Category: Housing

William Watson Stirling v Leadenhall Residential 2 Ltd: CA 29 Jun 2001

Held. A tenant who continued to stay in property after a possession order was granted, but who paid a sum equivalent to rent as it fell due, and something off the arrears, did not necessarily thereby become a tenant again, but could be viewed as a tolerated trespasser. That status might be compromised as against the landlord where he requested a sum which was, in effect, a rent increase. That request was incompatible with the terms of the court order granting him possession, and created a new tenancy.

Judges:

Judge LJ, Latham LJ, Lloyd J

Citations:

Times 25-Jul-2001, Gazette 13-Sep-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 1011, [2002] I WLR 499, [2001] 3 All ER 645, [2002] L and TR 14

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Street v Mountford HL 6-Mar-1985
When a licence is really a tenancy
The document signed by the occupier stated that she understood that she had been given a licence, and that she understood that she had not been granted a tenancy protected under the Rent Acts. Exclusive occupation was in fact granted.
Held: . .
Cited – Javad v Aqil CA 15-May-1990
P in possession – tenancy at will Until Completion
A prospective tenant was allowed into possession and then made periodic payments of rent while negotiations proceeded on the terms of a lease to be granted to him. The negotiations broke down.
Held: The tenant’s appeal failed. It was inferred . .

Cited by:

Cited – London Borough of Lambeth and Hyde Southbank Ltd v O’Kane, Helena Housing Ltd CA 28-Jul-2005
In each case the authority had obtained an order for possession of the tenanted properties, but the court had suspended the possession orders. The tenants had therefore now become ‘tolerated trespassers’. They now claimed that they had again become . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.89565

Metropolitan Properties v Finegold: CA 1975

The rental values of a block of flats were increased because of the presence nearby of an American school; the case turned on the equivalent provisions in the Rent Act 1968 to section 70(1) in the 1977 Act.
Held: One must have regard to the sort of factors which tend to push rents up or down on the market, to the age of the premises, up or down according to whether the premises are old or modern, to their character and their locality, because a house situate in pleasant surroundings, and with the advantage of local amenities, may command a higher rent than an identical house in a less attractive setting. If the committee took the view that the presence of a school made the houses in the surrounding area, and in particular these flats, more attractive, and thus likely to command more rent, then so far as section 46 (1) is concerned the fair rent ought to reflect that factor. In subsection (1), any amenity,any advantage which the premises inherently have, in their construction, their nature, their scale, their situation, their proximity to a school, a zoo or a theatre, whatever it may be, all those factors which would tend in the market to increase the rental, are factors to be taken into account by the committee in fixing the fair rent. The presence of an attractive school would tend to put up the fair rent because it would be an amenity making the premises more attractive.

Judges:

Lord Widgery

Citations:

[1975] 1 WLR 349

Statutes:

Rent Act 1977 46(1) 70(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Regina, Ex Parte Spath Holme Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and The Regions, Secretary of State For Wales CA 20-Jan-2000
Regulations made to ease the effect of changes on the calculation of registered rents were ultra vires and void. The Act under which they were made was intended to control inflation. The purpose of these Regulations was to ease the effect on . .
Cited – Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Chairman of the London Rent Assessment Committee Admn 19-Apr-2002
The respondent had determined a fair rent under the 1977 Act, on the grounds that LRAC had adopted an impermissible approach to the question of whether any ‘scarcity’ deduction fell to be made and to its assessment of that deduction as 30%. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.180399

Regina (Lester) v London Rent Assessment Committee: QBD 7 Nov 2002

The tenant sought to request the Committee to fix his rent. He sent the application, but it was not received before it came into effect. He appealed a rejection of his claim as out of time.
Held: The regulation required the rent to be referred to the committee before the new rent came into effect. That required the notice to be received in time. A reference to the committee could not be construed to include the sending of the notice.

Judges:

Sir Richard Tucker

Citations:

Times 25-Nov-2002, Gazette 09-Jan-2003

Statutes:

Housing Act 1988 13(4)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal from – Regina on the Application of Lester v The London Rent Assessment Committee CA 12-Mar-2003
The court faced the question of, whether if a landlord serves a notice on an assured tenant under section 13(2) of the Act proposing an increase in rent, that will be the rent unless, before the beginning of the new period specified in the notice . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.178297

Regina v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, ex parte M; Regina v Similar Ex Parte P etc: QBD 8 Oct 1996

Destitute asylum seekers who were not entitled to welfare benefits could be in need of care and attention within the meaning of section 21 of the 1948 Act although they were no longer entitled to housing assistance or other social security benefits such as income support. The Act should be read so as to disallow a refusal by local authorities to house destitute asylum seekers. Local Authority has residual duty to support destitute asylum applicants who had been refused benefits.

Citations:

Gazette 13-Nov-1996, Times 10-Oct-1996, [1996] EWHC Admin 90, (1997) 1 CCLR 85, (1997) 30 HLR 10

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

National Assistance Act 1948 21 22

Citing:

Appealed to – Regina v Westminster City Council ex parte A, London Borough of Lambeth ex parte X and similar CA 17-Feb-1997
This was an appeal from orders of certiorari quashing the decisions of three local authorities refusing to provide accommodation for the respondents, four asylum seekers, whose applications for asylum were presently being considered by the Secretary . .
Cited – Regina v Greater Manchester Council ex parte Worch 1988
The court considered to what extent it could look to the form of an Act before it was amended in order to assist it in construing the Act as amended: ‘The original section 21(a) of the [Coroners (Amendment) Act] 1926 is no longer law, since it has . .

Cited by:

Cited – Regina (on the Application of A) v National Asylum Support Service, London Borough of Waltham Forest CA 23-Oct-2003
A family of asylum seekers with two disabled children would be destitute without ‘adequate’ accommodation. What was such accommodation?
Held: The authority was under an absolute duty to house such a family. In satisfying such duty, it was . .
Appeal from – Regina v Westminster City Council ex parte A, London Borough of Lambeth ex parte X and similar CA 17-Feb-1997
This was an appeal from orders of certiorari quashing the decisions of three local authorities refusing to provide accommodation for the respondents, four asylum seekers, whose applications for asylum were presently being considered by the Secretary . .
Cited – Victor Chandler International v Commissioners of Customs and Excise and another CA 8-Mar-2000
A teletext page can be a document for gaming licensing purposes. A bookmaker sought to advertise his services via a teletext page. His services were not licensed in this country, but the advertisements were. It was held that despite the . .
Cited – Regina (on the Application of Mazin Mumaa Galteh Al-Skeini and Others) v The Secretary of State for Defence CA 21-Dec-2005
The claimants were dependants of Iraqi nationals killed in Iraq.
Held: The Military Police were operating when Britain was an occupying power. The question in each case was whether the Human Rights Act applied to the acts of the defendant. The . .
Cited – M, Regina (on the Application of) v Slough Borough Council HL 30-Jul-2008
The House was asked ‘whether a local social services authority is obliged, under section 21(1)(a) of the 1948 Act, to arrange (and pay for) residential accommodation for a person subject to immigration control who is HIV positive but whose only . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Benefits, Housing, Local Government

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.86806

Regina v Ealing London Borough Council Ex Parte Nicola Surdonja: Admn 20 Oct 1998

The homeless applicant family were housed in two hostels approximately a mile apart.
Held: A housing authority’s duty to provide interim accommodation pending homelessness decision extended to the provision of suitable accommodation. There was no justification for any other reading of the section. Housing which split up a family was not suitable.
Scott Baker J said: ‘In my judgment the obligation is not discharged by providing split accommodation in separate dwellings. It is the policy of the law that families should be kept together; they should be able to live together as a unit. I can well see that the obligation could be discharged by, for example, separate rooms in the same hotel, but not I think in two entirely separate hostels up to a mile apart.’

Judges:

Scott Baker J

Citations:

Times 30-Oct-1998, Gazette 11-Nov-1998, [1998] EWHC Admin 988, [1999] 1 ALL ER 566

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 188

Cited by:

Appeal from – Ealing London Borough Council v Surdonja etc CA 21-Jan-2000
When a local authority came to make the decision about the extent of the local connection of the homelessness applicant with the area, the assessment was to be made as regards the situation at the date of that decision. Where there was a review, the . .
Cited – Sharif v The London Borough of Camden SC 20-Feb-2013
The council appealed against a decision that having found Ms Sharif to be homeless, they had a duty also to house her sick father and sister as family members in one accomodation unit.
Held: The Council’s appeal succeeded (Lord Kerr . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.86604

Regina v London Rent Assessment Panel, Ex Parte Cadogan Estates Ltd: Admn 4 Jun 1997

If the proper rent is higher than the statutory maximum, then the rent should be so set and the assured tenancy status lost. The Committee was not prohibited from assessing the rent of the assured tenancy arising on termination of the long tenancy in excess of andpound;25,000.

Judges:

Kay J

Citations:

Times 10-Jul-1997, [1997] EWHC Admin 515, (1998) 30 HLR 487, [1997] 3 WLR 833, [1997] 2 EGLR 134, [1998] QB 398, [1997] 34 EG 88, (1998) 76 P and CR 410

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1988 14

Cited by:

Approved – Regina (on the Application of Morris) v The London Rent Assessment Committee and Another CA 7-Mar-2002
Mummery LJ said: ‘In my judgment, the principal submissions are based on a misreading of the statutory provisions. There is nothing in the provisions establishing or supporting a statutory principle of ‘once an assured tenancy, always an assured . .
Cited – Hughes v Borodex Ltd Admn 25-Mar-2009
The tenant under a long lease appealed against a rent assessment which increased the amount payable to a level where she lost her security of tenure. She said that 17 year old improvements she had made should not have been taken into account.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.87211

Regina v Brent London Borough Council Ex Parte Awua: HL 6 Jul 1995

The term ‘Accommodation’ in the Act was to be read to include short term lettings, and was not to be restricted to secure accommodation, and the loss of such accommodation can be counted as intentional homelessness. If a person who had been provided with accommodation in accordance with section 65(2) of the 1985 Act was once again made homeless or threatened with homelessness (for example, because the Council or other landlord had terminated his right of occupation), he might apply again, and the Council would be required once again to make enquiries under section 62(1). Suitability is primarily a matter of space and arrangement though no doubt other matters may also be material. It is important when considering an authority’s duty under the two parts of the Act not to confuse them.
Lord Hoffmann reviewed the case law: ‘The consequence of the decision in Ex parte Puhlhofer was that a person accommodated in conditions so intolerable that it would not be reasonable for him to continue to occupy that accommodation was not homeless although, if he actually left, he would not thereby become intentionally homeless. This produced the inconvenient result that persons living in such conditions had to put themselves on the street before they could activate the local authority’s duty to provide them with accommodation. To remedy this difficulty, the 1986 amendments (by sections 14(1) and (2)) again introduced a definition of ‘accommodation’ in section 58(2A) of the Act of 1985: ‘A person shall not be treated as having accommodation unless it is accommodation which it would be reasonable for him to continue to occupy.’ Guidance on the quality of accommodation which a local housing authority is entitled to treat as reasonable for a person to continue to occupy is provided by section 58(2B) (as added by the Act of 1986):
‘Regard may be had, in determining whether it would be reasonable for a person to continue to occupy accommodation, to the general circumstances prevailing in relation to housing in the district of the local housing authority to whom he has applied for accommodation or for assistance in obtaining accommodation.’
It follows that a local authority is entitled to regard a person as having accommodation (and therefore as not being homeless) if he has accommodation which, having regard to the matters mentioned in subsection (2B), it can reasonably consider that it would be reasonable for him to continue to occupy.’
Lord Hoffmann also said: ‘there is nothing in the Act to say that a local authority cannot take the view that a person can reasonably be expected to continue to occupy accommodation which is temporary. . the extent to which the accommodation is physically suitable, so that it would be reasonable for a person to continue to occupy it, must be related to the time for which he has been there and is expected to stay. A local housing authority could take the view that a family like the Puhlhofers, put into a single cramped and squalid bedroom, can be expected to make do for a temporary period. On the other hand, there will come a time at which it is no longer reasonable to expect them to continue to occupy such accommodation. At this point they come back within the definition of homeless in section 58(1).’

Judges:

Lord Hoffmann

Citations:

Times 07-Jul-1995, Independent 25-Jul-1995, Gazette 15-Sep-1995, [1996] 1 AC 55, (1995) 27 HLR 453, [1995] 3 All ER 493, [1995] 3 WLR 215, [1995] UKHL 23, 93 LGR 581

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 58(1) 60(1) 65(2) 85(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Regina v Brent London Borough Council Ex Parte Awua CA 31-Mar-1994
Temporary housing may be treated as being settled, so an abandonment of it may be intentional homelessness.
The applicant had been accepted by Tower Hamlets as unintentionally homeless and in priority need, and given temporary accommodation. . .
At first instance – Regina v Brent London Borough Council, Ex Parte Awua QBD 1-Jul-1993
A person refusing an offer of permanent accommodation was intentionally homeless. . .
Doubted – Din (Taj) v Wandsworth London Borough Council HL 26-Nov-1981
The appellants had applied for emergency housing as homeless persons, anticipating loss of their secure accomodation after falling into arrears. The Council reject their application, but a County Court quashed that decision. The Court of Appeal . .

Cited by:

Cited – Knight v Vale Royal Borough Council CA 31-Jul-2003
The claimant challenged a decision of the authority that she had made herself intentionally homeless.She had gone to a refuge, then to stay with her mother. She had been found to be intentionally homeless. She then found a shorthold tenancy. When . .
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Camden ex parte Pereira CA 20-May-1998
When considering whether a person was vulnerable so as to be treated more favourably in applying for rehousing: ‘The Council should consider such application afresh applying the statutory criterion: The Ortiz test should not be used; the dictum of . .
Applied – Regina v Wandsworth London Borough Council Ex Parte Wingrove; Regina v Same Ex Parte Mansoor CA 7-Jun-1996
Accommodation provided by a local authority need not be permanent in order to satisfy the statutory requirement to assist somebody in need of assistance for homelessness. The full duty might be discharged by securing the offer of an assured . .
Cited – Griffiths v St Helens Council CA 7-Mar-2006
The applicant had been agreed to be homeless with priority need, and had been provided with an assured shorthold tenancy.
Held: The Legislation now allowed broadly three classes of accomodation as suitable: (1) accommodation owned by the local . .
Cited – Slater v London Borough of Lewisham CA 12-Apr-2006
The applicant was heavily pregnant when she was offered a first floor one bedroomed flat. She rejected it.
Held: When a housing authority reviewed its decision on the applicant’s decision not to accept the accommodation offered, that review . .
Cited – Harouki v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea CA 17-Oct-2007
The applicant sought housing as a homeles person. Her present accommodation for herself, her husband and five children was so overcrowded that continued occupation was a criminal offence. She appealed a finding that it was reasonable to continue . .
Cited – Manchester City Council v Moran and Another; Richards v Ipswich Borough Council CA 17-Apr-2008
The two applicants had occupied a women’s refuge. They appealed against a refusal to consider them as homeless when they acted in such a way as to be evicted from the refuge, saying that the refuge did not constitute ‘accommodation . . which it . .
Cited – Muse v London Borough of Brent CA 19-Dec-2008
The court was asked whether the section 193 duty to provide housing was lost after the applicant had refused alternative temporary accommodation. The applicant had been granted temporary accommodation, but her family grew and it became too small. . .
Cited – Birmingham City Council v Ali and Others; Moran v Manchester City Council HL 1-Jul-2009
Homelessness Status Requires LA Action
The House considered appeals challenging whether local authorities who gave unacceptable housing to the homeless had satisfied their obligations to them as homeless people. What was meant by the phrase ‘accommodation which it would be reasonable for . .
Cited – Ravichandran and Another v London Borough of Lewisham CA 2-Jul-2010
The claimant appealed against an order confirming a review of the decision that the local authority owed no futher duty to her under section 193. She had rejected the house offered as unsuitable for medical reasons.
Held: The tenant’s appeal . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.86187

O’Byrne v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions and Another: CA 17 Apr 2001

A tenant sought to buy a flat under the right to buy scheme but the flat was in the green belt. The land was held under provisions in the 1938 Act making the sale of any part conditional on the consent of the respondent. The local authority objected, and an inquiry was held. The inspector refused the sale.
Held: The applicant successfully appealed. Having examined in detail the operation of the two inconsistent statutes the majority of the Court of Appeal held that there had been an implied repeal. On the basis that the requirements of the Right to Buy scheme were inconsistent with an impliedly repealed the earlier Act. The later provisions were so inconsistent with an repugnant to the earlier Act that the two could not stand together.
Buxton LJ, dissenting said: ‘The court will not lightly find a case of implied repeal, and the test for it is a high one.’
Laws LJ with whom Thorpe LJ agreed said that the contradiction between the two pieces of legislation must be ‘inescapable’ and that the construction of the later statute must be shown to be the only rational interpretation that is available.

Judges:

Thorpe, Buxton, Laws LJJ

Citations:

Times 17-Apr-2001, Gazette 20-Apr-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 499, [2001] NPC 71, [2002] HLR 30, [2001] 16 EGCS 144

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 118, Green Belt (London and Home Counties) Act 1938

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex Parte O’Byrne QBD 8-Jun-2000
A tenant sought to buy a flat under the right to buy scheme but the flat was in the green belt. The local authority objected, and an inquiry was held. The inspector held that the green belt policy itself would not be affected, but a sale would . .
See Also – Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte O’Byrne Admn 20-Aug-1999
It could be proper, when ordering for a third party to be joined in an action for judicial review, to order that the original party should not be responsible for the new party’s costs in any event. Such a power could be derived from the overriding . .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Regina v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the Regions ex parte O’Byrne HL 14-Nov-2002
The applicant sought to exercise her right to buy a property she had occupied of her local authority. It was in the green belt, and the authority declined to sell it until they had obtained authorisation for the sale. The authority appealed an order . .
Cited – Snelling and Another v Burstow Parish Council ChD 24-Jan-2013
The parties disputed the application and interpretation of ancient statues relating to allotments. The land had been appropriated to allotments under the 1945 Act. The Council had argued that it had a power of sale under the 1908 Act subject to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Planning, Local Government, Housing, Local Government

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.85990

Rajah v Arogol Co Ltd: CA 13 Apr 2001

A tenant held a protected tenancy of one room in a house, but later extended his occupation to the entire floor.
Held: He did not thereby lose his status as protected tenant, and it did not operate as a surrender of the existing tenancy. The section protected the continuing tenancy because it referred to a grant of the tenancy by a person who was then a landlord.

Citations:

Gazette 24-May-2001, Times 13-Apr-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 454

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1988 34

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.85657

Regina v Sacupima and Others, Ex Parte Newham London Borough Council: QBD 26 Nov 1999

A local authority decide to provide temporary accommodation for homeless applicants outside its area in assorted seaside towns, pending a final decision on their cases. This general policy was unlawful, since the authority had failed to consider properly the individual circumstances of the individuals involved. Many were on benefits, and had for example children being educated within the borough. The effect of the policy was to make any return to the borough impossible.

Citations:

Times 12-Jan-2000, [1999] EWHC 274 (QB), [2000] COD 133, (2001) 33 HLR 1

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 188

Cited by:

Appeal from – Regina v Newham London Borough Council, ex parte Sacupima and others CA 1-Dec-2000
Where a local authority had to decide whether temporary housing was suitable for a family who had applied under the homelessness provisions, the location of the short-term housing was relevant. In this case, a London authority, placing a family in . .
Cited – Nzolameso v City of Westminster SC 2-Apr-2015
The court was asked ‘When is it lawful for a local housing authority to accommodate a homeless person a long way away from the authority’s own area where the homeless person was previously living? ‘ The claimant said that on applying for housing she . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.85470

Pemberton v Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Southwark: CA 13 Apr 2000

A tenant had continued in occupation as a tolerated trespasser after a possession order. She made regular payments but failed to comply with the order setting terms for suspension. She sought damages from the landlord for nuisance for not dealing with an infestation of cockroaches. The landlord authority asserted that she had insufficient interest to found a claim. She was not a tenant.
Held: Her continued occupation with the implicit consent of the authority, ‘the peculiar status of a ‘tolerated trespasser”, was sufficient to make her an occupier able to claim in nuisance.

Judges:

Roch LJ, Clarke LJ, Sir Christopher Slade

Citations:

Times 26-Apr-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 128, [2000] 1 WLR 1672

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Thompson v Elmbridge Borough Council CA 1987
The wife was the secure tenant of the premises, against whom the local authority landlord obtained a possession order on grounds of arrears of rent, not to be enforced on payment of a weekly sum off the arrears in addition to what the order . .

Cited by:

Cited – London Borough of Lambeth and Hyde Southbank Ltd v O’Kane, Helena Housing Ltd CA 28-Jul-2005
In each case the authority had obtained an order for possession of the tenanted properties, but the court had suspended the possession orders. The tenants had therefore now become ‘tolerated trespassers’. They now claimed that they had again become . .
Cited – Knowsley Housing Trust v White; Honeygan-Green v London Borough of Islington; Porter v Shepherds Bush Housing Association HL 10-Dec-2008
The House considered situations where a secure or assured tenancy had been made subject to a suspended possession order and where despite the tenant failing to comply with the conditions, he had been allowed to continue in occupation.
Held: . .
Cited – Willis and Another v Derwentside District Council ChD 10-Apr-2013
The claimants sought damages alleging the escape of noxious CO2 gas from the defendant’s neighbouring land. The gas originated from old coal workings.
Held: There had come to be a liability falling in the defendant from 2006. Its delay in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Nuisance

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.84643

Notting Hill Housing Trust v Brackley and Another: CA 24 Apr 2001

One of two joint tenants was able to give a notice to quit a joint periodic tenancy, without first referring to the co-tenant. If this was inappropriate, then it was for Parliament to change the law. Such a notice was not the exercise of a ‘function’ relating to the land within the Act, and accordingly there was no need to consult on the notice with the co-tenant. The notice simply served to indicate an unwillingness to withhold consent to the continuance of the tenancy, to allow a liability to continue to accrue. The words of the new Act were strikingly similar to the Act it replaced, and the concept of ‘function’ was not extended.

Citations:

Times 15-Jun-2001, Gazette 14-Jun-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 601, [2001] L and TR 34, (2001) 82 P and CR DG26, [2001] 35 EG 106, [2001] 18 EGCS 175, [2001] 3 EGLR 11, [2002] HLR 10, [2001] WTLR 1353

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 11

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Newlon Housing Trust v Alsulaimen and Another HL 29-Jul-1998
A tenancy which had been terminated by a notice given by one of the joint tenants had expired. It did not come to an end by any deed, and so was not capable of being set aside by a family court in the course of divorce proceedings. The possession . .

Cited by:

Cited – Sims v Dacorum Borough Council CA 24-Jan-2013
Husband and wife had been joint tenants of the council. On the breakdown of the marriage, W gave notice to quit. H defended the council’s possession action, saying that it was an infringement of his human rights for him to lose his tenancy and home. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Trusts, Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.84370

Murat Kaya v Haringey London Borough Council and Another: CA 14 Jun 2001

The grant of temporary admission to the UK pending an decision on his asylum status, did not create a full ‘lawful presence’ in the UK. A person seeking to qualify for housing assistance had to be lawfully present within the UK, and temporary admission did not create a sufficient status by virtue of section 11.

Citations:

Times 14-Jun-2001, Gazette 21-Jun-2001, [2002] 34 HLR 1, [2001] EWCA Civ 677, [2001] EWCA Civ 677

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 185(2), Homelessness (England) Regulations 2000 (2000 No 701) 3(1)(e)(1), Immigration Act 1971 11(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Applied – Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Bugdaycay HL 19-Feb-1986
Three applicants had lied on entry to secure admission, stayed for a considerable time, and had been treated as illegal immigrants under section 33(1). The fourth’s claim that upon being returned he would been killed, had been rejected without . .

Cited by:

Cited – Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza CA 5-Nov-2002
The applicant sought to succeed to the tenancy of his deceased homosexual partner as his partner rather than as a member of his family.
Held: A court is bound by any decision within the normal hierachy of domestic authority as to the meaning . .
Confirmed – Szoma v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions CA 30-Jul-2003
The applicant, a foreign national had been given temporary admission to the UK. He received income support. But this ceased after his asylum application was rejected, and he remained resident.
Held: The legislation now made specific reference . .
Cited – Szoma v Secretary of State for the Department of Work and Pensions HL 28-Jul-2005
The applicant had claimed asylum on entry and was temporarily admitted. Though his claim for asylum was later refused, those admitted in this way were granted indefinite leave to remain. He had claimed and received benefits at first, but then these . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration, Housing, Benefits

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.82689

Haringey London Borough Council v Jowett: QBD 27 Apr 1999

Traffic noise from outside a building could not found an allegation of statutory nuisance. A landlord could liable for a nuisance he allowed to continue even though the same condition applied when he acquired his interest.

Citations:

Times 20-May-1999, [1999] EWHC Admin 365, [1999] 32 HLR 308

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Environmental Protection Act 1990 79(1)(a)

Cited by:

Cited – Vella v London Borough of Lambeth Admn 14-Nov-2005
The claimant sought judicial review of the decision to serve an abatement notice in respect of premises where the normal noise incidents of living were heard in neighbouring flats, which notices were to be abated by noise insulation.
Held: The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Nuisance, Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.81241

Greenwich London Borough Council v Regan: CA 31 Jan 1996

The authority had taken possession proceedings against the secure tenant for non-payment of rent, and obtained an order, suspended on condition as to payments. He again fell into arrears, and the authority made a further agreement. They now sought issue of a warrant, and the tenant argued that a new possession was required, saying that the further agreement constituted the grant of a new tenancy or licence, and that this happened irrespective of anybody’s intentions.
Held: No new tenancy had been created, and no new possession order was required. It would be wrong to require the authority to apply to court each time a tenant under a suspended order was late in payment. The tenancy was determined when the conditions were breached. The authority might waive that breach, in which case situation continued as before. Whether the variation created a new tenancy was a question of fact. In this case the tenancy ended twice. The waivers by the authority did not determine the tenancy. Had he applied, the tenant would have been granted a postponment of the possession on the new agreement.
‘The tenancy continues until the date on which the tenant is ordered to give up possession. If the order is suspended on terms, the tenancy continues until there is a breach of those terms and then determines. The Local Authority is free to treat the tenant as a trespasser and to request the court to issue a warrant of execution. The tenant, on the other hand, is entitled to apply to the court to vary the terms of the order by postponing the date of possession. If it does so, the tenancy is reinstated and treated as if it had not determined.’

Judges:

Millett LJ

Citations:

Times 08-Feb-1996, (1996) 28 HLR 469, (1996) 72 P and CR 507

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 85

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Distinguished – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council HL 31-Oct-1996
The authority had obtained a possession order from its secure tenant but then agreed to accept payments toward the arrears. The tenant applied for and was granted a declaration that she had on that agreement acquired a new tenancy. The authority . .
Cited – Referral By the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission In the Cases of William Gray James Bernard O’Rourke v Her Majesty’s Advocate HCJ 23-Dec-2004
. .
Cited – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council CA 21-Jul-1995
. .

Cited by:

Cited – Swindon Borough Council v Aston CA 19-Dec-2002
The tenant had fallen into arrears, and a possession order had been made. Having cleared the arrears, the possession order fell, but the landlord purported to issue a new tenancy agreement, with no security of tenure. They now sought possession . .
Cited – Marshall v Bradford Metropolitan District Council CA 27-Apr-2001
There were three issues; (1) whether it was proper for the judge to have struck out disrepair proceedings when it could be seen that an application to discharge or rescind a suspended possession order would be likely to succeed (2) whether the . .
Cited – London Borough of Lambeth and Hyde Southbank Ltd v O’Kane, Helena Housing Ltd CA 28-Jul-2005
In each case the authority had obtained an order for possession of the tenanted properties, but the court had suspended the possession orders. The tenants had therefore now become ‘tolerated trespassers’. They now claimed that they had again become . .
Applied – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council HL 31-Oct-1996
The authority had obtained a possession order from its secure tenant but then agreed to accept payments toward the arrears. The tenant applied for and was granted a declaration that she had on that agreement acquired a new tenancy. The authority . .
Cited – Richmond v Kensington and Chelsea CA 15-Feb-2006
The borough obtained a possession order of the secure tenancy of a flat occupied by their tenant for nuisance. It was suspended on terms for a certain period. They alleged further breaches shortly before the expiry of the possession order and they . .
Cited – Knowsley Housing Trust v White; Honeygan-Green v London Borough of Islington; Porter v Shepherds Bush Housing Association HL 10-Dec-2008
The House considered situations where a secure or assured tenancy had been made subject to a suspended possession order and where despite the tenant failing to comply with the conditions, he had been allowed to continue in occupation.
Held: . .
Cited – Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Southwark SC 23-Jun-2010
The appellant’s brother had been the secure tenant of the respondent Council which had in 1987 obtained an order for possession for rent arrears suspended on condition. The condition had not been complied with, but the brother had continued to live . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.81015

Ealing London Borough Council v Surdonja etc: CA 21 Jan 2000

When a local authority came to make the decision about the extent of the local connection of the homelessness applicant with the area, the assessment was to be made as regards the situation at the date of that decision. Where there was a review, the material date was the date of the review. Where an applicant had been residing in interim accommodation pending the review, that occupation itself could become a sufficient local connection at the time when the review was complete. The authority’s error was fundamental and had prevented them asking the correct question. The appeal was allowed.

Judges:

Henry LJ, Potter LJ

Citations:

Times 11-Feb-2000, [2001] QB 97, [2000] EWCA Civ 7, [2000] 2 All ER 597, [2000] NPC 5, (2000) 32 HLR 481, [2000] 3 WLR 481

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 188 202

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Regina v Ealing London Borough Council Ex Parte Nicola Surdonja Admn 20-Oct-1998
The homeless applicant family were housed in two hostels approximately a mile apart.
Held: A housing authority’s duty to provide interim accommodation pending homelessness decision extended to the provision of suitable accommodation. There was . .
Cited – Regina v Southwark London Borough Council ex parte Hughes 1983
Turner J said: ‘Housing is about the most basic social requirement of an individual. It is not conceptual, it is factual. The Housing Act is intended to be of social effect. It may be thought therefore that there are compelling reasons why the . .
Cited – Regina v Eastleigh Borough Council, Ex parte Betts; In re Betts HL 27-Jul-1983
Mr Betts applied to Eastleigh for accommodation under the 1977 Act. They said that he had no local connection and referred his application to Blaby where the applicant and his family had formerly been living. Blaby accepted the referral and offered . .
Cited – Regina v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, ex parte Avdic CA 2-Jan-1996
A refugee from Bosnia moved from Kirklees to London, where she applied for accomodation as being homeless. Hammersmith accepted that she was owed a duty, but referred her back to Kirklees in September. Her solicitors then sent in more material which . .
Cited – Regina v Newham London Borough Council Ex Parte Smith QBD 11-Apr-1996
The local connection test for rehousing may be applied as at the date of the application for housing: ‘In my judgment a local authority may properly ask itself whether the applicant had a local connection . . at the date of the application under . .

Cited by:

Cited – Al-Ameri, Osmani v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea/London Borough of Harrow CA 28-Feb-2003
The applicants sought to assert a local connection, having been housed in the respondent’s areas as destitute asylum seekers.
Held: The accomodation was not one of the applicant’s choice, and therefore could not be relied upon to establish a . .
Cited – Cramp v Hastings Borough Council CA 29-Jul-2005
Cases challenged successful appeals by applicants for housing for homelessness, where a county court had ordered a second review of the application. . .
Cited – Sharif v The London Borough of Camden SC 20-Feb-2013
The council appealed against a decision that having found Ms Sharif to be homeless, they had a duty also to house her sick father and sister as family members in one accomodation unit.
Held: The Council’s appeal succeeded (Lord Kerr . .
Appeal from – Mohamed v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council HL 1-Nov-2001
Mrs M came to England in 1994 living first in Ealing and then Hammersmith. Mr M came later and lived elsewhere in Hammersmith. Hammersmith gave them jointly temporary accommodation, first in a hotel and then in a flat. They then applied under . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Local Government

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80210

Cunningham v Birmingham City Council: Admn 6 May 1997

The council appealed against the finding that the complainant’s premises occupied under a tenancy of the council, constituted a statutory nuisance which they had a duty to abate. The claimant’s son was disabled and his condition involved behavioural problems. She said that the kitchen was, in view of his condition too small and dangerous in its layout.
Held: Whether premises are ‘prejudicial to health’ is an objective not a subjective test; there is no contrast with the test for nuisance. The magistrate had been wrong to determine the case in the way he did by relating the respondents’ duties to the particular health requirements of Robert, the son of the the appellant.

Judges:

Pill LJ, Astill J

Citations:

Times 09-Jun-1997, [1997] EWHC Admin 440

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Environmental Protection Act 1990 79(1)(a)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Salford City Council v McNally HL 1976
The House considered the interaction of the 1936 and 1957 Acts as to the distinction between the questions of injury to health and fitness for human habitation: ‘It was not a defence to establish that the house, the subject of the complaint, was . .
Cited – London Borough of Southwark v Ince QBD 1989
Savile J: ‘I am not persuaded that because there is now the Control of Pollution Act and there was previously the Noise Abatement Act that therefore lends any support to the construction [that the Public Health Act 1936 did not apply to premises . .
Cited – National Coal Board v Thorne 2-Jan-1976
Complaint was made as to the failure to repair a property, and the duty to abate the resulting nuisance. Watkins J said: ‘Speaking for myself I would adopt the words of Lord Wilberforce so as to state that a nuisance cannot arise if what has taken . .
Cited – Hall v The Manchester Corporation 1915
Lord Parker set out the test which to be applied when considering whether a property was fit for human habitation: ‘I desire to add that if the corporation are minded to make a new order under section 41 dealing with the houses in question, they . .
Cited – Morgan v Liverpool Corporation CA 1927
The tenant claimed that he had been injured when as the upper portion of a window was being opened one of the cords of the window sash broke and the top part of the window slipped down and caught and injured his hand. The plaintiff admitted that the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Nuisance, Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79709

Coventry City Council v Finnie and Another: QBD 2 May 1996

No undertaking for damages was to be required of a Local Authority exercising a statutory duty. The grant of an injunction in favour of a local authority performing law enforcement duties did not necessarily carry with it a cross-undertaking on damages of a type that is familiar in private litigation.

Judges:

Scott Baker J

Citations:

Times 02-May-1996, (1997) 29 HLR 658

Statutes:

Local Government Act 1972 222

Cited by:

Cited – Corner House Research, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry CA 1-Mar-2005
The applicant sought to bring an action to challenge new rules on approval of export credit guarantees. The company was non-profit and founded to support investigation of bribery. It had applied for a protected costs order to support the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Local Government, Housing

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79576

Chelsea Yacht and Boat Club Ltd v Pope: CA 6 Apr 2000

The tenant sought to assert that he occupied a houseboat, the Dinty Moore, under a tenancy of a dwellinghouse under the 1988 Act. The claimant appealed a decision that it was.
Held: A house-boat, even though used as a dwelling, did not have the character of a house sufficiently to allow an assured tenancy of it to arise. This could only happen if the boat itself became affixed to the land so as to become part of it. In this case the boat would float for several hours each day as the tide rose, and the boat could quite easily be moved to a different mooring. It was a chattel and was not inherently capable of becoming real property.

Judges:

Morritt LJ, Waller LJ, Tucker LJ

Citations:

Times 07-Jun-2000, [2000] 22 EG 147, [2000] 1 WLR 1941, [2000] EWCA Civ 425

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1988

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Holland v Hodgson 1872
(Court of Exchequer Chamber) Blackburn J set out what constituted a fixture: ‘There is no doubt that the general maxim of the law is, that what is annexed to the land becomes part of the land; but it is very difficult, if not impossible, to say with . .
Cited – Elitestone Ltd v Morris and Another HL 1-May-1997
The plaintiff acquired land on which 27 chalets were erected. They served notice to quit so that the site could be developed. The defendants argued that they had residential tenancies with protection under the Rent Act 1977.
Held: The tenants’ . .
Cited – Westminster City Council v Woodbury (Valuation Officer) and the Yard Arm Club Ltd CA 1-Nov-1992
A vessel, the Hispaniola was firmly fixed to moorings. The Council appealed a finding that it was exempt from inclusion in the rating list by the Act.
Held: The court found difficulty in the idea of lateral occupation by a chattel, or that . .
Cited – Cory v Bristow HL 1877
The owner of a vessel used for commercial purposes while fixed in position on a long-term basis over moorings on the riverbed could for rating purposes be treated as the occupier of those moorings and the part of the riverbed in which they were . .
Cited – Forrest v Overseers of Greenwich 1858
The court was asked whether a landing stage by a river was part of the land. F. moored a barge in the Thames between high and low water mark : the moorings wera stationary, in the bed of the river; and the barge floated at high water and grounded at . .
Cited – Stubbs v Hartnell CA 9-Jun-1997
The Court was asked whether a houseboat on the River Thames was subject to council tax. . .

Cited by:

Cited – Malekshad v Howard de Walden Estates Limited HL 5-Dec-2002
A house and an adjoining building had been first demised under one lease, then separated vertically. Two separate residential properties now existed.
Held: The vertical division meant that the two houses could not be enfranchised as one under . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79005

British Waterways Board v Norman: QBD 11 Nov 1993

A solicitor cannot claim payment from the other party of costs he would not ask his own client to pay. An implied contingency agreement with his client could defeat a claim for payment of costs from the other party. There was never any intention on the part of the solicitors to create any liability for their own costs if the proceedings failed. It therefore followed that they sought to conduct the case on a contingency basis, such basis being contrary to public policy in any criminal trial such as this.

Citations:

Ind Summary 29-Nov-1993, Times 11-Nov-1993, [1993] 22 HLR 232

Statutes:

Environmental Protection Act 1990 79

Costs, Legal Professions, Criminal Practice, Housing

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78651

Regina v Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council, Ex parte Bassett: 1983

The housing applicant had given up the tenancy of a house in Basingstoke when she and her husband decided to emigrate to Canada. They moved to Canada, but their application to stay permanently was refused, and they had to return to England, where they lived in temporary accommodation in Bramley. The marriage then broke down as a result of the husband’s behaviour, and the applicant left the Bramley accommodation and applied for accommodation as a homeless person.
Held: Taylor J, relying on Lord Fraser’s acceptance in Din of the need for a continuing causal connection, held that the applicant had not become homeless intentionally. Her homelessness was not due to her having given up the secure accommodation in Basingstoke and moved into unsettled accommodation: it was due to the break-up of her marriage.

Judges:

Taylor J

Citations:

(1983) 10 HLR 125

Citing:

Approved – Din (Taj) v Wandsworth London Borough Council HL 26-Nov-1981
The appellants had applied for emergency housing as homeless persons, anticipating loss of their secure accomodation after falling into arrears. The Council reject their application, but a County Court quashed that decision. The Court of Appeal . .

Cited by:

Cited – Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest SC 20-May-2015
‘The question in this case is whether the appellant falls within the scope of section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 as amended, which applies, by virtue of subsection (1), where the local housing authority are satisfied that ‘an applicant is homeless, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.566158

Regina v London Borough of Harrow ex parte Fahia: 1996

After deliberately losing her tenancy, the authority had provided the appliant with temporary accomodation in a guest house, but after her housing benefits were halved she lost that accomodation also.
Held: The authority had a duty to house her. The change in the level of housing benefits had operated to break the chain of causation, and she was no longer voluntarily homeless.
An example of the causal connection being interrupted, other than by a period in settled accommodation, would be if the applicant’s accommodation in the guest house had been burned down; or if, in Dyson’s case, the let of the cottage had been brought prematurely to an end by the cottage being destroyed by fire. As the judge observed, Dyson’s case had been decided as it was because, when the let came to an end, the fact that Miss Dyson was thereafter homeless was caused by her initial conduct. If, on the other hand, somebody went into a property for a three month period but lost it after 14 days because the premises were burnt down, then in the judge’s view, applying the ordinary common sense test of causation, one would say that the cause of the homelessness was the fire. The judge considered Ex p Bassett to be another illustration of the same principle.

Judges:

Roger Toulson QC, DJ

Citations:

(1996) 29 HLR 94

Cited by:

Appeal from – Regina v London Borough of Harrow ex parte Fahia CA 7-Mar-1997
The applicant had been found to have deliberately procured her own eviction from her tenanted accommodation in Harrow. She was given temporary accommodation in a guest house, where she stayed for over a year. Her housing benefit was then reduced by . .
At First Instance – Regina v Harrow London Borough Council Ex Parte Fahia HL 16-Sep-1998
The local authority submitted first that a person making a second application for emergency housing had to demonstrate a change of circumstance which might lead to a second application being successful and second that it was for the local authority . .
Cited – Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest SC 20-May-2015
‘The question in this case is whether the appellant falls within the scope of section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 as amended, which applies, by virtue of subsection (1), where the local housing authority are satisfied that ‘an applicant is homeless, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.566159

Regina v Hillingdon London Borough Council, Ex parte Tinn: 1988

Citations:

(1988) 20 HLR 205

Cited by:

Cited – Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest SC 20-May-2015
‘The question in this case is whether the appellant falls within the scope of section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 as amended, which applies, by virtue of subsection (1), where the local housing authority are satisfied that ‘an applicant is homeless, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.566157

Walker v Ogilvy: CA 1974

A tenant of a flat which he used principally at weekends and for short holidays. The tenant had another permanent residence.
Held: Parliament in passing the Rent Act 1968 never intended to protect people in occupation of what were in effect holiday houses.

Judges:

Ormrod LJ

Citations:

(1974) 29 P and CR 288

Statutes:

Rent Act 1968

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – ZH and CN, Regina (on The Applications of) v London Boroughs of Newham and Lewisham SC 12-Nov-2014
The court was asked whether the 1977 Act required a local authorty to obtain a court order before taking possession of interim accommodation it provided to an apparently homeless person while it investigated whether it owed him or her a duty under . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.554543

Regalian Securities Ltd v Scheuer: CA 1982

The court considered the right of a protected tenant to become a statutory tenant on the termination of his protected tenancy under section 2(1)(a) of the 1977 Act, requiring him to occupy the dwelling house ‘as his residence’. The tenant occupied the flat as a temporary expedient for part of the time when the house, which his wife had purchased and in which they and their children lived, was let to others during the winter.
Held: His residence in the flat did not have the quality needed to attract the protections of the Rent Acts.
Cumming-Bruce LJ asked whether the second residence was used as a home rather than a place of convenient resort.home. Cumming-Bruce LJ set out two principles that were relevant in that context: ‘First, the court enquires what is the extent and what are the characteristics of the user of the residence? When that is ascertained the court also enquires: Is the nature of the residence during the period that it persisted the kind of residence that is within the contemplation of the Rent Act? Is this the kind of residence that Parliament intended should clothe the tenant with the right to claim statutory protection?’
May LJ took a similar approach, asking whether there was occupation as a home.

Judges:

Cumming-Bruce LJ, Eveleigh LJ, May LJ

Citations:

(1982) 5 HLR 48

Statutes:

Rent Act 1977 2(1)(a)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – ZH and CN, Regina (on The Applications of) v London Boroughs of Newham and Lewisham SC 12-Nov-2014
The court was asked whether the 1977 Act required a local authorty to obtain a court order before taking possession of interim accommodation it provided to an apparently homeless person while it investigated whether it owed him or her a duty under . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.554544

Ali Bhai and Another v Black Roof Community Housing Association Ltd: CA 2 Nov 2000

The tenant appealed against a refusal of what he said was his right to buy the flat he occupied. The Housing Association respondent and arbitrator had said that the tenancy had been assured, not secure and that therefore no right to buy had existed. After the grant of the tenancy, the Association had changed in status from being fully mutual.
Held: The tenant’s appeal succeeded. A tenancy from a mutual housing association created in 1985 was neither protected nor secure, and the Housing Act 1985 did not alter that status. However the later Act did operate, when the association converted from its mutual status, to change the tenancy to a secure tenancy, and that in turn gave the tenant a right to buy. The conversion led to the ‘landlord condition’ becoming fulfilled.
Jonathan Parker LJ said: ‘paragraph 4(a) in my judgment provides a saving for existing tenancies in respect of which, immediately prior to the commencement date, the ‘landlord condition’ was satisfied (so that they were secure tenancies), but in respect of which the ‘landlord condition’ would otherwise have ceased to be satisfied as from the commencement date, by virtue of the repeals: e.g. a tenancy where the landlord immediately before the commencement date was a non-mutual association. The saving is achieved not by providing that such tenancies shall continue as secure tenancies until such time as the non-mutual association disposes of its interest to an authority or body which is not included in the amended list, for that would be inconsistent with the ‘ambulatory’ nature of the statutory code. Rather, the saving is achieved by preserving the unamended ‘landlord condition’ in relation to such a tenancy, so that it will be a secure tenancy at any time in the future when the interest of the landlord belongs to an authority or body within the unamended section 80 (e.g. a non-mutual association).’

Judges:

Kennedy LJ, Jonathan Parker LJ

Citations:

Times 15-Nov-2000, Gazette 23-Nov-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 276, [2001] 2 All ER 865

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985, Local Government and Housing Act 1989, Housing Act 1988 sch18 p4(a)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council v Paice CA 3-Apr-1995
A dwelling subtenant of part of premises comprised in a business lease became a secure tenant on the surrender of the mesne tenancy. Section 79 of the 1985 Act had ambulatory effect.
Waite LJ said: ‘The use of the term ‘at any time’ in section . .

Cited by:

Cited – Southward Housing Co-Operative Ltd v Walker and Another ChD 8-Jun-2015
The court was asked as to the nature and effect of tenancies for life granted by fully mutual housing co-operatives and in particular how they can lawfully be brought to an end and a possession order obtained. The tenants sought a declaration of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.77729

Mohram Ali v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council: CA 27 May 1992

A challenge to the exercise of homelessness duties by a local authority must be by way of Judicial Review. Nolan LJ: ‘It follows that in my judgment the public law duties of the council were not discharged until they had completed the process of deciding on the suitable accommodation which they were obliged to secure for the plaintiff. If this process was properly carried out as a matter of public law, then the consequential private law right of the plaintiff was simply a right to the accommodation which the council had decided to be suitable.’

Judges:

Nolan LJ

Citations:

Gazette 27-May-1992, [1993] QB 407, (1992) 24 HLR 474

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Desnousse v London Borough of Newham and others CA 17-May-2006
The occupier had been granted a temporary licence by the authority under the homelessness provisions whilst it made its assessment. The assessment concluded that she had become homeless intentionally, and therefore terminated the licence and set out . .
Cited – Mohamed v Manek and Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea CA 28-Apr-1995
The claimant applied to the Council for accommodation, claiming to be homeless and in priority need. The council housed him in a hotel owned by Mr Manek in Tooting Bec . He had a room, a separate bathroom and lavatory, and shared use of a kitchen. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.77734

Regina v Waveney District Council ex parte Bowers: 25 May 1982

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision that he was not homeless under section 1 of the Act. For 15 months he had been using a night shelter in Lowestoft. It was an unheated dormitory in a derelict building. It was empty and closed between 8:00am and 8:00pm each day. If on any evening he presented himself at the shelter at or after 8:00pm, he was offered a bed, unless it was already full, in which case he was turned away.
Held: The housing authority’s decision that he had accommodation at the shelter was irrational.

Judges:

Stephen Brown J

Citations:

Times 25-May-1982

Statutes:

Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977

Cited by:

Reversed in part – Regina v Waveney City Council, ex parte Bowers CA 25-May-1982
The applicant was an alcoholic and had in 1980 been hit by a motor vehicle and suffered a severe head injury. He sought judicial review of the respondent’s failure to house him.
Held: The appeal was allowed: ‘The question we have to consider . .
Cited – Manchester City Council v Moran and Another; Richards v Ipswich Borough Council CA 17-Apr-2008
The two applicants had occupied a women’s refuge. They appealed against a refusal to consider them as homeless when they acted in such a way as to be evicted from the refuge, saying that the refuge did not constitute ‘accommodation . . which it . .
Cited – Birmingham City Council v Ali and Others; Moran v Manchester City Council HL 1-Jul-2009
Homelessness Status Requires LA Action
The House considered appeals challenging whether local authorities who gave unacceptable housing to the homeless had satisfied their obligations to them as homeless people. What was meant by the phrase ‘accommodation which it would be reasonable for . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.266980

Kelly v Monklands District Council: 1986

A local authority’s housing duties may be owed to a child if that child is living independently of its parents.

Citations:

1986 SLT 169

Cited by:

Cited – Royal Borough of Kingston Upon Thames v Prince and Another CA 2-Dec-1998
The Borough’s tenant had died. His wife and daughter had lived with him, but the mother not for long enough to succeed to his tenancy. The daughter (aged thirteen) claimed to have done so having lived with him for three years.
Held: The 1985 . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Scotland, Housing, Children, Local Government

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.259630

Yumsak v London Borough of Enfield: Admn 2002

The court will not readily interfere with the approach of a housing authority to the question of suitability, although in an appropriate case it plainly will.

Citations:

[2002] EWHC 280 Admin, [2003] HLR 1

Cited by:

Cited – Calgin, Regina (on the Application of) v London Borough of Enfield Admn 29-Jul-2005
The claimant complained that having applied for housing in the borough they had in fact housed him outside the borough.
Held: The authority had a duty to house the applicant so far it was reasonably practicable within its borders. The policy . .
Cited – Nzolameso v City of Westminster SC 2-Apr-2015
The court was asked ‘When is it lawful for a local housing authority to accommodate a homeless person a long way away from the authority’s own area where the homeless person was previously living? ‘ The claimant said that on applying for housing she . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.234545

Thompson v Elmbridge Borough Council: CA 1987

The wife was the secure tenant of the premises, against whom the local authority landlord obtained a possession order on grounds of arrears of rent, not to be enforced on payment of a weekly sum off the arrears in addition to what the order described as ‘the current rent’. The wife defaulted on the terms and left the premises, leaving the husband in occupation. The landlord obtained a warrant for possession against the wife. The husband applied to be added as a defendant in the possession proceedings, so as to be able in the matrimonial proceedings to apply for the transfer of the tenancy to him. The possession order was suspended in these terms: ‘judgment for possession shall not be enforced for 28 days in any event, and for so long thereafter as the defendant punctually pays the arrears in addition to the current rent.’
Held: A tenant holding over under a suspended possession order becomes at best a tolerated trespasser if he then breaches the terms of the suspension. The tenancy terminates automatically and at the moment of breach of the conditions.
Russell LJ said: ‘It is to be observed that on the face of the order it does not purport to terminate the tenancy. The tenancy, in my judgment, plainly continues and is recognised by the order as continuing. The judgment for possession, however, is suspended so long as the current rent is paid in addition to the arrears. If that were not the true interpretation of the order, then plainly the words ‘the current rent’ to which I have adverted, would not appear.’ and
‘In my judgment, once the defendant in proceedings of this kind where there is a suspended order for possession, ceases to comply with the conditions of the order, namely, ‘the punctual payment of the current rent and arrears,’ and there is a breach of the terms of the order, the tenancy, whatever it may be, from that moment comes to an end.’
He then considered Sherrin’s case: ‘What I think is more important, and indeed crucial, is that Sherrin’s case was dealing with an entirely different code of legislation, namely, the Rent Acts, to that with which this case is concerned, namely, the Housing Act 1985. And, in particular, in the instant case, the court has the advantage of the statutory provision, to which I referred earlier, namely section 82(2) which seeks to define the date when a tenancy is to come to an end. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that this court is free to distinguish Sherrin v Brand both on the facts and on the law. Indeed the case is an illustration of how dangerous it can be to rely on judgments delivered where the statutory structure is different from that with which this court is concerned. I repeat section 82(2) provides:
Where the landlord obtains an order for the possession of the dwelling-house, the tenancy ends on the date on which the tenant it to give up possession in pursuance of the order.
I return to the terms of the order, which provide:
judgment for possession shall not be enforced for 28 days in any event, and for so long thereafter as the defendant punctually pays . . .the arrears . . in addition to the current rent.
In my judgment, once the defendant in proceedings of this kind where there is a suspended order for possession, ceases to comply with the conditions of the order, namely, ‘the punctual payment of the current rent and arrears’, and there is a breach of the terms of the order, the tenancy, whatever it may be, from that moment comes to an end.’

Judges:

Lord Justice Russell, Sir Denys Buckley

Citations:

[1987] 1 WLR 1425, (1987) 19 HLR 526

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 82(5)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Explained – Sherrin v Brand CA 1956
The landlord had obtained a possession order against his secure tenant. The order was suspended, but the landlord then failed to enforce the order after the date and when the tenant had failed to comply with the terms of the suspension. The tenant . .

Cited by:

Cited – London Borough of Newham v Hawkins and others CA 22-Apr-2005
The landlord had obtained a possession order, but the tenant continued in occupation as a tolerated trespasser, claiming entitlement as successors in title. Rent arrears had accrued, but even if the tenant had paid thenm the council would have . .
Cited – London Borough of Lambeth and Hyde Southbank Ltd v O’Kane, Helena Housing Ltd CA 28-Jul-2005
In each case the authority had obtained an order for possession of the tenanted properties, but the court had suspended the possession orders. The tenants had therefore now become ‘tolerated trespassers’. They now claimed that they had again become . .
Cited – Richmond v Kensington and Chelsea CA 15-Feb-2006
The borough obtained a possession order of the secure tenancy of a flat occupied by their tenant for nuisance. It was suspended on terms for a certain period. They alleged further breaches shortly before the expiry of the possession order and they . .
Cited – Marshall v Bradford Metropolitan District Council CA 27-Apr-2001
There were three issues; (1) whether it was proper for the judge to have struck out disrepair proceedings when it could be seen that an application to discharge or rescind a suspended possession order would be likely to succeed (2) whether the . .
Cited – Pemberton v Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Southwark CA 13-Apr-2000
A tenant had continued in occupation as a tolerated trespasser after a possession order. She made regular payments but failed to comply with the order setting terms for suspension. She sought damages from the landlord for nuisance for not dealing . .
Cited – Harlow District Council v Hall CA 28-Feb-2006
The defendant had been subject to a possession order in respect of his secure tenancy. He was later adjudged bankrupt. He asserted that the bankruptcy specifically prevented other action to enforce the debt, and the suspended possession order was . .
Cited – Bristol City Council v Hassan and Glastonbury CA 23-May-2006
The council had obtained possession orders for two properties from secure tenants, but the orders were suspended for so long as rent arrears were being discharged. The judges had understood that a date must appear on the possession order.
Cited – White v Knowsley Housing Trust and Another CA 2-May-2007
The tenant was an assured tenant. She fell into arrears of rent and a possession order was made, but suspended on terms. The court considered whether she continued to be an assured tenant, and could assert a right to buy the property as an assured . .
Cited – Knowsley Housing Trust v White; Honeygan-Green v London Borough of Islington; Porter v Shepherds Bush Housing Association HL 10-Dec-2008
The House considered situations where a secure or assured tenancy had been made subject to a suspended possession order and where despite the tenant failing to comply with the conditions, he had been allowed to continue in occupation.
Held: . .
Cited – Secretary of State for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs v Meier and Others SC 1-Dec-2009
The claimant sought a possession order to recover land from trespassers. The court considered whether a possession order was available where not all the land was occupied, and it was feared that the occupiers might simply move onto a different part. . .
Confirmed – Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Southwark SC 23-Jun-2010
The appellant’s brother had been the secure tenant of the respondent Council which had in 1987 obtained an order for possession for rent arrears suspended on condition. The condition had not been complied with, but the brother had continued to live . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.226029

Regina v Croydon London Borough Council, ex parte Graham: CA 1993

The very existence of material gaps in the reasons accompanying a decision may have rendered that decision unlawful.

Judges:

Steyn LJ

Citations:

(1993) 26 HLR 286

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Oxfordshire County Council v GB and Others CA 22-Aug-2001
When an appeal was lodged against the decision of the Special Educational Needs Tribunal, it was wrong for that Tribunal later to expand on its reasons, save in exceptional circumstances. Parental preference was not an overriding consideration, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Local Government, Housing

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.224963

ex parte Carroll: 1988

The applicant for housing was said to have suffered ‘a major and irreversible handicap’ as a result of a childhood injury but who also was in the habit of drinking six or seven pints of beer a day.
Held: The court accepted the submission ‘that the effect of that gloss upon the section is in practice to extend the meaning given to the word ‘vulnerable’ by Waller LJ as if it reads ‘less able to fend for oneself when homeless or in finding and keeping accommodation’.’

Judges:

Webster J

Citations:

[1988] 20 HLR 142

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – ex parte Sangeramano 1985
When consideriung whether an applicant for housing was vulnerable, ‘The vulnerability to be considered is vulnerability loosely in housing terms or in the context of housing.’ . .
Cited – ex parte Banbury 1987
. .

Cited by:

Cited – Regina v London Borough of Camden ex parte Pereira CA 20-May-1998
When considering whether a person was vulnerable so as to be treated more favourably in applying for rehousing: ‘The Council should consider such application afresh applying the statutory criterion: The Ortiz test should not be used; the dictum of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.200290

Campden Hill Towers v Gardner: CA 1977

A flat was let by an underlease for seven years. The lease excluded the outside walls of the flat, but the tenant covenanted to pay for repairs to the building through a service charge. The tenant refused to pay the service charge which included the costs of repairing a neighbouring block also (included within the definition of the premises by the underlease).
Held: The court will ask whether, in the ordinary use of words, the part of the house at issue would be regarded as structure and exterior. In this case that included the outside walls, the outside of interior party walls, the outer sides of the horizontal divisions between the flat and the flats above and below, and the structural framework and beams directly supporting the floors, ceilings and walls. The landlord could only recover for those items which it was obliged to repair, namely the external parts of the flat within the underlease, and could not recover the cost of repairing those parts it was obliged to repair in any event under the section.
Megaw LJ said: ‘[a]nything which, in the ordinary use of words, would be regarded as a part of the structure, or of the exterior, of the particular ‘dwelling house’ [sc the third floor flat], regarded as a separate part of the building, would be within the scope of paragraph (a).’, although ‘other parts of the outside walls and other parts of the structure of the block’ are ‘not ‘of the dwelling house’, and the paragraph expressly and deliberately uses the limiting words, as defined in the section itself, relating the paragraph to ‘the dwelling house”.

Judges:

Megaw LJ

Citations:

[1977] 2 WLR 159, [1977] QB 823

Statutes:

Housing Act 1961 32(1)(a) 32(1)(b)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Applied – Irvine v Moran 1991
The tenant took a lease for under 7 years, accepting repairing and other obligations. The question was how those obligations fitted the landlord’s implied obligations under section 32, and the effect of the section on decorating covenants. The . .
Cited – Wycombe Health Authority v Barnett CA 1982
A student tenant left the property for a few days. Whilst she was away, the pipes froze, cracked, and then burst. The landlord complained that he had neither turned off the water, nor lagged the pipes.
Held: The tenant had no such obligation . .
Cited – Edwards v Kumarasamy SC 13-Jul-2016
The claimant sub-tenant had been injured entering the block of apartments. He said that the freeholder was responsible despite no report of the disrepair having been made. The lease excused the landlord from unnotified liability. The parties . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.187656

Morrow v Nadeem: 1981

In a notice served pursuant to s25 of the 1954 Act the landlord was described as the individual who was effectively the sole shareholder and director of landlord company, rather than the landlord company itself.
Held: The landlord’s notice was invalid. It was a form preescribed by the rules requiring the correct identification of the landlord. The court considered also the effect of the omission to inform a proposed lessee about what would happen on a reference to a rent assessment committee on the substitution of council tax for poll tax. It would be a source of confusion rather than an evident error.

Judges:

Nicholls LJ

Citations:

[1986] 1 WLR 1381

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 25, Landlord & Tenant (Notices) Regulations 1957 (SI 1957/1157),

Cited by:

Cited – Andrews and Another v Brewer and Another CA 17-Feb-1997
Tenants challenged an order for possession, saying the form of notice was defective. The date specified in the notice was clearly a clerical error. It provided that the tenancy would commence on 29 May 1993 and end on 28 May 1993, on the face of it, . .
Cited – Pearson v Alyo CA 1990
Effect of mistake in notice given under the Act. . .
Cited – Lay and others v Ackerman and Another CA 4-Mar-2004
Notices had been served by tenants under the Acts. The properties were on a large estate where the freeholds had been divided and assigned to different bodies, and there were inconsistencies in identifying the landlords. The landlords served a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.187736

Morris v London Borough of Newham: Admn 2002

The claimant complained that the defendant authority had failed to provide her and her family with suitable accommodation pursuant to its duty under section 193. Breach of duty was conceded. The relief sought by the claimant included damages for breach of Article 8.
Held: ‘Absent special circumstances which interfere with private or family life, a homeless person cannot rely upon Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in conjunction with Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 in order to found a damages claim for failure to provide accommodation’. Although the defendant’s breach of duty had compelled the claimant and her family to live in ‘grossly overcrowded and unsatisfactory accommodation’ for a period of 29 weeks, this did not infringe Article 8.

Judges:

Jackson J

Citations:

[2002] EWHC 1262 Admin

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 193, European Convention on Human Rights 8

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Anufrijeva and Another v London Borough of Southwark CA 16-Oct-2003
The various claimants sought damages for established breaches of their human rights involving breaches of statutory duty by way of maladministration. Does the state have a duty to provide support so as to avoid a threat to the family life of the . .
Cited – Regina (Bernard and Another) v Enfield Borough Council Admn 25-Oct-2002
The claimants were husband and wife. They had six children. The wife was severely disabled and confined to a wheelchair. The defendant Council provided the family with a small house but in breach, as they ultimately accepted, of section 21(1) (a) of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Human Rights

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.186968

Heslop v Burns: CA 1974

The defendants had lived in a house rent free for a long period. After the owner died, his executors sought possession saying the defendants were mere licencees. The defendants claimed a tenancy at will, and that the right now asserted was statute barred.
Held: There was no agreement, and no evidence of an intention to create a tenancy. The act of allowing them into possession was merely an act of bounty, and a licence only was created. Courts should nowadays be less inclined to find a tenancy at will.
The possession of a licensee can never be adverse.

Judges:

Stamp, Roskill, and Scarman LJJ

Citations:

[1974] 1 WLR 1241, [1974] 3 All ER 406

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Approved – Facchini v Bryson 1952
The court held that in all the reported cases where it was held that an agreement was a licence rather than a tenancy: ‘In all the cases where an occupier has been held to be a licensee there has been something in the circumstances, such as a family . .

Cited by:

Cited – Goomti Ramnarace v Harrypersad Lutchman PC 21-May-2001
(Trinidad and Tobago) The defendant had gone into possession of land by consent, and many years later declined to leave. The claimant said the period of her adverse possession was insufficient but she claimed a tenancy. The claimant asserted that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.183130

Simmons v Pizzey: HL 1979

As to houses in multiple occupation, ‘both the expression ‘household’ and membership of it is a question of fact and degree, there being no certain indicia the presence or absence of any of which is by itself conclusive’. After reference to the the Oxford Dictionary and the Words and Phrases definitions of the term ‘household’, he concluded: ‘I do not find any of these references particularly helpful except to make clear to me that I would have supposed in any case that both the expression ‘household’ and membership of it is a question of fact and degree, there being no certain indicia the presence or absence of any of which is by itself conclusive.’

Judges:

Lord Hailsham

Citations:

[1979] AC 37

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Regina (on the application of Hossack) v Kettering Borough Council and another CA 25-Jun-2002
A neighbour challenged the use of houses as temporary accommodation for homeless youths. The properties housed up to six youths, who, the council claimed lived together as a single unit, and therefore came within Class C3.
Held: Nothing in the . .
Cited – Hossack, Regina (on the Application of) v Kettering Borough Council and Another Admn 31-Jul-2003
The claimant lived near houses used for the occupation by troubled youths. She complained that the occupation was in breach of planning control.
Held: The authority had properly considered the issues it was required to consider and the . .
Applied – London Borough of Hackney v Ezedinma QBD 1981
The house had rooms let for students in the basement and on the ground, first and second floors, with kitchens on the top three floors to serve the rooms. Five rooms had been let when the authority issued a notice under section 19(1) to restrict the . .
Cited – Regina v Birmingham Juvenile Court Ex Parte S 1984
The court considered what was meant by the term ‘household’: ‘at the heart of the concept it is the persons who comprise the household . . and not the place where the household is located as a matter of residence.’ . .
Cited – Richards v The Legal Services Commission Admn 19-Jul-2006
The claimant challenged the inclusion in her gross income for calculation of her eligibility to legal aid of maintenance payments received for her children who were both at University. She said that since she had responsibility for their . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.182286

Regina v London Borough of Hammersmith, ex parte P: QBD 1989

The applicants were members of six homeless families who had occupied accommodation in Northern Ireland. The council concluded that members of each household except one had been guilty of criminal and anti-social behaviour, as a result of which the IRA had threatened that they would all be killed unless they left Northern Ireland within 72 hours. The council concluded that all the applicants were homeless intentionally, primarily on the ground that they had ceased to occupy their homes in consequence of deliberate acts, namely their continued misbehaviour after warnings by or on behalf of neighbours.
Held: The council’s decision was confirmed. The question was one of causation; the section makes no mention of foreseeability but where the immediate cause of the departure (namely the IRA threat) was foreseeable, then it was easier to say that the bad behaviour was the cause of the homelessness and it was less easy to say that the homelessness was caused by a new intervening act. The court rejected the submission that it should, as a matter of public policy, refrain from making the applicants responsible for the acts of vigilantes.

Judges:

Schiemann J

Citations:

(1989) 22 HLR 21

Citing:

Approved – Devenport v Salford City Council CA 1983
A possession order was made because of the misconduct of the tenants and their children. The council made a finding of intentional homelessness, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
Held: For the purposes of the homelessness legislation, . .

Cited by:

Cited – Regina v London Borough of Hounslow ex parte R Admn 19-Feb-1997
The Applicant was 65 years old, with a history of criminal offences including serious sexual assaults on children. On release from prison, he presented himself as homeless. After his imprisonment, he had realised that he would be unable to keep up . .
Cited – Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest SC 20-May-2015
‘The question in this case is whether the appellant falls within the scope of section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 as amended, which applies, by virtue of subsection (1), where the local housing authority are satisfied that ‘an applicant is homeless, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.181073

Regina (Khan) v Oxfordshire County Council: QBD 4 Oct 2002

The applicant sought review of the authority’s decision not to offer her housing. She was subject to immigration control. She had been the victim of domestic violence and of abduction.
Held: The authority could provide assistance under either Act, unless prohibited by statute. The limitation in the 1948 statute did apply to restrict the authority’s decision under the 2000 Act. Nevertheless, in the particular circumstances the decision not to provide assistance was unreasonable, and review was granted.

Judges:

Moses J

Citations:

Gazette 31-Oct-2002, Times 04-Nov-2002

Statutes:

Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 115, National Assistance Act 1948 21(1)(a)

Immigration, Housing, Local Government

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.177845

Clarke v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and Another: QBD 9 Oct 2001

When assessing whether a gypsy should be granted planning permission to park his caravan on a site, the authority could not take into account the fact that he had earlier refused an offer of permanent housing, where acceptance of that offer would have been contrary to the applicant’s traditional way of life. The appellant and his family were Romanies who lead a nomadic way of life. The Inspector should consider whether: he lived in a caravan; he was a Romany; he was nomadic for a substantial part of the year; the itinerancy was linked to his livelihood; and he had an aversion to conventional housing.

Judges:

Burton J

Citations:

Times 09-Nov-2001

Statutes:

European Convention on Human Rights Art 8 and 14, Town and Country Planning Act 1990

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Discrimination, Human Rights, Housing, Planning

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.166861

Goringe v Twinsectra Ltd: 20 Apr 1994

Section 34(1)(b) of the 1977 Act should to be read subject to a limitation that it applies that a new tenancy must be a tenancy of the same premises as the old.

Citations:

(1994) LAGB June 11

Statutes:

Rent Act 1977 34(1)(b)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Approved – Arogol Company Ltd v Rajah CA 21-Mar-2001
Defendant’s appeal from an order granting the claimant a possession order in respect of a ground floor flat. The basic question in the proceedings was whether the defendant had a tenancy protected under the Rent Act 1977.
Held: The appeal . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.614931

Regina v Hackney London Borough Council, Ex parte Ajayi: 1997

Ms A had left settled accommodation in Nigeria to come to the United Kingdom, where she lived in overcrowded short-term accommodation. She was given notice to leave after she became pregnant. She challenged the authority’s decision that she had become homeless intentionally as a result of having left the accommodation in Nigeria, and argued that the true cause of her homelessness was her pregnancy.
Held: Dyson J stated that the fundamental question was whether there was a continuous chain of causation between the loss of the last settled accommodation and the present state of homelessness, adding: 2In some cases, the cause closest in point of time will be regarded as the effective cause. A good example of this might well be the case discussed in Ex p Fahia (1996) 29 HLR 94, 102, of the premises occupied on a short letting which are burnt down, thereby rendering the occupant homeless.’ In the particular circumstances of the case, the authority had been entitled, in the judge’s view, to decide that the effective cause of the applicant’s homelessness was her action in leaving Nigeria.

Judges:

Dyson J

Citations:

(1997) 30 HLR 473

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest SC 20-May-2015
‘The question in this case is whether the appellant falls within the scope of section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 as amended, which applies, by virtue of subsection (1), where the local housing authority are satisfied that ‘an applicant is homeless, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.566160

Regina v London Borough of Brent, ex parte Blatt: QBD 1991

The applicant was the respondent’s secure tenant. The respondent decided to change its tenancy agreement, by including a list of items of repair for which it would be responsible and a procedure by which it could vary the terms of the agreement. In a further clause the respondent agreed that no variation might be made to the agreement which either reduced the respondent’s repair obligations or made them more difficult to enforce or which reduced the tenant’s security of tenure under the agreement. The respondent later decided to remove the list of its repair obligations from the agreement, to remove the contractual security of tenure provisions and to replace them with the grounds provided by the Act and to remove the variation clause, including clause 8(b). The tenant sought judicial review.
Held: Section 102 of the Act gave power to the respondent to vary the terms of a secure tenancy; clause 8(b) was itself a term of the tenancy and so could itself be varied by deletion pursuant to statutory procedure. It was a matter of construction of the statute.
Leggatt LJ: ‘Mr. Watkinson argues that it was open to the Council to agree not to exercise the power given by section 103. He says that that is what the council did in 1981 as a result of negotiations with the tenants’ associations. He submits that the effect of including clause 8(b) in the old Agreement was to preclude the Council thereafter from varying the standard form by reducing the security of tenure of tenants under the Agreement. The respondents, therefore, cannot now reduce the quality of the security, as they have purported to do in the fashion complained of under the applicant’s first argument. Attractive though the argument is, especially since that is what the average tenant might expect the position to be, it cannot, in my judgment, prevail over the language of the statute. Section 102 gives power to the Council to vary the terms of a secure tenancy by Agreement with the tenants, or alternatively, in accordance with section 103 by giving notice of variation of a periodic tenancy following compliance with the statutory arrangements for a preliminary notice. In that way the respondents can in effect vary the terms of the tenancy unilaterally. Clause 8(b) is itself a term of the tenancy, so it can be varied by deletion. It does not, after all, contain or constitute a promise that it will not itself be revoked. In truth, however, as I have earlier indicated, this represents no substantial diminution in the tenants’ rights. Their basic protection is afforded by the statute, and such embellishments of that protection as were brought about by contract, would, if enforceable, only have been of value in the event that the statutory protection was itself reduced in future . . .’
Owen J: ‘. . . I would only add that whilst not finding that it is possible I am far from convinced that it would be impossible for a local authority to contract out the powers given by sections 102 and 103 of the Housing Act 1985. However, if such a contracting out is possible, then it would need to be both clear and explicit. I am satisfied there was no such contracting out here. Once that conclusion is accepted, then the changes intended to be made by the proposed Tenancy Agreement do not provide a sufficient Basis for the application made here. . .’

Judges:

Leggatt LJ, Owen J

Citations:

(1991) 24 HLR 319

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – North British Housing Association Ltd v Sheridan CA 29-Jul-1999
The respondent appealed against an order for possession made on the grounds that he had been convicted of breach of an order under the 1997 Act in harassing his daughter who lived nearby the premises. The tenant argued that the agreement had . .
Cited – Kilby v Basildon District Council Admn 26-Jul-2006
Tenants complained that the authority landlord had purported to vary a clause in his secure tenancy agreement which gave certain management rights to tenants.
Held: The powers to let on secure tenancies were governed by statute. The clause . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Local Government

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.221434

Remmington v Larchin: CA 1921

The word ‘person’ in the Act, was interpreted to mean ‘landlord’. When dealing with a penal section, if there are two reasonably possible meanings, the court should adopt the more lenient one: ‘where an equivocal word or ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable doubt of its meaning which the canons of interpretation fail to solve, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the subject and against the legislature which has failed to explain itself’

Judges:

Scrutton LJ

Citations:

[1921] 3 KB 404

Statutes:

Rent Act 1920 8(1)

Cited by:

Cited – Farrell v Alexander HL 24-Jun-1976
The House considered the construction of a consolidation Act.
Held: It is ordinarily both unnecessary and undesirable to construe a consolidation Act by reference to statutory antecedents, but it is permissible to do so in a case where the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Crime

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.539432

Fox v Dalby: 1874

A militia sergeant occupied a house built expressly for accommodation of persons looking after the stores and which had been assigned to him by his commanding officer.
Held: The sergeant did not occupy the house as a tenant. Brett J said: ‘where a person situate like the respondent is permitted . . to occupy premises by way of reward for his services, or as part payment, the occupation is that of tenant; but that, where he is required to occupy them for the better performance of his duties, though his residence there is not necessary for that purpose, or, if his residence there be necessary for the performance of his duties though not specifically required, his occupation is not that of tenant’

Judges:

Brett J, Lord Coleridge CJ

Citations:

(1874) LR 10 CP 285

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Wragg and others v Surrey County Council CA 1-Feb-2008
The Council appealed against declarations given that the respondent tenants (wildlife rangers) were entitled to purchase the freehold of their homes under right-to-buy. The Council said that the tenancies were occupied in connection with their . .
Applied – Glasgow Corporation v Johnstone and Others (orse Johnstons) HL 1965
A house lived in by a church officer was occupied for rating purposes by the church’s congregational board which employed him, and so was not liable for full rates. Lord Hodson said: ‘The distinction is usually shortly stated in this way: if the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.536729

Shreeve v Hallam: CA 1950

Sir Raymond Evershed MR considered what a judge had to look at when making a possession order: ‘In such matters the judge was not to consider whether it was reasonable for the landlord to claim possession, but whether it was reasonable to make an order.’

Judges:

Sir Raymond Evershed MR

Citations:

[1950] WN 140

Cited by:

Cited – Whitehouse v Lee CA 14-May-2009
The tenant appealed against an order requiring her to give up possession of her flat, held under the 1977 Act, saying that the court should not have found it reasonable to make an order after finding alternative accommodation suitable.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.344010

Regina v Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Garlick and similar: HL 19 Mar 1993

No homelessness priority could be established by means of having a child applying for housing, rather than his or her parent. An application by a person suffering mental disability who would also be dependent upon others was also rejected. In each case the true application was by the parent or carer. The Act is concerned with the provision of housing, not social services’ care. A parent or carer would be given priority under the later section by virtue of that care. The authorities’ duties under Part III of the 1985 Act were not owed to dependent children.
Lord Griffiths said: ‘Dependent children are not amongst those classified as in priority need.
Dependent children depend upon their parents or those looking after them to decide where they are to live and the offer of accommodation can only sensibly be made to those in charge of them.
Such a child is in my opinion owed no duty under this Act for it is the intention of the Act that the child’s accommodation will be provided by the parents or those looking after him and it is to those people that the offer of accommodation must be made.
If a family has lost its right to priority treatment through intentional homelessness the parent cannot achieve the same result through the back door by an application in the name of a dependent child.’

Judges:

Lord Griffiths

Citations:

Gazette 07-Jul-1993, Independent 19-Mar-1993, [1993] 2 All ER 65, [1993] 2 WLR 609, [1993] AC 509

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 59(1) 59(1)(c)

Cited by:

Cited – Regina v London Borough of Barnet ex parte G; Regina v London Borough of Lambeth ex parte W; Regina v London Borough of Lambeth ex parte A HL 23-Oct-2003
The applicants sought to oblige the local authority, in compliance with its duties under the 1989 Act, to provide a home for children, and where necessary an accompanying adult.
Held: There were four hurdles for the applicants to cross. They . .
Cited – Royal Borough of Kingston Upon Thames v Prince and Another CA 2-Dec-1998
The Borough’s tenant had died. His wife and daughter had lived with him, but the mother not for long enough to succeed to his tenancy. The daughter (aged thirteen) claimed to have done so having lived with him for three years.
Held: The 1985 . .
Cited – Hotak and Others v London Borough of Southwark and Another SC 13-May-2015
The court was asked as to the duty of local housing authorities towards homeless people who claim to be ‘vulnerable’, and therefore to have ‘a priority need’ for the provision of housing accommodation under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. Those . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Children

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.87493

Warwick District Council v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and Ch (HB) (Housing and Council Tax Benefits – Liability, Commerciality and Contrivance): UTAA 28 Jul 2020

Housing benefit – Commerciality – Regulation 9(1)(a) and (2) – ‘Trump-card facts’ and the ‘notional commercial landlord’. Housing benefit – Commerciality – Regulation 9(1)(a) and (2)-Whether a tenancy that is on a commercial basis can subsequently become non-commercial, and vice versa. Housing benefit – Commerciality – Regulation 9(1)(a) and (2) – Whether subsequent conduct by the parties to a tenancy that does not change the terms of what has been agreed between them (and in particular forbearance by a landlord in the enforcement of rent arrears) can have the effect that a previously commercial tenancy becomes uncommercial

Citations:

[2020] UKUT 240 (AAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Benefits, Housing

Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.656572

Portsmouth City Council v Bryant: CA 2000

It may be unreasonable to impose a possession order against a person in respect of a failing over which they have no control.
Simon Brown LJ said, having reviewed the existing authorities: ‘Those authorities clearly hold that no personal fault on the tenant’s part is required to bring a case within ground 2, although this consideration will come into play when deciding whether or not to make a possession order and, if so, whether to suspend it.’
Sedley LJ said: ‘I agree with my Lord that the true meaning of ground 2 in schedule 2 to the 1985 Housing Act (as amended) is its natural and ordinary meaning. A tenant may face possession proceedings not only if he or she has offended in one of the ways specified, but if someone who lives with or visits the tenant has done so. The rigours of this provision, which in its second limb may be independent of any fault on the tenant’s part, is mitigated by the requirement of section 84(2) that no possession order may be made unless the court considers it reasonable to do so. It may very well be unreasonable to make even a suspended order against somebody who will be powerless to rectify the situation and it will almost certainly be unreasonable to make an outright order against such a person. There are, after all, other legal expedients, not least under the Prevention from Harassment Act 1997, by which those guilty of anti-social conduct can be directly punished or restrained.’

Judges:

Sedley LJ, Simon Brown LJ

Citations:

(2000) 32 HLR 906

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 Sch2G2

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Knowsley Housing Trust v McMullen CA 9-May-2006
The defendant tenant appealed an order for possession of her flat. She was disabled and living with her 19 year old son. He had been made subject to an anti-social behaviour order. The court had found that she could have required him to leave. The . .
Cited – Royal Borough of Greenwich v Tuitt CA 25-Nov-2014
The Defendant appealed against the order for possession made against her in respect of her secure tenancy of a flat, made on the grounds that her son, now 18 years old and living with her and her partner, had committed repeated acts of nuisance and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.242873

Newcastle City Council v Morrison: CA 2000

The court reviewed the principles applicable when asking whether it is reasonable to make an order for possession against a tenant on grounds of nuisance: a) When considering reasonableness, the Judge must take account of all relevant circumstances ‘in a broad common sense way’; b) The interests of neighbours and the obligations of the landlord to those neighbours are relevant in nuisance cases. This has been said to be established by ‘a long line of authority’ as ‘a very pertinent factor’ in Romano’s case at paragraph 19, and it is now specifically enshrined in statute; c) The fact that nuisance has ceased does not ipso facto prevent even an outright order for possession being made; d) Although the tenant’s conduct is a relevant factor, the fact that she has done her best to control the person responsible for the nuisance does not prevent the making of order for possession; e) The fact that there may be an alternative remedy (in that case an injunction) available to the landlord does not of itself justify refusing an order for possession; and f) An appellate court will only interfere with a decision on reasonableness where the Judge has taken an irrelevant factor into account, ignored a relevant factor, or reached a perverse conclusion.

Citations:

(2000) 32 HLR 891

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Explained – Knowsley Housing Trust v McMullen CA 9-May-2006
The defendant tenant appealed an order for possession of her flat. She was disabled and living with her 19 year old son. He had been made subject to an anti-social behaviour order. The court had found that she could have required him to leave. The . .
Cited – Royal Borough of Greenwich v Tuitt CA 25-Nov-2014
The Defendant appealed against the order for possession made against her in respect of her secure tenancy of a flat, made on the grounds that her son, now 18 years old and living with her and her partner, had committed repeated acts of nuisance and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.242881

C v London Borough of Lewisham: CA 4 Jul 2003

The applicant lost her flat and had been refused emergency housing for herself and her child. She had a very troubled history with severe emotional trauma, and was disorganised. He application was refused on the ground of her having become intentionally homeless. The authority refused to extend her time to request a review. She now appealed a similar refusal of the court.
Held: In so far as the local housing authority was exercising an extra-statutory discretion, it was fully entitled to take it no further. The authority gave full reasons why the department was not prepared to accede to the request. This decision is even further beyond challenge by judicial review than a decision taken under s. 202(3).

Judges:

Lord Justice Ward, Lord Justice Waller And Lord Justice Dyson

Citations:

[2003] EWCA Civ 927, Times 12-Aug-2003, Gazette 11-Sep-2003

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 202 204

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina v London Borough of Tower Hamlets, ex parte Nadia Saber QBD 1991
It is not uncommon, after a decision has been reached that an applicant for housing under Part III of the Act became intentionally homeless, for a request to be made to reconsider the decision in the light of additional material or argument. Such a . .
Cited – Regina v Brighton and Hove Council ex parte Nacion (2) CA 1-Feb-1999
The applicant sought review of a decision not to offer him temporary accomodation pending an appeal following a review of a refusal to offer him emergency accomodation. He had become homeless as a result of imprisonment.
Held: The section gave . .
Cited – Regina v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, ex parte Chetnik Developments Limited HL 1988
The House was asked whether a rating authority could refuse to repay rates which had been paid by mistake.
Held: ‘Parliament must have intended the rating authorities to act in the same high principled way expected by the court of its own . .
Cited – Regina v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Guinness Plc CA 1989
The court asked about the standard of decision making at which a court could intervene: ‘Irrationality, at least in the sense of failing to take account of relevant factors or taking account of irrelevant factors, is a difficult concept in the . .
Cited – Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment and Others HL 11-May-1995
Three companies had applied for permission to build retail food superstores in Witney. The Inspector had recommended Tesco’s proposal, but the respondent rejected it. Tesco’s had offered to provide by way of a section 106 agreement full funding for . .
Cited – Regina v Lord Mayor and Citizens of City of Westminster ex parte Ellioua CA 2-Jul-1998
The applicant sought to be rehoused. On review it was decided that she was intentionally homeless. She asked the authority to review that decision (a re-review). The authority said it had no power so to do. She had a right to appeal on a point of . .
Cited – Demetri v Westminster City Council CA 12-Nov-1999
A right of appeal against a Housing authority’s decision lay only against the original decision itself after a review, and the notice of appeal was to be given with 21 days of the original review. A council in its discretion can decide to reconsider . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Local Government

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.184258

Commissioner of Valuation for Northern Ireland v Fermanagh Protestant Board of Education: CA 1965

Citations:

[1960] 24 HLR 605

Jurisdiction:

Northern Ireland

Cited by:

Cited – Hughes and Hughes v Greenwich London Borough Council CA 1992
The applicant was headmaster of a boarding school. The contract of employment did not require him to occupy the house, but a new house was built for the headmaster and he moved into it. It was not necessary for him to occupy the house for his . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.183484

Laimond Properties Ltd v Raeuchle: CA 24 Jan 2000

The landlord acquired the freehold of a small block of flats in 1993. The defendant had been a tenant protected under the Rent Acts since 1976. He also made use of a neighburing empty room without paying rent. His rent was nearly all paid through housing benenefits, but a shortfall grew, and possession proceedings were begun, with a claim for damages for trespass in the adjoining room. The tenant resisted possession proceedings alleging a failure to repair. He now appealed the dismissal of his counterclaim and the grant of possession.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The grant of a suspension as requested by the tenant was a matter of the judge’s discretion which could be interfered with only if the decision was flawed. S103(3) did not allow the imposition of payment obligation other than those for rent. The judge had not properly considered whether the sum of andpound;10.00 offered by the tenant would be likely to succeed in discharging the arrears of andpound;511.00, but had instead considered extraneous factors for the sum claimed for trespass. The judge should also have restricted his consideration to the matters pleaded.

Judges:

Sir Richard Scott V-C, Chadwick LJ

Citations:

[2000] EGI

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

See Also – Laimond Properties Limited v Al-Shakarchi CA 10-Feb-1998
If ‘suitable alternative accommodation’ was offered in exchange for a protected tenancy, the court need look only for some security for the tenant, not that he should receive equal protection. Where the landlord persuades the Rent Act protected . .
Application for leave – Laimond Properties Limited and Christina Raeuchle CA 18-Aug-1999
Application for leave to appeal granted. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.235017

Regina v Lambeth London Borough Council ex parte Eckpo-Wedderman: 1998

The court considered the matters to be taken into account by a local authority when setting its housing policy: ‘I do not believe that a local housing authority, considering (as it is right that it should) whether to meet a particular and perhaps unusual need by acquiring property on the open market, is obliged to disregard the cost of doing so.’

Judges:

Laws J

Citations:

[1998] 31 HLR 498

Cited by:

Cited – Calgin, Regina (on the Application of) v London Borough of Enfield Admn 29-Jul-2005
The claimant complained that having applied for housing in the borough they had in fact housed him outside the borough.
Held: The authority had a duty to house the applicant so far it was reasonably practicable within its borders. The policy . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Local Government

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.234544

Westminster Borough Council v Basson: CA 1990

The council sought possession of the premises. The defendant had been an unlawful occupier. He said that in the course of the proceedings, the Council had made reference to a tenancy and to the payment of rent and had issued a rent book.
Held: The acts during possession proceedings were not inconsistent with the council’s assertions, and no tenancy had been created, only a licence.

Citations:

(1990) 23 HLR 225

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – London Borough of Lambeth and Hyde Southbank Ltd v O’Kane, Helena Housing Ltd CA 28-Jul-2005
In each case the authority had obtained an order for possession of the tenanted properties, but the court had suspended the possession orders. The tenants had therefore now become ‘tolerated trespassers’. They now claimed that they had again become . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 14 May 2022; Ref: scu.231654

Lloyd v Sadler: CA 1978

One of two joint tenants under a tenancy protected under the Act, had left the property to get married and did not intend to return. The remaining tenant stayed until the end of the tenancy. The landlord claimed possession, arguing that the remaining tenant was not a statutory tenant protected by the statute because she was not ‘the tenant’.
Held: Megaw LJ said that whilst it was a ‘remarkable fact’ that ‘the Rent Acts throughout their long history have never made any relevant express provision relating to joint tenants or joint tenancies’, ‘the ordinary law as to joint tenancy does not have to be, and ought not to be, applied in all its strictness . . it is permissible for the court to hold, if so to do makes better sense of the relevant statutory provision in its particular context, that one of those persons, by himself, may for certain purposes be treated as being ‘the tenant’.’

Judges:

Megaw LJ

Citations:

[1978] 1 QB 774

Statutes:

Rent Act 1968 3(1)(a)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Secretarial and Nominee Co Ltd v Thomas and others CA 29-Jul-2005
The court was asked about transitional arrangements for Rent Act tenants after the 1988 Act: ‘If A, a Rent Act tenant, takes a new tenancy agreement after the commencement of the 1988 Act jointly with B, does B thereafter partake in the ongoing . .
Cited – Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council v Hickin CA 27-Jul-2010
The claimant sought to succeed to a secure tenancy. She had lived with her mother, a joint tenant, but who had died before her father who had not lived at the house for many years and who had now died. The council said that the tenancy had become . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.230018

Regina v Gravesham Borough Council ex parte Winchester: 1986

The court considered the nature of the assessment required of a housing auithority when application was made by a person claiming to be homeless. Simon Brown J said: ‘The duty to make necessary inquiries is not a duty to make all inquiries in fact necessary before the truth can be ascertained. A council which makes numerous inquiries can in my judgment only be attacked for failing to making one more if it failed to make an inquiry which no reasonable council could have failed to regard as necessary.’

Judges:

Simon Brown J

Citations:

(1986) 18 HLR 207

Statutes:

Housing Act 1986

Citing:

Cited – Regina v Thurrock Borough Council ex parte Williams QBD 1981
The burden when determining intentional homelessness is upon the local authority to be satisfied that the applicant became homeless intentionally before it can reach a conclusion that he was so homeless; if its inquiries lead to doubt or . .

Cited by:

Cited – Regina v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ex p Bayani 1990
The court set out authoritative guidance as to the scope of a reviewing court’s power to interfere on the ground of the insufficiency of inquiry by a local authority to whom a homelessness application had been made. Neill LJ said: ‘(1) The duty to . .
Cited – Cramp v Hastings Borough Council CA 29-Jul-2005
Cases challenged successful appeals by applicants for housing for homelessness, where a county court had ordered a second review of the application. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.229850

Cheryl Investments v Saldanha: CA 1978

Protection was sought under the 1954 Act for premises where the relevant occupation was partly residential and partly for the purposes of a business.
Held: The Act will apply so long as the business activity is a significant purpose of occupation. It must be more than incidental. The business occupation must exist both at the time when the contractual tenancy comes to an end and the date of service of the notice of determination of the tenancy: ‘If the tenant continues the ‘business occupation’ (if it may be called that) thereafter, no further difficulty arises. What is the situation, however, if between the end of the contractual tenancy and the service of notice of determination by the landlord the business occupation ceases? Section 25(1) provides that the landlord ‘may terminate a tenancy to which this Part of this Act applies by a notice given to the tenant in the prescribed form specifying the date at which the tenancy is to come to an end…’ If at the time the notice is served the business occupation has ceased, there is no ‘tenancy to which this Part of this Act applies,’ and nothing on which a section 25 notice by the landlord can bite. It seems therefore that the business occupation must exist both at the time, the contractual tenancy comes to an end and at the date of service of the notice of determination. It is necessary to point out, however, that in neither of the two cases with which we are concerned was there any change of purpose between the term date and the service of notice of determination. In each case the question is, was there or was there not a section 23(1) business occupation at the time the contractual tenancy ended?’
Lord Denning MR: ‘There was much discussion before us as to the meaning of the Business Tenancy Act (I use those words because I think ‘Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, Part II’ is a little confusing), especially the word ‘purposes’ in section 23(1); and the time or times at which those ‘purposes’ had to exist; and the effect of a change by the tenant in the use to which he put the property. Could he take himself in or out of the Act at his option? I found all these matters so confusing that I do not propose to attempt a solution today. I am only going to take four simple illustrations to show how the statute works; for they will suffice for our present cases.
First, take the case where a professional man is the tenant of two premises: one his office where he works; the other his flat, conveniently near, where he has his home. He has then a ‘business tenancy’ of his office; and a ‘regulated tenancy’ of his home. This remains the situation even though he takes papers home and works on them at evenings or weekends and occasionally sees a client at home. He cannot in such a case be said to be occupying his flat ‘for the purposes of’ his profession. He is occupying it for the purpose of his home, even though he incidentally does some work there: see Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 155 per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest.
Second, take the case where a professional man takes a tenancy of one house for the very purpose of carrying on his profession in one room and of residing in the rest of the house with his family, like the doctor who has a consulting room in his house. He has not then a ‘regulated tenancy’ at all. His tenancy is a ‘business tenancy’ and nothing else. He is clearly occupying part of the house ‘for the purposes of’ his profession, as one purpose; and the other part for the purpose of his dwelling as another purpose. Each purpose is significant. Neither is merely incidental to the other.
Third, suppose now that the first man decides to give up his office and to do all his work from his home, there being nothing in the tenancy of his home to prevent him doing it. In that case he becomes in the same position as the second man. He ceases to have a ‘regulated tenancy’ of his home. He has only a ‘business tenancy’ of it.
Fourth, suppose now that the second man decides to give up his office at home and to take a tenancy of an office elsewhere so as to carry on his profession elsewhere. He then has a ‘business tenancy’ of his new premises. But he does not get a ‘regulated tenancy’ of his original home, even though he occupies it now only as his home, because it was never let to him as a separate dwelling, unless the landlord agrees to the change.’
Geoffrey Lane LJ discussed the ddifference between premises occupied for carrying on a business and premises occupied for the purpose of a business: ‘It is obviously a very fine distinction, but the words in section 23 seem to have been used in an attempt to make it absolutely clear that activities on the premises which are merely incidental to residential occupation do not bring the premises within the section although they may properly be described as using them for carrying on a trade or business. The businessman, for example, who takes work home in the evening which he does in a study set aside for the purpose may very well be using the premises partly for carrying on thereat a business, but he could scarcely be said to be occupying the premises for the purposes of a business, any more than the person who watches the television regularly every evening can be said to be occupying his house for the purpose of watching television. It is only if the activity is part of the reason for, part of his aim and object in occupying the house that the section will apply. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest expressed the concept clearly when dealing with the meaning of the words of section 5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 in Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132: ‘It seems to me, therefore, that the words ‘premises . . used for the purpose of smoking cannabis’ are not happily chosen if they were intended to denote premises in which at any time cannabis is smoked. In my opinion, the words ‘premises used for any such purpose . . ‘ denote a purpose which is other than quite incidental or casual or fortuitous; they denote a purpose which is or has become either a significant one or a recognised one though certainly not necessarily an only one.’
As is so often the case in matters of this kind it will in the end come down to a question of degree, and borderline cases will produce their usual difficulties.’

Judges:

Geoffrey Lane LJ, Lord Denning MR, Eveleigh LJ

Citations:

[1978] 1 WLR 1329

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Esselte Ab and British Sugar Plc v Pearl Assurance Plc CA 8-Nov-1996
The tenant was no longer in occupation of the demised premises when he served a s27 notice.
Held: A business tenancy ceases at end of the lease, if the premises are not actually occupied by the tenant despite any notices given. The occupation . .
Cited – Pulleng v Curran CA 1980
The question was whether under the 1977 Act the tenant occupied the premises for residential purposes. The landlord said that a business was also conducted from them.
Held: The tenant had failed to establish that the business use had ceased. . .
Cited – Wagle v Trustees of Henry Smith’s Charity Kensington Estate CA 1990
The tenant had used the premises for both residential and business use. He claimed that, the business use having ceased, he had the protection of the 1977 Act.
Held: The Pulleng case required te court to reject the tenant’s argument. The . .
Cited – Pirabakaran v Patel and Another CA 26-May-2006
The landlord had wanted possession. The tenant said that the landlord had been harassing him. The landlord said that the tenancy was a mixed residential and business tenancy and that the 1977 Act did not apply.
Held: The 1977 Act applied. A . .
Cited – Webb and Barrett v London Borough of Barnet CA 1988
The authority resisted an application by the tenant to buy the property let as a council dwelling saying that the tenant was using it for mixed residential and business purposes. The tenant said that the business use had finished, and that the . .
Cited – Broadway Investments Hackney Ltd v Grant CA 20-Dec-2006
The respondent had taken a tenancy of premises from the local authority. The ground floor was for use as a shop, and the first was residential. He had previously taken a licence and had refurbished the premises. The authority sold the freehold to . .
Cited – Tan and Another v Sitkowski CA 1-Feb-2007
The tenant claimed Rent Act protection for his tenancy. He had been rehoused and began his tenancy in 1970 with the ground floor used as a shop, and the first floor as living accomodation. He later abandoned the business use. He appealed a finding . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.216552

Standingford v Probert: 1950

Citations:

[1950] 1 KB 377

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd HL 28-Oct-1999
Same Sex Paartner to Inherit as Family Member
The claimant had lived with the original tenant in a stable and long standing homosexual relationship at the deceased’s flat. After the tenant’s death he sought a statutory tenancy as a spouse of the deceased. The Act had been extended to include as . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.215916

Gammans v Ekins: CA 1950

The plaintiff had lived with a woman tenant for over 20 years and they had been regarded in the neighbourhood as man and wife.
Held: He could not thereby be deemed a member of her family for the Act of 1920. If their relationship was sexual ‘it seems to me anomalous that a person can acquire a ‘status of irremovability’ by living or having lived in sin, even if the liaison has not been a mere casual encounter but protracted in time and conclusive in character.’ and membership of the same family as limited to three relationships: that of children, that constituted by way of legitimate marriage and, thirdly, relationships whereby one person becomes in loco parentis to another. (Asquith LJ) and
Lord Evershed: ‘It may not be a bad thing that by this decision it is shown that, in the Christian society in which we live, one, at any rate, of the privileges which may be derived from marriage is not equally enjoyed by those living together as man and wife but who are not married.’

Judges:

Lord Evershed MR, Asquith LJ

Citations:

[1950] 2 KB 328

Statutes:

Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd HL 28-Oct-1999
Same Sex Paartner to Inherit as Family Member
The claimant had lived with the original tenant in a stable and long standing homosexual relationship at the deceased’s flat. After the tenant’s death he sought a statutory tenancy as a spouse of the deceased. The Act had been extended to include as . .
Disapproved – Dyson Holdings Ltd v Fox CA 17-Oct-1975
The defendant had lived with the tenant for 21 years until his death. They were unmarried and had no children. Reversing the County Court judge, the Court of Appeal ruled that she was a member of his family. It was absurd to distinguish between two . .
Cited – Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v M HL 8-Mar-2006
The respondent’s child lived with the estranged father for most of each week. She was obliged to contribute child support. She now lived with a woman, and complained that because her relationship was homosexual, she had been asked to pay more than . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.215910

Jones v Whitehill: CA 1950

The plaintiff, a woman, out of love and kindness, went to live with her aunt and uncle. On the uncle’s death, she claimed to be entitled to succeed to their tenancy.
Held: On the uncle’s death she was found to be a member of his family. The court rejected the argument that ‘family’ was confined to blood relations. ‘Step’ relationships such as step-children may also qualify, as may children who have been formally adopted. Parliament cannot intend that the tenant’s own child may qualify but a duly adopted child or a step-child may not.

Citations:

[1950] 2 KB 204

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd HL 28-Oct-1999
Same Sex Paartner to Inherit as Family Member
The claimant had lived with the original tenant in a stable and long standing homosexual relationship at the deceased’s flat. After the tenant’s death he sought a statutory tenancy as a spouse of the deceased. The Act had been extended to include as . .
Cited – Michalak v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 6-Mar-2002
The appellant had occupied for a long time a room in a house let by the authority. After the death of the tenant, the appellant sought, but was refused, a statutory tenancy. He claimed to be a member of the tenant’s family, and that the list of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.215909

Regina v Greenwich London Borough Council ex parte Dukic: 1996

Judges:

Toulson J

Citations:

[1996] 29 HLR 87

Cited by:

Cited – Regina v London Borough of Wandsworth ex parte Ann Garvey Admn 8-Apr-1997
The claimant said that the housing offered to her as a single mother with four children, one hyper-active, was inadequate. It was complained that the Doctor advising the authority had included in her report a consideration of what resources were . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.214457

Wilson v Nithsdale District Council: 1992

An eighteen year old girl had been sexually assaulted, was unable to return home, had been expelled from a hostel for suspected theft and was said to be at risk of further sexual assault if not provided with suitable accommodation. She sought housing as a vulnerable person.
Held: The court pointed out the dangers of a comparative approach in extablishing vulnerability: ‘The ‘comparative’ approach to vulnerability adopted in these cases cannot in my view be pushed to its logical limit; the intention cannot be that every homeless person will be held vulnerable for special reason merely because one other such homeless person might by comparison seem less vulnerable. The comparison must in my view be with some assumed average or normal run-of-the-mill homeless person. But if there is a lesser ability to fend for oneself, against that comparison, in a housing context, so that injury or detriment would result when such an ordinary homeless person would be able to cope without harmful effects, then in my opinion vulnerability for special reason is established for the purpose of the Act, and nothing more special (far less anything odd or exceptional) is required.’

Judges:

Lord Prosser

Citations:

[1992] SLT 1131

Cited by:

Approved – Regina v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Ex Parte Kihara; Similar CA 25-Jun-1996
Four asylum seekers had been deprived of benefits, and left destitute. They had sought housing assistance from the authority, claiming that the complete absence of resources left to them was an ‘other special reason’ leaving them vulnerable within . .
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Camden ex parte Pereira CA 20-May-1998
When considering whether a person was vulnerable so as to be treated more favourably in applying for rehousing: ‘The Council should consider such application afresh applying the statutory criterion: The Ortiz test should not be used; the dictum of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Scotland

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.200294

ex parte Banbury: 1987

Judges:

Russell J

Citations:

[1987] 19 HLR 76

Citing:

Approved – ex parte Sangeramano 1985
When consideriung whether an applicant for housing was vulnerable, ‘The vulnerability to be considered is vulnerability loosely in housing terms or in the context of housing.’ . .

Cited by:

Cited – ex parte Carroll 1988
The applicant for housing was said to have suffered ‘a major and irreversible handicap’ as a result of a childhood injury but who also was in the habit of drinking six or seven pints of beer a day.
Held: The court accepted the submission ‘that . .
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Camden ex parte Pereira CA 20-May-1998
When considering whether a person was vulnerable so as to be treated more favourably in applying for rehousing: ‘The Council should consider such application afresh applying the statutory criterion: The Ortiz test should not be used; the dictum of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.200291

Read v Goater: 1921

As to the Rent Acts, it was essential ‘that, wherever possible, [they] should be construed in a broad, practical, common-sense manner so as to effect the intention of the Legislature’

Judges:

McCardie J

Citations:

[1921] 1 KB 611

Cited by:

Cited – Cadogan Estates Limited v McMahon HL 26-Oct-2000
When a tenancy was terminated and was followed by a statutory tenancy, a term in the contractual tenancy that the tenancy should be forfeit on the tenant’s bankruptcy was continued in and inherited by the statutory tenancy. Though perhaps in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.196912

Ex parte Allen: 1985

A caravan cannot be a house.

Citations:

[1985] EGLR 153

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Malekshad v Howard de Walden Estates Limited HL 5-Dec-2002
A house and an adjoining building had been first demised under one lease, then separated vertically. Two separate residential properties now existed.
Held: The vertical division meant that the two houses could not be enfranchised as one under . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.192026

Scotlife Home Loans v Hedworth: CA 1996

The lender claimed possession as chargee under a legal charge granted by the respondents who filed Defences contending that the claimant had agreed to replace the secured loan and to waive its remedies for default under the charge. The claimant said the defence was misconceived. The District Judge declined to make a possession order, and gave directions. The claimant appealed to the circuit judge. By the time the appeal was heard Mrs Hedworth had amended her Defence to plead that the claimant’s charge was unenforceable against her since it had been procured by Mr Hedworth’s undue influence, of which the claimant had constructive notice. The judge allowed the claimant’s appeal and made a possession order. On appeal Mrs Hedworth sought to adduce additional affidavit evidence to the effect that if the appeal were allowed she would re-amend her Defence to allege that the claimant’s advance was applied in discharging existing charges which had themselves been procured by the undue influence of Mr Hedworth, of which the claimant had constructive notice. The claimant conceded that if Mrs Hedworth’s Defence were amended to include such allegations it would no longer be appropriate to strike it out.
Held: Dismissing her appeal: ‘I appreciate that counsel for Mrs Hedworth would argue that the fact that a loan by way of mortgage is to be applied for the redemption of prior mortgages does not necessarily establish that the remortgage is to the wife’s advantage because …. the mortgages redeemed may themselves have been procured by undue influence. I am not persuaded, however, by this argument. Indeed, it seems to me that it is contrary to the reasoning in Pitt. The court has to find an equilibrium between the proper protection of the rights of a wife who may be the victim of actual or presumed undue influence on the one hand and on the other hand the furtherance of ordinary business transactions involving mortgages of a matrimonial home in the joint ownership of a husband and wife. The decision in Pitt …. demonstrates that a transaction which involves a remortgage with the application of any surplus funds to a purpose which is to the apparent benefit of the husband and wife would not normally arouse suspicion. In the present case I think the correct approach is to consider what would have been the position had Scotlife been alerted to the fact that these monies were to be applied (save for a very small fraction) to the redemption of earlier mortgages. On this basis, I consider that Scotlife would have been entitled to treat the transaction as an ordinary business transaction. …. As I see it, Scotlife had no reason to question the validity of these earlier mortgages.’

Judges:

Neill LJ

Citations:

(1996) 28 HLR 771

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – UCB Group Ltd v Hedworth CA 4-Dec-2003
The defendant challenged the claimant’s right to possession under a legal charge. She appealed a finding that she had not established the undue influence of her husband, a solicitor.
Held: A lender who received a voidable security was entitled . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Undue Influence

Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.190507

Otter v Norman: HL 1988

The Rent Act 1977 had provided that a tenancy was not to be taken to be a protected tenancy of a dwelling house: ‘bona fide let at a rent which includes payments in respect of board or attendance’
Held: Where a landlord provided a continental beakfast to each of his tenants to be eaten in a communal room, this was enough to constitute ‘board’ so as to make the tenancies not protected. Any amount of board not de minimis would be sufficient to exclude the tenancy from the statutory protection. The House expressly rejected the submission that ‘board’ requires at least the provision of one main meal in addition to breakfast.

Citations:

[1988] 2 WLR 250, [1989] AC 129, [1988] 1 All ER 531

Statutes:

Rent Act 1977 7(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Hastings Borough Council ChD 23-Jun-1993
The local authority made a CPO in 1981 in respect of a sports ground. The applicants later acquired the land. In 1989 the order was confirmed and in March 1989 a vesting order was made. The authority was unable to afford to complete the purchase. In . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.186344

Irvine v Moran: 1991

The tenant took a lease for under 7 years, accepting repairing and other obligations. The question was how those obligations fitted the landlord’s implied obligations under section 32, and the effect of the section on decorating covenants. The landlord argued that the decoration was not repair, that the statutory implied obligations were to be subtracted from the lease, and that the remaining express covenants had effect.
Held: The phrase ‘structure and exterior of the dwelling-house’ did not mean the entire dwelling-house, or the building as constructed. The structure is that part of a building giving it its shape, stability and basic appearance, rather than to those elements which made it habitable. A separate garage and gates were not part of the structure, and nor were the internal plastering and door furniture. The windows, and the several parts of them did fall within section 32. The tenant’s obligations to decorate the exterior of any part of the structure were covered by s32 because this involved a protection against the elements. Most elements of decoration would involve some element of maintenance.

Citations:

[1991] 1 EGLR 261

Statutes:

Housing Act 1961 32

Citing:

Applied – Campden Hill Towers v Gardner CA 1977
A flat was let by an underlease for seven years. The lease excluded the outside walls of the flat, but the tenant covenanted to pay for repairs to the building through a service charge. The tenant refused to pay the service charge which included the . .
Cited – Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of Harrow School CA 14-Jul-1978
The court considered the finality of decision of a county court judge regarding the interpretation of the phrase ‘structural alteration’ in the 1974 Act. Paragraph 2 (2) of Schedule 8 provided that the determination of the county court judge ‘shall . .

Cited by:

considered – Bent v High Cliff Developments Ltd and Another ChD 2-Sep-1999
The replacement by a tenant of windows in a flat did not amount to structural alterations. The lease was clear as to what could constitute such alterations, and despite the different uses of the term in the lease, it clearly did not include either . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.183196

Regina v Kerr and the Hackney Borough Council: 1996

Citations:

[1996] 28 HLR 747

Cited by:

Cited – Regina v Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Mahmed Ali Admn 28-Apr-1997
The applicant sought an order declaring the property he occupied to be a nuisance, and that his landlords must execute repairs. The authority replied that the applicant had not allowed them access in order to carry out the works (Kerr). The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.182404

Regina (Johns) v Bracknell Forest District Council: 2001

Citations:

[2001] 33 HLR 86

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Cardiff City Council v Stone CA 29-Jan-2002
A local authority having served a notice on the tenant that the tenancy granted was under the section and therefore introductory, was not obliged to reserve a notice before beginning possession proceedings, even though several months may have passed . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.180084

Scurci Chimenti v Italy: ECHR 19 Dec 2002

Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of P1-1 ; Violation of Art. 6-1 ; Pecuniary damage – financial award ; Non-pecuniary damage – financial award
The applicant had let her flat. Her action to recover possession through the courts had taken 10 years, largely because of the lack of police support in enforcing her lawful attempts to recover possession under court orders, and she complained that this infringed her Protocol 1 article 1 rights.
Held: The court in Saffi had stated its view of the law in this situation. The case was well founded, and the claimant was awarded damages and costs.

Citations:

33227/96

Statutes:

European Convention on Human Rights 1

Jurisdiction:

Human Rights

Citing:

Applied – Immobiliare Saffi v Italy ECHR 28-Jul-1999
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of P1-1; Violation of Art. 6-1; Pecuniary damage – financial award; Non-pecuniary damage – claim rejected; Costs and expenses partial award – Convention . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Housing

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.178682

Regina (Piggott) v Bedfordshire County Council: QBD 17 Jan 2002

The claimant sought allocation of a pitch on a caravan site for gypsies. She appealed a refusal of the pitch, which had been made solely on the basis that she had already come onto the site and was trespassing at the time of the application.
Held: The council should weigh up the needs of the claimant, of the community in general, and the needs of other potential occupants who had behaved in an orderly way. Improper behaviour by the claimant might justify a lower priority, but was not itself conclusive.

Judges:

Justice Turner

Citations:

Times 29-Jan-2002, Gazette 06-Mar-2002

Housing

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.167484

Regina, Ex Parte Spath Holme Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and The Regions, Secretary of State For Wales: CA 20 Jan 2000

Regulations made to ease the effect of changes on the calculation of registered rents were ultra vires and void. The Act under which they were made was intended to control inflation. The purpose of these Regulations was to ease the effect on protected tenants of decisions which would lead to rent increases.

Citations:

Times 15-Feb-2000

Statutes:

Rent Acts (Maximum Fair Rent) Order 1999 (1999 No 6)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appealed to – Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and the Regions and another, ex parte Spath Holme Limited HL 7-Dec-2000
The section in the 1985 Act created a power to prevent rent increases for tenancies of dwelling-houses for purposes including the alleviation of perceived hardship. Accordingly the Secretary of State could issue regulations whose effect was to limit . .
Appeal from – Ex parte Motion Spath Holme Limited Admn 16-Mar-1999
The respondent had made an order with regard to the calculation of fair rents. The claimant challenged the order.
Held: There were social and economic arguments, and a very difficult balancing exercise had to be carried out in the light of the . .
Cited – Metropolitan Properties v Finegold CA 1975
The rental values of a block of flats were increased because of the presence nearby of an American school; the case turned on the equivalent provisions in the Rent Act 1968 to section 70(1) in the 1977 Act.
Held: One must have regard to the . .
Cited – Tormes Ltd v Landau 1971
. .
Cited – Mountview Court Properties v Devlin 1970
. .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and the Regions and another, ex parte Spath Holme Limited HL 7-Dec-2000
The section in the 1985 Act created a power to prevent rent increases for tenancies of dwelling-houses for purposes including the alleviation of perceived hardship. Accordingly the Secretary of State could issue regulations whose effect was to limit . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Housing, Administrative

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.135994

West Wiltshire District Council v Snelgrove and Snelgrove: Admn 17 Mar 1997

The council appealed against the acquittal of the defendants of offences under the 1977 Act. The occupiers were there under an informal temporary tenancy. The owners wished to move back in. The tenants had not left on the day appointed and on the day after the owners returned to find the house damaged and in a mess. The owners chose not to press charges, and the tenants after being intially refused entry to the house were let back in. On the same day. The magistrates found there was a licence only, and no tenancy and that the arrangement was an act of charity and a casual arrangement.
Held: No money had passed or was to pass between the parties as payment for occupation, and therefore the occupation was excluded from protection under the Act. Payments had been for the utilities only.

Citations:

[1997] EWHC Admin 285

Statutes:

Protection from Eviction Act 1977

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Norton v Knowles 1969
The court made the distinction between a mistaken belief as to the facts and a mistaken belief as to the law, pointing out that the latter ‘is, of course, not relevant or available as a ‘defence”. . .
Cited – Regina v Phekoo CACD 1981
The defendant was charged with doing acts calculated to interfere with the peace and comfort of residential occupiers so as to cause them to give up their occupation contrary to section 1(3)(a) of the 1977 Act. The defendant contended that he did . .
Cited – Bostock v Bryant 1990
When considering whether a payment has been paid by way of rent, the court looks to the explanation or reason for the payment, asking whether the payment is for exclusive use and occupation of the premises. In this case a payment by occupiers in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Crime

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.137230

Uratemp Ventures Ltd v Collins, Same v Carell: CA 10 Dec 1999

The presence of cooking facilities is an essential element in deciding whether premises could constitute a dwelling. Accordingly, a room in a hotel without such facilities could not be subject to an assured tenancy. A room with cooking facilities and access to a bathroom could be a dwelling, but the sharing of cooking facilities denied exclusive possession. Changes in circumstances did not operate to remove the necessity for cooking facilities to constitute a dwelling.

Citations:

Times 10-Dec-1999, Gazette 07-Jan-2000

Statutes:

Housing Act 1988 1(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal from – Uratemp Ventures Limited v Collins HL 11-Oct-2001
Can a single room within a hotel comprise a separate dwelling within the 1988 Act and be subject to an assured tenancy?
Held: A single room can be a dwelling. Each case must be interpreted in its own light as a question of fact, but respecting . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.90091

Welsh v Greenwich London Borough Council: CA 6 Jul 2000

A flat had been let without heating. The tenant complained at the consequent damp and condensation. The authority claimed it was not obliged to put the property into a better condition under a clause saying it agreed ‘to maintain the dwelling in good condition and repair’ and there was no structural damage. The tenant had not been legally advised and the tenancy was a social one.
Held: The words were to be taken in a non technical way, and could include an obligation to take steps to prevent the mould and condensation, if necessary by way of heating. The failure to provide insulation or lining allowed excessive condensation and mould. The council had failed to maintain the flat in good condition.

Citations:

Gazette 06-Jul-2000, Gazette 13-Jul-2000, Times 04-Aug-2000, (2001) 33 HLR 40

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Cobbold v London Borough of Greenwich CA 9-Aug-1999
The tenant had sought an order against the council landlord for failure to repair her dwelling. The defendant appealed refusal of leave to amend the pleadings in anticipation of the trial, now due to start on the following day.
Held: Leave was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.90380

Taj v Ali: CA 28 Apr 2000

A tenant was in very substantial arrears, but succeeded in having a claim for failure to repair set off against them leaving thirteen thousand pounds outstanding. The judge ordered possession but suspended it on terms which would require the arrears to be paid off over 55 years. The landlord’s appeal succeeded. The judge had already allowed for the landlord’s delay in acting, and such an order could only be made where the tenant had a prospect of paying off the arrears within a reasonable and definite time.

Citations:

Gazette 28-Apr-2000

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.89693

Tadema Holdings Ltd v Ferguson: CA 25 Nov 1999

A notice to increase rent could properly be served on a tenant even though he lacked mental capacity. Service of a notice must retain its natural meaning. A notice could properly be given where the landlord was named, and his address given ‘c/o the agent’ provided that address gave sufficient opportunity to contact the landlord.

Citations:

Times 25-Nov-1999, Gazette 08-Dec-1999

Statutes:

Housing Act 1988 ,13(2), Assured Tenancies and Agricultural Occupancies (Forms) Regulations 1997 No 194

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.89688

Shepping and another v Osada: CA 23 Mar 2000

The time limit on the recovery of possession of property subject to a tenancy to within one year of the landlord becoming aware of the death of the tenant required proceedings to have been issued within the year. The service of the notice requiring possession did not satisfy the requirement which was strictly for proceedings.

Citations:

Times 23-Mar-2000

Statutes:

Housing Act 1988 Sch2 Part 1 Ground 7

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.89226

Rogers v Lambeth London Borough Council: CA 10 Nov 1999

A local authority landlord had obtained a possession order against the tenant, for arrears of rent, but allowed the tenant to continue in possession, and eventually agreed to the order for possession being revoked. At that time the tenant became a statutory tenant, and was deemed to have been so for the intervening period. The tenant then had standing to claim damages for the landlords failure to repair in that period.

Citations:

Times 10-Nov-1999, Gazette 25-Nov-1999, (1999) 32 HLR 361

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 20

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – London Borough of Newham v Hawkins and others CA 22-Apr-2005
The landlord had obtained a possession order, but the tenant continued in occupation as a tolerated trespasser, claiming entitlement as successors in title. Rent arrears had accrued, but even if the tenant had paid thenm the council would have . .
Cited – London Borough of Lambeth and Hyde Southbank Ltd v O’Kane, Helena Housing Ltd CA 28-Jul-2005
In each case the authority had obtained an order for possession of the tenanted properties, but the court had suspended the possession orders. The tenants had therefore now become ‘tolerated trespassers’. They now claimed that they had again become . .
Cited – Knowsley Housing Trust v White; Honeygan-Green v London Borough of Islington; Porter v Shepherds Bush Housing Association HL 10-Dec-2008
The House considered situations where a secure or assured tenancy had been made subject to a suspended possession order and where despite the tenant failing to comply with the conditions, he had been allowed to continue in occupation.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.88847

Edmunds v Jones: CA 1957

Lord Evershed MR said: ‘I think that the words ‘residing with’ must be given their ordinary popular significance. They do not, I think, involve any technical import or have some meaning only to be defined by lawyers. Giving them, then, the ordinary sense of the language it is, to my mind, necessary in order that paragraph (g) may be satisfied, that the person claiming to succeed to the tenancy of the particular premises must fairly and truly be said to have been residing with the predecessor in those premises in the sense that the successor lived and shared for living purposes the whole of the premises to which he or she claims to have succeeded.

Judges:

Lord Evershed MR

Citations:

[1957] 1 WLR 118

Cited by:

Applied – Collier v Stoneman CA 1957
A grandchild and his wife shared a 2-bedroom flat with the grandmother tenant. There was communal living and eating and no question of a sub-tenancy.
Held: The claim to succession to the tenancy was upheld.
Sellers LJ said: ‘The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.554547

Collier v Stoneman: CA 1957

A grandchild and his wife shared a 2-bedroom flat with the grandmother tenant. There was communal living and eating and no question of a sub-tenancy.
Held: The claim to succession to the tenancy was upheld.
Sellers LJ said: ‘The grandmother, as tenant, had control of the premises, and I find it difficult to see how, without a tenancy of their own, the plaintiff and her husband, making their home there, could be said not to be residing with the grandmother up to the date of her death.’

Judges:

Jenkins, Sellers LJJ

Citations:

[1957] 1 WLR 1108

Citing:

Applied – Edmunds v Jones CA 1957
Lord Evershed MR said: ‘I think that the words ‘residing with’ must be given their ordinary popular significance. They do not, I think, involve any technical import or have some meaning only to be defined by lawyers. Giving them, then, the ordinary . .

Cited by:

Distinguished – Swanbrae Ltd v Elliott CA 1986
The court considered the quality of residence required where a person claimed to be a statutory tenant in succession to her mother, who had been a protected tenant, because she had resided in the premises with her before she died. The appellant had . .
Cited – ZH and CN, Regina (on The Applications of) v London Boroughs of Newham and Lewisham SC 12-Nov-2014
The court was asked whether the 1977 Act required a local authorty to obtain a court order before taking possession of interim accommodation it provided to an apparently homeless person while it investigated whether it owed him or her a duty under . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.554546

Skinner v Geary: CA 1931

Scrutton LJ said that the Rent Acts did not protect a tenant who was not in occupation of a house in the sense that the house was his home.

Judges:

Scrutton LJ

Citations:

[1931] 2 KB 546

Cited by:

Cited – ZH and CN, Regina (on The Applications of) v London Boroughs of Newham and Lewisham SC 12-Nov-2014
The court was asked whether the 1977 Act required a local authorty to obtain a court order before taking possession of interim accommodation it provided to an apparently homeless person while it investigated whether it owed him or her a duty under . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.554541