Request for injunction to restrain pilot’s intended strike action.

Citations:

[2019] EWHC 2302 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 21 January 2023; Ref: scu.652247

Where an employee is dismissed, his right to claim damages for unfair dismissal is not lost because of the making of an offer of re-employment. Because of this time continues to run for the lodging of a complaint, and if the re-engagement falls through for whatever reason, the original three month time limit is not disapplied, and the claim had expired.

Citations:

Times 07-Jul-1999, Gazette 11-Aug-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 1712

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 21 January 2023; Ref: scu.146627

Ryanair sought an injunction preventing the British Airline Pilots’ Association from calling strike action amongst Ryanair’s pilot employees who are members of BALPA.

Citations:

[2019] EWHC 3882 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 31 December 2022; Ref: scu.652249

Question as to the proper interpretation and effect of provisions of the Industrial Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1992 (‘the 1992 Order’). The two questions posed by the deputy resident magistrate are as follows: ‘(1) Was I correct in holding, on the facts admitted, proved and found by me, that the Northern Ireland Hotels federation was not at any relevant time an employers association within the meaning of the 1992 Order? (2) Was I correct in holding that none of the Respondents had any duty to comply with the provisions of Article 12B(3) or (4) of the 1992 Order?’

Citations:

[2008] NICA 2

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

Northern Ireland

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.263908

Citations:

[1999] UKEAT 728 – 99 – 2110

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.205703

EAT Procedural Issues – Employment Tribunal

Judges:

His Honour Judge Peter Clark

Citations:

[1999] UKEAT 1406 – 98 – 2110

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.205678

Commencement of employment – associated company

Citations:

[1999] UKEAT 31 – 99 – 2110

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.205668

Citations:

[2004] NICA 24

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

Northern Ireland

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.198876

Whether drivers on a rota were workers.

Judges:

Lord Justice Bean

Citations:

[2021] EWCA Civ 594

Links:

Bailii, Judiciary

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.662138

Redundancy and Jurisdictional/Time Points
In this appeal the EAT considered that where the EJ had made findings that indicated that the Claimant’s effective date of termination (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 97(1)(b) and 145(2)) could be established by reference to objective factors and that the EJ had held that by that date the Claimant ought reasonably to have known that her employment had been terminated; it was not possible for the EJ to fix the effective date of termination at a later date on the basis of the Claimant’s subjective belief that her employment continued especially where there were unresolved conflicts of testimony as to the basis upon which the Claimant held that belief. The EAT further held that the letter that was relied on by the Claimant as constituting a claim for payment of redundancy money could not reasonably bear the meaning attributed to it and that properly understood it was a letter of enquiry written on her behalf by her MP as opposed to a claim for payment under s. 164 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 0312 – 19 – 2905

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.661647

UNFAIR DISMISSAL; Reason for dismissal; band of reasonable responses; investigation.
In a claim of unfair dismissal, the reason for dismissal relied upon by the employer in terms of section 98 of the Employment Rights Act, 1996 ‘(ERA’) was ‘conduct’. The evidence suggested that the employer had considered a range of matters all of which related to conduct of the employee. Only some of those matters were ultimately mentioned in the letter to the employee which bore to confirm the reason for his dismissal. In these circumstances, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to make clear and unequivocal findings in fact about precisely what conduct of the employee caused the employer to dismiss. Within his Reasons, the Employment Judge recorded his conclusion that the Appellant genuinely held a belief that the Claimant ‘was guilty of the conduct for which he was dismissed’. Nowhere in his findings in fact, however, did he identify what that conduct was. In the absence of such a finding, the further conclusion that the employer did not have a reasonable basis for holding that belief could not stand.
In any event, and whatever was the reason for the dismissal, the Employment Judge had, in a number of respects, substituted his own view as to what a reasonable inquiry demanded. The appeal was allowed, and the case remitted to a different Tribunal for re-hearing.
Observed: To the extent that Scottish and Southern Energy plc v. Ness UKEATS/0043/10 held that, in a case of dismissal for conduct, there was no requirement on an employer to investigate wholly speculative matters advanced by an employee as possible mitigation, that was correct. If, however, the decision in Ness was intended to suggest that it would never be unreasonable in terms of section 98(4) ERA for an employer to fail to investigate mitigation, such an approach would be inconsistent with what was said in Sainsbury’s Supermarket Limited v. Hitt [2003] ICR 111.

Citations:

[2021] UKEAT 0040 – 19 – 0104

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.661953

The claimant company sought to prevent misuse of confidential information it said was obtained by the defendant whilst in its employment.

Judges:

Blake J

Citations:

[2011] EWHC 2260 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.444309

ECJ French Text – Appeal – Civil Service – Review of the decision of the Court – Litigation condition to be tried.

Citations:

T-12/08, [2010] EUECJ T-12/08

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

European

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.420488

Citations:

[2009] EWCA Civ 1258, [2010] Fam Law 1163, [2010] 3 FCR 222

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.381648

Citations:

[2000] EAT 1384 – 99 – 0205

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.265163

Citations:

[1994] UKEAT 360 – 94 – 0605

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.209931

EAT Unfair Dismissal – Exclusions including worker

Judges:

The Honourable Mr Justice Burton (P)

Citations:

EATS/0078/03, [2004] UKEAT 0078 – 03 – 3004

Links:

Bailii, EAT

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.200016

Citations:

[1995] UKEAT 316 – 92 – 2911

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.209511

Citations:

[1998] UKEAT 545 – 98 – 1410

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

See Also – Dormers Wells Infant School v Gill EAT 16-Jul-1999
EAT Unfair Dismissal – Reason for dismissal including substantial other reason. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.206746

Citations:

[1993] UKEAT 316 – 92 – 1612

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.210866

EAT Unfair Dismissal – Exclusions including worker/jurisdiction.

Judges:

His Hon Judge Clark

Citations:

[2003] EAT 1082 – 02 – 0107, [2003] UKEAT 1082 – 02 – 0107, EAT/1082/02

Links:

Bailii, Bailii, EAT

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.191709

Two appeals against the order of an employment tribunal which had revisited the order of an earlier tribunal of equivalent jurisdiction, in the absence of a material change in circumstances, or the original order being based on a material omission or mistreatment, or some other substantial reason necessitating the interference, would be allowed. The orders of the original employment tribunal would be restored and a preliminary hearing would take place before a fresh employment tribunal.
Earlier authorities relating to applications to strike out, at a preliminary hearing, claims which assert a continuing act but are said by the respondent to be time-barred, were reviewed and qualified.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 20 – 0079 – 20 –

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.661670

The Employment Tribunal erred in concluding that the parties entered into a contractually binding agreement by which ownership of a car would transfer from the Respondent to the Claimant upon the termination of his employment. Although the Employment Tribunal did not err in deciding that a proposal described as a ‘gift’ was an offer, one of the ingredients of a contract, it erred in concluding that the Claimant could accept part of the Respondent’s offer insofar as it related to the car while seeking to improve upon other parts of the offer. The claim was remitted to a different Employment Tribunal to consider the Claimant’s contention that the parties entered into an oral agreement for the transfer of the car at a meeting on 30 May 2018.

Citations:

[2021] UKEAT 20 – 0072 – 20 –

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.661700

In a case involving multiple claims of protected disclosure detriment, and a claim of unfair dismissal by reason of protected disclosures, the Employment Tribunal erred in its approach to whether there had been material non-compliance with an Unless Order that was attached to an earlier Order requiring further particulars of the claims. The EAT made observations on the particular perils and pitfalls of making, and construing, an Unless Order that is parasitic on an earlier Order, and that relates to the provision of particulars.
There were also breach of contract claims. The Tribunal correctly concluded that there had been material non-compliance in relation to all of those claims, and that they all stood struck out.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 0289 – 19 – 1206

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 20 December 2022; Ref: scu.652142

Only in exceptional cases will different treatment of employees of itself amount to an unfairness.

Citations:

[1995] IRLR 305

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – East Surrey District Health Authority v Paul EAT 4-May-1993
. .

Cited by:

Cited – Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen v Brady EAT 31-Mar-2006
The reason adduced by the union for the dismissal of the climant was found by the Tribunal on the facts not to be the true reason for dismissal, the true reason being the union executive committee’s political antipathy to Mr Brady.
Held: It . .
Cited – Epstein v Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead EAT 15-Nov-2007
EAT Unfair dismissal – Reasonableness of dismissal
Dismissal by Employment Tribunal of Appellant lifeguard’s claim for unfair dismissal challenged, because the Tribunal is said to have erred in not . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Employment

Updated: 12 December 2022; Ref: scu.276828

All contracts of employment are, as a matter of law, subject to an implied term that they are terminable on reasonable notice, and such a term can be displaced only by clear words.

Citations:

[1992] 1 SCR 831

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Reda, Abdul-Jalil v Flag Limited PC 11-Jul-2002
PC (Bermuda) The courts should be reluctant to accept a fetter on the employer’s right to dismiss on notice where there is an express term in the contract empowering the employer to do so.
Lord Millet . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Employment

Updated: 12 December 2022; Ref: scu.220482

The Claimant in the Employment Tribunal, a police officer serving with the Respondent Force, made a number of subject access requests to the Respondent’s Data Access Unit (DAU). One of these, made in 2017, (SAR1) was for all emails sent within the Force ‘with a connection to me’ between 2002 and 2017. The Respondent was aware that he considered that he had been the victim of unlawful discrimination, and intended to (and did) bring Employment Tribunal claims.
SAR 1 was referred by the DAU to the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), which was the body which kept an archive of all emails sent within the Force. Following an initial response from the ACU to the DAU, the Claimant was informed that his request was too wide, and that he needed to identify the names of senders and recipients that he wanted searched. The DAU was told by the ACU that its software at the time did not enable an automated search to be conducted for any email mentioning the Claimant, regardless of who sent or received it. In January 2018 the Claimant was given access to the emails that had been provided to the DAU by the ACU in November 2017. The Tribunal accepted that, to comply with GDPR from May 2018, the ACU upgraded its software, which improved its automated email search capabilities. Thereafter, following further correspondence about his request, a further batch of emails was provided to the Claimant in October 2018.
The Tribunal, by a majority, found that the Claimant had been victimised, in three respects, by the conduct of the Data Access Manager, referred to as Mr D, in connection with SAR 1. The premise of all these findings was the majority’s conclusion that the ACU in fact had the capability to find the further batch of emails provided in October 2018, when it first responded to SAR1 in November 2017; that the limitations of the ACU’s software prior to the GDPR upgrade did not truly explain why that second batch of emails had not been disclosed with the first batch; and that Mr D knew this to be the case. This conclusion was relied upon by the majority to support the conclusion that Mr D’s impugned conduct was reasonably viewed by the Claimant as detrimental treatment; and that the burden shifted to the Respondent to show that such conduct was not because of the Claimant’s protected acts; and that, as Mr D had not been called as a witness, the Respondent had not discharged that burden, so that findings of victimisation followed.
On the Respondent’s appeal, it was held:
(1) The majority did not have a proper basis, on the evidence before the Tribunal, and facts found, to conclude that the explanation given, for why the ACU was not able to retrieve more emails than were produced, prior to the software upgrade, was not true. The majority rested their conclusion on their understanding of what the ACU existed to do, but the facts found about that, whether generally or in relation to the email archive, did not properly support such an inference. The majority were also wrong to draw an adverse inference from the failure of the Respondent to call a witness from the ACU (in addition to one from the DAU) when the pleaded victimisation claims did not identify that the conduct of the ACU in relation to SAR1 was specifically being criticised. The finding that the explanation given by the ACU was not true was therefore perverse. As it was conceded by the Claimant that the findings of detrimental treatment all rested on that finding (and the inference that Mr D knew that the ACU could have retrieved the October emails at the outset), those findings of detrimental treatment could not stand.
(2) In any event, the matters referred to by the majority as supporting a shifting of the burden of proof could not, separately or cumulatively, properly support the shifting of the burden. In addition, in considering whether the burden shifted in relation to Mr D’s impugned conduct, the majority should have considered the picture painted by all of the Tribunal’s relevant findings regarding his conduct, and his interactions with the Claimant, in relation to SAR1. Consideration of the whole picture reinforced the conclusion that there was no proper basis for the majority’s finding that the burden of proof shifted to the Respondent.
The appeal was accordingly allowed.

Citations:

[2021] UKEAT 0330 – 19 – 1501

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.661680

In this case the Claimant lodged a Notice of Appeal that covered both an original judgement and a reconsideration judgement. The Notice was refused at sift insofar as it incorporated grounds of appeal arising from the reconsideration judgement on the basis that it was incompetent to appeal two orders arising from separate hearings in a single Notice of Appeal. On learning of the sift judge’s decision the Appellant lodged a new Notice of Appeal covering the grounds of appeal she wished to state against the reconsideration judgement. It was rejected by the Registrar as out of time. The Appellant submitted that the Registrar should not have rejected the second Notice of Appeal. Held that provided the Notice of Appeal made it clear that the Appellant sought to appeal the original judgement and the reconsideration judgement and both appeals were lodged within the time limits set by the Rules, the Notice of Appeal was competent to bring under appeal both the original judgement and the reconsideration judgement. Held further that had it been necessary to consider the matter, an extension of time would have been granted to permit the second Notice of Appeal to be received.

Citations:

[2021] UKEAT 00036 – 18 – 1501

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.661682

Practice and Procedure
In this case the Tribunal dismissed a claim because of non-compliance with an ‘unless’ order. The Claimant appealed arguing that she had complied with the order. Held that the Tribunal’s judgement failed to explain why the specification supplied by the Claimant was inadequate. In any event the level of detail could not be said to be materially non-compliant. While more detail could have been given, the specification provided was sufficient to enable the Respondent to prepare their defence. It was important that a realistic approach should be taken to the provision of names, dates and witnesses by a party who was unlikely to have ready access to the relevant information. Documents supplied by parties in compliance with ‘unless’ orders should not be treated as a specie of written pleading or subjected to minute scrutiny; and appeal allowed.

Citations:

[2021] UKEAT 0038 – 18 – 1002

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.661695

An Employment Tribunal erred by permitting the Claimant to amend her claim to add new allegations of whistleblowing detriment and by listing a final hearing without notice to the Respondent, in a case where the Respondent had made no response to the claim. The amendment decision was made without sufficient consideration of the guidance in Selkent Bus Co Ltd v Moore [1996] ICR 836. Rule 21 (3) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 required the Respondent to be given notice of the further hearing.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 0116 – 20 – 0511

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.661662

The employee complained that he had been constructively dismissed. The Tribunal held that applying the test in Malik v BCCI the implied obligation of trust and confidence had not been breached. While the Respondents had behaved badly in some ways not all the causes of breakdown were to be attributed to them and the employee was to some degree a contributor to the breakdown. The claimant submitted that it was striking that the Tribunal largely referred to the test in Malik as necessitating destruction of the implied obligation. In fact it was sufficient if the relationship had been seriously damaged. Held that the Tribunal’s judgement did not suggest that the wrong test had been applied. It had recited the full test at one point in the Judgement. The likely explanation for the repeated reference to the destruction of the obligation rather than to serious damage, was that the Tribunal was abbreviating the test for convenience. When the evidence was considered, and the Tribunal’s reasoning examined the Tribunal’s conclusion was consistent with the correct test having been applied. Held further that by engaging in a grievance process available under the contract of employment the Claimant did not affirm the contract. Held further that the Tribunal had erred in law by failing to determine whether the hearing was to be restricted to liability as opposed to liability and quantum. Had that been the sole issue in dispute the case would have been remitted back so that the Claimant had an opportunity to lead evidence relevant to remedy.

Citations:

[2021] UKEAT 0010 – 20 – 1201

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.661683

The Claimant was employed under a contract with a Cayman Islands firm, HWR. The Contract stated that it was governed by Cayman Islands law and subject to the jurisdiction of the Cayman Islands Courts. In January 2018, she was dismissed with a payment in lieu. She contended that the notice failed to comply with Cayman Islands Labour Law and was ineffective to terminate her contract. Three of the partners in the firm resided in the UK and the Claimant issued proceedings here. By the time she lodged her claim in the Tribunal, more than three months had elapsed since the payment in lieu. She also failed to obtain an Early Conciliation Certificate before lodging her claim. The Tribunal found that, notwithstanding the terms of her contract, she was employed by another Caymans entity, HG. It also held that there was no territorial jurisdiction to consider the claim, the Caymans being the proper forum, that there had been a failure to comply with EC requirements and that the claim was out of time. The claim was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In coming to its conclusions the Tribunal rejected the Claimant’s claim that certain correspondence was without prejudice.
The Claimant appealed against the findings as to the identity of the employer, EC compliance, time limits, territorial jurisdiction and without prejudice privilege, amongst other matters.
Held, allowing the appeal in part, that the Tribunal had erred in concluding that HG was the employer. The written material was clear that HWR was the employer and everything in the parties’ relationship thereafter was consistent with that. On a proper application of the principles in Autoclenz, the only conclusion was that HWR was the employer. It followed that the Claimant was entitled, pursuant to Brussels Recast, to issue proceedings against those of the partners in HWR domiciled in the UK. Accordingly, the Tribunal had territorial jurisdiction over the claim. The Tribunal had also erred in failing to treat the correspondence as covered by without prejudice privilege in that there was no unambiguous impropriety here.
However, the Tribunal’s conclusions as to EC and the failure to comply with time limits were correct. Those jurisdictional hurdles had not been overcome and so the case remains dismissed for want of jurisdiction, notwithstanding the EAT’s findings on other matters.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 0018 – 20 – 2112

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.661668

The Claimant was a female member of British Airways (BA’s) Eurofleet aircrew. BA had a policy (accepted as being a PCP) that members of crew who took parental leave under the Maternity and Parental Leave etc Regulations 1999 would have one paid rest day removed for each three days’ parental leave taken in any monthly roster. She claimed that this policy involved indirect discrimination on grounds of sex because a higher proportion of women took parental leave than men and that the policy therefore put women at a ‘particular disadvantage’. It was common ground that the appropriate ‘pool’ for comparison was all crew members (both male and female) who had childcare responsibilities. The Employment Tribunal (ET) rejected the claim on the basis that all crew members (whether male or female) who took parental leave would lose the paid rest day(s). This was an error of law since not all crew members with childcare responsibilities would necessarily take parental leave and the proper comparison was between the impact of the policy on women with childcare responsibilities and the impact on men with childcare responsibilities. The Claimant’s appeal was allowed.
BA cross-appealed on the basis that the ET was wrong to find that the policy involved any ‘disadvantage’ at all. The ET had decided in effect that it was self-evident that this was so but did not consider BA’s arguments that it did not represent a ‘disadvantage’ but was in effect a function of the rostering system. BA’s arguments were worthy of consideration and the ET therefore made an error of law in failing to consider them; BA’s cross-appeal was therefore allowed.
The ‘particular disadvantage’ and ‘disadvantage’ issues were remitted to a fresh ET to be considered again on the same evidence along with the issue of justification which remained outstanding.

Citations:

[2021] UKEAT 0337 – 19 – 2201

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.661681

The Claimant in the Employment Tribunal, who was a litigant in person, presented a claim form which, it was not disputed, raised claims for wages and in respect of loss of annual leave entitlement.
The Claimant did not attend the full merits hearing. The Tribunal dismissed her claims on the basis that the wages had been paid, and carry-over of the annual leave had been granted. It determined that there were no other claims raised by the claim form. It awarded the Respondent pounds 750 costs on the basis that the Claimant had unreasonably continued with the litigation after the wages and leave claims had been satisfied.
The Claimant appealed (a) on the basis that the Tribunal erred by not identifying that the claim form contained a claim of disability discrimination and/or victimisation; and (b) in respect of the award of costs.
Held:
(1) The Tribunal had not erred in not identifying any claim of disability discrimination or victimisation in the claim form. On a fair reading of the claim form, it did not contain any such complaint.
(2) The Tribunal acted unfairly in making an award of costs in the Claimant’s absence. It also in any event erred in failing to consider whether to take into account her means, or to explain whether, or how, it had done so. The costs award was quashed.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 0272 – 19 – 1206

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.652144

The Claimant was dismissed for urinating in a loading yard, the Respondent employer alleging that this was a breach of (unspecified) Health and Safety Regulations and serious and wilful neglect of company property. The Tribunal found that the dismissal was unfair and that the dismissal arose from the Claimant’s disability. A subsequent Judgment in relation to Remedy ordered re-instatement. The Respondent appealed both Decisions.
Held:
(1) The Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the evidence, including the CCTV evidence, did not establish that the Claimant had urinated on the pallets and so the arguments on perversity and substitution mindset failed.
(2) The Respondent’s fall-back position of objective justification for section 15 discrimination had been addressed adequately by the Tribunal in the Remedy Judgment, the matter having been initially overlooked. The decision on this was not perverse.
(3) The Tribunal had not erred in its approach to re-instatement. It had considered the particular circumstances of the Claimant and found that the operative cause of the dismissal was his disability but that he considered trust and confidence could be restored. The Respondent’s contention that trust and confidence had broken down was not rationally based.
Appeal dismissed.

Citations:

[2018] UKEAT 0268 – 17 – 1312

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.631856

EAT Unfair Dismissal : Exclusions Including Worker/Jurisdiction
The question was the date on which the Claimant began work for the Respondent, for the purpose of calculating sufficient service to bring a claim for unfair dismissal. She had been engaged from 1 October, and dismissed one day short of a year’s service. She argued that her attendance at the invitation of R at a meeting of one of its employee’s with a client, who was due to become a client of C’s once employed, for some hours on the 30 September, should have been regarded by an Employment Tribunal as being work under the contract.
Held: that the question was not whether C worked for her future employer, but whether that was work under the contract of employment which had been entered into. On the facts, the ET was entitled to hold it was not. Accordingly, C’s appeal failed.

Judges:

Langstaff P J

Citations:

[2013] UKEAT 0201 – 12 – 0803

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.495206

EAT Practice and Procedure : Striking-Out/Dismissal – Unless Order – non-compliance – effect
The Respondent had failed to comply with an ‘unless order’ and had made no application in any form for relief against sanction. The Employment Judge declined to make an order striking out the Respondent’s responses: he ought to have made an order in effect declaring that the effect of the ‘unless order’ was that the responses were struck out automatically: Scottish Ambulance Service v Laing [2012] UKEAT/0038/12. The Employment Judge’s decision could not be read as granting relief against sanction, but it was still open to the Respondent to apply to the Employment Tribunal for relief against sanction.

Judges:

Richardson J

Citations:

[2013] UKEAT 0014 – 13 – 0304

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.495208

EAT Rights On Insolvency
Two separate Employment Tribunals decided that Claimants who had been employed (without knowing it) by a company which had entered a CVA were entitled to claim arrears of pay and holiday pay from the National Insurance Fund when subsequently the company went into liquidation. In each case, the reasoning was flawed: the first Judge introduced concepts which were not present in Part XII of the ERA 96; the second relied on a view of the meaning of the EC Directive 2008/94 which was shown by the Appellant to be mistaken. The parties agreed that unless modified by reference to the Directive the domestic legislation precluded the claims; the EAT held that the Directive did not require any such modification, nor any different interpretation.

Judges:

Langstaff P J

Citations:

[2013] UKEAT 0287 – 12 – 1402

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

EC Directive 2008/94, Employment Rights Act 1996

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.495204

EAT Jurisdictional Points : Claim In Time and Effective Date of Termination
Contract of employment terminated on expiry of Claimant’s notice of resignation. Subsequent purported dismissal by Respondent following a disciplinary process after employment ended a nullity. ET1 presented out of time. Employment Judge entitled to refuse application to extend time. Appeal dismissed. Claims were time-barred.

Judges:

Peter Clark J

Citations:

[2013] UKEAT 0592 – 12 – 1104

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.495207

EAT Unfair Dismissal : Reason for Dismissal Including Substantial Other Reason – – Compensation – Polkey deduction – Contributory fault
The Claimant was a Union official dismissed for alleged misconduct – The Tribunal found the dismissal unfair on a mixture of substantive and procedural grounds and because of the substantive grounds directed no ‘Polkey discount’; but it did make a 50% reduction for contributory conduct.
HELD: that the Tribunal was entitled to find the dismissal unfair, but only on the procedural grounds; that accordingly a Polkey discount should have been considered and that the case should be remitted for that purpose and also to re-consider the issue of contributory conduct, since the amount of the former might affect the amount of the latter – One issue on remedy also remitted – Discussion of fairness of decision to dismiss taken in absence of two members of disciplinary panel.

Judges:

Underhill J

Citations:

[2013] UKEAT 0088 – 12 – 0305

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.495210

Citations:

[2000] UKEAT 1327 – 99 – 2202

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.264779

Citations:

[2001] UKEAT 1156 – 00 – 0604

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.203803

EAT Unfair Dismissal – Reason for dismissal including substantial other reason.

Judges:

His Honour Judge Peter Clark

Citations:

[1999] UKEAT 596 – 97 – 1607, EAT/596/97

Links:

Bailii, EAT

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Age Concern Scotland v Hines EAT 1983
An employee in a unique position within a company could not have a normal retirement age. ‘For [Miss Hines] it was argued that she fell into a category of one, being the only counselling organiser employed by the appellants, and that there were . .
Cited – Patel v Nagesan CA 1995
Mrs Nagesan’s contract specified no retirement age. She was dismissed on attaining 60. The employers disputed the tribunal’s jurisdiction, saying they had written to all employees, including Mrs Nagesan, purporting to introduce a new retiring age of . .
See Also – Gill Dormer Wells Infant School v Gill EAT 14-Oct-1998
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.205425

Citations:

[2002] UKEAT 875 – 02 – 0411

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

See Also – Cukic v Vordula Ltd EAT 12-Jun-2003
EAT Redundancy – Fairness . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.203202

A group of employees had brought proceedings which appeared (though there was some ambiguity) to be intended as claims for redundancy payments. More than three months after the effective date of termination they sought to amend to plead alternative claims for unfair dismissal.
Held: In hearing appeals from the EAT the first question the court of appeal has to address is whether there was an error of law on the part of the IT that gave the EAT its jurisdiction. The appeal court upheld a decision of the EAT reversing the IT’s decision because there was sufficient evidence that the Tribunal probably misdirected itself for the court to affirm the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal setting their decision aside. The argument that the primary statutory time limits should be treated as decisive was rejected. Lord Donaldson observed: ‘Now, it is quite true to say that Parliament has laid down rules covering the lodging of applications to Industrial Tribunals but it has not laid down rules for time limits in relation to amending applications which have already been made.’

Judges:

Sir John Donaldson MR

Citations:

[1989] IRLR 222

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Endorsed – Cocking v Sandhurst (Stationers) Ltd NIRC 1974
The Appellant employee had applied for leave to amend his first application by substituting the name of the parent company. The Tribunal held that the rules of procedure relating to time limits went to their jurisdiction and that the amended . .

Cited by:

Cited – Bryant v Housing Corporation CA 21-May-1998
A complainant before an industrial tribunal will only be allowed to amend her statement in order to add an allegation of victimisation for sex discrimination where this arises naturally from the facts alleged. In this case the new claim was rather . .
Cited – Transport and General Workers Union v Safeway Stores Ltd EAT 23-Mar-2007
EAT Practice and Procedure – Amendment

Safeway closed a depot, leading to a large number of redundancies. The Union alleged that consultation was inadequate. Proceedings were initially commenced claiming only . .
Cited – Heald Nickinson Solicitors v Summers and others EAT 21-May-2002
The firm of solicitors appealed an order in which they had been substituted as defendants to a claim for unfair dismissal. They said they had been given no opportunity to object. They had taken over part of a firm which had got into difficulties and . .
Cited – Science Warehouse Ltd v Mills EAT 9-Oct-2015
EAT Practice and Procedure : Amendment – Amendment of an ET claim to add a new cause of action – ACAS Early Conciliation (Section 18A Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (as amended))
At a Preliminary Hearing, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.186770

EAT Redundancy – Fairness

Judges:

The Honourable Mr Justice Wall

Citations:

[2003] EAT 0875 – 02 – 1206, [2003] UKEAT 0875 – 02 – 1206

Links:

Bailii, Bailii, EAT

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

See Also – Cukic v Vordula Ltd EAT 4-Nov-2002
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.191638

Redundancy – no consultation.

Citations:

[1999] EWCA Civ 1265

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 09 December 2022; Ref: scu.146180

WHISTLEBLOWING, PROTECTED DISCLOSURES, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
You can’t decide whether a claim has reasonable prospects of success if you don’t know what it is. Before considering strike out, or making a deposit order, reasonable steps should be taken to identify the claims, and the issues in the claims. With a litigant in person, this involves more than just requiring the claimant at a preliminary hearing to say what the claims and issues are; but requires reading the pleadings and any core documents that set out the claimant’s case.
The issues were not sufficiently identified in this case, which was the backdrop to the errors of law the tribunal made in determining that the claim of protected disclosure detriment or dismissal had no reasonable prospects of success because the tribunal: (1) failed to sufficiently analyse the information the claimant contended he had disclosed; (2) failed to consider the context in which the disclosure was made; (3) misdirected itself as to the test for whether protected disclosure were in the reasonable belief of the claimant made in the public interest; and (4) failed to properly analyse to whom the disclosure was made, and whether it was arguable that any qualifying disclosure was protected.

Citations:

[2021] UKEAT 0339 – 19 – 0904

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.661950

The Appellant is a mosque and a Registered Charity (‘the Respondent’). The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as a Minister of Religion. The Claimant alleged that he was paid pounds 1,407.16 by bank transfer from the Respondent each month, but then required to repay part of each payment to the Respondent. He claimed these sums as unauthorised deductions from wages. The Tribunal found in his favour. The Tribunal erred in law in failing to determine the specific occasions on which, and precise circumstances in which, payments and repayments had been made. As a result, the Tribunal had failed to determine whether there was an ‘occasion’, or occasions, on which the sums paid to the Claimant by the Respondent was less than that ‘properly payable’. The matter was remitted for rehearing.
Before the rehearing, case management will be required to consider any application by the Claimant to contend that any payments he made to the Respondent were rendered unlawful by section 15 ERA (rather than being unlawful deductions contrary to section 13 ERA) and/or by the Respondent to claim that recovery of the sums is precluded by the doctrine of illegality because there was an arrangement to make it appear that the Claimant’s salary was greater than it was to support his application for a visa.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 0311 – 19 – 1409

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.661677

In this case the Claimant sought various remedies from a number of persons. The first person she convened was Lloyds Banking Group plc. In a previous tribunal application, the Claimant had convened Lloyds Banking Group plc together with other persons. The Tribunal had decided she was not employed by Lloyds and was not entitled to seek a remedy from them. Lloyds were a holding company in the group of companies to which the 2nd Respondent belonged. The Tribunal had decided that they were not her employer and that she did not work for them. The tribunal decided that the 2nd respondent was her employer. In the present claim the Claimant sought further remedies in respect of other wrongs. These however arose in respect of the same contract of employment and period of employment. The 1st Respondent took a plea of res judicata which was upheld by the Tribunal. On appeal it was submitted that it was open to the Tribunal to consider the claim against the 1st Respondent because the tribunal that had adjudicated the Claimant’s first claim had not dealt with certain matters relevant to the question of her status as an employee or worker. It was further submitted that even if it had, there were exceptional circumstances that justified the claim continuing against the 1st Respondent. The Claimant submitted that the tribunal had been in error in upholding the res judicata plea and striking out the claim. Held the tribunal had not been in error. The question of the Claimant’s status as an employee or worker was the basis upon which all other substantive claims rested. Where that question had been decided it was not open to the Claimant to relitigate the issue. In any event the fresh arguments which it was said had been raised had already been dealt with by the tribunal that heard the first claim. No exceptional circumstance had been demonstrated that justified repelling the plea of res judicata.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 0009 – 20 – 2210

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.661657

The ET was entitled to find that the employer’s ‘sole or main purpose’ in giving the Claimant a formal oral warning for refusing to comply with an instruction to take down an email list he had created for union communications was ‘preventing or deterring him from taking part in the activities of an independent trade union at an appropriate time, or penalising him for doing so’ within the meaning of section 146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.
The question of the employer’s ‘sole or main motive’ is a subjective question, to be judged simply by enquiring into what was in the mind of the employer at the time.
The question of whether the employee qualifies for protection under paras (a) to (c) of section 146(1) is an objective question, to be decided by the ET.
The ET made findings of fact on these questions which disclosed no error of law or other basis for a successful appeal.
The employer raised no data protection law issues until closing submissions: they were not raised in the pleadings, or in any of the witness statements, or in cross examination. In those circumstances, the ET would have been entitled not to entertain them. IRC v Ainsworth [2009] ICR 985; Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout and Cie SCS v Belgian State (Case C-312/93) [1995] ECR I-4599; Van Schijndel v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1996] 1 CMLR 401; and Van der Weerd v Minister Van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedseklwaliteit [2007] 3 CMLR 7 considered.
Having considered the data protection law issues, the ET made findings open to it on the evidence, and correctly referred to and applied the authorities on the question of whether the alleged breaches, if they were taken as established (which they were not), could be said to remove Mr Brown from the protection of section 146 : Morris v Metrolink Ratp Dev Ltd [2019] ICR 90 CA; Lyon v St James Press Ltd [1976] ICR 413 EAT; Bass Taverns Ltd v Burgess [1995] IRLR 596 CA.
The ET also correctly applied the burden of proof.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 0084 – 19 – 1712

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.661676

The Claimant in the Employment Tribunal, a police officer serving with the Respondent Force, made a number of subject access requests to the Respondent’s Data Access Unit (DAU). One of these, made in 2017, (SAR1) was for all emails sent within the Force ‘with a connection to me’ between 2002 and 2017. The Respondent was aware that he considered that he had been the victim of unlawful discrimination, and intended to (and did) bring Employment Tribunal claims.
SAR 1 was referred by the DAU to the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), which was the body which kept an archive of all emails sent within the Force. Following an initial response from the ACU to the DAU, the Claimant was informed that his request was too wide, and that he needed to identify the names of senders and recipients that he wanted searched. The DAU was told by the ACU that its software at the time did not enable an automated search to be conducted for any email mentioning the Claimant, regardless of who sent or received it. In January 2018 the Claimant was given access to the emails that had been provided to the DAU by the ACU in November 2017. The Tribunal accepted that, to comply with GDPR from May 2018, the ACU upgraded its software, which improved its automated email search capabilities. Thereafter, following further correspondence about his request, a further batch of emails was provided to the Claimant in October 2018.
The Tribunal, by a majority, found that the Claimant had been victimised, in three respects, by the conduct of the Data Access Manager, referred to as Mr D, in connection with SAR 1. The premise of all these findings was the majority’s conclusion that the ACU in fact had the capability to find the further batch of emails provided in October 2018, when it first responded to SAR1 in November 2017; that the limitations of the ACU’s software prior to the GDPR upgrade did not truly explain why that second batch of emails had not been disclosed with the first batch; and that Mr D knew this to be the case. This conclusion was relied upon by the majority to support the conclusion that Mr D’s impugned conduct was reasonably viewed by the Claimant as detrimental treatment; and that the burden shifted to the Respondent to show that such conduct was not because of the Claimant’s protected acts; and that, as Mr D had not been called as a witness, the Respondent had not discharged that burden, so that findings of victimisation followed.
On the Respondent’s appeal, it was held:
(1) The majority did not have a proper basis, on the evidence before the Tribunal, and facts found, to conclude that the explanation given, for why the ACU was not able to retrieve more emails than were produced, prior to the software upgrade, was not true. The majority rested their conclusion on their understanding of what the ACU existed to do, but the facts found about that, whether generally or in relation to the email archive, did not properly support such an inference. The majority were also wrong to draw an adverse inference from the failure of the Respondent to call a witness from the ACU (in addition to one from the DAU) when the pleaded victimisation claims did not identify that the conduct of the ACU in relation to SAR1 was specifically being criticised. The finding that the explanation given by the ACU was not true was therefore perverse. As it was conceded by the Claimant that the findings of detrimental treatment all rested on that finding (and the inference that Mr D knew that the ACU could have retrieved the October emails at the outset), those findings of detrimental treatment could not stand.
(2) In any event, the matters referred to by the majority as supporting a shifting of the burden of proof could not, separately or cumulatively, properly support the shifting of the burden. In addition, in considering whether the burden shifted in relation to Mr D’s impugned conduct, the majority should have considered the picture painted by all of the Tribunal’s relevant findings regarding his conduct, and his interactions with the Claimant, in relation to SAR1. Consideration of the whole picture reinforced the conclusion that there was no proper basis for the majority’s finding that the burden of proof shifted to the Respondent.
The appeal was accordingly allowed.

Citations:

[2021] UKEAT 0300 – 19 – 2201

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.661679

An ET held that the dismissal of an employee who had been on long-term sickness absence was not unfair. However, it also held that the dismissal constituted unfavourable treatment because of something arising in consequence of disability pursuant to Section 15 of the Equality Act 2010.
Such an outcome is possible, as a matter of law – see City of York Council v Grossett [2018] IRLR 746 CA, a case which concerned misconduct rather than capability. However, it is of note that in O’Brien v Bolton St Catherine’s Academy [2017] ICR 737 CA Underhill LJ had expressed the view that ‘ . . it would be a pity if there were any real distinction in the context of dismissal for long-term sickness where the employee is disabled within the meaning of the 2010 Act. The law is complicated enough without parties and tribunals having routinely to judge the dismissal of such an employee by one standard for the purpose of an unfair dismissal claim and by a different standard for the purpose of discrimination law’
In the present case, each party appealed, contending that the findings in relation to the claim on which each was successful should have resulted in the other claim having succeeded.
The EAT allowed the Respondent’s appeal on the basis that the ET erred in law in failing to examine objectively the justification advanced at the date of the Hearing. Its focus on the beliefs of the dismissing officer at the time of the meeting and its failure to balance all the relevant factors amounted to an error of law. As to the ‘ordinary’ unfair dismissal, a number of contradictory findings could not be reconciled or explained by a difference in the applicable legal tests, and the Appellant’s appeal was also allowed and the case remitted for rehearing.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 0309 – 19 – 1302

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.652137

The Employment Appeal Tribunal declined to extend time for the presentation of a Notice of Appeal against one Judgment of the Employment Tribunal and dismissed a validly presented Appeal against a second Judgment which refused the Claimant’s request for reconsideration of the first. After the Employment Tribunal’s Judgments had been promulgated, and after the presentation of the Appeals, the Claimant and the Respondent had entered into a settlement agreement, following ACAS conciliation, which had compromised all the causes of action relied on by the Claimant before the Employment Tribunal. The Claimant subsequently sought to pursue both of the Appeals before the Employment Appeal Tribunal and contended that the conciliated agreement should be set aside.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the agreement between the parties resulted in the Appeals against the Employment Tribunal’s earlier Judgments being academic and that there was no sufficient reason for either of them to proceed to a Full Hearing in those circumstances. It also held, applying Freeman v Sovereign Chicken [1991] ICR 853, that it was not open to the Claimant to seek to set aside the conciliated agreement as part of the appeal proceedings.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 0013 – 20 – 1906

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.652143

It had not been open to an employment judge to decide that the claimants merely sought to re-label their claims when seeking an amendment to claims alleging discrimination on the ground of religion and belief and non-payment of holiday pay. The amendment sought to introduce, based on largely but not entirely the same facts, claims for compensation for breach of the Employment Act 1999 (Blacklisting) Regulations 2010 (the 2010 Regulations).
When applying the well known Selkent guidelines, the judge had correctly discerned that the factual basis of the claims was largely unchanged, other than by developments since they were originally presented; but she failed to take into account the substantial differences between the nature of the causes of action asserted in the original claims and those advanced in the draft amended claims; and, in consequence, the change in the remedies sought.
A claim under the 2010 Regulations requires the existence and use of a prohibited list. The cause of action is a form of discrimination quite unlike discrimination on the ground of religion or belief. The initial claims appeared to rely on non-payment of holiday pay but did not, unlike the draft amended claims, make clear that the remedy sought in respect of the non-payment was not the payment of the sums due but compensation for breach of the 2010 Regulations.
The judge had also omitted to address the respondent’s contention that the claims, as originally presented, had been brought out of time. Although she had appreciated that the Selkent guidelines included consideration of time limits, she had considered the time limits issue on the basis that it was appropriate to treat the original claims as having been made under the 2010 Regulations at the time they were presented.
The judge’s exercise of discretion to allow the amendment was therefore flawed. The application for permission to amend the claims would be remitted for reconsideration by a different employment judge. Time limits would also need to be revisited as part of the reconsideration exercise, including consideration of whether the claims as originally presented had been brought out of time.

Citations:

[2020] UKEAT 0283 – 19 – 1706

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.652141

Citations:

[2019] EWCA Civ 2000

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.651720

Judges:

Unerhill LJ VP, McCombe LJ, Morgan J

Citations:

[2020] EWCA Civ 733

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.651717

Conduct of child protection investigation against social worker.

Judges:

Grenfell HHJ

Citations:

[2010] EWHC 1035 (Admin), [2010] Fam Law 799, [2010] 2 FLR 1144, [2010] IRLR 699

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.414962

Judges:

His Honour Judge Richard Seymour QC

Citations:

[2010] EWHC 1603 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.421255

The process of the company making the claimant redundant had been declared a sham. The company appealed against a decision that even had the correct procedures been followed, the decision would have been the same. The tribunal said that insufficient evidence had been brought to support such an assertion.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The employer’s ‘case was that it had fairly and reasonably dismissed him for redundancy following actual consideration of, and consultation with him on, the ‘swallowing up’ point. That point was neither mentioned in the note of the critical meeting with Mr Whitworth nor in the ET3. Strand’s evidence on that aspect of redundancy in the witness statements and in the answers of Mr Greenhalgh in cross examination was not accepted. It was correct for the ET to conclude that there was ‘no evidence’ to support the Polkey point in the commonly accepted sense that no relevant facts were established by credible evidence. ‘

Judges:

Mummery, Longmore, Lloyd LJJ

Citations:

[2009] EWCA Civ 858

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Employment Rights Act 1996 98A(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Polkey v A E Dayton Services Limited HL 19-Nov-1987
Mr Polkey was employed as a driver. The company decided to replace four van drivers with two van salesmen and a representative. Mr Polkey and two other van drivers were made redundant. Without warning, he was called in and informed that he had been . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.372638

The plaintiff had been called in and dismissed without being given any opportunity to defend himself. The company admitted unfair dismissal.
Held: Sir Richard Scott VC said: ‘I have to say that it seems to me grossly unfair that an employee should be dismissed for gross misconduct without being given any opportunity, any chance at all, of meeting the evidently serious allegations that had been made against him. Indeed, as an example of employment practice it seems to me outrageous.’

Judges:

Sir Richard Scott VC

Citations:

[1997] IRLR 405

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Ainsworth and others v Whitbread Plc EAT 17-Dec-1997
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.267934

Mrs Elcombe accompanied her husband on a number of trips to Switzerland. Mr Elcombe was carrying money which was part of the proceeds of the Brinks-Mat gold bullion robbery. However, Mrs Elcombe did not know that. She thought that the money was the subject of a tax evasion exercise. Brink’s claimed against her that she was liable as a dishonest assistant in a breach of trust.
Held: Although Mrs Elcombe knew that her husband was engaged in a dishonest scheme (i.e. tax evasion) that was not enough. It had to be proved that she knew of the existence of the trust or, at least of the facts giving rise to the trust. A security guard was employed in a position of trust in which he possessed valuable information; and as a result owed a fiduciary duty to his employer not to divulge that information to anyone not entitled to it. But it could not have been suggested that a security guard owed his employer the full range of directors’ fiduciary duties.

Judges:

Rimer J

Citations:

[1999] CLC 133

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.230275

Judges:

Lindsay J

Citations:

[1998] UKEAT 52 – 98 – 1505

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.206359

Citations:

[1996] UKEAT 476 – 95 – 0703

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.208276

Citations:

[1999] UKEAT 1507 – 98 – 1803

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Employment

Updated: 07 December 2022; Ref: scu.204987