[2013] EWCA Crim 1487
Bailii
England and Wales

Crime

Updated: 21 November 2021; Ref: scu.516264

Reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission in relation to a plea of guilty by this appellant to an offence of carrying an imitation firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence, contrary to section 18 of the 1968 Act.

[2006] EWCA Crim 1650
Bailii
Firearms Act 1968 18
England and Wales

Crime

Updated: 20 November 2021; Ref: scu.270251

[2005] EWCA Crim 3553
Bailii
Drug Trafficking Act 1994 31(4)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Gibson v Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office CA 12-Jun-2008
The claimant’s husband had been made subject to a criminal confiscation order in the sum of pounds 5.5 million. She now sought to appeal an action against life policies in which she claimed a 50% interest.
Held: Despite the finding that she . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Updated: 20 November 2021; Ref: scu.278598

Appeal from conviction of inflicting grievous bodily harm.

Rose VP CACD, Richards, Bean JJ
[2004] EWCA Crim 2570
Bailii
England and Wales

Crime

Updated: 20 November 2021; Ref: scu.226807

Appeal from convictions for historic abuse: ‘the appeals raise the difficult question of the safety of verdicts which depend upon evidence given by witnesses who were young at the time, vulnerable and purport to give an account of events which may have taken place at least twenty-five years ago. They raise the issue as to whether, either at the close of the prosecution case, or at the close of the defence case, the judge should have intervened to withdraw the allegations from the jury on the basis that no jury could safely convict. They also raise an issue as to the proper way the judge should have directed the jury about such incidents.’
Held: As to some counts: ‘, in the light of the paucity of clear evidence identifying which teachers were responsible for the attack by the school and the inaccuracy of the judge in identifying which evidence went to Counts 7 to 9, the verdicts of guilty in relation to George Robson and Wilson are unsafe and should be quashed. It must not be forgotten that the witnesses were purporting to identify teachers as being responsible for this fight, possibly some twenty-six years previously. There was such a lack of clear, reliable and consistent evidence, coupled with a significantly inaccurate direction as to lead us to the conclusion that the verdicts on Counts 7 to 9 are unsafe.’

Moses LJ, McCombe J, Martin Stephens QC HHJ
[2006] EWCA Crim 2754
Bailii
England and Wales

Crime

Updated: 20 November 2021; Ref: scu.247500

The defendant had been convicted of possessing articles for terrorist purposes, namely a notebook with notes setting out how to construct a mortar bomb in his handwriting. There was also a coded list of potential targets.
Held: The decision in R v M ‘that ‘articles’ within the meaning of section 57 cannot extend to documents and records because express provision is made for these items under article 58′ was unsatisfactory. There was an overlap between sections 57 and 58, but that did not mean that a finding that a document was an article would make section 58 almost superfluous. The two sections dealt with different aspects of terrorism. Section 57 included a specific intention, but section 58 did not.

Lord Phillips CJ, Latham LJ, Cresswell J, Burton J
[2007] EWCA Crim 635, Times 26-Mar-2007
Bailii
Terrorism Act 2000 57(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – M and Others, Regina v CACD 7-Feb-2007
The defendants appealed a ruling by the recorder that electronic storage devices were ‘articles’ within s57. S58 dealt with documents, and section 57 with articles.
Held: Hooper LJ said: ‘There is no practical difference between a book which a . .
Cited – Palmer, Regina v CACD 11-Oct-2002
The defendant appealed against a very substantial confiscation order. The prosecution had served notices under sections 71 and 72(1), but the section 72(1) notice was invalid. The judge allowed a second notice to be served, and the case to be . .
Cited – Sekhon, etc v Regina CACD 16-Dec-2002
The defendants appealed against confiscation orders on the basis that in various ways, the Crown had failed to comply with procedural requirements.
Held: The courts must remember the importance of such procedures in the fight against crime, . .
Cited – Simpson v Regina CACD 23-May-2003
The appellant challenged a confiscation order made on his conviction of VAT fraud. It was argued that one could not be made unless a proper notice had been given, and none of the offences occurred before 1995. On the assumption that section 1 of the . .
Cited – Keogh v Regina CACD 7-Mar-2007
The defendant was charged under the 1989 Act. He complained that the effect of the Act was to put an unfair burden on him to establish that he was unaware of the damaging effects of disclosure.
Held: The Act did not comply with the defendant’s . .

Cited by:
Preferred – M, Regina v; Regina v Z; Regina v I; Regina v R; Regina v B (No 2) CACD 27-Apr-2007
The defendants, accused of offences under the 2000 Act, appealed an interim finding that documents stored on computers could amount to ‘articles’ within the Act. They said that the existence of sections 57 and 58 suggested two distinct regimes, one . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Updated: 20 November 2021; Ref: scu.251143

The defendant appealed against his conviction for inciting others to commit robbery. The men he was said to have incited were not convicted.

O’Connor LJ, Neill, Taylor JJ
[1982] EWCA Crim 1, [1983] 1 All ER 189, [1983] 2 WLR 227, [1983] QB 1083, [1982] Crim LR 677, (1982) 76 Cr App R 17
Bailii
England and Wales

Crime

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.247945

Several defendants had been convicted of various offences relating to the importation of substantial volumes of cocaine, and its manufacture into crack cocaine, and money-laundering offences. The first defendant appealed her conviction for having been involved in a conspiracy to courier the drugs. The principle evidence was a call lasting only three minutes in whch she booked a flight. Her defence was that any such call would take at least 10 minutes, and that she had not made such a call.
Held: The judge’s direction to the jury not to speculate risked withholding the defendant’s defence from them, and he might have avoided his sarcasm, but the result came within his range of discretion and may have been generous to her, but was insufficient to dispell his earlier comments which undermined the defence, and the appeal was allowed. Another defendant claimed to have had no knowledge of the conpiracy. A prison escort officer had overheard a conversation in which a leading conspirator had confessed tat he had not told her what was happening. The evidence was reliable, was admitted, and the conviction set aside.

Laws LJ, Penry-Davey J, Recorder of Chester
[2007] EWCA Crim 2
Bailii
England and Wales

Crime

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.248244

[2013] EWCA Crim 1053
Bailii
England and Wales

Crime

Updated: 14 November 2021; Ref: scu.511220

Appeal from conviction for conspiracy to rob, and against sentence

[2015] EWCA Crim 836
Bailii
England and Wales

Crime

Updated: 12 November 2021; Ref: scu.547539

Fear caused with fake gun remains assault

The defendant pointed an imitation gun at a woman. He acted in jest, but she was frightened until he told her that it wasn’t real.
Held: The assault was committed. The victim had been put in fear of immediate and unlawful violence.
An assault can be committed by a person purporting to require positive or negative compliance with a condition on pain of an assault. The expected blow following immediately upon the threat to inflict it, may be an assault where D never intends to carry out the threat,

[1976] Crim LR 121
England and Wales

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 12 November 2021; Ref: scu.539760

Jury Directions on Causation

The appellant shot at police officers who were attempting to arrest him for various serious offences. The appellant had with him a 16 year old girl who was pregnant by him. Against her will he used her body to shield him from any retaliation by the officers. The officers returned his fire and as a result the girl was killed. The appellant was charged with her murder. The trial judge left both murder and manslaughter to the jury. The appellant was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter.
Held: For the judge to direct the jury as to the relevant principles relating to causation and then leave it to the jury to decide whether or not, in the light of those principles, the relevant causal link had been established. In the rare case in which it was necessary to direct the jury’s minds to the question of causation, it was usually enough to direct them simply that in law the accused’s act need not be the sole cause, or even the main cause, of the victim’s death, it being enough that the act contributed significantly to that result.
Robert Goff LJ said: ‘In cases of homicide, it is rarely necessary to give the jury any direction on causation as such. Of course, a necessary ingredient of the crimes of murder and manslaughter is that the accused has by his act caused the victim’s death. But how the victim came by his death is usually not in dispute . . Even where it is necessary to direct the jury’s minds to the question of causation, it is usually enough to direct them simply that in law the accused’s act need not be the sole cause, or even the main cause, of the victim’s death, it being enough that his act contributed significantly to that result . . Occasionally, however, a specific issue of causation may arise. One such case is where, although an act of the accused constitutes a causa sine qua non of (or necessary condition for) the death of the victim, nevertheless the intervention of a third person may be regarded as the sole cause of the victim’s death, thereby relieving the accused of criminal responsibility. Such intervention, if it has such an effect, has often been described by lawyers as a novus actus interveniens . We are aware that this time-honoured Latin term has been the subject of criticism. We are also aware that attempts have been made to translate it into English; though no simple translation has proved satisfactory, really because the Latin term has become a term of art which conveys to lawyers the crucial feature that there has not merely been an intervening act of another person, but that that act was so independent of the act of the accused that it should be regarded in law as the cause of the victim’s death, to the exclusion of the act of the accused. At the risk of scholarly criticism, we shall for the purposes of this judgment continue to use the Latin term . . in cases where there is an issue whether the act of the victim or of a third party constituted a novus actus interveniens, breaking the causal connection between the act of the accused and the death of the victim, it would be appropriate for the judge to direct the jury, of course in the most simple terms, in accordance with the legal principles which they have to apply.’

Robert Goff LJ, Cantley, Farquharson JJ
[1983] EWCA Crim 1, (1983) 76 Cr App R 279, [1983] Crim LR 394
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Gnango, Regina v SC 14-Dec-2011
The prosecutor appealed against a successful appeal by the defendant against his conviction for murder. He and an opponent had engaged in a street battle using guns. His opponent had shot an innocent passer by. The court was now asked as to whether . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.247946

The defendant, a taxi driver, had without objection on the part of an Italian student asked for a fare of andpound;6 for a journey for which the correct lawful fare was 10s 6d. The taxi driver was convicted of theft. On appeal the main contention was that the student had consented to pay the fare. But it was clear that the appellant had not told the student what the lawful fare was.
Held: Section 1(1) of the 1968 Act is not to be read as if it contained such words as ‘without having the consent of the owner’. A theft is complete upon proof of the statutory elements: (i) a dishonest (ii) appropriation (iii) of property belonging to another (iv) with the intention of permanently depriving the owner of it. ‘That there was appropriation in this case is clear. Section 3(1) states that any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation. Here there was clearly such an assumption. That an appropriation was dishonest may be proved in a number of ways. In this case it was not contended that the appellant had not acted dishonestly.’ Where consent is in issue, it is relevant, not to appropriation, but to dishonesty. Consent in the context of the law of theft means true consent with full knowledge of the relevant facts. belief that the passenger gave informed consent (i.e. knowing that he was paying in excess of the fare) ‘is relevant to the issue of dishonesty, not to the question whether or not there has been an appropriation.’ Sections 1(1) and 15(1) of the Act are not mutually exclusive. If the facts proved justify a conviction under section 15(1), there can lawfully be a conviction under section 1(1) on the same facts.

Viscount Dilhorne
[1972] AC 626, [1971] 3 WLR 225, [1971] 2 All ER 1253, [1971] UKHL 2
Bailii
Theft Act 1968 1
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Regina v Lawrence (Alan) CACD 1970
The offence created by section 1(1) of the 1968 Act involved four elements: ‘(i) a dishonest (ii) appropriation (iii) of property belonging to another (iv) with the intention of permanently depriving the owner of it.’ . .

Cited by:
Approved – Director of Public Prosecutions v Gomez HL 3-Dec-1992
The defendant worked as a shop assistant. He had persuaded the manager to accept in payment for goods, two cheques which he knew to be stolen. The CA had decided that since the ownership of the goods was transferred on the sale, no appropriation of . .
Considered – Regina v Morris (David) CACD 1983
Two defendants worked together to alter the labels on joints of meat in a supermarket, and to present the one with the now reduced price at the till. The appealed convictions for theft saying that since the purchase transferred the property in the . .
Applied – Regina v Morris (David); Anderton v Burnside HL 2-Jan-1983
The defendants had been accused of theft. One switched labels on a joint of pork in a supermarket, and the other presented the meat with the now cheaper label for purchase.
Held: The appeals were dismissed. There can be no conviction for theft . .
Cited – Regina v Shuck CACD 1992
The defendant was a company officer. He gave instructions to an innocent third party which resulted in the dishonest diversion of substantial sums of the company’s money. He appealed the judge’s interpretation of the word ‘appropriation.’
Cited – Wheatley and Another v The Commissioner of Police of the British Virgin Islands PC 4-May-2006
(The British Virgin Islands) The defendants appealed against convictions for theft and misconduct. Being civil servants they had entered in to contract with companies in which they had interests. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.189995

The defendant appealed against his conviction for a dishonest attempt to avoid payment. He had made regular trips on the London underground, and had purchased two weekly season tickets, one for each end of his journey, but not in respect of the middle part. He now argued that the judge had incorrectly interpreted sub-paragraph (c). He said that subsection (c) dealt with a potential liability, or alternatively, a liability created at the time of the fraud, and does not extend to the type of situation of the case.
Held: The appeal failed: ‘the traveller on the underground is saying, albeit tacitly by waving the season tickets in the air, ‘I am the holder of a ticket which authorises me to be making this journey without further payment. Consequently I am not under any liability to pay any more.’ In the ordinary meaning of the words it seems to us that that is dishonestly obtaining, or attempting to obtain, an exemption from the liability to pay the excess fare which, if he had been honest, he would have had to pay. As we say, the fact that it may also have been an attempt to commit an offence under subsection (b) is neither here nor there. Consequently, upon those grounds, in our judgment, the learned Judge was right not to stop the case, as Mr. Blair-Gould submitted he should have, at the end of the prosecution case, and also in his direction to the jury which it is not necessary for us to read.’

Lord Lane LCJ, McCowan, Nolan JJ
[1983] EWCA Crim 3, [1983] Crim LR 470
Bailii
Theft Act 1978 2(1)(c)
England and Wales

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.247948

Obstruction of Highway – Highway not clear

The apellant protesters had been convicted of obstructing the highway by affixing themselves to a fence by a roadway by the Atomic Weapons Establishment. They argued that the road was not a highway and that any obstruction was de minimis. In particular, a green line presumed to indicate the boundary of the road way had been found by the judge to have possibly been misplaced without satisfactory evidence.
Held: ‘I have reached the conclusion that the finding of fact made by District Judge Khan at paragraph 19 e. of the Case Stated cannot be reconciled with a finding that he was sure that the Appellants laid down upon the highway . . there was simply no evidence before the District Judge which would begin to justify the conclusion that an area of the road to the west of the green line, which had been part of the private road until the green line had been painted on the road, ceased to be part of the private road and became part of the highway. There was no evidence before him that this area of road had all the characteristics of a highway and certainly no evidence to establish that an additional area of the road had been dedicated as such.’

Burnett LJ, Sir Wyn Williams
[2017] EWHC 1955 (QB)
Bailii
Highways Act 1980 32 137(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Kotegaonkar v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Another Admn 19-Jul-2012
The court was asked: ‘can a way which is not connected to another public highway, or to some other point to which the public have a right of access, itself be a public highway?’ A path had been registered over part of te claimant’s land, but with no . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.591415

Novus actus interveniens

The defendant had shot a person during the course of an argument. The victim underwent surgery in hospital where a tracheotomy tube was inserted into his windpipe. Some weeks later, his condition deteriorated and he died two months after the incident. The victim’s windpipe was found on post mortem examination to have become obstructed because of narrowing near the site of the tracheotomy scar. Evidence was given in the proceedings that there had been a failure on the part of the treating doctors to have diagnosed and appropriately treated the victim’s deteriorating condition. The defendant was found guilty of murder and appealed.
Held: The court considered the doctrine of novus actus interveniens – whether or not there was the necessary causal relationship between the shooting of the victim by the defendant and the victim’s ultimate death so as to found a conviction for murder.
Beldam LJ said: ‘In the criminal law, and in particular in the law of homicide, whether the death of a deceased was the result of the accused’s criminal act is a question of fact for the jury, but it is a question of fact to be decided in accordance with legal principles explained to the jury by the judge.’
. . And: ‘Where the law requires proof of the relationship between an act and its consequences as an element of responsibility, a simple and sufficient explanation of the basis of such relationship has proved notoriously elusive.
In a case in which the jury have to consider whether negligence in the treatment of injuries inflicted by the accused was the cause of death we think it is sufficient for the judge to tell the jury that they must be satisfied that the Crown have proved that the acts of the accused caused the death of the deceased, adding that the accused’s acts need not be the sole cause or even the main cause of death, it being sufficient that his acts contributed significantly to that result. Even though negligence in the treatment of the victim was the immediate cause of his death, the jury should not regard it as excluding the responsibility of the accused unless the negligent treatment was so independent of his acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that they regard the contribution made by his acts as insignificant.
It is not the function of the jury to evaluate competing causes or to choose which is dominant provided they are satisfied that the accused’s acts can fairly be said to have made a significant contribution to the victim’s death. We think the word ‘significant’ conveys the necessary substance of a contribution made to the death which is more than negligible. (

Beldam LJ
(1991) 93 Cr App R 251, [1991] 1 WLR 844, [1991] 3 All ER 670
England and Wales

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.541407

[2003] NICC 18
Bailii
England and Wales

Crime

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.245249

The appellants challenged their convictions for theft, saying that as partners in a firm they could not be convicted of theft of partnership property.
Held: The appeals were allowed for the unsatisfactory and unsafe nature of the convictions on the particular evidence. However, the 1861 Act having not been repealed, and that: ‘the object of the Theft Act was to get rid of the subtleties and, indeed, in many cases the absurd anomalies of the pre-existing law. The view of this Court is that in relation to partnership property the provisions in the Theft Act have the following result: provided there is the basic ingredients of dishonesty, provided there be no question of there being a claim of right made in good faith, provided there be an intent permanently to deprive, one partner can commit theft of partnership property just as much as one person can commit the theft of the property of another to whom he is a complete stranger.’

Edmund Davis, Karminski LJJ, Jawton J
[1970] EWCA Crim 1, [1970] 1 WLR 838, [1970] 2 All ER 97, 54 Cr App Rep 257, 134 JP 429
Bailii
Theft Act 1968 1, Larceny Act 1861
Citing:
Cited – Morgan v Marquis 2-Nov-1853
The defendants had possession of some flour for sale under instructions from Perrin. The jury found that the sale was to be for the account of Perrin and one Shute and not Perrin alone, and that Perrin and Shute were joint tenants. Perrin committed . .
Cited – Farrer v Beswick 1836
Baron Parke said: ‘I have always understood, until the doubt was raised in Barton v. Williams, that one joint-tenant or tenant in common of a chattel could not be guilty of a conversion by a sale of that chattel, unless it were sold in such a manner . .
Cited – Regina v Jesse Smith 1871
Chief Justice Bovill said, referring to the 1861 Act: ‘At the time that Act (24 and 25 Vict. c. 96) was passed theft by a partner of the goods of the firm did not fall within the criminal law, either common or statute. This defect was supplied by 31 . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.249922

The defendant appealed from his conviction for manslaughter. He had been found to have prepared heroin by loading it into a syringe and passing it to a friend.
Held: Even if ‘the appellant had not himself wielded the syringe, he would have committed an offence under s.23 if he had caused the administration of the heroin even though he did not himself physically administer it.’ ‘Effectively, the only matter in issue was whether it was open to the judge to leave to the jury the possibility that there was a version of events that caused Mr Finlay to be guilty of an offence under Section 23 of the 1861 Act even though he had not himself held the syringe.’ and ‘The test is one of causation. In this case, could it be said that the act of the deceased in taking up the syringe and using it on herself, which are to be assumed to be the facts, prevented Mr Finlay’s previous acts being causative of the injection. ‘ Defence counsel sought to ‘make the existence of what used to be called a novus actus interveniens, and can now more simply be regarded as an act of another person, as something that as a matter of law [emphasis added] breaks the chain of causation. It was that view or assumption that was rejected by the House of Lords in the Empress Car case. Intervening acts are only a factor to be taken into account by the jury in looking at all the circumstances.’

Buxton LJ
[2003] EWCA Crim 3868
Offences Against the Persons Act 1861 823
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Empress Car Company (Abertillery) Ltd v National Rivers Authority HL 22-Jan-1998
A diesel tank was in a yard which drained into a river. It was surrounded by a bund to contain spillage, but that protection was over ridden by an extension pipe from the tank to a drum outside the bund. Someone opened a tap on that pipe so that . .

Cited by:
Cited – Kennedy v Regina CACD 17-Mar-2005
The court considered when it was appropriate to find someone guilty of manslaughter where that person has been involved in the supply of a Class A controlled drug, which is then self administered by the person to whom it is supplied, and the . .
Cited – Regina v Kennedy HL 17-Oct-2007
The defendant had been convicted of manslaughter. He had supplied a class A drug to a friend who then died taking it. The House was asked ‘When is it appropriate to find someone guilty of manslaughter where that person has been involved in the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.225877

The defendant appealed against his conviction for taking a motor vehicle without authority.
Held: Bridge LJ said: ‘where as here, a conveyance is taken and moved in a way which necessarily involves its use as a conveyance, the taker cannot be heard to say that the taking was not for that use. If he has in fact taken the conveyance and used it as such, his motive in so doing is, Mr. Mathieson submits, quite immaterial. It follows, in our judgment, that the trial judge was right, not only to reject the submission of no case, but also to direct the jury as he did, that on the undisputed facts the appellant had taken the Land Rover for his own use. Accordingly the appeal will be dismissed.’

Lord Bridge MR, Wien, Kenneth Jones JJ
[1976] EWCA Crim 1, (1977) 64 Cr App R 54, [1977] RTR 6
Bailii
Theft Act 1968 12
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Bogacki CACD 1973
The three defendants had been charged with attempting to take a motor bus without authority. They had gone to a bus garage late at night and attempted to start the engine of a bus without success. The trial judge directed the jury as follows, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.249937

The defendant was accused of the rape of his wife and assault. At the time they were separated by virtue of a court order recently obtained by her. He replied that the offence alleged was not known to law because of the marriage.
Held: The separation order amounted to a withdrawal by the wife of the consent implied by the marriage. He could be guilty of the rape alleged.

[1949] 2 All ER 448, 33 Cr App Rep 216
England and Wales
Cited by:
Followed – Regina v Miller Assz 1954
A husband was charged with rape of his wife after she had left him and petitioned for divorce. He was also charged with an assault.
Held: There was no evidence which entitled the court to say that the wife’s implied consent to marital . .
Cited – Regina v R HL 23-Oct-1991
H has no right to sexual intercourse with W – rape
The defendant appealed against his conviction for having raped his wife, saying that intercourse with his wife was necessarily lawful, and therefore outside the statutory definition of rape. Due to the matrimonial difficulties, the wife had left . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.194940

The defendants appealed againts their convictions for rape and against sentence. The victims was the second defendant’s wide.
Held: Applying Morgan, the first defendant’s belief that the victim was consenting was an answer to the charge. His belief was real if unreasonable. However the acquittal of the first defendant based upon a mistaken belief did not mean that no rape had taken place, and accordingly the second defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting such stood: ‘Her ravishment had come about because L had wanted it to happen and had taken action to see that it did by persuading Cogan to use his body as the instrument for the necessary physical act. In the language of the law the act of sexual intercourse without the wife’s consent was the actus reus: it had been procured by L who had the appropriate mens rea, namely his intention that Cogan should have sexual intercourse with her without her consent. In our judgment it is irrelevant that the man whom L had procured to do the physical act himself did not intend to have sexual intercourse with the wife without her consent. L was using him as a means to procure a criminal purpose.’

Lawton LJ, James LJ, Bristow J
[1975] EWCA Crim 2, [1975] 3 WLR 316,, [1975] 2 All ER 1059, (1975) 61 Cr App Rep 217, (1975) 139 JP 608, [1976] QB 217
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Quick CACD 18-Apr-1973
The defendant appealed against his conviction for assault. He had pleaded guilty after a ruling by the judge as to the meaning of the phrase ‘a defect of reason, from disease of the mind’ within the meaning of the M’Naughten Rules. More particularly . .
Cited – Regina v Morgan HL 30-Apr-1975
The defendants appealed against their convictions for rape, denying mens rea and asserting a belief (even if mistaken) that the victim had consented.
Held: For a defence of mistake to succeed, the mistake must have been honestly made and need . .
Cited – Walters v Lunt and another 1951
The respondents had been charged under section 33(1) of the 1916 Act with receiving from a child aged seven years, certain articles knowing them to have been stolen.
Held: A child under eight years was deemed in law to be incapable of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.249932

The defendant had pleaded guilty, after a legal ruling, to a count of administering poison contrary to section 23 of the 1861 Act and a count of manslaughter. The court had found that the defendant physically assisted the deceased by holding his belt round the deceased’s arm as a tourniquet, so as to raise a vein in which the deceased could insert a syringe, while the deceased injected himself. It was argued in support of his appeal to the Court of Appeal that the defendant had committed no unlawful act for purposes of either count. The court was asked: ‘has a defendant, who applies and holds a tourniquet on the arm of a drug abuser, while he injects himself with heroin, any defence to a charge under section 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 or to manslaughter if death results?’
Held: The appeal failed. Rose LJ said: ‘assessment of the appellant’s conduct as being that of a principal or secondary party cannot properly be made by having regard merely to the application of the tourniquet in isolation. It is artificial and unreal to separate the tourniquet from the injection. The purpose and effect of the tourniquet, plainly, was to raise a vein in which the deceased could insert the syringe. Accordingly, by applying and holding the tourniquet, the appellant was playing a part in the mechanics of the injection which caused death. It is therefore, as it seems to us, immaterial whether the deceased was committing a criminal offence.’

Rose LJ, VP CACD, Gross, Pitchers JJ
[2003] EWCA Crim 945, [2003] 2 Cr App R 10, [2003] 1 WLR 1374, [2003] All ER (D) 217
Bailii
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 23
England and Wales

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.245921

The defendant stabbed a pregnant woman. The child was born prematurely and died. The attack had been directed at the mother, and the proper offence was manslaughter.
Held: The only questions which need to be addressed are (1) whether the act was done intentionally, (2) whether it was unlawful, (3) whether it was also dangerous because it was likely to cause harm to somebody and (4) whether that unlawful and dangerous act caused the death. Lord Hope: ‘an embryo is in reality a separate organism from the mother from the moment of its conception.’
A foetus is ‘neither a distinct person separate from its mother, nor merely an adjunct of the mother, but was a unique organism to which existing principles could not necessarily be applied’

Gazette 24-Sep-1997, [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 911, [1997] UKHL 31, [1998] AC 245, [1997] 3 All ER 936, [1997] 3 WLR 421, [1997] Crim LR 829, Times 25-Jul-1997
House of Lords, Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) CACD 29-Nov-1995
The defendant was convicted of murder. He stabbed a pregnant woman, causing the premature birth and then death of her child.
Held: Murder is a possible charge for a wound inflicted on an infant en ventre sa mere, but dying after a live birth. . .
Cited – Regina v Cunningham HL 8-Jul-1981
A defendant may be convicted of murder if it is established either (1) that he had an intent to kill or (2) that he had an intent to cause really serious bodily injury.
Intention is a state of mind which can never be proved as a fact. It can . .
Cited – Regina v Mitchell 1983
An unlawful and dangerous acted directed at one person but injuring somebody else can found a charge of manslaughter. . .
Cited – Regina v Pembliton CCCR 1874
The defendant was fighting in the street. He picked up a large stone and threw it at the people he had been fighting with. He missed and broke a window causing damage of a value exceeding pounds 5. The jury convicted the defendant, although finding . .
Cited – Regina v Latimer 1886
Two men quarrelled in a public house. One struck at the other with his belt. The glancing blow bounced off and struck the prosecutrix, wounding her severely. He was prosecuted for having unlawfully and maliciously wounded her, contrary to section 20 . .
Cited – Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions HL 21-Mar-1974
It is sufficient to raise a prima facie case of murder (subject to entire or partial excuses such as self-defence or provocation) for it to be proved that the defendant did the act which caused the death intending to kill the victim or to cause him . .
Cited – Regina v Vickers CCA 1957
The appellant, having broken into a dwelling-house to commit burglary, came upon the occupier whom he struck in a way which according to the medical evidence could have been inflicted with a moderate degree of violence. The victim died as a result. . .
Cited – Regina v Church CCA 1965
The defendant was convicted of manslaughter. After he had been unable to satisfy his female victim sexually, he had become angry and had seriously assaulted her. He mistakenly thought she was dead and tipped her in the river where she drowned.
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Kennedy CACD 31-Jul-1998
The defendant was convicted of manslaughter having handed a loaded a syringe with heroin and handed it to a friend who injected himself, and later died.
Held: The defendant had gone beyond the minimum necessary for criminal liability. All it . .
Cited – Regina v Woollin HL 2-Apr-1998
The defendant appealed against his conviction for the murder of his child. He had thrown the child to the floor, hitting the head. He said that he had not intended to kill the child.
Held: On a murder charge, where the short direction on . .
Cited – Regina (Smeaton) v Secretary of State for Health and Others Admn 18-Apr-2002
The claimant challenged the Order as regards the prescription of the morning-after pill, asserting that the pill would cause miscarriages, and that therefore the use would be an offence under the 1861 Act.
Held: ‘SPUC’s case is that any . .
Cited – Regina v Coutts HL 19-Jul-2006
The defendant was convicted of murder. Evidence during the trial suggested a possibility of manslaughter, but neither the defence nor prosecution proposed the alternate verdict. The defendant now appealed saying that the judge had an independent . .
Cited – Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland : Abortion) SC 7-Jun-2018
The Commission challenged the compatibility of the NI law relating to banning nearly all abortions with Human Rights Law. It now challenged a decision that it did not have standing to bring the case.
Held: (Lady Hale, Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson . .
Cited – Crowter and Others, Regina (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Health And Social Care Admn 23-Sep-2021
Foetus has no Established Human Rights
The Claimants sought a declaration that section 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 1967, as amended, is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), as well as some other remedies. The claimant had Down’s Syndrome, and complained the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.78009

The defendant was fighting in the street. He picked up a large stone and threw it at the people he had been fighting with. He missed and broke a window causing damage of a value exceeding pounds 5. The jury convicted the defendant, although finding that he had not intended to break the window.
Held: The conviction should be quashed. The words ‘unlawfully and maliciously’ were very widely used in the 1861 Act and the issue on appeal was whether the defendant had acted ‘maliciously’. The court interpreted ‘maliciously’ as requiring proof of intention, but were inclined to accept that intention could be shown by proof of reckless disregard of a perceived risk.
Blackburn J said: ‘The jury might perhaps have found on this evidence that the act was malicious, because they might have found that the prisoner knew that the natural consequence of his act would be to break the glass, and although that was not his wish, yet that he was reckless whether he did it or not; but the jury have not so found, and I think it is impossible to say in this case that the prisoner has maliciously done an act which he did not intend to do.’
Lord Coleridge CJ said: ‘it seems to me that what is intended by the statute is a wilful doing of an intentional act. Without saying that if the case had been left to them in a different way the conviction could not have been supported, if, on these facts, the jury had come to a conclusion that the prisoner was reckless of the consequence of his act, and might reasonably have expected that it would result in breaking the window, it is sufficient to say that the jury have expressly found the contrary.’

Lord Coleridge CJ, Blackburn J, Pigott B, Lush J and Cleasby B
(1874) LR 2 CCR 119, [1874-80] All ER 1163
Malicious Damage Act 1861 51
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v G and R HL 16-Oct-2003
The defendants, young boys, had set fire to paper and thrown the lit papers into a wheelie bin, expecting the fire to go out. In fact substantial damage was caused. The House was asked whether a conviction was proper under the section where the . .
Cited – Regina v Faulkner 1877
(Irish Court of Crown Cases Reserved) The defendant had set fire to a ship while stealing rum from its hold. He had been boring a hole by candlelight and some rum had spilled out and been ignited. It was conceded that he had not intended to burn the . .
Cited – Regina v Cunningham CCA 1957
Specific Intention as to Damage Caused
(Court of Criminal Appeal) The defendant wrenched a gas meter from the wall to steal it. Gas escaped. He was charged with unlawfully and maliciously causing a noxious thing, namely coal gas, to be taken by the victim.
Held: Byrne J said: ‘We . .
Distinguished – Regina v Latimer 1886
Two men quarrelled in a public house. One struck at the other with his belt. The glancing blow bounced off and struck the prosecutrix, wounding her severely. He was prosecuted for having unlawfully and maliciously wounded her, contrary to section 20 . .
Cited – Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) HL 24-Jul-1997
The defendant stabbed a pregnant woman. The child was born prematurely and died. The attack had been directed at the mother, and the proper offence was manslaughter.
Held: The only questions which need to be addressed are (1) whether the act . .
Applied – Regina v Welch 1875
The defendant faced charges of unlawfully and maliciously killing, maiming and wounding a mare under the Act.
Held: The trial judge was right to direct the jury to convict if they found that the defendant in fact intended to kill, maim or . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.186778

[2006] ScotHC HCJAC – 64
Bailii
Scotland

Crime

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.245489

The defendants sought leave to appeal against their convictions for a brutal and horrific murder. Becerra suggeste dtat he had wanted to withdraw from the event before the murder took place.
Held: The appeal failed: ‘ in the circumstances then prevailing, the knife having already been used and being contemplated for further use when it was handed over by Becerra to Cooper for the purpose (if necessary) of avoiding by violent means the hazards of identification, if Becerra wanted to withdraw at that stage, he would have to ‘countermand’, to use the word that is used in some of the cases or ‘repent’ to use another word so used, in some manner vastly different and vastly more effective than merely to say ‘Come on, let’s go’ and go out through the window.’

Roskill, Bridge LJJm Kilner Brown J
(1975) 62 Cr App R 212, [1975] EWCA Crim 6
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Regina v Whitehouse 1941
(British Columbia) The court asked when a party to a joint enterprise may claim to have abandoned or withdrawn from that enterprise ‘Can it be said on the facts of this case that a mere change of mental intention and a quitting of the scene of the . .
Cited – Rex v Saunders and Archer 1573
Misdirected Poison remained Offence
A intended to kill his wife, and gave her a poisoned apple. She gave it her child who ate the apple and died. The defendant had not intended his daughter to eat the apple.
Held: A was guilty of the murder of his daughter, but his wife, who was . .
Cited – Rex v Edmeads And Others 4-Mar-1828
Common Intent Required for Joint Enterprise
(Berkshire Assizes) An indictment charged Edmeads and others with unlawfully shooting at game keepers.
Held: The learned Baron ruled on the question of common intent, ‘that is rather a question for the Jury; but still, on this evidence, it is . .
Cited – Rex v Croft CCA 1944
A person who was present at the suicide of another and who assisted or encouraged the suicide, is guilty of murder as a principal in the second degree. The survivor of a suicide pact was properly convicted of murder. The court considered liability . .

Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Derek William Bentley (Deceased) CACD 30-Jul-1998
The defendant had been convicted of murder in 1952, and hung. A court hearing an appeal after many years must apply laws from different eras to different aspects. The law of the offence (of murder) to be applied was that at the time of the offence. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.192083

The defendant was accused of manslaughter in a road traffic case.
Held: The House sought a simple definition of manslaughter which would be applicable for road traffic cases. Lord Atkin said: ‘My Lords, of all crimes manslaughter appears to afford most difficulties of definition, for it concerns homicide in so many and so varying conditions. From the early days when any homicide involved penalty the law has gradually evolved ‘through successive differentiations and integrations’ until it recognises murder on the one hand, based mainly, though not exclusively, on an intention to kill, and manslaughter on the other hand, based mainly, though not exclusively, on the absence of intention to kill but with the presence of an element of ‘unlawfulness’ which is the elusive factor.’ and ‘The principle to be observed is that cases of manslaughter in driving motor cars are but instances of a general rule applicable to all charges of homicide by negligence. Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough: for purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence: and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established. Probably of all the epithets that can be applied ‘reckless’ most nearly covers the case. It is difficult to visualise a case of death caused by reckless driving in the connotation of that term in ordinary speech which would not justify a conviction for manslaughter: but it is probably not all-embracing, for ‘reckless’ suggests an indifference to risk whereas the accused may have appreciated the risk and intended to avoid it and yet shown such a high degree of negligence in the means adopted to avoid the risk as would justify a conviction. If the principle of Bateman’s case is observed it will appear that the law of manslaughter has not changed by the introduction of motor vehicles on the road. Death caused by their negligent driving, though unhappily much more frequent, is to be treated in law as death caused by any other form of negligence: and juries should be directed accordingly.’

Lord Atkin
[1937] AC 576, [1937] UKHL 1
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Explained – Rex v Bateman CCA 1925
A doctor was convicted of manslaughter arising out of his treatment of a woman in childbirth. Lord Hewart CJ discussed the law governing manslaughter by negligence, which required, as the element distinguishing criminal from civil liability, proof . .

Cited by:
Approved – Regina v Shulman, Regina v Prentice, Regina v Adomako; Regina v Holloway HL 1-Jul-1994
An anaesthetist failed to observe an operation properly, and did not notice that a tube had become disconnected from a ventilator. The patient suffered a cardiac arrest and died, and the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, being guilty of gross . .
Cited – Regina on the Application of Rowley v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 4-Apr-2003
The applicant sought to challenge a decision not to prosecute a third party following the death of her son. He had been in care, having multiple disabilities, including epilepsy. He drowned whilst in a bath. It had been recognised that he needed . .
Cited – Brown v The Queen (Jamaica) PC 13-Apr-2005
A police officer appealed against his conviction for manslaughter after being involved in a road traffic accident. Two were killed. The policemen complained as to the direction given on gross negligence manslaughter.
Held: Adomako could not . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.180633

r_martin CCCCR

The defendant was accused of unlawful conduct in causing panic at a theatre (by turning off the lights and barring the doors) in the course of which a number of people were injured by trampling as they stampeded down a stairway. His conduct was intended as a prank, but any sane person would have realised that it was dangerous.
Held: He was guilty of the offence under section 20 of the 1861 Act: ‘inflicting grievous bodily harm does not require any physical contact between the accused and the victim’ The prisoner had acted: ‘unlawfully and maliciously’ . . in the sense of doing and unlawful act calculated to injure and by which others were injured.’
Lord Coleridge CJ said: ‘The prisoner must be taken to have intended the natural consequences of that which he did. He acted ‘unlawfully and maliciously’, not that he had any personal malice against the particular individuals injured, but in the sense of doing an unlawful act calculated to injure . . ‘
Stephen J said: ‘if the prisoner did that which he did as a mere piece of foolish mischief unlawfully and without excuse, he did it ‘wilfully’, that is, ‘maliciously’, within the meaning of the statute.’

Lord Coleridge CJ, Stephen J
(1881) 8 QBD 54
Offences against the Person Act 1861 20
Cited by:
Cited – Haystead v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 2-Jun-2000
The defendant had hit a mother in the face as she held the child. The force was sufficient to cause her to drop the child causing injury to the child. He appealed against a conviction for beating the child.
Held: The appeal failed. A battery . .
Cited – Rhodes v OPO and Another SC 20-May-2015
The mother sought to prevent a father from publishing a book about her child’s life. It was to contain passages she said may cause psychological harm to the 12 year old son. Mother and son lived in the USA and the family court here had no . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.544326

The House was asked whether the conduct of the defendant at a tennis match at Wimbledon amounted to using ‘insulting words or behaviour’ whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned contrary to section 5. He went onto court 2, blew a whistle and threw about leaflets. He was protesting about South Africa. He argued that he had had no intention to insult anybody present.
Held: The appeal was allowed, and the prosecution quashed. The House refused to accept that the words needed legal interpretation before being applied by the jury to the particular case.
Lord Reid said: ‘The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. If the context shows that a word is used in an unusual sense the court will determine in other words what that unusual sense is. But here there is in my opinion no question of the word ‘insulting’ being used in any unusual sense. It appears to me, for reasons which I shall give later, to be intended to have its ordinary meaning. It is for the tribunal which decides the case to consider, not as law but as fact, whether in the whole circumstances the words of the statute do or do not as a matter of ordinary usage of the English language cover or apply to the facts which have been proved. If it is alleged that the tribunal has reached a wrong decision then there can be a question of law but only of a limited character. The question would normally be whether their decision was unreasonable in the sense that no tribunal acquainted with the ordinary use of language could reasonably reach that decision.
Were it otherwise we should reach an impossible position. When considering the meaning of a word one often goes to a dictionary. There one finds other words set out. And if one wants to pursue the matter and find the meaning of those other words the dictionary will give the meaning of those other words in still further words which often include the word for whose meaning one is searching.
No doubt the court could act as a dictionary. It could direct the tribunal to take some word or phrase other than the word in the statute and consider whether that word or phrase applied to or covered the facts proved. But we have been warned time and again not to substitute other words for the words of a statute. And there is very good reason for that. Few words have exact synonyms. The overtones are almost always different.’
and
‘Parliament had to solve the difficult question of how far freedom of speech or behaviour must be limited in the general public interest. It would have been going much too far to prohibit all speech or conduct likely to occasion a breach of the peace because determined opponents might not shrink from organising or at least threatening a breach of the peace in order to silence a speaker whose views they detest. Therefore vigorous and it may be distasteful or unmannerly speech or behaviour is permitted so long as it does not go beyond any one of three limits. It must not be threatening. It must not be abusive. It must not be insulting. I see no reason why any of these should be construed as having a specially wide or a specially narrow meaning. They are all limits easily recognisable by the ordinary man. Free speech is not impaired by ruling them out. But before a man can be convicted it must be clearly shown that one or more of them has been disregarded.
We were referred to a number of dictionary meanings of ‘insult’ such as treating with insolence or contempt or indignity or derision or dishonour or offensive disrespect. Many things otherwise unobjectionable may be said or done in an insulting way. There can be no definition. But an ordinary sensible man knows an insult when he sees or hears it. The Divisional Court had tried to lay down a definition of the words ‘insulting behaviour’ and then to say that the appellants behaviour came within the definition. But the Act contains no such definition, and indeed no words of definition are needed. The words of the section are clear and they convey of themselves a meaning which the ordinary citizen can well understand. The suggested definition would enlarge what Parliament has enacted and it would do this in relation to a criminal offence. The Act does not define the meaning to be given to the word ‘insulting’ and the cases cited in this House, the Divisional Court and before the magistrates do not say or suggest that it should be given any special meaning. Unless the context otherwise requires, words in a statute have to be given their ordinary natural meaning and there is in this Act nothing to indicate or suggest that the word ‘insulting’ should be given any other than its ordinary natural meaning. ‘
Lord Kilbrandon said: ”insulting’ is an ordinary uncomplicated English word. Boswell defends Dr. Johnson, to whose work we were referred, against a charge of obscurity in his definitions, by quoting from the preface to the dictionary: ‘To explain, requires the use of terms less abstruse than that which is to be explained, and such terms cannot always be found. . The easiest word, whatever it may be, can never be translated into one more easy.’ One felt the force of this upon being offered as exegetical substitutions for the word ‘ insult’ suchwords as ‘ insolence ‘ or ‘ affront’. All three words are as much, or as little, in need of interpretation.

Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Reid, Lord Morris
[1973] AC 854, [1972] UKHL 6, HL/PO/JU/4/3/1219
Bailii
Public Order Act 1936 5
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Bryan v Robinson 1960
Lord Parker CJ said: ‘Somebody may be annoyed by behaviour which is not insulting behaviour.’ . .
Cited – Cooper and Others v Shield 1971
. .
Cited – Jordan v Burgoyne 1963
The defendant, a racist addressed a crowd containing many persons of the Jewish faith and other people of sensible but strong views saying, in the most obnoxious way, that ‘Hitler was right’, and other crazed sentiments of that kind.
Held: . .

Cited by:
Cited – Jolie v Regina CACD 23-May-2003
The appellant had been convicted of having a pointed article with him in a public place. He said that the car he was driving had needed an instrument to operate the lock. At first he had used a knife, but then used scissors, losing the knife in the . .
Cited – Moyna v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions HL 31-Jul-2003
The appellant had applied for and been refused disability living allowance on the basis of being able to carry out certain cooking tasks.
Held: The purpose of the ‘cooking test’ is not to ascertain whether the applicant can survive, or enjoy a . .
Cited – Percy v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 21-Dec-2001
The defendant had been convicted of using words or behaviour likely to cause harassment alarm or distress, when she defaced the US flag, and stood on it before a US military officer. She said that the defacing of flags was a common form of protest, . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Hammond QBD 13-Jan-2004
A preacher repeatedly displayed posters such as ‘Stop Homosexuality’ and ‘Stop Lesbianism’. He had been convicted of displaying a sign which was threatening abusive or insulting within the sight of a person likely to be caused harrassment alarm on . .
Cited – Evans Dorothy, Regina v CACD 6-Dec-2004
The defendant appealed her conviction for having breached a restraining order under the 1997 Act. The order required her not to be ‘abusive by words or actions’ towards her neighbour. She had regularly parked her car so as to block her neighbour’s . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins Admn 23-Jun-2005
The defendant had, over a period of time, telephoned his MP’s office using racially abusive epithets. He was originally charged under the 1984 Act, but then under the 2003 Act. The magistrates found the remarks offensive, but not so grossly . .
Cited – Fogg and Ledgard v The Secretary of State for Defence, Short Admn 13-Dec-2005
The applicants sought judicial review of a decision of the respondent not to name the wreck of the merchant ship SS STORAA as a protected site under the 1986 Act. It had been a merchant ship forming part of a convoy, and was sunk by enemy action in . .
Cited – Fitzroy House Epworth Street (No. 1) Ltd and Another v Financial Times Ltd CA 31-Mar-2006
The defendant tenant sought to exercise a break clause in the lease. The landlord said that the notice was deficient because the tenant had failed ‘materially to comply with’ its repairing obligations. The judge found the cost of repairs were . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins HL 19-Jul-2006
The defendant had made a series of racist and abusive calls to the office of his local MP. The prosecutor appealed a refusal to convict under the 1984 (now the 2003) Act. The defendant had argued that the messages had been offensive, but not grossly . .
Cited – Majorstake Ltd v Curtis CA 8-Aug-2006
The tenant had given notice under section 42 requiring a new lease. The landlord said it wished to redevelop the apartment by combining it with a neighbouring one. The issue was as to what constituted ‘any premises in which [Flat 77] is contained’ . .
Cited – Connolly v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 15-Feb-2007
The defendant appealed against her conviction under the Act for having sent indecent or grossly offensive material through the post in the form of pictures of an aborted foetus sent to pharmacists. She denied that they were offensive, or that she . .
Cited – H, Regina v (Interlocutory application: Disclosure) HL 28-Feb-2007
The trial judge had refused an order requested at a preparatory hearing by the defence for the disclosure of documents held by the prosecutor. The House was now asked whether a right of appeal existed against such a refusal.
Held: The practice . .
Cited – Demirkaya v Secretary of State for Home Department CA 23-Jun-1999
Whether an asylum applicant had a well founded fear of persecution if he returned home, is always a question of fact and degree, and could not be made a question of law. Even so where there was a clear risk of repeated rather than single beatings if . .
Dicta Applied – Customs and Excise v McLean Homes (Midland) Ltd 1993
. .
Cited – HM Revenue and Customs v Lt Cmdr Colin Stone; The Kei ChD 5-Jun-2008
The taxpayer had imported a newly built Dutch Barge. The Revenue appealed a decision that VAT was not payable on that import. He had claimed exemption on the basis that it was a ship exceeding 15 tons and not designed or adapted for leisure use.
Approved – W v L CA 1974
For civil patients, it matters a great deal whether the classification of their condition is ‘severe subnormality’ or just ‘subnormality’ or whether it is ‘mental illness’ or ‘psychopathic disorder’. Lawton LJ discussed the construction of the . .
Cited – McFaddens (A Firm) v Platford TCC 30-Jan-2009
The claimant firm of solicitors had been found negligent, and now sought a contribution to the damages awarded from the barrister defendant. They had not managed properly issues as to their clients competence to handle the proceedings.
Held: . .
Cited – NW, Regina v CACD 3-Mar-2010
The appellant, a schoolgirl and her friend were involved in an incident with police officers which rapidly escalated. She said that only she had been involved, but that it was wrong when others quite outside her control became involved on seeing the . .
Cited – Hammond v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 13-Jan-2004
The defendant, who had since died, had been convicted of a public order offence in that standing in a street he had displayed a range of placards opposing homosexuality. He appealed saying that the finding was an unwarranted infringement of his . .
Cited – Abdul and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 16-Feb-2011
The defendants appealed against convictions for using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour . . within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress. He had attended a . .
Cited – Bauer and Others v The Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 22-Mar-2013
The appellants had entered Fortnum and Masons to demonstrate against tax avoidance. They appealed against convitions for aggravated trespass.
Held: The statutory question posed by s.68 is whether the prosecution can prove that the trespasser . .
Cited – Jones v First Tier Tribunal and Another SC 17-Apr-2013
The claimant had been injured when a lorry driver swerved to avoid hitting a man who stood in his path. He said that the deceased’s act of suicide amounted to an offence of violence under the 1861 Act so as to bring his own claim within the 2001 . .
Cited – Golds, Regina v SC 30-Nov-2016
The defendant appealed against his conviction for murder, saying that he should have been only convicted of manslaughter, applying the new test for diminished responsibility as provided under the 1957 Act as amended, and particularly whether the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.182750

Specific Intention as to Damage Caused

(Court of Criminal Appeal) The defendant wrenched a gas meter from the wall to steal it. Gas escaped. He was charged with unlawfully and maliciously causing a noxious thing, namely coal gas, to be taken by the victim.
Held: Byrne J said: ‘We have considered those cases R v Faulkner, and we have also considered, in the light of those cases, the following principle which was propounded by the late Professor C S Kenny in the first edition of his Outlines of Criminal Law published in 1902 and repeated at p.186 of the 16th edition edited by Mr. J. W. Cecil Turner and published in 1952: ‘In any statutory definition of a crime, malice must be taken not in the old vague sense of wickedness in general but as requiring either (1) An actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done; or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (ie, the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it). It is neither limited to nor does it indeed require any ill will towards ‘the person injured”. The same principle is repeated by Mr. Turner in his 10th edition of Russell on Crime at p. 1592.’

Byrne J
[1957] 2 QB 396
Offences against the Person Act 1861 23
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Pembliton CCCR 1874
The defendant was fighting in the street. He picked up a large stone and threw it at the people he had been fighting with. He missed and broke a window causing damage of a value exceeding pounds 5. The jury convicted the defendant, although finding . .
Cited – Regina v Faulkner 1877
(Irish Court of Crown Cases Reserved) The defendant had set fire to a ship while stealing rum from its hold. He had been boring a hole by candlelight and some rum had spilled out and been ignited. It was conceded that he had not intended to burn the . .

Cited by:
Approved – Regina v G and R HL 16-Oct-2003
The defendants, young boys, had set fire to paper and thrown the lit papers into a wheelie bin, expecting the fire to go out. In fact substantial damage was caused. The House was asked whether a conviction was proper under the section where the . .
Cited – Regina v Mowatt CACD 20-Jun-1967
The defendant was attacked by his victim, and he hit his victim in the face. He was charged with wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm with an alternative of unlawful wounding also open to the jury. The judge gave no direction on the . .
Cited – Regina v Stephenson CACD 1979
The defendant sought to sleep in a hollow in a haystack. He lit a fire, to keep warm, which set fire to the stack. He appealed against his conviction under the 1971 Act. He had a long history of schizophrenia and may not have had the same ability to . .
Cited – Atkinson v Regina CACD 7-Nov-2003
The appellant had been convicted of false accounting in the making of false claims for payment for prescriptions, submitting forms which said that the patient was over 60 when she knew they were not. She said she filled the forms in mechanically. . .
Cited – Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) CACD 7-Apr-2004
Police Officers had been acquitted of misconduct in public office. They had stood by in a police station custody suite as a prisoner lay on the floor and died.
Held: The trial took place before R -v- G which had overruled Caldwell. The . .
Approved – Regina v Savage; Director of Public Prosecutions v Parmenter HL 7-Nov-1991
The first defendant had been convicted of wounding. She had intended to throw beer over her victim, but her glass slipped from her hand, and cut the victim. The second defendant threw his three year old child in the air and caught him, not realising . .
Cited – Konzani, Regina v CACD 17-Mar-2005
The defendant appealed conviction for inflicting grievous bodily harm on three women, by having unprotected sexual intercourse knowing that he was HIV positive, but without telling the women. Each contracted HIV. The allegation was that he had . .
Cited – Hilda Amoo-Gottfried v Legal Aid Board (No 1 Regional Committee) CA 1-Dec-2000
The claimant appealed an order dismissing her claim for misfeasance in public office by the defendant, for the way in which they had mishandled her membership of duty solicitor rota schemes.
Held: The court discussed the requirements for . .
Cited – Hilda Amoo-Gottfried v Legal Aid Board (No 1 Regional Committee) CA 1-Dec-2000
The claimant appealed an order dismissing her claim for misfeasance in public office by the defendant, for the way in which they had mishandled her membership of duty solicitor rota schemes.
Held: The court discussed the requirements for . .
Cited – Haystead v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 2-Jun-2000
The defendant had hit a mother in the face as she held the child. The force was sufficient to cause her to drop the child causing injury to the child. He appealed against a conviction for beating the child.
Held: The appeal failed. A battery . .
Cited – Regina v Barnes CACD 21-Dec-2004
The defendant appealed against a conviction for inflicting grievous bodily harm, after causing a serious leg injury in a football match when tackling another player.
Held: There was surprisingly little authority on when it was appropriate to . .
Mentioned – Navigators Insurance Company Ltd and Others v Atlasnavios-Navegacao Lda SC 22-May-2018
The vessel had been taken by the authorities in Venezuela after drugs were found to have been attached to its hull by third parties. Six months later it was declared a constructive total loss. The ship owners now sought recovery of its value from . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.186783

The House was asked to consider whether there existed the crime of a conspiracy to commit a public mischief.
Held: There was no such crime, since it was so undefined as to be unfair to any defendant. Although at common law no clear distinction was originally drawn between conspiracies to ‘cheat’ and conspiracies to ‘defraud ‘, these terms being frequently used in combination, by the early years of the nineteenth century ‘conspiracy to defraud’ had become a distinct species of criminal agreement independent of the old common law substantive offence of ‘cheating’. The abolition of this substantive common law offence by section 31(l)(a) of the Theft Act, 1968, except as regards offences relating to the public revenue, thus leaves surviving and intact the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud.
Where the intended victim of a ‘conspiracy to defraud’ is a private individual the purpose of the conspirators must be to cause the victim economic loss by depriving him of some property or right, corporeal or incorporeal, to which he is or would or might become entitled. The intended means by which the purpose is to be achieved must be dishonest. They need not involve fraudulent misrepresentation such as is needed to constitute the civil tort of deceit. Dishonesty of any kind is enough.
Where the intended victim of a ‘conspiracy to defraud’ is a person performing public duties as distinct from a private individual it is sufficient if the purpose is to cause him to act contrary to his public duty, and the intended means of achieving this purpose are dishonest. The purpose need not involve causing economic loss to anyone.
Viscount Dilhorne said: ‘The preferment of charges alleging public mischief appears to have become far more frequent in recent years. Why this is, I do not know. It may be that it is due to a feeling that the conduct of the accused has been so heinous that it ought to be dealt with as criminal and that the best way of bringing it within the criminal sphere is to allege public mischief and trust that the courts will fill the gap, if gap there be, in the law. But if gap there be, it must be left to the legislature to fill.
I hope that in future such a vague expression as ‘public mischief’ will not be included in criminal charges. It introduces a wide measure of uncertainty and should not be a vehicle for the enlargement of the criminal law or a device to secure its extension to cover acts not previously thought to be criminal.’ Judges have no power to create new offences.’
Lord Simon of Glaisdale said: ‘To be punishable as conduct tending to pervert the course of justice, the conduct must be such as can be properly and seriously so described. ‘Pervert’ is a strong word (cf. ‘corrupt’ and ‘outrage’ as explained in Knuller (1973) AC 435).’

Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Reid, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Kilbrandon
[1975] AC 842
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd; Knuller etc v Director of Public Prosecutions HL 1972
The defendants were charged after pasting up in telephone booths advertisements for homosexual services. They published a magazine with similar advertisements. The House was asked to confirm the existence of an offence of outraging public decency. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Goldstein, Rimmington v Regina CACD 28-Nov-2003
Two defendants appealed in respect of alleged offences under common law of causing a public nuisance. One had sent race hatred material, and the other bomb hoaxes, through the post. Both claimed that the offence was so ill defined as to be an . .
Cited – Regina v Rimmington; Regina v Goldstein HL 21-Jul-2005
Common Law – Public Nuisance – Extent
The House considered the elements of the common law offence of public nuisance. One defendant faced accusations of having sent racially offensive materials to individuals. The second was accused of sending an envelope including salt to a friend as a . .
Cited – Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner; Regina v Scott HL 20-Nov-1974
The defendant had been accused of conspiracy to produce pirate copies of films obtained by purchasing copies from cinema owners without the knowledge or consent of the copyright owners.
Held: To establish a conspiracy to defraud, it was not . .
Cited – Regina v Cotter and Others CACD 10-May-2002
The defendants appealed against convictions for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. They said that the fact that an investigation followed a false allegation was insufficient to found a complaint, and that the extent of the crime was so . .
Cited – The Director of Public Prosecutions v SK Admn 10-Feb-2016
The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of a charge of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. The defendant had completed somebody else’s community service sentence. The prosecutor said that such an act did affect something ‘in the course of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.188881

The defendant saw disparaging statements made about him by neighbours in the course of divorce proceedings. He wrote to them and asked them to withdraw the statements they had made and threatened proceedings for slander. He was charged with attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Held: A threat or promise made to a witness with the intention of persuading him to alter or withhold his evidence was an attempt to pervert the course of justice, even if the threat or promise related to a lawful act or the exercise of a legal right. It was for the jury to decide whether the defendant’s letter constituted a threat to bring an action with the intention of causing his neighbours not to give evidence. The offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice would not necessarily be committed by a person who tried to persuade a false witness or even a witness believed to be false to speak the truth or to refrain from giving false evidence. However proper the end, the means must not be improper.
Stephenson LJ said: ‘Perversion of the course of justice is per se an offence against the public weal. An attempt (or incitement) to pervert (or defeat) the (due) course of justice is an offence against the common law and no less than a conspiracy to pervert it was a punishable misdemeanour: Reg. v. Grimes (Note) (1968) 3 All E.R. 179, 181, per Kilner Brown J, Reg. v. Vreones (1891) 1 Q.B. 360, 367; Rex v. Greenburg (1919) 63 S.J. 553; Reg. v. Andrews (1973) Q.B. 422, 425 and Reg. v Panayiotou (1973) 1 WLR 1032. Those cases show also that tampering with evidence, including a person to give false evidence or not to give evidence, for reward are instances of this common law offence, whether the evidence is to be given in criminal or in civil proceedings and whether the inducement is effective or, as in this case, not. But they were all concerned with the manufacture of false evidence or the withdrawal of a true complaint. They do not deal with the limits of the offence or indicate whether it can be committed where the evidence of the potential witness is false or may be false, or whether it can be committed where the means used are not bribery or reward but threats, or where the threats used are threats to exercise a legal right, or where the intention, or one of intentions of him who approaches the potential witness is to exercise such a right or to see that justice, is done to himself or another.
It would seem repugnant to justice and to common sense if in every one of these cases the ‘offender’ could be said to be attempting to pervert or defeat or obstruct the course or the ends of justice.’
and ‘There may be cases of interference with a witness in which it would be for the jury to decide whether what was done or said to the witness amounted to improper pressure, and so wrongfully interfered with the witness and attempted to pervert the course of justice, and it would be not only unnecessary and unhelpful but wrong for this court or the trial judge to usurp their function. The decision will depend on all the circumstances of the case, including not merely the method of interfering, but the time when it is done, the relationship between the person interfering and the witness and the nature of the proceedings in which the evidence is being given. Pressure which may be permissible at one stage of the particular proceedings may be improper at another. What may be proper for a friend or relation or a legal adviser may be oppressive and improper coming from a person in a position of influence or authority. But it is for the judge to direct the jury that some means of inducement are improper and if proved make the defendant guilty, and this was such a case. A jury should be directed that a threat (or promise) made to a witness is, like an assault on a witness, an attempt to pervert the course of justice, if made with the intention of persuading him to alter or withhold his evidence, whether or not what he threatens (or promises) is a lawful act, such as the exercise of a legal right, and whether or not he has any other intention or intends to do the act if the evidence is not altered or withheld.’

Stephenson LJ
[1976] 1 QB 372
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Re S 36 Criminal Justice Act 1972; Attorney General’s Reference No 1 of 2002 CACD 14-Oct-2002
The court was asked: ‘Whether the common-law offence of perverting the course of public justice is committed where false evidence is given or made, not to defeat what the witness believes to be the ends of justice, or not to procure what the witness . .
Cited – Regina v Cotter and Others CACD 10-May-2002
The defendants appealed against convictions for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. They said that the fact that an investigation followed a false allegation was insufficient to found a complaint, and that the extent of the crime was so . .
Cited – Versloot Dredging Bv v Hdi Gerling Industrie Versicherung Ag and Others ComC 8-Feb-2013
The defendants had engaged an expert witness, and he had undertaken investigations at the claimant’s premises. The claimant now sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from preventing the expert talking to them independently of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.244817

A person whose role is that of principal in the second degree in respect of a misdemeanour can not be convicted of the misdemeanour unless it is proved that the misdemeanour has been committed by the principal offender:

[1940] 1 All ER 339
England and Wales

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.539564

In order to reduce Killing of a person to the crime of manslaughter, there must not only be sufficient provocation, but the jury must be satisfied that the fatal blow was given in consequence of that provocation. If A. had formed a deliberate design to kill B, and, after this, they meet and have a quarrel, and many blows pass, and A kill B , this will be murder, if the jury are of opinion that the death was in consequence of previous malice, and not of the sudden provocation.
There is an external element to an assessment of the reasonableness of a man’s actions. Coleridge J said: ‘though the law condescends to human frailty, it will not indulge human ferocity. It considers man to be a rational being, and requires that he should exercise a reasonable control over his passions’. A man cannot pray in aid his own violent disposition to bolster a defence of provocation.

Coleridge J
[1837] 8 Car and P 115, [1839] EngR 273, (1839) 8 Car and P 115, (1839) 173 ER 422
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Her Majestys Attorney General for Jersey v Holley PC 15-Jun-2005
(Jersey) The defendant appealed his conviction for murder, claiming a misdirection on the law of provocation. A chronic alcoholic, he had admitted killing his girlfriend with an axe. Nine law lords convened to seek to reconcile conflicting decisions . .
Cited – Mohammed, Regina v CACD 13-Jul-2005
The court granted permission to appeal against a conviction for murder on grounds that related to the judge’s summing up in respect of provocation: ‘Although Holley is a decision of the Privy Council and Morgan Smith a decision of the House of . .
Approved – Rex v Lesbini 1914
The test of provocation in a murder allegation, is not whether the occurrence is sufficient to deprive the particular individual in question of his self-control, having regard to his nature and idiosyncrasies, but whether it would suffice to deprive . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.228009

The defendant had plea of guilty to two charges of inciting his daughter, aged 15, to commit incest with him. He appealed saying that it was possible that the offences of which he had been convicted were unknown to the law. The prosecution conceded that the common law offence of incitement consisted of inciting another to commit a crime and that a girl aged 15 was incapable of committing the crime of incest by statute. The prosecution argued that the indictment could be read to charge the defendant with inciting his daughter to aid and abet him to have unlawful sexual intercourse with her, contrary to another statutory provision.
Held: The appeal succeeded. As the daughter was incapable of committing the crime of incest, the defendant could not be guilty of the common law offence of incitement. Further, given the statutory context, the daughter could not in law have aided and abetted her father to commit incest with her. It followed that there was no offence known to the law of a man inciting a girl under the age of 16 to aid and abet him to have unlawful sexual intercourse with her.

Scarman, Geoffrey Lane LJJ, Donaldson J
[1977] EWCA Crim 2, [1977] 3 All ER 737, 142 JP 45, [1977] 2 WLR 925, (1977) 65 Cr App Rep 33, [1977] QB 868
Bailii
England and Wales

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.249938

The CC appealed by case stated against a refusal of an order under the 2000 Act for the disclosure by the defendant of a cryptography key. The defendant had a history of sexual offences against children and had failed to keep to the terms of a Sexual Offences Prevention Order. He was found with indecent images of children on his computer, but pen drives also found were encrypted. The defendant had refused to release a password. He had since been convicted of other similar offences, but the applicant persisted with his request. The lower court asked whether it had been correct to refuse the request since here here was no evidence that the defendant had a software key.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The judge’s interpretation was too limited: ‘it was a perfectly legitimate inference to draw from the circumstances of recovery of the pen drives that the respondent might know encryption keys relating to the information stored on them.’ and ‘as stated in paragraph 24 of the judgment in S privilege against self-incrimination may be engaged by the requirement of disclosure, that is it may arise at the permission stage. Indeed it seems to me that it did in the present case. However I consider that, as in S, the privilege in this case is engaged only to a very limited extent. I consider that the interference to that limited extent is entirely proportionate to the public interest within the meaning of section 49(2)(c) of the Act and that, insofar as the judge decided otherwise, he was wrong to do so. ‘

Sir Anthony May P, McCombe J
[2011] EWHC 1966 (Admin)
Bailii
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 49, Protection of Children Act 1978 1
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Saunders v The United Kingdom ECHR 17-Dec-1996
(Grand Chamber) The subsequent use against a defendant in a prosecution, of evidence which had been obtained under compulsion in company insolvency procedures was a convention breach of Art 6. Although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the . .
Cited – Regina v S and A CACD 9-Oct-2008
The defendant appealed against his conviction under the 2000 Act for failing to disclose the key used to encrypt a computer file. He was subject to a control order as a suspected terrorist. As the police raided his house, they found the key had been . .
Cited – Regina v Kearns CACD 22-Mar-2002
The defendant had failed to account for the disappearance of a substantial part of his estate to the official receiver following his bankruptcy. He appealed his conviction for failing to provide an account, saying that the requirement to provide . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.442194

Mens Rea essential to crime

In order to constitute an act of bankruptcy by a trader in departing from his dwelling-house, it is not alone sufficient that a creditor should be thereby delayed, but the departure must also have been with that intent. The word ‘or’ in the statute of the 1 Jac. 1, e. 15, must be read ‘and.’
Lord Kenyon, CJ said: ‘It is a principle of natural justice and of our law, that actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. The intent and act must both concur to constitute the crime’

Lord Kenyon, CJ
[1798] EngR 47, (1798) 7 TR 509, (1798) 101 ER 1103
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Tolson CCR 11-May-1889
Honest and Reasonable mistake – No Bigamy
The defendant appealed against her conviction for bigamy, saying that she had acted in a mistaken belief.
Held: A man commits bigamy if he goes through a marriage ceremony while his wife is alive, even though he honestly and reasonably . .
Cited – Taylor, Regina v SC 3-Feb-2016
No Liability Extension on Taking Without Consent
Appeal by leave of the Court of Appeal on a point of law arising in the course of the trial of the appellant for aggravated vehicle taking, contrary to section 12A of the Theft Act 1968. The defendant had taken a vehicle without the owner’s consent, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.348797