimmermann) v Lilly Hertel ECJ 16-Jan-2014
ECJ Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 – Insolvency proceedings – Action to set a transaction aside by virtue of the debtor’s insolvency – . .

Cited by:
CitedBurnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding and Another CA 17-Jun-2016
The company, now in liquidation sought to claim for the alledged misapplication by former directors of its funds in 2007. It now appealed against a summary rejection of its claim as time barred.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Section 21(1)(b) . .
CitedRoyal Mail Group Ltd v Jhuti SC 27-Nov-2019
‘if a person in the hierarchy of responsibility above the employee determines that she (or he) should be dismissed for a reason but hides it behind an invented reason which the decision-maker adopts, the reason for the dismissal is the hidden reason . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Torts – Other, Limitation

Leading Case

Updated: 29 November 2021; Ref: scu.545696

Chandra and Another v Brooke North (A Firm) and Another: CA 5 Dec 2013

Appeal against a decision allowing amendments to be made to the particulars of claim in two solicitors’ negligence actions. The central issue in this appeal is whether those amendments raised new causes of action after expiry of the limitation period.

Laws, Jackson, McFarlane LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 1559, [2014] TCLR 1, 151 Con LR 113, [2013] 50 EG 102
Bailii
England and Wales

Professional Negligence, Limitation

Updated: 26 November 2021; Ref: scu.518764

Nemeti and Others v Sabre Insurance Co Ltd: CA 3 Dec 2013

The court considered the power of courts to allow substitution of a new party after the expiration of the limitation period.

Sir Terence Etherton Ch, Hallett VP, Sharp LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 1555
Bailii
European Communities (Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2002, Road Traffic Act 1988 151
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Liverpool City Council Ex Parte Muldoon; Regina v Same Ex Parte Kelly HL 11-Jul-1996
The claimant sought to challenge a refusal of the Housing Authority to pay housing benefit. The Secretary of State had made the relevant Regulations determining eligibility for benefits. If the challenge were successful, the Secretary of State would . .
CitedIrwin and Another v Lynch and Another CA 6-Oct-2010
The court considered an appeal against an order allowing an amendment outside the limitation period which would . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Insurance, Road Traffic

Updated: 26 November 2021; Ref: scu.518566

Allendale Ltd v Moualem: CA 6 Jul 2004

A promissory note executed on 30 June 1988, payable on demand. The promissory note was executed as a deed and therefore was a speciality falling under section 8 of the Limitation Act 1980, with a limitation period of 12 years. No demand was made for payment under the note within the period of 12 years. It is, and has been recognised for nearly 200 years as the law, that a promissory note payable on demand is enforceable from the date of its execution, and not from the date of any demand.

Waller, Buxton LJJ
[2004] EWCA Civ 915
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedNorton v Ellam 1837
Baron Parke said: ‘It is quite clear that a promissory note, payable on demand, is a present debt, and is payable without any demand, and the statute begins to run from the date of it.’ . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Limitation

Updated: 23 November 2021; Ref: scu.517237

Smart v The London Borough of Lambeth: CA 7 Nov 2013

A local authority granted a licence to a housing association which in turn allowed a housing cooperative to provide accommodation to former squatters on a licence which was initially for 5 years but was extended. A claim was made for adverse possession.

Longmore, Underhill, Floyd LJJ
2013] 46 EG 108, [2014] HLR 7, [2013] EWCA Civ 1375
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedZH and CN, Regina (on The Applications of) v London Boroughs of Newham and Lewisham SC 12-Nov-2014
The court was asked whether the 1977 Act required a local authorty to obtain a court order before taking possession of interim accommodation it provided to an apparently homeless person while it investigated whether it owed him or her a duty under . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 25 November 2021; Ref: scu.517466

Billings v Reed: CA 1945

The plaintiff’s wife had been killed by a negligently piloted RAF aeroplane. It was argued that, although this was a war injury, the language of section 3(1) did not exclude a claim based on trespass to the person.
Held: Lord Greene MR said: ‘It seems to me that in this context the phrase ‘breach of duty’ is comprehensive enough to cover the case of trespass to the person which is certainly a breach of duty as used in a wide sense.’

Lord Greene MR, Mackinnon and Lawrence LJJ
[1945] KB 11
Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act 1939
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedA v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006
Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
CitedA v Hoare HL 30-Jan-2008
Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend . .
AppliedLetang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Limitation, Negligence

Updated: 25 November 2021; Ref: scu.240375

Alves v Attorney General of The Virgin Islands (British Virgin Islands): PC 18 Dec 2017

From the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (British Virgin Islands)

Lord Neuberger

Lord Kerr

Lord Carnwath

Lord Hughes

Lord Hodge
[2017] UKPC 42
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedStubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993
Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Limitation

Updated: 22 November 2021; Ref: scu.601883