The applicant challenged a refusal to confirm a draft order recognising a road used as a path as a byway open to all traffic.
Held: The challenge succeeded. The path had been shown under the 1948 Act as a road used as a public path. The council had reclassified it as a bridleway, which did not exclude its use also as a public right of way for vehicular purposes. The Secretary of State had refused to recognise the order saying that the vehicular rights had been extinguished by the earlier re-classification. However the proviso in the 1949 Act had not been repealed, and the re-classification did not defeat the vehicular rights.
Judges:
Lightman J
Citations:
[2005] EWHC 1324 (Admin), Times 30-Aug-2005, [2005] 3 WLR 616, [2006] QB 113
Links:
Statutes:
Countryside Act 1968, National Parks and Access to the hcountryside Act 1948, Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Hood CA 1975
The court considered the nature of the 1949 Act: ‘The object of the statute is this: it is to have all our ancient highways mapped out, put on record and made conclusive, so that people can know what their rights are. Our old highways came into . .
Cited – Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Riley 1990
The court considered the effect of a reclassification of a road under the 1968 Act.
Held: Reclassification as a bridleway left open the possible existence of public vehicular rights since the 1968 Act had left the effect of the proviso in . .
Cited – Marlene Peggy Masters v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions CA 31-Jul-2000
Where a public byway was defined as such under the Act, it was intended that the highway should be shown as such on the definitive map. The fact, if it was such, that a byway had fallen into disuse was not an indication that it should be omitted . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Land
Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.227937
