Category: Land

London Borough of Barking and Dagenham and Another v Persons Unknown and Others: CA 13 Jan 2022

Cases in which local authorities have sought interim and sometimes then final injunctions against unidentified and unknown persons who may in the future set up unauthorised encampments on local authority land. These persons have been collectively described in submissions as ‘newcomers’. The persons concerned fall mainly into three categories, who would describe themselves as Romani Gypsies, Irish Travellers and New Travellers.

Judges:

Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls

Lord Justice Lewison

And

Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing

Citations:

[2022] EWCA Civ 13, [2022] WLR(D) 48, [2022] 2 WLR 946

Links:

Bailii, WLRD

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – South Cambridgeshire District Council v Gammell and Others CA 31-Oct-2005
Where proceedings were brought against unnamed persons and interim relief was granted to restrain specified acts, a person became both a defendant and a person to whom the injunction was addressed by doing one of those acts.
As to capturing . .

Cited by:

Cited – MBR Acres Ltd and Others v McGivern QBD 2-Aug-2022
Contempt Procedures Not to be abused
Reasons for dismissal of contempt application.
Held: The contempt application against Ms McGivern was dismissed and certified as being totally without merit.
The court does not grant injunctions to parties to litigation to be used as a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Litigation Practice

Updated: 04 August 2022; Ref: scu.671055

Fordyce v Sir Henry Bridges, Catherine Elizabeth Mary Reid, Madeline Curling, Jane Curling, Isabella Curling, Agnes Catherine Thomson, Mary Louisa Thomson, Emily Harriet Thomson, Gertrude Eliza Thomson, Florence Jessie Thomson, And Jo: 15 Mar 1848

If all the heirs of a Scotch entail were necessary parties to a suit in this Court, touching matters in which they are interested as such heirs of entail, the suit could not proceed, not only on account of their number, but because future heirs of entail coming into esse would not be bound by any proceedings in it, as their claim is not through any persons parties to the suit.
As you cannot have, in any shape, before the Court all the heirs of entail whom you seek to bind, it would be idle to prove that some are out of the jurisdiction.
When, to avoid a failure of justice in the Court from the peculiar nature of the interest under a Scotch entail, it shall become necessary to decide the point [as to making all the heirs of a Scotch entail parties to a suit], some rule must be laid down, for which there is no precedent.
Not possible to dispute the proposition, that the heir of a Scotch entail is not bound by the proceedings in a suit to which he was no parly, he claiming under the entail, and not deriving title through anyone, a party to the suit, and having a direct interest in the subject of that suit in his own right, though not in possession.
Although the heir is not bound by the proceedings in such suit, he cannot have a decree in his own suit, unless he can shew that he was injured by the former decree, or has interests inconsistent with its directions.

Citations:

[1848] EngR 347 (C), (1847-1848) 2 Coop T Cott 325

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Trusts, Land

Updated: 03 August 2022; Ref: scu.299897

White v Bijou Mansions: CA 1938

The court heard an rejected an argument that s56 worked to allow a third party to sue under a covenant to which he had not been party: ‘before he can enforce it he must be a person who falls within the scope and benefit of the covenant according to the true construction of the document in question.’ (Sir W Greene MR)

Judges:

Sir W Greene MR

Citations:

[1938] Ch 351

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 56

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – White v Bijou Mansions ChD 1937
The court heard an argument that section 56 of the 1925 Act had not changed the law to allow a third party to sue under a covenant to which he had not been party.
Held: Simonds J rejected an argument that section 56 enabled anyone to take . .

Cited by:

Cited – Beswick v Beswick HL 29-Jun-1967
The deceased had assigned his coal merchant business to the respondent against a promise to pay andpound;5.00 a week to his widow whilst she lived. The respondent appealed an order requiring him to make the payments, saying that as a consolidating . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Land

Updated: 31 July 2022; Ref: scu.251041

Truckell v Stock: CA 1957

The court considered the effect of a conveyance where an inspection of the ground revealed a mistake in the description of the land.

Citations:

[1957] 1 All ER 74, [1957] 1 WLR 161

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Grigsby v Melville CA 6-Jul-1973
The seller had owned two adjoing properties. He sold one off to the plaintiff, describing it in the conveyance as ‘all that dwellinghouse’. A cellar under the part sold off had access only from the retained property, but contained supports for the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 31 July 2022; Ref: scu.244815

Vasiliou v Secretary of State for Transport: CA 1991

When considering the revocation or modification of a planning consent, any impact on an interested party is a relevant consideration. A planning permission should not have been granted closing a public road without considering its adverse effect on the business of traders relying on it. In the absence of a stopping-up or diversion order, the grant of planning permission does not of itself affect or override any existing rights of property or over a highway On a stopping up order the Secretary of State cannot go behind the planning authority’s decision on the planning issues. It remains, however, a matter for the judgment of the Secretary of State.

Judges:

Nicholls LJ

Citations:

[1991] 2 All ER 77

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Moto Hospitality Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport CA 26-Jul-2007
The company sought damages to its business on a motorway service station when works closed an access road.
Held: The Secretary of State’s appeal succeeded. A claim for compensation under section 10 had not been established, at least in respect . .
Cited – Alnwick District Council v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions and others Admn 4-Aug-1999
The Council had given planning consent for a superstore, not appreciating the proposed size, which would contravene national planning policy. In the face of the council’s objections, the Secretary of State revoked the permission. The substantial . .
Cited – Health and Safety Executive v Wolverhampton City Council and Another Admn 5-Nov-2009
The claimant sought to have development stopped on a site which it said was too near a site for the storage of liquid petroleum gas.
Held: Collins J allowed the claim and granted declaratory relief that Wolverhampton had failed to: (i) notify . .
Cited – The Health and Safety Executive v Wolverhampton City Council and Victoria Hall Ltd CA 30-Jul-2010
The Council had granted planning pemission for four blocks of student accomodation. The Executive objected that it had not dealt properly with the issue the proximity of a liquified petroleum gas storage depot.
Held: Though there had been some . .
Cited – The Health and Safety Executive v Wolverhampton City Council SC 18-Jul-2012
The Council had granted planning permission for four student housing units. The Executive complained that they were too near to a liquified gas storage depot. The Court was now asked whether the impact of any compensation which might be payable on . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Damages, Planning

Updated: 31 July 2022; Ref: scu.259676

Whitbread and Co Ltd v Watt: CA 1902

The buyer agreed to buy a house when the developer had finished 300 houses on the site, but now sought return of his deposit.
Held: The developer’s appeal against an order for the return of the deposit failed.
Williams LJ said: ‘The lien which a purchaser has for his deposit is not the result of any express contract: it is a right which may be said to have been invented for the purpose of doing justice. It is fiction of a kind which is sometimes resorted to at law as well as in equity. For instance, when an action is brought for money had and received to the use of the plaintiff, it is not true that the money has been so received, but that is the way in which the law states the case in order to do justice. When Lord Westbury in Rose v. Watson speaks of a ‘transfer to the purchaser of the ownership of a part of the estate corresponding to the purchase-money paid,’ and Lord Cranworth speaks of the purchaser being exactly in the same position of a mortgagee of the estate to the extent of the purchase-money which he has paid, those expressions are merely verbal vehicles to carry the right which justice demands that the purchaser should have. Having read the report of Rose v. Watson, I must say that, speaking for myself, I agree with Mr. Brinton to this extent, that the decision does not expressly carry the purchaser’s lien beyond a case in which the contract has gone off through the default of the vendor.’
Stirling LJ said: ‘It is, I think, quite true, as Mr. Brinton has contended, that the question of the existence of the purchaser’s lien for his deposit arises in the present case in circumstances which differ from those of all previous reported cases. The contract has here been brought to an end, not by any act or default of the vendor, but by reason of the purchaser’s exercising a power of rescinding it which is reserved to him by the contract itself. This does not seem to have occurred in any previous case. Nevertheless, in the judgments in the two leading cases on the subject, Wythes v. Lee and Rose v. Watson, the rule is stated in terms which cover the present case. And, if we look at that which is really the foundation of the doctrine, namely the desire to do justice as between vendor and purchaser, it appears to me that reason applies no less forcibly in the present case than in the ordinary case in which the rescission of the contract takes place by reason of some default on the part of the vendor. In a case in which the vendor had rescinded under a power reserved to him, it would, I think, be absolute injustice if the purchaser were not allowed to have a lien for the purchase-money which he had paid, and by which was the security on his part for the performance by him of the contract. I think also the justice of the case requires that the purchaser should have a lien when the contract reserves to him a power to rescind.’

Judges:

Williams LJ, Stirling LJ

Citations:

[1902] 1 Ch 835

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Whitbread and Co Ltd v Watt ChD 1901
The purchaser contracted to purchase a plot on a building estate belonging to the vendor. The contract provided that ‘the purchase is to be completed as soon as 300 houses shall have been erected on the said estate’. Thus the contract was one under . .

Cited by:

Cited – Chattey and Another v Farndale Holdings Inc and others CA 11-Oct-1996
The plaintiffs had paid deposits for apartments which were to be built. After the developer became insolvent the plaintiffs sought recovery of the deposits, saying they had a lien which preceded the claims of chargees.
Held: The one appeal . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Land

Updated: 31 July 2022; Ref: scu.259718

Dyer v Dorset County Council: CA 1988

The court discussed what was meant by the curtilage of the appellant’s house: ‘Thus the sole issue is whether Mr Dyer’s house is or is not within the curtilage of another building or, by the application of section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1978, of more than one other building. This is a question of fact and degree and thus primarily a matter for the trial judge, provided that he has correctly directed himself on the meaning of ‘curtilage’ in its statutory context.’ and ‘Parliament has not seen fit to define the word ‘curtilage’ in this statutory context and we have to regard to dictionaries and to such authorities as to its meaning as existed in 1980 and 1984.’ and ‘There are also a number of ecclesiastical authorities to the effect that a curtilage must be near a house and must ‘belong’ to it …’ ”Curtilage’ seems always to involve some small and necessary extension to that to which the word is attached.’ Nourse LJ: ‘I agree. The derivations mentioned in the Oxford English Dictionary (French, courtil – a little court or garth; Italian, corte; Mediaeval Latin, cortile or curtile – a court or yard) rather suggest that ‘curtilage’ started life as a word describing a small area enclosed by walls or buildings, the smallness of the area being emphasised by the diminutive suffix ‘age’, as in village. The need for physical enclosure of the area having disappeared in current usage, the dictionary definition, which I quote in full, is for most present-day purposes adequate.’ and ‘While making every allowance for the fact that the size of a curtilage may vary somewhat with the size of the house or building, I am in no doubt that the 100 acre park on the edge of which Mr Dyer’s house now stands cannot possibly be said to form part and parcel of Kingston Maurward House, far less of any of the other college buildings. Indeed, a park of this size is altogether in excess of anything which could properly be described as the curtilage of a mansion house, an area beyond which no conveyancer would extend beyond that occupied by the house, the stables and other outbuildings, the garden and the rough grass up to the ha-ha, if there was one.’ Mann LJ: ‘The word ‘curtilage’ is a term of art and, in employing it, the draftsman and Parliament must have had regard to its meaning as such a term. Its meaning as a term was discussed in Metheun-Campbell. It appears from that decision that the meaning of the word ‘curtilage’ is constrained to a small area about a building. The size of the area appears to be a question of fact and degree.’

Judges:

Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR, Nourse LJ, Mann LJ

Citations:

[1988] 3 WLR 213, [1989] 1 QB 346

Statutes:

Interpretation Act 1978

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Jepson v Gribble 1876
A house occupied by the medical superintendent of an asylum fronted on to a public road and had access from the back to the asylum itself, although it was very much closer than to the asylum than are the lecturers’ cottages to any other college . .
Cited – Methuen-Campbell v Walters CA 1978
The curtilage of a house is narrowly confined to the area surrounding it and did not extend to a paddock. Buckley LJ said: ‘In my judgment, for one corporeal hereditament to fall within the curtilage of another, the former must be so intimately . .

Cited by:

Applied – Skerritts of Nottingham Limited v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions, Harrow London Borough Council Admn 22-Mar-1999
The curtilage of a building is a small area around it. An assessment of whether a separate structure was within the curtilage which did not consider the distance between the various buildings must be incorrect in that it had omitted an essential . .
Cited – Crockett v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions and another Admn 24-Oct-2002
The applicant built a shed on land behind his bungalow, but without planning consent. The planning authority issued enforcement proceedings. He appealed, contending that it fell within the Order. The inspector visited the property, and decided that . .
Cited – Lowe v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 6-Feb-2003
The landowner appealed against an enforcement notice issued with respect to a chain link fence erected along the driveway of his grade II listed building. He said the drive was not part of the curtilage of the building.
Held: The inspector had . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Land

Updated: 31 July 2022; Ref: scu.181012

Burnside and Another v Emerson and Others: CA 1968

The plaintiffs were injured in a road accident caused by flooding. They sued the executors of the deceased driver whose car spun out of control into the path of their own car, and also the highway authority, who had installed a proper system of drainage (except in one respect) but whose employees had failed to keep it clear so that it operated efficiently.
Held: At common law it was the duty of the inhabitants of a parish to put and keep its highways ‘in such good repair as renders it reasonably passable for the ordinary traffic of the neighbourhood at all seasons of the year without danger caused by its physical condition.’ Standing water on a road whether or not the result of occasional flooding did not itself show a failure to maintain the highway by the authority.
Lord Justice Diplock said: ‘The duty of maintenance of a highway which was, by section 38(1) of the Highways Act, 1959, removed from the inhabitants at large of any area, and by section 44(1) of the same Act was placed on the highway authority, is a duty not merely to keep a highway in such a state of repair as it is at any particular time, but to put it in such good repair as renders it reasonably passable for the ordinary traffic of the neighbourhood at all seasons of the year without danger caused by its physical condition. I take most of those words from the summing-up of Blackburn J. in a case in 1859, Reg. v. Inhabitants of High Halden , ‘Non-repair’ has the converse meaning. Repair and maintenance thus includes providing an adequate system of drainage for the road; and it was in this respect that the judge found that the highway authority in this case had failed in their duty to maintain the highway. I think that on the evidence, for the reasons given by Lord Denning M.R., he was entitled to make that finding. . . mere failure to repair gives rise to no cause of action unless the failure to repair results in a danger to the traffic using the road and damage caused to some user of the highway by the existence of that danger.’
Lord Denning: The highway authorities were never liable for non-feasance in a civil action, but the common law rule was abolished by the 1961 Act: ‘There is a duty on a highway authority to maintain the highway, and ‘maintain’ includes repair. If it is out of repair, they fail in their duty: and if damage results, they may now be made liable unless they prove that they used all reasonable care. The action involves three things: First. The plaintiff must show that the road was in such a condition as to be dangerous for traffic . . . Second: The plaintiff must prove that the dangerous condition was due to a failure to maintain which includes a failure to repair the highway. In this regard, a distinction is to be drawn between a permanent danger due to want of repair, and a transient danger due to the elements. When there are potholes or ruts in a classified road which have continued for a long time unrepaired, it may be inferred that there has been a failure to maintain. When there is a transient danger due to the elements, be it snow or ice or heavy rain, the existence of danger for a short time is not evidence of a failure to maintain. (Quoting Burgess v Northwich) So I would say that an icy patch in winter or an occasional flooding at any time is not in itself evidence of a failure to maintain. We all know that in times of heavy rain our highways do from time to time get flooded. Leaves and debris and all sorts of things may be swept in and cause flooding for a time without any failure to repair at all.
Third: If there is a failure to maintain, the highway authority is liable prima facie for any damage resulting therefrom. It can only escape liability if it proves that it took such care as in all the circumstances was reasonable: and in considering this question, the court will have regard to the various matters set out in section 1(3) of the Act of 1961′
LordDenning went on to consider the difference between transient and systemic causes of flooding in the Burnside case: ‘The mere presence of this pool of water on that night does not by itself show a failure to maintain. It had been raining all day. The pool of water had not been very deep for very long. Mr. Bailey, a farmer, who drove along at 8 o’clock had had no difficulty. It had become deep at 9 o’clock. Later on, at 10 o’clock, the pool was there, but was going down. But the evidence did not rest merely on the presence of the pool of water. There was additional evidence which showed that this stretch of road was not kept properly drained. It was quite often flooded when there was rain. A bus-driver gave evidence. He had been going up and down the road for some years. He said the road was always flooded there after rain. Mr. Broughton, who had been chairman of the parish council for many years, said that in the old days, when there were lengthmen who walked this length of road, he used to complain to them, and they would scrape out the debris. But in recent years the lengthmen had been replaced by a gang who visited at longer intervals. He used to complain to the surveyor then when the road was flooded: but it took them a good deal longer to put it right. After this accident had occurred, the parish council themselves wrote to the local authority, saying: ‘At a recent parish meeting complaints were made regarding water lying on the main Nottingham/Melton road opposite the school and between the two gravel-pit hills. This is considered very dangerous and I was instructed to request you to deal with this hazard as soon as possible.’ To which the local authority simply said: ‘The points mentioned are being investigated.’ Yet, according to the evidence, nothing further was done.’
Approving Burnside: ‘He found that although the system which the Nottinghamshire County Council had installed was a good system and would have been sufficient if it had been carried out, nevertheless their servants failed to operate this system properly. He said they failed in three ways: (i) by failing to secure that the drain was at the lowest point (it appears that there was a dip in the road at this point. A six-inch drain had been put in. But then the highway authority had raised the road two or three inches: and when they did so, the drain had not been put at the lowest point. It had been partly obstructed by the making of the road); (ii) by failing to keep the grips or gullies in such a condition that they would take the water from the road . . .; (iii) by failing to see that the ditch was properly cleaned out so that it would take the water from the gullies. I think these findings by the judge were borne out by the evidence, and show a failure to maintain. ‘

Judges:

Lord Justice Diplock, Lord Denning MR, Lord Justice Goff

Citations:

[1968] 1 WLR 1490, [1968] 1 All ER 74

Statutes:

Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1961

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Burgess v Northwich Local Board 1880
In the context of the duty of a local parish to maintain a highway, Lindley J said: ‘An occasional flooding, even if it temporarily renders a highway impassable, is not sufficient to sustain an indictment for non-repair.’
Counsel accepted . .
Cited – Regina v Inhabitants of High Halden 1859
highhalden1859
The court considered the liability of the parish for injury arising from a failure to repair the road. The road was ‘an old soft road formed of Weald of Kent clay, and had never been repaired with hard substances’. The evidence was that in wet . .

Cited by:

Cited – Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council HL 1-Apr-2004
Statutory Duty Not Extended by Common Law
The claimant sought damages after a road accident. The driver came over the crest of a hill and hit a bus. The road was not marked with any warning as to the need to slow down.
Held: The claim failed. The duty could not be extended to include . .
Cited – Thoburn v Northumberland County Council CA 19-Jan-1999
The claimant alleged that the defendant by allowing a flood across a road not to be cleared was in breach of their statutory duty under the 1980 Act.
Held: Though the blockage was not entirely on the Highway, the nature and extent of it was . .
Cited – Department for Transport, Environment and the Regions v Mott Macdonald Ltd and others CA 27-Jul-2006
Claims arose from accidents caused by standing water on roadway surfaces after drains had not been cleared by the defendants over a long period of time. The Department appealed a decision giving it responsibility under a breach of statutory duty . .
Cited – Haydon v Kent County Council CA 1978
Impacted snow and ice had built up on a steep, narrow, made-up footpath from Monday to Thursday during a short wintry spell. The plaintiff slipped and broke her ankle. The highway authority operated a system of priorities. Their resources were fully . .
Cited – Department for Transport, Environment and the Regions v Mott Macdonald Ltd and others CA 27-Jul-2006
Claims arose from accidents caused by standing water on roadway surfaces after drains had not been cleared by the defendants over a long period of time. The Department appealed a decision giving it responsibility under a breach of statutory duty . .
Cited – Goodes v East Sussex County Council HL 16-Jun-2000
The claimant was driving along a road. He skidded on ice, crashed and was severely injured. He claimed damages saying that the Highway authority had failed to ‘maintain’ the road.
Held: The statutory duty on a highway authority to keep a road . .
Cited – Kind v Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Council Admn 31-Jul-2001
The appellant complained that the local council had failed to maintain a highway. The road was a single track rural highway. The Crown Court allowed for the present-day character of the highway, and the appellant objected. The complainant sought to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Torts – Other

Updated: 31 July 2022; Ref: scu.195690

Nyali Ltd v Attorney-General: CA 1956

The Kenyan and British authorities agreed for the building by the plaintiff of a bridge supported by the imposition of tolls. Btitish military were exempt from payment. At the time of the agreement there was only one unit of military, but as time went on more troops arrived, and the bulk of the traffic was exempt. The bridge owner challenged the arrangement in Britain.
Held: The term ‘military’ included all soldiers of the Queen and was not restricted to the original detachment. It remained a military vehicle when driven by a military driver on duty. However, construing the agreement, a toll became payable in certain limited circumstances.
The task of making qualifications to English law to suit the circumstances of overseas territories called for wisdom on the part of their judges. This was a ‘wise provision.’
As to the application of the common law in a foreign jurisdiction, the court recogised the wisdom of applying the common law qualified as necessary to suit local circumstances: ‘Just as with an English oak, so with the English common law. You cannot transplant it to the African continent and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in England.’

Judges:

Lord Denning

Citations:

[1956] 1 QB 1

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Christian and others v The Queen PC 30-Oct-2006
(The Pitcairn Islands) The defendants appealed convictions for assorted sexual offences against underage girls. They denied that the laws under which they were convicted had applied to the Pitcairn Islands.
Held: The appeals against conviction . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Constitutional, Land, Armed Forces

Updated: 31 July 2022; Ref: scu.245767

Pryor, Re 54 Nelmes Way: UTLC 15 Jul 2009

UTLC RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS -discharge or modification -dwellinghouse -covenants not to erect more than one dwellinghouse set back to building line -application to discharge or modify to permit two additional dwellinghouses -one objection -application refused -Law of Property Act 1925, S84(1)(a), (aa), (c).

Citations:

[2009] UKUT 131 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 30 July 2022; Ref: scu.373417

Pattle and Another v the Secretary Of State for Transport: UTLC 21 Jul 2009

UTLC COMPENSATION – compulsory purchase -preliminary issue -small part of claimant’s land within the limits of deviation for Channel Tunnel Rail Link and eventually compulsorily acquired under Channel Tunnel Rail Link Act 1996 – claim advanced for value of land taken and severance and injurious affection – claim also advanced under rule 6 of Land Compensation Act 1961 section 5 for losses allegedly sustained by claimants by way of lost rents they would have received from a redevelopment of the land in 1996 but which redevelopment was deferred because of the prospective acquisition of part of the land and the general blighting effects of scheme – whether this rule 6 claim should be dismissed at a preliminary hearing in advance of any consideration of the evidence or of issues of causation remoteness or reasonableness – ‘before and after’ valuation method considered.

Citations:

[2009] UKUT 141 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 30 July 2022; Ref: scu.373416

Weybridge Management Ltd v Spelthorne Borough Council: UTLC 16 Jul 2009

UTLC COMPENSATION – compulsory purchase – Green Belt land – conservation area – hope value – comparables – price indices – claimant’s own time – surveyor’s fees – VAT – compensation determined at andpound;102,000.

Citations:

[2009] UKUT 135 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 30 July 2022; Ref: scu.373422

Urban Edge Group Ltd v London Underground Ltd: UTLC 4 Jun 2009

UTLC COMPENSATION – compulsory purchase – preliminary issues – planning permission – whether permission to be assumed on basis that land ‘allocated’ in development plan – whether planning permission to be assumed under no-scheme rule – cancellation assumption – chances of planning permission for different development options – Spirerose – Land Compensation Act 1961 s16(2).

Citations:

[2009] UKUT 103 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Land Compensation Act 1961 16(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Damages

Updated: 30 July 2022; Ref: scu.373411

Clemdell Ltd v Dorset County Council: LT 13 May 2009

LT COMPENSATION – Purchase of land by agreement for construction of distributor road by Authority possessing compulsory purchase powers – preliminary issues – initial advance payment – rights to further advance payment(s) – additional compensation for loss of opportunity to earn profits due to withholding of advance payments and refusal to permit registration of mortgage – determined that clamant has no right to additional advance payments under Agreement – that terms of Agreement not overridden by the Compensation Code (except where specifically provided for) and that no additional compensation payable for loss of opportunity to earn profits, per Ryde International plc v London Regional Transport [2004] 2 EGLR 1.

Citations:

[2009] EWLands CON – 145 – 2005

Links:

Bailii

Land

Updated: 30 July 2022; Ref: scu.372337

Wilde, Re: Main Road, Long Bennington: LT 24 Apr 2009

LT RESTRICTIVE COVENANT – modification – 4 objections – ground (c) made out in relation to one objection but not others – ground (b) made out in relation to 3 objections only – ground (aa) made out in relation to 3 objections only – need for at least one ground to be satisfied in relation to all entitled to benefit – agreement with fourth objector on new restriction and compensation enabling ground (aa) to be applied.

Citations:

[2009] EWLands LP – 12 – 2008

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 30 July 2022; Ref: scu.372334

Churchill v Temple and Others: ChD 22 Oct 2010

Application for declarations relating to the enforceability, meaning and effect of a restrictive covenant.
Held: The court stressed the dangers of allowing an overly commercial construction to override the clear language of the instrument.

Citations:

[2010] EWHC 3369 (Ch), [2011] 17 EG 72

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – CGIS City Plaza Shares 1 Ltd and Another v Britel Fund Trustees Ltd ChD 13-Jun-2012
The claimants asserted a right of light either by prescription or under lost modern grant. The defendants argued that alterations in the windows arrangements meant that any prescription period was restarted.
Held: ‘the Defendant is not correct . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 28 July 2022; Ref: scu.443303

Moore v British Waterways Board: ChD 12 Mar 2009

Citations:

[2009] EWHC B12 (Ch)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal from – Moore v British Waterways Board CA 5-Feb-2010
The claimant sought the right to moor his houseboats on the Grand Union Canal, a waterway regulated by the defendant who issued licences. The claimant said that rights granted under the 1793 Act survived the new scheme. The defendant said that a . .
See Also – Moore v British Waterways Board ChD 10-Feb-2012
The claimant said that the defendant did not have the powers it claimed in serving notices requiring him to remove boats from a section of the Grand Union Canal.
Held: The respondent did have the power under section 8 of the 1983 Act. As a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Transport

Updated: 28 July 2022; Ref: scu.347119

Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Hood: CA 1975

The court considered the nature of the 1949 Act: ‘The object of the statute is this: it is to have all our ancient highways mapped out, put on record and made conclusive, so that people can know what their rights are. Our old highways came into existence before 1835. They were created in the days when people went on foot or on horseback or in carts. They went to the fields to work, or to the village, or to the church. They grew up time out of mind. The law of England was: once a highway, always a highway. But nowadays with the bicycle, the motorcar and the bus, many of them have fallen into disuse. They have become overgrown and no longer passable. But yet it is important that they should be preserved and known, so that those who love the countryside can enjoy it, and take their walks and rides there. That was the object of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 and the Countryside Act 1968. In 1949 the local authorities were required to make inquiries and map out our countryside. First, a draft map; next a provisional map; and finally a definitive map. There were opportunities both for landowners and the public to make their representations as and when each map passed through each stage. In 1968 there was to be a review and re-classification.’ Obiter: on reclassification of a RUPP as a bridleway public vehicular rights could be extinguished.

Judges:

Lord Denning Master of the Rolls

Citations:

[1975] 1 QB 891

Statutes:

National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 27(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Todd, Bradley v The Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs Admn 22-Jun-2004
Application was made to quash an order modifying the Council’s definitive map of public rights of way.
Held: Before the Secretary of State could confirm a Council’s modification of a right of way shown on the definitive map, where that . .
Cited – Kind, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Admn 27-Jun-2005
The applicant challenged a refusal to confirm a draft order recognising a road used as a path as a byway open to all traffic.
Held: The challenge succeeded. The path had been shown under the 1948 Act as a road used as a public path. The . .
Disapproved – Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Riley 1990
The court considered the effect of a reclassification of a road under the 1968 Act.
Held: Reclassification as a bridleway left open the possible existence of public vehicular rights since the 1968 Act had left the effect of the proviso in . .
Cited – Fortune and Others v Wiltshire Council and Another CA 20-Mar-2012
The court considered the contnuation of public rights of way against the new system of the ending of certain unrecorded rights.
Held: he appeal failed. ‘As a matter of plain language, section 67(2)(b) does not, in our judgment, require the . .
Cited – Fortune and Others v Wiltshire Council and Another CA 20-Mar-2012
The court considered the contnuation of public rights of way against the new system of the ending of certain unrecorded rights.
Held: he appeal failed. ‘As a matter of plain language, section 67(2)(b) does not, in our judgment, require the . .
Cited – Trail Riders Fellowship v Secretary of State for The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Admn 26-Jan-2015
The Fellowship appealed against confirmation of an order changing a Byway open to all traffic to a bridleway, thus excluding their members (in this case motorcyclists) from its use by motorised vehicles. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 28 July 2022; Ref: scu.199308

In re Clergy Orphan Corporation: CA 1894

The court considered the extent of the prohibition on restrictions on the sale of land by a charity to land forming part of the endowment of the charity.
Held: Davey LJ said: ‘All property of every description belonging to or held in trust for a charity . . is an endowment within the meaning of the Act.’
He refused to limit the word ‘endow’ in section 66 of the Charitable Trusts Act 1853 to property held upon some special purpose or trust in connection with the charity as distinguished from the general purposes of the charity and applied it to all property belonging to or held in trust for a charity, whether held upon trusts or conditions which render it lawful to apply the capital to the maintenance of the charity or upon trusts which confine the charitable application to the income.

Judges:

Davey LJ, Lord Herschell LC, Lindley LJ

Citations:

[1894] 3 Ch 145

Statutes:

Charitable Trusts Act 1853 66

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Bayoumi v Women’s Total Abstinence Union Ltd and Another CA 5-Nov-2003
A charity entered into a contract for the sale of land. It failed to comply with the requirements under the Act. The purchaser assigned the benefit of the contract, to the claimant who sought to enforce the contract.
Held: The section only . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Charity, Land

Updated: 28 July 2022; Ref: scu.235721

Attorney-General ex relater Sutcliffe and Others v Calderdale Borough Council: CA 1982

The court discussed whether a terrace of cottages was within the curtilage of an old factory which was a listed building. At first instance, Skinner J had held that they were, and that permission could not be granted for their demolition. The Council appealed.
Held: The appeal failed.
Stephenson LJ said: ‘The terrace has not been taken out of the curtilage by the changes which have taken place, and remain so closely related physically or geographically to the mill as to constitute with it a single unit and to be comprised within its curtilage in the sense that those words are used in this subsection.’
and ‘Three factors have to be taken into account in deciding whether a structure (or object) is within the curtilage of a listed building . . whatever may be the strict conveyancing interpretation of the ancient and somewhat obscure word ‘curtilage’. They are (1) the physical ‘layout’ of the listed building and the structure, (2) their ownership, past and present, (3) their use or function, past and present. Where they are in common ownership and one is used in connection with the other, there is little difficulty in putting a structure near a building or even some distance from it into its curtilage.’
Changes in ownership and changes in use of the cottages in more recent times had not taken the cottages out of the curtilage of the mill.

Judges:

Stephenson, Ackner LJJ and Sir Sebag Shaw

Citations:

(1982) 46 P and CR 399

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1971 54(9)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Approved – Methuen-Campbell v Walters CA 1978
The curtilage of a house is narrowly confined to the area surrounding it and did not extend to a paddock. Buckley LJ said: ‘In my judgment, for one corporeal hereditament to fall within the curtilage of another, the former must be so intimately . .

Cited by:

Cited – Lowe v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 6-Feb-2003
The landowner appealed against an enforcement notice issued with respect to a chain link fence erected along the driveway of his grade II listed building. He said the drive was not part of the curtilage of the building.
Held: The inspector had . .
Cited – Skerritts of Nottingham Limited v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions, Harrow London Borough Council Admn 22-Mar-1999
The curtilage of a building is a small area around it. An assessment of whether a separate structure was within the curtilage which did not consider the distance between the various buildings must be incorrect in that it had omitted an essential . .
Cited – Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions and Another v Skerritts of Nottingham Ltd CA 25-Feb-2000
The meaning of ‘curtilage’ whilst not strictly a term of art had caused considerable difficulties. There was nothing inherent in the concept to imply any limitation that the area should be small. In this case the curtilage of a manor house could . .
Cited – George Wimpey UK Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 22-Sep-2004
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Land

Updated: 28 July 2022; Ref: scu.195572

Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd: CA 4 Jul 2013

The court set out answers to consequential questions raised by their judgment, and the form of declaration required.

Judges:

Moses, Tomlinson, Floyd LJJ

Citations:

[2013] EWCA Civ 814

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

At ChD – Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus Plc ChD 19-Jul-2012
On the sale of the claimant’s property, the solicitors received agreement by the defendant bank to the release of their charge over the property for a certainsum, being less than the loan outstanding. In the course of discharging the loan, a bank . .

Cited by:

See Also – Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd v Menelaou SC 4-Nov-2015
The bank customers, now appellants, redeemed a mortgage over their property, and the property was transferred to family members, who in turn borrowed from the same lender. A bank employee simply changed the name on the mortgage. This was ineffective . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Equity

Updated: 26 July 2022; Ref: scu.512161

Smith Brothers Farms Ltd v The Canwell Estate Company Ltd: CA 2 Mar 2012

By a transfer of 1990, land had become subject to a rentcharge to pay a sum of 1.00 pound per annum plus a fixed proportion of the claimant’s costs, expenses and outgoings incurred in fulfilling its obligations under the covenant. The 1977 Act disallowed any new rentcharges save as an estate rentcharge.
Held: Where a rentcharge is set up to secure recovery of the cost of the performance of covenant benefitting the servient owner’s land, it was valid and it would stay so as a registered estate rentcharge. However, at any point when the rent owner sought recovery of costs from an owner of the servient land the rentcharge provision could not be relied where the sums claimed were unreasonable as against performance of the covenant. In such circumstances the rentcharge did not cease to be an estate rentcharge or to be valid: it simply became unavailable to the rent owner as a means of recovering that unreasonable contribution.

Judges:

Mummery, Toulson, Kitchin LJJ

Citations:

[2012] EWCA Civ 237, [2012] 1 P and CR 19, [2012] 1 WLR 2626, [2012] WLR(D) 59, [2012] 2 All ER 1159

Links:

Bailii, WLRD

Statutes:

Rentcharges Act 1977 2

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 26 July 2022; Ref: scu.451802

Icebird Ltd v Winegardner: PC 2 Jun 2009

(The Bahamas) The parties disputed the existence of a right of way. The appellant issued proceedings to claim that the right of way had been obstructed. After inordinate delay, it was struck out.
Held: The appeal succeeded. There had been inordinate delay, but the defendant had not been prejudiced, and this was not a case of flagrant disinterest in pursuing the claim. A fair trial remained possible.

Judges:

Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, Lord Mance, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury

Citations:

[2009] UKPC 24

Links:

Bailii

Citing:

Cited – Birkett v James HL 1977
Exercise of Power to Strike Out
The court has an inherent power to strike out an action for want of prosecution, and the House set down the conditions for its exercise. The power is discretionary and exercisable only where (a) there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay and . .
Cited – Grovit and others v Doctor and others HL 24-Apr-1997
The plaintiff began a defamation action against seven defendants. Each had admitted publication but pleaded justification. The claims against the fourth to seventh defendants were dismissed by consent, and the third had gone into liquidation. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Commonwealth, Land

Updated: 26 July 2022; Ref: scu.346618

Thompson v Foy: ChD 20 May 2009

Lewison J discussed the decision in Etridge: ‘In the light of the arguments before me, there are some additional observations I should make. First, although in Etridge Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead described the paradigm case of a relationship where influence is presumed as being one in which the complainant reposed trust and confidence in the other party in relation to the management of the complainant’s financial affairs, I do not consider that this description was intended to be exhaustive. To restrict the type of trust and confidence in this way would not be consistent with the authoritative exposition by Lindley LJ in Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 in which Lindley LJ referred to ‘cases in which the position of the donor to the donee has been such that it has been the duty of the donee to advise the donor, or even to manage his property for him’. This very sentence was paraphrased by Lord Nicholls. In addition, when describing the circumstances in which the burden of proof would shift Lord Nicholls used much more general language . . Second, the requisite trust and confidence can arise in the course of the impugned transaction itself: Turkey v Awadh [2005] 2 P and CR 29.’

Judges:

Lewison J

Citations:

[2009] EWHC 1076 (Ch)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Allcard v Skinner CA 1887
The donor had parted with almost all her property. She now sought to have the transaction set aside for undue influence.
Held: Where a wife has entered into a gratuitous transaction with her husband, the burden was on the husband as donee to . .
Cited – Turkey v Awadh and Another CA 8-Mar-2005
. .

Cited by:

Cited – Hewett v First Plus Financial Group Plc CA 24-Mar-2010
The appellant appealed against a mortgage possession order, saying that she had been misled into signing the charge by a non-disclosure by her husband of an extra-marital affair he was conducting. The bank had not met the standards set in Etridge, . .
Applied – Link Lending Ltd v Bustard CA 23-Apr-2010
The respondent had been detained in a secure mental unit for a year. In that time her home was charged to the appellant. She asserted that she had been a person in actual occupation. The chargee now appealed against a finding that the respondent had . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Undue Influence, Land

Updated: 26 July 2022; Ref: scu.346246

Carter and Another v Cole and Another: CA 20 May 2009

Citations:

[2009] EWCA Civ 410

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

See Also – Carter, Carter v Cole, Cole CA 11-Apr-2006
Disputed right of way. The court recognised the right of the owner of a servient tenement to repair a roadway.
Longmore LJ said that step-in rights are, by definition, rights to reasonable access for maintenance of the servient tenement, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

land

Updated: 26 July 2022; Ref: scu.346214

Time Products Ltd v Combined English Stores: 2 Dec 1974

The plaintiff and the defendant were each interested in buying a property and had agreed that one of them would make an offer, the other refraining from doing so, and that if the offer were to be accepted the purchaser would deal with the property in a manner to the advantage of both. The arrangement was not sufficiently detailed as to constitute an enforceable contract and the offeror, having become the purchaser with the other refraining from competing, sought to keep the property for itself, excluding the other from any benefit.
Held: The property was declared to be held on trust for the two parties in equal shares.

Judges:

Oliver J

Citations:

Unreported, 2 December 1974

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Banner Homes Group Plc v Luff Developments and Another CA 10-Feb-2000
Competing building companies agreed not to bid against each other for the purchase of land. One proceeded and the other asserted that the land was then held on trust for the two parties as a joint venture.
Held: Although there was no formal . .
Cited – Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd and Another v Cobbe HL 30-Jul-2008
The parties agreed in principle for the sale of land with potential development value. Considerable sums were spent, and permission achieved, but the owner then sought to renegotiate the deal.
Held: The appeal succeeded in part. The finding . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Trusts

Updated: 26 July 2022; Ref: scu.276429

Dyfed County Council v Secretary of State for Wales: CA 30 Nov 1989

The Council had, under section 53 of the 1981, Act modified its definitive map to add five footpaths including that under appeal. An inspector had refused to confirm three of the footpaths, including the one in dispute, and in accordance with his decision the Secretary of State had confirmed the order subject to that modification. The Council applied under Schedule 15 to quash the order. It failed at first instance.
Held: The appeal succeeded. the inspector had failed to give sufficient reasons to enable the Court to determine whether or not his decision was right in law.
Use of a pathway for recreational walking is capable of founding a case of deemed dedication of a highway unless the use merely ancillary to other recreational activities such as sunbathing, fishing or swimming.
Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C said: ‘It follows in my judgment (and the Secretary of State does not dissent) that there has been a failure to comply with the requirements of Schedule 15 to the Act of 1981 since there has been a failure to conduct a proper local inquiry. That failure has substantially prejudiced the interests of the county council. Accordingly under paragraph 12 of schedule 15 we have power to quash the order. In my judgment the order should be so quashed in this case for the reasons that I have given.
Normally I would reach that conclusion with considerable regret, given the time expense and trouble that has already been expended on this case in seeking to establish whether a public right of way exists. However, in this case my regret is tempered by the fact that I suspect that hitherto the matter may have been approached on the wrong basis. It may be helpful to the parties, if they are going to re-consider what should happen in the future, if I explain the doubts which I have.’
. . And: ‘I have only dealt with the matter at such length in the hope that may help resolve for the future the nature of the rights around this lake rather than give rise to yet further litigation such as that with which we have been dealing.
For myself I would allow the appeal and quash the order made and confirmed by the Minister, leaving it open for the matter to be started afresh.’

Judges:

Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C

Citations:

Times 15-Dec-1989, (1990) PandCR 275

Statutes:

Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 53

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Oxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
Cited – Jones v Welsh Assembly Government Admn 15-Dec-2008
The County Council had made an order under section 53, establishing a footpath over the claimant’s land. The land owner now appealed. The court had previously quashed the inspector’s decision on the basis that he had not allowed for the interruption . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 26 July 2022; Ref: scu.192186

Longman v Viscount Chelsea: CA 1989

(Obiter) The section did not dispense with the need for delivery of a deed executed by a corporation.

Judges:

Nourse LJ

Citations:

(1989) 58 PandCR 189

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 74(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Torkington CA 31-Oct-2003
The proposed landlord had sealed the lease, but the tenant was to seal and deliver his part by a certain date. The respondent purported to complete the lease later.
Held: Under the 1985 Act completion would require writing, intention and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 26 July 2022; Ref: scu.188668

HRH Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi and Others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Another: TCC 26 Jan 2017

Claims for damages arising from failures in oil pipeline management in Nigeria.

Citations:

[2017] EWHC 89 (TCC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

At FTT – Ogale Community and Others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Another CA 14-Feb-2018
The claimants sought damages after widescale historic damage to areas of Nigeria by subsidiaries of the defendant. The defendant said that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear such a claim.
Held: The claimants had not established the . .
At FTT – Okpabi and Others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Another SC 12-Feb-2021
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Land

Updated: 25 July 2022; Ref: scu.573402

Painter v Hutchison and Another: ChD 3 Apr 2007

The court was asked whether the illegal intention behind the execution of a declaration of trust had been carried into effect to the extent that it prevented P from asserting that a declaration of trust in relation to a property was a sham and that she was in fact the beneficial owner of the property.
Held: Although both P and her husband had said that the reason behind the execution of the trust was to distance the property from the Inland Revenue, that had not actually happened. Amongst other things, the declaration of trust was never shown to the Inland Revenue and P had declared the property to them as her asset. She was not prevented from asserting that the property was hers.

Judges:

Lewison J

Citations:

[2007] EWHC 758 (Ch)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – SQ v RQ and Another FD 31-Jul-2008
The home in which the family had lived was held in the name of a brother. Each party claimed that it was held in trust for them. Chancery proceedings had been consolidated into these ancillary relief applications. The home had been in the husband’s . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Land, Trusts

Updated: 25 July 2022; Ref: scu.250707

Potters v Loppert: ChD 1973

The court was asked as to the liability of an estate agent to account for interest earned upon a pre-contract deposit paid to him expressly as a stakeholder. No contract was made.
Held: A stakeholder is not a trustee or agent; he is a principal who owes contractual obligations to the depositors. A pre-contract deposit paid by a prospective purchaser was received subject to an obligation to repay the money on request unless and until a contract was concluded. Material considerations included that until the event was known the recipient was to keep the money in his own hands, but if the recipient employed the money he was entitled to any profit and answerable for any loss.
Sir John Pennycuick V-C said: ‘I propose, in the first place, to consider the law in relation to contract deposits. Looking at the position apart from authority, one might perhaps at first sight rather expect that where any property is placed in medio in the hands of a third party to await an event as between two other parties the third party receives that property as trustee, and that the property and the investments for the time being representing it represent the trust estate. Where the property is something other than money – for example, an investment – that must, in the nature of things, almost certainly be the position. But where the property is money – that is, cash or a cheque resulting in a bank credit – this is by no means necessarily so. Certainly the money may be paid to the third party as trustee, but equally it may be paid to him as principal upon a contractual or quasi-contractual obligation to pay the like sum to one or other of the parties according to the event. It must depend upon the intention of the parties, to be derived from all the circumstances, including any written documents, in which capacity the third party receives the money.’

Judges:

Sir John Pennycuick V-C

Citations:

[1973] Ch 399, [1973] 1 All ER 658

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Rockeagle Ltd v Alsop Wilkinson CA 1991
The position of a stakeholder and the two potential claimants to a stake is the subject of a tripartite contract. The relationship between the stakeholder and the two potential claimants is contractual, not fiduciary. The money is not trust money. . .
Cited – Manzanilla Limited v Corton Property and Investments Limited; John MacIver (Southport) Limited; Rootbrights Limited and Halliwell Landau (a Firm) CA 13-Nov-1996
Millett LJ set out the principles applicable to a deposit paid on a land transaction being held by a stakeholder: ”Where a stakeholder is involved, there are normally two separate contracts to be considered. There is first the bilateral contract . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Contract

Updated: 25 July 2022; Ref: scu.550154

Fraser and Another v Canterbury Diocesan Board of Finance: ChD 22 Feb 2000

Where land had been acquired under the Act on trusts related specifically to the provision of education in accordance with a specified religion, the abandonment by the school of that purpose meant that the land reverted immediately to the original donor. It was clear that the trust established was not merely for educational purposes where the religious element was incidental. That element was the purpose of the gift.

Citations:

Times 22-Feb-2000

Statutes:

School Sites Act 1841

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal from – Fraser and Another v Canterbury Diocesan Board Of Finance (No 1) CA 24-Nov-2000
A grant of land was made under the 1841 Act in 1872 (after the 1870 Act) and the school had in 1874 been transferred to a school board under section 23 of the 1870 Act. The school closed permanently in 1992. The issue was whether reverter had . .
Cited – Fraser and Another v Canterbury Diocesan Board of Finance and others HL 27-Oct-2005
Land had been acquired by a deed under the 1841 Act, but had in 1995 ceased to be used as a school ‘for the education of children and adults of the labouring manufacturing and other poorer classes . . And for no other purpose ‘. Under the Act, the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Ecclesiastical, Education

Updated: 25 July 2022; Ref: scu.80664

In Re Wallis and Simmonds (Builders) Ltd: ChD 1974

The deposit of title documents, without more, gives rise to an inference that the deposit was intended by the parties to operate as creating an equitable charge or mortgage over the property whose title document is deposited. In logic there could be no distinction between deposits to secure a first and third party indebtedness.
Templeman J said: ‘But in my judgment this is a contractual lien – it is said to be a contractual lien – and that makes all the difference. It is also a contractual charge; true it is that the charge arises by presumption, but it does not arise by operation of law. What the court does is to say: `We shall not compel the parties to write down in so many words what the effect of the deposit of title deeds is; we shall simply assume that when they contract, and although they probably do not know the consequences, the person who takes the title deeds contracts not only to retain them but also to have an equitable charge on the land.’ The presumption reads into the contract the charge which is implied. If that is right, the charge was created by the company and is therefore registrable under s95.’

Judges:

Templeman J

Citations:

[1974] 1 WLR 391, [1974] 1 All ER 561, [1974] AC 467

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – United Bank of Kuwait Plc v Sahib and Others CA 2-Feb-1996
The bank appealed against a decision that the simple deposit of deeds with a bank did not take effect as an equitable charge.
Held: Depositing deeds with a bank is not sufficient to create a charge over them. The old law as to the creation of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Equity

Updated: 25 July 2022; Ref: scu.434815

Gold v Mincoff Science and Gold: ChD 18 Jan 2001

A sleeping partner in a business executed several charges over partnership property, unaware that the funds raised were being used for purposes other than the partnership business. Their solicitors admitted negligence in not advising them sufficiently closely as to the effect of the all monies nature of the charges. A claim was brought to recover money, but then enlarged when the creditor appreciated the extent of the all monies charge. The claimant sought damages for negligence from the solicitor.
Held: The limitation defence succeeded only in part. Where the solicitor had chosen to hide the effect of the clause from his client on signing later charges, liability arising under earlier charges continued.

Judges:

Neuberger J

Citations:

Gazette 18-Jan-2001

Statutes:

Limitation Act 1980

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal From – Gold v Mincoff Science and Gold (A Firm) CA 19-Jul-2002
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Professional Negligence, Land, Limitation

Updated: 25 July 2022; Ref: scu.80896

Phoenix Property Investors Ltd v Grange Securities Ltd: ChD 5 May 2011

A contract for the sale of land required certain works to be completed before completion was to take place. The parties disputed whether the works had been adequately completed and accordingly made cross allegations of repudiation and breach.

Judges:

David Cooke J

Citations:

[2011] EWHC 1131 (Ch)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 25 July 2022; Ref: scu.434889

Orton v Collins and others: ChD 23 Apr 2007

The court considered how a Part 36 offer could be treated as accepted when it involved an agreement to transfer land, because the offer and its acceptance would not operate under the 1989 Act.
Held: The agreement was enforceable. The Civil Procedure Rules, and the inherent jurisdiction of the court, allowed the creation of rights and obligations over and above separate rights: ‘the solution to this case is not to be sought by creating two mutually exclusive pigeonholes marked ‘Contract’ and ‘Part 36 Settlement’. It seems to me that the acceptance of a Part 36 offer may well create a contract and probably does so in the vast majority of cases. When it does create a contract which requires further implementation (e.g. a contract to assign the copyright in a song) it may be possible to obtain specific performance. Or if the contract is broken a party may choose to start a new claim on that contract. But what I have to decide is whether a Part 36 acceptance that, for some reason, creates no contract can nevertheless be enforced by application to the court.
In my judgment, if parties who are before the court choose to employ machinery prescribed by the court’s rules in order to settle their dispute, they must be taken to submit to the consequences. Namely, that if the offer is accepted the court may enforce it. A party who makes a valid Part 36 offer, or one who accepts it, must be taken to be binding himself to submit to those consequences. ‘

Judges:

Peter Prescott QC

Citations:

[2007] EWHC 803 (Ch), [2007] 3 All ER 863, [2007] 1 WLR 2953

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 2

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Steadman v Steadman HL 1976
A mere payment of a sum of money might amount to an act of part performance, as might the act of a purchaser instructing solicitors to prepare and submit a draft conveyance or transfer, so as to leave asituation capable of enforcement in equity. . .
Cited – Mehta v J Pereira Fernandes SA ChD 7-Apr-2006
The parties were in dispute. The now respondent threatened winding up. The appellant had someone in his company send an email requesting an adjournment and apparently giving a personal guarantee to a certain amount. The application was adjourned, . .
Cited – Nweze and Another v Nwoko CA 29-Mar-2004
The parties had settled their dispute in an oral compromise agreement under which it was agreed that land would be sold at the best price reasonably obtainable. One now argued this was unenforceable as an agreement for the disposal of land requiring . .
Cited – Firstpost Homes Ltd v Johnson and Others CA 14-Aug-1995
The parties disputed whether a contract had been made. The proposed contract was contained in a letter and a plan but only the plan was signed by both parties.
Held: The requirements of Section 2 had not been satisfied because it was the . .
Cited – Timmins v Moreland Street Property Co Ltd CA 1958
The Court considered the effect of a note or memorandum evidencing the sale of a property where it was described as ‘6,8 and 41, Boundary Street, Shoreditch (freehold).’ It was sought to connect the signature on a purchaser’s deposit cheque with an . .
Cited – Hollingsworth v Humphrey CA 10-Dec-1987
The parties disputed the effect of a Tomlin order, an order made by the court that stayed the proceedings on the terms of a compromise ‘except for the purpose of carrying the said terms into effect’. The defendant had failed to honour the contract . .
Cited – Jennison v Baker CA 1972
Salmon LJ said: ‘The inherent power of the judges of the High Court to commit for contempt of court has existed from time immemorial . . The power exists to ensure justice shall be done. And solely to this end, it prohibits acts and words tending to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Land

Updated: 25 July 2022; Ref: scu.251426

HKRUK II (CHC) Ltd v Heaney: ChD 3 Sep 2010

The claimant sought a declaration that its property was free of a suggested right of light in favour of its neighbour

Judges:

Langan QC HHJ

Citations:

[2010] EWHC 2245 (Ch), [2010] 44 EG 126, [2010] 3 EGLR 15

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Company, Meux’s Brewery Co v Same CA 1895
The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction for nuisance by noise and vibration which was causing structural injury to a public house.
Held: The court set out the rules for when a court should not grant an injunction for an infringement of . .
Cited – Jaggard v Sawyer and Another CA 18-Jul-1994
Recovery of damages after Refusal of Injunction
The plaintiff appealed against the award of damages instead of an injunction aftter the County court had found the defendant to have trespassed on his land by a new building making use of a private right of way.
Held: The appeal failed.
Cited – Regan v Paul Properties Ltd and others CA 26-Oct-2006
The court considered the appropriate remedy after a finding of infringement of a right to light, and in particular: ‘whether the proper remedy for infringement in this case is damages for nuisance, as ordered by the court below, or whether a . .
Cited – Jacklin and Another v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire CA 16-Feb-2007
The claimants asserted a vehicular right of way over land belonging to the defendant poilce authority. The defendant said that it had been abandoned. The judge found that it had not been and granted an injunction to prevent the defendants . .
Cited – Wrotham Park Estate Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd ChD 1974
55 houses had been built by the defendant, knowingly in breach of a restrictive covenant, imposed for the benefit of an estate, and in the face of objections by the claimant.
Held: The restrictive covenant not to develop other than in . .
Cited – Tamares (Vincent Square) Ltd. v Fairpoint Properties (Vincent Square) Ltd ChD 8-Feb-2007
The defendant had been found liable for infringing the claimant’s right of light. The court considered the proper measure of damages.
Held: The court should ask what might be the fair result of a hypothetical negiation for the sale of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 25 July 2022; Ref: scu.434924

Cukurova Finance International Ltd and Another v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd: PC 5 May 2009

(British Virgin Islands) Shares in two companies incorporated under the BVI Business Companies Act 2004, Cukurova Finance International Ltd and Cukurova Telecoms Holdings Ltd were provided as security under two sets of equitable mortgages, one set was governed by BVI law and the other set by English law. The Board was asked as to how the rules of English law relating to equitable mortgages of shares have been affected by European Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements.
Held: It was not necessary for a valid appropriation for a collateral-taker to become registered owner of the shares.

Judges:

Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Mance

Citations:

[2009] UKPC 19, [2009] 1 CLC 701, [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 1173, [2009] Bus LR 1613, [2009] 3 All ER 849, [2009] 3 CMLR 11

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

Commonwealth

Cited by:

See Also – Cukurova Finance International Ltd and Others v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd PC 23-May-2012
(British Virgin Islands) Interlocutory issue as to who should manage the affairs of the Turkcell mobile telephone business pending the Board’s final adjudication (after a hearing which should take place this autumn) on the rights and wrongs of what . .
See Also – Cukurova Finance International Ltd and Another v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd PC 30-Jan-2013
(British Virgin Islands) The claimant sought to recover shareholdings given in charge.
Held: There was an event of default, which entitled ATT to accelerate the loan and to appropriate – or forfeit – the charged shares, but that relief against . .
See Also – Cukurova Finance International Ltd and Another v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd PC 9-Jul-2013
British Virgin Islands . .
See Also – Cukurova Finance International Ltd and Another v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd PC 29-Jul-2013
(British Virgin Islands) . .
See Also – Cukurova Holding As v Sonera Holding Bv PC 13-May-2014
(British Virgin Islands) The appellant sought to have set aside the Final Decision of an arbitrator. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, Land

Updated: 24 July 2022; Ref: scu.341822

Brighton and Hove City Council, Re Land Between Marine Drive and the Cliff: LT 4 Feb 2009

LT RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS – entitlement to benefit – restriction in order of Official Arbitrator modifying covenant under s 84 of Law of Property Act 1925 – objectors not entitled to benefit of modified covenant – whether objectors entitled to benefit of restriction in order – whether benefit conferred by contract – held objectors not entitled.

Citations:

[2009] EWLands LP – 14 – 2007

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 84

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 24 July 2022; Ref: scu.341629

Shire Barns Developments Llp, Re: Wealden Way: LT 4 Apr 2009

LT RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS – discharge or modification – dwellinghouse – application to erect an additional bungalow in the grounds of existing bungalow – whether injury caused to adjoining owners – application refused – Law of Property Act 1925 s84(1)(c)

Citations:

[2009] EWLands LP – 17 – 2006

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 84(1)(c)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 24 July 2022; Ref: scu.341641

Marriott v Secretary of State for the Environment: Admn 10 Oct 2000

Application to quash public footpath re-classification.
Held: Sullivan J quashed an order with regret but did not consider any alternative.

Judges:

Sullivan J

Citations:

[2000] EWHC 652 (Admin), [2001] JPL 559

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981

Cited by:

Cited – Jones v Welsh Assembly Government Admn 15-Dec-2008
The County Council had made an order under section 53, establishing a footpath over the claimant’s land. The land owner now appealed. The court had previously quashed the inspector’s decision on the basis that he had not allowed for the interruption . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 24 July 2022; Ref: scu.341225

Jones v Welsh Assembly Government: Admn 15 Dec 2008

The County Council had made an order under section 53, establishing a footpath over the claimant’s land. The land owner now appealed. The court had previously quashed the inspector’s decision on the basis that he had not allowed for the interruption of the path, but had refused to quash the Order itself. The claimant said that it was not possible to quash one without the other.
Held: The court considered the authorities and concluded that the order must be an order quashing the Ceredigion County Council (Footpath 49/29/M) Definitive Map Modification Order 2004.

Judges:

Vosper QC HHJ

Citations:

[2008] EWHC 3515 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 53(2)(b)

Citing:

Cited – Dyfed County Council v Secretary of State for Wales CA 30-Nov-1989
The Council had, under section 53 of the 1981, Act modified its definitive map to add five footpaths including that under appeal. An inspector had refused to confirm three of the footpaths, including the one in dispute, and in accordance with his . .
Cited – Regina v Cornwall County Council ex parte Huntington and Another CA 1994
No application for judicial review could be made before the Secretary of State had confirmed a modification order. Simon Brown LJ identified three categories of case excluded from the statutory review procedure: ‘a) A failure by the statutory . .
Cited – Jacques v Secretary of State for the Environment CA 1995
The Inspector had found that the landowner had, by overt acts directed at users of the way in question, including the erection of locked gates and of fencing and of notices, disproved any intention on his part to dedicate.
Held: The . .
Cited – Maltbridge Island Management Company v Secretary of State for Environment and Hertfordshire County Council Admn 31-Jul-1998
Application to set aside addition of land to definitive map of public rights of way as byway open to all traffic (BOAT).
Held: The force of the evidence of private conveyancing documents may outweigh the value of public documents such as a . .
Cited – National Trust v Secretary of State for Environment Admn 17-Dec-1998
The claimant applied to have quashed the East Sussex County Council (Crowlink Car Park To Flagstaff Point, East Dean and Friston No 37 Definitive Map Modification Order 1997. The Order modified the County Council’s definitive map and statement of . .
Cited – Buckland and Buckland and Capel v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and Regions Admn 11-Jan-2000
For a track to be deemed to be a byway open to all traffic, there was no need to prove vehicular use, nor both pedestrian and equestrian use. It was necessary however to show that the use by foot and horse combined exceeded on balance use by . .
Cited – Marriott v Secretary of State for the Environment Admn 10-Oct-2000
Application to quash public footpath re-classification.
Held: Sullivan J quashed an order with regret but did not consider any alternative. . .
Cited – Applegarth v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and Regions Admn 28-Jun-2001
The landowner challenged an order under the 1981 Act.
Held: the inspector’s decision was upheld.
However, a different inspector at an earlier inquiry had concluded that the modifying order should not be confirmed. That decision had been . .
Cited – Rowley and Another v Secretary of State for Transport Local Government and the Regions Admn 24-May-2002
The inspector after holding an inquiry had confirmed the decision of the county council to make an order modifying the definitive map by the inclusion of a footpath over the objectors’ land.
Held: The decision by the Secretary of State . .
Cited – Todd, Bradley v The Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs Admn 22-Jun-2004
Application was made to quash an order modifying the Council’s definitive map of public rights of way.
Held: Before the Secretary of State could confirm a Council’s modification of a right of way shown on the definitive map, where that . .
Cited – Norman and Another v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Admn 5-Jul-2006
The applicants sought to have quashed an order by the Council confirming a footpath. Having concluded that the decision of an inspector confirming a modification order was flawed, the Court said that it should be quashed and the matter remitted for . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 24 July 2022; Ref: scu.341226

Maroudas v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Another: Admn 9 Mar 2009

Application was to quash the decision of the Secretary of State, made by an inspector in May 2008 following a hearing, to confirm a modification order made in response to an application originally made under section 53(5). It had had several failings, but these had been addressed by the authority.
Held: Mackie QC upheld the inspector’s decision to treat the application as validly made by the relevant date. As he observed, there had been nothing ‘opportunistic’ about the application, made long before any hint of the proposals which led in due course to the 2006 legislation. Although he was bound by the Winchester decision, and he accepted that the defects in the original application could not be treated as ‘minor’, he was entitled to look ‘at the substance of the matter’, which was that: ‘by the time the letter of 22 April 1997 was written it was perfectly clear what the application related to. There was a map, as one sees from ‘enclosed is a summary plan of the application’ in the letter of 25 March 1997, and a signature and a date. No one would, or could, have been misled about what happened after that. Mr Maroudas rightly had to accept that he would have no grounds at all for his application if, instead of the exchange of letters, the council had gone through the bureaucratic, or some would say necessary, step of returning the form to [the applicant] to sign and amend, rather than resolving the matter on an exchange of correspondence. That seems to me to move proper strictness into unnecessary bureaucracy . . .’

Judges:

Mackie QC HHJ

Citations:

[2009] EWHC 628 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Cited by:

Appeal from – Maroudas v Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs CA 18-Mar-2010
The claimant appealed against an order refusing his request to quash a footpath modification order. The request had not been signed as required.
Held: The appeal succeeded. ‘subject to the de minimis principle, an application must strictly . .
Cited – Trail Riders Fellowship and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Dorset County Council SC 18-Mar-2015
Objection had been made that a plan, used to register a right of way before it would disappear if un-registered, was to the wrong scale and that therefore the application was ineffetive.
Held: The Council’s appeal failed. The plan was too . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Administrative

Updated: 24 July 2022; Ref: scu.330989

Spirerose Ltd v Transport for London: LT 16 Nov 2007

LT COMPENSATION – compulsory purchase – acquisition of former industrial premises – claim for loss of development value – valuation – planning permission in no-scheme world – whether planning permission that would have been granted in no-scheme world to be assumed or whether claimant confined to hope value – method of valuation – residual basis adopted in absence of adequate comparables – compensation determined at pounds 608,000.

Citations:

[2007] EWLands ACQ – 41 – 2005

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal From – Transport for London v Spirerose Ltd (In Administration) CA 13-Nov-2008
The parties disputed the compensation to be awarded on the compulsory acquisition of land and in particular as to whether ‘the site should be valued on the basis (a) (as the tribunal held) of its full value with planning permission for a mixed use . .
At LT – Transport for London (London Underground Ltd) v Spirerose Ltd HL 30-Jul-2009
Compulsory Purchase Compensation – Land As it Is
The House considered the basis of calculation of compensation on the compulsory purchase of land without planning permission, but where permission would probably be granted. The appellant challenged the decision which had treated the probability as . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 24 July 2022; Ref: scu.262243

599 Developments Ltd v NNB Generation Co (HPC): UTLC 2 Aug 2019

Compensation – Compulsory Purchase – permissibility of heads of claim – compensation under section 19, Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 – right of pre-emption – severance and injurious affection under section 7, Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 – the no-scheme world

Citations:

[2019] UKUT 235 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 24 July 2022; Ref: scu.640520

Get Nominees Limited v Trinity Welsh Homes Limited: ChD 9 Sep 2014

Trial of an action under which the claimant seeks specific performance of an agreement made between itself and the defendant dated 22 June 2010 relating to a freehold property at Bethel Road, Caernarfon, Gwynedd for a sum of andpound;613,500. The claimant was the seller, and the defendant was the buyer. The seller argued that an option agreement had lapsed after a failure to meet a time condition. The buyer argued that time was not of the essence.

Judges:

Purle QC HHJ

Citations:

[2014] EWHC 4737 (Ch)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Rockeagle Ltd v Alsop Wilkinson CA 1991
The position of a stakeholder and the two potential claimants to a stake is the subject of a tripartite contract. The relationship between the stakeholder and the two potential claimants is contractual, not fiduciary. The money is not trust money. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Land

Updated: 24 July 2022; Ref: scu.550163

Grender and others v Dresden and others: ChD 13 Feb 2009

Residents on an estate where the estate roads had come into the control of a trust administered by the residents disputed the arrangement necessary to manage the road scheme. Directions were sought for the implementation of a scheme.
Held: Objections based on the lack of a quorum at meetings in the distant past should fail as being far too late. The deed of trust did purport to manage trust assets of value, and had a clear commercial purpose.

Judges:

Norris J

Citations:

[2009] EWHC 214 (Ch), [2009] WTLR 379, [2009] NPC 29

Links:

Bailii

Citing:

Cited – In Re Plymouth Breweries Ltd 1967
In 1893 a scheme of reconstruction which adjusted the rights of the preference and the ordinary shareholders was promoted, and in the following year was approved by the court. But it appeared that the scheme had never been approved by a quorate . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Company

Updated: 23 July 2022; Ref: scu.304537

Hamilton v Dumfries and Galloway Council: SCS 24 Feb 2009

The petitioner sought a declarator that an area of land on the edge of the village of Collin was not a ‘road’ capable of being added by the respondents, Dumfries and Galloway Council, to their list of public roads under section 16 of the 1984 Act. The court was asked as to the nature of a public right of passage, and as to the manner in which such a right may be constituted and extinguished.

Judges:

Lord Reed, Lord Mackay of Drumadoon, Lord Marnoch

Citations:

[2009] ScotCS CSIH – 13

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 16

Citing:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Jones and Lloyd HL 4-Mar-1999
21 people protested peacefully on the verge of the A344, next to the perimeter fence at Stonehenge. Some carried banners saying ‘Never Again,’ ‘Stonehenge Campaign 10 years of Criminal Injustice’ and ‘Free Stonehenge.’ The officer in charge . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Scotland, Land

Updated: 23 July 2022; Ref: scu.304559

Aribisala v St James’ Homes (Grosvenor Dock) Ltd: ChD 14 Mar 2008

The claimant contracted to buy two apartments from the defendant. The contract purported to exclude section 49.

Judges:

Floyd J

Citations:

[2008] EWHC 456 (Ch), Times 04-Apr-2008, [2008] 12 EG 96, [2009] 1 WLR 1089, [2008] 3 All ER 762, [2008] 19 EG 206, [2008] 2 EGLR 65

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 49(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – London Borough of Wandsworth v Allison CA 15-Apr-2008
The claimant had applied for emergency housing, saying that he had suffered a deep vein thrombosis, and was vulnerable under the 1996 Act. The authority said that its finding that the VT would not put him at additional risk if homeless, was one of . .
See Also – Aribisala v St James Homes (Grosvenor Dock) Ltd ChD 12-Jun-2007
The parties had agreed in a contract for the sale and purchase of land to exclude the application of section 49(2). The buyer had failed to comply with a notice to complete.
Held: The parties cannot contract out of section 49(2). The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 23 July 2022; Ref: scu.266470

Glasgow and South-Western Railway v Greenock Corporation: HL 23 Jul 1917

Property – Reparation – Negligence – River – Burgh – Operations in Alveo Fluminis Causing Damage to Lower Heritor – Damnum Fatale.
A burn in a slight depression ran alongside of, but at a lower level than, a public road in a burgh. The burgh corporation, having been given the valley of the burn, which it used as a park, constructed a culvert to carry the burn and levelled up the valley so that the roadway became the lowest point on the surface. An exceptionally heavy rainfall occurred lasting over an hour. The roadway became flooded, and the water, sweeping down the incline of the road, in one place went to swell the water collecting behind the retaining wall of a railway in cutting, which fell, and in another place carried away a garage and with the debris drove against the mouth of a culvert under another railway and the railway wall, and that wall also fell.
Held, on the basis that the culvert in the park had proved unable to receive the water coming to it and that an overflow had occurred at its intake prior to the damage being done to the railway property, that the Corporation was liable in damages.
Held also, by Lord Wrenbury, that even if the overflow at the intake of the culvert took place subsequent to the damage to the railway property, the Corporation was liable in damages inasmuch as the result of their operations was, irrespective of the overflow, to increase the water running on the road by water which would but for their operations have been safely carried away in the valley of the burn.
Per the Lord Chancellor-‘It is the duty of anyone who interferes with the course of a stream to see that the works which he substitutes for the channel provided by nature are adequate to carry off the water brought down even by extraordinary rainfall, and if damage results from the deficiency of the substitute which he has provided for the natural channel he will be liable. Such damage is not in the nature of damnum fatale, but is the direct result of the obstruction of a natural watercourse by the defenders’ works followed by heavy rain.’

Judges:

Lord Chancellor (Finlay), Lord Dunedin, Lord Shaw, Lord Parker, and Lord Wrenbury

Citations:

[1917] UKHL 600, 54 SLR 600

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Land

Updated: 23 July 2022; Ref: scu.631009

Adekunle and Others v Ritchie: Misc 17 Aug 2007

(Leeds County Court) An enfranchised freehold was in joint names because the elderly tenant could not obtain a mortgage on her own.

Judges:

Behrens J

Citations:

[2007] 2 P and CR DG20, [2007] BPIR 1177, (2007) 104(35) LSG 36, [2007] EW Misc 5 (EWCC), [2007] WTLR 1505

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Jones v Kernott SC 9-Nov-2011
Unmarried Couple – Equal division displaced
The parties were unmarried but had lived together. They now disputed the shares in which they had held the family home. It had been bought in joint names, but after Mr Kernott (K) left in 1993, Ms Jones (J) had made all payments on the house. She . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Trusts

Updated: 22 July 2022; Ref: scu.406759

Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v Wolverhampton City Council and Tesco Stores Ltd: Admn 3 Feb 2009

Each supermarket company and the authority owned part of the site. The authority had granted each an outline permission for a new store, but had decided to allow the Tesco store to proceed. The claimant had at one point indicated that it did not wish to go ahead. The claimant now challenged the associated compulsory purchase order.
Held: The court dismissed the application for judicial review of the compulsory purchase decision.

Judges:

Elias J

Citations:

[2009] EWHC 134 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Cited by:

Cited – Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v Wolverhampton City Council CA 31-Jul-2009
The council wanted to exercise its powers of compulsory purchase so as to allow them to acquire the claimant’s land to go toward the completion of the development of a competitor’s proposed supermarket. The claimant sought judicial review, saying . .
Appeal from – Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v Wolverhampton City Council CA 31-Jul-2009
The council wanted to exercise its powers of compulsory purchase so as to allow them to acquire the claimant’s land to go toward the completion of the development of a competitor’s proposed supermarket. The claimant sought judicial review, saying . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Land

Updated: 22 July 2022; Ref: scu.280426

Salvage Wharf Ltd and Another v G and S Brough Ltd: CA 29 Jan 2009

The claimant had agreed with a developer in 1999 to allow a development which would have a minor affect on his light. The developer later extended the development, to increase the interference with the right to light, relying on the earlier agreement as an abandonment of the right. The claimant sought to register a light obstruction notice.
Held: The appeal failed. The claimant did not abandon his rights to light by entering into the 1999 agreement. Nor did the claimant lose those rights to light by operation of the proviso to s.3 of the 1832 Act. The agreement had acknowledged the rights enjoyed by the claimant’s land, and was not an abandonment of the rights. The arrangements in the 1959 Act were intended to allow a development to be challenged in a manner which would avoid the need to chalenge a completed building with an order for its demolition. The later development in this case went beyond what was envisaged in the earlier agreement, but the buildings had been erected, and the claimant would not be allowed to register its light obstruction.

Judges:

Tuckey LJ, Carnwath LJ, Jackson LJ

Citations:

[2009] EWCA Civ 21, [2009] 2 P and CR 13, [2009] 3 WLR 990, [2010] 1 Ch 11

Links:

Bailii, Times

Statutes:

Prescription Act 1832 3, Rights of Light Act 1959 2

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – RHJ Ltd v FT Patten (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 12-Mar-2008
A right to light is an unusual form of easement in the sense that it exists only with regard to the access to light to defined apertures in a building (as opposed to the dominant land generally) and its acquisition depends on actual enjoyment, not . .
Cited – Marlborough (West End) Ltd v Wilks Head and Eve ChD 20-Dec-1996
A dispute between neighbours was settled by a deed with the following clause: ‘IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND DECLARED that notwithstanding that the Building Owners have placed windows in that part of their new buildings which overlook the premises . .
Cited – Mitchell v Cantrill CA 1887
In 1864 Sir Humphrey de Trafford granted a 999 year lease of a dwelling house ‘with all rights and appurtenances, legal, used, or reputed, to the said plot of land, except rights, if any, restricting the free use of any adjoining land or the . .
Cited – Willoughby v Eckstein ChD 1936
The parties were tenants of the same landlord, the Grosvenor Estate in adjoining premises at Balfour Mews in Westminster. The plaintiff claimed for an infringement of his right of light from ancient windows by his neighbour, and also that the height . .
Cited – Regina v Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd, ex Parte Bowden and Another HL 18-Jul-1995
A regulated firm, Fisher Prew-Smith, ran a scheme whereby elderly homeowners were persuaded to invest money in equity-linked funds by mortgaging their homes on terms that the interest would roll up unless and until the total mortgage debt reached a . .
Cited – KPMG Llp v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd CA 27-Apr-2007
The parties disputed the interpretation of a break clause in their lease. Carnwath LJ said that courts should not readily accept that parties have made mistakes in formal documents: ‘correction of mistakes by construction’ is not a separate branch . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 22 July 2022; Ref: scu.280241

Radanath Doss And Others v Gisborne And Co: PC 19 Jan 1871

ER (Fort William (Bengal)) A usufructuary mortgage, to run over a certain number of years, was executed in 1828 by a member of a joint Hindoo family, with the consent of the other members, to R., who afterwards sold the mortgaged estate to H. and H, whose Agent R. was. H. and If. subsequently, in 1811 and 2851, conveyed the estate tn, G. and Co., as an absolute purchaser in fee. In a suit for redemption of the mortgage brought in 1864 G and Co. set up as a defence their title as bona fide Purchasers without notice, and, having been in possession more than twelve years, pleaded the Limitation of suits Act, NO. XIV of 1859, sect. 6, as a bar to the suit. Held : First, that the onus was on G and Co. to establish by clear and satiefactory evidence the termination of the mortgage and the absolute sale by the mortgagees to R . the root of their title; and, in the absence of such proof, that the transaction in 1841 and 1851 was merely an assignment of the mortgage and, Secondly in the circumstances that G and Co were not Purchasers within the true construction of section 5 of Act No XIV of 1859, to entitle them to the benefit of the twelve years’ limitation as a bar to the suit for redemption.

Citations:

[1871] EngR 1, (1871) 14 Moo Ind App 1, (1871) 20 ER 687, [1871] UKPC 2

Links:

Commonlii, Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Commonwealth

Updated: 22 July 2022; Ref: scu.280182

Fletcher, Re Pheasants, Ferry Lane Mill End: LT 12 Jan 2009

LT RESTRICTIVE COVENANT – costs – successful application to stay substantive application made on first day of hearing – subsequent High Court Order that objectors not entitled to benefit of restriction – whether unsuccessful objectors entitled to costs incurred before Tribunal proceedings stayed.

Citations:

[2009] EWLands LP – 6 – 2007

Links:

Bailii

Land

Updated: 22 July 2022; Ref: scu.280179