Category: Family

Forbes v Forbes: 9 Feb 1854

A man cannot have two domicils, at least with reference to the succession to his personal estate.
Legitimate children acquire by birth the domicil of their father.
An infant cannot change his domicil by his own act.
A new domicil cannot be acquired except by intention and act; but, being in itinere to the intended domicil, is a sufficient act for this purpose.
But the strongest intention of abandoning a domicil, and actual abandonment of residence, will not deprive a man of that domicil, unless he has acquired another.
An engagement to serve, and actual service in the Indian Army, under a commission from the East India Company, when the duties of such an appointment necessarily require residence in India for an indefinite period, confers upon the officer an Anglo-Indian domicil ; for the law, in such a case, presumes an intention consistent with his duty, and holds his residence to be animo et facto in India. And this, even if he have property in the country which was his domicil of origin.
An Anglo-Indian is not, for all purposes, an English domicil.
A domiciled Scotchman, having ancestral property but no house in his native country, by accepting a commission, and serving in the Indian Army, abandoned his domicil of origin, and acquired an Anglo-Indian domicil. He afterwards attained the rank of general in the Indian Army, and was made colonel of a regiment, and then left India with the intention of not returning thither, but came to Great Britain, where he lived part of the year in a house which he had built on his estate in Scotland, and part in a hired house in London, under circumstances which, if he had been a single man, would have given him again a Scotch domicil; but his wife and establishment of servants resided constantly at the house in London. Held, that this fact counterbalanced the effect of the other circumstances, and proved that his intention was permanently to reside in England ; and that, therefore, he must be considered to have abandoned his acquired domicil in India, and acquired, by choice, a new one in England.
[1854] EngR 230, (1854) Kay 341, (1854) 69 ER 145
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Holliday and Another v Musa and Others CA 30-Mar-2010
The adult children of the deceased appealed against a finding that their father had died domiciled in the UK, and allowing an application under the 1975 Act. He had a domicile of origin in Cyprus but had lived in England since 1958. . .
See Also – Forbes v Forbes 3-Mar-1854
General Forbes died. It became necessary to decide what was his domicile at the date of death. He had been born in Scotland, but then served for 35 years in India, before retirng to live in London.
Held: The domicile in India was a domicile of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.293087

Babiarz v Poland: ECHR 10 Jan 2017

The Court referred to Johnston v Ireland and said: ‘In the area of framing their divorce laws and implementing them in concrete cases, the Contracting Parties enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention and to reconcile the competing personal interests at stake.
. . The Court has already held that neither Article 12 nor 8 of the Convention can be interpreted as conferring on individuals a right to divorce. Moreover, the travaux preparatoires of the Convention indicate clearly that it was an intention of the Contracting Parties to expressly exclude such right from the scope of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court has reiterated on many occasions that the Convention is a living instrument to be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. It has also held that, if national legislation allows divorce, which is not a requirement of the Convention, Article 12 secures for divorced persons the right to remarry.
. . Thus, the Court has not ruled out that the unreasonable length of judicial divorce proceedings could raise an issue under Article 12. The Court did not rule out that a similar conclusion could be reached in cases where, despite an irretrievable breakdown of marital life, domestic law regarded the lack of consent of an innocent party as an insurmountable obstacle to granting a divorce to a guilty party. However, that type of situation does not obtain in the present case, which concerns neither a complaint about the excessive length of divorce proceedings nor insurmountable legal impediments on the possibility to remarry after divorce.
. . In the Court’s view, if the provisions of the Convention cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing a possibility, under domestic law, of obtaining divorce, they cannot, a fortiori, be interpreted as guaranteeing a favourable outcome in divorce proceedings instituted under the provision of that law allowing for a divorce.’
1955/10 (Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) : Court (Fourth Section)), [2017] ECHR 13, [2017] 2 FLR 613
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights
Human Rights
Cited by:
Cited – Owens v Owens CA 24-Mar-2017
Unreasonable Behaviour must reach criteria
W appealed against the judge’s refusal to grant a decree of divorce. He found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, but did not find that H had behaved iin such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with H.
Held: . .
Cited – Her Majesty’s Attorney General v Akhter and Another CA 14-Feb-2020
Islamic Nikah Ceremony did not create a marriage
The parties had undertaken, in 1998, an Islamic marriage ceremony, a Nikah. They both knew at the time that to be effective in UK law, there would need to be a civil ceremony, and intended but did not achieve one. The parties having settled their . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 August 2021; Ref: scu.573178

Baxter v Baxter: PC 1947

The House considered whether a wife who insisted that her husband always used a condom was thereby guilty of a wilful refusal to consummate the marriage within the meaning of section 7(1)(a).
Held: She was not, for a marriage may be consummated although artificial methods of contraception are used. As to Firth v Firth, Viscount Jowitt LC said: ‘Long before the passing of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, it was a matter of common knowledge that reputable clinics had come into existence for the purpose of advising spouses on what is popularly called birth control, and (with all respect to a dictum to the opposite effect by the late Langton J in the unreported case of Firth v Firth) it is also a matter of common knowledge that many young married couples agree to take contraceptive precautions in the early days of married life.’
Viscount Jowitt LC quoted with approval a passage in Lord Stair’s Institutions: ‘It seems to me that the true view of the matter is expressed in Lord Stair’s Institutions, 1681 ed, book I, tit 4, para 6. That learned and distinguished author put the matter thus: ‘So then, it is not the consent of marriage as it relateth to the procreation of children that is requisite; for it may consist, though the woman be far beyond that date; but it is the consent, whereby ariseth that conjugal society, which may have the conjunction of bodies as well as of minds, as the general end of the institution of marriage, is the solace and satisfaction of man.’ I am content to adopt these words as my own.’
Viscount Jowitt LC
[1948] AC 274, [1947] 2 All ER 886
Matrimonial Causes Act 1937
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Firth v Firth 25-Jun-1941
Langton J said: ‘[Counsel] said that it was a matter of common knowledge that young people, for a period, at any rate, after their marriage had intercourse only with the intervention of contraceptives. On this part of his common knowledge I can only . .

Cited by:
Cited – Regina (Smeaton) v Secretary of State for Health and Others Admn 18-Apr-2002
The claimant challenged the Order as regards the prescription of the morning-after pill, asserting that the pill would cause miscarriages, and that therefore the use would be an offence under the 1861 Act.
Held: ‘SPUC’s case is that any . .
Cited – X City Council v MB and others; re MAB FD 13-Feb-2006
The adult patient was autistic. The doctors said that he lacked capacity, and the authority sought to prevent his return to Pakistan with, they thought, a view to being married. . .
Cited – Maclennan v Maclennan SCS 10-Jan-1958
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 August 2021; Ref: scu.223712

Firth v Firth: 25 Jun 1941

Langton J said: ‘[Counsel] said that it was a matter of common knowledge that young people, for a period, at any rate, after their marriage had intercourse only with the intervention of contraceptives. On this part of his common knowledge I can only offer him my sympathy. It is no part of my common knowledge and I decline to accept it as a matter of common knowledge at all.’
Langton J
Unreported, 25 June 1941
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Baxter v Baxter PC 1947
The House considered whether a wife who insisted that her husband always used a condom was thereby guilty of a wilful refusal to consummate the marriage within the meaning of section 7(1)(a).
Held: She was not, for a marriage may be . .
Cited – Regina (Smeaton) v Secretary of State for Health and Others Admn 18-Apr-2002
The claimant challenged the Order as regards the prescription of the morning-after pill, asserting that the pill would cause miscarriages, and that therefore the use would be an offence under the 1861 Act.
Held: ‘SPUC’s case is that any . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 August 2021; Ref: scu.223711

Griffiths v Fleming: CA 4 Mar 1909

A husband and his wife effected with an insurance association a policy whereby, in consideration of a premium of which each paid part, a sum of money was made payable upon the death of whichever of them should die first to the survivor. The wife having died, the husband brought an action upon the policy to recover the policy money.
Held: Upon the footing that the policy was an insurance by the husband upon the life of the wife, that, notwithstanding the provisions of the Life Assurance Act, 1774, it was not necessary, in order to maintain the action, that the plaintiff should prove that he had any pecuniary interest in the life of his wife.
The interest ‘must be a legal interest, not a mere chance or expectation’
Farwell LJ said (read in agreement by Kennedy LJ: ‘[Section 3 of the 1774 Act] has been held to mean ‘pecuniary interest’ measured by the loss that would be suffered by the beneficiary if the life stopped at the date of the policy. Lord Blackburn says in Wilson v Jones (L.R. 2 Ex 139 at p.150): ‘I know of no better definition of an interest in an event than . . that, if the event happens, the party will gain an advantage, if it is frustrated he will suffer a loss.’ And the interest must be a legal interest, not a mere chance or expectation: Hebdon v West; Halford v Kymer.’
Farwell LJ and Kennedy LJ
[1909] 1 KB 805, [1909] UKLawRpKQB 57
Commonlii
Life Assurance Act 1774 3, Married Wome??’s Property Act 1882 11
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Murphy (By Her Litigation Friend Stockmont) v Holland CA 19-Dec-2003
A married couple had taken out an insurance policy on their joint lives. The policy was maintained after they divorced. On his death, his child by the later marriage claimed a share in the policy under the 1975 Act.
Held: (Chadwick LJ . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 August 2021; Ref: scu.195617

Stoeckert v Geddes (Appeal No 66 of 1998): PC 13 Dec 1999

PC Jamaica The claimant claimed against the estate of her former partner. Though not married they had lived together for many years, and she claimed there had been an express understanding that she would receive part of his estate. A constructive trust was claimed and denied.
Held: The facts alleged were not capable of sustaining the claim. Leaving the claimant in charge of his business whilst the deceased had gone to live abroad did not establish such a trust, and nor did the several statements made.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Saville of Newdigate, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough
[1999] UKPC 52
Bailii, PC
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Grant v Edwards and Edwards CA 24-Mar-1986
A couple were not married but lived together in Vincent Farmhouse in which the plaintiff claimed a beneficial interest on separation. The female partner was told by the male partner that the only reason for not acquiring the property in joint names . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 August 2021; Ref: scu.163208

Bellinger v Bellinger: FD 22 Nov 2000

The test for what sex somebody was for the purposes of validating a marriage was the sex as decided and set out on the birth registration certificate. Though increasing recognition has been given to the complexities of gender identity over the years, this was an area which, if it was to be reformed, must be reformed by parliament and as a comprehensive whole, not piecemeal by judges. Johnson J said: ‘There is now a distinct possibility that were it possible to do so, examination of the brain of a living individual would reveal further indications of gender. But that is not yet possible and the practical reality is that whatever may ultimately emerge from advances in medical science, the only criteria for determining the gender of an individual remain those identified in Corbett.’
Johnson J
Times 22-Nov-2000, [2001] 1 FLR 389
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 11
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) FD 1-Feb-1970
There had been a purported marriage in 1963 between a man and a male to female trans-sexual.
Held: Because marriage is essentially a union between a man and a woman, the relationship depended on sex, and not on gender. The law should adopt the . .

Cited by:
Appeal from – Bellinger v Bellinger CA 17-Jul-2001
Transgender Male may not marry as Female
Despite gender re-assignment, a person born and registered a male, remained biologically a male, and so was not a woman for the purposes of the law of marriage. The birth registration in this case had been correct. The words ‘male and female’ in the . .
At first instance – Bellinger v Bellinger HL 10-Apr-2003
Transgendered Male/Female not to marry as Female
The parties had gone through a form of marriage, but Mrs B had previously undergone gender re-assignment surgery. Section 11(c) of the 1973 Act required a marriage to be between a male and a female. It was argued that the section was incompatible . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.78325

Bannister v Bannister: CA 1980

The Court allowed a wife’s appeal against the dismissal of her petition for divorce, Ormrod LJ observed: ‘The learned judge, I am afraid, fell into the linguistic trap which is waiting for all of us when we speak of ‘unreasonable behaviour’ in relation to section 1(2)(b) cases. The basis of this subsection is not ‘unreasonable behaviour’ but behaving in such a way that the petitioner ‘cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent’, a significantly different concept. It is difficult to find an alternative shorthand expression for this subsection, so we all talk, inaccurately, of ‘unreasonable behaviour’.’
Ormrod LJ
(1980) 10 Fam Law 240
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Owens v Owens SC 25-Jul-2018
W petitioned for divorce alleging that he ‘has behaved in such a way that [she] cannot reasonably be expected to live with [him]’. H defended, and the petition was rejected as inadequate in the behaviour alleged. She said that the section should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.666502

Katz v Katz: 1972

Misuse of the phrase ‘unreasonable behaviour’
[1972] 1 WLR 955, [1972] 3 All ER 219
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Owens v Owens SC 25-Jul-2018
W petitioned for divorce alleging that he ‘has behaved in such a way that [she] cannot reasonably be expected to live with [him]’. H defended, and the petition was rejected as inadequate in the behaviour alleged. She said that the section should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.666501

Ash v Ash: FD 2 Feb 1972

The court considered the standard of behaviour which would support an allegation that a petitioner spouse should not reasonably be expected to live with the other spouse.
Held: Tthe court will have regard to the particular petitioner and the particular respondent in assessing what is reasonable.
Bagnall J said: ‘In order, therefore, to answer the question whether the petitioner can or cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent, in my judgment I have to consider not only the behaviour the respondent has alleged and established in evidence, but the character, personality, disposition and behaviour of the petitioner. The general question may be expanded thus: can this petitioner, with his or her character and personality, with his or her faults and other attributes, good and bad, having regard to his or her behaviour during the marriage, reasonably be expected to live with this respondent? It follows that if a respondent is seeking to resist a petition on the first ground upon which Mr. Ash relies, he must in his answer plead and his evidence establish the characteristics, faults, attributes, personality and behaviour on the part of the petitioner upon which he relies.’
‘It seems to me that a violent petitioner can reasonably be expected to live with a violent respondent. A petitioner who is addicted to drink can reasonably be expected to live with a respondent who is similarly addicted . .’ and ‘If each is equally bad, at any rate in similar respects, each can reasonably be expected to live with the other.’
Bagnall J
[1972] Fam 135
Divorce Reform Act 1969 1(2)(b)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Birch v Birch CA 22-Oct-1991
W appealed against dismissal of her petition for divorce to the effect that her husband had behaved in such a way that she could not reasonably have been expected to live with him. The judge had found H difficult but that his behaviour was not to . .
Cited – Owens v Owens CA 24-Mar-2017
Unreasonable Behaviour must reach criteria
W appealed against the judge’s refusal to grant a decree of divorce. He found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, but did not find that H had behaved iin such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with H.
Held: . .
Unsustainable – Owens v Owens SC 25-Jul-2018
W petitioned for divorce alleging that he ‘has behaved in such a way that [she] cannot reasonably be expected to live with [him]’. H defended, and the petition was rejected as inadequate in the behaviour alleged. She said that the section should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.549109

Stevens v Stevens: FD 1979

Sheldon J considered whether the divorce petitioner had established that she should not be expected to continue to live with her husband. An earlier behaviour petition by her had been rejected as making insufficient allegations against H.
Held: Sheldon J said: ‘the wife would be entitled to a decree in the present suit if she could establish (a) that their marriage remained irretrievably broken down . . and (b) that since March 16, 1976, he has behaved in such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with him. In my judgment, moreover, it is not necessary for her to establish . . that the husband’s behaviour, of which she now complains, was in any way responsible for the breakdown of the marriage.
On the other hand, of course, the facts that the marriage had clearly broken down and, a fortiori, that the breakdown was due to the fault of the wife are or may be matters in determining whether the husband’s behaviour since has been unreasonable in this context. The court must have regard to the whole history of the matrimonial relationship.
Sheldon J
[1979] 1 WLR 885
England and Wales
Citing:
Adopted – Welfare v Welfare FD 12-Oct-1977
Bush J heard a defended divorce petion sand said: ‘Conduct of a respondent could not be looked at in isolation but had to be viewed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, including the degree of provocation.’ He continued to adopt the . .

Cited by:
Cited – Owens v Owens CA 24-Mar-2017
Unreasonable Behaviour must reach criteria
W appealed against the judge’s refusal to grant a decree of divorce. He found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, but did not find that H had behaved iin such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with H.
Held: . .
Cited – Owens v Owens SC 25-Jul-2018
W petitioned for divorce alleging that he ‘has behaved in such a way that [she] cannot reasonably be expected to live with [him]’. H defended, and the petition was rejected as inadequate in the behaviour alleged. She said that the section should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.581084

Balraj v Balraj: CA 1980

The husband’s petition was based on section 1(2)(e) of the 1973 Act, namely that he and the wife had lived apart for at least five years. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s rejection of the wife’s opposition to the grant of a decree, which was that it would result in grave hardship to her within the meaning of section 5 of the 1973 Act. She had argued that the judge had failed to pay sufficient regard to her subjective reaction, as a Hindu wife, to the grant of a decree. In giving the leading judgment Cumming-Bruce LJ offered an analogy: ‘In behaviour cases, where the ground relied upon to prove the breakdown or a condition precedent to breakdown is the effect of behaviour, the court has to decide the single question whether the husband (for example) has so behaved that it is unreasonable to expect the wife to live with him. In order to decide that, it is necessary to make findings of fact of what the husband actually did and then findings of fact upon the impact of his conduct on that particular lady. As has been said again and again between a particular husband and a particular lady whose conduct and suffering are under scrutiny, there is of course a subjective element in the totality of the facts that are relevant to the solution but, when that subjective element has been evaluated, at the end of the day the question falls to be determined on an objective test.’
Obiter the court said: ‘(i) the court has to decide the single question whether the respondent has so behaved that it is unreasonable to expect the petitioner or applicant to live with him;
(ii) in order to decide that, it is necessary to make findings of fact as to what the respondent actually did, and findings of fact as to the impact of that conduct on the petitioner or applicant;
(iii) there is, of course, a subjective element in the totality of the facts that are relevant to the solution, but when that subjective element has been evaluated, at the end of the day the question falls to be determined on an objective test.’
Cumming-Bruce LJ
(1980) 11 Fam Law 110, (1981) 11 Fam Law 110
matrimonial Causes Act 1973 1(2)(e) 5
England and Wales
Cited by:
Approved – Owens v Owens CA 24-Mar-2017
Unreasonable Behaviour must reach criteria
W appealed against the judge’s refusal to grant a decree of divorce. He found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, but did not find that H had behaved iin such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with H.
Held: . .
Cited – Owens v Owens SC 25-Jul-2018
W petitioned for divorce alleging that he ‘has behaved in such a way that [she] cannot reasonably be expected to live with [him]’. H defended, and the petition was rejected as inadequate in the behaviour alleged. She said that the section should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.581123

Livingstone-Stallard v Livingstone-Stallard: FD 1974

Section 1(2)(b) is expressed in very simple language, and ‘is . . quite easy for a layman to understand’. The court considered the necessary test for whether unreasonable behaviour had reached a point such as to allow a decree of divorce.
Dunn J said: ‘Coming back to my analogy of a direction to a jury, I ask myself the question; would any right-thinking person come to the conclusion that this husband has behaved in such a way that this wife cannot reasonably be expected to live with him, taking into account the whole of the circumstances and the characters and personalities of the parties?’
Dunn J
[1974] 2 All ER 766, [1974] Fam 47
Divorce Reform Act 1969 1(2)(b)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Adopted – O’Neill v O’Neill CA 1975
The court considered the level of unreasonable behaviour necessary to found a decree of divorce.
Cairns LJ said: ‘The right test is, in my opinion, accurately stated in Rayden on Divorce . . ‘The words ‘reasonably be expected’ prima facie . .
Cited – Wachtel v Wachtel CA 8-Feb-1973
The court described the 1969 and 1970 Acts as ‘a reforming statute designed to facilitate the granting of ancillary relief in cases where marriages have been dissolved . . We regard the provisions of sections 2,3, 4 and 5 of the Act of 1970 as . .
Cited – Buffery v Buffery CA 30-Nov-1987
The court considered a petition for divorce beased upon unreasonable behaviour. The Wife petitioner appealed from the decision dismissing her petition for the dissolution of her marriage to the respondent.
Held: After discussing O’Neill: ‘one . .
Applied – Birch v Birch CA 22-Oct-1991
W appealed against dismissal of her petition for divorce to the effect that her husband had behaved in such a way that she could not reasonably have been expected to live with him. The judge had found H difficult but that his behaviour was not to . .
Cited – Owens v Owens CA 24-Mar-2017
Unreasonable Behaviour must reach criteria
W appealed against the judge’s refusal to grant a decree of divorce. He found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, but did not find that H had behaved iin such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with H.
Held: . .
Approved – Butterworth v Butterworth CA 7-Feb-1997
Brooke LJ, with whom Balcombe LJJ agreed, treated the test for whether behaviour was so unreasonable as to support a petition for divorce as being that laid down by Dunn J in Livingstone-Stallard. . .
Cited – Owens v Owens SC 25-Jul-2018
W petitioned for divorce alleging that he ‘has behaved in such a way that [she] cannot reasonably be expected to live with [him]’. H defended, and the petition was rejected as inadequate in the behaviour alleged. She said that the section should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.231160

Thurlow v Thurlow: FD 1976

A husband’s petition under the subsection was based on the wife’s failure to contribute to the running of the home and on her increasingly erratic behaviour, both of which were the result of a severe neurological condition. Rees J noted that, before approving the form of words in section 2(1)(b) of the 1969 Act, Parliament had considered and rejected a form of words that ‘the conduct of the respondent has been so intolerable that the petitioner could not reasonably be expected to continue or resume cohabitation’.
He held that a respondent’s failure to act could amount to behaviour for the purposes of the subsection. Even more significantly, he held that behaviour caused by illness could fall within the subsection; and, in granting a decree to the husband, he added that ‘no blame of any kind can be nor is attributed to the wife’.
[1976] Fam 32
Divorce Reform Act 1969 2(1)(b)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Owens v Owens SC 25-Jul-2018
W petitioned for divorce alleging that he ‘has behaved in such a way that [she] cannot reasonably be expected to live with [him]’. H defended, and the petition was rejected as inadequate in the behaviour alleged. She said that the section should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.666498

Pheasant v Pheasant: FD 1972

H petitioned for divorce pursuant to section 2(1)(b) of the Divorce Reform Act 1969, which came into force on 1 January 1971. The husband’s case was that the wife had been unable to give him the demonstrative affection which he needed.
Held: Ormrod J dismissed the petition. He observed that Parliament had not yet assimilated the law relating to marriage with the law of partnership, which made different provisions both for dissolution and for the resolution of financial issues consequent upon it. He construed section 2(1)(b) as placing primary emphasis on the respondent’s behaviour rather than on the petitioner’s personal idiosyncrasies. He asked himself whether it was: ‘reasonable to expect this petitioner to put up with the behaviour of this respondent, bearing in mind the characters and the difficulties of each of them, trying to be fair to both of them, and expecting [of them] neither heroic virtue nor selfless abnegation . . ‘
Ormrod J
[1972] Fam 202
Divorce Reform Act 1969 2(1)(b)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Owens v Owens SC 25-Jul-2018
W petitioned for divorce alleging that he ‘has behaved in such a way that [she] cannot reasonably be expected to live with [him]’. H defended, and the petition was rejected as inadequate in the behaviour alleged. She said that the section should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.666497

Priday v Priday: FD 1970

Cumming-Bruce J dismissed a husband’s petition for divorce on the ground of the wife’s cruelty under section 1(1)(a)(iii) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965. But, in recounting the history of the marriage, the judge also commented at p 557 on the conduct of the husband towards the wife:
‘Up to 1968 [the husband] sometimes attempted intercourse by force in the hope that if he succeeded in intercourse, even by such method, that … might stimulate her again emotionally to return to reality, but that was unsuccessful and he naturally abstained from such attempts. I am satisfied that his recourse to force in intercourse was not in any sense culpable but was a desperate attempt on his part to re-establish what might have been an important element in matrimonial consortium.’
Cumming-Bruce J
[1970] 3 All ER 554
England and Wales
Cited by:
Unsustainable – Owens v Owens SC 25-Jul-2018
W petitioned for divorce alleging that he ‘has behaved in such a way that [she] cannot reasonably be expected to live with [him]’. H defended, and the petition was rejected as inadequate in the behaviour alleged. She said that the section should be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.666500

Shaw v Shaw: CA 31 Jul 2002

Thorpe LJ said it was difficult to see how a failure to disclose assets in ancillary relief proceedings could be both substantial and unintentional.
As to Bodey J’s analysis of the power to vary an award of a lump sum in Westbury: ‘I am in complete agreement with that approach. It is frequently the case that the wife’s entitlement is expressed as a lump sum payable by two instalments where the husband’s ability to pay cash is dependent upon realisations whether of land, shares or chattels. That fortuitous circumstance, reflected in an order drawn to accommodate the payer, should not, in my judgment, in any way widen the payer’s opportunity to reopen the quantum issue whether in reliance upon Barder v Calouri or Levesy v Jenkins.’
Thorpe LJ
[2002] EWCA Civ 1298, [2002] 2 FLR 1204, [2002] 3 FCR 298
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved – Westbury v Sampson CA 23-Mar-2001
The claimant was advised to accept a consent order that his wife should pay him a capital sum in the divorce, but by instalments. The wife later successfully applied to have the sum reduced. He sought to claim against his former solicitors for not . .
Cited – Barder v Calouri HL 1987
In divorce proceedings, the husband transferred his interest in the matrimonial home to the wife who had been awarded care and control of the two children of the family. The order was made on 20th February 1985 and on 25th March an appalling tragedy . .

Cited by:
Cited – Judge v Judge and others CA 19-Dec-2008
The wife appealed against an order refusing to set aside an earlier order for ancillary relief in her divorce proeedings, arguing that it had been made under a mistake. The sum available for division had had deducted an expected liabiliity to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.188946

Dunbar’s Trustees v Dunbar: HL 11 Apr 1905

By an antenuptial marriage-contract executed in 1848 the wife bound herself to convey to the trustees the whole funds and estate, real and personal, which she then had or might thereafter ‘conquest and acquire by purchase, succession, or otherwise.’ The trustees were directed to pay the annual income of the trust estate to the wife during her life for her separate use, exclusive of the jus mariti. Held that the clause of conquest did not extend to estate which consisted of, or was purchased with, savings made by the wife from her separate income during the subsistence of the marriage.
Lord Macnaghten in the Chair, Lord Davey, Lord Robertson, and Lord Lindley
[1905] UKHL 553, 42 SLR 553
Bailii
Scotland

Updated: 06 August 2021; Ref: scu.621176

Mills v Mills: SC 18 Jul 2018

The Court was asked: ‘In circumstances in which at the time of a divorce a spouse, say a wife, is awarded capital which enables her to purchase a home but later she exhausts the capital by entry into a series of unwise transactions and so develops a need to pay rent, is the court entitled to decline to increase the order for the husband to make periodical payments to her so as to fund payment of all (or perhaps even any) of her rent even if he could afford to do so?’ On their divorce, the parties agreed a consent order involving capital and maintenance payments. They anticipated that the capital would buy a house, but W also obtained a mortgage, and now sought an increase in the maintenance payments to allow her to make the payments. The judge refused her application saying that it was a choice she had made. The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal, and H appealed now in turn.
Held: The Court of Appeal had erred. The judge had given proper reasons, and had made a decision properly within his discretion.
Lady Hale, President, Lord Wilson, Lord Carnwath, Lord Hughes, Lord Hodge
[2018] UKSC 38, UKSC 2017/0040
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary, SC Summary Video, SC 2018Jun 06 am Video, SC 2018 May 08 pm Video
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 31(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
At CA – M v M CA 1-Feb-2017
. .
Cited – Pearce v Pearce CA 28-Jul-2003
The financial claims on divorce had been settled by a compromise recorded in a court order. The order included periodical payments to the former wife. After she suffered financial losses, she sought an increase, and the former husband sought an . .
Cited – North v North CA 25-Jul-2007
The husband appealed a consent order for payment of pounds 202,000 to commute a varied nominal maintenance order. The original order had been made many years before. In the meantime, the former husband had grown wealthy, and she had suffered . .
Cited – Yates v Yates CA 28-Mar-2012
Under a consent order the wife had received a substantial lump sum on the basis that she would use half of it in discharging a mortgage on her home. In the event she had repaid only part of the mortgage debt and had invested in a non-income-bearing . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 31 July 2021; Ref: scu.620137

North v North: CA 25 Jul 2007

The husband appealed a consent order for payment of pounds 202,000 to commute a varied nominal maintenance order. The original order had been made many years before. In the meantime, the former husband had grown wealthy, and she had suffered financially from her own actions. The judge had varied then capitalised the maintenance required.
Held: ‘In any application under section 31 the Applicant’s needs are likely to be the dominant or magnetic factor. But it does not follow that the respondent is inevitably responsible financially for any established needs. He is not an insurer against all hazards nor, when fairness is the measure, is he necessarily liable for needs created by the applicant’s financial mismanagement, extravagance or irresponsibility . . Thus in the present case the wife’s failure to utilise her earning potential, her subsequent abandonment of the secure financial future provided for her by the husband, her choice of a more hazardous future in Australia, together with her lifestyle choices in Australia, were all productive of needs which she had generated and for which the husband should not as a matter of fairness be held responsible in law. ‘ The court made a substitutional order reducing substantially the capital sum payable by the former husband.
Thorpe LJ, May LJ, Bennett J
[2007] EWCA Civ 760, Times 17-Aug-2007, [2007] 2 FCR 601, [2008] 1 FLR 158, [2008] Fam Law 508, [2007] All ER (D) 386
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Rose v Rose CA 20-Feb-2002
The parties married in 1984, and divorced in 2000. They had two children. The husband had a substantial fortune. In ancillary relief proceedings, at the financial dispute resolution hearing, the judge indicated what order was on his mind, the . .
Cited – Edgar v Edgar CA 23-Jul-1980
edgar_edgarCA1980
H and W separated and in 1976, without any pressure H and at the instigation of W, signed a deed of separation negotiated through solicitors. H agreed to purchase a house for W, to confer on her capital benefits worth approximately andpound;100,000, . .
Cited – Dipper v Dipper CA 1980
The court has no power to dismiss an applicant’s claim for periodical payments against her will. . .
Cited – Pearce v Pearce CA 28-Jul-2003
The financial claims on divorce had been settled by a compromise recorded in a court order. The order included periodical payments to the former wife. After she suffered financial losses, she sought an increase, and the former husband sought an . .
Cited – Piglowska v Piglowski HL 24-Jun-1999
When looking to the needs of parties in a divorce, there is no presumption that both parties are to be left able to purchase alternative homes. The order of sub-clauses in the Act implies nothing as to their relative importance. Courts should be . .

Cited by:
Cited – Mills v Mills SC 18-Jul-2018
The Court was asked: ‘In circumstances in which at the time of a divorce a spouse, say a wife, is awarded capital which enables her to purchase a home but later she exhausts the capital by entry into a series of unwise transactions and so develops a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 31 July 2021; Ref: scu.258392

Pearce v Pearce: CA 28 Jul 2003

The financial claims on divorce had been settled by a compromise recorded in a court order. The order included periodical payments to the former wife. After she suffered financial losses, she sought an increase, and the former husband sought an order finalising the arrangements.
Held: The judge should have restricted himself to capitalisation of the increased periodical payments order and abstained from the addition of a substantial uplift. He should not have allowed the wife to discharge her mortgage at the husband’s expense, which violates the principle that capital claims once compromised could not be revisited. There is simply no power or discretion to embark on further adjustment of capital to reflect the outcome of unwise or unfortunate investment on one side or prudent or lucky investment on the other.
Thorpe LJ said: ‘Both as a matter of principle and as a matter of good practice, in my opinion the judge had to decide three questions in the following sequence. First he had to decide what variation to make in the order for periodical payments agreed in 1997. An increase was inevitable given inflation and the husband’s overall increased prosperity despite the decline in his income. The judge’s second task was to fix the date from which the increased order was to commence. That would dispose of the past and present account between the parties. Then, and only then, should he have moved to the future, substituting a capital payment calculated in accordance with the Duxbury tables for the income stream that he was terminating.
Of course I do not seek to put the trial judge in a straitjacket. He exercises a broad discretion at the first stage. Equally at the third stage he exercises a discretion, albeit a narrower one, in departing from the mathematics of the Duxbury tables to reflect special factors which individual cases will regularly generate.’
The President, Lord Justice Thorpe, And Lord Justice Mantell
[2003] EWCA Civ 1054, Times 01-Sep-2003, [2003] 3 FLR 1144, [2004] 1 WLR 68
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 31(7B)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Minton v Minton HL 1979
Establishing Clean Break on Divorce
The House set out the principles for establishing a ‘clean break’ financial settlement on a divorce. Once a capital claim in a divorce has been given effect in a court order, the court does not have jurisdiction to vary it. Lord Scarman said: ‘Once . .
Cited – de Lasala v de Lasala PC 4-Apr-1979
No Revisiting of Capital Claim after Compromise
(Hong Kong) Where capital claims are compromised in a once-for-all court order they cannot be revisited or reissued in the absence of a substantial mistake. Capital orders are ‘once-for-all orders’. The legal effect of the order derives not from the . .
Cited – S v S FD 1986
Both parties sought a variation of a maintenance order. The former husband sought to be allowed to pay a sufficient capital sum to his former wife to commute the payment in her favour.
Held: Provided the sum could be paid and the result would . .
Cited – Brooks v Brooks HL 29-Jun-1995
A director’s pension scheme could be treated as a post-nuptial marriage settlement where the director was the only scheme member. It was thus a matrimonial asset capable of variation by a court in ancillary relief proceedings in a divorce. The court . .
Cited – Harris v Harris CA 1-Jul-2001
The first instance court had acceded to the husband’s application for downward variation of the wife’s periodical payments to andpound;9,000 per annum and to the wife’s application substituting a lump sum of andpound;120,000 for the future . .
Cited – Cornick v Cornick (No 3) FD 2001
The court considered its powers when being asked to vary a lump sum provision at the same time as a variation of maintenance.
Held: ‘section 31(7B) clearly introduces a wide discretionary power to be exercised by applying the words of the . .
Cited – White v White CA 19-May-2003
The parties to the marriage owned a property which they had extended. The relationship deteriorated, and the mother sought an order under the 1996 Act. The mother left the home, and the father cared for the children. He sought orders under the 1989 . .
Cited – Cornick v Cornick (No 2) CA 2-Jan-1995
The court considered the boundary of its power in ordering periodical payments: ‘I do not believe that Hale J erred in her approach in principle to this case, and I reject the submission which Mr Mostyn has made that there was a delimiting factor . .

Cited by:
Cited – McFarlane v McFarlane; Parlour v Parlour CA 7-Jul-2004
Appeals were made against orders for periodical payments made against high earning husbands. The argument was that if the case of White had decided that capital should be distributed equally, the same should apply also to income.
Held: The . .
Cited – North v North CA 25-Jul-2007
The husband appealed a consent order for payment of pounds 202,000 to commute a varied nominal maintenance order. The original order had been made many years before. In the meantime, the former husband had grown wealthy, and she had suffered . .
Cited – Dixon v Marchant CA 24-Jan-2008
The parties had only recently settled their ancillary relief proceedings by consent when the former wife remarried. The former husband sought the setting aside of the order. The wife had denied the relationship. The judge had found the conditions in . .
Cited – Vaughan v Vaughan CA 31-Mar-2010
H had been paying maintenance to W for many years after the divorce. W now appealed against an order revoking the arrangement without providing a capital sum to replace it. H’s health had declined, and also his earnings.
Held: W’s appeal . .
Cited – NG v SG FD 9-Dec-2011
The court considered what to do when it was said that a party to ancillary relief proceedings on divorce had failed to make proper disclosure of his assets. H appealed against an award of a capital sum in such proceedimngs.
Held:
Held: . .
Cited – Mills v Mills SC 18-Jul-2018
The Court was asked: ‘In circumstances in which at the time of a divorce a spouse, say a wife, is awarded capital which enables her to purchase a home but later she exhausts the capital by entry into a series of unwise transactions and so develops a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 31 July 2021; Ref: scu.184907

Yates v Yates: CA 28 Mar 2012

Under a consent order the wife had received a substantial lump sum on the basis that she would use half of it in discharging a mortgage on her home. In the event she had repaid only part of the mortgage debt and had invested in a non-income-bearing bond the sum which she had thus elected not to apply to full clearance of the mortgage. When, later, a judge came to capitalise her right to continuing periodical payments, he included in his calculation of her need the amount of interest payable by her in respect of the residual mortgage debt. The Court of Appeal held that the inclusion had been wrong.
Thorpe LJ said:
’12. . . It seems to me little more than common sense that if a recipient of a lump sum twice the size of the mortgage on the final matrimonial home elects to hold back capital made available for the mortgage discharge in order to invest in a bond that bears no income, she cannot look to the payer thereafter for indemnity or contribution to the continuing mortgage interest payments. That seems to me to be an absolutely self-evident point.’
L
Lewison LJ said: ‘the need to pay the mortgage at all arose from her own choice not to apply . . the lump sum in discharging the existing mortgage . . The financial consequences of her investment choice are her responsibility. It is wrong in principle for the husband to have to continue to fund the mortgage.’
[2012] EWCA Civ 532, [2013] 2 FLR 1070
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Mills v Mills SC 18-Jul-2018
The Court was asked: ‘In circumstances in which at the time of a divorce a spouse, say a wife, is awarded capital which enables her to purchase a home but later she exhausts the capital by entry into a series of unwise transactions and so develops a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 31 July 2021; Ref: scu.460361

M v M: CA 1 Feb 2017

Sir Ernest Ryder SPT
[2017] EWCA Civ 129
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 31(3)
England and Wales
Cited by:
At CA – Mills v Mills SC 18-Jul-2018
The Court was asked: ‘In circumstances in which at the time of a divorce a spouse, say a wife, is awarded capital which enables her to purchase a home but later she exhausts the capital by entry into a series of unwise transactions and so develops a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 July 2021; Ref: scu.620142

A v United Kingdom: ECHR 8 Oct 1982

A disabled UK citizen living on benefits complained of the denial of entry clearance to his Filippino fiancee whom he had never met but wished to marry here. The ground of refusal was that she would be a charge on public funds.
Held: The right to marry did not in principle include the right to choose the geographical location of the marriage and the refusal of entry was justified. The case did not involve a genuine marriage between two persons already in the jurisdiction.
(1983) 5 EHRR CD296, 9054/80, [1982] ECHR 15
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8
Human Rights
Cited by:
Cited – Baiai and others, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 30-Jul-2008
In order to prevent marriages of convenience in the UK the Secretary of State introduced a scheme under which certain persons subject to immigration control required her written permission to marry and would not receive it unless they were present . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 July 2021; Ref: scu.272206

Hughes and Another (Edwardes’ Trustees) v Edwardes and Another: HL 25 Jul 1892

In an antenuptial marriage-contract the wife conveyed a sum of pounds 4000 to trustees. The deed provided that in the event of the marriage being dissolved by the predecease of the wife leaving children, the husband should have an alimentary liferent of this fund, that after his death the capital should be paid over to the children of the marriage on their attaining majority, and that if there were no children alive at the dissolution of the marriage, or should they all die before the terms of payment of their provisions as aforesaid, the husband should continue to have the liferent of the fund during his life, but that the whole capital should be subject to the wife’s disposal by will. In the parallel clause which dealt with the event of the husband predeceasing the wife, it was provided that the wife should have an alimentary liferent of the fund; that after her death the interest was to be applied for behoof of the children during their minority, and that on their attaining majority the capital was to be paid to them, but subject to the declaration that if ‘such children should all die before their mother, or . . should they all die before attaining majority, and without leaving issue of their own bodies,’ the fund should continue to be held for the alimentary liferent of the widow; and it was further declared that in the event of the wife surviving her husband, and of the failure of issue of the marriage, she should have the right to test on the capital. It was expressly provided that the provisions to children should not be payable, or become vested interests, or be transmissible by them until after the death of the longest liver of the spouses, and until the children attained majority.
The marriage was dissolved by the predecease of the wife, who was survived by one son, and left a will in which she made over all she possessed to her husband.
In an action by the husband and son for payment upon their joint discharge of the pounds 4000, held (rev. judgment of the First Division) that the trustees were bound to maintain the trust, not only for the protection of the husband’s alimentary liferent, but also for the possible issue of the son.
Lord Chancellor, Lord Watson, Lord Herschell, Lord Macnaghten, Lord Morris, and Lord Hannen
[1892] UKHL 911, 29 SLR 911
Bailii
Scotland

Updated: 29 July 2021; Ref: scu.634558

The Attorney General (ex rel The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd) v Open Door Counselling Ltd and Dublin Wellwoman Centre Ltd: 1988

(High Court in Ireland) Hamilton P said: ‘Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 protected and protect the foetus in the womb and having regard to the omission of the words ‘Quick with child’ which were contained in the statute of 1803 . . that protection dates from conception. Consequently, the right to life of the foetus, the unborn, is afforded statutory protection from the date of its conception.’
Hamilton P
[1988] IR 592
Offences against the Person Act 1861
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland ECHR 29-Oct-1992
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Lack of jurisdiction (Art. 8); Preliminary objection rejected (victim); Preliminary objection rejected (six month period); Preliminary objection rejected . .
Cited – Regina (Smeaton) v Secretary of State for Health and Others Admn 18-Apr-2002
The claimant challenged the Order as regards the prescription of the morning-after pill, asserting that the pill would cause miscarriages, and that therefore the use would be an offence under the 1861 Act.
Held: ‘SPUC’s case is that any . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 July 2021; Ref: scu.223717

Quila and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department: SC 12 Oct 2011

Parties challenged the rule allowing the respondent to deny the right to enter or remain here to non EU citizens marrying a person settled and present here where either party was under the age of 21. The aim of the rule was to deter forced marriages.
Held: The Secretary of State’s appeal failed (Lord Brown dissenting). Following Razgar, the question requiring to be answered was whether there had been an interference by a public authority with the exercise of a person’s right to respect for his private or family life and if so, whether it had had consequences of sufficient gravity to engage the operation of the article 30.
Lord Wilson cited with approval Lord Bingham’s formulation in Huang and Baroness Hale and said: ‘where delicate and difficult judgment are involved . . this court will treat with appropriate respect the views taken by those whose primary responsibility is to make the judgments in question. But those views cannot be decisive. Ultimately, it is for the courts to decide whether or not the Convention rights have been breached: R (SB) v Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC 100; Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd [2007] 1 WLR 1420.’
As to the requirements for finding a valid interference in artiicle 8 rights, ‘four questions generally arise’: ‘(a) is the legislative objective sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right?; (b) are the measures which have been designed to meet it rationally connected to it?; (c) are they no more than are necessary to accomplish it?; and (d) do they strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community?’
Lord Phillips, President, Lady Hale, Lord Brown, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson
UKSC 2011/0022, [2011] UKSC 45, [2012] 1 All ER 1011, [2011] 3 WLR 836, [2012] Imm AR 135, [2012] 1 FLR 788, [2011] UKHRR 1347, [2012] Fam Law 21, [2011] 3 FCR 575, [2011] INLR 698, [2012] 1 AC 621, [2012] HRLR 2
SC, SC Summ, Bailii Summary, Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 6, Family Law Act 1996 63A(4), Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 81, Directive 2003/86/EC
England and Wales
Citing:
At First Instance – Quila and Another v Secretary of State for The Home Department Admn 7-Dec-2009
The claimant, a Chilean national, sought review of a decision not to allow him to stay in the UK as the husband of a British national. He said that the decision was based on him being under 21, and that this was discriminatory, and infringed his . .
Appeal from – Quila and Another v Secretary of State for The Home Department CA 21-Dec-2010
The court was asked whether the ban contained in paragraph 277 of the immigration rules on the entry for settlement of foreign spouses between the ages of 18 and 21 is a lawful way of dealing with the problem of forced marriages. . .
Cited – Abdulaziz etc v The United Kingdom ECHR 28-May-1985
Three women, all lawfully settled in the UK, had married third-country nationals but, at first, the Secretary of State had refused permission for their husbands to remain with them, or join them, in the UK.
Held: The refusals of permission had . .
Cited – Costello-Roberts v The United Kingdom ECHR 25-Mar-1993
‘Slippering’, a punishment by hitting a child with a slipper, when used as part of school discipline was not a degrading punishment under the convention. Conduct must attain a minimum level of severity to engage the operation of the Convention. . .
Cited – Gul v Switzerland ECHR 19-Feb-1996
A Turkish father, who had been permitted on humanitarian grounds to reside with his wife in Switzerland, failed to establish that, by refusing to allow their seven-year-old son to join them in Switzerland, the state had interfered with respect for . .
Cited – Boultif v Switzerland ECHR 2-Aug-2001
The applicant complained under Article 8 that the Swiss authorities had not renewed his residence permit, after which he had been separated from his wife, a Swiss citizen and who could not be expected to follow him to Algeria. Switzerland argued . .
Cited – Regina v Sectretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Razgar etc HL 17-Jun-2004
The claimant resisted removal after failure of his claim for asylum, saying that this would have serious adverse consequences to his mental health, infringing his rights under article 8. He appealed the respondent’s certificate that his claim was . .
Cited – Rodrigues Da Silva and Hoogkamer v The Netherlands ECHR 31-Jan-2006
A Brazilian mother came to the Netherlands in 1994 and set up home with a Dutch national but not applying for a residence permit. In 1996 they had a daughter who became a Dutch national. In 1997 they split up and the daughter remained with her . .
Cited – AG (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 20-Nov-2007
The threshold requirement referable to the nature of the consequences was ‘not a specially high one’
Sedley LJ discussed the Huang case: ‘The effect of their Lordships’ decision (and, if we may say so, the intended effect of this court’s . .
Cited – ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 1-Feb-2011
The respondent had arrived and claimed asylum. Three claims were rejected, two of which were fraudulent. She had two children by a UK citizen, and if deported the result would be (the father being unsuitable) that the children would have to return . .
Cited – Tuquabo-Tekle and others v The Netherlands ECHR 15-Sep-2010
A mother, father and their three sons were of Eritrean ethnicity but lived in the Netherlands and had acquired Dutch citizenship. When leaving Eritrea in 1989, the mother had left behind a daughter, then aged eight. When she was aged 15, an . .
Cited – Y v Russia ECHR 4-Dec-2008
The applicants complained about the first applicant’s deportation to China, about his unlawful detention, about the disruption of their family life and about the absence of domestic remedies. They referred to Articles 3, 5, 8 and 13 of the . .
Cited – Regina (Holding and Barnes plc) v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the Regions; Regina (Alconbury Developments Ltd and Others) v Same and Others HL 9-May-2001
Power to call in is administrative in nature
The powers of the Secretary of State to call in a planning application for his decision, and certain other planning powers, were essentially an administrative power, and not a judicial one, and therefore it was not a breach of the applicants’ rights . .
Cited – Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Limited HL 4-Dec-2003
The claimant’s house was regularly flooded by waters including also foul sewage from the respondent’s neighbouring premises. He sought damages and an injunction. The defendants sought to restrict the claimant to his statutory rights.
Held: The . .
Cited – Begum (otherwise SB), Regina (on the Application of) v Denbigh High School HL 22-Mar-2006
The student, a Muslim wished to wear a full Islamic dress, the jilbab, but this was not consistent with the school’s uniform policy. She complained that this interfered with her right to express her religion.
Held: The school’s appeal . .
Cited – Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 21-Mar-2007
Appellate Roles – Human Rights – Families Split
The House considered the decision making role of immigration appellate authorities when deciding appeals on Human Rights grounds, against refusal of leave to enter or remain, under section 65. In each case the asylum applicant had had his own . .
Cited – Baiai and others, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 30-Jul-2008
In order to prevent marriages of convenience in the UK the Secretary of State introduced a scheme under which certain persons subject to immigration control required her written permission to marry and would not receive it unless they were present . .
Cited – In re KR (Abduction: Forcible Removal by Parents) FD 1999
The court set out a form for use when inviting the cooperation in securing HM’s return to the jurisdiction of a child taken abroad by her parents for a forced marriage of the police authorities in this country and ‘respectfully requesting and . .
Cited – Thlimmenos v Greece ECHR 6-Apr-2000
(Grand Chamber) The application of a rule that a felon could not become a chartered accountant infringed the rights under article 14, taken in conjunction with article 9, of a pacifist convicted of the felony of refusing to perform military service. . .
Cited – FH (Post-flight spouses: Iran) v Entry Clearance Officer, Tehran UTIAC 10-Aug-2010
UKIAT The Immigration Rules make no provision for the admission of post-flight spouses of refugees with limited leave. The Rules should be changed. In the mean time it is most unlikely that it will be . .
Cited – Sen v The Netherlands ECHR 21-Dec-2001
. .
Cited – Pretty v The United Kingdom ECHR 29-Apr-2002
Right to Life Did Not include Right to Death
The applicant was paralysed and suffered a degenerative condition. She wanted her husband to be allowed to assist her suicide by accompanying her to Switzerland. English law would not excuse such behaviour. She argued that the right to die is not . .
Cited – Odelola v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 20-May-2009
The appellant had applied for leave to remain as a postgraduate doctor. Before her application was determined, the rules changed. She said that her application should have been dealt with under the rules applicable at the time of her application. . .
Cited – Uner v The Netherlands ECHR 18-Oct-2006
(Grand Chamber) The court considered the application of article 8 considerations in extradition and similar proceedings, and said: ‘the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any . .
Cited – Haghighi v The Netherlands ECHR 14-Apr-2009
. .
Cited – Omoregie And Others v Norway ECHR 31-Jul-2008
. .
Cited – Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd HL 25-Apr-2007
Belfast had failed to license sex shops. The company sought review of the decision not to grant a licence.
Held: The council’s appeal succeeded. The refusal was not a denial of the company’s human rights: ‘If article 10 and article 1 of . .

Cited by:
Cited – Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) SC 19-Jun-2013
The bank challenged measures taken by HM Treasury to restrict access to the United Kingdom’s financial markets by a major Iranian commercial bank, Bank Mellat, on the account of its alleged connection with Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic . .
Cited – Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) SC 19-Jun-2013
The bank challenged measures taken by HM Treasury to restrict access to the United Kingdom’s financial markets by a major Iranian commercial bank, Bank Mellat, on the account of its alleged connection with Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic . .
Cited – Birks, Regina (On the Application of) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Admn 25-Sep-2014
birks_cpmAdmn1409
The claimant police officer sought judicial review of a decision to continue his suspension. He had been investigated and cleared after a death in custody. He sought to join the Church of England Ministry and was offered a post. He was re-assured . .
Cited – Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, and Others, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 12-Nov-2014
The claimant had supported the grant of a visa to a woman in order to speak to members of Parliament who was de facto leader of an Iranian organsation which had in the past supported terrorism and had been proscribed in the UK, but that proscription . .
Cited – Nicklinson and Another, Regina (on The Application of) SC 25-Jun-2014
Criminality of Assisting Suicide not Infringing
The court was asked: ‘whether the present state of the law of England and Wales relating to assisting suicide infringes the European Convention on Human Rights, and whether the code published by the Director of Public Prosecutions relating to . .
Cited – T and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department and Another SC 18-Jun-2014
T and JB, asserted that the reference in certificates issued by the state to cautions given to them violated their right to respect for their private life under article 8 of the Convention. T further claims that the obligation cast upon him to . .
Cited – Beghal v Director of Public Prosecutions SC 22-Jul-2015
Questions on Entry must be answered
B was questioned at an airport under Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act, and required to answer questions asked by appropriate officers for the purpose set out. She refused to answer and was convicted of that refusal , contrary to paragraph 18 of that . .
Cited – Ali and Bibi, Regina (on The Applications of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 18-Nov-2015
At the claimants alleged that the rules requiring a foreign spouse or partner of a British citizen or a person settled in this country to pass a test of competence in the English language before coming to live here were an unjustifiable interference . .
Cited – Steinfeld and Keidan, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for International Development (In Substitution for The Home Secretary and The Education Secretary) SC 27-Jun-2018
The applicants, an heterosexual couple wished to enter into a civil partnership under the 2004 Act, rather than a marriage. They complained that had they been a same sex couple they would have had that choice under the 2013 Act.
‘. . the . .
Cited – The Christian Institute and Others v The Lord Advocate SC 28-Jul-2016
(Scotland) By the 2014 Act, the Scottish Parliament had provided that each child should have a named person to monitor that child’s needs, with information about him or her shared as necessary. The Institute objected that the imposed obligation to . .
Cited – Hesham Ali (Iraq) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 16-Nov-2016
The appellant, an Iraqi national had arrived in 2000 as a child, and stayed unlawfully after failure of his asylum claim. He was convicted twice of drugs offences. On release he was considered a low risk of re-offending. He had been in a serious . .
Cited – MM (Lebanon) and Others, Regina (on The Applications of) v Secretary of State and Another SC 22-Feb-2017
Challenge to rules requiring certain minimum levels of income (Minimum Income Requirement – MIR) for allowing entry for non-EEA spouse.
Held: The challenges udder the Human Rights Act to the Rules themselves failed. Nor did any separate issue . .
Cited – Tigere, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills SC 29-Jul-2015
After increasing university fees, the student loan system was part funded by the government. They introduced limits to the availability of such loans, and a student must have been lawfully ordinarily resident in the UK for three years before the day . .
Cited – Kiarie and Byndloss, Regina (on The Applications of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 14-Jun-2017
The court considered a challenge to the rules governing ‘out of country’ appeals against immigration decisions. They had in each case convictions leading to prison terms for serious drugs related offences.
Held: The appeals were allowed, and . .
Cited – A and B, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Health SC 14-Jun-2017
The court was asked: ‘Was it unlawful for the Secretary of State for Health, the respondent, who had power to make provisions for the functioning of the National Health Service in England, to have failed to make a provision which would have enabled . .
Cited – Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland : Abortion) SC 7-Jun-2018
The Commission challenged the compatibility of the NI law relating to banning nearly all abortions with Human Rights Law. It now challenged a decision that it did not have standing to bring the case.
Held: (Lady Hale, Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 July 2021; Ref: scu.445396

Lachaux v Lachaux: FD 2 Mar 2017

Mostyn J
[2017] EWHC 385 (Fam), [2017] 4 WLR 57, [2017] 2 FCR 678, [2017] WLR(D) 171, [2018] 1 FLR 380
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Duhur-Johnson v Duhur-Johnson FD 3-May-2005
The husband sought to stay divorce proceedings commenced here by his wife, saying that they had already been divorced in Nigeria. The wife said the Nigerian proceedings should not be recognised in English law.
Held: The cases established: 1) . .

Cited by:
Cited – Radseresht v Radseresht-Spain FD 13-Oct-2017
Applications by H for declarations that a divorce granted in 2009 in Dubai is entitled to recognition in England and Wales under s.45 of the 1986 Act, and of status under s.55 of the Act, and going with that his application to strike out the prayer . .
Appeal from – Lachaux v Lachaux CA 1-May-2019
Recognition of an overseas divorce, and whether UK court had jurisdiction. . .
Cited – Hijazi v Yaxley-Lennon (Orse Tommy Robinson) QBD 22-Jul-2021
No Valid Evidence to Support Serious Accusations
The claimant was filmed being assaulted in the school playground. The film was published on the internet, and the defendant right wing politician re-published it, but falsely said that the claimant had himself been violent.
Held: The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 July 2021; Ref: scu.579929

C v C: 1942

(New Zealand) The husband told the wife he was a famous Australian featherweight boxer and quite well off. The husband was in fact a New Zealander and neither a boxer nor rich. The wife sought annullment of the marriage.
Held: The petitionfailed. Callan J said that it was a ‘case of real consent induced by fraud, and not a case of no consent or absence of consent.’ The woman had consented to marrying the man she in fact married.
Callan J
[1942] NZLR 356
England and Wales

Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.540361

Miletante v Ogunwomoju: FD 1993

W sought a decree of nullity. They had married, but H had assumed the identity of a man living lawfully within the UK, and W had therefore taken a false name. H was deported, having acquired no right of abode.
Held: The decree was granted. The false representation was as to H’s identity, and the marriage was void.
Arun Owen HHJ
[1993] 2 FCR 356, [1994] Fam Law 17
England and Wales

Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.540362

Olafisoye v Olafisoye: FD 28 Jul 2010

The court was asked to consider the recognition here of a foreign divorce.
Held: Holman J said: ‘I observe and stress at the outset the following matters. First, in this case, and probably in all such cases, the issue is very fact specific and requires an intense focus on the steps which were taken and all the circumstances of the particular case. Second, the focus under sub-paragraph (i) is not upon whether or not, or when, the respondent party actually had notice, but upon the steps which were or were not taken by or on behalf of the applicant party to give notice. In this regard, I agree with, and adopt, propositions (1) to (6) in paragraph 44 of the judgment of Mr Jeremy Richardson QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge in Duhur-Johnson v Duhur-Johnson (Attorney General Intervening) [2005] 2 FLR 1042 at pages 1052 to 1053, noting as I do that he had been assisted by the ‘helpful, erudite and succinct’ submissions of counsel on behalf of the Attorney General (see paragraph [4]).
Third, it is very important to keep in mind that under the sub-paragraph there are two stages in the approach of the court. First, it must make an assessment or judgment whether such steps were not taken as ‘should reasonably have been taken’; but even if the court adjudges that they were not, that merely opens the door or gateway to the second stage and an overall exercise of discretion whether or not to recognise the overseas divorce . . In exercising the second stage of discretion, if the gateway is open and it arises, the court should, in my view, still be very slow to refuse recognition of the decision and order of the foreign court, at any rate when, as here, it is clearly that of an independent, properly constituted court operating a procedure and applying substantive law (as is clear from the documents in this case) which substantially accords with our own. It is not simply a matter of ‘comity’ or respect for the foreign court. Orderly legal relationships in the international world require that, so far as possible, judicial outcomes in one country can be relied upon in all others provided there was (as here) a proper connection with the first country.
The effect of non-recognition here of a divorce which is valid or effective in the country where it was made is to create a so called ‘limping marriage’ i.e. that the parties are treated as still being married here, when they are not so treated elsewhere. That is so obviously undesirable that the court leans, so far as possible and consistent with the legislation and justice, against exercising a discretion so as to produce a limping marriage.’
Holman J
[2010] EWHC 3540 (Fam)
Bailii
Family Law Act 1986
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Olafisoye v Olafisoye FD 19-Feb-2010
. .

Cited by:
Cited – Liaw v Lee (Recognition of Divorce) FD 3-Jun-2015
The applicant sought that the decrees nisi and absolute of divorce issued by the High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam in favour of the respondent husband be refused recognition in England and Wales.
Held: The application was granted: ‘the husband . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.430383

Potanin v Potanina: FD 8 Nov 2019

Judgment on application to set aside leave to apply for financial relief pursuant to Part III Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.
Cohen
[2019] EWHC 2956 (Fam), [2020] 1 FCR 482, [2020] 2 WLR 311, [2020] 1 FLR 616, [2019] WLR(D) 632, [2020] Fam 189
Bailii, WLRD
[2020] Fam 1899
England and Wales

Updated: 09 July 2021; Ref: scu.648699

S v S: FD 15 Dec 2014

‘application by Mrs S for financial remedy orders against Mr S. For convenience I will refer to them as ‘the husband’ and ‘the wife.’ It raises questions as to how to deal fairly with the fact that the husband brought into the relationship and marriage substantial wealth (pounds 13 million) upon which the current kitty of some pounds 25 million is directly or indirectly based. It also raises fiercely disputed factual issues as to when the parties’ ‘relationship leading to marriage’ began; whether in 1995 or 1997. This is said to matter because within that disputed period the husband received a crucial payment of andpound;9 million from a particular business transaction which enabled his business to grow. It is a case of considerable bitterness as between the parties which has impacted negatively on their attitudes to one another and on their approach to a fair overall outcome. ‘
Bodey J
[2014] EWHC 4732 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 08 July 2021; Ref: scu.547118

In Re SK (Proposed Plaintiff) (an Adult by way of her Litigation Friend): FD 2004

The court considered an application for a forced marriage protection order.
Held: Singer J said that the court’s inherent jurisdiction is ‘sufficiently flexible . . to evolve in accordance with social needs and social values.’
Singer J
[2005] 2 FLR 230, [2004] EWHC 3202 (Fam), [2005] 3 All ER 421, [2006] 1 WLR 81, [2005] 2 FCR 459
Bailii
Supreme Court Act 1981, Family Law Act 1996
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – In re PS (an Adult), Re; City of Sunderland v PS by her litigation friend the Offcial Solcicitor and CA; Re PS (Incapacitated or Vulnerable Adult) FD 9-Mar-2007
The patient an elderly lady with limited mental capacity was to be returned from hospital, but her daughter said she was to come home. The local authority sought to prevent this, wanting to return her to a residential unit where she had lived for . .
Cited – Chief Constable and Another v YK and Others FD 6-Oct-2010
cc_ykFD10
The court gave directions in Forced Marriage Protection order applications. An order had been made at the request of the police on behalf of A, and the court had declined to discharge it on A’s own application.
Held: Special advocates were not . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 July 2021; Ref: scu.269961

D’Este v D’Este; D(J) v D(S): FD 1973

The husband had obtained a decree absolute of divorce against his wife. The matrimonial home had been conveyed to them jointly. He remarried and applied to the court for variation of the post-nuptial settlement. He died before the application was heard, and his second wife sought to carry on the application in her capacity as his personal representative.
Held: The court had no jurisdiction to deal with the application. Under section 4 of the 1970 Act an application for variation could only be made and proceeded with by one spouse against another while both remained alive. So far as material, section 4 gave power to the court to vary ‘for the benefit of the parties to the marriage . . any ante-nuptial or post-nuptial settlement . . made on the parties to the marriage’
Ormrod J said: ‘In my judgment, the real answer to this application is this, that the whole of the matrimonial causes legislation, right back to 1857, is essentially a personal jurisdiction arising between parties to the marriage or the children of the marriage. The death of one or other of the parties to the litigation has nothing whatever to do with the old common law rule which was abrogated by the Act of 1934. The fact that these applications abate by death derives, in my judgment, from the legislation which created the rights, if they are rightly called ‘rights’ and from no other source. If that is correct, then it is not necessary to examine very closely whether or not the administratrix in this case has something which could be called, by any stretch of imagination, a cause of action.’
Ormrod J
[1973] Fam 55, [1973] 1 All ER 349
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1970 4
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Barder v Barder; Barder v Caluori HL 1988
Later Event no ground to appeal from consent order
The matrimonial home had been owned jointly by the husband and wife. In divorce proceedings, an order was made by consent that the husband should transfer his interest in the home to the wife within 28 days. Before the order had been executed, the . .
Cited – Harb v King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz and Another CA 9-Nov-2005
The wife sought to continue her claim for ancillary relief despite the death of her husband, the former King of Saudi Arabia.
Held: The court’s jurisdiction over the King had been challenged. However the claimants claim now abated on the death . .
Distinguished – A v P (Surrogacy: Parental Order: Death of Applicant) FD 8-Jul-2011
M applied for a parental order under the 2008 Act. The child had been born through a surrogacy arrangement in India, which was lawful there, but would have been unlawful here. The clinic could not guarantee a biological relationship with the child. . .
Cited – In re A (A Minor) FD 8-Jul-2011
An application was made in care proceedings for an order restricting publication of information about the family after the deaths of two siblings of the child subject to the application. The Sun and a local newspaper had already published stories . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 July 2021; Ref: scu.235890

Carega Properties SA (formerly Joram Developments Ltd) v Sharratt: HL 1979

A widow aged 75 had developed a platonic relationship with a young man aged 24. He lived in her flat for nearly 20 years until she died. They treated themselves as aunt and nephew. The trial judge held that through their relationship this elderly lady and young man achieved a familial nexus, meaning thereby a nexus such as one would only find within a family. The Court of Appeal reversed the judge’s decision, and held that on the facts the relationship was not within the permissible limits of the meaning of the phrase ‘a member of the . . . tenant’s family’.
Held: The term ‘family’ where it is used in the Rent Acts is not a term of art. Its interpretation is a question of law, and and ‘family’ is not the same as ‘household’. ‘The facts of the instant case, if they are not unique, are certainly most unusual, and for that reason they do not, in my opinion, provide a suitable occasion for this House to undertake a general consideration of what persons may be included in the expression ‘a member of the original tenant’s family’ where at the time of the tenant’s death there did exist between him and the claimant to a statutory tenancy by succession a relationship of one or other of the various kinds to which I have referred above. In particular, the difficult question posed by Dyson Holdings Ltd. v. Fox [1976] Q.B. 503 as to the extent, if any, to which changed social attitudes towards cohabitation between unmarried couples and the offspring of such liaisons may have enlarged the meaning of the expression ‘family’ in the Rent Act 1968 does not arise in the instant case and is best left for consideration in the light of the actual facts of a case in which it does arise.’
Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne
[1979] 1 WLR 928, [1979] 2 All ER 1084
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved – Ross v Collins CA 1964
The defendant had acted as the original tenant’s housekeeper in return for which he remitted her rent. They had never addressed each other by their Christian names and there was no question of an intimate personal relationship. After his death she . .
Cited – Dyson Holdings Ltd v Fox CA 17-Oct-1975
The defendant had lived with the tenant for 21 years until his death. They were unmarried and had no children. Reversing the County Court judge, the Court of Appeal ruled that she was a member of his family. It was absurd to distinguish between two . .
Appeal from – Carega Properties SA v Sharratt CA 1979
The Court referred to the ‘Cohen’ Question: ‘. . it is for this court to decide, where such an issue arises, whether, assuming all the facts found by the judge to be correct, the question may, as a matter of law, within the permissible limits of the . .

Cited by:
Cited – Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd HL 28-Oct-1999
Same Sex Paartner to Inherit as Family Member
The claimant had lived with the original tenant in a stable and long standing homosexual relationship at the deceased’s flat. After the tenant’s death he sought a statutory tenancy as a spouse of the deceased. The Act had been extended to include as . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 July 2021; Ref: scu.215876

P v P: CA 6 May 2015

Appeal brought by the trustees of a post-nuptial settlement against an order varying that settlement by way of ancillary relief following a divorce between the spouses.
Jackson, Black, LJJ, Sir David Keene
[2015] EWCA Civ 447
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 22 June 2021; Ref: scu.546456

Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken v K and A: ECJ 9 Jul 2015

ECJ Judgment – Reference for a preliminary ruling – Directive 2003/86/EC – Article 7(2) – Family reunification – Integration measures – National legislation requiring the family members of a third country national residing lawfully in that Member State to pass a civic integration exam in order to enter the territory of that Member State – Cost of such an exam – Compatibility
C-153/14, [2015] EUECJ C-153/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:453
Bailii
Directive 2003/86/EC 7(2)
European

Updated: 22 June 2021; Ref: scu.550004

Midland Bank v Cooke and Another: CA 13 Jul 1995

Equal equitable interest inferrable without proof

The bank sought to enforce a charge given by the husband to secure a business loan. The property was purchased from the husband’s and his family’s resources and the loan, and was in his name. There had been no discussion or agreement between husband and wife at the time of the acquisition as to the basis upon which the property was held by the husband, or as to the extent of their respective beneficial interests.
Held: The wife was entitled to half share in the property. She had made a contribution equal to one half of the wedding gift, had a claim under Rossett. An equal equitable interest in a home could be inferred without proof of explicit words: ‘I would therefore hold that positive evidence that the parties neither discussed nor intended any agreement as to the proportions of their beneficial interest does not preclude the court, on general equitable principles, from inferring one’. Cash contributions were not the sole determinant of the value of a share of the equity in a home.
Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, Lord Justice Waite and Lord Justice Schiemann
Independent 26-Jul-1995, Times 13-Jul-1995, Gazette 31-Aug-1995, [1995] 4 All ER 562, [1995] 2 FLR 915, [1995] EWCA Civ 12, [1996] 1 FCR 442
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Followed – Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset HL 29-Mar-1990
The house had been bought during the marriage but in the husband’s sole name. The plaintiff’s charge secured the husband’s overdraft. The bank issued possession proceedings. Mr Rosset had left, but Mrs Rosset claimed, as against the bank an interest . .
Cited – Springette v Defoe CA 1-Mar-1992
Property was purchased in joint names, but with no express declaration of the beneficial interests. The couple had lived together for a short time as joint tenants of the local authority. They were able to purchase at a substantial discount from the . .
Cited – Grant v Edwards and Edwards CA 24-Mar-1986
A couple were not married but lived together in Vincent Farmhouse in which the plaintiff claimed a beneficial interest on separation. The female partner was told by the male partner that the only reason for not acquiring the property in joint names . .
Cited – McHardy and Sons (A Firm) v Warren and Another CA 8-Apr-1994
A gift of the deposit to a couple can create an equal interest in the home for the spouses though the house is purchased in one name only. Lord Justice Dillon said: ‘To my mind it is irresistible conclusion that where a parent pays the deposit, . .

Cited by:
Cited – Oxley v Hiscock CA 6-May-2004
oxley_hiscockCA2004
The parties were not married, but had brought together their resources to purchase a home in the name of one of them. Nothing had been said about the respective shares on which the property was to be held.
Held: The shares were to be assessed . .
Cited – Carlton v Goodman CA 29-Apr-2002
The defendant claimed an interest in a house. The deceased had been a sitting tenant, and wanted to purchase his house. He could not obtain finance alone, and she joined with him, becoming liable under the mortgage. She did not live in the house . .
Cited – Van Laethem v Brooker and Another ChD 12-Jul-2005
The claimant asserted an interest in several properties by virtue of a common intention constructive trust or by proprietary estoppel. The parties had been engaged to be married.
Held: ‘A [constructive] trust arises in connection with the . .
Cited – Stack v Dowden HL 25-Apr-2007
The parties had cohabited for a long time, in a home bought by Ms Dowden. After the breakdown of the relationship, Mr Stack claimed an equal interest in the second family home, which they had bought in joint names. The House was asked whether, when . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 June 2021; Ref: scu.83713

Ayeh-Kumi v The Lord Chancellor and Another: QBD 9 Jun 2021

In England and Wales the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 says that one ground for divorce is that the other spouse has behaved in such a way that the person wanting the divorce cannot reasonably be expected to live with them. The Claimant claims that the law is too vague and does not comply with the requirement of Human Rights Law that laws must be accessible so that people can comply with them and understand the requirements. He relies on numerous occasions when judges and other people have criticised the law in the past but the law has not changed and he says that the court must consider the issue if Parliament will not. The Defendants who are the Government argue that the claim should be dismissed without the arguments being heard in detail because the claim is made too late and in the wrong court and will not succeed. The Judge held that the claim should be considered in view of the fact that the hearing was not a mini-trial and was not a hearing of a trial on a point of law, that it was not too late and not in the wrong court.
McCloud M
[2021] EWHC 1564 (QB)
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, European Convention on Human Rights
England and Wales

Updated: 21 June 2021; Ref: scu.663351

Potanina v Potanin: CA 13 May 2021

Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (‘Part III’) provides (subject to jurisdictional requirements set out in s.15) for the making of an application for financial relief following an overseas divorce. An order can be made notwithstanding that an order for financial relief has been made in a country outside England and Wales. By s.13 no application can be made without the leave of the court and by s.13(1) no leave is to be granted unless the court considers that there is ‘substantial ground for the making of an application for such an order.’
Chapter 6 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (‘FPR’) governs the procedure to be followed when making such an application, including at FPR r.8.25(1), that the application for leave must be made without notice and must be determined without notice unless the court thinks it appropriate for the application to be determined on notice (FPR r.8.25(3)). Where permission has been granted ex parte the respondent may, within seven days of the making of the order, make an application under FPR r.18.11 to set aside the order granting leave.
This appeal is concerned with the proper approach to an application made for the grant of leave and to any subsequent application to set aside an ex parte order for leave.
Lady Justice King
[2021] EWCA Civ 702
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 16 June 2021; Ref: scu.662479

Purba v Purba: CA 1 Jul 1999

The court considered an appeal against an award in an ancillary relief case on divorce. The husband had it was thought deliberately hidden assets, but the husband claimed that the wife’s budget was excessive. Thorpe LJ said: ‘I see no force in the criticism of the judge’s acceptance of the wife’s budget. In this field of litigation budgets prepared by the parties often have a high degree of unreality – usually the applicant wife’s budget is much inflated. Most unusually, in this case the wife’s budget seems to have been rather understated in many respects. It is true that one of the major items on the budget was substantial monthly expenditure for rent or mortgage. It is true that that could be said to be a superfluous item once the substantial lump sum was ordered. But the essential task of the judge is not to go through these budgets item by item but stand back and ask, what is the appropriate proportion of the husband’s available income that should go to the support of the wife? This was a husband with pounds 66,000 a year gross, pounds 50,000 a year net, and of that available net income it simply could not be contended that pounds 14,400 a year for his wholly dependent wife was excessive.’
Stuart-Smith LJ, Pil LJ, Thorpe LJ
[1999] EWCA Civ 1730, [2000] 1 FLR 444, [2000] 1 FCR 652, [2000] Fam Law 86
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Purba v Purba CA 15-Jan-1999
Application for leave to appeal against award in ancillary relief case – granted. . .

Cited by:
Cited – M v M (Financial Relief: Substantial Earning Capacity) FD 29-Mar-2004
The parties had been married for 12 years, there were three children, one with special needs, and assets of over 12 million pounds. The court considered the application for ancillary relief. It was substantially agreed that the wife should receive . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 June 2021; Ref: scu.146645

Jones v Kernott: SC 9 Nov 2011

Unmarried Couple – Equal division displaced

The parties were unmarried but had lived together. They now disputed the shares in which they had held the family home. It had been bought in joint names, but after Mr Kernott (K) left in 1993, Ms Jones (J) had made all payments on the house. She applied for an order under section 14 of the 1996 Act. The county court judge found that the initial presumption in favour of fifty fifty had been displaced, and set a share of 10% for K. The Court of appeal allowed K’s appeal.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and the decision of the judge at the County Court was restored.
‘The time has come to make it clear, in line with Stack v Dowden (see also Abbott v Abbott [2007] UKPC 53, [2007] 2 All ER 432), that in the case of the purchase of a house or flat in joint names for joint occupation by a married or unmarried couple, where both are responsible for any mortgage, there is no presumption of a resulting trust arising from their having contributed to the deposit (or indeed the rest of the purchase) in unequal shares. The presumption is that the parties intended a joint tenancy both in law and in equity. But that presumption can of course be rebutted by evidence of a contrary intention, which may more readily be shown where the parties did not share their financial resources.’
Lord Walker and Lady Hale said: ‘the following are the principles applicable in a case such as this, where a family home is bought in the joint names of a cohabiting couple who are both responsible for any mortgage, but without any express declaration of their beneficial interests.
(1) The starting point is that equity follows the law and they are joint tenants both in law and in equity.
(2) That presumption can be displaced by showing (a) that the parties had a different common intention at the time when they acquired the home, or (b) that they later formed the common intention that their respective shares would change.
(3) Their common intention is to be deduced objectively from their conduct: ‘the relevant intention of each party is the intention which was reasonably understood by the other party to be manifested by that party’s words and conduct notwithstanding that he did not consciously formulate that intention in his own mind or even acted with some different intention which he did not communicate to the other party’ (Lord Diplock in Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, 906). Examples of the sort of evidence which might be relevant to drawing such inferences are given in Stack v Dowden, at para 69.
(4) In those cases where it is clear either (a) that the parties did not intend joint tenancy at the outset, or (b) had changed their original intention, but it is not possible to ascertain by direct evidence or by inference what their actual intention was as to the shares in which they would own the property, ‘the answer is that each is entitled to that share which the court considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property’: Chadwick LJ in Oxley v Hiscock [2005] Fam 211, para 69. In our judgment, ‘the whole course of dealing . . in relation to the property’ should be given a broad meaning, enabling a similar range of factors to be taken into account as may be relevant to ascertaining the parties’ actual intentions.
(5) Each case will turn on its own facts. Financial contributions are relevant but there are many other factors which may enable the court to decide what shares were either intended (as in case (3)) or fair (as in case (4)).’
Lord Walker, Lady Hale, Lord Collins , Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson
[2011] UKSC 53, UKSC 2010/0130, [2011] 46 EG 104, [2011] 3 FCR 495, [2011] Fam Law 1338, [2012] WTLR 125, [2011] NPC 116, [2011] BPIR 1653, [2011] 3 WLR 1121, 14 ITELR 491
Bailii, SC Summary, SC, Bailii Summary
Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 14
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Gissing v Gissing HL 7-Jul-1970
Evidence Needed to Share Benefical Inerests
The family home had been purchased during the marriage in the name of the husband only. The wife asserted that she had a beneficial interest in it.
Held: The principles apply to any case where a beneficial interest in land is claimed by a . .
Cited – Drake v Whipp CA 30-Nov-1995
The parties, an unmarried cohabiting couple, disputed their respective shares in a property held in the man’s sole name. Both had made direct contributions both to the purchase of a barn and to its expensive conversion into a home. The plaintiff . .
At High Court – Jones v Kernott ChD 10-Jul-2009
The couple were unmarried but had bought a property in joint names. Ms Jones had contributed the overwhelming share of the purchase price, and had paid all outgoings after Mr Kernott left several years ago. The County court judge had awarded J 90%, . .
Cited – Grant v Edwards and Edwards CA 24-Mar-1986
A couple were not married but lived together in Vincent Farmhouse in which the plaintiff claimed a beneficial interest on separation. The female partner was told by the male partner that the only reason for not acquiring the property in joint names . .
Cited – Stack v Dowden HL 25-Apr-2007
The parties had cohabited for a long time, in a home bought by Ms Dowden. After the breakdown of the relationship, Mr Stack claimed an equal interest in the second family home, which they had bought in joint names. The House was asked whether, when . .
Cited – Kernott v Jones CA 26-May-2010
The unmarried couple bought a property together. Mr K appealed against an award of 90% of the property to his former partner. The court was asked, whether, following Stack v Dowden, it was open to the court to find that the parties had agreed that . .
Cited – Walker v Hall CA 1984
The court considered the way of distributing property purchased by an unmarried couple: ‘When such a relationship comes to an end, just as with many divorced couples, there are likely to be disputes about the distribution of shared property. How are . .
Cited – Adekunle and Others v Ritchie Misc 17-Aug-2007
(Leeds County Court) An enfranchised freehold was in joint names because the elderly tenant could not obtain a mortgage on her own. . .
Cited – Lowson v Coombes CA 26-Nov-1998
A house was purchased by an unmarried couple to live together, but conveyed into the female partner’s sole name. Her partner was still married, and she feared that on his death his wife would inherit.
Held: ‘the case being one of illegality, I . .
Cited – Pettitt v Pettitt HL 23-Apr-1969
A husband and wife disputed ownership of the matrimonial home in the context of the presumption of advancement.
Lord Reid said: ‘These considerations have largely lost their force under present conditions, and, unless the law has lost its . .
Cited – Abbott v Abbott PC 26-Jul-2007
(Antigua and Barbuda) The parties disputed the division of the family assets after a divorce. The family home was registered in the sole name of the husband. There being no provision for property adjustment, the court had to decide the division on . .
Cited – Oxley v Hiscock CA 6-May-2004
oxley_hiscockCA2004
The parties were not married, but had brought together their resources to purchase a home in the name of one of them. Nothing had been said about the respective shares on which the property was to be held.
Held: The shares were to be assessed . .
Cited – Springette v Defoe CA 1-Mar-1992
Property was purchased in joint names, but with no express declaration of the beneficial interests. The couple had lived together for a short time as joint tenants of the local authority. They were able to purchase at a substantial discount from the . .
Cited – Pettitt v Pettitt HL 23-Apr-1969
A husband and wife disputed ownership of the matrimonial home in the context of the presumption of advancement.
Lord Reid said: ‘These considerations have largely lost their force under present conditions, and, unless the law has lost its . .
Cited – Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) HL 1966
The House gave guidance how it would treat an invitation to depart from a previous decision of the House. Such a course was possible, but the direction was not an ‘open sesame’ for a differently constituted committee to prefer their views to those . .
Cited – In re Z (A Minor) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) CA 31-Jul-1995
The court was asked whether the daughter of Cecil Parkinson and Sarah Keays should be permitted to take part in a television programme about the specialist help she was receiving for her special educational needs.
Held: The court refused to . .

Cited by:
Cited – Gow v Grant SC 24-May-2012
The parties had lived together as an unmarried couple, but separated. Mrs Gow applied under the 2006 Act for provision. Mr Grant’s appeal succeeded at the Inner House, and Mrs Gow now herself appealed.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The Act did . .
Cited – Singh v Singh and Another ChD 8-Apr-2014
The parties disputed ownership of various valuable properties. The father asserted that they were held under trusts following the Mitakshara Hindu code, under a common intention constructive trust. The son said that properties held in his own name . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.448292

Thomas v Thomas: CA 2 May 1995

H was a wealthy businessman, but, as a member of Lloyds, he had been required to charge the family home to secure potential liabilities. Also, the company of which he was managing director had always paid out only smaller sums by way of dividends, putting more into pension funds for the directors.
Held: The appeal failed. A judge may allow for the ability of other family members to assist on making a financial relief order. The court had been entitled on the evidence to ‘draw inferences as to the availability of funds to provide alternative security for the guarantee and for the Lloyds losses loan, and thus liberate the primary equity in the family home to provide a lump sum appropriate to the rehousing needs of the wife and children and of sufficient scale to justify shutting her out from any future capital relief.’
Waite LJ said: ‘But certain principles emerge from the authorities. One is that the court is not obliged to limit its orders exclusively to resources of capital or income which are shown actually to exist. The availability of unidentified resources may, for example, be inferred from a spouse’s expenditure or style of living, or from his inability or unwillingness to allow the complexity of his affairs to be penetrated with the precision necessary to ascertain his actual wealth or the degree of liquidity of his assets. Another is that where a spouse enjoys access to wealth but no absolute entitlement to it (as in the case, for example, of a beneficiary under a discretionary trust or someone who is dependent on the generosity of a relative), the court will not act in direct invasion of the rights of, or usurp the discretion exercisable by, a third party. Nor will it put upon a third party undue pressure to act in a way which will enhance the means of the maintaining spouse. This does not, however, mean that the court acts in total disregard of the potential availability of wealth from sources owned or administered by others. There will be occasions when it becomes permissible for a judge deliberately to frame his orders in a form which affords judicious encouragement to third parties to provide the maintaining spouse with the means to comply with the court’s view of the justice of the case. There are bound to be instances where the boundary between improper pressure and judicious encouragement proves to be a fine one, and it will require attention to the particular circumstances of each case to see whether it has been crossed.’
Waite LJ, Glidewell LJ
Independent 04-May-1995, [1995] EWCA Civ 51, [1995] 2 FLR 668, [1996] 2 FCR 544, [1995] Fam Law 672
Bailii, FLW
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 25
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Howard v Howard CA 1945
Lord Greene MR said: ‘In my opinion there is no jurisdiction in the Divorce Court to make an order which will leave the husband in a state of starvation (to use rather picturesque language) with a view to putting pressure on trustees to exercise . .
Cited – J-PC v J-AF, orse J v J CA 1955
Before the divorce, H had earned a good income. After proeedings, his income was very substantially reduced. The court considered how it should deal with non-disclosure in a divorce financial application.
Sachs J said: ‘In cases of this kind, . .
Cited – Donaldson v Donaldson 1958
The parties were to divorce. H was leaving the RAF and received a gratuity of andpound;2,200 and, having commuted his pension, received a total of andpound;7,624 which he gave over to the woman he now wished to marry. She in turn bought a mnk farm . .
Cited – O’D v O’D CA 1976
When considering an application for ancillary relief by a wife, the court should consider the wife’s position, ‘not from the narrow point of ‘need’, but to ascertain her reasonable requirements.’ . .
Cited – B v B (Financial Provision) CA 1982
‘judicious encouragement’ can be legitimately made by the court to induce family companies and discretionary trustees to help a maintaining spouse to satisfy financial arrangements made by the court: . .
Cited – Nicholas v Nicholas CA 1984
The Court upheld an appeal against an order for the husband to procure the transfer to the wife of a property belonging to a company in which he held a 71% shareholding, the other 29% being held by his business associates. However, both members of . .
Cited – Browne v Browne CA 1989
The court considered under what circumstances money held in trust for a party could be included within assets to be considered in an application for ancillary relief in family proceedings.
Held: The question is more appropriately expressed as . .
Cited – Crittenden v Crittenden CA 12-Apr-1990
The word ‘property’ in the section refers only to property in which one or other of the parties has a beneficial interest, and the words ‘deal with’ relate to acts of dealing, not a lack of dealing with. . .
Cited – Green v Green FD 1993
In an ancillary relief application, Connell J awarded to the wife assets vested in a limited company whose entire share capital was owned by the husband. . .
Cited – H v H (Financial Provision: Capital Assets) CA 1993
H appealed against an order adjusting the shares in the matrimonial home in favour of W.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The adjustment had been made without any particular rationale. Though H did stand to inherit, his mother was in robust . .

Cited by:
Cited – Ben Hashem v Ali Shayif and Another FD 22-Sep-2008
The court was asked to pierce the veil of incorporation of a company in the course of ancillary relief proceedings in a divorce. H had failed to co-operate with the court.
After a comprehensive review of all the authorities, Munby J said: ‘The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.276288

Hammersley v Baron De Biel, An Infant, By W J Blake, His Next Friend: HL 25 Mar 1845

The Plaintiffs father, B, had agreed with one T that he would marry T’s daughter and provide a jointure for her in consideration of T’s undertaking to leave a sum of pounds 10,000 in his will to his daughter to be settled on her and her children. B married T’s daughter and provided her with a jointure, but T did not leave his daughter in his will the pounds 10,000 which he had promised. B’s son asked the Court of Chancery to order T’s executors to pay the money.
Held: A representation made by one party for the purpose of influencing the conduct of another, and acted on by him, will in general be sufficient to entitle him to the assistance of a Court of Equity, for the purpose of realising such representation.
A submission that there never had been more than ‘a rough sketch of the proposals expressly subject to revision’ was rejected. Lord Lyndhurst LC said: ‘But the principle of law, at least of equity, is this – that if a party holds out inducements to another to celebrate a marriage, and holds them out deliberately and plainly, and the other party consents, and celebrates the marriage in consequence of them, if he had good reason to expect that it was intended that he should have the benefit of the proposal which was so held out, a Court of Equity will take care that he is not disappointed and will give effect to the proposal. This is stated as a part of the arrangement; it is stated in the proposal.’
Lord Cottenham, Lord Lyndhurst LC, Lord Brougham, Lord Campbell
[1845] EngR 592, (1845) 12 Cl and Fin 45, (1845) 8 ER 1312
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Western Fish Products Ltd v Penwith District Council and Another CA 22-May-1978
Estoppel Cannot Oust Statutory Discretion
The plaintiff had been refused planning permission for a factory. The refusals were followed by the issue of Enforcement Notices and Stop Notices. The plaintiff said that they had been given re-assurances upon which they had relied.
Held: The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.303734

Alfonso-Brown v Milwood: FD 27 Mar 2006

The court considered whether a traditional ceremony in the Ga tradition of Ghana was effective to create a customary marriage. The respondent was at the time already monogomously married, which would normally make the traditional marriage ineffective. The petitioner said that the respondent had led her to believe that he was free to marry. A recording of ceremony was produced. The respondent said that it was of an engagement ceremony only. The petitioner said it had been followed immediately by the marriage. The payment of a dowry was said to be part of a marriage ceremony not an engagement.
Held: ‘the Petitioner fails to establish that a ceremony of marriage was purportedly performed which lacked validity and effect only because of the Respondent’s subsisting marriage. The burden of proof is upon her, and I find that she has not discharged it.’ The respondent had not intended to mary on that day.
Singer J
[2006] EWHC 642 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.240155

Gay v Sheeran, London Borough of Enfield: CA 18 Jun 1999

The ability for a court to order the transfer of a secure tenancy between partners under the Act depended upon the court first making an occupation order in favour of the party from whom the tenancy was to be transferred, but the order could be made on the same occasion. To make an occupation order the tenant had to be entitled to it at the date of the application and the hearing. The Act required also that for a transfer to be made, the applicant had to have one of the rights specified. The applicant did not have such a right, and a transfer could not be ordered.
Times 30-Jun-1999, Gazette 28-Jul-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 1621
Family Law Act 1996 36
England and Wales
Citing:
Leave applied for – Lewis v Lewis HL 1985
The House considered the position of a statutory tenant under the 1977 Act, when application was made under the 1967 Act. . .
Cited – Newlon Housing Trust v Alsulaimen and Another HL 29-Jul-1998
A tenancy which had been terminated by a notice given by one of the joint tenants had expired. It did not come to an end by any deed, and so was not capable of being set aside by a family court in the course of divorce proceedings. The possession . .
Cited – Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk HL 5-Dec-1991
One tenant of two joint tenants of a house left and was granted a new tenancy on condition that the existing one of the house, still occupied by her former partner, was determined. She gave a notice to quit as requested, the council claimed . .

Cited by:
Cited – Morris, Regina (on the Application of) v Westminster City Council and Another Admn 7-Oct-2004
The applicant questioned the compatibility of s185 of the 1996 Act with Human Rights law. The family sought emergency housing. The child of the family, found to be in priority housing need, was subject also to immigration control. Though the matter . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.146536

Ann Deborah Alban Davies v Ifor John David Davies: CA 4 Mar 1999

The marriage was unhappy. The wife consulted briefly but did not instruct a solicitor, Mr Tooth. Some 7 years later as divorce proceedings were considered, the husband did instruct Mr Tooth. She sought to prevent him acting, but then wanted to withdraw her summons. The husband would only agree if she paid the costs. She refused.
Held: The summons was quite properly issued. There was a real matter to be considered. The point of view of the petitioner wife was put forward moderately it seems to me. It was met with a very strong rebuff which indicated that, come what may, the respondent husband was going to seed the dismissal of the matter with costs. There remained a real and not just fanciful risk of conflict. The husband’s appeal against the costs order failed.
[1999] EWCA Civ 890
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – In Re A Firm of Solicitors ChD 9-May-1995
A solicitor moving from a firm acting on one side of a dispute to the firm on the other side must be able to show that no conflict of interest would arise. The court should intervene unless it is satisfied that there is no risk of disclosure. It . .
Cited – Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) HL 16-Dec-1998
Conflicts of Duty with former Client
The House was asked as to the duties of the respondent accountants (KPMG). KPMG had information confidential to a former client, the appellant, which might be relevant to instructions which they then accepted from the Brunei Investment Agency, of . .
Cited – RTZ Pension Property Trust Ltd v ARC Property Developments Ltd and Asfa Limited CA 26-Nov-1998
Where a plaintiff discontinued his action, but still sought costs from the defendant, he had to show some misconduct by the defendant, such as encouraging the action by concealment of a defence. A mere late amendment causing no loss was not . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 January 2021; Ref: scu.145805

Barts NHS Foundation Trust v Raqeeb and Others: FD 3 Oct 2019

‘The dilemma presented by cases concerning, as this case does, the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment from a child rests on the fact that they address what many see as an appalling present, but a present that for many also remains sanctified morally or as an article of religious faith because life subsists.’
References: [2019] EWHC 2530 (Fam)
Links: Bailii
Judges: Mr Justice MacDonald
Jurisdiction: England and Wales

Last Update: 23 September 2020; Ref: scu.648675

Midland Bank Plc v Cooke and Another: CA 7 Jul 1995

References: [1995] EWCA Civ 12, [1995] 2 FLR 915, [1996] 1 FCR 442, [1995] 4 All ER 562
Links: Bailii
Coram: Stuart Smith, Waite, Schiemann LJJ
Ratio:
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Jones v Kernott SC (Bailii, [2011] UKSC 53, SC Summary, UKSC 2010/0130, SC, Bailii Summary, [2011] 46 EG 104, [2011] 3 FCR 495, [2011] Fam Law 1338, [2012] WTLR 125, [2011] NPC 116, [2011] BPIR 1653, [2011] 3 WLR 1121, 14 ITELR 491)
    The parties were unmarried but had lived together. They now disputed the shares in which they had held the family home. It had been bought in joint names, but after Mr Kernott (K) left in 1993, Ms Jones (J) had made all payments on the house. She . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 17 July 2019
Ref: 259354

Silver v Silver: 1955

References: [1955] 1 WLR 728
Ratio:
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Baiai and others, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL (Bailii, [2008] UKHL 53, HL, Times 13-Aug-08, [2008] 3 WLR 549, [2009] 1 AC 287, (2008) 26 BHRC 429, [2008] 3 FCR 1, [2008] HRLR 45, [2008] Fam Law 994, [2008] 2 FLR 1462, [2008] 3 All ER 1094, [2008] UKHRR 1232)
    In order to prevent marriages of convenience in the UK the Secretary of State introduced a scheme under which certain persons subject to immigration control required her written permission to marry and would not receive it unless they were present . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 15 March 2019
Ref: 272213

Burnett v George: 1992

References: [1992] 1 FLR 525 CA
Ratio:
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust and Another CA (Times 07-Dec-01, Gazette 10-Jan-02, Bailii, [2001] EWCA Civ 1721, [2003] 3 All ER 932)
    The claimant had sued her former employer for post-traumatic stress resulting from alleged harassment at her place of work. The claimant appealed against an order refusing damages. The court had held that outside the 1997 Act which was not in force . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 08 July 2017
Ref: 182089

Cronin Macinnes Or Smith v Smith: SCS 6 Jan 2009

smithSCS2009
References: [2009] ScotCS CSOH_02
Links: Bailii
Ratio: In the context of a divorce and falling house prices and where capital provision was to be made from the sale proceeds, the court considered whether the order should fix a capital sum before a sale price was known.
Held: The 1985 Act required a fair division. After making appropriate maintenance provisions, the court said that a capital sum should not presently be fixed.
Statutes: Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985

Last Update: 09 March 2017
Ref: 279814