(Jamaica) The defendant had fatally stabbed a woman. On arrest, he admitted killing her and that he had the knife which he had used to do so. He gave the police officer a pouch containing a knife, on which blood of the same group as that of the deceased was found, and a jar containing cocaine. He blamed the cocaine for causing him to commit the crime. He did not give evidence but made an unsworn statement from the dock. He did not deny killing the deceased, or mention taking cocaine, but said that he did not know what had happened.
Held: A judge should recognise that counsel presenting a case to the jury may choose to emphasise some possible verdicts and have good reason for not mentioning others. Nevertheless the judge had a duty to place all the possible verdicts before the jury, and whether or not counsel had sought to advance them, provided only that there was evidence which properly raised the issue in the trial. ‘As a matter of law it is not disputed that the voluntary consumption of drugs, as well as the voluntary consumption of alcohol, may operate so as to reduce the crime to murder to one of manslaughter on the ground that intoxication was such that the accused would not have been able to form the specific intent to kill or commit grievous bodily harm.’
Lord Clyde: ‘The function and responsibility of the judge is greater and more onerous than the function and the responsibility of the counsel appearing for the prosecution and for the defence in a criminal trial. In particular counsel for a defendant may choose to present his case to the jury in the way which he considers best serves the interest of his client. The judge is required to put to the jury for their consideration in a fair and balanced manner the respective contentions which have been presented. But his responsibility does not end there. It is his responsibility not only to see that the trial is conducted with all due regard to the principle of fairness, but to place before the jury all the possible conclusions which may be open to them on the evidence which has been presented in the trial whether or not they have all been canvassed by either of the parties in their submissions. It is the duty of the judge to secure that the overall interests of justice are served in the resolution of the matter and that the jury is enabled to reach a sound conclusion on the facts in light of a complete understanding of the law applicable to them. If the evidence is wholly incredible, or so tenuous or uncertain that no reasonable jury could reasonably accept it, then of course the judge is entitled to put it aside. The threshold of credibility in this context is, as was recognised in Xavier v The State (unreported), 17 December 1998; Appeal No. 59 of 1997 a low one, and, as was also recognised in that case, it would only cause unnecessary confusion to leave to the jury a possibility which can be seen beyond reasonable doubt to be without substance. But if there is evidence on which a jury could reasonably come to a particular conclusion then there can be few circumstances, if any, in which the judge has no duty to put the possibility before the jury. For tactical reasons counsel for a defendant may not wish to enlarge upon, or even to mention, a possible conclusion which the jury would be entitled on the evidence to reach, in the fear that what he might see as a compromise conclusion would detract from a more stark choice between a conviction on a serious charge and an acquittal. But if there is evidence to support such a compromise verdict it is the duty of the judge to explain it to the jury and leave the choice to them. In Xavier v The State the defence at trial was one of alibi. But it was observed by Lord Lloyd of Berwick in that case that, ‘If accident was open on the evidence, then the judge ought to have left the jury with the alternative of manslaughter’. In the present case the earlier statements together with their qualifications amply justified a conclusion of manslaughter and that alternative should have been left to the jury.’
Lord Clyde
Times 16-Mar-2000, [2000] UKPC 5, [2000] 1 WLR 1270, (2000) 56 WIR 424
Bailii, PC, PC
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Duncan CACD 1981
Where a defendant has not given evidence the whole of a ‘mixed’ statement, one which includes matter which is incriminating and also matter which is exculpatory, should be admitted in evidence, if it is to be admitted at all. Nevertheless, the court . .
Cited – Regina v Chief Constable of The Royal Ulster Constabulary Ex Parte Begley; Regina v McWilliams HL 24-Jul-1997
There is no right at common law to have a solicitor present during a police interview. There was no infringement of the suspect’s human rights by the Northern Ireland Rules. The House discussed its ability to take the law forward: ‘It is true that . .
Cited – Mills and Others v The Queen PC 1-Mar-1995
A judge’s identification direction need not always warn on the need for witnesses to be convincing. An unsworn statement from a defendant is significantly inferior to oral evidence. . .
Cited by:
Cited – Coutts, Regina v CACD 21-Jan-2005
The defendant appealed his conviction for murder, saying that the judge should have left to the jury the alternative conviction for manslaughter. The victim had died through strangulation during a sexual assault by the defendant. He said it had not . .
Cited – Hunter, Moodie v The Queen PC 8-Oct-2003
PC (Jamaica) The defendants appealed against their convictions for capital murder.
Held: The appeals were allowed, and non-capital convictions substituted. It is not enough to comply with section 2(2), for . .
Cited – Regina v Coutts HL 19-Jul-2006
The defendant was convicted of murder. Evidence during the trial suggested a possibility of manslaughter, but neither the defence nor prosecution proposed the alternate verdict. The defendant now appealed saying that the judge had an independent . .
Approved – Shaw and Campbell, Regina v CANI 8-Jun-2001
The defendant appealed his conviction for murder saying the judge should have left the alternative charge of having assisted offenders to the jury.
Held: Referring to Fairbanks: ‘It was argued on behalf of the Crown that this test was not . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Criminal Practice
Updated: 03 January 2022; Ref: scu.174642
