The appellants had entered Fortnum and Masons to demonstrate against tax avoidance. They appealed against convitions for aggravated trespass.
Held: The statutory question posed by s.68 is whether the prosecution can prove that the trespasser has done anything on the land (‘there’), apart from trespassing, with the required statutory intent? As to that, there is no warrant for the proposition that continuing occupation on land on which a person has trespassed cannot be a further act distinct from the initial trespass. The allegation here was not only that the accused had trespassed but, once they had entered the premises, that they had demonstrated there.
The remaining allegation was as to intimidation which ‘is a forceful word indicating, in its Latin root, the notion of putting someone in fear.’ The judge was not unreasonable in inferring from the facts of the demonstration that those who took part in it intended to intimidate.
The judge was wrong to treat some as principal offenders and others as accessories. This runs the risk of inhibiting legitimate participation in demonstrations and protests and: ‘it seems to me that in the type of aggravated trespass of which Peppersharp and the instant appeals are examples, there is a contradiction between the facts as found and the conclusion that participants were guilty only as accessories because they encouraged others to commit the offence. That conclusion carries with it the assumption that they themselves had not committed the conduct element of the offence. But if their presence as part of the demonstration did not amount to the conduct element of the offence, because it was not an act distinct from the act of trespass, presence would not have been a sound basis for inferring an intention to intimidate or an intention to encourage. Far better to ask whether they were part of the demonstration and whether that demonstration was itself an act distinct from the trespass, and whether it could be inferred that those participating in the demonstration had one of the three intentions identified in s.68.’
Moses LJ discussed Dehal and said: ‘Whatever the merits of that judgment, it does not seem to me that it should be construed as requiring the prosecution to prove more than conduct which falls within s.68(1). If the prosecution proves that the conduct of a defendant falls within s.68 and that the defendant had the necessary intention, it has nothing additional to prove. It does not have to prove, in addition to the guilt of the defendant, that the prosecution was proportionate. Dehal should be read as no more than an application of Sedley LJ’s warning in Redmond-Bate v DPP [DC.23.7.99] that ‘freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having’. The warning has no relevance to the instant appeals. Although I must take the blame, Dehal equally was not an authority that the District Judge needed to consider. Once he found that the case against these appellants was proved under s.68(1) that was an end of the matter.’
Moses LJ, Kenneth Parker J
 EWHC 634 (Admin),  1 WLR 3617
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 6891)(3)
England and Wales
Cited – Crown Prosecution Service v Barnard and Others QBD 3-Nov-1999
The information against the derendants alleged no more than that the accused had ‘unlawfully occupied the site and that they had done so with the intention specified in s.68’ of the 1994 Act.
Held: The information did not disclose any offence . .
Cited – Peppersharp v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 10-Feb-2012
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for aggravated trespass. Hostile protesters had entered into Millbank Tower, and ignited smoke bombs and smashed a large plate glass window from the outside.
Held: Irwin J said: ‘On . .
Cited – Brutus v Cozens HL 19-Jul-1972
The House was asked whether the conduct of the defendant at a tennis match at Wimbledon amounted to using ‘insulting words or behaviour’ whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned contrary to section 5. He went onto court 2, blew a . .
Cited – Customs and Excise Commissioners v Top Ten Promotions Limited 1969
Lord Upjohn, discussing the construction of a statute, said: ‘It is highly dangerous, if not impossible, to attempt to place an accurate definition upon a word in common use; you can look up examples of its many uses if you want to in the Oxford . .
Cited – Regina v Coney QBD 18-Mar-1882
A public prize-fight was unlawful. Spectators were tried at Berkshire County Quarter Sessions with common assault. The Chairman of Quarter Sessions directed the jury to convict the spectators of common assault on the basis that having stayed to . .
Cited – Nero and Another v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 29-Mar-2012
Parties appealed against convictions for aggravated trespass under the 1994 Act arising from trespassing demonstrations. They argued that the lawfulness of the activity being carried out on the land subject to the trespass is an ingredient in the . .
Cited – Regina v Jones (Margaret), Regina v Milling and others HL 29-Mar-2006
Domestic Offence requires Domestic Defence
Each defendant sought to raise by way of defence of their otherwise criminal actions, the fact that they were attempting to prevent the commission by the government of the crime of waging an aggressive war in Iraq, and that their acts were . .
Cited – Dehal v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 27-Sep-2005
The appellant had been convicted under section 4 of the 1986 Act. He had been accused of attending at Luton Guruwarda and intending to cause distress. He said that he had gone only peacefully to express his true religious beliefs. He had left a . .
Cited – James v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 13-Nov-2015
The appellant challenged her conviction for failing to comply with conditions imposed on a public demonstration. Her demonstration outside the Royal Courts of Justice had brought traffic to a standstill. At trial she had been refused permission to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.471960