The defendant saw disparaging statements made about him by neighbours in the course of divorce proceedings. He wrote to them and asked them to withdraw the statements they had made and threatened proceedings for slander. He was charged with attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Held: A threat or promise made to a witness with the intention of persuading him to alter or withhold his evidence was an attempt to pervert the course of justice, even if the threat or promise related to a lawful act or the exercise of a legal right. It was for the jury to decide whether the defendant’s letter constituted a threat to bring an action with the intention of causing his neighbours not to give evidence. The offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice would not necessarily be committed by a person who tried to persuade a false witness or even a witness believed to be false to speak the truth or to refrain from giving false evidence. However proper the end, the means must not be improper.
Stephenson LJ said: ‘Perversion of the course of justice is per se an offence against the public weal. An attempt (or incitement) to pervert (or defeat) the (due) course of justice is an offence against the common law and no less than a conspiracy to pervert it was a punishable misdemeanour: Reg. v. Grimes (Note) (1968) 3 All E.R. 179, 181, per Kilner Brown J, Reg. v. Vreones (1891) 1 Q.B. 360, 367; Rex v. Greenburg (1919) 63 S.J. 553; Reg. v. Andrews (1973) Q.B. 422, 425 and Reg. v Panayiotou (1973) 1 WLR 1032. Those cases show also that tampering with evidence, including a person to give false evidence or not to give evidence, for reward are instances of this common law offence, whether the evidence is to be given in criminal or in civil proceedings and whether the inducement is effective or, as in this case, not. But they were all concerned with the manufacture of false evidence or the withdrawal of a true complaint. They do not deal with the limits of the offence or indicate whether it can be committed where the evidence of the potential witness is false or may be false, or whether it can be committed where the means used are not bribery or reward but threats, or where the threats used are threats to exercise a legal right, or where the intention, or one of intentions of him who approaches the potential witness is to exercise such a right or to see that justice, is done to himself or another.
It would seem repugnant to justice and to common sense if in every one of these cases the ‘offender’ could be said to be attempting to pervert or defeat or obstruct the course or the ends of justice.’
and ‘There may be cases of interference with a witness in which it would be for the jury to decide whether what was done or said to the witness amounted to improper pressure, and so wrongfully interfered with the witness and attempted to pervert the course of justice, and it would be not only unnecessary and unhelpful but wrong for this court or the trial judge to usurp their function. The decision will depend on all the circumstances of the case, including not merely the method of interfering, but the time when it is done, the relationship between the person interfering and the witness and the nature of the proceedings in which the evidence is being given. Pressure which may be permissible at one stage of the particular proceedings may be improper at another. What may be proper for a friend or relation or a legal adviser may be oppressive and improper coming from a person in a position of influence or authority. But it is for the judge to direct the jury that some means of inducement are improper and if proved make the defendant guilty, and this was such a case. A jury should be directed that a threat (or promise) made to a witness is, like an assault on a witness, an attempt to pervert the course of justice, if made with the intention of persuading him to alter or withhold his evidence, whether or not what he threatens (or promises) is a lawful act, such as the exercise of a legal right, and whether or not he has any other intention or intends to do the act if the evidence is not altered or withheld.’
Stephenson LJ
[1976] 1 QB 372
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Re S 36 Criminal Justice Act 1972; Attorney General’s Reference No 1 of 2002 CACD 14-Oct-2002
The court was asked: ‘Whether the common-law offence of perverting the course of public justice is committed where false evidence is given or made, not to defeat what the witness believes to be the ends of justice, or not to procure what the witness . .
Cited – Regina v Cotter and Others CACD 10-May-2002
The defendants appealed against convictions for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. They said that the fact that an investigation followed a false allegation was insufficient to found a complaint, and that the extent of the crime was so . .
Cited – Versloot Dredging Bv v Hdi Gerling Industrie Versicherung Ag and Others ComC 8-Feb-2013
The defendants had engaged an expert witness, and he had undertaken investigations at the claimant’s premises. The claimant now sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from preventing the expert talking to them independently of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Crime
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.244817
