Category: Litigation Practice

In Re Hearn, De Bertodano v Hearn (No.1): ChD 1913

W, living apart from H, asked the court to decide questions as to the will of H’s father, including a determination as to whether H had forfeited a life interest in certain property. Before the application was heard a ‘complex consent order’ was recorded with the court, under which H was to make periodical payments to W and he was left in possession of the subject properties; by consent all proceedings were stayed. H defaulted in making payments. The wife applied for relief, including the appointment of a receiver, in the initial proceedings.
Held: The request was refused. The compromise had gone outside the ambit of the original action, no liberty to apply had been reserved at all, the stay being absolute and unqualified, and the relief was not a mere enforcement of the agreed terms but to modify them to give effect to the original intention in changed circumstances. The original proceedings were ‘now spent and exhausted’. Such an application could not be made by a summons in the original action which was commenced in 1908 by originating summons, but independent proceedings must be taken.
Sargant J
(1913) 108 LT 452
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – In Re Hearn CA 2-Jan-1913
The parties had settled their action, and the compromise agreement embodied as a schedule to the court order. The claimant now appealed against an order refusing to allow him to enforce the agreement by action within the original proceedings, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.470616

Ropac Ltd v Inntrepreneur Pub Co and Another: ChD 7 Jun 2000

There had been a consent order in the terms of an unless order giving the landlord an order for possession unless the tenant paid sums by a certain date, time being of the essence. The order was not complied with and the tenant applied for a retrospective extension of time to comply with the order.
Held: The court retained the power to grant an order for extension of time even though the parties had previously agreed the terms of an ‘unless’ consent order and it had expressed time to be of the essence. The court’s case management powers had to be read in the light of the overriding objective as expressed in the Rules. Under the RSC the order in the case before him was in sufficiently clear terms to be a binding consent order with which the court would only have interfered in circumstances which would justify interference with a contract. Under the CPR however, the court had jurisdiction to extend time: ‘To my mind, the CPR therefore gives the Court rather more wide- ranging, more flexible powers than the RSC. In my judgment, those powers are to be exercised not merely to do justice between the parties, but in the wider public interest. Further, the objective to deal with a case justly must, as I see it, sometimes (albeit rarely) require the court to override an agreement made between the parties in the course of, and in connection with, the litigation. I consider that this means that the court has greater power to interfere than before. Having said that, I should add this. Where the parties have agreed in clear terms on a certain course, then, while that does not take away its power to extend time, the court should, when considering an application to extend time, place very great weight on what the parties have agreed and should be slow, save in unusual circumstances, to depart from what the parties have agreed.’
Neuberger J set out the process he had to apply to to extend time in respect of a consent order. He said at: ‘First, at least in general, if the order was a genuine consent order, that is representing a contractual agreement between the parties, and stated that, if a party did not do something within a specified time, then his claim or defence would be struck out or that there would be some other sanction, that represented a contract with which the court had no power to interfere, save in circumstances in which the court has power to interfere with a contract. That seems to me to be the effect of the judgments in Purcell v FC Trigell Limited [1971] 1 QB 359 – see at 365G per Winn LJ and 366D per Buckley LJ .’
Neuberger J
Times 21-Jun-2000, Gazette 29-Jun-2000, [2001] LandTR 10
Civil Procedure Rules 81
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Purcell v F C Trigell Ltd CA 1971
The court will not interfere with an existing consent order, save in circumstances in which it could interfere with a contract as a matter of substantive law. A consent order derives its authority from the contract made between the parties. . .
Cited – Siebe Gorman and Co Limited v Pneupac Limited CA 1982
Lord Denning MR discussed the meaning of ‘consent order’ saying: ‘There are two meaning to the words ‘by consent’. One meaning is this: the words ‘by consent’ may evidence a real contract between the parties. In such a case the court will only . .
Cited – Tigner Welsh London Company Limited v Spiro 1992
. .

Cited by:
Cited – Di Placito v Slater and others CA 19-Dec-2003
The parties had earlier compromised their dispute, with the claimant undertaking not to lodge any further claim unless he did so within a certain time. They now sought to commence action.
Held: When considering whether to discharge such an . .
Cited – The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Jonkler and Another ChD 10-Feb-2006
The applicant had given an undertaking to the court to secure discontinuance of company director disqualification procedings. He now sought a variation of the undertaking.
Held: The claimant had given an undertaking, but in the light of new . .
Cited – Weston v Dayman CA 7-Jun-2006
The Court considered the interpretation of a consent order on an application to vary its terms. The terms were incorporated within a consent order. It was argued that the variation could be based on CPR 3.1(7) which provides that the Court has power . .
Cited – Community Care North East (A Partnership) v Durham County Council QBD 29-Apr-2010
ccne_durhamCA10
The parties had settled their dispute and sealed it in a Tomlin Order. The court now asked as to its power to vary such an order. The order required the defendant to reopen a tendering process, but other tenderers now objected, and the council felt . .
Cited – Watson v Sadiq and Another CA 16-Jul-2013
The appellant and defendant said that the agreement compromising their action, and embodied within a Tomlin schedule, had been reached by duress and was vitiated. He said that the Recorder had exercised undue influence in advising the need for a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.88860

Interflora Inc and Another v Marks and Spencer Plc and Another: ChD 21 Feb 2013

‘The Claimants (‘Interflora’) seek the permission of the Court to adduce in evidence the witness statements of 13 witnesses at the trial of this action scheduled for mid April 2013. Interflora do not accept that they need the Court’s permission, but they have sought it out of an abundance of caution. Having regard to the previous history, that was a sensible approach to adopt. As Interflora rightly anticipated, the First Defendant (‘Marks and Spencer’) contends that permission is required and should be refused. ‘
Arnold J
[2013] EWHC 273 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Interflora Inc and Another v Marks and Spencer Plc and Another ChD 29-Apr-2010
Response to request for clarification of reference to the ECJ. . .
ECJ Opinion – Interflora And Others v Marks and Spencer plc, Flowers Direct Online Limited ECJ 24-Mar-2011
ECJ (Opinion) Trade marks – Keyword advertising corresponding to the trade mark of a competitor of the advertiser – Trade marks with a reputation – Blurring – Tarnishment – Free-riding – Directive 89/104 – . .
ECJ – Interflora And Others v Marks and Spencer plc, Flowers Direct Online Limited ECJ 22-Sep-2011
ECJ Trade marks – Keyword advertising on the internet – Selection by the advertiser of a keyword corresponding to a competitor’s trade mark with a reputation – Directive 89/104/EEC – Article 5(1)(a) and (2) – . .
See Also – Interflora Inc and Another v Marks and Spencer Plc and Another ChD 20-Jun-2012
Application for permission to to adduce witness evidence at trial from witnesses gathered from two pilot surveys. . .
Cited – Marks and Spencer Plc v Interflora Inc and Another CA 20-Nov-2012
The court gave guidance on the use of surveys in trials for passing off and trade mark infringement.
Lewison LJ reviewed the practice of conducting interviews and surveys in passing off cases: ‘The upshot of this review is that courts have . .

Cited by:
See also – Interflora Inc v Marks and Spencer Plc CA 22-Mar-2013
Interflora had been refused permision to adduce survey evidence, but now appealed against refusal of permission to adduce evidence of confusion by witness statements.
Held: Appeal allowed. Reasons to follow. . .
See Also – Interflora Inc and Another v Marks and Spencer Plc CA 5-Apr-2013
The court gave its reasons for allowing the claimant to bring additional witness evidence as to confusion as opposed to survey evidence. . .
See Also – Interflora Inc and Another v Marks and Spencer Plc and Another ChD 15-Apr-2013
The defendant objected to the introduction of certain evidence by the claimant under a Civil Evidence Act notice. . .
See Also – Interflora Inc and Another v Marks and Spencer Plc and Another ChD 21-May-2013
Mark use in search engine was infringing use
The claimant mark owner alleged that the defendant, in paying a search engine to use the claimants mark as a search keyword was infringing its rights. The defendant argued that the use of the same sign in different contexts could amount to a . .
See Also – Interflora Inc and Another v Marks and Spencer Plc and Another ChD 12-Jun-2013
The court considered the form of the injunction requested to give effect to the earlier full judgment in the case brought, requiring the defendant to discontinue any use of the terms complained of as infringing the claimant’s registered marks as . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.471170

Clark v Ardington Electrical Services: CA 4 Apr 2001

(Orse Burdis v Livsey)
Kitchin, Jackson, Floyd LJJ
[2001] EWCA Civ 585, [2002] 3 WLR 762, [2003] QB 36
Bailii
Consumer Credit (Exempt Agreements) Order 1989, Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983
England and Wales
Cited by:
See Also – Clark v Tull (T/A Ardington Electrical Services) CA 1-May-2002
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 September 2021; Ref: scu.218103

Matthews v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council: LT 13 Sep 2002

PRACTICE – admissibility of letter marked without prejudice and details of negotiations in an expert report – whether letter an assertion of rights or a negotiating document – held letter and details of negotiation inadmissible under the without prejudice rule.
[2002] EWLands CON – 38 – 2002
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 30 September 2021; Ref: scu.225716

Generali Italia Spa and Others v Pelagic Fisheries Corporation and Another: ComC 18 May 2020

Application to set aside an order made under CPR Part 71 that the director of a company which is a judgment debtor attend court to provide information for the purpose of enabling the judgment creditor to enforce the judgment debt.
[2020] EWHC 1228 (Comm), [2020] WLR(D) 298
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales

Updated: 30 September 2021; Ref: scu.651167

Anglo Eastern Trust Ltd v Kermanshahgi: ChD 2002

An asset freezing order restrains the defendent from dealing with his assets but does not prevent him from borrowing money, thereby increasing his overall indebtedness.
Neuberger J
[2002] EWHC 1702 (Ch)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov SC 21-Oct-2015
The court was asked as to the interpretation and application of the standard form freezing order. In the course of long-running litigation between JSC BTA Bank and Mr Ablyazov the Bank had obtained a number of judgments against the respondent . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 September 2021; Ref: scu.591723

Rayner and Another v Ritson: QBD 14 Nov 1865

Inspection of documents. 14 and 15 Vict. c. 99, S. 6. Marine Insurance. Action on policy. – In an action on a policy of marine insurance for a constructive total loss the defendant is entitled, both under the old practice and the Statute 14 and 15 Vict c. 99, s 6, to an inspection of all papers iii the possession of the Plaintiff relative to the matters in issue, including letters between the captain and the plaintiff.
[1865] EngR 730, (1865) 6 B and S 888, (1865) 122 ER 1421
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 29 September 2021; Ref: scu.281642

Siporex Trade SA v Comdel Commodities: 1986

The court should not absolve a defaulting party from the consequences of its neglect by maintaining a Mareva injunction order in force.
Bingham J
[1986] 2 Lloyds LR 428
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Tryg Baltic International (UK) Ltd v Boston Compania De Seguros Sa and others ComC 28-May-2004
Four defendants from Argentina sought to have set aside an order for them to be served, saying the appropriate jursidiction, if there was a triable issue, would be Argentina.
Held: The agreements were to be construed according to English Law. . .
Cited – Fourie v Le Roux and others HL 24-Jan-2007
The appellant, liquidator of two South African companies, had made a successful without notice application for an asset freezing order. He believed that the defendants had stripped the companies of substantial assets. The order was set aside for . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 September 2021; Ref: scu.197879

Martin v Kaisary and Another (1): CA 16 Mar 2005

Substitution of other party after limitation period expiry. The court considered the Law Committee’s recommendations on limitation and noted the intention to allow the addition of defendants out of time where this might validate a claim.
Brooke LJ
[2006] PIQR 5, [2005] EWCA Civ 594
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980
England and Wales
Cited by:
See Also – Martin v Kaisary and Another QBD 5-Apr-2005
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 September 2021; Ref: scu.226044

Taylor Goodchild Ltd v Taylor and Another: ChD 24 Jul 2020

Application by the Defendants to strike out the Claimant’s Particulars of Claim on the ground of res judicata and/or as an abuse of process pursuant to CPR 3.4, further or alternatively for summary judgment pursuant to CPR 24.
Snowden J Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster
[2020] EWHC 2000 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 29 September 2021; Ref: scu.652792

James Buchanan and Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd: HL 1978

A consignment of whisky was stolen whilst on consignemt from a bonded warehouse under CMR terms for Teheran. In bond, it was worth 7,000 pounds, and on export no excise duty was to be paid. Being stolen in the course of transit, excise duty of 30,000 pounds became payable. The plaintiffs claimed to recover the value including the duty, under Article 23.2 of the CMR.
Held: The liability to excise duty constituted ‘other charges’ under Article 23.4. The English text of the convention was incorporated through a schedule. A parallel Fench text had equal authenticity. The process of statutory interpretation required the court directly to interpret the English text of the convention while recognising that another authentic text existed. The court could interpret the statute on broad principles of general acceptation, assisted if need be by reference to the French text, without the need for a preliminary test of ambiguity.
Lord Wilberforce said:’I think that the correct approach is to interpret the English text, which after all is likely to be used by many others than British businessmen, in a normal manner, appropriate for the interpretation of an international convention, unconstrained by technical rules of English law, or by English legal precedent, but on broad principles of general acceptation: Stag Line Ltd v Foscolo, Mango and Co Ltd [1932] AC 328, per Lord Macmillan, at p 350. Moreover, it is perfectly legitimate in my opinion to look for assistance, if assistance is needed, to the French text. This is often put in the form that resort may be had to the foreign text if (and only if) the English text is ambiguous, but I think this states the rule too technically. As Lord Diplock recently said in this House the inherent flexibility of the English (and, one may add, any) language may make it necessary for the interpreter to have recourse to a variety of aids: Carter v Bradbeer [1975] 1 WLR 1204, 1206. There is no need to impose a preliminary test of ambiguity.’
Lord Wilberforce, Lord Salmon, Lord Dilhorne
[1978] AC 141
Customs and Excise Act 1952 85
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Stag Line v Foscolo, Mango and Company HL 1931
English statutes which give effect to international conventions need to be interpreted with the international origin of the rules well in mind. The Act only applies to contracts of carriage of goods outwards from ports in the United Kingdom, and the . .
Appeal from – James Buchanan and Company Ltd v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd CA 2-Dec-1976
A trailer full of whisky had been stolen. Four fifths of its retail value was excise duty. Because it was to have been exported, duty had not been paid. On the theft the owners had had to pay the duty. The owners sued the carriers for the loss, but . .

Cited by:
Distinguished – Sandeman Coprimar Sa v Transitos Y Transportes Integrales S L , Bradford Cargo Terminal Limited, Spain Tir Centro Transportes Internacionales S A , Interserve International Freight Plc, Joda Freight CA 11-Feb-2003
Sub-bailees had lost Spanish tax seals which vouched for the respective tax having been paid whilst whisky was being transported from Scotland to Spain. The seals themselves were made of paper and had no intrinsic value. The importers claimed for . .
Cited – Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation HL 8-Dec-2005
The appellants had suffered deep vein thrombosis whilst travelling on long haul air flights. The defendants said that their liability was limited because the injuries were not accidents.
Held: The claimants’ appeal failed. The definition of . .
Cited – Revenue and Customs v Smallwood and Another CA 8-Jul-2010
The taxpayers had set up trusts which they said were based in Mauritius allowing them to claim double taxation relief. The Revenue had issued closure notices, confirmed by the SPCT, but overturned by the High Court. The Revenue appealed, saying that . .
Cited – British American Tobacco Denmark A/S v Kazemier Bv SC 28-Oct-2015
One container loaded with cigarettes was allegedly hi-jacked in Belgium en route between Switzerland and The Netherlands in September 2011, while another allegedly lost 756 of its original 1386 cartons while parked overnight contrary to express . .
Cited – Gard Marine and Energy Ltd and Another v China National Chartering Company Ltd and Another SC 10-May-2017
The dispute followed the grounding of a tanker the Ocean Victory. The ship was working outside of a safe port requirement in the charterparty agreement. The contract required the purchase of insurance against maritime war and protection and . .
Cited – Mitsui and Co Ltd and Others v Beteiligungsgesellschaft Lpg Tankerflotte Mbh and Co Kg and Another SC 25-Oct-2017
This appeal raises the issue whether the daily vessel-operating expenses of shipowners incurred while they were negotiating to reduce the ransom demands of pirates should be allowed in general average – ie whether those expenses should be shared . .
Cited – Smallwood v Revenue and Customs ChD 8-Apr-2009
The taxpayer had settled company shares for the benefit of himself and his family. He appealed from an amendment to his tax returns creating a CGT liability of 6 million pounds.
Held: The appeal was successful. . .
Cited – Warner v Scapa Flow Charters (Scotland) SC 17-Oct-2018
This appeal raises a question about the interpretation of article 16 of the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974 (‘the Athens Convention’) and its application to the Scots law of limitation of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.179737

BPE Solicitors and Another v Gabriel: SC 17 Jun 2015

Application for directions in a pending appeal. The claimant alleged negligence against his former solicitors. After his successful claim was substantially overturned on appeal, he was made bankrupt.
Held: If the trustee adopted and pursued the action, but lost, he would not become personally liable for the costs in the lower courts.
Lord Mance, Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath, Lord Toulson, Lord Hodge
[2015] UKSC 39, [2015] 4 Costs LO 467, [2015] WLR(D) 259, [2015] AC 1663, [2015] 4 All ER 672, [2015] BPIR 779, [2015] 3 WLR 1, UKSC 2014/0026
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC, SC Summary, SC Video
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 40(5), upreme Court Rules 2009 46
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Gabriel v Little and Others CA 22-Nov-2013
The claimant sought repayment of sums loaned to the defendant by them under a facility letter supported by a legal charge. The charge had been enforced but the sums realised had been insufficient. . .
Cited – Borneman v Wilson CA 1884
The Wilsons, father and son, had acted as commercial agents of one Borneman. He began an action against them in the Chancery Division for an account of their dealings with his goods and obtained interlocutory relief on motion including an injunction . .
Cited – School Board for London v Wall Brothers CA 1891
. .
Cited – Heath v Tang, Stevens v Peacock CA 11-Aug-1993
The bankrupt applicants each applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the judgment for a liquidated sum on which the bankruptcy petition had been based. In the first case, the trustee in bankruptcy indicated his unwillingness to . .
Cited – Trustee of Property of Vickery (a Bankrupt) v Modern Security Systems Limited CA 15-Oct-1997
A trustee in bankruptcy will be treated as the party if he has in fact adopted the proceedings by conducting the litigation, even if there has been no formal substitution . .
Cited – In re Bluck, Ex parte Bluck 1887
The discretionary character of a costs order meant that it was not even a contingent liability until the order had actually been made . .
Cited – In re A Debtor (No 68 of 1911) 1911
. .
Cited – In re Pitchford 11-Jan-1924
. .
Cited – Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd (The ‘Vimeira’) HL 1986
Wide Application of Costs Against Third Party
A claim had been made against charterers by the ship owners, and in turn by the charterers against their sub-charterers. Notice of motion were issued after arbitration awards were not accepted. When heard, costs awards were made, which were now . .
Cited – Glenister v Rowe CA 21-Apr-1999
The claimant sued for breach of trust. The action was re-instated after being struck out for want of prosecution, but in the meantime the defendant had been made bankrupt and then discharged from bankruptcy. An order for costs was then made which . .
Cited – In re Nortel Companies and Others SC 24-Jul-2013
The court was asked as to the interrelationship of the statutory schemes relating to the protection of employees’ pensions and to corporate insolvency.
Held: Liabilities which arose from financial support directions or contribution notices . .

Cited by:
Cited – Plevin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd SC 29-Mar-2017
The court had ordered the respondent to pay the claimant’s costs. These were high because the solicitors had acted under a conditional fee agreement, and disproportionate to the funds at issue. The respondents challenged assignments of the original . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.549064

Deighton v Cockle: CA 2 Dec 1911

Where, an order haying been obtained for judgment under Order xiv., judgment is not signed until more than twelve months afterwards, the case does not come within Order lxiv., r. 13, and therefore it is not necessary that the notice of intention to proceed required by that rule should have been given before signing judgment.
The issue was whether, having obtained leave on 28 May 1904 to sign summary judgment (under the then Order XIV), the plaintiff was by the actual signing of judgment, which it did not undertake until 3 July 1905, taking a ‘proceeding’, so as require a month’s notice to ‘proceed’ to be given in advance.
Held: It was not. Vaughan Williams LJ concluded that the rule requiring a month’s notice to proceed ‘only applied to proceedings towards judgment’ or ‘interlocutory proceedings’, and ‘did not apply to proceedings after judgment obtained’ or ‘after an end of the litigation had been arrived at’. Buckley LJ took a similar view, while Kennedy LJ considered that the rule referred to ‘some proceeding while the matter is still in controversy, or there is still some further step to be taken before judgment is obtained’
Vaughan Williams LJ, Buckley LJ, Kennedy LJ
[1912] 1 KB 206, [1911] UKLawRpKQB 182
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – In re Racal Communications Ltd; In Re a Company HL 3-Jul-1980
Court of Appeal’s powers limited to those Given
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is wholly statutory; it is appellate only. The court has no original jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction itself to entertain any original application for judicial review; it has appellate jurisdiction over . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.668239

Newport City Council v Charles: CA 4 Jul 2008

The respondent sought vacation of the date listed for hearing the appeal. His leading counsel was unavailable, and the court had fixed the day without first checking that he would be available.
Held: There were several reasons for the Court of Appeal to take sittings outside London. The convenience of the parties was not the sole or overriding concern. This was a half day case which other leading counsel should be able to take up.
Lord Justice Laws and Lord Justice Richards
[2008] EWCA Civ 893, Times 11-Aug-2008
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 25 September 2021; Ref: scu.272554

Rogerson (T/A Cottesmore Hotel, Golf and Country Club) v Eco Top Heat and Power Ltd: TCC 2 Jul 2021

‘The application before the Court concerns the jurisdiction which permits the Court to allow a party to change its expert witness upon terms which can include disclosure of materials, including any reports prepared by a prior expert, as the price for such change. It raises the interesting question of how far back in time this jurisdiction can reach.’
[2021] EWHC 1807 (TCC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 25 September 2021; Ref: scu.667727

KH (Deceased) By AMH v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (II): UTAA 4 Aug 2021

Tribunal procedure and practice (including Upper Tribunal) – Set aside applications – Application of MA v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) [2020] UKUT 172 (AAC) and the cases that preceded it, in circumstances where unclear whether an application has been made, or where the application is equivocal. Tribunal procedure and practice (including Upper Tribunal) – Statements of reasons – Adequacy of reasoning in Prescribed Disease appeals. Industrial diseases – D1 (pneumoconiosis)
[2021] UKUT 189
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 25 September 2021; Ref: scu.667705

Allen v Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd and Another: CA 14 Jul 2011

The claimant appealed against an order requiring him to deposit a substantial sum as security for costs for the bringing of his action for copyright infringement in respect of the Harry Potter series of books.
Held: The appeal failed. The judge’s summary of the applicable law was not criticised, and ‘as so often, there was undoubtedly a range of orders that a judge could legitimately have made in the exercise of the discretion in accordance with the rules. However, it seems to me that the judge was in a far better position than we can be to assess the significance and relevance of the various factors. It does not seem to me that he brought into account any irrelevant matter nor that it would be open and proper for us to question his assessment of the significance of the various factors to which he did refer. Accordingly it seems to me that the judge’s order was well within the range of orders that a judge could come to.’
Rix, Lloyd, Sullivan LJJ
[2011] EWCA Civ 943
Bailii
Civil Procedure Rules 3
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Olakunle O Olatawura v Alexander O Abiloye CA 17-Jul-2002
The claimant challenged an order requiring him to give security for costs before proceeding. The judge had felt he was unreasonable in the way he was pursuing his claim. He appealed saying the order was made outside the scope of Part 25.
Held: . .
Appeal from – Allen v Bloomsbury Publishing Plc and Another ChD 18-Mar-2011
Further applications in defendant’s application for summary judgment and or security for costs in the claimant’s claim alleging copyright infringement.
Held: The claimant was ordered to pay a sum of andpound;50,000 as security for costs.
See Also – Allen v Bloomsbury Publishing Plc and Another ChD 14-Oct-2010
The claimant sought damages alleging breach of copyright by the defendant author saying she had copied large parts of the claimant’s work in her book ‘Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire’. The defendant now sought summary judgment, saying the action . .
Cited – Huscroft v P and O Ferries Ltd CA 21-Dec-2010
Second appeal against order requiring sum for security for costs to be paid into court and in default for the claim to be struck out.
Held: The Court considered its jurisdiction to make an order for security for costs under rule 3.1 and, . .
Cited – Nasser v United Bank of Kuwait CA 11-Apr-2001
The claimant, a foreign resident, alleged that her jewels had been stolen from a deposit box while in possession of the defendants. The defendants sought security for costs.
Held: An order for security may not legitimately be based on the bare . .
Cited – Radu v Houston and Another CA 22-Nov-2006
An order for security for costs had been made against the defamation claimant, supported by an unless order. Security not having been provided, judgment was entered by default.
Held: Where an unless order was made, a generous time should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 September 2021; Ref: scu.443228

The Al Tawwab: CA 1991

The ship ‘Sardinia Sulcis’ collided with the ‘Al Tawwab’. The charterers of the latter paid damages and so were subrogated to the owners’ rights against the owners of the Al Tawwab. They brought proceedings in rem in the name of ‘the Owners of the ‘Sardinia Sulcis’. Before they did so, the owners assigned their rights to another company, the demise charterers of the vessel. The court was asked to substitute the demise charterers for the owners pursuant to O.20, r 5.
Held: They could. Lloyd LJ summarised the criteria under that rule: ‘The first point to notice is that there is power to amend under the rule even though the limitation period has expired: see O.20, r. 5(2). The second point is that there is power to amend, even though it is alleged that the effect of the amendment is to add a new party after the expiration of the limitation period. But the Court must be satisfied (1) that there was a genuine mistake, (2) that the mistake was not misleading, (3) that the mistake was not such as to cause reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person intending to sue, and (4) that it would be just to allow the amendment.’ and ‘The ‘identity of the person intending to sue’ is a concept which is not all that easy to grasp and can be difficult to apply to the circumstance of a particular case.’ He considered the test to be applied to ascertain ‘the person intended to be sued’: ‘In one sense a plaintiff always intends to sue the person who is liable for the wrong which he has suffered. But the test cannot be as wide as that. Otherwise there could never be any doubt as to the person intended to be sued, and leave to amend would always be given. So there must be some narrower test. In Mitchell v. Harris Engineering the identity of the person intented to be sued was the plaintiffs employers. In Evans v. Charrington it was the current landlord. In Thistle Hotels v. McAlpine the identity of the person intending to sue was the proprietor of the hotel. In The Joanna Borchard it was the cargo-owner or consignee. In all these cases it was possible to identify the intending plaintiff or intended defendant by reference to a description which was more or less specific to the particular case. Thus if, in the case of an intended defendant, the plaintiff gets the right description but the wrong name, there is unlikely to be any doubt as to the identity of the person intended to be sued. But if he gets the wrong description, it will be other wise.’
Stocker LJ said: ‘can the intended plaintiff or defendant be identified by reference to a description which is specific to the particular case – e.g. landlord, employer, owners or ship owners. If the identity of the person intending to sue or be sued appears from such specific description any amendment is one of name; where it does not it will in many if not in all cases involve the description of another party rather than simply the name.’
Lloyd LJ, Stocker LJ
[1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 201
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Adelson and Another v Associated Newspapers Ltd CA 9-Jul-2007
The claimant sought to add the name of a further claimant. The defendant objected, saying that it was after the expiry of the limitation period.
Held: The claimant was seeking to use the rules for substitution of parties to add a party. In . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 September 2021; Ref: scu.254524

Cobbold v London Borough of Greenwich: CA 9 Aug 1999

The tenant had sought an order against the council landlord for failure to repair her dwelling. The defendant appealed refusal of leave to amend the pleadings in anticipation of the trial, now due to start on the following day.
Held: Leave was refused, though: ‘The overriding objective is that the court should deal with cases justly. That includes, so far as practicable, ensuring that each case is dealt with not only expeditiously but also fairly. Amendments in general ought to be allowed so that the real dispute between the parties can be adjudicated upon provided that any prejudice to the other party or parties caused by the amendment can be compensated for in costs, and the public interest in the efficient administration of justice is not significantly harmed. There is always prejudice when a party is not allowed to put forward his real case provided that it is properly arguable.’ Justice ordinarily requires that issues which either party properly wishes to raise should be heard.
Peter Gibson LJ
[1999] EWCA Civ 2074
Bailii
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 11, Defective Premises Act 1972 4
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Welsh v Greenwich London Borough Council CA 6-Jul-2000
A flat had been let without heating. The tenant complained at the consequent damp and condensation. The authority claimed it was not obliged to put the property into a better condition under a clause saying it agreed ‘to maintain the dwelling in . .
Cited – Skuse v Granada Television CA 30-Mar-1993
The claimant complained that the defendant had said in a television programme that he had failed to act properly when presenting his expert forensic evidence in court in the trial of the Birmingham Six.
Held: The court should give to the . .

Cited by:
Cited – Bowerbank v Amos (Formerly Staff) CA 31-Jul-2003
The parties had gone into business together. After a breakdown, they had now spent very considerable sums in litigation. At the trial, the judge allowed an amendment of the claim after the close of evidence. He considered that it related to matters . .
Cited – Savings and Investment Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v Fincken CA 14-Nov-2003
Parties to litigation had made without prejudice disclosures. One party sought to give evidence contradicting the dsclosure, and the other now applied for leave to amend based upon the without prejudice statements to be admitted to demonstrate the . .
Cited – Daniels v Thompson CA 18-Mar-2004
The executor brought an action against the solicitor who had advised his client in connection with the transfer of her house in which she was to continue to live, saying he should have advised her that the gift would not protect her from Inheritance . .
Cited – Mastercard International Incorporated v Hitachi Credit (Uk) Plc ChD 8-Jul-2004
The claimants challenged award of a trade mark saying they were owners of many marks incorporating the word ‘Master’ associated with credit, and the applicants mark was too similar to its own.
Held: Applying Davidoff, the words can also be . .
Cited – Forticrete Ltd v Lafarge Roofing Ltd ChD 25-Nov-2005
Patent infringement action. . .
Cited – Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc and Another v Yeda Research and Development Co Ltd ChD 16-Feb-2006
The patent application had been presented to the European Patent Office and granted only after 13 years. The claimant now appealed refusal to allow amendment of its claim to allow a claim in its sole name. The defendant argued that it was out of . .
Cited – Gillick v Brook Advisory Centres and Another CA 23-Jul-2001
The claimant appealed after closing her action for an alleged defamation by the respondents in a leaflet published by them. She challenged an interim decision by the judge as to the meaning of the words complained of.
Held: The leaflet made . .
Cited – Berezovsky v Abramovich ComC 22-May-2008
Applications were made to amend pleadings and for consequential orders. The claimant sought damages of $4.3 billion alleging breach of trust. The claimant sought to add claims which the defendant said were out of time.
Held: The proposed . .
Cited – Parker and Another v SJ Berwin and Co and Another QBD 17-Dec-2008
The claimants sought damages from their former solicitors. They set out to purchase a football club, expending substantial sums for the purpose, relying on the defendants’ promised provision of service in finding and arranging the funding. They said . .
Cited – Shah and Another v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd QBD 26-Jan-2009
The claimants sought damages after delays by the bank in processing transfer requests. The bank said that the delays were made pending reports of suspected criminal activity. The bank’s delay had stigmatised the claimant causing further losses. The . .
Cited – Dowson and Others v Northumbria Police QBD 30-Apr-2009
Nine police officers claimed damages for alleged harassment under the 1997 Act by a senior officer in having bullied them and ordered them to carry out unlawful procedures. Amendments were sought which were alleged to be out of time and to have . .
Cited – Hussain and Another v Sarkar and Another CA 29-Jan-2010
The claimant sought damages saying that in a traffic accident, the first defendant driver had driven into the rear of their car. The second defendant asked for permission to amend its peading to allege fraud, that the accident had been staged, but . .
Cited – Wright v Caan QBD 27-Jul-2011
The claimant sought damages in defamation and malicious falsehood and in respect of a conversation with a journalist and the defendant’s website. The defendant had made offers of support to her business venture in a television program. After she . .
Cited – Khudados v Leggate and others EAT 16-Feb-2005
Application was made to make extensive amendments to the notice of appeal.
Held: The application was refused. The EAT practice guide required an application for an amendment to be made as soon as its necessity became apparent. The applicant . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 September 2021; Ref: scu.146989

Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd: CA 1942

The court considered the rule against self incrimination. Lord Justice Goddard said: ‘The rule is that no one is bound to answer any questions if the answer thereto would, in the opinion of the judge, have a tendency to expose the defendant to any criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture which the judge regards as reasonably likely to be incurred.’ The right to decline to answer must be plain in respect of the answer to each question and must be considered by the judge each time it is raised. Sometimes a question may not apparently raise any rational response of self-incrimination and the court must be satisfied that the answer would or might tend to criminate.
Goddard LJ
[1942] 2 KB 253
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Holder v The Law Society Admn 26-Jul-2005
The applicant challenged the independence of the respondent’s disciplinary tribunal.
Held: The claim failed: ‘the nature of the Tribunal is entirely adequately independent and impartial for the purposes for which it is constituted. The . .
Cited – Regina v S and A CACD 9-Oct-2008
The defendant appealed against his conviction under the 2000 Act for failing to disclose the key used to encrypt a computer file. He was subject to a control order as a suspected terrorist. As the police raided his house, they found the key had been . .
Cited – Phillips v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd and Others ChD 17-Nov-2010
The claimant had been assistant to a well known publicist. The defendant had settled an action brought by her principal for hacking his mobile telephone, in the course of which it appeared that the claimant’s phone had also been hacked. She now . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 September 2021; Ref: scu.230903

Pritam Kaur v S Russell and Sons Ltd: CA 2 Jun 1972

The plaintiff sought damages following the death of her husband when working for the defendant. The limitation period expired on Saturday 5 September 1970. The writ was issued on the Monday following.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The writ was issued in time.
Lord Denning MR said: ‘The defendants can say: ‘The plaintiff has three years in which to bring his action. If the last day is a Saturday or Sunday, or other dies non, he ought not to leave it until the last day. He ought to make sure and issue it the day before when the offices are open’.
The plaintiff can say: ‘The statute gives me three years in which I can bring my action. If I go into the offices on the last day, and find them closed, I ought not to be defeated on that account. I should be allowed to go next day when the offices are open. Otherwise I should be deprived of the three years which the statute allows me.’
Those arguments are so evenly balanced that we can come down either way. The important thing to do is to lay down a rule for the future so that people can know how they stand. In laying down a rule, we can look to parallel fields of law to see the rule there. The nearest parallel is the case where a time is prescribed by rules of court for doing any act. The rule prescribed in both the County Court and the High Court is this: If the time expires on a Sunday or any other day on which the court office is closed, the act is done in time if it is done on the next day on which the court office is open. I think we should apply a similar rule when the time is prescibed by statute for doing any act. By so doing, we make the law consistent in itself; and we avoid confusion to practitioners. So I am prepared to hold that, when a time is prescribed by statute for doing any act, and that act can only be done if the court office is open on the day when the time expires, then, if it turns out in any particular case that the day is a Sunday or other dies non, the time is extended until the next day on which the court office is open.
Lord Denning MR
[1973] 1 QB 336, [1973] 1 All ER 617, [1973] 2 WLR 147
Limitation Act 1939 2
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Pritam Kaur v S Russell and Sons Ltd QBD 1-Jun-1972
The plaintiff sought damages following the death of her husband when working for the defendants. He had died on 5 September 1967 but the writ was not issued until Monday 7 September 1970. The applicable limitation period was 3 years, which the . .
Approved – Marren v Dawson Bentley and Co Ltd 1961
Compensation was sought for injuries received in the course of employment.
Held: The limitation period was to be calculated to have started on the day after the occurrence which founded the claim, the day itself being excluded from the . .

Cited by:
Applied – Aadan v Brent London Borough Council CA 3-Dec-1999
On a day when the court office is closed, the time for filing documents is accordingly extended by one day, if the expiring day would otherwise have been that day. A request for an appeal was due to be filed within 21 days. The last day was a day on . .
Cited – The Clifford Maersk QBD 25-May-1982
The defendants contracted to carry a cargo for the plaintiff. The plaintiffs asserted that it was delivered in a damaged condition. The Act required an action to be brought within one year. The defendants granted extensions of time until at last ‘up . .
Distinguished – Swainston v Hetton Victory Club Ltd CA 1983
The claimant was dismissed on 7 September 1981. The time limit of three months, expired at midnight on 6 December. Other departments shared the building entrance with the Tribunal. The front door was closed over the weekend, but there was a . .
Cited – St. Helens Metropolitan Borough Council v Barnes CA 25-Oct-2006
The claimant had delivered his claim form to the court, but it was not processed until after the limitation period had expired. The defendant appealed a finding that the claimant had brought the cliam within the necessary time.
Held: The claim . .
Cited – Mucelli v Government of Albania (Criminal Appeal From Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice) HL 21-Jan-2009
The House was asked whether someone who wished to appeal against an extradition order had an obligation also to serve his appellant’s notice on the respondent within the seven days limit, and whether the period was capable of extension by the court. . .
Cited – Modaresi, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Health SC 24-Jul-2013
The Court was asked: ‘As: (i) a public body with obligations in public law and (ii) a public authority under the Human Rights Act 1998 can the Secretary of State for Health ‘the S/S’ lawfully refuse to refer a patient’s case to the First-tier Mental . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 September 2021; Ref: scu.231055

Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Proctor: HL 1923

Viscount Cave LC said: ‘In such a case . . it is the duty of the Court of Appeal to make up its own mind not disregarding the judgment appealed from and giving special weight to that judgment in cases where the credibility of witnesses comes into question, but with full liability to draw its own inferences from the facts proved or admitted and to decide accordingly.’
Viscount Simmonds went on to say: ‘This does not mean that an appellate court should likely differ from the finding of a trial judge on a question of fact, and I would say that it would be difficult for it to do so where the finding turns solely on the credibility of the witness. But I cannot help thinking that some confusion may have arisen from failure to distinguish between the finding of a specific fact and a finding of a fact which is really an inference from facts specifically found, or, as it has sometimes been said, between the perception and evaluation of facts.’
Viscount Cave LC, Viscount Simmonds
[1923] AC 253, (1923) 39 TLR 275, (1923) 92 LJKB 479
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – The Ikarian Reefer CA 1995
The court reversed the decision of the trial judge that the plaintiff insured shipowners had not deliberately scuttled their vessel or cast her away: ‘(1) The burden of showing that the trial Judge was wrong lies on the appellant . . (2) When . .
Cited – Walker v Geo H Medlicott and Son (a Firm) CA 19-Nov-1998
The claimant said that the defendant solicitor had negligently failed to include in the will a specific devise of property in his favour.
Held: A beneficiary who alleged negligent failure of a will draftsman to include a gift to him in a will . .
Cited – Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission HL 17-Dec-1968
All Public Law Challenges are For a Nullity
The plaintiffs had owned mining property in Egypt. Their interests were damaged and or sequestrated and they sought compensation from the Respondent Commission. The plaintiffs brought an action for the declaration rejecting their claims was a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.187258

Chatterton v Watney: CA 1881

Cotton LJ said: ‘The effect of a garnishee order is to bind the debt attached and to prevent the creditor from receiving it; and when it is made absolute it gives the judgment creditor a right to recover payment from the garnishee, and by rule 8 it is provided that payment made by the garnishee under the proceeding shall be a valid discharge to him as against the judgment debtor. There is nothing in the terms of the General Order to affect any security for the debt, it only takes away the right of the judgment debtor to receive the money and gives the judgment creditor a right to receive it. It has not the effect of transferring the security, nor does it give the person who obtained the garnishee order any right to the security or any claim against the land comprised in it.’
Cotton LJ
(1881) 17 Ch D 259
England and Wales

Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.183525

Edwards v Hope: CA 1885

Set off of costs against damages award.
Bowen LJ
(1885) 14 QBD 922
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Sonia Burkett, Regina (on the Application of) v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham CA 15-Oct-2004
The appellant challenged an order for costs after dismissal of her application for judicial review of the respondent’s planning decision. The claimant had been granted legal aid at about the time of the bringing in of the new legal aid scheme. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.216499

Priddle v Fisher and Sons: CA 1968

The appellant had arranged to be represented at an industrial tribunal hearing by a trade union representative with whom he intended to travel to the hearing. However, unfortunately the union representative was unwell on the day of the hearing and unable to make the journey. The appellant himself set off on his own intending to conduct his own case but he was unable to complete the journey because of snow. He managed to get a message through to the tribunal telling the tribunal office that the trade union representative would not be appearing, and that he himself had problems getting there. He did not formally apply for an adjournment.
Held: The court overturned the decision of the industrial tribunal to proceed with the case in the absence of the appellant, because they said that the tribunal should have considered the telephone message as amounting to an application to adjourn, even though he had not asked expressly for an adjournment. The tribunal had refused to adjourn because there had been no express request for an adjournment. The exercise of discretion by a lower court may not be appealed in the absence of an error of law. In this case such an error was found.
Lord Parker CJ
[1968] 1 WLR 1478, [1968] 3 All ER 506
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Tokyo Diner Plc v S Matsumoto EAT 3-May-2001
The matter was due to come on for preliminary hearing. The respondent’s solicitor was summoned to a medical appointment only the evening before. She attended the tribunal, but left before the case was called on. There was a dispute as to whether . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.183461

McPhail v Persons, Names Unknown: CA 1973

The court was asked to make an order against persons unknown in order to recover land. Although an owner of land which was being occupied by squatters was entitled to take the remedy into his own hand, he was encouraged to go to a common law court and obtain an order that he ‘do recover’ the land, and to issue a writ of possession immediately. The sheriff would execute the writ, although once the owner had obtained his order he was entitled to take possession at once by his own hand. Because he could lawfully take possession at once without the help of the court, the courts of common law never suspended the order for possession. Anyone who was squatting on the premises could be turned out at once. There was no provision for giving any time.
Lord Denning said that a court of equity would never intervene in aid of someone wrongfully in possession of land so as to suspend an order for possession. ‘Seeing that in the case of a tenancy the owner is not entitled to regain possession himself by his own self-help, and that he is bound to come to the court to recover possession, it follows that the courts are able to fix a date on which possession shall be recovered. At any rate, the House of Lords has proceeded on that assumption (see J. and F. Stone Lighting and Radio Ltd. v. Levitt [1947] A.C. 209, 216); and Parliament has done likewise. Thus in section 138 of the County Courts Act 1888, Parliament said that at the end of a tenancy the judge may order possession to be given’ either forthwith or on or before such day as the judge shall think fit to name; . . ‘That section was repealed by the County Courts Act 1934 and replaced by a simple provision in section 48 that ‘A county court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any action for the recovery of land . . ‘ But the Act of 1934 was a consolidating Act. It did not alter the previous law. It certainly did not take away the power given by section 138 of the Act of 1888. It proceeded on the assumption that at the end of a tenancy a court has power to fix a date on or before which possession should be given. All the textbook writers, without exception, say that the county court has this power. Likewise in the Protection from Eviction Act 1964, Parliament in section 2 (1) said that when the court made an order for possession by the owner against the occupier:
‘…the court may suspend the execution of the order for such period, not exceeding 12 months from the date of the order, as the court thinks reasonable.’
That section was repealed by the Rent Act 1965 [section 52 and Schedule 7, Part 1], but Parliament cannot thereby have intended to take away the power of the court at the end of a tenancy to suspend the execution of its order. It simply left intact its previous power.
If the county court has the power at the end of the tenancy to fix a date, then the High Court must have the like power. The County Courts Acts have always provided for the transfer of actions from the county court to the High Court, and vice versa, as for instance sections 49 and 50 of the County Courts Act 1959. It cannot be that, on such a transfer, the High Court has less power than the county court.
In my opinion, therefore, when a tenancy has come to an end, the landlord is not entitled to take possession except by an order of the court: and, on making the order, the court has power to fix a date for possession.’
Lawton LJ said: ‘squatters were never able to enlist the aid of the Court of Chancery to resist a writ of possession and they cannot now. The position of tenants and licensees holding over may be different.’
Lord Denning MR, Lawton LJ
[1973] 3 All ER 393, [1973] Ch 447
Rules of the Supreme Court 113
England and Wales
Citing:
Doubted – In Re Wykeham Terrace ChD 1971
Squatters had broken into and were in occupation of vacant premises. The plaintiff owner did not know their names. He applied for an order for possession by means of an ex parte originating summons to which there was no defendant. Service was . .

Cited by:
Cited – Bloomsbury Publishing Group Ltd and J K Rowling v News Group Newspapers Ltd and others ChD 23-May-2003
The publishers had gone to great lengths to keep advance copies of a forthcoming book in the Harry Potter series secret. They became aware that some had been stolen from the printers and sought injunctions against the defendants and another unnamed . .
Cited – Kay and Another v London Borough of Lambeth and others; Leeds City Council v Price and others and others HL 8-Mar-2006
In each case the local authority sought to recover possession of its own land. In the Lambeth case, they asserted this right as against an overstaying former tenant, and in the Leeds case as against gypsies. In each case the occupiers said that the . .
Cited – Bristol City Council v Hassan and Glastonbury CA 23-May-2006
The council had obtained possession orders for two properties from secure tenants, but the orders were suspended for so long as rent arrears were being discharged. The judges had understood that a date must appear on the possession order.
Cited – Desnousse v London Borough of Newham and others CA 17-May-2006
The occupier had been granted a temporary licence by the authority under the homelessness provisions whilst it made its assessment. The assessment concluded that she had become homeless intentionally, and therefore terminated the licence and set out . .
Applied – Swordheath Properties Ltd v Floyd 1978
The rules relatng to the grant of immediate possession to a landowner as against squatters applied in the County Court just as much as in the High Court. The amount of damages payable by a trespasser on land is ordinarily the letting value of the . .
Applied – Boyland and Son Ltd v Rand and Others CA 20-Dec-2006
The defendant squatters sought leave to appeal an order for immediate possession.
Held: (As citeable authority) MacPhail remained good law despite the passing of the 1980 Act, and an order for immediate possession was correct. . .
Cited – London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm and Disability Rights Commission CA 25-Jul-2007
The court was asked, whether asked to grant possession against a disabled tenant where the grounds for possession were mandatory. The defendant was a secure tenant with a history of psychiatric disability. He had set out to buy his flat, but the . .
Still Good Law – Boyland and Son Ltd v Rand CA 20-Dec-2006
The defendant travellers occupied land belonging to the claimants. A possession order had been obtained, and the defendants now sought a reasonable time to be allowed to leave.
Held: The law had not changed, and section 89 could not be used to . .
Cited – Secretary of State for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs v Meier and Others SC 1-Dec-2009
The claimant sought a possession order to recover land from trespassers. The court considered whether a possession order was available where not all the land was occupied, and it was feared that the occupiers might simply move onto a different part. . .
Cited – Pritchard and Others v Teitelbaum and Others ChD 20-Apr-2011
The claimants sought orders allowing them to re-enter the tenanted properties after eviction in order to allow them recover their possessions left behind. Proceedings for recovery of possession had continued over several years.
Held: The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.183362

Choice Investments Ltd v Jeromnimon: CA 1981

‘[Service of the order nisi] prevents the bank from paying the money to its customer until the garnishee order is made absolute, or is discharged . . The money at the bank is then said to be ‘attached’ . . But the ‘attachment’ is not an order to pay. It only freezes the sum in the hands of the bank until the order is made absolute or is discharged. It is only when the order is made absolute that the bank is liable to pay.’
Lord Denning MR
[1981] QB 149
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Societe Eram Shipping Company Limited and others v Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd, Compagnie Internationale de Navigation HL 12-Jun-2003
The appeal concerned a final third party debt order (formerly a garnishee order). A judgment in France was registered here for enforcement. That jurisdiction was now challenged.
Held: A third party debt order is a proprietary remedy operating . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.183523

Huddersfield Banking Co Ltd v Henry Lister and Son Ltd: CA 1895

A consent order, which had been completed and acted upon, but without affecting interests of third parties, was set aside by the Court upon the ground of common mistake of fact.
Kay LJ said: ‘A compromise takes place when there is a question of doubt and the parties agree not to try it out, but to settle it between themselves by a give-and-take arrangement. I quite agree that if this was a case of that kind it would be extremely difficult to interfere with the order.’
Lindley LJ said: ‘nor have I the slightest doubt that a consent order can be impeached, not only on the ground of fraud, but upon any grounds which invalidate the agreement it expresses in a more formal way than usual.’
Vaughan Williams J said: ‘I agree that if the arrangement come to was a compromise of doubtful rights and a give-and-take arrangement, parties to it could not afterwards have the compromise set aside because upon obtaining fuller information they thought they had made a bad bargain. But, having regard to the evidence, I am of opinion that this arrangement was not a compromise or give-and-take arrangement of the sort I have referred to.’ Nevertheless a compromise agreement was a contract and it does not cease to be so when it is enshrined in a consent order, which is a ‘mere creature’ of the contract.
Lindley LJ, Vaughan Williams J, Kay LJ
[1895] 2 Ch 273
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Gerrard Ltd v Read and Another ChD 21-Dec-2001
The applicant was party to a consent order, but appealed part of it which he now asserted was unlawful.
Held: It is settled law that a consent order could be varied where the whole order was vitiated because some or all of it was unlawful. . .
Cited – Margaret Brennan v Bolt Burdon, London Borough of Islington, Leigh Day and Co QBD 30-Oct-2003
The claimant had sought relief for the injury to her health suffered by condition of her flat. The legal advisers had settled the matter, thinking that the claim had not been timeously served. The defendant appealed an order that the compromise was . .
Cited – Brennan v Bolt Burdon and Others, London Borough of Islington, Leigh Day and Co CA 29-Jul-2004
The claimant sought damages for injury alleged to have been suffered as tenant of a house after being subjected to carbon monoxide poisoning, and also from her former solicitors for their delay in her claim. The effective question was whether the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.183441

Barnett v French: CA 1981

The court considered how defendants should be named in court proceedings where their identity was unknown.
Donaldson LJ
[1981] 1 WLR 848
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Levy v Levy 9-Nov-1979
The court was prepared to use the nomination ‘John Doe’ to identify an individual whose name was not known to the court. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Bloomsbury Publishing Group Ltd and J K Rowling v News Group Newspapers Ltd and others ChD 23-May-2003
The publishers had gone to great lengths to keep advance copies of a forthcoming book in the Harry Potter series secret. They became aware that some had been stolen from the printers and sought injunctions against the defendants and another unnamed . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.183365

TC and BW v London Borough of Islington: UTAA 9 Aug 2021

When conducting a remote hearing where one of the parties and their witness/quasi-representative were hearing impaired, the First-tier Tribunal had done enough for its hearing to be a fair one. The individuals concerned had indicated strategies by which they could manage and not subsequently indicated that, after all, they could not do so and there was nothing to put the First-tier Tribunal on notice that that might be the case. Dicta of Longstaff J in Rackham v NHS Professionals Ltd UKEAT/0010/15/LA, [2015] UKEAT 0110 – 15 – 1612 regarding the importance to personal autonomy of respecting the choices of people with disabilities applied. On the evidence the key points on which the appellant was dissatisfied had not gone wrong for her because of her hearing impairment but as the result of choices made during the proceedings.
[2021] UKUT 196
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.667707

Pilkington v Wood: 1953

The plaintiff bought freehold land from a seller conveying as beneficial owner, the defendant acting as the plaintiff’s solicitor in the transaction. When the plaintiff later tried to sell the property he found the title was defective, the seller having been the trustee of the property and having committed a breach of trust in buying it himself. In the plaintiff’s action against the defendant solicitor for negligence, the latter admitted negligence but contended that before suing him the plaintiff ought to have mitigated his damage by suing the seller on an implied covenant of title.
Held: The plaintiff was not obliged, even under an indemnity against his costs, to undertake ‘complex litigation’. Even accepting that the seller was solvent and therefore worth suing, it was clear that the seller would both resist the claim and also claim over against his own solicitors and it was not clear that the plaintiff had a good claim against the seller.
Harman J: ‘I do not propose to attempt to decide whether an action against [the seller] would lie or be fruitful. I can see it would be one attended with no little difficulty. I am of opinion that the so-called duty to mitigate does not go so far as to oblige the injured party, even under an indemnity, to embark on a complicated and difficult piece of litigation against a third party. The damage to the plaintiff was done once and for all directly the voidable conveyance to him was executed. This was the direct result of the negligent advice tendered by his solicitor, the defendant, that a good title had been shown; and, in my judgment, it is no part of the plaintiff’s duty to embark on the proposed litigation in order to protect his solicitor from the consequences of his own carelessness.’
Harman J
[1953] Ch 770, [1953] 2 All ER 810
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Walker v Geo H Medlicott and Son (a Firm) CA 19-Nov-1998
The claimant said that the defendant solicitor had negligently failed to include in the will a specific devise of property in his favour.
Held: A beneficiary who alleged negligent failure of a will draftsman to include a gift to him in a will . .
Cited – Powell v Haywards (a Firm) CA 18-Feb-1999
Solicitors appealed against an order for payment of damages for professional negligence. The solicitors said that the plaintiff should have mitigated her damages.
Held: The plaintiffs had not failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate their . .
Cited – Olafsson v Foreign and Commonwealth Office QBD 22-Oct-2009
The claimant sought damages after the defendant had negligently failed to arrange for the service of the claimant’s defamation proceedings on a defendant in Iceland leaving the action time barred.
Held: The Claimant had not acted unreasonably . .
Cited – Joyce v Bowman Law Ltd ChD 18-Feb-2010
The claimant asserted negligence by the defendant licensed conveyancers in not warning him of the effect of an option in the contract. He had been advised that it would allow him to choose to buy additional land, but it was in fact a put option. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 September 2021; Ref: scu.241680

Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd: 1987

The grant of an interlocutory injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, depends on what is sometimes called the balance of convenience but is more accurately an assessment of whether granting or withholding the injunction at that stage is more likely in the end to produce a just result. The features which ordinarily justify describing an injunction as mandatory are often more likely to cause irremediable prejudice than in cases in which a defendant is merely prevented from taking or continuing with some course of action.
Hoffmann J
[1987] 1 WLR 670
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Gujadhur and others v Gujadhur and Another PC 26-Jul-2007
(Mauritius) In a family company, some shares were held as nominees. When called to retransfer them, they said the agreement was statute-barred.
Held: The requirements of the refere procedure were satisfied and that a mandatory order should be . .
Cited – EE and Brian Smith (1928) Ltd v Hodson and others CA 23-Nov-2007
The defendants appealed grant of an interim injunction to enforce restrictive employment covenants. The second defendant had sold his interest in the claimant company in 2001, but after his consultancy ended, he set up another business, the third . .
Cited – National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd v Olint Corp Ltd (Jamaica) PC 28-Apr-2009
Jamaica – The customer appealed against refusal of an order requiring its bank not to close the customer accounts after the customer had been accused of fraud. There was no evidence that the account was being used unlawfully.
Held: In the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 September 2021; Ref: scu.258618

Regina v Leicester City Justices, ex parte Barrow: CA 1 Aug 1991

The appellant challenged a community charge liability order in which justices had refused an application made on his behalf for a friend to be allowed to sit with him to give advice and assistance. He sought judicial review. The Divisional Court had refused review.
Held: The appeal succeeded. ‘A party to proceedings has a right to present his own case and in so doing to arm himself with such assistance as he thinks appropriate, subject to the right of the court to intervene . . if a party arms himself with assistance in order the better himself to present his case, it is not a question of seeking the leave of the court. It is a question of the court objecting and restricting him in the use of this assistance, if it is clearly unreasonable in nature or degree or if it becomes apparent that the ‘assistance’ is not being provided bona fide, but for an improper purpose or is being provided in a way which is inimical to the proper and efficient administration of justice by, for example, causing the party to waste time, advising the introduction of irrelevant issues or the asking of irrelevant or repetitious questions.’ The court expressed its hope that as regards the term ‘McKenzie Friend’: ‘the fervent hope . . that we shall hear no more of ‘McKenzie friends’ as if they were a form of unqualified legal assistant known to the law.’ Such terminology obscures the real issue which is fairness or unfairness. Let the term ‘McKenzie friend’ join the ‘Piltdown man’ in decent obscurity.’
On the facts ‘I cannot be sure that the applicants were not prejudiced and accordingly I have no doubt that the justices’ order should be quashed.’
Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR said: ‘It is important to appreciate that in this case we are not concerned with rights of audience or rights to conduct litigation. Rights to conduct litigation are not relevant to proceedings on a summons claiming a community charge liability order, whilst the applicants’ right of audience as parties to the proceedings has never been called into question and neither they nor Mr John sought any right of audience for him. The applicants’ case came on for hearing at a time when, for good reason, the court was closed to the general public, other than representatives of the press, and the applicants, represented by Ms Jones, rightly sought (and needed) the leave of the justices to enable Mr John to enter the court. The reason put forward by Ms Jones was that the applicants wished Mr John to assist them in presenting their cases to the court by taking notes, quietly making suggestions to the applicants and giving the applicants advice.
The justices’ refusal to allow Mr John to enter the court may well have aggrieved Mr John, but he is not a party to these proceedings. In so far as he has a legitimate grievance, it could only be on the basis that he was a member of the public who wanted to be a spectator in court, for, not having a right of audience on behalf of the applicants, he personally had no other right. The applicants are in a different position. They have a right to be heard in their own defence. Fairness, which is fundamental to all court proceedings, dictates that they shall be given all reasonable facilities for exercising this right and, in case of doubt, they should be given the benefit of that doubt for courts must not only act fairly, but be seen to act fairly. The real issue in this appeal is whether the Leicester City justices acted fairly and were seen to act fairly in the circumstances of this case. That they sought to do so in a difficult situation is not in doubt, but they may not have succeeded. References to ‘McKenzie Friends’ and still more to a ‘right to a McKenzie Friend’ mislead, because they suggest that someone who seeks to assist a litigant in person has a special status akin to, if less than, that of one who has a right to audience or a right to conduct litigation. The ‘McKenzie Friend’ does not exist at all as such and has neither status nor rights. The only right is that of the litigant and his right is to reasonable assistance which can take many forms.’
Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR
[1991] 2 QB 260
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – McKenzie v McKenzie CA 10-Jul-1970
Mr McKenzie was a litigant in person who wished to be assisted by a young Australian barrister, gratuitously, in the conduct of his case by sitting beside the husband in Court and prompting him. The hearing was in open Court . The friend’s conduct . .
Approved – Re G (Chambers Proceedings: McKenzie friend) CA 10-Jul-1991
A proposed McKenzie friend was a solicitor who was to be paid, but did not wish to be on the record. H appealed a refusal to allow him to be present in chambers. The Judge had taken the view that the proceedings were of a highly confidential nature . .

Cited by:
Cited – O and others (Children); In re O (Children), In re W-R (a Child), In re W (Children) CA 22-Jun-2005
In each case litigants in person had sought to be allowed to have the assistance and services of a Mackenzie friend in children cases. In one case, the court had not allowed confidential documents to be disclosed to the friend.
Held: The . .
Cited – Regina v Horseferry Road Justices ex parte Hillier Admn 9-Oct-1998
Challenge to conviction based upon evidence as to contents of evidence bags where there was a discontinuity in its custody. Counsel complained that he had been badgered by the stipendiary magistrate into revealing his defence in advance.
Held: . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 September 2021; Ref: scu.227948

Alan Raymond Myles v Barry Heywood: ScSf 10 Sep 2001

The pursuer craved from the Sheriff an interim interdict against the Procurator Fiscal from proceeding with a criminal charge.
Held: the Sheriff sitting in a civil court has no power to restrain criminal proceedings by the Procurator Fiscal, even though the pursuer sought to enforce his Convention rights. The general rule, under the 1947 Act, is that interdict against the Crown cannot be granted.
[2001] ScotSC 16
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights Article 8, Crown Proceedings Act 1947 21(1) 42 43
Scotland

Updated: 12 September 2021; Ref: scu.166524

Regina v Cotham: QBD 30 Apr 1898

By 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 4, licensing justices at special transfer sessions have power to license persons, ‘ intending to keep inns theretofore kept by other persons being about to remove from such inns/’ to sell exciseable liquors by retail. Justices, acting under that section, granted a licence by way of transfer from a person who was not and had not been in occupation of the premises in respect of which he held it, and no exciseable liquors had been sold upon those premises for many years.
Held: that as the justices had disregarded the provisions of the statute giving them jurisdiction, and must have acted upon some considerations altogether outside that statute, they had not heard and determined the matter according to law, and that a mandamus ought to go commanding them so to hear and determine it.
To obtain an order of mandamus, the applicant must show that he has a sufficient interest.
Matters ‘absolutely apart from the matters which by law ought to be taken into consideration’ must be ignored.
Kennedy J. noted the distinction between, on the one hand, disregarding the provisions of a statute and considering matters which ought not to be considered and, on the other hand, what he called ‘a mere misconstruction of an Act of Parliament.’
Kennedy J
[1898] 1 QB 802
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 09 September 2021; Ref: scu.258764

In re Phelps: CA 1980

The intestate’s widow notified her husband’s personal representative that she had elected to exercise her statutory right to the matrimonial home. At first instance, Foster J held that the words ‘in or towards satisfaction’ were only applicable where the value of the entitlement was equal to, or exceeded, the value of the property, and were not applicable in a case where the entitlement would be more than satisfied by the appropriation. In such a case, the surviving spouse had no right of election.
Held: The appeal was allowed. There would be no point or purpose in the words ‘in or towards satisfaction’ they were to be confined to cases where either the value of the entitlement exceeded that of the property, or was exactly equal to it. The effect of the statute was to extend the power of appropriation by an administrator of an intestate’s estate to include a transaction that is partly an appropriation and partly a sale; and, in the light of the apparent policy of the Schedule, this confers a right of election upon the surviving spouse where the value of the property exceeds that of the entitlement but in which case the surviving spouse must make a cash payment to the deceased’s estate equal to the difference.
It is not only permissible but necessary to have regard to cross-headings in statutes.
Templeman LJ said: ‘The effect of the section is that for purposes of Schedule 2 a transaction which in essence is partly appropriation and partly sale becomes an appropriation, and Schedule 2 must be read as if the section included this new hybrid power of appropriation . . The section does not merely confer a new power
on the personal representatives; it directs that the power of appropriation under
section shall include the new power . . the object of that wording is to ensure that when, pursuant to the statute, the surviving spouse requires the personal representative to exercise the power conferred that requirement will include a duty to exercise where appropriate that power as extended.’
Buckley, Templeman and Bridge LJJ
[1980] 1 Ch 275
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Ahsan v Carter CA 28-Jul-2005
The claimant sought to assert race discrimination by the Labour Party in not selecting him as a political candidate. The defendant, chairman of the party appealed.
Held: A political party when selecting candidates was not acting as a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 September 2021; Ref: scu.229698

In re Wareing: 1948

A decision of the House of Lords had established that an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal on the liability of certain annuities to tax was wrong.
Held: The decision of the Court of Appeal nevertheless continued to bind the annuitant who had been party to it. It did not, by contrast, bind the annuitant who had not been a party.
Jenkins J
[1948] Ch 221
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Ahsan v Carter CA 28-Jul-2005
The claimant sought to assert race discrimination by the Labour Party in not selecting him as a political candidate. The defendant, chairman of the party appealed.
Held: A political party when selecting candidates was not acting as a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 September 2021; Ref: scu.229693

Bradlaugh v Clarke: HL 1883

The use of the word ‘like’ is apt to incorporate all the features of the principal subject.
Brett LJ
(1883) 8 App Cas 354, H L (E )
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Clarke v Bradlaugh CA 1881
The defendant had sat and voted in parliament without taking the statutory oath. The writ was issued on the same day. The defendant argued that since the writ was deemed to have been issued at the start of the day, the events on which the claim was . .

Cited by:
Cited – BBC Enterprises Ltd v Hi-Tech Xtravision Ltd and Others CA 21-Dec-1989
The plaintiff sold television entertainment through subscriptions. The broadcasts were protected by encryption. The defendant sold equipment which could unscramble the broadcasts. They were sued under the section. At first instance, the claim was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 September 2021; Ref: scu.181056

Jalla and Others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Others: TCC 21 Jul 2021

Issue as to whether the claimants’ purported legal representatives, Rosenblatt Limited, have authority to act
[2021] EWHC 2121 (TCC)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
See Also – Jalla and Others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Others TCC 20-Jul-2021
Claimants’ application for an extension of time in respect of both claims currently before the court – service of witness statements . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 September 2021; Ref: scu.667724

The Front Door (UK) Ltd (T/A Richard Reid Associates) v The Lower Mill Estate Ltd: TCC 17 Aug 2021

Application by the Claimant to join the three proposed defendants to the claim and an application to amend the Particulars of Claim in the form of an updated draft. The applications are opposed on the grounds that the claims have no real prospect of success, arguably the claims are statute-barred and they are inadequately particularised.
Mrs Justice O’Farrell
[2021] EWHC 2324 (TCC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 08 September 2021; Ref: scu.667734

Strover and Another v Strover and Another: ChD 10 May 2005

Insurance policies had been taken out by the partners in a firm. The surviving family of one and the remaining partners contested ownership. The policy was held in part for the benefit of the family. The premiums had been paid from partnership funds, but from drawings accounts. The premiums had continued to be paid by the partnership after his retirement and also after his death.
Held: The trusts should be rectified to hold part of the proceeds for the defendant family members. The family had not raised the issue of an estoppel in their pleadings, but the judge finding that such a pleading was proper, he could apply an estoppel in the absence of it being pleaded.
Hart J
[2005] EWHC 860 (Ch), Times 30-May-2005
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Inwards v Baker CA 13-Jan-1965
An indulgent father had encouraged his son to build a bungalow on his, the father’s, land. The son had done so in the expectation, encouraged by the father, that he would be permitted to remain in occupation.
Held: The court formulated the . .
Cited – Oxley v Hiscock CA 6-May-2004
oxley_hiscockCA2004
The parties were not married, but had brought together their resources to purchase a home in the name of one of them. Nothing had been said about the respective shares on which the property was to be held.
Held: The shares were to be assessed . .
Cited – Ramsden v Dyson HL 1866
The Vice-Chancellor had held that two tenants of Sir John Ramsden, the owner of a large estate near Huddersfield, were entitled to long leases of plots on the estate. They ostensibly held the plots as tenants at will only, but they had spent their . .
Cited – Grant v Edwards and Edwards CA 24-Mar-1986
A couple were not married but lived together in Vincent Farmhouse in which the plaintiff claimed a beneficial interest on separation. The female partner was told by the male partner that the only reason for not acquiring the property in joint names . .
Cited – Willmott v Barber ChD 19-Jun-1880
In 1869 Barber granted a 99-year lease of three acres of land in east London, subject to a covenant against assignment or sub-letting without consent. In 1874, in breach of covenant, he sub-let one acre on an annual tenancy to Willmott (who owned a . .
Cited – Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd (in Liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd CA 1982
The court explained the nature of an estoppel by convention.
Lord Denning MR said: ‘The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with cases. That is why I have not gone . .
Cited – Grant v Edwards and Edwards CA 24-Mar-1986
A couple were not married but lived together in Vincent Farmhouse in which the plaintiff claimed a beneficial interest on separation. The female partner was told by the male partner that the only reason for not acquiring the property in joint names . .
Cited – Jennings v Rice, Wilson, Marsh, Norris, Norris, and Reed CA 22-Feb-2002
The claimant asserted a proprietary estoppel against the respondents. He had worked for the deceased over many years, for little payment, and doing more and more for her. Though he still worked full time at first, he came to spend nights at the . .
Cited – Crabb v Arun District Council CA 23-Jul-1975
The plaintiff was led to believe that he would acquire a right of access to his land. In reliance on that belief he sold off part of his land, leaving the remainder landlocked.
Held: His claim to have raised an equity was upheld. The plaintiff . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 September 2021; Ref: scu.224888

Zumax Nigeria Ltd v First City Monument Bank Plc: ChD 14 Jul 2020

Allegation that a receiving bank had not credited accounts with sums transferred in. After the allegations had been rejected on appeal, the claimant was ordered to pay sums on account of costs and as security for costs, of being allowed to amend its claims. The defend sought dismissal of the claims in default.
Miles J
[2020] EWHC 1852 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 07 September 2021; Ref: scu.652775

Miailhe v France (No 2): ECHR 26 Sep 1996

Hudoc Preliminary objection joined to merits (victim); Preliminary objection rejected (victim); Preliminary objection rejected (non-exhaustion); Preliminary objection rejected (ratione materiae); No violation of Art. 6-1.
Questions as to the admissibility of evidence are for the national court.
[1996] ECHR 42, 18978/91, (1996) 23 EHRR 491
Worldlii, Bailii
Human Rights
Citing:
See Also – Miailhe v France (No 1) ECHR 25-Feb-1993
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Preliminary objection rejected (non-exhaustion); Violation of Art. 8; Just satisfaction reserved . .

Cited by:
Cited – Hammond, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 1-Dec-2005
The claimants had been convicted of murder, but their tariffs had not yet been set when the 2003 Act came into effect. They said that the procedure under which their sentence tarriffs were set were not compliant with their human rights in that the . .
Cited – Ofulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 September 2021; Ref: scu.165448

N v ACCG and Others: SC 22 Mar 2017

The local authority and a young man’s parents disputed his continued care, he having substantial incapacities. The parents wanted assistance caring for him on visits home. The LA declined to fund that support. The LA now argued that the CoP had not had the jurisdiction sought. This was a public law issue challengeable only by judicial review. The CoP had only the ability to choose between the options offered.
Held: The appeal failed: ‘This was not a case in which the court did not have jurisdiction to continue with the planned hearing. It was a case in which the court did not have power to order the CCG to fund what the parents wanted. Nor did it have power to order the actual care providers to do that which they were unwilling or unable to do. In those circumstances, the court was entitled to conclude that, in the exercise of its case management powers, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the hearing.’
‘the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection (and for that matter the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court relating to people who lack capacity) is limited to decisions that a person is unable to take for himself. It is not to be equated with the jurisdiction of family courts under the Children Act 1989, to take children away from their families and place them in the care of a local authority, which then acquires parental responsibility for, and numerous statutory duties towards, those children. There is no such thing as a care order in respect of a person of 18 or over. Nor is the jurisdiction to be equated with the wardship jurisdiction of the High Court. Both may have their historical roots in the ancient powers of the Crown as parens patriae over people who were then termed infants, idiots and the insane. But the Court of Protection does not become the guardian of an adult who lacks capacity and the adult does not become the ward of the court.’
The issue is not one of jurisdiction in the usual sense of whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the case. After all, the Court of Protection made the orders which it was asked to make in this case and no-one has suggested that it had no jurisdiction to do so. It was seized of an application properly made by the authorities responsible for providing services for MN. The context was a care order giving the local authority parental responsibility for him which was about to come to an end. No doubt if there had been no dispute with the family about his care, there would have been no need to make an application. Section 5 of the 2005 Act gives a general authority, to act in relation to the care or treatment of P, to those caring for him who reasonably believe both that P lacks capacity in relation to the matter and that it will be in P’s best interests for the act to be done. This will usually suffice, unless the decision is so serious that the court itself has said it must be taken to court. But if there is a dispute (or if what is to be done amounts to a deprivation of liberty for which there is no authorisation under the ‘deprivation of liberty safeguards’ in Schedule A1 to the 2005 Act) then it may be necessary to bring the case to court, as the authorities did in this case. The court clearly has jurisdiction to make any of the orders or declarations provided for in the Act. The question is not strictly one of jurisdiction but of how the case should be handled in the light of the limited powers of the court.
Lady Hale, Deputy President, Lord Wilson, Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath, Lord Hughes
[2017] UKSC 22, [2017] 2 WLR 1011, [2017] WLR(D) 202, UKSC 2015/0238, (2017) 155 BMLR 1, [2017] COPLR 200, (2017) 20 CCL Rep 133, [2017] 3 All ER 719, [2017] AC 549
Bailii, SC, SC Summary, SC Summary Video, SC 161214 am Video, SC 161214 pm Video, SC 161215 am Video, WLRD
Mental Capacity Act 2005
England and Wales
Citing:
At CoP – ACCG and Another v MN and Others CoP 20-Nov-2013
Application for order under the 2005 Act restricting contact between the young adult child with disabilities and his family. Eleanor King J described his condition saying he had: ‘severe learning and physical disabilities together with autism and an . .
Cited – A v Liverpool City Council HL 1981
Though the child was subject to a care order in favour of the local authority, a wardship order was sought.
Held: Once a care order had been made, whether final or interim, the court was effectively faced with a choice and not a choice which . .
Leave to Appeal CA – ACCG and Another v MN CA 25-Jun-2014
Two renewed applications for permission to appeal from a judgment of the CoP regarding provision of support for home visits for a young adult with severe health difficulties and the scope of the power of the CoP to make provisions. . .
Cited – F v West Berkshire Health Authority HL 17-Jul-1990
The parties considered the propriety of a sterilisation of a woman who was, through mental incapacity, unable to give her consent.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and the operation would be lawful if the doctor considered it to be in the best . .
Cited – AN v Lithuania ECHR 31-May-2016
Where the court cited article 12 of the Convention (para 69) and held that where a measure of protection is necessary, it should be proportionate to the degree of incapacity and tailored to the individual’s circumstances and needs . .
Cited – St Helens Borough Council v PE and Another FD 29-Dec-2006
The court has jurisdiction to grant whatever relief in declaratory form is necessary to safeguard and promote a vulnerable adult’s welfare and interests. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court encompasses situations in which the necessity . .
Cited – KC and Another v City of Westminster Social and Community Services Dept. and Another; Westminster City Council v C and others CA 19-Mar-2008
A ‘marriage’ though valid under both Sharia law and the lex loci celebrationis despite the manifest incapacity of one of the parties was not, on grounds of public policy, entitled to recognition in English law.
The 2005 Act has not abolished . .
Cited – Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond Upon Thames HL 4-Feb-2009
The father had been awarded shared residence for three children. He asked the local authority to provide appropriate housing.
Held: The authority’s appeal succeeded.
‘When any family court decides with whom the children of separated . .
Cited – XCC v AA and Another (Rev 3) CoP 26-Jul-2012
The scope of the declarations which may be made by the Court of Protection under section 15 may be narrower than the scope of those which may be made in the High Court . .
Cited – Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James SC 30-Oct-2013
The hospital where a gravely ill man had been treated had asked for a declaration that it would be in his best interests to withhold certain life-sustaining treatments from him. When can it be in the best interests of a living patient to withhold . .
Cited – Mcdonald v The United Kingdom ECHR 20-May-2014
Decisions about the allocation of limited resources may well be justified as necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the country. . .
Cited – Re MN (Adult) CA 7-May-2015
The parties disputed the care of MN, a young adult without capacity.
Held: Munby P gave four reasons why the Court of Protection should not embark on the kind of process for which the parents contended: first, it is not its proper function to . .
Cited – KD and Another v London Borough of Havering CoP 19-Oct-2009
The court may determine a case summarily of its own motion, but their power ‘must be exercised appropriately and with a modicum of restraint’. . .
Cited – Gard And Others v The UK ECHR 13-Jun-2017
ECHR Decision . .
Cited – An NHS Trust and Others v Y and Another SC 30-Jul-2018
The court was asked whether a court order must always be obtained before clinically assisted nutrition and hydration, which is keeping alive a person with a prolonged disorder of consciousness, can be withdrawn, or whether, in some circumstances, . .
Cited – W v M and Others CoP 28-Sep-2011
Baker J pointed out that ‘there is a spectrum of minimal consciousness extending from patients who are only just above the vegetative state to those who are bordering on full consciousness.’
Orse W (by her litigation friend, B) v M (by her . .
Cited – Burke, Regina (on the Application of) v General Medical Council and others (Official Solicitor and others intervening) CA 28-Jul-2005
The claimant suffered a congenital degenerative brain condition inevitably resulting in a future need to receive nutrition and hydration by artificial means. He was concerned that a decision might be taken by medical practitioners responsible for . .
Cited – Lambert And Others v France ECHR 5-Jun-2015
The applicants alleged, in particular, that the withdrawal of Vincent Lambert’s artificial nutrition and hydration would be in breach of the State’s obligations under Article 2 of the Convention, would constitute ill-treatment amounting to torture . .
Cited – KU (A Child) v Liverpool City Council CA 27-Apr-2005
The solicitor appealed an order which made the success fee payable different at diferent stages of the court action.
Held: The court had no power to make such an order. To the extent that the CPR might suggest otherwise they were wrong. . .
Cited – Glass v The United Kingdom ECHR 9-Mar-2004
The applicant’s adult son was disabled. There was a disagreement with the hospital about his care. The hospital considered that to alleviate his distress, he should not be resuscitated. The family wanted to take him home, fearing euthanasia. The . .
Cited – S, In re (hospital patient: court’s jurisdiction) FD 1995
Hale J said: ‘ . . what is sought in this case is the preservation of the status quo while proper inquiries are made. The appropriate way to achieve this is obviously by way of an interlocutory injunction … if the position is not yet known, then . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 05 September 2021; Ref: scu.581028

Sony Music Entertainment (Uk) Limited, Sony Music Entertainment Inc , Polydor Limited, Umg Recordings Inc , Virgin Records Limited v Easyinternetcafe Limited: ChD 28 Jan 2003

The claimant sought damages from the defendants who ran an internet cafe where its visitors downloaded files from the Internet and then copied the files onto CDs, so infringing copyrights owned by the claimants.
Held: The defendants were not paid directly for the copying, but it was part of the charge for the service. Whatever defence might have been available to the private customers under section 70, the intervention for profit by the defendant defeated that defence. Liability for infringement was strict. On a Part 24 hearing, the court should not be told of the existence of a Part 36 offer.
The Honourable Mr Justice Peter Smith
Times 06-Feb-2003
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 17(1) 18(1) 70
England and Wales

Updated: 05 September 2021; Ref: scu.178793

Republic of India and Others v India Steamship Co Ltd; The Indian Endurance and The Indian Grace: CA 1992

Munitions were consigned to Cochin on board the defendants’ vessel. A fire occurred, and part was jettisoned, the remainder being damaged. The cargo owners first claimed damages in India for short delivery under the bills of lading for the jettisoned cargo. The Indian judge held that the defendants were liable for the value of the undelivered cargo, about pounds 6,000. The plaintiffs then sued in rem in London for pounds 2.6 million for the total loss of the cargo. The Indian claim pleaded short delivery of the cargo delivered at Cochin, viz. 51 shells (and a small item described as ‘charge green bag’). The claim was advanced under one of the two bills of lading under which the consignment was shipped. In the plaint, it was alleged that the ship-owners had been guilty of negligence while the cargo was in transit in the vessel, which was taken to refer to a breach of their duty as bailees (carriers for reward). It was either common ground (or found by the Indian judge) that the contract incorporated the Hague Rules. The claim in the English action was in the ordinary form for a damage to cargo claim, alleging against the ship-owners (1) breach of contract and/or duty as carrier by sea for reward to deliver the goods in like good order and condition as when shipped; (2) negligence, in breach of duty as carriers and/or as bailees for reward; and (3) breach of their obligations under article III(1) and (2) of the Hague-Visby Rules, which apply to the contracts contained in or evidenced by the two bills of lading under which the goods were shipped. One issue in the Court of Appeal was the relevance of Indian law to the question of cause of action estoppel. Leggatt LJ: ‘For my part, I see nothing in the suggestion that evidence of Indian law is required in order to establish that the cause of action sued on in India was the same as that relied on here. I accept Mr. Gruder’s submission that it is a matter for English law to determine whether the causes of action were the same; there is no evidence or argument that they were not and, until the contrary is proved, Indian law must be presumed to be the same as English law. With the effect of the Indian judgment in India we are not concerned.’
Leggatt LJ
[1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 124
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Republic of India and Others v India Steamship Co Ltd (‘The Indian Endurance and The Indian Grace’) (No 1) HL 29-Mar-1993
Munitions were being carried to Cochin on board the defendants’ vessel. Some was jettisoned in a fire and the remainder was damaged. The cargo owners sought damages in India for short delivery under the bills of lading, as to the jettisoned cargo . .
Cited – Barrett v Universal-Island Records Ltd and others ChD 15-May-2006
The claimant was entitled to share in the copyright royalties of Bob Marley and the Wailers, and claimed payment from the defendants. The defendants said that the matters had already been settled and that the claim was an abuse of process, and also . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 03 September 2021; Ref: scu.251635

Republic of India and Others v India Steamship Co Ltd (‘The Indian Endurance and The Indian Grace’) (No 1): HL 29 Mar 1993

Munitions were being carried to Cochin on board the defendants’ vessel. Some was jettisoned in a fire and the remainder was damaged. The cargo owners sought damages in India for short delivery under the bills of lading, as to the jettisoned cargo only. The defendants were held liable for the value of the undelivered cargo. The plaintiffs then sued in rem in London for the total loss. The claim in the Indian action was for short delivery and was advanced under one of the two bills of lading under which the consignment was shipped, pleading negligence in the shipowners. This was taken to refer to a breach of their duty as bailees (carriers for reward). It was either common ground (or found by the Indian judge) that the contract incorporated the Hague Rules. The claim in the English action was in the ordinary form for a damage to cargo claim, alleging against the shipowners (1) breach of contract and/or duty as carrier by sea for reward to deliver the goods in like good order and condition as when shipped; (2) negligence, in breach of duty as carriers and/or as bailees for reward; and (3) breach of their obligations under article III(1) and (2) of the Hague-Visby Rules, which apply to the contracts contained in or evidenced by the two bills of lading under which the goods were shipped. The House considered whether the causes of action alleged in the two actions were the same.
Held: Because the Act operated to bar the commencement of proceedings, rather than to exclude the jurisdiction of the court per se, the parties were entitled to contract explicitly, or by waiver or otherwise to exclude the operation of the Act, and to give jurisdiction to the UK court. The operation of the res judicata doctrine is subject to exception for plea of waiver or estoppel.
Lord Goff of Chieveley said: ‘the goods in question were shipped under a contract of carriage the terms of which (as set out in the Hague Rules or the Hague-Visby Rules) regulate the respective rights and obligations of the parties. In these circumstances, the mere fact that the pleader can, so to speak, get the case on its feet by alleging short delivery or delivery of the goods not in the like good order and condition as when shipped, does not in my opinion assist. For it is wholly unrealistic to regard the cause of action as being other than a cause of action arising under the contract, which provides for the relevant duties of the shipowners regarding the seaworthiness of the ship and the care of the goods. Even if attention is concentrated on the liability of the shipowner as bailee, the fact remains that he is a bailee for reward, and that accordingly his liability will be governed by the terms of the contract of carriage . . Here . . it is necessary to identify the relevant breach of contract; and if it transpires that the cause of action in the first action is a breach of contract which is the same breach of contract which constitutes the cause of action in the second, then the principle of res judicata applies, and the plaintiff cannot escape from the conclusion by pleading in the second action particulars of damage which were not pleaded in the first.’ and ‘[The present case] is rather concerned with a single incident, i.e., the fire during transit which broke out in the cargo over which the plaintiffs’ consignment of munitions was stowed, which resulted in the damage to that consignment and to loss (by jettison) of a small part of it. Furthermore, as appears from the pleadings, that loss or damage might have resulted from breach of more than one term of the contract, for example breach of the obligation to make the vessel seaworthy under article III, rule 1, of the Hague-Visby Rules, or breach of the obligation to load and stow, etc., the vessel carefully under article III, rule 2. However, for present purposes, there is no need to distinguish between the two breaches; because the factual basis relied upon by the plaintiffs as giving rise to the two breaches is the same, and indeed was referred to compendiously by the plaintiffs in the Cochin action as ‘negligence’. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that there is identity between the causes of action in the two sets of proceedings.’
Lord Goff of Chieveley
Gazette 07-Apr-1993, Ind Summary 29-Mar-1993, [1993] 2 WLR 461, [1993] AC 410, [1993] 1 All ER 998
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 34
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Republic of India and Others v India Steamship Co Ltd; The Indian Endurance and The Indian Grace CA 1992
Munitions were consigned to Cochin on board the defendants’ vessel. A fire occurred, and part was jettisoned, the remainder being damaged. The cargo owners first claimed damages in India for short delivery under the bills of lading for the . .

Cited by:
Cited – Meretz Investments Nv and Another v ACP Ltd and others ChD 30-Jan-2006
The applicant challenged the exercise of a power of sale under a mortgage, saying that the mortgagee’s purposes included purposes not those under the mortgage. The parties had been involved in an attempted development of a penthouse.
Held: The . .
Cited – Sarwar v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (Rev 1) ChD 27-Jul-2011
The claimant appealed against a finding of indebtedness to the bank. He had said at trial that the bank had been charging interest at 25%. The bank denied this, but after trial it became clear that he had been correct. The bank argued for abuse of . .
Cited – Moorjani and Others v Durban Estates Ltd and Another TCC 15-May-2019
Allegations of breach of landlords’ repairing obligations – defendants’ strike out application.
Held: ‘ the critical question is whether this second action is based on the same cause, or causes, of action, and not whether it pleads the same . .
See Also – Republic of India v India Steamship Co Ltd (Indian Endurance and Grace (No 2) CA 1-May-1996
An action against ship in rem prevents a personal action against the owner; there would be a risk of double jeopardy. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 03 September 2021; Ref: scu.88741

Clibbery v Allan and Another: FD 2 Jul 2001

There is nothing inherently different in Family Division proceedings to justify an implied ban on all disclosures of matters proceeding in chambers. Here no children or other sensitive matters were involved. The simple filing of an affidavit containing material in the Family division could not thereby create any confidentiality in that material. The instant material was not covered by any other undertaking implied in the court process, and the restriction on publication was discharged.
Times 02-Jul-2001, Gazette 05-Jul-2001, [2001] 2 FLR 819
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Allan v Clibbery (1) CA 30-Jan-2002
Save in cases involving children and ancillary and other situations requiring it, cases in the family division were not inherently private. The appellant failed to obtain an order that details of an action under the section should not be disclosed . .
Cited – Kent County Council v The Mother, The Father, B (By Her Children’s Guardian); Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) FD 19-Mar-2004
The council had taken the applicant’s children into care alleging that the mother had harmed them. In the light of the subsequent cases casting doubt on such findings, the mother sought the return of her children. She applied now that the hearings . .
Cited – P v BW (Children Cases: Hearings in Public) FD 2003
The applicant sought a joint residence order, and for a declaration that the rules preventing such hearings being in public breached the requirement for a public hearing.
Held: Both FPR 1991 rule 4.16(7) and section 97 are compatible with the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 03 September 2021; Ref: scu.79220

Deweer v Belgium: ECHR 27 Feb 1980

The applicant, a Belgian butcher, paid a fine by way of settlement in the face of an order for the closure of his shop until judgment was given in an intended criminal prosecution or until such fine was paid.
Held: Since the payment was made in circumstances of constraint and under protest, a violation of Article 6(1) was found. However: ‘The ‘right to a court’, which is a constituent element of the right to a fair trial, is no more absolute in criminal than in civil matters. In the Contracting States’ domestic legal systems, a waiver of this kind is frequently encountered both in civil matters, notably in the shape of arbitration clauses in contracts, and in criminal matters in the shape inter alia of fines paid by way of composition. The waiver, which has undeniable advantages for the individual concerned as well as for the administration of justice, does not in principle offend against the Convention; on this point the court shares the view of the Commission.’ The court looks behind the appearances and investigates the realities of the procedure.
The court decided:
‘(a) ‘Criminal charge’ is an ‘autonomous’ concept which must be understood within the meaning of the Convention.
(b) The term has a ‘substantive’ rather than a ‘formal’ meaning.
(c) On the facts, the Court held the proceedings against the applicant had constituted a ‘criminal charge’ which could be defined as ‘the official notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence’.’
The Court reflected this: ‘There accordingly exists a combination of concordant factors conclusively demonstrating that the case has a criminal character under the Convention. The ‘charge’ could, for the purposes of Article 6(1), be defined as the official notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence. In several decisions and opinions the Commission has adopted a test that appears to be fairly closely related, namely, whether ‘the situation of the [suspect] has been substantially affected’.’
H Mosler, P
6903/75, (1980) 2 EHRR 439, [1980] ECHR 1, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 439, [1980] ECC 169
Worldlii, Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 6(1)
Human Rights
Cited by:
Cited – Di Placito v Slater and others CA 19-Dec-2003
The parties had earlier compromised their dispute, with the claimant undertaking not to lodge any further claim unless he did so within a certain time. They now sought to commence action.
Held: When considering whether to discharge such an . .
Cited – Clingham (formerly C (a minor)) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea; Regina v Crown Court at Manchester Ex parte McCann and Others HL 17-Oct-2002
The applicants had been made subject of anti-social behaviour orders. They challenged the basis upon which the orders had been made.
Held: The orders had no identifiable consequences which would make the process a criminal one. Civil standards . .
Cited – Stretford v The Football Association Ltd and Another CA 21-Mar-2007
The claimant was a football player’s agent. The licensing scheme required disputes, including disciplinary procedures, to be referred to arbitration. He denied that the rule had been incorporated in the contract. He also complained that the . .
Cited – Nordstrom-Janzon v The Netherlands ECHR 1996
The parties had settled an earlier dispute under a joint venture agreement on terms which included a provision that disputes between them should not be settled by the ordinary courts but by a special arbitration procedure. The arbitrators rejected . .
Cited – Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust etc CA 11-May-2004
The court considered the effect on costs orders of a refusal to take part in alternate dispute resolution procedures. The defendant Trust had refused to take the dispute to a mediation. In neither case had the court ordered or recommended ADR.
Cited – Eckle v Germany ECHR 15-Jul-1982
Two fraud prosecutions against the claimants had lasted for 15 and 20 years respectively.
Held: Article 6.1 applies to all stages of criminal proceedings, including sentencing and any appeal. The ‘reasonable time’ in criminal matters, . .
Cited – Zaichenko v Russia ECHR 18-Feb-2010
(First Section) The claimant complaned that he had not been allowed access to a lawyer when being questioned by police when he was not under arrest. He had been stopped driving home from work and his car inspected by the police after reports of . .
Cited – Ambrose v Harris, Procurator Fiscal, Oban, etc SC 6-Oct-2011
(Scotland) The appellant had variously been convicted in reliance on evidence gathered at different stages before arrest, but in each case without being informed of any right to see a solicitor. The court was asked, as a devolution issue, at what . .
Cited – McGowan (Procurator Fiscal) v B SC 23-Nov-2011
The appellant complained that after arrest, though he had been advised of his right to legal advice, and had declined the offer, it was still wrong to have his subsequent interview relied upon at his trial.
Held: It was not incompatible with . .
Cited – Wright v Michael Wright Supplies Ltd and Another CA 27-Mar-2013
The appellant said that the judge had erred in allowing only written evidence. The case was long running, complex, unwieldy and the intransigent parties were each acting as litigants in person.
Held: The court asked whether mediation might not . .
Cited – O’Neill v Her Majesty’s Advocate No 2 SC 13-Jun-2013
The appellants had been convicted of murder, it being said that they had disposed of her body at sea. They now said that the delay between being first questioned and being charged infringed their rights to a trial within a reasonable time, and . .
Cited – Saunders v The United Kingdom ECHR 17-Dec-1996
(Grand Chamber) The subsequent use against a defendant in a prosecution, of evidence which had been obtained under compulsion in company insolvency procedures was a convention breach of Art 6. Although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the . .
Cited – J, Regina v CACD 2-Jul-2001
Orse Attorney General’s Reference No 2 of 2001
The AG sought to appeal from the decision that an indictment against the seven defendants should be stayed on the ground that there had been a breach of Article 6(1). They were accused of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 03 September 2021; Ref: scu.164885

PJSC National Bank Trust and Another v Boris Mints and Others: ComC 6 Feb 2020

The issue to be decided is whether it is open to IM (fourth defendant) to seek the release of the Return Date Undertakings, and if it is, whether it is just and convenient in all of the circumstances to maintain the undertakings against IM.
Mrs Justice Cockerill
[2020] EWHC 204 (Comm)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 03 September 2021; Ref: scu.648596