Deighton v Cockle: CA 2 Dec 1911

Where, an order haying been obtained for judgment under Order xiv., judgment is not signed until more than twelve months afterwards, the case does not come within Order lxiv., r. 13, and therefore it is not necessary that the notice of intention to proceed required by that rule should have been given before signing judgment.
The issue was whether, having obtained leave on 28 May 1904 to sign summary judgment (under the then Order XIV), the plaintiff was by the actual signing of judgment, which it did not undertake until 3 July 1905, taking a ‘proceeding’, so as require a month’s notice to ‘proceed’ to be given in advance.
Held: It was not. Vaughan Williams LJ concluded that the rule requiring a month’s notice to proceed ‘only applied to proceedings towards judgment’ or ‘interlocutory proceedings’, and ‘did not apply to proceedings after judgment obtained’ or ‘after an end of the litigation had been arrived at’. Buckley LJ took a similar view, while Kennedy LJ considered that the rule referred to ‘some proceeding while the matter is still in controversy, or there is still some further step to be taken before judgment is obtained’
Vaughan Williams LJ, Buckley LJ, Kennedy LJ
[1912] 1 KB 206, [1911] UKLawRpKQB 182
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedIn re Racal Communications Ltd; In Re a Company HL 3-Jul-1980
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Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.668239