For a mortgagee in possession selling a property, it does not matter that the time may be unpropitious and that by waiting a higher price could be obtained: he is not bound to postpone in the hope of obtaining a better price.

Citations:

[1983] 1 WLR 1349

Cited by:

Cited – Silven Properties Limited, Chart Enterprises Incorporated v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, Vooght, Harris CA 21-Oct-2003
The claimants sought damages from mortgagees who had sold their charged properties as receivers. They said they had failed to sell at a proper value. They asked whether the express appointment in the mortgage of receivers as agents of the mortgagor . .
Cited – Bradford and Bingley Bplc v Ross CA 11-Mar-2005
The appellant had charged his property to the claimant, and had then fallen into arrears. The property was sold, and the lender sought the balance outstanding from him. The bank failed to disclose that they had sold the property to an associated . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.187037

The House described the way that the 1845 Act continued to affect the calculation of compensation: ‘The relevant section of the Act of 1845 (section 68) has, over 100 years, received through a number of decisions, some in this House, and by no means easy to reconcile, an interpretation which fixes upon it a meaning having little perceptible relation to the words used. This represents a century of judicial effort to keep the primitive wording – which itself has an earlier history – in some sort of accord with the realities of the industrial age.’

Judges:

Lord Wilberforce

Citations:

[1974] CLY 374, [1975] AC 99

Statutes:

Land Compensation Act 1965 10

Cited by:

Cited – Wrotham Park Settled Estates v Hertsmere Borough Council CA 12-Apr-1993
Land had been purchased under compulsory purchase powers. It had been subject to restrictive covenants in favour of neighbouring land which would have prevented the development now implemented. The question was how the compensation should be . .
Cited – Westminster City Council v Ocean Leisure Limited CA 21-Jul-2004
The claimant company owned property next to land which had been acquired to build a new bridge across the Thames. It sought compensation for disturbance to its business from the works.
Held: The state of the law was complicated and . .
Cited – Wiltshire County Council v Crest Estates Ltd. and others CA 5-Aug-2005
The builders had agreed as part of the planning process to indemnify the council against all claims incidental to the carrying out of the works for which permission was given. The council had to compulsorily purchase land, and sought repayment from . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.186371

Citations:

[1902] 1 KB 574

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Wrotham Park Settled Estates v Hertsmere Borough Council CA 12-Apr-1993
Land had been purchased under compulsory purchase powers. It had been subject to restrictive covenants in favour of neighbouring land which would have prevented the development now implemented. The question was how the compensation should be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.186375

The well established presumption that the boundary of plots of land separated by a hedge and ditch, that the boundary is the hedge on the far side of the ditch is a rebuttable presumption. The question was ‘how far the presumption had been displaced by evidence of acts of ownership on the part of the defendants.’

Judges:

Collins MR

Citations:

[1902] 18 Times LR 282

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Vowles v Miller 9-Jul-1810
Lawrence J said: ‘The rule about ditching is this. No man, making a ditch, can cut into his neighbour’s soil, but usually he cuts it to the very extremity of his own land: he is of course bound to throw the soil which he digs out, upon his own land; . .

Cited by:

Cited – Alan Wibberley Building Ltd v Insley CA 12-Nov-1997
Where adjoining fields are separated by a hedge and a ditch, who owns the ditch?
Held: The old presumption as to the location of a boundary based on the layout of hedges and ditches is irrelevant where the conveyance was by reference to an OS . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.183678

‘There is undoubtedly a popular belief in some parts of the country which has found its way into books that the owner of a hedge is also the owner of a space outside it; sometimes said to be four feet from the base of the bank on which the hedge stands. I am not aware of any legal authority for this broad proposition.’ ‘This matter of the respective positions of the fence and the ditch as affording evidence of the boundary was referred as a custom. It is not a custom at all when rightly understood, but it is a mere presumption. It is a very different thing from a custom. This presumption is very often decisive where there is no evidence at all as to what the boundaries are, but, like any other presumption it is rebuttable, and very often it can easily be rebutted by the production of title deeds. In this case, when the title deeds are examined, there is no room for the operation of the presumption at all.’

Judges:

Scrutton LJ, Goddard LJ

Citations:

[1918] 1 Ch 232

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Alan Wibberley Building Ltd v Insley CA 12-Nov-1997
Where adjoining fields are separated by a hedge and a ditch, who owns the ditch?
Held: The old presumption as to the location of a boundary based on the layout of hedges and ditches is irrelevant where the conveyance was by reference to an OS . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.183679

Citations:

[1977] 3 All ER 509, [1977] 1 WLR 1242

Cited by:

Cited – G and K Ladenbau (UK) Ltd v Crawley and De Reya QBD 25-Apr-1977
The defendant solicitors acted for the plaintiff in the purchase of land, but failed to undertake a commons search which would have revealed an entry which would prevent the client pursuing his development. The defect was discovered only when . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.183168

The court considered the way in which the 1841 Act might operate as to a reversion of the title. Clauson J said: ‘In my view it is plain that the deed is intended to operate and operate only under the [1841] Act, and the effect of dealing with the matter as if the Act had not been passed is to destroy the authority under which and under which alone the grant was intended to operate : the result is therefore in my view precisely the same as if the statute had said the reverter is to take place as if the grant had not been made.’

Judges:

Clauson J

Citations:

[1934] Ch 244

Statutes:

School Sites Act 1841

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Rector of Wrington and The Bath and Wells Diocesan Board of Finance v Jenkinson and Others ChD 26-Feb-2002
Land having been conveyed under the Act, and it no longer being needed as a school, it had to be decided to whom the land reverted.
Held: The tracing of beneficiaries had to be in the basis under section 2, that the land had never been so . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.183014

A right of way had been granted over the plaintiff’s land for the benefit of ‘Nine acre field’ in its ordinary use as a field. Hay grown on both Nine acre field and the adjoining ‘Parrott’s land’ had been mowed and stored on Nine acre field in the summer of 1866, and in September 1866 its whole bulk was sold to the defendant who carted it away over the plaintiff’s land to the highway. The jury held that the original storage on Nine acre field had been done honestly and not in order to gain the advantage of the right of way. The stacking and subsequent dealing with the hay must have been regarded by the jury as being in the ordinary and reasonable use of Nine acre field.
Held: The test identified judgments was whether Nine acre field was being used for purposes others than those included in its ordinary and reasonable use.
However, Bovill CJ said: ‘If no additional burthen was cast upon the servient tenement the jury might well find that there had been only the ordinary and reasonable use of the right of way’. A right of way obtained by prescription for the purpose of carting hay to field ‘cannot be increased so as to affect the servient tenement by imposing upon it any additional burthen’ and ‘[i]n all cases of this kind which depend upon user the right acquired must be measured by the extent of the enjoyment which is proved’.

Judges:

Bovill CJ, Willes J

Citations:

[1867] LR 2 CP 577

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Richard Jonathan Brett Guise v John Drew ChD 8-Jun-2001
A right of way had been acquired by prescription, but its extent was disputed. It had been used for mainly residential purposes, but then to a greater extent for a different business use.
Held: A right of way may be for one purpose, to the . .
Applied – Wimbledon and Putney Commons Conservators v Dixon CA 1875
A prescriptive right of way had been enjoyed in connection with the use of the dominant land for agricultural purposes, which had included enlarging the farmhouse and rebuilding a cottage. The dominant owner could not use the way for carting . .
Cited – McAdams Homes Ltd v Robinson and Another CA 27-Feb-2004
The defendant blocked the line of a sewer. The claimant alleged that it had an easement and sought the cost of building the alternative pipe. The question to be answered was ‘Where an easement is granted by implication on the sale of a property, . .
Cited – Wood v Saunders 1875
The dominant land at the time of sale contained a house ‘adapted for about twenty-five inmates, and only part of the drainage of the house rain into the ditch or moat’ on land retained by the vendor. The purchaser subsequently extended the house, . .
Cited – Harris v Flower CA 1904
The servient land-owner alleged an excessive user by which it was attempted to impose an additional burden on the servient tenement in the use of a right of way for obtaining access to a factory erected partly on the land to which the right of way . .
Cited – Bramwell and Others v Robinson ChD 21-Oct-2016
Interference with right of way
Neighbour dispute as to right of way.
Held: The defendant had failed to establish the ‘swing space’ he asserted, but otherwise the claimant had in several ways behaved unreasonably and interfered with the use of the right and harrassed the . .
Cited – Lynn Shellfish Ltd and Others v Loose and Another SC 13-Apr-2016
The court was asked as to the extent of an exclusive prescriptive right (ie an exclusive right obtained through a long period of use) to take cockles and mussels from a stretch of the foreshore on the east side of the Wash, on the west coast of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.181798

The 1812 Act provided for the draining, enclosing and improving of a fen which was common land. Under the Act the grass growing on various roadways was vested in the surveyor of highways, who had power to let it for the pasturage of ‘sound and healthy sheep’ but with an express prohibition of other animals. Nevertheless the land was in the event used, for over sixty years, for the pasturage of horses and cattle, despite the fact that this involved a danger of damage to the drainage system.
Held: If a lost modern grant is to be presumed, it is essential to consider who are to be the supposed grantors and grantees. The defendants’ counsel found themselves in considerable difficulties in this respect. The Court is endowed with a great power of imagination for the purpose of supporting ancient user. But, in inferring a legal origin for such user, it cannot infer one which would involve illegality. A lost grant cannot be presumed where such a grant would be in contravention of a statute: ‘If such a grant could not have had a legal origin, then it is not competent for us to presume its existence. On the other hand, if it could have had a legal origin, then we ought to presume the existence of such a grant, when there is evidence of user for such a long period.’ and ‘such a grant as is here suggested would have been illegal, whoever is supposed to have made it.’

Judges:

Sir Richard Henn Collins MR

Citations:

[1902] 1 Ch 557

Statutes:

Newborough Inclosure Act 1812

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – George Legge and Son Ltd v Wenlock Corporation HL 1938
The question was whether the status of a natural stream could be changed to that of a sewer by the unlawful discharge for a long period of sewage into the stream. The claimant asserted that a right by way of an easement could be acquired despite the . .
Cited – Glamorgan County Council v Carter QBD 1962
A caravan owner appealed against an enforcement notice on the basis that no planning permission was required because the parking of caravans was the purpose for which the land had been last used.
Held: Factually that was correct. Prima facie . .

Cited by:

Cited – Roland Brandwood and others v Bakewell Management Ltd CA 30-Jan-2003
House owners had used vehicular access across a common to get to their houses for many years. The commons owner required them to purchase the right, and they replied that they had acquired the right by lost modern grant and/or by prescription.
Cited – Tinsley v Milligan CA 1992
The court considered the defence of illegal user to a claim to have established an easement by prescription: ‘These authorities seem to me to establish that when applying the ‘ex turpi causa’ maxim in a case in which a defence of illegality has been . .
Cited – Hanning and Others v Top Deck Travel Group Ltd CA 9-Jun-1993
The owner of a common appealed a finding that the neighbouring land owner had acquired by prescription a right of way across the common to use a track for commercial vehicles (buses) to get to the property (the bus depot).
Held: An easement . .
Cited – Bakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
Applied – Hulley v Silversprings Bleaching and Dyeing Co Ltd ChD 1992
A lower riparian owner sued the Silversprings company for nuisance.
Held: The fact that the plaintiff’s predecessors had acquiesced in pollution for twenty years was no defence, because the plaintiff was not the only person affected by the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.179840

Specific devisee of a mortgage is not bound by an account settled between the representatives of the mortgagor and those of the mortgagee.

Citations:

[1743] EngR 14, (1743) Amb 17, (1743) 27 ER 9

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.383682

H used a public highway crossing the defendant’s land, to disrupt grouse-shooting upon the defendant’s land. He complained after he had been forcibly restrained by the defendant’s servants from doing so. The defendant justified his actions saying that the plaintiff was a trespasser upon the highway.
Held: Insofar as the plaintiff was upon a highway for purposes other than its use as a highway, he was a trespasser.
Lord Esher MR said: ‘on the ground that the plaintiff was on the highway, the soil of which belonged to the Duke of Rutland, not for the purpose of using it in order to pass and repass, or for any reasonable or usual mode of using the highway as a highway, I think he was a trespasser.’ and ‘Highways are, no doubt, dedicated prima facie for the purpose of passage; but things are done upon them by everybody which are recognised as being rightly done, and as constituting a reasonable and usual mode of using a highway as such. If a person on a highway does not transgress such reasonable and usual mode of using it, I do not think that he will be a trespasser.’
Lopes LJ said: ‘if a person uses the soil of the highway for any purpose other than that in respect of which the dedication was made and the easement acquired, he is a trespasser. The easement acquired by the public is a right to pass and repass at their pleasure for the purpose of legitimate travel, and the use of the soil for any other purpose, whether lawful or unlawful, is an infringement of the rights of the owner of the soil.’
Kay LJ said: ‘the right of the public upon a highway is that of passing and repassing over land the soil of which may be owned by a private person. Using that soil for any other purpose lawful or unlawful is a trespass.’

Judges:

Lord Esher MR, Lopes LJ, Kay LJ

Citations:

[1893] 1 QB 142, (1893) The Times LR 115, [1892] UKLawRpKQB 217

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina v Pratt 1855
‘I take it to be clear law that, if a man use the land over which there is a right of way for any purpose, lawful or unlawful, other than that of passing and repassing, he is a trespasser.’ . .

Cited by:

Applied – Hickman v Maisey CA 16-Mar-1900
A racing tout used the public highway which crossed the plaintiff’s property to watch racehorses being trained on the plaintiff’s land. On a particular occasion he walked backwards and forwards on a portion of the highway 15 yards long for a period . .
Applied – Director of Public Prosecutions v Jones and Lloyd HL 4-Mar-1999
21 people protested peacefully on the verge of the A344, next to the perimeter fence at Stonehenge. Some carried banners saying ‘Never Again,’ ‘Stonehenge Campaign 10 years of Criminal Injustice’ and ‘Free Stonehenge.’ The officer in charge . .
Cited – Herrick and Another v Kidner and Another Admn 17-Feb-2010
Psychological Obstruction to Public Footpath
A public footpath crossed the appellants’ land. They constructed a gateway across it which they now accepted had been a significant obstruction of the right of way. The local authority served a notice requiring its removal, including the stone . .
Cited – Jones and Lloyd v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-Jan-1997
The appellants had been peacefully protesting at Stonehenge. They were among others who refused to leave when ordered to do so under an order made by the police officer in charge declaring it to be a trespassory assembly under the 1986 Act. They . .
Cited – City of London v Samede and Others QBD 18-Jan-2012
The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either . .
Cited – Rodgers v Ministry of Transport QBD 20-Feb-1952
A cafe operated by the trunk road. Lorry drivers when pulling off to stop, damaged the verge, along which ran a public footpath. The defendant constructed a lay-by for the lorries, re-routing the footpath around it, purporting tu use powers under . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.192188

Citations:

[1999] EWCA Civ 698

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.145613

The Parish Council sought judicial review of the county council’s decision to reject a regristation of land as a Common on the ground that the user of the land by the villagers had not been shown to be ‘as of right.’
Held: Leave to bring the review was refused, applying the Steed case.

Judges:

Buxton J

Citations:

[1996] EWHC Admin 28

Statutes:

Commons Registration Act 1965 13(b)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Applied – Regina v Suffolk County Council Ex Parte Steed and Another CA 2-Aug-1996
Customary rights over land were not defeated by failure to register as common. ‘As of right’ meant that the right must be exercised in the belief that it is a right enjoyed by the inhabitants of the village to the exclusion of all other people. ‘it . .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Regina v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council CA 24-Nov-1997
The Parish Council appealed against refusal of leave to seek judicial review of a decision to reject an application for certain land to be registered as a common. . .
At first instance – Regina v Oxfordshire County Council and Another, Ex Parte Sunningwell Parish Council HL 25-Jun-1999
When setting out to establish that a piece of land has become a village green with rights of common, the tests are similar to those used in the law of prescription and adverse possession. Accordingly, there is no need to establish a belief in those . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.136576

Local Authority need not show intention to build on all parts of land being compulsorily purchased under the Act. The object of section 89 was to allow a local authority to purchase land which was unsightly, neglected or derelict to put it to use. The authority’s proposed use was to clear and stabilise the area and make it a heritage site. The section allowed them to buy the land to execute ‘such works on that land or any other land as appears to them expedient’.

Judges:

ustice Macpherson of Cluny

Citations:

Times 08-Apr-1996

Statutes:

National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 89

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.89867

Judges:

Mr Justice Zacaroli

Citations:

[2018] EWHC 3195 (Ch)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.631382

An unpaid vendor’s lien arises the moment the contract is entered into. It is discharged on completion to the extent that the purchase money is paid.

Citations:

[1959] Ch 523, [1958] 2 All ER 397

Cited by:

Approved – London and Cheshire Insurance Co Ltd v Laplagrene Property Co Ltd ChD 1971
. .
Cited – Scott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd and Others SC 22-Oct-2014
The appellant challenged a sale and rent back transaction. He said that the proposed purchaser had misrepresented the transaction to them. The Court was asked s whether the home owners had interests whose priority was protected by virtue of section . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.553542

Citations:

[1995] NPC 144

Cited by:

Cited – Scott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd and Others SC 22-Oct-2014
The appellant challenged a sale and rent back transaction. He said that the proposed purchaser had misrepresented the transaction to them. The Court was asked s whether the home owners had interests whose priority was protected by virtue of section . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.553543

When construing a conveyance, the court must look to the surrounding circumstances as at the date of the contract, and not that of the conveyance.

Judges:

Joyce J

Citations:

[1903] 1 Ch 118

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.515410

A cafe operated by the trunk road. Lorry drivers when pulling off to stop, damaged the verge, along which ran a public footpath. The defendant constructed a lay-by for the lorries, re-routing the footpath around it, purporting tu use powers under the 1936 Act. The plaintiff objected.
Held: The action for an injunction failed. The verge was part of the highway, and it was a proper use of the highway to pull over on to it for a temporary stop for a legitimate purpose, provided that he caused no obstruction to either the highway, or in this case the footpath. The works had not amounted to the construction of a car park, but were merely levelling and widening the highway. The defendant had not exceeded his powers.

Judges:

Lord Goddard CJ

Citations:

[1952] 1 All ER 634, (1952) 116 JP 200, [1952] 1 TLR 625, (1952) 96 Sol Jo 197, (1952) 50 LGR 520

Statutes:

Trunk Roads Act 1936, Highway Act 1864 47 48

Citing:

Cited – Harrison v Duke of Rutland CA 8-Dec-1893
H used a public highway crossing the defendant’s land, to disrupt grouse-shooting upon the defendant’s land. He complained after he had been forcibly restrained by the defendant’s servants from doing so. The defendant justified his actions saying . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.460434

The mortgagee’s costs, whether costs of an enforcement or a redemption action or included in ‘costs, charges and expenses’, are not recoverable from the mortgagor personally, but both as against the mortgagor and other persons interested in the equity of redemption, they are added to the amount due under the mortgage and must be paid as a condition of redeeming.
Fry LJ said: ‘When there is a covenant for the payment of a principal sum, and that judgment has been obtained upon the covenant for that sum, it is plain that the covenant is merged in the judgment, and, if there is a covenant to pay interest which is merely incidental to the covenant to pay a principal debt, that covenant also is merged in a judgment on the covenant to the principal debt. Of course a covenant to pay interest may be so expressed as not to merge a judgment for the principal; for instance, if there was a covenant to pay interest so long as any part of the principal should remain due either on the covenant or on a judgment.’

Judges:

Cotton, Fry LJJ

Citations:

(1883) 25 Ch D 338

Cited by:

Approved – Economic Life Assurance Society v Usborne HL 1902
If the loan agreement provides that the contract term for payment of interest survives judgment, then the contract term remains enforceable after judgment. Lord Halsbury said: ‘My Lords, it seems to me that Fry LJ in the case of Ex parte Fewings . . . .
Cited – Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank HL 25-Oct-2001
The House was asked whether a contractual provision for interest to run after judgment as well as before in a consumer credit contract led to an unfair relationship.
Held: The term was not covered by the Act, and was not unfair under the . .
Cited – Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc CA 15-Sep-1999
A bank had a clause in its standard terms which provided that it could continue to recover interest at the contract rate after judgment for default. The clause was an unfair term. The clause allowed a bank to impose an arrangement for repayment by . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.445463

Citations:

[1901] 2 Ch 324

Citing:

Cited – Hepworth v Pickles ChD 2-Nov-1899
The parties contracted for the sale and purchase of a shop which had been used continuously and openly with an off-licence for the sale of alcohol for twenty four years. After exchange, a restrictive covenant was revealed against the use of land as . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.425245

Citations:

[1682] EngR 314, (1682) Pop 108, (1682) 79 ER 1216 (A)

Links:

Commonlii

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.401411

The plaintiff claimed to have acquired a right of light against the defendants.
Held: Lord Justice Lindley said: ‘The whole theory of prescription at common law is against presuming any grant, or covenant not to interrupt, by or with anyone except an owner in fee.’ In this case no grant could be presumed: ‘A grant from the Crown, as distinguished from its tenant, cannot be presumed, for there has been no enjoyment against the Crown itself; and without it there is no foundation for such a presumption.’
Lopes LJ decided on the facts that the fiction would not stand scrutiny because he could not believe that the Crown would have made a grant after 1852 which had been lost by 1893: ‘For convenience sake the fiction of a lost grant is very often pressed into the service; but to presume a lost grant made by the Crown, or the lessees of the Crown, since 1852 and lost, would be overtaxing the credulity of the most credulous, and would be making a demand too extravagant even for the elasticity of this patient and accommodating fiction.’

Judges:

Lindley LJ, Lopes LJ, A L Smith LJ

Citations:

[1893] 3 Ch 48

Cited by:

Cited – Odey and Others v Barber ChD 29-Nov-2006
The claimants sought a declaration that they had two rights of way over a neighbour’s land. One was claimed by continuous use for twenty years, and the second was said to have been implied under the 1925 Act. No express grant was suggested. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.381615

Mummery LJ set out the test to be applied when asking whether there had been a substantial interference in the exercise of an easement so as to be actionable: ‘Not every interference with an easement, such as a right of way, is actionable. There must be a substantial interference with the enjoyment of it. There is no actionable interference with a right of way if it can be substantially and practically exercised as conveniently after as before the occurrence of the alleged obstruction. Thus, the grant of a right of way in law in respect of every part of a defined area does not involve the proposition that the grantee can in fact object to anything done on any part of the area which would obstruct passage over that part. He can only object to such activities, including obstruction, as substantially interfere with the exercise of the defined right as for the time being is reasonably required by him. Authority for that is to be found in the judgment of Russell L.J. in Keefe v. Amor [1965] 1 Q.B. 334 at 347. As Scott J. held in Celsteel Ltd v. Alton House Ltd [1985] 1 W.L.R. 204 at 217: ‘There emerge from the three cases I have cited two criteria relevant to the question whether a particular interference with a right of way is actionable. The interference will be actionable if it is substantial. And it will not be substantial if it does not interfere with the reasonable use of the right of way.’

Judges:

Mummery LJ

Citations:

(1999) 79 P and CR 32

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – B and Q Plc v Liverpool and Lancashire Properties Ltd ChD 26-Jul-2000
The dominant owner wished to deal with delivery vehicles in a manner where they were left parked awaiting emptying. The servient owner (a lessee) wanted to construct buildings over a large part of the land. The servient owner objected.
Held: . .
Cited – Wilkinson and The Estate of Brian Wilkinson v Farmer CA 22-Oct-2010
The court considered whether there was a compelling reason to allow a second application for leave to appeal against an order settling the width of a right of way.
Held: The appeal was allowed. Very limited facts could be established from the . .
Cited – Emmett v Sisson CA 3-Feb-2014
Appeal against judgment in boundary dispute involving a private driveway.
Held: The appeal failed. ‘The respondents are entitled to exercise the ‘relative luxury’ of the ample right to gain both vehicular and pedestrian access to their land . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.375071

A mortgagee may tack simple contract debts to his mortgage as against the heir where the property descended is assets in his hands for payment of simple contract debts, and consequently since the stat. 3 and 4 Will. 4, c. 104, a mortgagee of freeholds may tack his simple contract debt as against the heir.

Citations:

[1856] EngR 277, (1856) 22 Beav 341, (1856) 52 ER 1139

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.291032

The South Wales Fiailway Company, having power to take and purchase lands and to construct a railway according to the plans and books of reference deposited under their Act, gave notice to the Llanelly Railway and Dock Company that they (the South Wales Railway Company) required to purchase a small piece of land, on part of which the Llanelly Railway was actually constructed, such piece of land being set out, in the said plans and books of reference, as part of the proposed line of the South Wales Railway : but they afterwards refused to issue their warrant to the sheriff to assess the amount of purchase moriey, on the ground that the Llanelly Railway and Dock Company had no power under their Act to sell any portion of land on which their railway was constructed. Held, on mandamus to the South Wales Railway Company to issue their warrant, that, as there was no express clause in any special or general Act of Parliament, which authorised either the Llanelly Railway and Dock Company to sell any part of their actual line of railway, or the South Wales Railway Company to purchase it, the authority was not to be implied from the general power given to the South Wales Railway Company to make their line, and to purchase lands, according to their deposited plans and books of reference.

Citations:

[1850] EngR 364, (1850) 14 QB 902, (1850) 117 ER 346

Links:

Commonlii

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.297711

Mortgage of an interest under a will – Administration to mortgagee

Citations:

[1861] EngR 317 (A), (1861) 2 Sw and Tr 133

Links:

Commonlii

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.284078

There was a long lease of land with a dwellinghouse built on it. The lease contained covenants: ‘not to erect or build or cause to be erected or built upon the said piece of ground thereby demised, without the previous license in writing of the lessor parties, ‘any other building whatsoever,’ and ‘not to do or suffer to be done on the said premises or any part thereof any act, matter, or thing which may be or become an annoyance, nuisance, or disturbance to the neighbourhood or to any tenant of the lessor parties.’ A neighbour built a house on neighbouring land in accordance with approved plans. Shortly after he went into occupation the Defendant commenced to erect a substantial trellis-work screen on the northern side of his land fronting the new house. This screen stood on the Defendant’s land about a foot from the boundary fence (which was a brick wall eight feet high) and was fifty-eight feet six inches in length, and stood twelve feet above the boundary wall.
Held: The claim for an injunction succeeded on 2 grounds. The trellis was held to be a building within the meaning of the covenant, and it was an annoyance within the meaning of the covenant.
Romer J said: ‘In the second place, I have no doubt whatever in my own mind, that it is a breach of the covenant that the lessee ‘will not do or suffer to be done on the premises, any act, matter, or thing which might be or become an annoyance to any tenant of the lessor.’ To my mind, undoubtedly, what the Defendant has done is an annoyance to Mr Neale, the tenant of the lessor. I think, in the first place, that it does substantially interfere with the access of light to the windows on the ground floor of this building, and that, notwithstanding some parts of the expert evidence; and I feel satisfied beyond that, and irrespective of that, that it causes an annoyance to Mr Neale, the tenant, within the meaning of the words used in the covenant. It falls within the definition of the word ‘annoyance,’ in a covenant like this, which was given by the three Lords Justices in the case of Tod-Heatly v. Benham 40 Ch. D. 80. In the first place, to adopt the language of Lord Justice Cotton, I am satisfied by the evidence before me that reasonable people, having regard to the ordinary use of Mr Neale’s house for pleasurable enjoyment, would be annoyed and aggrieved by what has been done by the Defendant. It would be an annoyance or grievance to reasonable, sensible people. It is an act which is an interference with the pleasurable enjoyment of the house. Then, to adopt the words of Lord Justice Lindley, I think it does raise an objection in the minds of reasonable men, and is an annoyance within the meaning of the covenant. Lastly, as pointed out by Lord Justice Bowen, ‘ ‘Annoyance’ is a wider term than nuisance, and if you find a thing which reasonably troubles the mind and pleasure, not of a fanciful person or of a skilled person who knows the truth, but of the ordinary sensible English inhabitant of a house – if you find there is anything which disturbs his reasonable peace of mind, that seems to me to be an annoyance, although it may not appear to amount to physical detriment to comfort.’
I have come to the conclusion, therefore, that this is a clear breach of the last-mentioned covenant as well as of the first, and on both grounds I think the Plaintiff is entitled to succeed.’

Judges:

Romer J

Citations:

[1894] 3 Ch 671

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Tod-Heatley v Benham 1888
What was ‘annoyance’ between neighbours
The court considered how to construe a covenant in a lease ‘nor do or wittingly or willingly cause or suffer to be done any act, matter, or thing in or upon or about the said premises, which shall or may be or grow to the annoyance, nuisance, . .

Cited by:

Cited – Dennis and Another v Davies (B20 (Ch)) ChD 21-Nov-2008
The claimants sought to enforce a restrictive covenant to restrain a neighbour building an extension.
Held: A building could be a source of annoyance and therefore a breach of the particular covenant. The requirement for the builder’s . .
Cited – Davies v Dennis and Others CA 22-Oct-2009
The land owner appealed against an injunction given to prevent him carrying out building works which the neighbours said would breach a restrictive covenant. The covenants negatived a building scheme.
Held: The appeal failed. Covenants of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.280410

A notice to treat on compulsory purchase can be withdrawn even after possession has been taken. The acquiring authority acquires an equitable interest in such land when the compensation has been assessed.

Judges:

Carnwath J

Citations:

Times 18-Dec-1995, (1995) 72 PCandR 95

Cited by:

Cited – Rhondda Cynon Taff Borough Council v Watkins CA 12-Feb-2003
Land had been purchased compulsorily, but the respondent unlawfully returned to possession in 1966, and now claimed title by adverse possession. The Council executed a vesting deed poll in 1988. The Council asserted that he could not be in adverse . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.87476

Where land had been sold subject to a reservation back of sporting rights those rights were not limited to reasonable amount or so as not to allow interference with normal agricultural activities. Nor damage claimable from escaping game birds.

Citations:

Times 22-Jul-1998

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.84782

A contract void for illegality was entirely void, and monies were repayable even though there had been part performance by way of possession of land.

Citations:

Gazette 18-Mar-1998

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.84538

Bailiffs and Sheriffs have no right of forcible re-entry into premises, after once taking walking possession, unless their deliberate exclusion by the debtor can be shown.

Citations:

Times 25-Mar-1998, Gazette 29-Apr-1998

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.82768

Where a notice of application to modify or discharge a restrictive covenant is ambiguous as to whether full discharge is wanted and no notice of opposition was received, the court could not assume the covenant could be discharged entirely.

Citations:

Gazette 03-Sep-1998

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.82256

Rights of a first lender to grant tenancies must be respected, and override the rights of a second mortgagee to possession. A mortgagee in possession has full power to grant a tenancy. A mortgagee is not limited by the section.

Citations:

Times 27-May-1999

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 99

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.78359

Partners borrowed substantial sums from the claimant bank. A charge on the property made each jointly and severally liable for the debts. After default, the bank sought repayment from one partner of sums lent outside the partnership to the other. The appellant asserted that this made him guarantor of the partner, and that any ambiguity should be construed in the surety’s favour. The court held that the words were clear and imported the necessary meaning throughout the charge, and the meaning was not outside the parties intentions.

Citations:

Gazette 13-Jul-2000, Gazette 27-Jul-2000

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.77683

The express grant of a right over land which would place the dominant owner in such occupation of the servient land as to bar the servient owner from possession or control of the land may not constitute the grant of an easement but may be construed as a grant of the fee simple.

Judges:

Lopes LJ

Citations:

(1890) 44 Ch D 12

Cited by:

Cited – Moncrieff and Another v Jamieson and others HL 17-Oct-2007
The parties disputed whether a right of way over a road included an implied right for the dominant owner to park on the servient tenement.
Held: The appeal failed. ‘The question is whether the ancillary right is necessary for the comfortable . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.260029

The grantee’s land was surrounded partly by land of the vendor, and partly by that of other parties, including a disused airfield owned by a third party. For some time following the grant they had been able to obtain access over the airfield by permission of the owner. There was an argument, rejected by the judge, that he had agreed to abandon any claim to access over the vendor’s land. The issue therefore arose as to his legal rights in the event of the permissive right being unavailable.
Held: Where a freehold site is land-locked, there is normally implied a right of way irrespective of any common intention of the parties as to its creation or otherwise. There was a finding of a ‘conditional abandonment’ of a way of necessity, the need for which might or might not arise if the permissive way were lost. If the land is partly bounded by the vendor’s land and partly by the land of a third party, a merely permissive way over the third party’s land (as the only means of access) will not prevent the purchaser acquiring a right over the vendor’s land. The acid test of whether a person needs a way is whether he can compel an adjoining owner to grant him a legal right.
Danckwerts J said: ‘the law would clearly have implied in favour of the grantee of the triangular piece of land a way of necessity – that is to say, a right of way to enable the grantee to obtain access over the grantor’s land in some line to be chosen by the grantor; so that the triangular piece of land would be of some use to the grantee instead of being useless, as it would be if no right of way existed. I am satisfied that the law would have implied such a right notwithstanding that the piece of land granted by the conveyance of 1947 was not completely surrounded by the grantor’s land, but on three sides abutted on to land which belonged to other persons.’ and
‘There is therefore no express authority on the point. In my opinion, however, if the grantee has no access to the property which is sold and conveyed to him except over the grantor’s land or over the land of some other person or persons whom he cannot compel to give him any legal right of way, commonsense demands that a way of necessity should be implied, so as to confer on the grantee a right of way, for the purposes for which the land is conveyed, over the land of the grantor; and it is no answer to say that a permissive method of approach was in fact enjoyed, at the time of the grant, over the land of some person other than the grantor because that permissive method of approach may be determined on the following day, thereby leaving the grantee with no lawful method of approaching the land which he has purchased.’

Judges:

Danckwerts J

Citations:

[1952] Ch 835

Cited by:

Cited – Adealon International Proprietary Ltd v London Borough of Merton ChD 12-Apr-2006
The claimant had bought land originally bought from the defendant, but after a long series of events, the only available access was over the retained land. It sought a right of way of necessity.
Held: At the time of the grant, other access was . .
Cited – Adealon International Proprietary Ltd v London Borough of Merton CA 25-Apr-2007
The claimant had bought land from the council. The only means of access was over land retained by the council but there was no grant of a right of way. The claimant now appealed refusal of a right of way by necessity.
Held: At the time of the . .
Cited – Sweet and Another v Sommer and Another ChD 25-Jun-2004
Part of land had been sold off. By oversight no right of way had been taken in favour of the retained land. The dominant owner argued that by demolition of a building a means of access could be found and that therefore no right of way by necessity . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.253249

(Sussex Spring Assizes) Lord St Leonards had bought some land and planted trees on what he thought was his side of the boundary. Some 20 years later Mr Ashburner bought the adjoining land and claimed that the trees were on his side of the boundary. The plan was too small to provide a clear answer. Bramwell B directed the jury ‘Title deeds come to little without evidence of actual enjoyment, for otherwise anyone might pretend to give away the lands of anybody else. Parchment, of itself, comes to little; the real question is as to actual enjoyment.’

Judges:

Bramwell B

Citations:

(1869) 21 LT 595

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Ali v Lane and Another CA 21-Nov-2006
The parties disputed the boundary between their neighbouring plots of land.
Held: In the modern law the conveyance (parchment or not) is undoubtedly the starting point. Where information contained in the conveyance is unclear or ambiguous, it . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.246345

Lord Wilberforce referred to the Watcham case as: ‘a precedent which I had thought had long been recognised to be nothing but the refuge of the desperate.’ but ‘Whether in its own field, namely that of interpretation of deeds relating to real property by reference to acts of possession, it retains any credibility in the face of powerful judicial criticism is not before us.’

Judges:

Lord Wilberforce

Citations:

[1974] AC 235

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Doubted – Watcham v Attorney-General of the East Africa Protectorate PC 1919
The Watchams held land along the bank of the Nairobi River. It had been conveyed to them by the Crown by a certificate under the East African Land Regulations. The certificate gave the area transferred as ’66 3/4 acres, or thereabouts’, but included . .

Cited by:

Cited – Beale v Harvey CA 28-Nov-2003
Land had been divided into three lots on its development, but the site plan did not match the line of a fence actually erected.
Held: The court was not bound by the Watcham case, and would not follow it to allow reference to the later . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.247520

Citations:

(1979) 249 EG 1075

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Batchelor v Kent County Council LT 1-Mar-1987
The tribunal was asked to determine compensation to be paid on the acquisition of two plots of land. The land-owner claimed andpound;9,000,000 and the council offered andpound;5,490. The land-owner claimed the value as ransom as necessary access to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.245985

A diversion of a footpath must be along an entirely new path, and not an existing way.

Citations:

Times 03-Feb-1982

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Mear and others v Cambridgeshire County Council ChD 20-Oct-2006
The claimants sought a declaration that a path over neighbouring land was a public vehicular highway as recorded by the respondents, and not a footpath as asserted by the owners, and that gates over the path infringed the public rights. The council . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.245553

Under the section, the highway authority has duties when informed by a parish council that a highway has been unlawfully stopped. The highway authority must, ‘unless satisfied that the representations are incorrect’, take proper proceedings accordingly. It is not for the court to decide whether there is a public footpath or not: the question is whether there is sufficiently strong evidence on which the highway authority could reasonably have decided that a public footpath existed.

Citations:

(1979) 40 PandCR 390

Statutes:

Highways Act 1959

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Mear and others v Cambridgeshire County Council ChD 20-Oct-2006
The claimants sought a declaration that a path over neighbouring land was a public vehicular highway as recorded by the respondents, and not a footpath as asserted by the owners, and that gates over the path infringed the public rights. The council . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.245551

The court considered a conveyance on sale which created an underground flying freehold. Sir William James VC said that the owner of land owns ‘everything up to the sky’.

Judges:

Sir William James VC

Citations:

(1870) LR 9 Eq 671, (1870) 39 CJCh 547, (1870) 2 LT 263, (1870) 7 Digest (Repl) 267

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Grigsby v Melville CA 6-Jul-1973
The seller had owned two adjoing properties. He sold one off to the plaintiff, describing it in the conveyance as ‘all that dwellinghouse’. A cellar under the part sold off had access only from the retained property, but contained supports for the . .
Cited – Star Energy Weald Basin Ltd and Another v Bocardo Sa SC 28-Jul-2010
The defendant had obtained a licence to extract oil from its land. In order to do so it had to drill out and deep under the Bocardo’s land. No damage at all was caused to B’s land at or near the surface. B claimed in trespass for damages. It now . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.244811

(Court of Exchequer Chamber) Blackburn J set out what constituted a fixture: ‘There is no doubt that the general maxim of the law is, that what is annexed to the land becomes part of the land; but it is very difficult, if not impossible, to say with precision what constitutes an annexation sufficient for this purpose. It is a question which must depend on the circumstances of each case, and mainly on two circumstances, as indicating the intention, viz., the degree of annexation and the object of the annexation. When the article in question is no further attached to the land, then by its own weight it is generally to be considered a mere chattel; see Wiltshire -v- Cottrell (1 EandB 674; 22LJ (QB) 177) and the cases there cited. But even in such a case, if the intention is apparent to make the articles part of the land, they do become part of the land: see D’Eyncourt -v- Gregory. (Law Rep 3 Eq 382) Thus blocks of stone placed on the top of another without any mortar or cement for the purpose of forming a dry stone wall would become part of the land, though the same stones, if deposited in a builder’s yard and for convenience sake stacked on the top of each other in the form of a wall, would remain chattels. On the other hand, an article may be very firmly fixed to the land, and yet the circumstances may be such as to shew that it was never intended to be part of the land, and then it does not become part of the land. The anchor of a large ship must be very firmly fixed in the ground in order to bear the strain of the cable, yet no one could suppose that it became part of the land, even though it should chance that the shipowner was also the owner of the fee of the spot where the anchor was dropped. An anchor similarly fixed in the soil for the purpose of bearing the strain of the chain of a suspension bridge would be part of the land. Perhaps the true rule is, that articles not otherwise attached to the land than by their own weight are not to be considered as part of the land, unless the circumstances are such as to shew that they were intended to be part of the land, the onus of shewing that they were so intended lying on those who assert that they have ceased to be chattels, and that, on the contrary, an article which is affixed to the land even slightly is to be considered as part of the land, unless the circumstances are such as to shew that it was intended all along to continue a chattel, the onus lying on those who contend that it is a chattel. This last proposition seems to be in effect the basis of the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas delivered by Maule J., in Wilde -v- Waters. (16 CB 637; 24 LJ (CP) 193) This, however, only removes the difficulty one step, for it still remains a question in each case whether the circumstances are sufficient to satisfy the onus. In some cases, such as the anchor of the ship or the ordinary instance given of a carpet nailed to the floor of a room, the nature of the thing sufficiently shews it is only fastened as a chattel temporarily, and not affixed permanently as part of the land.’

Judges:

Blackburn J

Citations:

(1872) LR 7 CP 328

Citing:

Cited – Wiltshear v Cottrell 1854
A wooden granary was not a fixture. When an article is no further attached to the land, then by its own weight it is generally to be considered a mere chattel. . .
Cited – D’Eyncourt v Gregory (No 1) 1866
If the intention is apparent to make the articles part of the land, they become part of the land. Sculptures which simply rested by their own weight were held to form part of the architectural design for the hall in which they were placed and so . .

Cited by:

Cited – Deen v Andrews 1986
Land was sold. The parties disputed whether a greenhouse was included.
Held: It was a large greenhouse consisting of a sectional frame bolted to a large concrete base. ‘Building’ was to be given the meaning ascribed by s62 of the 1925 Act. The . .
Cited – Elitestone Ltd v Morris and Another HL 1-May-1997
The plaintiff acquired land on which 27 chalets were erected. They served notice to quit so that the site could be developed. The defendants argued that they had residential tenancies with protection under the Rent Act 1977.
Held: The tenants’ . .
Cited – Botham and others v TSB Bank Plc CA 30-Jul-1996
A flat had been repossessed by the bank. The parties disputed whether items were fixtures and charged with the land or not.
Held: The judge had correctly analysed and applied the law of fixtures and fittings. The appeal failed save to a . .
Cited – Chelsea Yacht and Boat Club Ltd v Pope CA 6-Apr-2000
The tenant sought to assert that he occupied a houseboat, the Dinty Moore, under a tenancy of a dwellinghouse under the 1988 Act. The claimant appealed a decision that it was.
Held: A house-boat, even though used as a dwelling, did not have . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.240408

Citations:

[2000] 80 PandCR 108

Cited by:

Cited – Montrose Court Holdings Ltd and Another v Shamash and others CA 21-Feb-2006
Tenants challenging power of freeholders to impose parking regulations on occupiers of development. The landlord appealed.
Held: ‘the regulations in the present case – which limited the right to park to the parking of one vehicle at a time – . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.240402

Citations:

[1955] 1 Ch 910

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.231050

Citations:

[1980] RVR 165

Cited by:

Cited – Halil v London Borough of Lambeth LT 2-Mar-2001
LT COMPENSATION – compulsory acquisition of leasehold shop and premises – total extinguishment of business – disturbance – analysis of accounts – treatment of wife’s earnings – depreciation of capital assets – . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.230989

In calculating compensation on a compulsory purchase, there should be no deduction from notional profit to reflect the ‘wages’ of the proprietor of a business operated by a sole trader.

Citations:

[1955] 5 P and CR 237

Cited by:

Cited – Halil v London Borough of Lambeth LT 2-Mar-2001
LT COMPENSATION – compulsory acquisition of leasehold shop and premises – total extinguishment of business – disturbance – analysis of accounts – treatment of wife’s earnings – depreciation of capital assets – . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.230997

For the purpose of establishing whether a purchaser does so for value, the exact extent of consideration is not to be tested.

Citations:

(1673) Rep t Finch 102, [1673] EngR 111, (1673) Fin H 102, (1673) 23 ER 55

Links:

Commonlii

Land

Updated: 09 May 2022; Ref: scu.222683