Albert v Motor Insurers Bureau: HL 1971

The plaintiff suffered injury as a passenger when getting a lift to work from a co-worker. The driver was uninsured and had given lift to several co-workers over a period of time, mking a charge.
Held: The lift arrangement was in the nature of a contract, and therefore under the MIB scheme, the MIB were obliged to pay compensation.
Viscount Dilhorne said: ‘To constitute carriage for hire or reward, it is not, of course, necessary that payment is made before the journey. If there is an arrangement that payment will be made for that it matters not when the payment is in fact made.’

Viscount Dilhorne
[1971] 3 WLR 291
England and Wales

Road Traffic, Insurance, Personal Injury, Contract

Updated: 30 November 2021; Ref: scu.565344

Powlesland v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 9 Dec 2013

The defendant apealed against his conviction for having taken part in a public procession, a a Critical Mass Cycle Ride, knowingly in breach of conditions attached to it by the Police. The defendant had argued that the ride was not a procession.
Held: The appeal failed. ‘The power to give directions is to be used, not just when the organisers of a procession have been co-operative enough to tell the police in advance of their intentions as to a specific route, but and perhaps more importantly when they have not done so. It would be an absurd interpretation if a direction, aimed at preventing serious disruption, could not be given unless the police knew as a matter of objectively provable fact that the procession would follow a specific route from A to B via particular roads, despite disruptive organisers masking their intentions. It cannot be that, until the police know the specific route, they cannot use s12 to prevent the use of a reasonably possible but seriously disruptive route. The power to give directions would not be useable when most needed; and it could always be objected that the police did not know what the route was to be, but had merely believed, however reasonably, that it could take a disruptive route.’

Goldring LJ, Ouseley J
[2013] EWHC 3846 (Admin), (2014) 178 JP 67, [2014] 1 WLR 2984, [2014] WLR(D) 139
Bailii, WLRD
Public Order Act 1986 12(5)
Citing:
CitedKay v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis HL 26-Nov-2008
The claimant had been involved in a monthly cycle ride through central London which had continued for many years. The ride took place without any central organisation and without any route being pre-planned. They objected to being required to apply . .
CitedKay v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Admn 27-Jun-2006
For many years and in many large cities, once a month, cyclists had gathered en masse to cycle through the city in a ‘Critical Mass’ demonstration. There was no central organisation. Clarification was sought as to whether the consent of the police . .
CitedFlockhart v Robinson 1950
A challenge was made to the organising of a procession. Its route was determined by Mr Flockhart as he went along.
Held: For the purposes of section 3(4) of the 1936 Act, a procession ‘is a body of persons moving along a route’ and that, by . .
CitedJukes and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 16-Jan-2013
Two of those participating in a march demonstrating against cuts in the education budget, left that march to join the Occupy Movement’s demonstration in Trafalgar Square against the excesses of capitalism. They were, convicted at Westminster . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic, Police

Updated: 28 November 2021; Ref: scu.519993

Coles and Others v Hetherton and Others: CA 20 Dec 2013

The claimants’ insurers disputed arrangements by the defendants’ insurers in motor accident claims which, they said artificially inflated the costs of repairs to the profit of the defendants’ insurers.

Moore-Bick, Aikens, Vos LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 1704
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoColes and Others v Hetherton and Others ComC 22-Sep-2011
Parties challenged the method used by the Royal and Sun Alliance insurance to calculate the cost of repairs to motor vehicles damaged in accidents. After conflicting decisions in County Courts, the issue was brought before the Commercial Court.
Appeal fromColes and Others v Hetherton and Others ComC 15-Jun-2012
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Damages, Road Traffic

Updated: 28 November 2021; Ref: scu.519317

Regina v Camden London Borough Council Ex Parte Cran and Others: QBD 25 Jan 1995

A designation of an area as a controlled parking area was vitiated by the failure of the Local Authority to consult locally. The court expanded on the principles for consultation set out in Gunning: ‘What kind and amount of consultation is required in a particular case must depend on the circumstances. A few general principles can however, be stated.
‘The process of consultation must be effective; looked at as a whole, it must be fair. This requires that: consultation must take place while the proposals are still at a formative stage; those consulted must be provided with information which is accurate and sufficient to enable them to make a meaningful response; they must be given adequate time in which to do so; there must be adequate time for their responses to be considered; the consulting party must consider responses with a receptive mind and a conscientious manner when reaching its decision.’

McCullough J
Times 25-Jan-1995, Ind Summary 20-Mar-1995, (1996) 94 LGR 8
European Convention on Human Rights 9
Citing:
CitedRegina v Brent London Borough Council ex parte Gunning 1985
The demands of fair consultation procedures will vary from case to case and will depend on the factors involved. The requirements are: ‘First, that consultation must be at a time when proposals are still at a formative stage. Second, that the . .

Cited by:
CitedRegina (on the Application of Wainwright) v Richmond Upon Thames London Borough Council CA 20-Dec-2001
A local authority was under a statutory duty to consult before undertaking road improvements. Because of the chaotic mail administration systems, the consultation had been ruled unlawful. The council appealed.
Held: The council had in fact . .
CitedPartingdale Lane Residents’ Association, Regina (on the Application of) v Barnet London Borough Council Admn 2-Apr-2003
Complaint was made that a Councillor had closed his mind to any arguments and had predetermined the decision on a proposed road re-opening order.
Held: The application was allowed. Councillor Coleman had himself gone beyond a legitimate . .
CitedX, Regina (on the Application of) v Y School Admn 21-Feb-2007
The court was asked whether a school was entitled to refuse to allow a Muslim girl to wear the niqab full face veil at school. The reasons were ‘first educational factors resulting from a teacher being unable to see the face of the girl with a . .
CitedWatkins-Singh, Regina (on the Application of) v The Governing Body of Aberdare Girls’ High School and Another Admn 29-Jul-2008
Miss Singh challenged her school’s policy which operated to prevent her wearing while at school a steel bangle, a Kara. She said this was part of her religion as a Sikh.
Held: Earlier comparable applications had been made under human rights . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Local Government

Updated: 17 November 2021; Ref: scu.86281

Ashton v Turner: QBD 1981

The plaintiff sought damages after being injured as a passenger in a car. He and the driver had both just been involved in a burglary, and the driver, who had taken alcohol was attempting to escape. The driver was driving very dangerously in order to avoid their arrest after two taxi drivers had tried to block the car.
Held: The claim failed. As a matter of public policy the law would not recognise a duty of care owed by one participant in a crime to another: ‘a duty of care did not exist between the first defendant and the plaintiff during the course of the burglary and during the course of the subsequent flight in the get-away car.’
He held in the alternative that, even if a duty of care was owed, the Claimant had willingly accepted as his the risk of negligence and injury resulting from it.

Ewbank J
[1981] QB 137, [1980] 3 All ER 870
Road Traffic Act 1972 148(3)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedMarshall v Osmond CA 1983
The plaintiff was passenger in a stolen car seeking to escape the police as they chased. The car was stopped, the plaintiff got out of the car, and was hit by a police car. He sought damages.
Held: His appeal against dismissal of his claim was . .
DistinguishedKirkham v Anderton, The Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester police CA 20-Dec-1989
The claimant’s husband hanged himself in Risley Remand Centre after the police had failed to warn the prison authorities that he was (as the police knew) a suicide risk. He was suffering from clinical depression and had previously attempted suicide . .
Dictum DisapprovedPitts v The Personal Representatives of Mark James Hunt (Deceased) and Another CA 1990
The plaintiff and a friend had spent the evening drinking at a disco before setting off on the friend’s motorcycle. The plaintiff was aware that the motorcyclist was neither licensed to ride a motorcycle nor insured. During the journey, the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Negligence

Updated: 12 November 2021; Ref: scu.188781

Griffiths v Liverpool Corporation: CA 1967

The Highways Act of 1961 had enlarged the duty of the highway authority and made it a general duty to take reasonable care to secure that the highway was not dangerous to traffic.
As to the effect of the 1961 Act, Diplock LJ said: ‘The duty at common law to maintain, which includes a duty to repair a highway, was not based in negligence but in nuisance. It was an absolute duty to maintain, not merely a duty to take reasonable care to maintain, and the statutory duty which replaced it was also absolute.’ and ‘The defendants had a statutory duty to maintain the highway and the question of reasonable care has no relevance.’
DiplocK LJ continued: ‘Subsection (2) does not, in my opinion, make proof of lack of reasonable care on the part of a highway authority a necessary element in the cause of action of a plaintiff who has been injured by a danger on a highway. What it does is to enable the highway authority to rely upon the fact that it has taken reasonable care as a defence — the onus of establishing this resting upon it. A convenient way of expressing the effect of the subsection is that it does not qualify the legal character of the duty imposed by subsection (1) but provides the highway authority with a statutory excuse for not performing it.
But however this may be there are two crucial differences between a liability in negligence and the statutory liability of a highway authority under this section. To succeed in an action for negligence the plaintiff must prove, inter alia, (1) that the defendant has been guilty of lack of reasonable care and (2) that such lack of reasonable care was the cause of the injury to him. In an action under the statute against a highway authority for injury sustained from a danger on a highway the plaintiff need prove neither of these things in order to succeed. Unless the highway authority proves that it did take reasonable care the statutory defence under subsection (2) is not available to it at all. Nor is it a defence for the highway authority to show that even had it taken all reasonable care this might not have prevented the damage which caused the injury. It may be that if the highway authority could show that no amount of reasonable care on its part could have prevented the danger the common law defence of inevitable accident would be available to it; but that is not relied on in the present case and it is not necessary for us to express a final conclusion upon it.’

Diplock LJ, Sellers LJ
[1967] 1 QB 374
Highways Act 1961 58(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Inhabitants of High Halden 1859
highhalden1859
The court considered the liability of the parish for injury arising from a failure to repair the road. The road was ‘an old soft road formed of Weald of Kent clay, and had never been repaired with hard substances’. The evidence was that in wet . .

Cited by:
CitedGoodes v East Sussex County Council HL 16-Jun-2000
The claimant was driving along a road. He skidded on ice, crashed and was severely injured. He claimed damages saying that the Highway authority had failed to ‘maintain’ the road.
Held: The statutory duty on a highway authority to keep a road . .
CitedJones v Rhondda Cynon Taff County Borough Council CA 15-Jul-2008
The claimant, a fireman, sought damages for injuries suffered when he was injured answering a call out. He fell into a depressed area by the road side as he was pulling away a burning wooden pallet.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The court . .
CitedRance v Essex County Council CA 21-Feb-1997
Appeal against refusal of claim against highway authority. The appellant was injured when her car crashed. A high volume of heavy goods vehicles had been using a local road, damaging the road and verges. Though the road was wide enough for her car . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Nuisance, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.244696

Mirvahedy v Henley and another: HL 20 Mar 2003

The defendants’ horses escaped from the field, and were involved in an accident with the claimant’s car.
Held: The defendants were liable under section 2(2). To bolt was a characteristic of horses which was normal ‘in the particular circumstances’, these being some sort of fright or other external stimulus. Section 2 places all animals into one of two categories by their species. Animals either belong to a dangerous species, or they do not. A keeper of an animal is liable for damage caused by his animal dependant upon the category. A dangerous species must meet two requirements, a) that it is not commonly domesticated here and b) that fully grown animals ‘normally have such characteristics that they are likely, unless restrained, to cause severe damage or that any damage they may cause is likely to be severe’.
Lord Nicholls: ‘Take a large and heavy domestic animal such as a mature cow. There is a real risk that if a cow happens to stumble and fall onto someone, any damage suffered will be severe. This would satisfy requirement (a). . . But a cow’s dangerousness in this regard may not fall within requirement (b). This dangerousness is due to a characteristic normally found in all cows at all times. The dangerousness results from their very size and weight. It is not due to a characteristic not normally found in cows ‘except at particular times or in particular circumstances.”

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Nicholls
Times 24-Mar-2003, [2003] UKHL 16, Gazette 15-May-2003, [2003] 2 AC 491, [2003] RTR 26, [2003] PIQR P25, [2003] NPC 38, [2003] 2 WLR 882, [2003] 2 All ER 401
House of Lords, Bailii
Animals Act 1971 2 6(2) 11
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromMirvahedy v Henley and Henley CA 21-Nov-2001
Horses with no abnormal characteristics were panicked, ran out and collided with a car. The car driver sought damages.
Held: The question was not whether the animals betrayed abnormal characteristics of which the owners should have been aware, . .
CitedBreeden v Lampard CA 21-Mar-1985
A riding accident occurred at a cubbing meet. The plaintiff’s leg was injured when the defendant’s horse kicked out. A claim was advanced under section 2. This horse, like any horse, was liable to kick out when approached too closely, or too . .
CitedCummings v Grainger CA 1977
An untrained Alsatian dog was turned loose in a scrap-yard to deter intruders. The dog seriously injured the plaintiff who had entered the yard.
Held: The requirements of section 2(2) were satisfied but the defendant was entitled to rely upon . .

Cited by:
CitedClark v Bowlt CA 26-Jun-2006
A claim was made for personal injury suffered riding a horse.
Held: The court doubted whether a propensity occasionally to move otherwise than as directed can be described as a characteristic of a horse, for the purposes of s. 2(2)(b), but, if . .
CitedWelsh v Stokes and Another CA 27-Jul-2007
The claimant sued a riding stables after she was badly injured on being thrown from the horse provided. Her claim in negligence failed, but she succeeded under strict liabiilty under the 1971 Act, after the judge relied upon hearsay evidence.
CitedFreeman v Higher Park Farm CA 30-Oct-2008
The claimant fell from a horse hired to her by the defendant. She claimed for her injuries, and appealed rejection of her claim in strict liability under the 1971 Act. The horse was known to be lively and occasionally to buck, but the claimant was a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Animals, Road Traffic, Personal Injury

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.179981

Pryor v Greater Manchester Police: CA 30 Jun 2011

The claimant had purchased a car, but not yet received confirmation of its registration in his name. After verifying his friend’s insurance he lent the car to him. The friend was stopped by officers, the non-registrations noted and the car was impounded and destroyed. He appealed against rejection of his claim.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The conditions for seizure had not been met. It was only after a relevant certificate of insurance has not been provided that it can be asked whether the officer had reasonable grounds for suspecting an offence under section 143. The certificate satisfied the requirement as ‘the relevant certificate of insurance’, and doubts later acquired did not enlarge the powers under section 165.

Ward, Stanley Burnton, Black LJJ
[2011] EWCA Civ 749, [2011] RTR 33, (2011) 175 JP 492
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 143 165A
England and Wales

Road Traffic, Police

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.441394

Director of Public Prosecutions v Alexander: Admn 27 Jul 2010

The defendant had crashed his car after driving off with a girl, and while being chased by another car driven by her boyfriend. The police first cautioned him for false imprisonment, but then prosecuted him for careless driving. The prosecutor appealed against a successful plea of autrefois convict. The defendant said that the offence for which he was cautioned and the summons he now faced were the same incident.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The offences were different. In the one case the offence was the manner of driving, and the other the detention of the woman. The victims were different, and the modes of trial were different, so that in some circumstances there would have been two trials. Nor was any explicit promise given by the police.

Stanley Burnton LJ, Treacy, Nicol JJ
[2010] EWHC 2266 (Admin), (2010) 174 JP 519, [2010] ACD 98
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 3, Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedConnelly v Director of Public Prosecutions HL 1964
Plea of Autrefois Acquit is Narrow in Scope
The defendant had been tried for and acquitted of murder. The prosecution then sought to have him tried for robbery out of the same alleged facts. The House considered his plea of autrefois convict.
Held: The majority identified a narrow . .
CitedPhipps, Regina v CACD 14-Jan-2005
The appellant had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol. After complaints by the injured victim’s family he was further prosecuted for dangerous driving. He now appealed his conviction, having pleaded guilty when the judge failed to find an . .
CitedNicholas v Chester Magistrates Court Admn 11-Jun-2009
The claimant sought judicial review of a refusal by the respondents to state a case. . .
CitedGore, Regina v; Regina v Maher CACD 14-Jul-2009
The defendants appealed aginst their convictions for inflicting grievous bodily harm. When first arrested they had been issued with fixed penalty tickets for much lesser offences. The police officers did not anticipate the seriousness of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Criminal Practice

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.424081

Coates, Regina v: Misc 18 Jan 2011

(Barnsley Magistrates Court) The defendant owned a Segway, a two wheeled vehicle. He was charged with having driven it on a public footpath despite its being a motor vehicle. He denied that it was a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on the road’.
Held: ‘If I am satisfied from all the evidence presented, that a reasonable person was to say ‘yes, the Segway might well be used on a road’, then, applying the test, the vehicle is intended or adapted for such use.
In my judgement, the conclusion must be that general use on the roads is to be contemplated.’

Michael Rosenberg District Judge
[2011] EW Misc 3 (MC)
Bailii
Highways Act 1835, Road Traffic Act 1988 185(1), Road Traffic Regulation Act 1988 136(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v King Admn 13-Feb-2008
The defendant was charged after driving a ‘City Mantis Electric Scooter’. He was disqualified from driving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of the charges on the basis that the scooter was not of such a description as to require a licence . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Saddington; Chief Constable of the North Yorkshire Police v Michael Saddington Admn 1-Nov-2000
A motorised scooter of the type known as a ‘Go-Ped’ was a motor vehicle within the Act. Accordingly a driving licence and third party insurance were both required for its use on a public highway. The scooter required the passenger to stand on a . .
CitedBurns v Currell 1963
The defendant was accused of offences related to the driving on a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle, a Go-Kart.
Held: In fact it was not a motor vehicle within the statutory definition. The Court set out the test to be applied in . .
CitedChief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Fleming QBD 1987
The defendant was stopped pushing a motor-cycle along the road. It had been adapted for scrambling, and the registration plates lights and speedometer had been removed. He argued that it was no longer a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.430057

Ryder v Crown Prosecution Service: Admn 14 Apr 2011

The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, saying that the collection of a sample of urine had not been in accordance with the requirements of section 7. He had had the samples taken whilst in hospital from a catheter bag. He said there had not been two samples.
Held: The appeal failed.
Langstaff L said: ‘what must be applied, as it seems to me, is the plain English of the statute. If one asks here whether or not two samples — I shall call them samples to distinguish them from the statutory requirement, which is that of a specimen for analysis — were provided, then factually, as it seems to me, there could be no other conclusion to which the Bench could come other than that they were. Urine came within the hour after the request from the motorist. It went to the officer in some suitable container. The motorist knew that it would, and had accepted the procedure. The urine was plainly ‘provided’.’ and
‘if a flow of urine is connected in a chamber and that chamber is emptied, as it was here, into another chamber, the urine which thereafter collects in the first chamber is not the same sample, not the same urine as that which has been drained away. A specimen of that second filling seems to me to constitute a second specimen of urine. In this case, there were in fact three samples, one or two specimens being disregarded before that which was taken for evidential purposes shortly before 6.00 a.m. in the morning. Given that the purpose of the provisions was to ensure that the urine ultimately sent for analysis was a fresh specimen, and properly reflected the bodily condition of the person from whom it was taken, it seems to be entirely consistent with that principle that the statutory words should be interpreted here as the Bench interpreted them, , that there was here more than one specimen.’

Langstaff, Spencer JJ
[2011] EWHC 4003 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 5(1)(a) 7, Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 2
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRoney v Matthews QBD 1975
The LCJ considered an argument that the officer had not complied with the requirement that a defendant to be requested to provide two specimens within one hour of the request. He said: ‘The reference to two specimens of urine, I think, is explained . .
CitedProsser v Dickeson QBD 1982
The motorist who had been arrested and required to provide a laboratory test specimen under what was then section 9, under which it was for him to choose to provide a specimen of either blood or urine. He decided to provide two specimens of urine . .
CitedRegina v Radcliffe CACD 1977
In the procedure for giving two specimens of urine at a police station to test for driving over the prescribed limit, it does not matter that the first specimen was of any particular quantity. It therefore follows that, provided two specimens are . .
CitedRegina v Musker 1985
The motorist defendant had been required to provide a laboratory test specimen, under section 9(1). He filled one-third of a two-pint container at 2:15 am. A constable disposed of that pursuant to section 9(6) and the container was washed out. A . .
CitedNugent v Ridley 1987
May LJ considered the need to require two samples of urine under the Road Traffic act. He said that the only construction that he could give to that subsection was to read it precisely as it reads, namely that a specimen was to be provided within . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.463084

Romantiek Transport Bvba and others v Vehicle and Operator Services Agency: CA 16 May 2008

Vehicles and trailers had been detained by the respondent. The claimants said that the vehicles were being used under a ‘cabotage’ scheme allowing foreign lorries to be used temporarily on the UK.
Held: Any haulage contractor holding the appropriate European licence was entitled to perform cabotage. That applied irrespective of the withdrawal of the UK licences. That did not apply however where the operator was in effect practising as a full time operator within the UK.

Lord Justice Tuckey, Lord Justice Longmore and Lord Justice Toulson
[2008] EWCA Civ 534, Times 03-Jun-2008
Bailii
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3118/93, Council Regulation (EEC) 3118/93 (OJ November 12, 1993, No L279/1), EEC 3118/93, Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Regulations (1995 No 2869)
England and Wales

Road Traffic, European

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.267919

Hatton, Regina (on the Application of) v Devon and Cornwall Constabulary: Admn 4 Feb 2008

The defendant sought judicial review, on a renewed application, to challenge the decision to issue a speeding fine, and in the alternative that he had failed to identify the driver as required. The defendant had supplied the information but under a condition not allowing that information to be used for prosecution, citing Funke.
Held: The defendant had provided the information required, but his condition was not worth the paper it was written on. The Chief Constable had been wrong to proceed with a prosecution under section 172, but should simply have proceeded with the allegation of speeding. Permission was refused.

Collins J
[2008] EWHC 209 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Offences Act 1988 12
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.264593

Weightman v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 6 Mar 2007

Magistrates to identify reasons for finding guilt

The defendant appealed agains his conviction under section 172 of the 1988 Act. He had been abroad when his car attracted the speeding fine, but had been unable to identify which iof the several people who might have driven it, had done so.
Held: The decision of the magistrates left the defendant unable to identify the reasoning of the magistrates: ‘the oral judgment fails to explain in any satisfactory way why the statutory defence was rejected. That amounted to an error of law. That being so, and in the light of my earlier holding that the crown court’s decision appeared to be Wednesbury unreasonable in that there were no recorded facts on which the decision was based, I would hold that the appeal must be allowed.’

Smith LJ, Gross J
[2007] EWHC 634 (Admin), [2007] RTR 565
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 172(3)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedMarshall v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 17-Jun-2015
A car was seen speeding. Husband and wife each said that they did not know who was driving it in response to notices requiring that information. Mrs M now appealed against her conviction under section 172. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Magistrates

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.251159

Wright v Wenlock: 1971

The court set out the circumstances in which, in the absense of an explanation, the only proper inference is careless driving.
Lord Parker CJ said ‘the facts of a particular case may be such that, in the absence of some explanation the only possible inference is careless driving’

Lord Parker CJ
[1971] RTR 228, [1972] CLR 49
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedBingham, Regina (on the Application of) v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 7-Feb-2003
The defendant appealed by case stated against a conviction for driving a lorry without due care and attention, leading to the death of another road user. There had been an unexplained swing of the rear of his trailer out into the path of the other . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Criminal Evidence

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.538292

Regina v Inhabitants of High Halden: 1859

highhalden1859

The court considered the liability of the parish for injury arising from a failure to repair the road. The road was ‘an old soft road formed of Weald of Kent clay, and had never been repaired with hard substances’. The evidence was that in wet weather and in the winter months it was ‘very bad, soft and in an impassable state’ with deep ruts which ‘formed in fact the watercourses of the road’. Blackburn J directed the jury that the parish was not bound to make the road hard ‘. . but they were bound in some way, by stone or other hard substances to repair the road ; but they were bound in some way, by stone or other hard substances, if necessary, to put the road in such repair so as to be reasonably passable for the ordinary traffic of the neighbourhood at all seasons of the year.’ A guilty verdict was returned.

Blackburn J
26 Digest (Repl) 383, (1859) 1 F and F 678, [1860] EngR 93, (1860) 175 ER 903
Commonlii
Cited by:
CitedBurnside and Another v Emerson and Others CA 1968
The plaintiffs were injured in a road accident caused by flooding. They sued the executors of the deceased driver whose car spun out of control into the path of their own car, and also the highway authority, who had installed a proper system of . .
CitedHaydon v Kent County Council CA 1978
Impacted snow and ice had built up on a steep, narrow, made-up footpath from Monday to Thursday during a short wintry spell. The plaintiff slipped and broke her ankle. The highway authority operated a system of priorities. Their resources were fully . .
CitedDepartment for Transport, Environment and the Regions v Mott Macdonald Ltd and others CA 27-Jul-2006
Claims arose from accidents caused by standing water on roadway surfaces after drains had not been cleared by the defendants over a long period of time. The Department appealed a decision giving it responsibility under a breach of statutory duty . .
CitedGriffiths v Liverpool Corporation CA 1967
The Highways Act of 1961 had enlarged the duty of the highway authority and made it a general duty to take reasonable care to secure that the highway was not dangerous to traffic.
As to the effect of the 1961 Act, Diplock LJ said: ‘The duty at . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Negligence, Torts – Other, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.244626

Selby (Justin) v Director of Public Prosecutions: QBD 1994

The defendant sat on a motor bike, propelling it on a pavement with his feet; although the engine was running the machine, according to the defendant, was not in gear.
Held: The justices were correct to have found that the defendant, even on his version of the facts, was riding within the meaning of section 72. The justices had been referred to the definition of ‘ride’ taken from the Concise Oxford Dictionary.
An alleyway was not a footpath by a roadway.
Henry J said: ‘The difficulty that faces him in making such a submission is that it clearly would be riding a bicycle and it would be a curious state of affairs if something that amounted to riding in the case of a bicycle was not riding in the case of a motor cycle simply because the motor cycle is power-assisted in a way that a bicycle is not. It seems to me that this was riding and the justices were quite right to find that as such.’
Taylor LJ said: ‘the justices’ view as to what amounted to riding was correct. In my judgment, riding is being carried out if a person is being carried on a motor cycle as it moves on its wheels, whether propelled by the engine, by his feet or by gravity.’

Henry J, Taylor LJ
[1994] RTR 157
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedCoates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.442518

Bannister, Regina v: CACD 28 Jul 2009

The defendant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving. As a police officer he had driven at over 110 mph on a motorway in the wet, lost control and crashed. He said that the fact that he had undertaken the police advanced drivers’ course should be taken into account in deciding whether he had been driving dangerously.
Held: ‘taking into account the driving skills of a particular driver is inconsistent with the objective test of the competent and careful driver set out in the statute. If the special skill of the driver is taken into account in assessing whether the driving is dangerous, then it must follow inevitably that the standard being applied is that of the driver with special skills and not that of the competent and careful driver, because the standard of the competent and careful driver is being modified.’ The summing up had in fact been more favourable to the defendant than it should have been. However, it was irrelevant whether he had been on police business at the time, and the jury may have been confused by the judge’s direction. The conviction was quashed.

Lord Justice Thomas, Mr Justice Collins and Mr Justice Owen
[2009] EWCA Crim 1571, Times 24-Aug-2009
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1991 2A
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedMilton v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 16-Mar-2007
The defendant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, saying that his special skills as a trained police driver should have been allowed for. He had driven on a motorway at average speeds of 148mph.
Held: His appeal was allowed. The . .
CitedRegina v Woodward (Terence) CACD 7-Dec-1994
On a prosecution for causing death by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1 of the 1988 Act, the fact that the driver was adversely affected by alcohol was a relevant circumstance in determining whether he was driving dangerously.’The fact (if it . .
CitedRegina v Marison CACD 16-Jul-1996
A diabetic who drove anticipating a diabetic attack was driving recklessly and his act constituted dangerous driving. . .
CitedAttorney General’s Reference No 4 of 2000 CACD 2001
Lord Woolf CJ reaffirmed that the test for dangerous driving was an objective one: ‘Section 2A sets out a wholly objective test. The concept of what is obvious to a careful driver places the question of what constitutes dangerous driving within the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.365620

Nottingham City Council, Regina (on The Application of) v Bus Lane Adjudicator and Others: Admn 9 Mar 2017

Bus Lane Signage was not as required

The Council sought review of decisions against it as to the infringement of bus lane rules. The Adjudicator had found that its signage was inadequate.
Held: The Council had not used the sign required and the request for review failed.

Lang DBE J
[2017] EWHC 430 (Admin)
Bailii
Local Authorities Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996 18, Bus Lane Contraventions (Penalty Charges, Adjudication and Enforcement) (England) Regulations 2005, Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.579638

Newbury v Davis: QBD 1974

newbury_davisQBD1974

The owner of a vehicle agreed to lend it to someone else on condition that that person insured against third party risks. In the owner’s absence, that person drove the car on a road without insurance.
Held: The appeal against conviction was allowed: ‘the defendant did not permit Mr Jarvis to use the car. The defendant gave no permission to use it unless Mr Jarvis had a policy of insurance to cover its use, and he had none. Having no policy of insurance, he took the vehicle without the defendant’s permission. In other words, permission given subject to a condition which is unfulfilled is no permission at all. It may be that the difference is a small one between a case where the owner gives unconditional permission in the mistaken belief that the use is covered by insurance, or in the disappointed hope that it will be covered, and the case where the permission is given subject to a condition and that condition is not fulfilled. But to my mind there is a difference and it is one of legal substance. On this view of the case the defendant committed no offence.’

Lord Widgery CJ, MacKenna J
[1974] RTR 367
Road Traffic Act 1972
Cited by:
CitedPhilip Owen Lloyd-Wolper v Robert Moore; National Insurance Guarantee Corporation Plc, Charles Moore CA 22-Jun-2004
The first defendant drove a car belonging to his father and insured by his father. The father consented to the driving but under a mistaken belief that his son was licensed. The claimant was injured by the defendant in a road traffic accident.
DistinguishedBaugh v Crago QBD 1975
The defendant believed that a driver was the holder of a driving licence and permitted him to use the vehicle, when the driver was not in fact such a holder. The prosecutor appealed his acquittal.
Held: Considering Newbury v Davis. The . .
CitedFerrymasters Ltd v Adams 1980
Employers were alleged to have caused or permitted an employee to drive a vehicle on the road while not holding a driving licence authorising him to do so. When the employee had entered the employment, the employers had ensured that he held a valid . .
DistinguishedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Fisher QBD 1992
F was asked to lend L a car. F knew L was disqualified, but agreed provided L found an insured driver with a full valid driving licence. F did not know who L would ask or that he in fact asked R to drive; R was employed as delivery driver and the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Insurance

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.199925

Regina v Conway: CACD 28 Jul 1988

The defendant appealed against his conviction for reckless driving. He said the offence was committed out of necessity, since his passenger’s life was under threat.
Held: Necessity can only be a defence to a charge of reckless driving where the facts establish ‘duress of circumstances’ . . where the defendant was constrained by circumstances to drive as he did to avoid death or serious bodily harm to himself or some other person.

Woolf LJ, McCullough, Auld JJ
[1988] EWCA Crim 1, [1989] QB 290
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1972 2
Citing:
CitedRegina v Willer (Mark Edward) CACD 1986
The defendant appealed against his conviction for reckless driving (absolute discharge and ten penalty points). He drove his car slowly on the pavement in front of a shopping precinct. He said that this had seemed to him to be the only way in which . .
CitedRegina v Denton CACD 1987
Necessity not a defence to reckless driving
The trial judge had refused to leave to the jury the defence of necessity, which the appellant sought to bring to a road traffic allegation.
Held: The appeal failed. Caulfield J referred to the authorities, and said: ‘In view of our ultimate . .
CitedRegina v Lawrence (Stephen) HL 1981
The defendant had ridden a motor-cycle and hit a pedestrian. The court asked whether he had been reckless.
Held: The House understood recklessness as ‘a state of mind stopping short of deliberate intention, and going beyond mere inadvertence’ . .
CitedRegina v Graham (Paul) CACD 18-Dec-1981
The defence of duress requires establishment of a reasonable belief. In judging the accused’s response the test is: ‘have the prosecution made the jury sure that a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the characteristics of the defendant, . .
CitedRegina v Willer (Mark Edward) CACD 1986
The defendant appealed against his conviction for reckless driving (absolute discharge and ten penalty points). He drove his car slowly on the pavement in front of a shopping precinct. He said that this had seemed to him to be the only way in which . .
CitedRegina v Howe etc HL 19-Feb-1986
The defendants appealed against their convictions for murder, saying that their defences of duress had been wrongly disallowed.
Held: Duress is not a defence available on a charge of murder. When a defence of duress is raised, the test is . .

Cited by:
CitedRegina v Martin (Colin) CACD 29-Nov-1988
Defence of Necessity has a Place in Criminal Law
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving whilst disqualified. He said he had felt obliged to drive his stepson to work because his stepson had overslept. His wife (who had suicidal tendencies) had been threatening suicide unless he . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.262891

Iaciofano v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 15 Jul 2010

The defendant appealed against his conviction for speeding, saying that the device used to measure his speed was not approved. The only evidence relied on was that the officer said it had been installed in many police vehicles.
Held: The magistrates had not been entitled to take judicial notice of such an opinion. Though a court hearing a case stated might have wide powers in such cases, the powers were not available here because of the restricted nature of the magistrates’ decision. The court would remit the matter for trial before a new bench. An argument that a remittal would lead to unfair prejudice or prejudice failed, since the delay was only nine months.

Hooper LJ, Parker J
[2010] EWHC 2357 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 84 89(1), Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 Sch 2, Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 20, Senior Courts Act 1981 28(8)(iii)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedNicholas v Penny QBD 1950
A police officer’s assessment of a defendant’s speed could be corroborated by evidence as to the reading of a speedometer, even if the latter device had not been checked for the accuracy of its reading, unless there were particular reasons for . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Thornley Admn 3-Feb-2006
The prosecution appealed dismissal of an allegation of speeding. The defendant had argued that the prosecution had not served the required evidence. The prosecution sought to rely upon the evidence of the officer.
Held: The provisions of . .
CitedNicholas v Penny QBD 1950
A police officer’s assessment of a defendant’s speed could be corroborated by evidence as to the reading of a speedometer, even if the latter device had not been checked for the accuracy of its reading, unless there were particular reasons for . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.424952

Mills v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 3 Dec 2008

The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving whilst disqualified, saying that they had had insufficient evidence that he was such. It was not disputed that he was driving. Previous convictions for the same offence had been entered, but the details did not show the sentences imposed, no certificate of disqualification was entered, and it was not formally admitted. The magistrates had said that they relied on answers of ‘no comment’ given at interview.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The prosecution must prove to the criminal standard that the person accused was a disqualified driver, and secondly it can be proved by any admissible means, such as an admission — even a non-formal one by the accused — that he was a disqualified driver. It was wholly inappropriate for the magistrates to have drawn any inference from the lack of comment on the part of the appellant. It is not as if he subsequently relied on any fact or matter which gave rise to the opportunity of drawing the adverse inference from the failure to answer the question.

Scot Baker LJ, Maddison J
[2008] EWHC 3304 (Admin), (2009) 173 JP 157, [2009] RTR 12
Bailii
Criminal Justice Act 2003 101(1)(d)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedPattison v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 15-Dec-2005
The court considered the circumstances under which evidence of previous convictions could be admitted against a defendant where he did not admit that he was the same person. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Magistrates, Criminal Evidence

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.293959

Stovin v Wise (Norfolk City Council, 3rd party): CA 16 Feb 1994

A road user was injured on a corner which was known to the highway authority to be dangerous. The authority had sought to make arrangements with the owner of land adjoining the highway to remove a bank which obstructed the view.
Held: The Highway Authority could be liable in negligence for failing to achieve a remedy to a situation which it knew to be dangerous, but that no additional duty was owed, under its statutory duty to maintain the highway, to execute works on private land. Kennedy LJ ‘I agree with the judge that the statutory duty to maintain the highway does not extend to work on land not forming part of the highway. There is no definition of highway in the Act of 1980 beyond that in section 328(1), where it is defined as meaning ‘the whole or a part of a highway, other than a ferry or waterway,’ but the common law definition is that a highway is a way over which there exists a public right of passage. It seems to me that despite what is contained in the other statutory provisions to which we have been referred it would be stretching the meaning of both ‘highway’ and ‘maintain’ if this court were to say that in order to comply with its duty to maintain the highway authority had to remove an obstruction to visibility situated on adjoining land. In my judgment sections 79 and 154 are merely sections which enable the highway authority to carry out functions which go beyond the scope of section 41. Accordingly I conclude that the judge was right not to find any relevant breach of statutory duty.’
Nourse, Kennedy and Roch L.JJ
Times 08-Mar-1994, Gazette 13-Apr-1994, [1994] 3 All ER 467, [1994] 1 WLR 1124
lip
Highways Act 1980 41(1) 328(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
ConsideredHaydon v Kent County Council CA 1978
Impacted snow and ice had built up on a steep, narrow, made-up footpath from Monday to Thursday during a short wintry spell. The plaintiff slipped and broke her ankle. The highway authority operated a system of priorities. Their resources were fully . .
ConsideredAnns and Others v Merton London Borough Council HL 12-May-1977
The plaintiff bought her apartment, but discovered later that the foundations were defective. The local authority had supervised the compliance with Building Regulations whilst it was being built, but had failed to spot the fault. The authority . .
ConsideredMurphy v Brentwood District Council HL 26-Jul-1990
Anns v Merton Overruled
The claimant appellant was a house owner. He had bought the house from its builders. Those builders had employed civil engineers to design the foundations. That design was negligent. They had submitted the plans to the defendant Council for approval . .
DistinguishedEast Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent HL 1941
An exceptionally high spring tide caused many breaches of the banks of the River Deben, and extensive flooding, including the respondent’s farm. By section 6 of the 1930 Act, the appellants had a statutory power to maintain the flood defences, but . .
DistinguishedSheppard v Glossop Corporation CA 1921
. .

Cited by:
Appeal fromStovin v Wise, Norfolk County Council (Third Party) HL 24-Jul-1996
Statutory Duty Does Not Create Common Law Duty
The mere existence of statutory power to remedy a defect cannot of itself create a duty of care to do so. A highway authority need not have a duty of care to highway users because of its duty to maintain the highway. The two stage test ‘involves . .
CitedGreat North Eastern Railway Limited v Hart and Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions and Network Rail Infrastructure Limited QBD 30-Oct-2003
A driver had crashed through a barrier before a bridge, and descended into the path of a train. Ten people died. He now sought a contribution order against the Secretary of State for the condition of the barrier which was said to be faulty.
CitedKane v New Forest District Council CA 13-Jun-2001
A pedestrian walked from a footpath into the road and was hit by a car. She sought damages from the highway authority, saying that they had allowed vegetation to grow to an extent to make it impossible to be seen. As a second tier appeal, the . .
CitedThoburn v Northumberland County Council CA 19-Jan-1999
The claimant alleged that the defendant by allowing a flood across a road not to be cleared was in breach of their statutory duty under the 1980 Act.
Held: Though the blockage was not entirely on the Highway, the nature and extent of it was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 October 2021; Ref: scu.89578

Monk v Warbey: CA 1935

The court took a strict view of a vehicle owner’s potential liability to injured third parties.
Held: A person who suffered injury by reason of a breach of s35 could maintain an action in damages for that breach: ‘The Road Traffic Act, 1930, under which the question arises, was passed in these circumstances: it had become apparent that people who were injured by the negligent driving of motor cars were in a parlous situation if the negligent person was unable to pay damages. Accordingly two statutes were passed, one for the purpose of enabling persons who were thus injured to recover, in the case of the bankruptcy of an insured defendant the money which would be payable to him by the insurance company. Parliament enacted that in such circumstances the insurance money should go not to the general creditors of the bankrupt defendant but to the injured person; in other words the injured person, although not a party to the insurance could make the insurance company liable. That Act-the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act, 1930, did not meet the whole difficulty that had arisen because motor car owners sometimes lent their cars to uninsured persons, and if a person who borrowed a car and in driving it caused injury to a third person the remedy provided by that Act did not avail the injured person. Consequently the Road Traffic Act, 1930, was passed for the very purpose of making provision for third parties who suffered injury by the negligent driving of motor vehicles by uninsured persons to whom the insured owner had lent such vehicles. How could Parliament make provision for their protection from such risks if it did not enable an injured third person to recover for a breach of s.35? That section which is in Part II of the Act headed ‘Provision against third-party risks arising out of the use of motor vehicles,’ would indeed be no protection to a person injured by the negligence of an uninsured person to whom a car had been lent by the insured owner, if no civil remedy were available for a breach of the section.’
Greer LJ
[1935] 1 KB 75, [1934] All ER 373
Road Traffic Act 1930 35
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedPhilip Owen Lloyd-Wolper v Robert Moore; National Insurance Guarantee Corporation Plc, Charles Moore CA 22-Jun-2004
The first defendant drove a car belonging to his father and insured by his father. The father consented to the driving but under a mistaken belief that his son was licensed. The claimant was injured by the defendant in a road traffic accident.
CitedCampbell v Gordon SC 6-Jul-2016
The employee was injured at work, but in a way excluded from the employers insurance cover. He now sought to make the sole company director liable, hoping in term to take action against the director’s insurance brokers for negligence, the director . .
AppliedMcLeod v Buchanan HL 1940
Buchanan allowed his brother to use a vehicle without restriction as to the purpose of use; Buchanan did not actually know (although he had reason to think) that the vehicle the subject of the permission was being used for private purposes. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 October 2021; Ref: scu.199929

Ames v MacLeod: OHCS 1969

The accused, who was alleged to have been driving a motor car, had been walking beside it as it ran down a slight incline, and had steered it by placing his hand on the wheel. The car had run out of petrol.
Held: The question turned on whether the defendant was ‘in a substantial sense controlling the movement and direction of the car,’ and held that this test was satisfied.
1969 JC 1
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRegina v MacDonagh CA 1974
The Road Traffic Acts do not define the word ‘drive’ and in its simplest meaning it refers to a person using the driver’s controls for the purpose of directing the movement of the vehicle. It matters not that the vehicle is not moving under its own . .
CitedHoy v McFadyen HCJ 2000
The accused was charged with driving whilst disqualified. He had been in the driver’s seat and had started the engine. On turning off the engine the car lurched forward slightly. The handbrake was defective and would not hold the car on a slope. To . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Alderton Admn 25-Nov-2003
The defendant had been found sat in his car. He had been spinning its wheels, but not moving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of a charge of attempting to drive whilst under the influence of alcohol.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 October 2021; Ref: scu.189934

Regina v Bogacki: CACD 1973

The three defendants had been charged with attempting to take a motor bus without authority. They had gone to a bus garage late at night and attempted to start the engine of a bus without success. The trial judge directed the jury as follows, adverting specifically to the change of language between section 12 of the Act of 1968 and section 217 of the Act of 1960. He said: ‘The offence is not, I repeat, the offence is not taking and driving away, it is merely taking and taking, members of the jury, means assuming possession of an object for your own unauthorised use, however temporary that assumption of possession might be. Kay I give you an example. Suppose that you left your motor car parked in the car park behind a cinema, and you forgot to lock the door but you shut the door, and suppose that a man and a woman, some time later, when the motor car was unattended, came along, opened the door, got into the car, and had sexual intercourse in the car. This particular offence would then have been committed by them’. Later he said with respect to the defendants before him: ‘The question is: Did they, without the permission of the owners, acquire possession, for however short a time, for their own unauthorised purpose? That is the question.’
Held: Roskill LJ said: ‘ ‘The word ‘take’ is an ordinary simple English word and it is undesirable that where Parliament has used an ordinary simple English word elaborate glosses should be put upon it. What is sought to be said is that ‘take’ is the equivalent of ‘use’ and that mere unauthorised user of itself constitutes an offence against section 12. It is to be observed that if one treats ‘takes’ as a synonym for ‘uses’, the subsection has to be read in this way: ‘if . . he uses any conveyance for his own or another’s use . . ‘ That involves the second employment of the word ‘use’ being tautologous, and this court can see no justification where Parliament has used the phrase ‘if . . he takes any conveyance for his own or another’s use’ for construing this language as meaning if he ‘uses any conveyance for his own or another’s use,’ thus giving no proper effect to the words ‘for his own or another’s use.’ For those reasons the court accepts Mr. Lowry’s submission that there is still built in, if I may use the phrase, to the word ‘takes’ in the subsection the concept of movement and that before a man can be convicted of the completed offence under section 12 (1) it must be shown that he took the vehicle, that is to say, that there was an unauthorised taking possession or control of the vehicle by him adverse to the rights of the true owner or person otherwise entitled to such possession or control, coupled with some movement, however small . . of that vehicle following such unauthorised taking.’
Roskill LJ
[1973] 1 QB 832
Theft Act 1968 12, Traffic Act 1960 217
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRegina v Bow CACD 24-Nov-1976
The defendant appealed against his conviction for taking a motor vehicle without authority.
Held: Bridge LJ said: ‘where as here, a conveyance is taken and moved in a way which necessarily involves its use as a conveyance, the taker cannot be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 July 2021; Ref: scu.544330

Director of Public Prosecutions v Whittle: QBD 5 Jun 1995

Medical emergency to be treated as defence of duress rather than special reason.
Ind Summary 05-Jun-1995, [1996] RTA 154
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Ubhi Admn 11-Feb-2003
The prosecutors appealed the finding by the magistrates that there were special reasons for not disqualifying the defendant from driving after finding him guilty of driving with excess alcohol. He had driven his sister to hospital after she fell and . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 July 2021; Ref: scu.80055

Regina v David Newton: 1974

The Lord Chief Justice was unable to accept that someone with 127 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, a little over half the legal limit, did not feel any effect. The process of considering whether special reasons might avoid a disqualification, the magistrates had a two stage. First to test the evidence to see whether special reasons existed, and second whether as an exercise of discretion, they should not disqualify.
[1974] RTR 451
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v O’Connor and Chapman and Others 1991
The court looked at the elements needed to be established to support a defence to a charge of driving with excess alcohol on the basis that the defendant’s drinks had been spiked: ‘On the authorities, it is now clearly established that the matters . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions, Regina (on the Application of) v Sharma Admn 27-Apr-2005
The prosecution appealed by way of case stated a finding by the magistrates of special reasons for the non-disqualification of the respondent for driving with excess alcohol. The defendant had drunk acohol, but unknown to her a friend had added . .
CitedWoolfe v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-Jun-2006
The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He claimed to have a medical condition under which the contents of his stomach would regurgitate into his mouth, and that this could exaggerate the alcohol reading.
Held: . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 May 2021; Ref: scu.226028

Martin v Director of Public Prosecutions: QBD 30 Nov 1999

When a driver suffers an obligatory disqualification through a drink driving offence, the court may not at the same time impose on his licence additional penalty points for offences associated with the events of the drink driving offence. The 1988 Act was a consolidating act, and was not to be construed so as to change the law in the absence of clear intention. The omission of certain words was not enough to evince that intention.
Times 30-Nov-1999, Gazette 08-Dec-1999
Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 44(1), Road Traffic Act 1972 9(1)(a)
England and Wales

Updated: 16 May 2021; Ref: scu.83440

Seddon v Binions: CA 1978

The Court gave guidance on the proper method of interpreting a term of a motor insurance policy which defines the limitations of use subject to which the policy provides cover. Roskill LJ: ‘Inevitably, where one has a phrase such as ‘social, domestic or pleasure purposes’ used in a policy of insurance . . there will be cases which will fall on one side of the line and cases which will fall on the other side. For my part, however much claims managers might wish it otherwise, I do not believe it is possible to state any firm principle under which it can always be predicted which side of the line a particular case will fall. It must depend on the facts of the particular case; and the facts of particular cases will vary infinitely in their detail.’ and ‘It seems to me that the solution to the problem can best be reached in this case by asking the question: what was the essential character of the journey in the course of which the particular accident occurred?’ and ‘It may well be that there will be cases, as there have been in the past, where the essential character . . of a particular journey was of a particular kind – and that that essential character will not be altered in the crucial respects merely because, incidental to that journey, something happens in the way of giving a lift to a friend as an act of courtesy or, to borrow Mr Justice du Parcq’s expression [in Passmore v Vulcan Boiler and General Insurance Co Ltd (1936) 54 Ll L R 92], charity.’ Megaw LJ: ‘[I]n general, I should have thought that there is something that can clearly be called, as I would put it, a primary purpose, by which I intend the same meaning, I think, as Roskill LJ intended in using the phrase ‘essential character of the journey’. If there be such a primary purpose, or essential character, then the Courts should not be meticulous to seek to find some possible secondary purpose, or some inessential character, the result of which could be suggested to be that the use of the car fell outside the proper use for the purposes of which cover was given by the insurance policy.’
Roskill LJ, Megaw LJ
[1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 381, [1978] RTR 163
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedKeeley (Widow of Terence Noel James Keeley Deceased) v Pashen and Wren Motor Syndicate 1202 at Lloyd’s CA 10-Nov-2004
The driver had driven his car at a crowd of people intending to frighten them. Instead one had been killed. The insurers resisted liability saying that the use of the car for this purpose and as it was being used as a taxi, was not use for social . .
AppliedCaple v Sewell and others CA 9-Nov-2001
. .
CitedAXA Insurance UK Ltd v EUI Ltd (T/A Elephant Insurance) QBD 14-May-2020
The claimant insurer had insured a garage in respect of a car it used for loan to customers when their own car was being repaired. There was a collision on the customer driving home from work. The defendant insurer was the driver’s own insurer. The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 May 2021; Ref: scu.220134

Parish v Director of Public Prosecutions (Orse Parrish v Director of Public Prosecutions): QBD 1 Nov 1999

The defendant motorist was accused of driving with excess alcohol. There had been a difference in readings between two samples taken within a short time of each other.
Held: He should have been allowed an adjournment to bring his own expert witness to explain the discrepancy. A breath test taken only a short time after the one relied upon had produced a result which was lawful. The cases did not mean that it was not possible to contradict the findings of a blood test.
Tuckey LJ, Moses J
Times 02-Mar-2000, [2000] RTR 143
Road Traffic Act 1988
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedNelson v Thompson 1985
. .

Cited by:
CitedBreckon v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 22-Aug-2007
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol.
Held: There was no requirement that the prosecutor should produce the results of the roadside breath test in evidence, and the breathalyser was of the approved . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 April 2021; Ref: scu.84574

Regina v Parking Adjudicator; Ex Parte Wandsworth London Borough Council: CA 26 Nov 1996

The person registered as the keeper is the person liable to pay a parking fine though the actual act of parking which gave rise to the fine was one carried out by the garage with whom the car had been left for repair.
Gazette 27-Nov-1996, Times 26-Nov-1996, [1996] EWCA Civ 869, [1998] RTR 51, [1997] COD 155
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1991 66 Sch6
England and Wales

Updated: 15 April 2021; Ref: scu.87520

Scott and Another v Westminster City Council: CA 20 Mar 1995

A vendor’s ‘hot chestnut’ stall was an ‘item deposited on highway’ and could be removed by the Council under the 1980 Act. Waite LJ said: ‘The verb ‘to deposit’ is a term of wide connotation, apt to describe any state of affairs in which one object is placed upon another. Like all words of wide import, it is liable to attract shades of meaning which, according to the context, indicate that the placement contemplated shall have a particular connotation . . It is therefore an expression to be judged in the light of its context, and, being so common a word, the number of differing contexts in which it is liable to occur is almost limitless. But unless a particular context otherwise dictates, it should be interpreted in the broad sense in which it is used in everyday speech. One of the consequences of its flexibility is that there may be cases in which it will be difficult to determine whether a particular placement has the characteristics of a deposit or not . . ‘
Waite LJ
Ind Summary 20-Mar-1995, [1995] RTR 32
Highways Act 1980 149(2)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedThames Water Utilities Ltd v Bromley Magistrates’ Court Admn 20-Mar-2013
Sewage had escaped from the company’s facilities. They now sought judicial review of their conviction under the 1990 Act, saying there had been no ‘deposit’ of sewage.
Held: The request for review failed: ‘the answer to the question whether . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 April 2021; Ref: scu.89063

Carey v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset: CA 7 Apr 1995

A vehicle must obstruct persons using the road, not just the road itself, before it can be removed under the Regulations. ‘Obstruction’ is relative to the users of the highway, not to the occupation of the highway itself.
Independent 20-Apr-1995, Times 07-Apr-1995
Removal and Disposal of Vehicles Regulations 1986 (1986 No 183) 3(1)
England and Wales

Updated: 10 April 2021; Ref: scu.78893

Regina v Woodward (Terence): CACD 7 Dec 1994

On a prosecution for causing death by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1 of the 1988 Act, the fact that the driver was adversely affected by alcohol was a relevant circumstance in determining whether he was driving dangerously.’The fact (if it be so) that an accused has ingested a large quantity of alcoholic drink is a circumstance within the knowledge of the accused. Accordingly, the statute requires that ‘regard shall be had’ to it.’
Lord Taylor CJ
Times 07-Dec-1994, [1995] 2 Cr App R 388, [1995] 3 All ER 79, [1995] RTR 130
Road Traffic Act 1988 1
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v McBride 1961
Evidence that a driver had been drinking was admissible when the driver faced a charge of dangerous driving. . .

Cited by:
CitedPhipps, Regina v CACD 14-Jan-2005
The appellant had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol. After complaints by the injured victim’s family he was further prosecuted for dangerous driving. He now appealed his conviction, having pleaded guilty when the judge failed to find an . .
CitedWebster v Regina CACD 3-Mar-2006
The appellant challenged his conviction for aiding an abetting the causing of death by dangerous driving as a passenger. The driver had been drunk.
Held: The mere intoxication of the driver was not of itself and alone sufficient to establish . .
CitedMilton v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 16-Mar-2007
The defendant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, saying that his special skills as a trained police driver should have been allowed for. He had driven on a motorway at average speeds of 148mph.
Held: His appeal was allowed. The . .
CitedBannister, Regina v CACD 28-Jul-2009
The defendant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving. As a police officer he had driven at over 110 mph on a motorway in the wet, lost control and crashed. He said that the fact that he had undertaken the police advanced drivers’ course . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 April 2021; Ref: scu.88345

Regina v Murray: CACD 10 Jun 1994

If one defendant claims a defence of duress from fear of the other’s driving, the other driver’s driving convictions are relevant and can be admitted in evidence. Evidence of the convictions of the other driver should have been admitted even though he did not give evidence because they were relevant. Knowledge of his character might well have coloured the jury’s deliberations and bolstered the credibility of Murray’s account. Unless there is simply no nexus whatever between the previous convictions sought to be adduced and the offence alleged against the accused, they should be admitted and admitted in these particular circumstances without any nice distinctions being drawn between the various individual offences recorded in the record.
Ind Summary 11-Jul-1994, Times 24-Jun-1994, [1995] RTR 239
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRegina v Randall (EP) CACD 21-Feb-2003
The defendant had been a co-accused on a charge of murder. He appealed saying the judge had incorrectly directed the jury on the relevance of his co-accused’s previous convictions for violence.
Held: The appeal was allowed. He should have been . .
CitedRegina v Randall HL 18-Dec-2003
Two defendants accused of murder each sought to place blame for the victim’s death on the other. One sought to rely upon the other’s record of violence as evidence of his co-accused’s propensity to violence.
Held: The record was admissible. By . .
CitedRegina v Southwark Coroner ex parte Fields Admn 30-Jan-1998
The deceased died after being hit by a policemen with his baton when being arrested. The verdict of misadventure was now challenged. The police officer said he had hit out in fear of imminent attack. It was said that the Coroner had permitted those . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 April 2021; Ref: scu.87397

Regina v Marison: CACD 16 Jul 1996

A diabetic who drove anticipating a diabetic attack was driving recklessly and his act constituted dangerous driving.
Gazette 02-Aug-1996, Times 16-Jul-1996, [1997] RTR 457
Road Traffic Act 1988 2A
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedMilton v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 16-Mar-2007
The defendant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, saying that his special skills as a trained police driver should have been allowed for. He had driven on a motorway at average speeds of 148mph.
Held: His appeal was allowed. The . .
CitedBannister, Regina v CACD 28-Jul-2009
The defendant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving. As a police officer he had driven at over 110 mph on a motorway in the wet, lost control and crashed. He said that the fact that he had undertaken the police advanced drivers’ course . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 March 2021; Ref: scu.87274

Coles and Others v Hetherton and Others: ComC 22 Sep 2011

Parties challenged the method used by the Royal and Sun Alliance insurance to calculate the cost of repairs to motor vehicles damaged in accidents. After conflicting decisions in County Courts, the issue was brought before the Commercial Court.
Held: The applications should be transferred and the court gave management directions.
Walker J
[2011] EWHC 2405 (Comm)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
See AlsoColes and Others v Hetherton and Others ComC 15-Jun-2012
. .
See AlsoColes and Others v Hetherton and Others CA 20-Dec-2013
The claimants’ insurers disputed arrangements by the defendants’ insurers in motor accident claims which, they said artificially inflated the costs of repairs to the profit of the defendants’ insurers. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 March 2021; Ref: scu.444878

Regina v Shepherd; Regina v Wernet; Attorney General’s References Nos. 14 and 24 of 1993: CACD 26 Jan 1994

New sentencing guidelines were handed down for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving whilst driving with excess alcohol. The definition and sentence for the offence had been changed. Lord Taylor CJ: ‘Drivers who drive after taking alcohol should understand that in bad cases they will lose their liberty for upwards of five years and in the very worst cases, if contested, sentences will be in the higher range of those now permitted by Parliament.’ and ‘We wish to stress that human life cannot be restored, nor can its loss be measured by the length of a prison sentence. We recognise that no term of months or years imposed on the offender can reconcile the family of a diseased victim to their loss, nor will it cure their anguish.’ and ‘where a driver had driven with selfish disregard for the safety of other road users or of his passengers of with a degree of recklessness, instead of the appropriate sentence being 2 years or more, sentences of upwards of 5 years would be appropriate.’
Ind Summary 31-Jan-1994, Gazette 02-Feb-1994, Gazette 26-Jan-1994, [1994] 15 CAR (S) 640
England and Wales
Citing:
ReconsideredRegina v Boswell CACD 1984
The court gave guidelines for sentencing for the offence of causing death by reckless driving. . .
CitedRegina v Pimm 1994
The offence of motor manslaughter is generally reserved for situations where on the facts there is a very high risk of the driving resulting in death. . .
CitedRegina v Pettipher CACD 1989
. .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 13 March 2021; Ref: scu.88016

Director of Public Prosecutions v Kavaz: CACD 17 Mar 1999

The duty to demonstrate that a car is properly insured and has an MOT certificate remains the responsibility of the actual driver.
Gazette 17-Mar-1999, [1999] RTR 40
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromDirector of Public Prosecutions v Tuncer Kavaz Admn 25-Nov-1997
. .

Cited by:
Appealed toDirector of Public Prosecutions v Tuncer Kavaz Admn 25-Nov-1997
. .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 13 March 2021; Ref: scu.80119

Jukes and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 16 Jan 2013

Two of those participating in a march demonstrating against cuts in the education budget, left that march to join the Occupy Movement’s demonstration in Trafalgar Square against the excesses of capitalism. They were, convicted at Westminster Magistrates’ Court of breaching conditions imposed under section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986 in respect of the route the march should take. They said that they had left the march and were on a new route of their own.
Held: The District Judge was right to find that they had not left the March, and: ‘Those participating in the public procession were entitled to leave it, but they were not entitled to move from the route of the procession whilst they remained as participants in it. I’
The Court said: ‘It is important to note that the conditions imposed pursuant to the power confirmed under section 12(1) are conditions which relate, as the section indicates, to a particular public procession. ‘Public procession’ is defined in section 16 of the Act to mean a procession in a public place. That it relates to a particular public procession is made clear by the identification within section 12(1) of the grounds upon which conditions may be imposed. The circumstances and the route on the basis of which a police officer’s belief of risk must reasonably be founded route relate to a particular public procession.’
Moses LJ and Gloster J
[2013] EWHC 195 (Admin)
Bailii
Public Order Act 1986 12
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedPowlesland v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 9-Dec-2013
The defendant apealed against his conviction for having taken part in a public procession, a a Critical Mass Cycle Ride, knowingly in breach of conditions attached to it by the Police. The defendant had argued that the ride was not a procession.
CitedJones and Others v The Commissioner of Police for The Metropolis Admn 6-Nov-2019
Distributed Demonstration not within 1986 Act
The claimants, seeking to demonstrate support for the extinction rebellion movement by demonstrating in London, now challenged an order made under the 1986 Act restricting their right to demonstrate.
Held: The XRAU was not a public assembly at . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 03 March 2021; Ref: scu.471020

Carvalho Ferreira Santos: ECJ 7 Dec 2010

ECJ (Approximation Of Laws) Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC and 90/232/EEC – Automobile Liability Insurance – Determining liability regime for claims arising from motor vehicle traffic – Limiting the right to compensation from the insurance required based on the contribution to the damage of one of the drivers responsible for the accident – Unable to determine the causal contribution to the occurrence of the two conductors-Responsibility for risk.
C-484/09, [2010] EUECJ C-484/09, [2011] EUECJ C-484/09
Bailii, Bailii
European

Updated: 03 March 2021; Ref: scu.427314

Beckett, Regina (on The Application of) v Aylesbury Crown Court: Admn 22 Jan 2004

The applicant had unsuccessfully appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He had been stopped randomly to check his documents and the road worthiness of the older car.
Held: The appeal failed. May LJ said: ‘Whether it be under section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, or under a duty at common law, a police officer has the power, provided he or she does not act capriciously or in bad faith, or provided there is no malpractice or oppression or opprobrious behaviour, to stop a motorist on the road. If thereafter there is a reasonable suspicion of drinking, a breath test may be administered.’
May LJ
[2004] EWHC 100 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 5(1)(a)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedBeard v Wood 1980
The court discussed the power of a constable to stop a driver.
Held: Provided the officer was acting in good faith the statutory powers given to him he need have no grounds for stopping a driver. Nothing in the section required the prosecutor . .
CitedChief Constable of Gwent v Dash 1986
In the absence of malpractice, oppression, caprice or opprobrious behaviour, there is no restriction on the stopping of motorists by a police officer in the execution of his duty and subsequent requirement of a breath test if the officer then and . .
CitedSteel v Goacher QBD 1985
Griffiths LJ discussed the lawfulness of a police officer’s stopping of a motorist, and said: ‘It should, however, be stated that the police officer was acting within the execution of his duty by virtue of his power at common law and not by virtue . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 February 2021; Ref: scu.425318

Director of Public Prosecutions v Butler: Admn 4 Mar 2010

The Local Authority appealed against the rejection of an allegation of speeding, on the basis that that the speed limit sign, which was designed to be illuminated, was not in fact lit.
Held: The appeal failed.
Toulson LJ, Owen J
[2010] EWHC 669 (Admin)
Bailii
Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 1994
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedJones v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 27-Jan-2011
jones_dppAdmn11
The driver appealed against his conviction for exceeding the relevant maximum speed on a Special Road, the A55 in North Wales. The speed limit signs were designed to be illuminated, but the lamps were not working. Instructions had been given not to . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 February 2021; Ref: scu.408627

Regina v Greenwich London Borough Council, Ex Parte Williams and Others: QBD 29 Dec 1995

QBD A local authority has no power to close a road to control pollution from motor vehicles. Air pollution danger from traffic was not a sufficient ‘likelihood of danger.’
Ind Summary 29-Jan-1996, Times 29-Dec-1995
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 14
England and Wales

Updated: 15 February 2021; Ref: scu.86767

Clarke, Regina v: CACD 14 May 2009

The defendant appealed against his sentence for causing death by dangerous driving. He had suffered a hypoglycemic attack, but had not stopped. Expert evidence that he may not have been aware of the attack appeared to have been rejected by the jury.
Held: The highly exceptional circumstances of this case reduce the Appellant’s culpability to an extent which brings the offence significantly below the sentencing range which would normally apply in a case of driving whilst conscious of a significant medical impairment.
[2009] EWCA Crim 921, [2009] RTR 32
Bailii

Updated: 14 February 2021; Ref: scu.343900

Brett v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 16 Mar 2009

The defendant faced trial for driving whilst over the prescribed alcohol limit. On a pre-trial review, the prosecution had applied for the evidence of the analyst to be given under the hearsay provisions, on the basis that she was living abroad. She had not been warned and it was not reasonably practicable to secure her attendance. At trial, the deputy district judge considered that he was bound by that ruling and refused to hear further argument on the issue of admissibility. One aspect of the case stated was whether the district judge was correct.
Held: The court allowed the appeal, applying sections 8A and 8B of the 1980 Act. There was no question of the pre-trial ruling binding the deputy judge in relation to the trial. At the trial very different considerations obtained compared with the pre-trial hearing, in particular relating to the attendance by the analyst and securing her evidence since – by then – the prosecution could well have obtained her attendance.
Leveson LJ, Sweeney J
[2009] EWHC 440 (Admin), [2009] 1 WLR 2530, (2009) 173 JP 274
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 2006 5(2)(a), Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 8A 8B
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions, Regina (on the Application of) v Chorley Justices and Forrest Admn 8-Jun-2006
The prosecutor applied for an order to require the magistrates to state a case. He faced a charge of driving with excess alcohol. He pleaded not guilty. There were several adjournments, and a considerable delay. At the trial, and with no . .

Cited by:
CitedJones v South East Surrey Local Justice Area Admn 12-Mar-2010
jones_sesjaAdmn10
The defendant sought judicial review of a decision of the magistrates to adjourn a case where, on the day before, a differently constitued bench had refused an adjournment requested by the prosecution. On the first occasion the prosecutor had not . .
CitedBielecki v The Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-Aug-2011
The court had delivered a draft judgment which counsel said was based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the case she had presented. Counsel now suggested that the matter should be referred to a two judge divisional court. That was refused. The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 13 February 2021; Ref: scu.323733

Kay v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis: HL 26 Nov 2008

The claimant had been involved in a monthly cycle ride through central London which had continued for many years. The ride took place without any central organisation and without any route being pre-planned. They objected to being required to apply for a licence and to file a route with the Commissioner under section 11. The question was whether each ride was the same procession, and whether it was ‘commonly or customarily’ held.
Held: Mr Kay’s appeal succeeded. A regular procession need not follow the same route each time. The fact that no person or persons organised the procession meant that no person held any duty under the Act, and section 11 had no application.
Lord Rodger said: ‘if Parliament had actually intended to use the Public Order Act 1986 to outlaw processions of that kind without a predetermined route, then it would not have done so by a side wind in a section creating a system of notification: it would have done so specifically. Section 13 contains a carefully crafted measure which allows councils, with the consent of the Secretary of State, to prohibit public processions in certain specified circumstances. Where the Act contains a specific provision prohibiting certain processions, there is no room for implying into another provision a requirement which would have the effect of prohibiting a different type of procession by exposing the organisers to a criminal conviction and fine.’
Lord Phillips said: ‘Critical Mass is not an organisation but the name given to a recurrent event. It takes place in central London on the evening of the last Friday of every month, as it has done since April 1994. Similar events take place on the last Friday of every month in many other cities throughout the world. Critical Mass starts at the same location, (the South Bank near the National Theatre) at the same time (6 pm). It is featured in Time Out magazine. It is in the nature of Critical Mass that there is no fixed, settled or predetermined route, end-time or destination; where Critical Mass goes, where and what time it ends are all things which are chosen by the actions of the participants on the day.’
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carswell, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
[2008] UKHL 69, [2008] 1 WLR 2723, [2009] RTR 16, [2009] HRLR 10, [2009] 2 All ER 935
Bailii, HL, Times
Public Order Act 1986 11
England and Wales
Citing:
At First InstanceKay v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Admn 27-Jun-2006
For many years and in many large cities, once a month, cyclists had gathered en masse to cycle through the city in a ‘Critical Mass’ demonstration. There was no central organisation. Clarification was sought as to whether the consent of the police . .
Appeal fromCommissioner of Police for the Metropolis v Kay CA 21-May-2007
The commissioner appealed against a judgment that a mass cycle ride held regularly but over different routes did not first require notice to be given.
Held: The commissioner’s appeal succeeded. The fact that the route changed meant that the . .
CitedFlockhart v Robinson 1950
A challenge was made to the organising of a procession. Its route was determined by Mr Flockhart as he went along.
Held: For the purposes of section 3(4) of the 1936 Act, a procession ‘is a body of persons moving along a route’ and that, by . .
CitedRegina v Secretary of State for Health ex parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) HL 13-Mar-2003
The appellant challenged the practice of permitting cell nuclear replacement (CNR), saying it was either outside the scope of the Act, or was for a purpose which could not be licensed under the Act.
Held: The challenge failed. The court was to . .

Cited by:
CitedRolls-Royce plc v Unite the Union CA 14-May-2009
rolls_uniteCA2009
The parties disputed whether the inclusion of length of service within a selection matrix for redundancy purposes would amount to unlawful age discrimination. The court was asked whether it was correct to make a declaratory judgment when the case . .
CitedPowlesland v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 9-Dec-2013
The defendant apealed against his conviction for having taken part in a public procession, a a Critical Mass Cycle Ride, knowingly in breach of conditions attached to it by the Police. The defendant had argued that the ride was not a procession.
Updated: 12 February 2021; Ref: scu.278297

King Lifting Ltd v Oxfordshire County Council: QBD 20 Jul 2016

A heavy crane had toppled from a road. The crane owners said that the highway authority were responsible for the poor condition of the road.
Held: The action failed. The evidence did not support the assertion that the accident arose from a road insufficiently maintained.
Reddihough HHJ
[2016] EWHC 1767 (QB)
Bailii
Highways Act 1980 41(1) 58(2) 329(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedWest Sussex County Council v Russell CA 12-Feb-2010
The council appealed against a finding that it had failed in its duty to keep the highway safe leading to an accident in which the claimant was severely injured. The road was narrow, and a significant drop had developed by the edge of the road. The . .
CitedGoodes v East Sussex County Council HL 16-Jun-2000
The claimant was driving along a road. He skidded on ice, crashed and was severely injured. He claimed damages saying that the Highway authority had failed to ‘maintain’ the road.
Held: The statutory duty on a highway authority to keep a road . .
CitedRider v Rider CA 1973
The plaintiff was a passenger in a car which her husband was driving and which collided with a van. The husband had been driving too fast. The edge of the tarmac on the road abutted grass verges at a lower level and the edge had been inadequately . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 February 2021; Ref: scu.567639

Police Service for Northern Ireland v Mullan: CANI 22 Jan 2008

[2008] NICA 10
Bailii
Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1995
Northern Ireland
Citing:
CitedTaylor v Rajan 2-Jan-1974
The defendant had consumed alcohol so that the alcohol level was 102 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. An appeal was heard as to whether there existed special reasons for not disqualifying him.
Held: The court considered . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 February 2021; Ref: scu.266763

Piggott v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 8 Feb 2008

The defendant driver had been stopped and required to provide a specimen of breath. She failed to do so, and gave no reason. At trial she produced nedical evidence, accepted by the magistrates, that she suffered asthma and a hyperventilation syndrome, but she was convicted after the magistrates concluded that she should have told the police of the reason.
Held: It would be wrong to import a requirement that was not set out in the statute. The appeal succeeded.
Moses LJ, Sullivan J
[2008] EWHC 305 (Admin), Times 10-Mar-2008
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1968 7(1)
Citing:
Not to be followedTeape v Godfrey 1986
. .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 06 February 2021; Ref: scu.266039

Byrne (A Minor) v The Motor Insurers Bureau, Secretary of State for Transport: QBD 5 Jun 2007

The court was asked whether the UK provisions for the Motor Insurers bureau met the requirements of the European Directive.
Held: The UK had failed to implement the directive properly by imposing a three year limit on claims when no such limitation was allowed by the directive. That failure arose not from any policy, but mere and inexcusable inadvertence. The breach was sufficiently serious to leave the Secretary of State liable for damages.
Flaux J
[2007] EWHC 1268 (QB), Times 15-Jun-2007, [2008] 2 WLR 234
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromByrne (A Minor) v The Motor Insurers Bureau and Another CA 22-May-2008
The claimant said that the rejection of his claim against the MIB was out ouf time under the MIB scheme, where, had the claim been against the driver, the claim would have succeeded.
Held: The Bureau’s appeal failed. European law imposed a . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 03 February 2021; Ref: scu.253212

Currie, Regina v: CACD 26 Apr 2007

The defendant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving. The failure of the police to serve him with a notice of intended prosecution invalidated the conviction. The police replied that there was no need for such a notice because there had been an accident. The driver had been stopped but had then driven off. A police officer had had to place her hands on the bonnet to balance herself when avoiding it, and she had lost her grip on the door. The defendant said that the issue of whether there had been an accident should have been decided by a jury.
Held: The case of Seward could be distinguished, because the question of whether there had been an accident related not to the offence itself, but to the procedure involved, and ‘the reference to ‘court’ in what is now s2(3) of the 1988 Act means the judge when the case is proceeding in the crown court. The issues which the judge is required to decide under that subsection will plainly involve issues of fact. Other issues of fact can arise under section 1(1), for example whether the defendant was warned at the time of the offence that he might be prosecuted e.g. a police officer says he was warned but the defendant says he was not. The subsection is silent as to who decides such questions, but it seems to us that the whole of sections 1 and 2 are directed to the need to ensure that as far as possible defendants are not taken by surprise in relation to motoring offences to which s1 of the Act applies. What is required is that by one means or another they should have notice of the relevant event in sufficient time to be able to recall it themselves and recall it to others who may be able to give evidence on their behalf.’
Baker LJ, Openshaw J, Sir Richard Curtis
[2007] EWCA Crim 926
Bailii
Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 2
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRex v Bolkis CCA 1932
The defendant complained that a jury had not been asked a question of fact, namely whether his name and address could not be discovered withut due diligence. The section had a proviso that failure to comply with the section was not a bar to . .
CitedRegina v Seward 1970
The section in the 1967Act required as a precondition to a request for a breath specimen that an accident had occurred. The defendant complained that this was an issue of fact, but had been decided by the deputy chairman and not the jury.
CitedRegina v Morris 1972
Whether the particular facts of a case amount to an accident is a question of law. In a case of disputed facts under s2(2) of the 1967 Act it is for the jury to decide the facts and apply to the facts found the judge’s direction as to the meaning of . .
CitedRegina v Stacey CA 1982
The defendant had been arrested for driving whilst unfit through drink. He was warned three hours later that he might be prosecuted for reckless driving. In fact he was not charged with any offence relating to drink. When tried for reckless driving . .
CitedFenton v J Thorley and Co Ltd HL 1903
A workman who ruptured himself by an act of over-exertion in trying to turn a wheel was held to have suffered an injury ‘by accident.’ The act of turning the wheel was not in itself an accident. But the injury which the man sustained while carrying . .
CitedChief Constable of West Midlands Police v Billingham 1979
Bridge LJ considered the meaning of the word ‘accident’, and, after saying that there had been many authorities for different stautory and contractual contexts, said: ‘It is, in my judgment, a word which has a perfectly well understood meaning in . .
CitedGibson v Dalton CA 1980
The requirement to notify a defendant of the possibility of a prosecution is to allow him to preserve any necessary evidence. . .
CitedBemner v Westwater HCJ 1993
A police officer was driving in the opposite direction to the accused. He came round a bend in the road to face two vehicles, one was driven by the accused overtaking the other vehicle. He was in the police officer’s path. The officer braked, . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 03 February 2021; Ref: scu.251506