Citations:

Unreported 15 February 1985

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Taylor (A Child Proceeding By his Mother and Litigation Friend C M Taylor) v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police CA 6-Jul-2004
The Chief Constable appealed aganst a finding that his officers had wrongfully arrested and imprisoned the claimant. The claimant was 10 years old when arrested, and complained that the officers had not properly advised him of the nature and purpose . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Police, Torts – Other

Updated: 29 May 2022; Ref: scu.198672

Citations:

[2002] EWCA Civ 80

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Torts – Other, Police

Updated: 29 May 2022; Ref: scu.216717

The claimant sought to pursue his claim for damages after a hearing aid was damaged whilst he was in police custody.
Held: The issues had been canvassed in the criminal proceedings, by the Police complaints authority and by the courts over some eight years. The application for leave to appeal and for judicial review was a waste of the courts time and was refused.

Citations:

[1996] EWCA Civ 1256

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Police, Torts – Other

Updated: 29 May 2022; Ref: scu.141124

The Police had confiscated money suspected to be the proceeds of drug trafficking, but no offence was proved. The magistrates had refused to return the money under the 1897 Act. The claimants now sought to reciver it under civil proceedings.
Held: The judge was wrong to have found public policy grounds for refusing to order what he had found to be such proceeds. There was no statutory power to hold the money and it must be returned: ‘There is no statutory power to confiscate the proceeds of drug dealing within the United Kingdom where the person entitled to possession of the money is not convicted of a drug trafficking offence. I recognise that there may be circumstances where for a variety of reasons a prosecution may not take place. But that does not, in my view, justify expropriation by means of a defence to a civil claim for return of money which has been seized from persons who are not convicted.’
The position was essentially the same whether proceedings were taken against the police directly or whether proceedings were taken pursuant to 1897 Act. In each of the cases, the police initially lawfully seized the money, but the statutory power to retain it was exhausted. ‘the court should not, in my view, countenance expropriation by a public authority of money or property belonging to an individual for which there is no statutory authority’ and ‘if goods are in the possession of a person, on the face of it he has the right to that possession. His right to possession may be suspended or temporarily divested if the goods are seized by the police under lawful authority. If the police right to retain the goods comes to an end, the right to possession of the person from whom they are seized revives. In the absence of any evidence that anybody else is the true owner, once the police right of retention comes to an end, the person from whom they were compulsorily taken is entitled to possession.’

Judges:

May, Pill, Hale, LJJ

Citations:

Gazette 08-Dec-1999, [2000] QB 427, [1999] EWCA Civ 3041, [2000] 2 WLR 546, [2000] 1 All ER 209

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Police (Property) Act 1897 1(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Applied – Tinsley v Milligan HL 28-Jun-1993
Two women parties used funds generated by a joint business venture to buy a house in which they lived together. It was vested in the sole name of the plaintiff but on the understanding that they were joint beneficial owners. The purpose of the . .

Cited by:

Cited – Morgan, Regina (on the Application of) v Justices of Dyfed Powys Magistrates’ Court Admn 18-Jun-2003
Money had been taken by the Police, but after the applicants had been acquitted, they sought it to be returned. Their action was struck out after long delays. They applied to the Magistrates who turned down the application.
Held: The money . .
Followed – Regina (on the application of Carter) v Ipswich Magistrates’ Court Admn 2002
Mrs Carter had paid a man to murder someone. The man was an undercover police agent. In time Mrs Carter was convicted of soliciting to commit murder, but Mr Carter was acquitted. She disclaimed all interest in the money she had paid in favour of her . .
Followed – Costello v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary CA 22-Mar-2001
The police seized a car from Mr Costello, believing that it was stolen. The seizure was lawful at the time, by virtue of section 19 of PACE. The police never brought any criminal proceedings against Mr Costello, but they refused to return the car to . .
Cited – Gough and Another v The Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police CA 2-Mar-2004
The claimants sought return of vehicle parts from the police. The police replied that the goods had been tampered with in such a way as to suggest they may have been stolen, and that they were therefore kept, even after the finish of the court . .
Cited – Merseyside Police v Hickman and Another Admn 1-Mar-2006
Cash had been seized by the police under the 1984 Act. It was later seized also under the 2003 Act. The respondent said this was unlawful.
Held: The forfeited money could be seized again under the 2003 Act. The 2002 Act allowed appropriate . .
Cited – Scopelight Ltd and Others v Chief of Police for Northumbria CA 5-Nov-2009
The claimant sought return of items removed by the defendants under the 1984 Act. A decision had been made against a prosecution by the police. The police wished to hold onto the items to allow a decision from the second defendant.
Held: The . .
Cited – O’Leary International Ltd v North Wales Police Admn 31-May-2012
The company employed drivers to cross the UK. They were stopped and did not have the requisite drivers records. Instead they produced certificates as to having had rest days. These proved false, and the drivers said that the had been produced for . .
Cited – Merseyside Police v Owens Admn 31-May-2012
The police had refused to returns items seized from Mr Owens on the basis that to do so would indirectly encourage and assist him in suspected criminal activity. CCTV footage had been removed from him to attempt identify an arsonist of a house.The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Police

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.90348

When making an arrest, the standard of proof required of the officer is suspicion and no more. It falls well short of prima facie proof. Suspicion should not be elided with guilt, or even prima facie proof of guilt. It ‘is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: I suspect but I cannot prove.’

Judges:

Lord Devlin

Citations:

[1970] AC 942

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Jarrett v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police CA 14-Feb-2003
The claimant sought damages for false imprisonment and assault after her wrongful arrest. She had waived her handbag at an officer investigating a disturbance and been arrested. The police said the arrest was lawful, she being suspected of common . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Police, Torts – Other

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.182927

Where a constable arrested someone based upon information on the police national computer, he was not to be held accountable for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment, if the information upon which that had in turn been based, did not justify the suspicion. The issue was whether the constable acted reasonably in relying upon that information. The entry itself was reasonable and objective cause for his suspicion, and arrest of the claimant. If information received from a member of the public could be an appropriate basis for an arrest, why should that same information cease to be such a basis when transformed into an entry on the computer.
The chief constable appealed against a finding of false imprisonment and assault, saying the claimant had been arrested properly. He was a passenger in a car which was mistakenly listed as ‘of interest’.
Held: The chief constable’s appeal succeeded. The critical question to be asked in all cases is what is in the mind of the arresting officer: he can never be a ‘mere conduit’ for someone else. It is for that reason insufficient for an arresting officer to rely solely upon an instruction to carry out the arrest. Conversely, however, where the arresting officer’s suspicion is formed on the basis of a police national computer entry, that entry is likely to provide the necessary objective justification. If information from an informer or member of the public can properly found suspicion sufficient for an arrest, why too should not an apparently responsible entry in the computer?

Judges:

Simon Brown LJ VP, Longmore J

Citations:

Times 14-Feb-2001, Gazette 05-Apr-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 39

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary HL 21-Nov-1996
Second Hand Knowledge Supports Resaobnable Belief
The plaintiff had been arrested on the basis of the 1984 Act. The officer had no particular knowledge of the plaintiff’s involvement, relying on a briefing which led to the arrest.
Held: A reasonable suspicion upon which an arrest was founded . .
Cited – Fox, Campbell and Hartley v The United Kingdom ECHR 30-Aug-1990
The court considered the required basis for a reasonable suspicion to found an arrest without a warrant: ‘The ‘reasonableness’ of the suspicion on which an arrest must be based forms an essential part of the safeguard against arbitrary arrest and . .

Cited by:

Cited – Armstrong v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police CA 5-Dec-2008
The Chief Constable appealed against a finding that the claimant had been arrested for rape without reasonable grounds. A description of the rapist had been given which the claimant met in several respects, but from which he clearly differed in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Police

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.81482

Whether an officer had reasonable cause to arrest somebody without a warrant depended upon an objective assessment of the information available to him, and not upon his subjective beliefs. The court had three questions to ask (per Woolf LJ): ‘(a) Did the arresting officer suspect that the person arrested was guilty of the offence? The answer to this question depends entirely on the findings of fact as to the officer’s state of mind. (b) Assuming the officer had the necessary suspicion, was there reasonable cause for suspicion? This is a purely objective requirement to be determined by the judge if necessary on the facts found by a jury. (c) If the answer to the two previous questions is in the affirmative, then the officer has a discretion which entitles him to make an arrest and in relation to that discretion has been exercised in accordance with the principles laid down [in Wednesbury]’
Lawton LJ said: ‘Suspicion by itself, however, will not justify an arrest. There must be a factual basis for it of a kind which the court would adjudge to be reasonable. The facts may be within the arresting constable’s own knowledge or have been reported to him. When there is an issue in a trial as to whether a constable had a reasonable cause, his claim to have had knowledge or to have received reports on which he relied may be challenged. It is within this context that there may be evidential issue as what he believed to be the facts. But it would be for the court to adjudge what were the facts which made him suspect that the person he arrested was guilty of the offence which he was investigating.’

Judges:

Woolf LJ, Sir Frederick Lawton

Citations:

[1988] NLJR 180, Times 15-Jun-1988, [1996] LG Rev Rep 241, [1996] LGR 241

Statutes:

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 24(6)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation CA 10-Nov-1947
Administrative Discretion to be Used Reasonably
The applicant challenged the manner of decision making as to the conditions which had been attached to its licence to open the cinema on Sundays. It had not been allowed to admit children under 15 years of age. The statute provided no appeal . .

Cited by:

Cited – Jarrett v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police CA 14-Feb-2003
The claimant sought damages for false imprisonment and assault after her wrongful arrest. She had waived her handbag at an officer investigating a disturbance and been arrested. The police said the arrest was lawful, she being suspected of common . .
Cited – Cumming and others v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police CA 17-Dec-2003
The six claimants sought damages for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. Each had been arrested on an officer’s suspicion. They operated CCTV equipment, and it appeared that tapes showing the commission of an offence had been tampered with. Each . .
Cited – O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary HL 21-Nov-1996
Second Hand Knowledge Supports Resaobnable Belief
The plaintiff had been arrested on the basis of the 1984 Act. The officer had no particular knowledge of the plaintiff’s involvement, relying on a briefing which led to the arrest.
Held: A reasonable suspicion upon which an arrest was founded . .
Cited – Al-Fayed and others v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and others CA 25-Nov-2004
The appellants appealed from dismissal of their claims for wrongful imprisonment by the respondent. Each had attended at a police station for interview on allegations of theft. They had been arrested and held pending interview and then released. Mr . .
Cited – Austin and Saxby v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis QBD 23-Mar-2005
Towards the end of a substantial May Day demonstration on the streets of London, police surrounded about 3,000 people in Oxford Circus and did not allow them to leave for seven hours. The claimant who was present, but not involved in any of the . .
Cited – Raissi and Another v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis QBD 30-Nov-2007
The claimants had been arrested under the 2000 Act, held for differing lengths of time and released without charge. They sought damages for false imprisonment.
Held: The officers had acted on their understanding that senior offcers had more . .
Cited – Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Raissi CA 12-Nov-2008
The Commissioner appealed against an award of damages for false imprisonment. The claimant had been arrested shortly after a terrorist attack. The judge had held that they had no reasonable belief of his involvement. The Commissioner did not now . .
Cited – Richardson v The Chief Constable of West Midlands Police QBD 29-Mar-2011
The claimant, a teacher, said he had been unlawfully arrested and detained after an allegation of assault from a pupil. Having attended the police station voluntarily, he said that the circumstances did not satisfy the required precondition that an . .
Cited – Hayes v Merseyside Police CA 29-Jul-2011
The claimant had been arrested after a complaint of harassment. The officer then contacted the complainant who then withdrew his complaint. The officer went to visit the complainant to discuss it further. On his return the claimant was released from . .
Cited – Howarth v Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis QBD 3-Nov-2011
The claimant sought judicial review of a decision to search him whilst travelling to a public protest in London. A previous demonstration involving this group had resulted in criminal damage, but neither the claimant nor his companions were found to . .
Cited – Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis v Copeland CA 22-Jul-2014
The defendant appealed against the award of damages for assault, false imprisonment and malicious prosection, saying that the question posed for the jury were misdirections, and that the jury’s decision was perverse. The claimant was attending the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Police, Torts – Other

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.190122

Two school boys, visiting premises for a lawful purpose, aroused suspicion of police officers on duty in plain clothes. One officer produced his warrant card, stated that they were police officers and asked why they were calling at the houses. The boys did not believe that they were police officers. One of them made as if to run away and one of the constables caught hold of his arm and cautioned him. There was then a struggle which involved the other boy.
Held: The officer’s action in catching hold of two schoolboys was performed not in the course of arresting them but for the purpose of detaining them for questioning and so was unlawful.

Winn LJ said: ‘So one comes back to the question in the end, in the ultimate analysis: was this officer entitled in law to take hold of the first boy by the arm – of course the same situation arises with the other officer in regard to the second boy a little later – justified in committing that technical assault by the exercise of any power which he as a police constable in the precise circumstances prevailing at that exact moment possessed?
I regret, really, that I feel myself compelled to say that the answer to that question must be in the negative. This officer might or might not in the particular circumstances have possessed a power to arrest these boys. I leave that question open, saying no more than I feel some doubt whether he would have had a power of arrest: but on the assumption that he had a power to arrest it is to my mind perfectly plain that neither of these officers purported to arrest either of these boys. What was done was not done as an integral step in the process of arresting, but was done in order to secure an opportunity, by detaining the boys from escape, to put to them or either of them the question that was regarded as the test question to satisfy the officers whether or not it would be right in the circumstances, and having regard to the answer obtained from that question, if any, to arrest them.
I regret to say that I think there was a technical assault by the police officers.’

Judges:

Lord Parker CJ,, Winn LJ, Widgery J

Citations:

[1967] 2 QB 510

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Applied – Collins v Wilcock QBD 1984
The defendant appealed against her conviction for assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty. He had sought to caution her with regard to activity as a prostitute. The 1959 Act gave no power to detain, but he took hold of her. She . .
Cited – Wood v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 14-May-2008
The defendant challenged his conviction for obstructing a police officer and threatening behaviour. The officer had taken hold of him to restrain him, not intending to arrest him, but only to establish whether he was a person they were looking for. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Police, Torts – Other

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.186337

Before charging a prisoner, a police officer must have ‘an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the accuser to the conclusion that the person was probably guilty of the crime imputed.’
Once a plaintiff has established his imprisonment, the onus then lies on the defendant to ‘plead and prove affirmatively the existence of reasonable cause’.

Judges:

Judge Hawkins

Citations:

[1878] 8 QBD 167

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Glinski v McIver HL 1962
The court considered the tort of malicious prosecution when committed by a police officer, saying ‘But these cases must be carefully watched so as to see that there really is some evidence from his conduct that he knew it was a groundless charge.’ . .
Cited – Osman v The United Kingdom ECHR 28-Oct-1998
Police’s Complete Immunity was Too Wide
(Grand Chamber) A male teacher developed an obsession with a male pupil. He changed his name by deed poll to the pupil’s surname. He was required to teach at another school. The pupil’s family’s property was subjected to numerous acts of vandalism, . .
Approved – Herniman v Smith HL 1938
The court considered the tort of malicious prosecution.
Held: It is the duty of a prosecutor to find out not whether there is a possible defence, but whether there is a reasonable and probable cause for prosecution. The House approved the . .
Cited – Gibbs and others v Rea PC 29-Jan-1998
(Cayman Islands) The respondent worked for a bank. He disclosed a business interest, but that interest grew in importance to the point where he resigned in circumstances amounting to constructive dismissal. His home and business officers were raided . .
Cited – Matin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis CA 20-Jun-2002
The claimant sought to have restored his claim for malicious prosecution.
Held: ‘The fact that there might be an arguable case that the prosecutor was activated by malice, that is to say, to prosecute for an improper motive, does not of itself . .
Cited – McHarg v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police ChD 9-Jan-2004
The claimant police officer sought damages for malicious prosecution. The defendant applied for the claim to be struck out.
Held: There was insufficient evidence to establish malice. The claim was struck out. . .
Cited – Rowlands v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police CA 20-Dec-2006
The claimant succeeded in her claims for general damages against the respondent for personal injury, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, but appealed refusal of the court to award aggravated damages against the chief constable.
Held: . .
Cited – Moulton v Chief Constable of The West Midlands CA 13-May-2010
The claimant appealed against dismissal of his claim for damages for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office. He had been arrested and held on allegations of serious sexual assaults, but then released when the matter came to the Crown . .
Cited – BT v Crown Prosecution Service CA 16-Dec-1997
The plaintiff appealed against dismissal of his claim for malicious prosecution brought against the Service.
Held: Actions for malicious prosecution, against the Crown Prosecution Service are to be examined closely to ensure that they are not . .
Cited – Williamson v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago PC 3-Sep-2014
(Trinidad and Tobago) The claimant had been held after arrest on suspicion of theft. He was held for several months before the case was dismissed, the posecution having made no apparent attempt to further the prosecution. He appealed against refusal . .
Cited – Motasim v Crown Prosecution Service and Others QBD 15-Aug-2017
The claimant had been arrested on suspicion of terrorism, from his innocent association with people later convicted of terrorism. The defendant discovered evidence which would undermine the case against him, but refuse to disclose it. Eventually, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Police, Torts – Other

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.183666

The court considered the tort of malicious prosecution when committed by a police officer, saying ‘But these cases must be carefully watched so as to see that there really is some evidence from his conduct that he knew it was a groundless charge.’
A charging officer is simply required to make an assessment of whether there is sufficient evidence to withstand examination in the course of ‘a fair and impartial trial’.
The idea of malice covered ‘any motive other than a desire to bring a criminal to justice’. ‘such difficulty as there is in the correct statement and application of the law as to want of reasonable and probable cause, arises from the fact that, while it is for the judge to determine (whether as fact or law) whether there was such want, it is for the jury to determine any disputed facts which are relevant to that determination.’
The House discussed the interaction between malice and want of honest belief: ‘though from want of probable cause malice may and often is inferred, even from the most express malice, want of probable cause, of which honest belief is an ingredient, is not to be inferred.’
Lord Devlin observed: ‘At first sight it is undoubtedly an attractive proposition that a police officer should not be expected to hold an opinion about the guilt and innocence of those he prosecutes; a prosecuting counsel is not expected to hold such an opinion any more than the magistrate who commits for trial . . It derives, I think, a lot of its attraction from the ambiguous use of the word ‘guilt’. If the word is used without qualification, I entirely agree, for the reasons I have given, that a police officer should not be expected to hold an opinion. But when the question to which his mind ought to be directed is no more than the strength of his case, I think it would be unsatisfactory and impracticable to attempt to distinguish between facts proved directly and facts inferred, or (for inference depends on opinion), between fact and opinion generally. Opinion enters into everything from the beginning. The value of a statement taken from a witness depends, until it is tested in court, on the officer’s opinion of the witness’s honesty, accuracy and power of observation.’
Viscount Simonds discussed the extent to which an officer should investigate a possible defence: ‘A question is sometimes raised whether the prosecutor has acted with too great haste or zeal and failed to ascertain by inquiries that he might have made facts that would have altered his opinion upon the guilt of the accused. Upon this matter it is not possible to generalise, but I would accept as a guiding principle what Lord Atkin said in Herniman v Smith [1938] AC 305, that it is the duty of a prosecutor to find out not whether there is a possible defence but whether there is a reasonable and probable cause for prosecution.’

Judges:

Lord Denning, Lord Devlin, Viscount Simonds

Citations:

[1962] AC 726, [1962] 1 All ER 696

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Dawson v Vasandau 1863
It is not necessary for a charging officer to believe that the prosecution will result in a conviction before charging a prisoner. . .
Cited – Tempest v Snowden 1952
Decision too charge – whether was warranted
A custody officer is not required to be sure that the accused person is guilty before charging him, but rather he should believe that a charge is warranted . .
Cited – Hicks v Faulkner 1878
Before charging a prisoner, a police officer must have ‘an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which, assuming them to be true, would . .
Cited – Herniman v Smith HL 1938
The court considered the tort of malicious prosecution.
Held: It is the duty of a prosecutor to find out not whether there is a possible defence, but whether there is a reasonable and probable cause for prosecution. The House approved the . .

Cited by:

Cited – Palomares v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police CA 11-Oct-1996
The Chief Constable appealed a finding of false imprisonment. The claimant had been arrested, but later the charges were dismissed. The jury found on the trial for malicious prosecution that the officers had not believed the truth of the allegations . .
Cited – Osman v The United Kingdom ECHR 28-Oct-1998
Police’s Complete Immunity was Too Wide
(Grand Chamber) A male teacher developed an obsession with a male pupil. He changed his name by deed poll to the pupil’s surname. He was required to teach at another school. The pupil’s family’s property was subjected to numerous acts of vandalism, . .
Cited – Gibbs and others v Rea PC 29-Jan-1998
(Cayman Islands) The respondent worked for a bank. He disclosed a business interest, but that interest grew in importance to the point where he resigned in circumstances amounting to constructive dismissal. His home and business officers were raided . .
Cited – Keegan and Others v Chief Constable of Merseyside CA 3-Jul-2003
The police had information suggesting (wrongly) that a fugitive resided at an address. An armed raid followed, and the claimant occupant sought damages.
Held: The tort of malicious procurement of a search warrant required it to be established . .
Cited – McHarg v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police ChD 9-Jan-2004
The claimant police officer sought damages for malicious prosecution. The defendant applied for the claim to be struck out.
Held: There was insufficient evidence to establish malice. The claim was struck out. . .
Cited – Matin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis CA 20-Jun-2002
The claimant sought to have restored his claim for malicious prosecution.
Held: ‘The fact that there might be an arguable case that the prosecutor was activated by malice, that is to say, to prosecute for an improper motive, does not of itself . .
Cited – Sinclair v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire and British Telecommunications Plc CA 12-Dec-2000
The claimant had been prosecuted, but the charge was dismissed as an abuse of process. He now appealed a strike out of his civil claim for damages for malicious prosecution.
Held: The appeal failed. The decision to dismiss the criminal charge . .
Cited – Coudrat v Revenue and Customs CA 26-May-2005
The claimant appealed against dismissal of his claim for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution against the Customs and Excise. He was arrested and held accused of VAT fraud. Proceedings were discontinued. He had signed an application for . .
Cited – Clifford v The Chief Constable of The Hertfordshire Constabulary QBD 1-Apr-2011
The claimant alleged malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office bought by the claimant who was charged with child pornography offences in July 2004. The prosecution had eventually offered no evidence. He said that it should have been . .
Cited – BT v Crown Prosecution Service CA 16-Dec-1997
The plaintiff appealed against dismissal of his claim for malicious prosecution brought against the Service.
Held: Actions for malicious prosecution, against the Crown Prosecution Service are to be examined closely to ensure that they are not . .
Cited – Williamson v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago PC 3-Sep-2014
(Trinidad and Tobago) The claimant had been held after arrest on suspicion of theft. He was held for several months before the case was dismissed, the posecution having made no apparent attempt to further the prosecution. He appealed against refusal . .
Cited – Motasim v Crown Prosecution Service and Others QBD 15-Aug-2017
The claimant had been arrested on suspicion of terrorism, from his innocent association with people later convicted of terrorism. The defendant discovered evidence which would undermine the case against him, but refuse to disclose it. Eventually, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Police

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.182185

Claim for damages for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. The claimants had been arrested an held as brothers of a third brother arrested for suspicion of involvement in the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. The police applied to have excluded documents including interception warrants.

Judges:

McCombe J

Citations:

[2007] EWHC 3421 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Terrorism Act 2000 41(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Police, Torts – Other

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.271255

The defendant police officers had gone into a house where a child was being held in a man’s arms. The police officers said that they had reason to think that a breach of the peace might occur between the man and his mistress. The question arose as to whether the mistress had authority to give an invitation to the police officers to come in.
Held: Parker LCJ said: ‘Regardless of the invitation, there was sufficient to justify the police entering the house on the basis that they genuinely suspected a danger of breach of the peace occurring.’

Judges:

Parker LCJ, Widgery, O’Connor JJ

Citations:

Times 21-Oct-1967

Cited by:

Cited – McLeod, Mealing (deceased) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner CA 3-Feb-1994
The plaintiff appealed against the dismissal of her claims for trespass and breach of duty by the defendant’s officers. In divorce proceedings, she had been ordered to return certain household goods to her husband, but had failed yet to do so. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Police, Torts – Other

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.543044

The plaintiff had been awarded damages for false imprisonment by the jury on the basis that his otherwise lawful detention at a police station had been made unlawful because it was unreasonable in the circumstances to keep him in a police cell.
Held: The defendant’s appeal succeeded.
Ackner LJ said: ‘We agree with the views expressed by the Divisional Court that it must be possible to conceive of hypothetical cases in which the conditions of detention are so intolerable as to render the detention unlawful and thereby provide a remedy to the prisoner in damages for false imprisonment. A person lawfully detained in a prison cell would, in our judgment, cease to be so lawfully detained if the conditions in that cell were such as to be seriously prejudicial to his health if he continued to occupy it, eg, because it became and remained seriously flooded, or contained a fractured gas pipe allowing gas to escape into the cell. We do not therefore accept as an absolute proposition that if detention is initially lawful, it can never become unlawful by reason of changes in the conditions of imprisonment.’

Judges:

Ackner LJ

Citations:

[1990] 3 WLR 481

Citing:

Cited – Williams v Home Office (No 2) 1981
Tudor-Evans J said: ‘In my judgment, the sentence of the court and the provisions of section 12(1) always afford a defence to an action of false imprisonment. The sentence justifies the fact of imprisonment and the subsection justifies the . .
Cited – Regina v Board of Visitors of Gartree Prison, Ex parte Sears 14-Mar-1985
A prisoner sought damages in respect of cellular confinement and loss of privileges.
Held: Mann J. said: ‘If a person is imprisoned in a place where he is lawfully so imprisoned, then it does not seem to me that a variation in conditions of . .

Cited by:

Erroneous – Regina v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, Ex parte Hague, Weldon v Home Office HL 24-Jul-1991
The prisoner challenged the decision to place him in segregation under Prison Rule 43. Under rule 43(1) the initial power to segregate was given to ‘the governor’. The case arose from the fact that the governor of one prison had purported to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Torts – Other, Police

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.271097