Category: Road Traffic

Smith v Kynnersley: CA 26 Mar 1903

By a special Act, passed in 1799, the trustees of a bridge were authorized to demand before any passage should be permitted over the bridge the following (amongst other) tolls: ‘ For every sledge, drag, or such like* carriage, the sum of sixpence’.
Held: The clause did not authorize the charge of sixpence in respect,
of a bicycle passing over the bridge.

Citations:

[1903] 1 KB 788, [1903] UKLawRpKQB 63

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Coates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 09 February 2022; Ref: scu.442522

Brown v Roberts: 1965

The statutory concept of ‘use’ where a vehicle is parked but not lawfully drivable is that the owner has an element of control, management or operation of the vehicle while it is on the road

Citations:

[1965] 1 QB 1

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – R and S Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering) v UK Insurance Ltd SC 27-Mar-2019
The driver’s car failed its MOT., He took it to private premises to repair. In those repairs, inflammable materials ignited and the fire spread those premises and adjoining third party premises. The premise’ insurers paid the owners of both and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 09 February 2022; Ref: scu.671592

Rymer v Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 21 Jul 2010

The defendant had pleaded guilty by post, but on being called to court to face a possible disqualification from driving he was refused the chance to re-open his plea. The action had been begun under the written charge procedure introduced by the 2003 Act. The notification he had been given said that the conviction dated from the first hearing.
Held: The defendant’s appeal failed. The adjourned hearing was a resumption of the hearing at which the conviction had already been entered, and the defendant had no automatic right to re-open his plea. Nevertheless the court to which the case was remitted should hear a request to be allowed to re-open the plea on established principles.

Judges:

Hooper LJ, Rafferty J

Citations:

[2010] EWHC 1848 (Admin), (2010) 174 JP 473

Links:

Bailii, WLRD

Statutes:

Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 12(9), Criminal Justice Act 2003 29(1), Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No. 21) Order 2008 (SI 2008/1424), Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 37.8

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Magistrates, Road Traffic, Criminal Practice

Updated: 06 February 2022; Ref: scu.420996

Regina v Radcliffe: CACD 1977

In the procedure for giving two specimens of urine at a police station to test for driving over the prescribed limit, it does not matter that the first specimen was of any particular quantity. It therefore follows that, provided two specimens are given, it does not matter whether there is any particular gap in time between the two specimens. All that matters is that the statutory procedure should be have been carried out.

Citations:

[1977] RTR 99

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1972

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Ryder v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 14-Apr-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, saying that the collection of a sample of urine had not been in accordance with the requirements of section 7. He had had the samples taken whilst in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 February 2022; Ref: scu.470577

Whelehan v Director of Public Prosecution: 1995

A police officer saw a motorist, the appellant, sitting in the driver’s seat of a car with keys in the ignition in the early hours of the morning, and smelt alcohol on his breath. The conversation which then took place between the officer and the offender was not under caution. The magistrates found it not to have been in breach of the Code of Practice.
Held: The finding was upheld by the Divisional Court.

Citations:

[1995] RTR 177

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Applied – Ridehalgh, Regina (on the Application of) v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-May-2005
The appellant a police officer had arrived at work having been drinking. A senior officer asked if he had driven to work. He replied yes, and on that basis had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol. He appealed saying that the question . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Magistrates

Updated: 02 February 2022; Ref: scu.226697

Harding v Price: KBD 1948

Section 22 of the 1930 Act obliged a driver in certain circumstances to report an accident causing damage to another vehicle, person or animal. The defendant failed to do so because he was unaware that he had been involved in an accident. He claimed that he could not be guilty of the offence because he was unaware that he had been involved in an accident.
Held: The Court agreed, notwithstanding that there was nothing in the section to identify the need for any mens rea.
Lord Goddard LCJ said: ‘If, apart from authority, one seeks to find a principle applicable to this matter it may be thus stated. If a statute contains an absolute prohibition against the doing of some act, as a general rule mens rea is not a constituent of the offence; but there is all the difference between prohibiting an act and imposing a duty to do something on the happening of a certain event. Unless a man knows that the event has happened, how can he carry out the duty imposed? If the duty be to report, he cannot report something of which he has no knowledge. That is the ratio decidendi of Nichols v Hall [5 LR 8 CP 322, 326] and, in my opinion, it is applicable to and decisive of the present case. Any other view would lead to calling on a man to do the impossible.’

Judges:

Lord Goddard LCJ

Citations:

[1948] 1 KB 695, [1948] 1 All ER 283

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1930 22

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Brend v Wood 1946
The court discussed the need to assume that conviction for an offence required proof of mens rea.
Lord Goddard CJ said: ‘It should first be observed that at common law there must always be mens rea to constitute a crime; if a person can show . .

Cited by:

Cited – Whiteside v The Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 21-Dec-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against conviction under section 172 of failing to provide appropriate driver details. The notices had been received at his address, but he had been unaware of them. He was at the time working regularly in the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Crime

Updated: 01 February 2022; Ref: scu.541080

Camden London Borough Council v Humphreys and Another: CA 26 Jan 2017

The Council appealed against an order rejecting its penalty charge imposed on the respondent. He had lawfully parked his mopend in a parking bay, but the bay was later suspended, and he was ticketed.

Judges:

McCombe, Beatson, Briggs LJJ

Citations:

[2017] EWCA Civ 24

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 29 January 2022; Ref: scu.573606

Pinner v Everett: HL 1969

The House was asked whether or not a person was ‘driving or attempting to drive’ a motor vehicle when he had been stopped by the police in connection with the illumination of his rear number plate, and the driver got out of the car and started to talk to the police and they, smelling alcohol, required him to take a blood test which he refused to do.
Held: No specimen of breath could be required if the suspicion did not arise when the person was driving or attempting to drive even though an extended meaning was given to that expression.
Lord Morris said: ‘In my view, the words ‘person driving’ in . . at least cover and include someone who has been driving but who has temporarily interrupted his driving and is about to resume driving.’ and ‘Thus, if someone intended to park his car in the road outside his home he might drive to a place outside his house and there stop; just before and at that very instant he would be a ‘person driving’ and in general terms he could be described as ‘the driver’. But if, having finished his journey, he stopped his engine and locked his car and went inside his home, he would then have ceased to be a ‘person driving’ although in general terms someone might still describe him as ‘the driver’. Questions of fact and of degree may well arise.’
Lord Reid said:’ In determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to ask always is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute? It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature, that it is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase. We have been warned again and again that it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for the words of the statute.’
and ‘It asks me to choose between two phrases ‘actually driving’ and ‘the driver, neither of which is to be found in the Act. It is in effect substituting ‘the driver’ for the statutory words ‘person driving or attempting to drive’. The two are not the same. A person can often be properly called the driver although for quite a long time he has neither been driving nor attempting to drive.’

Lord Reid, Lord Morris
[1969] 1 WLR 1266, [1969] 3 All ER 257, (1969) 64 Cr App R 160
Road Traffic Act 1968
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Aitken v Financial Services Compensation Scheme Limited SCS 30-May-2003
. .
Cited – Molaudi v Ministry of Defence EAT 15-Apr-2011
molaudi_modEAT11
EAT JURISDICTIONAL POINTS
The Claimant sought to bring a claim for racial discrimination against the defendant relating to events which occurred while the Claimant was a serving soldier. He had previously . .
Cited – British Pregnancy Advisory Service, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care Admn 5-Jun-2019
Abortion Time Limit statement was correct.
The Court considered ‘ the correct interpretation of the words, ‘the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week’ in s.1(1)(a) of the Abortion Act 1967 ‘ The guidance was challenged as the calculations. The date of the beginning of the . .
Cited – Edkins v Knowles QBD 1973
The motorist was driving at an excessive and dangerous speed. He was seen by detectives from a police motor car. They followed him but thought that he was driving far too fast and dangerously for them to overtake him. They followed him to a holiday . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Road Traffic

Updated: 27 January 2022; Ref: scu.184319

Regina v Marchant and Another: CACD 21 Jul 2003

The second defendant, a farmer, employed the first defendant, inter alia, to drive his tractor. The tractor, when fitted up was necessarily dangerous, but was licensed to be driven on the roads. There was a fatal accident on the highway. The defendants appealed from convictions for causing death by dangerous driving.
Held: The Court concluded that the prosecution should not have sought a conviction on the ‘dangerous condition’ case and that the Learned Recorder should not have allowed them to do so. The appeals were allowed and the conviction quashed. Though a driver could not escape criminal liability for taking a dangerous vehicle onto the road merely because the vehicle was licensed in that condition by the Secretary of State, prosecutors should take particular care before deciding to prosecute in such circumstances.
‘in the particular circumstances of this case, some reference to the fact that this was an authorised vehicle in its ‘inherent’ condition was appropriate and indeed desirable in assisting the jury in its approach to the question whether the state of the vehicle was ‘obviously dangerous to a competent and careful driver’. Where the state of a vehicle is inherent and the vehicle is authorised for use on the road and is being used in a rural area in which agricultural machinery is frequently driven along country roads, we consider that some reference to these facts should be made to the jury. The statement that authorisation under the Regulations is no defence to the charge without more may indicate that it is of absolutely no relevance.’

The Vice President (Lord Justice Rose) Mr Justice Grigson Mr Justice Beatson
[2003] EWCA Crim 2099, [2004] 1 All ER 1187, [2004] 1 WLR 442
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 1 40A 41 44, Motor Vehicles (Authorisation of Special Types) General Order 1979 13C
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Morris CACD 2002
The meaning of the word ‘obvious’ in a statute was in itself so clear that it should not be defined for a jury. . .
Cited – Regina v Strong 1995
‘obvious to a careful and competent driver’ refers to a dangerous state which would be ‘seen or realised at first glance’ . .
Cited – Wood v Milne QBD 1987
The ‘state of the vehicle’ includes the manufactured condition of the vehicle. As a matter of construction, it was not necessary to prove a lack of maintenance in order to prove a breach of the Regulations . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic

Updated: 27 January 2022; Ref: scu.184883

Elliott, Regina (On the Application of) v Stoke On Trent Crown Court: Admn 22 May 2009

Renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review against a decision of the Crown Court, sitting at Stoke-on-Trent, whereby it dismissed an appeal brought by the claimant against his convictions for dangerous driving and failing to provide a specimen of breath.

[2009] EWHC 2678 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 26 January 2022; Ref: scu.377831

Swain v McCaul and Others: QBD 11 Jul 1996

A lorry used for delivering skips was not used for refuse collection and was subject to the tachograph regime. The providing of skips for rubbish was a purely commercial enterprise not carried out for a public authority.

Times 11-Jul-1996, [1997] RTR 102
Transport Act 1968 97(1)(a)(iii)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Vehicle Inspectorate v Bruce Cook Road Planing Ltd and Another HL 8-Jul-1999
The transport of motorway maintenance vehicles and plant to and from sites on the back of a low loader is not sufficiently closely connected with the use of such machines on the motorways, to attract exemption as for such use from the general . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 26 January 2022; Ref: scu.89646

Pumbien v Vines: QBD 14 Jun 1995

A car on left on the road is used for MOT and insurance purposes even though it might be immobilized.

Times 14-Jun-1995, [1996] RTR 37
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – R and S Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering) v UK Insurance Ltd SC 27-Mar-2019
The driver’s car failed its MOT., He took it to private premises to repair. In those repairs, inflammable materials ignited and the fire spread those premises and adjoining third party premises. The premise’ insurers paid the owners of both and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 23 January 2022; Ref: scu.85081

UK Insurance Ltd v Rands Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering): CA 12 Apr 2017

Sir Terence Etherton MR, Beatson, Henderson LJJ
[2017] EWCA Civ 259, [2017] WLR(D) 286, [2017] 4 All ER 199, [2017] QB 1357, [2017] 3 WLR 450, [2017] Lloyd’s Rep IR 463, [2017] RTR 25
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – UK Insurance Ltd v Holden QBD 2017
The car owner was repairing his car, but his negligence caused a fire which extended to a neighbour’s property. The insurance companies sought declarations as to liability under his road traffic insurance policy. . .

Cited by:
Appeal from (CA) – R and S Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering) v UK Insurance Ltd SC 27-Mar-2019
The driver’s car failed its MOT., He took it to private premises to repair. In those repairs, inflammable materials ignited and the fire spread those premises and adjoining third party premises. The premise’ insurers paid the owners of both and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Insurance

Updated: 23 January 2022; Ref: scu.582101

RoadPeace v Secretary of State for Transport: Admn 7 Nov 2017

RoadPeace challenged certain legislation, as to compulsory insurance for motor vehicles, and for payment of compensation for personal injury and damages caused by uninsured driver, saying that it failed properly to implement European law.
Held: Ouseley J recorded and accepted the view of the Secretary of State for Transport and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau that section 145(3)(a) could not be read down and that there required to be amending legislation.

Ouseley J
[2017] EWHC 2725 (Admin), [2017] WLR(D) 736
Bailii, WLRD
Road Traffic Act 1988 145 151 153(3), Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 1(4), European Communities (Rights Against Insurers) Regulations 2002, Parliament and Council Directive 2009/103/EC
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – R and S Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering) v UK Insurance Ltd SC 27-Mar-2019
The driver’s car failed its MOT., He took it to private premises to repair. In those repairs, inflammable materials ignited and the fire spread those premises and adjoining third party premises. The premise’ insurers paid the owners of both and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, Personal Injury, Road Traffic, Insurance

Updated: 23 January 2022; Ref: scu.599418

Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav DD: ECJ 26 Feb 2014

ECJ Opinion – Automobile Liability Insurance – Concept of ‘vehicular’ – Accident caused by a tractor with a trailer during harvest bales of hay in a barn

Mengozzi AG
C-162/13, [2014] EUECJ C-162/13, [2014] EUECJ C-162/13, [2016] RTR 10
Bailii, Bailii
European
Cited by:
Cited – R and S Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering) v UK Insurance Ltd SC 27-Mar-2019
The driver’s car failed its MOT., He took it to private premises to repair. In those repairs, inflammable materials ignited and the fire spread those premises and adjoining third party premises. The premise’ insurers paid the owners of both and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Insurance

Updated: 23 January 2022; Ref: scu.521842

Clarke v Kato and Others; Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd: HL 25 Nov 1998

Save exceptionally, a car park is not a road for the purposes of road traffic legislation on obligatory insurance. It is an unjustified strain on the language. A distinction made between the road ways and the parking bays was artificial and unhelpful. Whether any particular area was a road is a question of fact in each case. ‘In the generality of the matter it seems to me that in the ordinary use of language a car park does not so qualify. In character and more especially in function they are distinct. It is of course possible to park on a road, but that does not mean that the road is a car park. Correspondingly one can drive from one point to another over a car park, but that does not mean that the route which has been taken is a road. It is here that the distinction in function between road and car park is of importance. The proper function of a road is to enable movement along it to a destination. Incidentally a vehicle on it may be stationary. One can use a road for parking. ‘
Otherwise: Clarke v General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Plc
Clark and Others v. Kato, Smith and General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Plc

Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Steyn, Lord Clyde
Times 23-Oct-1998, Gazette 25-Nov-1998, Gazette 11-Nov-1998, [1998] UKHL 36, [1998] 4 All ER 417, [1998] 1 WLR 1647
House of Lords, Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 145(3)(a)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Company Limited CA 22-Nov-1996
The concept of a ‘Road’ under the Act includes areas of a public car park marked out for the use of vehicles. . .
Cited – Harrison v Hill 1932
Mr Harrison was convicted by the Sheriff-substitute of an offence under section 7(4) of the 1930 Act on the ground that, while disqualified from holding a driving licence, he had driven a vehicle on a specific road. The Sheriff-substitute stated a . .
Cited – Griffin v Squires 1958
To count as a road in road traffic law, a stretch of land must at least be a road. A car park was held not to be a road. . .
Cited – Bugge v Taylor 1941
A branch of a road which leads into and continues out of the place in question, such as in this case, a forecourt may qualify as a road. . .
Cited – Oxford v Austin 1981
The court said that a road was ‘a definable way between two points over which vehicles could pass.’ . .
Cited – Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA ECJ 13-Nov-1990
Sympathetic construction of national legislation
LMA OVIEDO sought a declaration that the contracts setting up Commercial International were void (a nullity) since they had been drawn up in order to defraud creditors. Commercial International relied on an EC . .
Cited – Lonsdale v Howard and Hallam Ltd CA 8-Feb-2006
The claimant sought damages after his agency with the defendants was terminated. The central issue was whether compensation was to be calculated at two years commission as derived from French practice or otherwise.
Held: ‘there is no clear . .

Cited by:
Cited – Brewer v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 11-Feb-2004
The defendant was a disqualified driver. He was seen to be driving slowly across a railway station car park. He was found to have excess alcohol in his blood.
Held: Allowing his appeal against conviction. The magistrates had found that the car . .
Cited – Bowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .
Cited – R and S Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering) v UK Insurance Ltd SC 27-Mar-2019
The driver’s car failed its MOT., He took it to private premises to repair. In those repairs, inflammable materials ignited and the fire spread those premises and adjoining third party premises. The premise’ insurers paid the owners of both and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 23 January 2022; Ref: scu.79206

Elliott v Grey: QBD 1959

The defendant had left his car on the roadway. It was raised on bricks, and the battery was removed. He appealed his conviction for it not being insured.
Held: The conviction was correct. The acts of the defendant fell within the mischief of the Act. The car was being ‘used on a road’.

[1959] 3 All ER 733
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – R and S Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering) v UK Insurance Ltd SC 27-Mar-2019
The driver’s car failed its MOT., He took it to private premises to repair. In those repairs, inflammable materials ignited and the fire spread those premises and adjoining third party premises. The premise’ insurers paid the owners of both and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 23 January 2022; Ref: scu.200604

R and S Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering) v UK Insurance Ltd: SC 27 Mar 2019

The driver’s car failed its MOT., He took it to private premises to repair. In those repairs, inflammable materials ignited and the fire spread those premises and adjoining third party premises. The premise’ insurers paid the owners of both and claimed an indemnity from the driver. His motor policy covered him, as required in respect of third party claims from any accident involving his car while being driven or used on a public road. His insurer sought a declaration that the policy did not cover the claim against the driver since the policy limited itself to use on roads. The repair did not fall within ‘use’ for the purposes of section 145(3) of the Act. The owner of the repair premises counterclaimed for a declaration that the motorist’s insurer was liable for damage suffered and third parties arising from the fire. The judge granted the declaration sought by the motorist’s insurer but the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the owner of the premises and granted the declaration sought in the counterclaim.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The policy was to be construed so that its third party cover met the RTA requirements>
of the RTA. The certificate did not purport to provide additional cover in itself, and
because the relevant legislation treats a certificate of insurance as distinct from a policy, it is therefore necessary to read words into clause 1a. The CA had gone too far in making the extension to cover the losses.
‘Use’ in EU law is not confined to a road or other public place. It extends to any use of a vehicle as a means of transport. To comply with EU law, Parliament may need to reconsider the wording of the RTA, but the RTA may not be ‘read down’ to comply by excising the words ‘on a road or other public place’ because this would go against the grain and thrust of the legislation. It is therefore the cover required by the RTA, not EU law, that must be read into the policy. In case of such an omission being identified, the Court may adopt a corrective construction, but here such an extension beyond the RTA express provisions but no further.
In this case it was the negligence in the conduct of the repair, not any use of the vehicle which caused the actual damage.

Baroness Hale of Richmond Psc, Lord Wilson, Lord Hodge, Lady Arden,Lord Kitchin Jjsc
[2019] UKSC 16, UKSC 2017/0096, [2019] 2 All ER (Comm) 793, [2019] 3 All ER 917, [2019] Lloyd’s Rep IR 404, [2019] 2 WLR 1015, [2019] WLR(D) 199, [2020] AC 1025, [2019] RTR 28
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary, SC Video Summary, SC 18 Dec 13 am Viudeo, SC 18 Dec 13 pm Video, WLRD
Road Traffic Act 1988
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV (1) ECJ 5-Oct-2004
ECJ Reference for a preliminary ruling: Arbeitsgericht Lorrach – Germany. Social policy – Protection of the health and safety of workers – Directive 93/104/EC – Scope – Emergency workers in attendance in . .
Cited – Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd and Others HL 1-Jul-2009
Mutual Knowledge admissible to construe contract
The parties had entered into a development contract in respect of a site in Wandsworth, under which balancing compensation was to be paid. They disagreed as to its calculation. Persimmon sought rectification to reflect the negotiations.
Held: . .
Cited – Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav DD ECJ 26-Feb-2014
ECJ Opinion – Automobile Liability Insurance – Concept of ‘vehicular’ – Accident caused by a tractor with a trailer during harvest bales of hay in a barn . .
Approvee – Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd CA 1956
Where an employer is found vicariously liable for an employee’s actions, they are entitled to recover an indemnity from them, to cover such losses.
Held: An accident which occurred in the yard of a slaughterhouse did not arise out of use on . .
Cited – Inman v Kenny and Another CA 12-Jan-2001
The claimant was sat below an embankment. A motorcycle driven by the defendant left the path at the top of the embankment landing on her causing serious injuries. . .
Cited – Lewis v Tindale and Others QBD 14-Sep-2018
The court was asked as to the liability of the Motor Insurer’s Bureau for an accident not occurring on a public road.
Held: Soole J said that section 145 should not be read down, because reading down would go against the grain and thrust of . .
Cited – RoadPeace v Secretary of State for Transport Admn 7-Nov-2017
RoadPeace challenged certain legislation, as to compulsory insurance for motor vehicles, and for payment of compensation for personal injury and damages caused by uninsured driver, saying that it failed properly to implement European law.
At First Instance – UK Insurance Ltd v Holden QBD 2017
The car owner was repairing his car, but his negligence caused a fire which extended to a neighbour’s property. The insurance companies sought declarations as to liability under his road traffic insurance policy. . .
Appeal from (CA) – UK Insurance Ltd v Rands Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering) CA 12-Apr-2017
. .
Cited – Elliott v Grey QBD 1959
The defendant had left his car on the roadway. It was raised on bricks, and the battery was removed. He appealed his conviction for it not being insured.
Held: The conviction was correct. The acts of the defendant fell within the mischief of . .
Cited – Clarke v Kato and Others; Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd HL 25-Nov-1998
Save exceptionally, a car park is not a road for the purposes of road traffic legislation on obligatory insurance. It is an unjustified strain on the language. A distinction made between the road ways and the parking bays was artificial and . .
Cited – Pumbien v Vines QBD 14-Jun-1995
A car on left on the road is used for MOT and insurance purposes even though it might be immobilized. . .
Cited – Brown v Roberts 1965
The statutory concept of ‘use’ where a vehicle is parked but not lawfully drivable is that the owner has an element of control, management or operation of the vehicle while it is on the road . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insurance, Road Traffic, European

Updated: 23 January 2022; Ref: scu.635122

UK Insurance Ltd v Holden: QBD 2017

The car owner was repairing his car, but his negligence caused a fire which extended to a neighbour’s property. The insurance companies sought declarations as to liability under his road traffic insurance policy.

[2017] QB 1357
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – UK Insurance Ltd v Rands Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering) CA 12-Apr-2017
. .
At First Instance – R and S Pilling (T/A Phoenix Engineering) v UK Insurance Ltd SC 27-Mar-2019
The driver’s car failed its MOT., He took it to private premises to repair. In those repairs, inflammable materials ignited and the fire spread those premises and adjoining third party premises. The premise’ insurers paid the owners of both and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Insurance

Updated: 23 January 2022; Ref: scu.671591

Seddon v Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency: CA 28 Jan 2019

The court was asked whether the DVLA, in circumstances where it has doubts which it has decided to investigate about the age or identity of a registered ‘Historic Vehicle’ which it knows has been advertised for sale, owes a duty of care to prospective purchasers to inform the seller of its concerns.

[2019] EWCA Civ 14
Bailii
England and Wales

Administrative, Road Traffic, Negligence

Updated: 22 January 2022; Ref: scu.633092

Siegel v The Procurator Fiscal, Lerwick: ScSf 26 Jul 2016

The question in this case is whether or not special reasons exist for not endorsing Mr Siegel’s licence with penalty points for the offence of using a motor vehicle without there being in force a valid policy of insurance to cover that use, in contravention of section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

[2016] ScotSC 49
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 143

Scotland, Road Traffic

Updated: 22 January 2022; Ref: scu.568563

Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys: HL 1977

Humphrys was charged with driving while disqualified. The issue was the correctness of the identification by a police constable. In evidence, Humphrys denied that he was the driver, or indeed that he had driven any car during the year in question. He was acquitted. Later he was charged with perjury said to arise from his untruthful evidence that he had not driven the car. At trial, the judge overruled a defence submission that the same constable who had given evidence at the first trial should not be allowed to give the same evidence at the second trial. It was argued that issue estoppel applied. The judge rejected the submission. The evidence was given. Humphrys was convicted of perjury. He appealed, and his conviction was quashed. The acquittal implied rejection of a police officer’s evidence, but the officer’s evidence was re-introduced. At the second trial. The defendant’s appeal succeeded.
Held: The House allowed the prosecutor’s appeal. The doctrine of issue estoppel had no place in English criminal law. The power to stop a prosecution for abuse of process should only be used in ‘most exceptional circumstances.’ It was doubtful whether magistrates had this jurisdiction at all. Courts should resist importing notions of issue estoppel or res judicata into the criminal law. Lord Salmon: ‘It is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene.’ However, every court has a right in its discretion to decline to hear proceedings on the ground that they are oppressive and an abuse of the process of the court. The house emphasised the inherent jurisdiction of a criminal court to prevent an abuse of process should be distinguished from a purported power in the trial judge to refuse to allow a prosecution to proceed, merely because he considered, as a matter of policy, that the prosecution ought not to have been brought, or that it should not continue.
Lord Salmon discussed the role of a judge in deciding whether a case should proceed: ‘A judge has not and should not appear to have any responsibility for the institution of prosecutions; nor has he power to refuse to allow a prosecution to proceed merely because he considers that, as a matter of policy, it ought not to have been brought. It is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious tha the judge has the power to intervene.’

Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Salmon
[1977] AC 146, [1977] AC 1, [1976] 2 All ER 497, (1976) 63 Cr App R 95, [1976] 2 WLR 857
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Andrews-Weatherfoil Ltd CACD 1972
For so long as it is possible for persons concerned in a single offence to be tried separately, it is inevitable that the verdicts returned by the two juries will on occasion appear to be inconsistent with one another. Eveleigh J: ‘It is necessary . .
Explained – Sambasivam v Director of Public Prosecutions, Federation of Malaya PC 1950
(Malaya) The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court after a lawful trial is not restricted to the fact that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. It is binding and conclusive in all subsequent . .

Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Derby Crown Court, ex parte Brooks QBD 1985
The court set out the characteristics of abuse of process in criminal matters. It may be an abuse of process if: ‘the prosecution have manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by the law . .
Cited – Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 1990) CACD 1990
A police officer attended an incident where two people were arrested. Complaints about his conduct were made of which he was given notice. A formal investigation was instituted and adjourned pending the outcome of criminal proceedings against those . .
Cited – Regina v Shanks CACD 19-Mar-2003
The appellant appealed his conviction for murder. He had shot his lover as she walked away from an argument. The fact of his conviction following mention of a guilty plea to possession of the firearm was complained of.
Held: The judge had . .
Cited – Regina v Leeds Magistrates Court ex parte Serif Systems Limited and Hamilton Admn 9-Oct-1997
The applicant sought that summonses be set aside as an abuse of process, being begun to embarrass him as he set out to become an MP. Thirty one private summonses had been issued.
Held: Of the summonses to be continued it could not be said that . .
Cited – Hui Chi-ming v The Queen PC 5-Aug-1991
(Hong Kong) The defendant was charged with aiding and abetting a murder. A, carrying a length of water pipe and accompanied by the defendant and four other youths, seized a man and A hit him with the pipe, causing injuries from which he died. No . .
Cited – Petch and Coleman v Regina CACD 13-Jul-2005
The defendants appealed their convictions for murder, saying that a co-defendant, have been captured after fleeing the country had later been treated more leniently, a plea of manslaughter having been accepted.
Held: In order to substitute . .
Cited – Regina v Z (Prior acquittal) HL 22-Jun-2000
The defendant on a charge of rape had been tried and acquitted of the rape of different women on three previous occasions in three separate trials. The prosecution wished to call those three complainants to give similar fact evidence in support of . .
Cited – Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 2000) CACD 23-Nov-2000
The defendant had faced a charge of possessing an offensive weapon, namely a rice flail. The judge invited the prosecution to reconsider the case before it started, but the case went ahead. After the jury was empanelled, but before the prosecutor . .
Cited – Levey, Regina v CACD 27-Jul-2006
The defendant appealed against his conviction of manslaughter of his baby son. He said that a family court had previously investigated the same allegations and had explicitly found itself unable to say which of himself and the mother were . .
Cited – Regina v Belmarsh Magistrates’ Court ex parte Fiona Watts Admn 8-Feb-1999
The defendant sought to have dismissed as an abuse of proces charges against her that as an officer of Customs and Excise prosecuting the now private prosecutor, she had committed various offences.
Held: The magistrate was vested with . .
Cited – Hertfordshire County Council v National Grid Gas Plc Admn 2-Nov-2007
The council laid complaints against the defenedant that it had not properly re-instated road surfaces after completing works. It now appealed, by way of case stated, against the court’s acceptance of the defendant’s argument that the large number of . .
Cited – Maxwell, Regina v SC 20-Jul-2011
The defendant had had his conviction for murder set aside after a finding of gross prosecutorial misconduct by the police. The Court was now asked as to the propriety of the order for a retrial. The police involved in the case had misled the CPS, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice, Road Traffic

Updated: 21 January 2022; Ref: scu.219688

Selby v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset: QBD 1988

The defendant lorry driver was interviewed to discover his involvement in a road traffic accident in whch damage was caused to a stationery vehicle. He said that he had been unaware of any such collision, though he had been driving at that location at the time. Having given no evidence, he now appealed against his conviction.
Held: The appeal failed. Once it appeared that the defendant had in fact been involved in the accident, the onus of proof was on the driver to establish that he had been genuinely unaware of the accident.

[1988] RTR 216
Road Traffic Act 1972 25, Road Traffic Act 1974 24(2)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Whiteside v The Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 21-Dec-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against conviction under section 172 of failing to provide appropriate driver details. The notices had been received at his address, but he had been unaware of them. He was at the time working regularly in the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 20 January 2022; Ref: scu.541081

Burns v Currell: 1963

The defendant was accused of offences related to the driving on a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle, a Go-Kart.
Held: In fact it was not a motor vehicle within the statutory definition. The Court set out the test to be applied in deciding whether a particular vehicle was intended for use on roads for the purposes of the statutory definition.
Lord Parker CJ said: ‘Thus, in the ordinary case, it seems to me that there will be little difficulty in saying whether a particular vehicle is a motor vehicle or not. But to define exactly the meaning of the words ‘intended or adapted’ is by no means easy. For my part, I think that the expression ‘intended’, to take that word first, does not mean ‘intended by the user of the vehicle either at the moment of the alleged offence or for the future’. I do not think that it means the intention of the manufacturer or the wholesaler or the retailer; and it may be, as Salmon J said in Daley v Hargreaves, that it is not referring to the intention as such of any particular purpose.’
Salmon J. suggested that the word ‘intended’ might be paraphrased as ‘suitable or apt’. It may be merely a difference of wording, but I prefer to make the test whether a reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its users would be a road user.
In deciding that question, the reasonable man would not, as I conceive, have to envisage what some man losing his senses would do with a vehicle; nor an isolated user or a user in an emergency. The real question is: Is some general use on the roads contemplated as one of the users? Approaching the matter in that way, at the end of the case the justices would have to ask themselves: has it been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable person looking at the Go-Kart would say that one of its uses would be a use on the road?’ and ‘I prefer to make the test whether a reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its users [uses] would be a road user. In deciding that question, the reasonable man would not, as I conceive, have to envisage what some man losing his senses would do with a vehicle; nor an isolated user or a user in an emergency. The real question is: Is some general use on the roads contemplated as one of the users?’

Lord Parker CJ, Ashworth, Winn JJ
[1963] 2 All ER 297, [1963] 2 QB 433
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Daley v Hargreaves 1961
The court considered what it was for a vehicle to be intended or adapted for use as a motor vehicle.
Held: The phrase did not refer to the intention as such of any particular purpose. Salmon J suggested that the word ‘intended’ might be . .

Cited by:
Applied – Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Fleming QBD 1987
The defendant was stopped pushing a motor-cycle along the road. It had been adapted for scrambling, and the registration plates lights and speedometer had been removed. He argued that it was no longer a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Saddington; Chief Constable of the North Yorkshire Police v Michael Saddington Admn 1-Nov-2000
A motorised scooter of the type known as a ‘Go-Ped’ was a motor vehicle within the Act. Accordingly a driving licence and third party insurance were both required for its use on a public highway. The scooter required the passenger to stand on a . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v King Admn 13-Feb-2008
The defendant was charged after driving a ‘City Mantis Electric Scooter’. He was disqualified from driving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of the charges on the basis that the scooter was not of such a description as to require a licence . .
Cited – Coates, Regina v Misc 18-Jan-2011
(Barnsley Magistrates Court) The defendant owned a Segway, a two wheeled vehicle. He was charged with having driven it on a public footpath despite its being a motor vehicle. He denied that it was a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on the . .
Cited – Coates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 January 2022; Ref: scu.431823

Coates v Crown Prosecution Service: Admn 29 Jul 2011

The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge had correctly read and applied the authorities. The manufacturer’s statement that the Segway was not intended for use on the roads was not determinitive, and nor was its treatment in foreign jurisdictions. The test is an objective one.
Munby LJ said: ‘the ultimate question for the court in a case such as this, depending upon whether the offence is charged under the first or second limb, is whether, within the meaning of section 72, the defendant (i) was riding and/or (ii) was leading or driving a carriage, not whether he was riding or driving a motor vehicle. As the statutory provisions to which I have referred demonstrate, a motor vehicle is a carriage for this purpose, but it does not follow from this that the carriage must be a motor vehicle. Indeed, as the authorities that I must shortly come to demonstrate, something which is not a motor vehicle can nonetheless be a carriage for this purpose.’
The Segway was a carriage within the meaning of section 72.

Munby LJ, Langstaff J
[2011] EWHC 2032 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 185(1), Highway Act 1835 72 78
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Corkery v Carpenter KBD 1950
The defendant was accused of being drunk in charge of a carriage. He was in fact riding a cycle. Section 12 made it an offence to be ‘drunk while in charge on any highway . . of any carriage, horse, cattle, or steam engine’.
Held: The Act was . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v King Admn 13-Feb-2008
The defendant was charged after driving a ‘City Mantis Electric Scooter’. He was disqualified from driving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of the charges on the basis that the scooter was not of such a description as to require a licence . .
Cited – Daley v Hargreaves 1961
The court considered what it was for a vehicle to be intended or adapted for use as a motor vehicle.
Held: The phrase did not refer to the intention as such of any particular purpose. Salmon J suggested that the word ‘intended’ might be . .
Cited – Burns v Currell 1963
The defendant was accused of offences related to the driving on a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle, a Go-Kart.
Held: In fact it was not a motor vehicle within the statutory definition. The Court set out the test to be applied in . .
Cited – Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Fleming QBD 1987
The defendant was stopped pushing a motor-cycle along the road. It had been adapted for scrambling, and the registration plates lights and speedometer had been removed. He argued that it was no longer a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on . .
Cited – Selby (Justin) v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 1994
The defendant sat on a motor bike, propelling it on a pavement with his feet; although the engine was running the machine, according to the defendant, was not in gear.
Held: The justices were correct to have found that the defendant, even on . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Saddington; Chief Constable of the North Yorkshire Police v Michael Saddington Admn 1-Nov-2000
A motorised scooter of the type known as a ‘Go-Ped’ was a motor vehicle within the Act. Accordingly a driving licence and third party insurance were both required for its use on a public highway. The scooter required the passenger to stand on a . .
Cited – Regina v Mathias 1861
The court was aked whether the use of a child’s perambulator on a footpath amounted to a public nuisance or, if it did not, something that the owner of the soil was nonetheless entitled to prevent. The defendant argued as to section 72: ‘If a . .
Cited – Taylor v Goodwin QBD 1879
The court was asked whether a bicycle was a ‘carriage’ within the meaning of section 78. It was said to have been ‘ridden at a furious pace’. The appellant argued that: ‘A bicycle is not a ‘carriage’ within the meaning of the Act, nor can it be said . .
Cited – Williams v Ellis 1880
The court was asked whether a bicycle was a carriage for toll purposes.
Held: It was not. The applicable local turnpike Act defined a carriage in such a way that motorised and animal drawn vehices were caught but not otherwise. . .
Cited – Kadhim v Housing Benefit Board, London Borough of Brent CA 20-Dec-2000
A lower court was not bound to follow a decision of a higher court, where the decision at issue had been based, on the relevant point, on an unargued assumption about the law, which had in turn been pivotal to the decision of that higher court: ‘The . .
Cited – Regina v Burstow, Regina v Ireland HL 24-Jul-1997
The defendant was accused of assault occasioning actual bodily harm when he had made silent phone calls which were taken as threatening.
Held: An assault might consist of the making of a silent telephone call in circumstances where it causes . .
Cited – Flower Freight Co Ltd v Hammond 1963
. .
Cited – Taylor v Mead QBD 1961
The defendant, a commercial traveller, fitted a rail across in the back of his private motor car to carry dresses. The issue was whether or not there had been some degree of adaptation.
Held: Lord Parker CJ said: ‘It seems to me that, by . .
Cited – Cannan v Earl of Abingdon QBD 6-Apr-1900
The court was asked whether it was correct to charge a bicycle as a ‘carriage’ at a toll station for the bridge over the River Thames at Swinford.
Held: On the language of the particular statute a bicycle or tricycle was a ‘carriage’.
Cited – Simpson v Teignmouth and Shaldon Bridge Company CA 1903
The owners of the tolled bridge over the Teign, sought to charge bicycle riders tolls.
Held: A bicycle was not chargeable as a carriage on the bridge toll under the Act establishing it. The court doubted that a bicycle was a ‘carriage hung on . .
Cited – Smith v Kynnersley CA 26-Mar-1903
The court held that a bicycle seeking to use a toll road was, by virtue of the words of the statute allowing the charge, not chargeable as a carriage. . .
Cited – Environment Agency v Stanford Admn 30-Jun-1998
The prosecutor appealed against the decision of magistrates to stay a prosecution as an abuse.
Held: The decision of a prosecutor to prosecute remains his alone. Where no clear representations had been made that if certain works were carried . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 January 2022; Ref: scu.442437

Exeter City Council, Regina (on The Application of) v Sandle: Admn 16 May 2011

Appeal by way of case stated from a decision of the Crown Court at Exeter on an appeal against the decision of the Exeter City Council (the appellant in this case) to decline to grant a Hackney Carriage Licence following the expiry of his existing licence.

Ciollins J
[2011] EWHC 1403 (Admin), [2011] LLR 480
Bailii

Road Traffic

Updated: 18 January 2022; Ref: scu.566252

Directeur General Des Finances Publiques v Mapfre Asistencia Compania Internacional De Seguros Y Reaseguros Sa (Fifth Chamber): ECJ 16 Jul 2015

ECJ Reference for a preliminary ruling – Taxation – Turnover tax – Scope – Exemption – Notion of ‘insurance transactions’ – Notion of ‘supply of services’ – Lump sum for a warranty covering breakdowns of a second-hand vehicle

[2015] EUECJ C-584/13, [2015] RTR 32, [2015] STC 2293, ECLI:EU:C:2015:488, [2015] BVC 42
Bailii
Citing:
Opinion – Directeur General Des Finances Publiques v Mapfre Asistencia Compania Internacional De Seguros Y Reaseguros Sa (Fifth Chamber) ECJ 4-Feb-2015
Opinion – Taxation – VAT – Scope – Exemptions – Concept of ‘insurance transactions’ – Concept of ‘supply of services’ – Lump sum paid for a warranty covering breakdowns of a second-hand motor vehicle . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, VAT, Road Traffic

Updated: 17 January 2022; Ref: scu.565752

Directeur General Des Finances Publiques v Mapfre Asistencia Compania Internacional De Seguros Y Reaseguros Sa (Fifth Chamber): ECJ 4 Feb 2015

Opinion – Taxation – VAT – Scope – Exemptions – Concept of ‘insurance transactions’ – Concept of ‘supply of services’ – Lump sum paid for a warranty covering breakdowns of a second-hand motor vehicle

Szpunar AG
ECLI:EU:C:2015:55, [2015] EUECJ C-584/13 – O
Bailii
Cited by:
Opinion – Directeur General Des Finances Publiques v Mapfre Asistencia Compania Internacional De Seguros Y Reaseguros Sa (Fifth Chamber) ECJ 16-Jul-2015
ECJ Reference for a preliminary ruling – Taxation – Turnover tax – Scope – Exemption – Notion of ‘insurance transactions’ – Notion of ‘supply of services’ – Lump sum for a warranty covering breakdowns of a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, VAT, Road Traffic

Updated: 17 January 2022; Ref: scu.565735

Wigley-Foster v Wilson and Another: CA 16 May 2016

The court considered the operation of the Motor iNsurers Bureau in cases where an insurer became insolvent, and particularly as to its compliance with the Directive

Gloster, David Richards LJJ, Sir Robin Jacob
[2016] EWCA Civ 454
Bailii
Fourth Motor Insurance Directive
England and Wales

Road Traffic, Personal Injury, European

Updated: 16 January 2022; Ref: scu.564195

Hofmann v Freistaat Bayern: ECJ 26 Apr 2012

ECJ Directive 2006/126/EC – Mutual recognition of driving licences – Refusal by a Member State to recognise, in favour of a person whose driving licence was withdrawn on its territory, the validity of a driving licence issued by another Member State

J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, P
[2012] EUECJ C-419/10
Bailii
Directive 2006/126/EC
European
Citing:
Opinion – Hofmann v Freistaat Bayern ECJ 10-Nov-2011
ECJ Opinion – Directive 2006/126 / EC – Mutual recognition of driving licenses – Refusal of a Member State to recognize, to a person whose driving license has been withdrawn in its territory, the validity of a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 16 January 2022; Ref: scu.549932

United Trade Action Group Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v Transport for London: Admn 6 Dec 2021

First, in Part 8 proceedings Uber, supported by Free Now, claims a declaration that an operator licensed under the 1998 Act who accepts a booking from a passenger is not required by the Act to enter as principal into a contractual obligation with the passenger to provide the journey in respect of that booking. In other words, Uber and Free Now say that Lord Leggatt’s suggestion in Uber v Aslam is wrong.
Second a challenge to the licensing terms of Free Now drivers.

Lord Justice Males
-And-
Mr Justice Fraser
[2021] EWHC 3290 (Admin)
Bailii
Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998
England and Wales

Road Traffic, Licensing

Updated: 15 January 2022; Ref: scu.670394

Marshall v Crown Prosecution Service: Admn 17 Jun 2015

A car was seen speeding. Husband and wife each said that they did not know who was driving it in response to notices requiring that information. Mrs M now appealed against her conviction under section 172.

Beatson LJ, Kenneth Parker J
[2015] EWHC 2333 (Admin), (2016) 180 JP 33
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 172(2)(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Weightman v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 6-Mar-2007
Magistrates to identify reasons for finding guilt
The defendant appealed agains his conviction under section 172 of the 1988 Act. He had been abroad when his car attracted the speeding fine, but had been unable to identify which iof the several people who might have driven it, had done so.
Cited – Howarth v Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis QBD 3-Nov-2011
The claimant sought judicial review of a decision to search him whilst travelling to a public protest in London. A previous demonstration involving this group had resulted in criminal damage, but neither the claimant nor his companions were found to . .
Cited – Tuthill v The Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 15-Nov-2011
The defendant appealed against his conviction, saying that the evidence was obtained by means of an unlawful search by an officer. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Magistrates, Road Traffic

Updated: 14 January 2022; Ref: scu.562467

Steel v Goacher: QBD 1985

Griffiths LJ discussed the lawfulness of a police officer’s stopping of a motorist, and said: ‘It should, however, be stated that the police officer was acting within the execution of his duty by virtue of his power at common law and not by virtue of any power contained in section 159 of the Road Traffic Act.’ Having referred to Beard v Wood he continued: ‘The finding that the police officer was acting lawfully in the execution of his duty at the time he stopped the defendant is sufficient to dispose of the appeal.’

[1985] RTR 98
Road Traffic Act 1972 159
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Beard v Wood 1980
The court discussed the power of a constable to stop a driver.
Held: Provided the officer was acting in good faith the statutory powers given to him he need have no grounds for stopping a driver. Nothing in the section required the prosecutor . .

Cited by:
Cited – Beckett, Regina (on The Application of) v Aylesbury Crown Court Admn 22-Jan-2004
The applicant had unsuccessfully appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He had been stopped randomly to check his documents and the road worthiness of the older car.
Held: The appeal failed. May LJ said: ‘Whether it . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Police

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.425324

Bristol Alliance Ltd v Williams and Another: QBD 1 Jul 2011

The driver had crashed into the insured’s building causing substantial damage. The court was asked which of the driver’s and building’s insurers should bear the costs. The driver’s insurers said that he had acted deliberately and therefore they were not liable. Though they might even so be liable through the Motor Insurers Bureau, the provisions of that scheme would exempt them where, as here, the claim was under subrogation.
Held: The overriding purpose of the compulsory insurance scheme was to protect innocent third parties. The statute and regulations overrode certain kinds of exceptions which an insurer might place in the policy, but a clause against the causing of damage deliberately was not included. The judgment of Laws LJ in Charlton was to be preferred and the word ‘accident’ and its cognates may be construed so as to include the insured’s own criminal or deliberate acts.

Tugendhat J
[2011] EWHC 1657 (QB)
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 151, The Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risks) Regulations 1972
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Beresford v Royal Insurance Co Ltd HL 1938
The forfeiture rule was to be applied in a case involving suicide. An insured may not recover under a policy of insurance in respect of loss intentionally caused by his own criminal or tortious act, however clearly the wording of the policy may . .
Cited – Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co Ltd v Morrison 1942
The statutory requirement for compulsory insurance in the Road Traffic Act 1930 was of little value if it was open to insurers to freely exclude liability for common risks. . .
Cited – Hardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau CA 1964
The court was asked whether insurance pursuant to the Road Traffic Act 1960 would provide valid cover for the benefit of a third party injured by deliberately criminal conduct on the part of the driver.
Held: Diplock LJ said: ‘The rule of law . .
Cited – Gardner v Moore HL 1984
The uninsured first defendant deliberately drove a car at the plaintiff who was walking on the pavement, and thus caused serious injuries. The MIB accepted that the trial judge was bound by Hardy to declare that the Bureau was bound to indemnify the . .
Cited – Churchill Insurance v Charlton CA 2-Feb-2001
The victim of an unlawful act of a driver off-road sought damages from another driver and his insurers. The insurers refused to pay.
Held: There is a balance to be found between the statutory purpose of compulsory motor insurance and the . .
Cited – Criminal proceedings against Ruiz Bernaldez ECJ 28-Mar-1996
Europa In the preliminary-ruling procedure under Article 177 of the Treaty, it is for the national courts alone, before which the proceedings are pending and which must assume responsibility for the judgment to . .
Cited – Wragg and Another v Partco Group Ltd UGC Ltd CA 1-May-2002
A claim was made against directors of a company involved in a takeover, for failure to make proper disclosure. The case involved also other issues. The defendants appealed against a refusal to strike out the claim.
Held: The rules made . .
Cited – EB v France ECHR 30-Sep-2009
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Insurance

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.441423

Invicta Plastics Limited v Clare: QBD 1976

Those advertising and selling devices which were designed to detect the presence of police radar speed devices commit the offence of incitement under section 1(1) of the 1949 Act which required a licence for the use of such apparatus.

[1976] RTR 251, [1976] Crim LR 131
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 1(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Knightsbridge Crown Court ex parte Foot Admn 29-Jan-1998
A device which tested for police radar speed check did not intercept a message between persons and therefore was not unlawful. ‘a signal in this context is not a mere electronic impulse but is rather a sign or something of meaning to another person. . .
Cited – CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc HL 12-May-1988
The plaintiffs as representatives sought to restrain Amstrad selling equipment with two cassette decks without taking precautions which would reasonably ensure that their copyrights would not be infringed by its users.
Held: Amstrad could only . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Crime

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.187450

Newbury v Davis: QBD 1974

The owner of a vehicle agreed to lend it to someone else on condition that that person insured against third party risks. In the owner’s absence, that person drove the car on a road without insurance.
Held: The appeal against conviction was allowed: ‘the defendant did not permit Mr Jarvis to use the car. The defendant gave no permission to use it unless Mr Jarvis had a policy of insurance to cover its use, and he had none. Having no policy of insurance, he took the vehicle without the defendant’s permission. In other words, permission given subject to a condition which is unfulfilled is no permission at all. It may be that the difference is a small one between a case where the owner gives unconditional permission in the mistaken belief that the use is covered by insurance, or in the disappointed hope that it will be covered, and the case where the permission is given subject to a condition and that condition is not fulfilled. But to my mind there is a difference and it is one of legal substance. On this view of the case the defendant committed no offence.’

Lord Widgery CJ, MacKenna J
[1974] RTR 367
Road Traffic Act 1972
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Philip Owen Lloyd-Wolper v Robert Moore; National Insurance Guarantee Corporation Plc, Charles Moore CA 22-Jun-2004
The first defendant drove a car belonging to his father and insured by his father. The father consented to the driving but under a mistaken belief that his son was licensed. The claimant was injured by the defendant in a road traffic accident.
Distinguished – Baugh v Crago QBD 1975
The defendant believed that a driver was the holder of a driving licence and permitted him to use the vehicle, when the driver was not in fact such a holder. The prosecutor appealed his acquittal.
Held: Considering Newbury v Davis. The . .
Cited – Ferrymasters Ltd v Adams 1980
Employers were alleged to have caused or permitted an employee to drive a vehicle on the road while not holding a driving licence authorising him to do so. When the employee had entered the employment, the employers had ensured that he held a valid . .
Distinguished – Director of Public Prosecutions v Fisher QBD 1992
F was asked to lend L a car. F knew L was disqualified, but agreed provided L found an insured driver with a full valid driving licence. F did not know who L would ask or that he in fact asked R to drive; R was employed as delivery driver and the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Insurance

Leading Case

Updated: 12 January 2022; Ref: scu.199925

Quelch v Phipps: QBD 10 Jan 1955

A bus driver failed to stop and provide information pursuant to section 22 of the Road Traffic Act 1930. A passenger had stepped off the back of the bus in Oxford High Street whilst the bus was moving and the passenger was injured. The driver was not aware at the time that the accident had occurred but was told by the conductor at the next stop. He had no direct knowledge of the accident but was nonetheless found to have direct knowledge. Lord Goddard said that in these circumstances: ‘The driver must at any rate from a common sense point of view know that the accident had occurred.’

[1955] 2 QB 107
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Wangige, Regina v CACD 14-Oct-2020
Second Prosecution on Same Facts was An Abuse
The defendant appealed his conviction of causing death by dangerous driving. He appealed from the refusal of the judge to give a stay the prosecution as an abuse He had been previously prosecuted for a lesser offence on the same facts.
Held: . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 January 2022; Ref: scu.654663

Gurtner v Circuit: CA 1968

The Court described the gap in provision for the recovery of damages for injury where the driver of a vehicle was uninsured: ‘if (a) the defendant was not insured at the time of the accident or (b) his policy of insurance was avoided in the circumstances specified in section 10(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1934 for non-disclosure or misrepresentation or (c) his insurer too was insolvent. To fill this gap the insurers transacting compulsory motor vehicle insurance business in Great Britain, acting in agreement with the Minister of Transport, formed a company, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, to assume liability to satisfy judgments of these three kinds. But instead of amending the legislation so as to impose upon the Motor Insurers’ Bureau a statutory liability to the unsatisfied judgment creditor as had been done by the Road Traffic Act, 1934, in respect of the liability of insurers to satisfy judgments against defendants covered by a valid policy of insurance, the matter was dealt with by an agreement of June 17, 1946, between the Minister of Transport and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau. To this contract, for that is all that it is in law, no unsatisfied judgment creditor is a party. Although clearly intended by both parties to be for the benefit of such creditors, the Minister did not enter into it otherwise than as a principal. He was not purporting to act as agent so as to make it capable in law of ratification by those whom it was intended to benefit. Many of them were not born at the time when it was made. The only person entitled to enforce the contract is the Minister. I do not doubt that upon the principle accepted by the House of Lords in Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58 the Minister could enforce it by obtaining a judgment for specific performance which, once obtained, could be enforced against the bureau by the unsatisfied judgment creditor in whose favour the order for specific performance was made. But the Minister is the only party entitled to bring an action to enforce the contract. It confers no right of action against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau upon any unsatisfied judgment creditor.’
Diplock LJ: ‘A matter in dispute is not in my view effectually and completely adjudicated upon unless the rules of natural justice are observed and all those it will be liable to satisfy the judgment are given an opportunity to be heard.’

Diplock LJ
[1968] 2 QB 587
Road Traffic Act 1934 810(3)
England and Wales
Citing:
Disapproved – Amon v Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd 1956
The court analysed the circumstances under which additional parties might be joined to an action by a defendant, applying a narrow interpretation. The court considered whether a defendant may be added against the parties’ wishes: ‘There are two . .

Cited by:
Cited – Balkanbank v Naser Taher and Others QBD 13-Feb-1995
The plaintiff had obtained a worldwide Mareva injunction, giving an undertaking for damages. On its discharge, the defendants sought to make a counterclaim. The defendant company and its subsidiaries sought to counterclaim for their damages suffered . .
Cited – Humber Work Boats Ltd v ‘Selby Paradigm’, Owners of Mv and others AdCt 23-Jul-2004
The barge had become holed when run aground and then repaired. The repair was faulty, and it sank. The insurers rejected the claim saying that the owners had failed to disclose a report showing areas of thinning of the hull. The underwriters sought . .
Cited – Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd SC 20-Feb-2019
The Court was asked in what circumstances is it permissible to sue an unnamed defendant? The respondent was injured when her car collided with another. The care was insured but by a driver giving a false name. The car owner refused to identify him. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Road Traffic, Insurance

Updated: 10 January 2022; Ref: scu.200494

Cameron v Hussain and Another: CA 23 May 2017

The court was asked: ‘i) whether it is possible to obtain a judgment in respect of a claim for damages against a defendant identified only by description (‘an unnamed defendant’), in the context of a motor claim against an unidentified hit-and-run driver, where the vehicle was identified and an insurance policy had been effected in respect of such vehicle in the name of either a non-existent person or someone who was not traceable;
ii) whether an insurer would be liable to satisfy any unsatisfied judgment against such an unnamed defendant under section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (‘the 1988 Act’);
iii) whether the judges below were right to refuse to allow the claimant permission to amend her claim form and particulars of claim so as to substitute, for the named first defendant, a defendant identified only by the following description:
‘The person unknown driving vehicle registration number Y598 SPS who collided with vehicle registration number KG03 ZIZ on 26th May 2013.”

Gloster VP, Lloyd Jones LJJ, Sir Ross Cranston
[2017] WLR(D) 353, [2017] EWCA Civ 366, [2017] PIQR P16, [2018] 1 WLR 657, [2017] RTR 23, [2017] Lloyd’s Rep IR 487
WLRD, Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd SC 20-Feb-2019
The Court was asked in what circumstances is it permissible to sue an unnamed defendant? The respondent was injured when her car collided with another. The care was insured but by a driver giving a false name. The car owner refused to identify him. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Insurance

Updated: 10 January 2022; Ref: scu.584251

Williams v London Borough of Waltham Forest: Admn 6 Nov 2015

Application for statutory review pursuant to paragraph 35 of schedule 9 to the 1984 Act in relation to 20 experimental traffic orders (‘ETOs’) made under section 9 of that Act by the London Borough of Waltham Forest (‘the Council’) in respect of a group of streets in Walthamstow Village.

Holgate J
[2015] EWHC 3907 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 January 2022; Ref: scu.559686

Tempest (t/a Cesspool Sid) v Commissioners of Customs and Excise: ChD 16 Mar 2000

The taxpayer owned and operated vehicles for discharging cesspool waste over agricultural land. He sought to reclaim the rebate entitlement for heavy oil. It was held that the four wheeled vehicles were off-the-road vehicles even if they would be driven on roads to and from the work sites. It was not an agricultural vehicle but was entitled as an off road vehicle if it was not otherwise entitled to a rebate, if it was designed and constructed mainly for use off the roads, and if it could not exceed 25 mph under its own power.

Times 16-Mar-2000
Hydrocarbon Oil Duty Act 1979
England and Wales

Road Traffic, Transport, Agriculture

Updated: 09 January 2022; Ref: scu.89763

Green v Chief Constable of South Wales Police: Admn 10 May 2006

The defendant appealed his conviction for speeding, saying that the magistrates had refused to order disclosure of the police video recording of the events, seeing no issue to which the tape would be relevant.
Held: The defendant had no absolute right of disclosure. The court had been correct to refuse an order for its disclosure and the defendant had not been deprived of a fair hearing.

Lord Justice Scott Baker Mr Justice Openshaw
[2006] EWHC 1210 (Admin)
Bailii
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 83
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 08 January 2022; Ref: scu.242553

Nagy v Vas Megyei Rendor-fokapitanysag: ECJ 29 Oct 2015

ECJ Judgment – Reference for a preliminary ruling – Principle of non-discrimination – Article 18 TFEU – Citizenship of the Union – Article 20 TFEU – Freedom of movement for persons – Article 63 TFEU – Free movement of capital – Road use – Drivers resident in the Member State concerned – Requirement to provide on the spot proof of lawful use of vehicles registered in another Member State at a police check

C-583/14, [2015] EUECJ C-583/14
Bailii
European

Road Traffic

Updated: 05 January 2022; Ref: scu.554138

Director of Public Prosecutions v Kavaz: Admn 25 Nov 1997

[1997] EWHC Admin 1042
Road Traffic Act 1988 143(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appealed to – Director of Public Prosecutions v Kavaz CACD 17-Mar-1999
The duty to demonstrate that a car is properly insured and has an MOT certificate remains the responsibility of the actual driver. . .
Cited – Rex v Oliver 1944
When an Act of Parliament provides that a person shall not do a certain thing unless he has a licence, the onus is always on the defendant to prove that he has a licence because it is a fact peculiarly within his own knowledge . .

Cited by:
Appeal from – Director of Public Prosecutions v Kavaz CACD 17-Mar-1999
The duty to demonstrate that a car is properly insured and has an MOT certificate remains the responsibility of the actual driver. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 January 2022; Ref: scu.137987

Mahmood v Vehicle Inspectorate: Admn 5 Nov 1997

[1997] EWHC Admin 980
Road Traffic Act 1988 133
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Stilk v Myrick KBD 16-Dec-1809
No Obligation Incurred without Consideration
The plaintiff agreed to sail with the defendant on a voyage being paid pounds 5.00 a month. Two crew deserted and the captain asked the remainder to do their work sharing the wages saved. The plaintiff sought the additional sum above the articled . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 03 January 2022; Ref: scu.137925

Director of Public Prosecutions v Rogers: Admn 15 Oct 1997

Prosecutor’s appeal against dismissal of drink driving case.

Lord Justice Brooke, and
Mr Justice Gage
[1998] Crim LR 202, [1997] EWHC Admin 878
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v CS CACD 29-Feb-2012
The defendant appealed against the refusal of the judge to allow her defence of necessity in answer to a charge under section 1 of the 1984 Act. She said that it had been necessary to prevent the child being sexually abused.
Held: The appeal . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 03 January 2022; Ref: scu.137823

The Director of Public Prosecutions v Whittaker: Admn 3 Jul 2015

Appeal by way of case stated from a decision dismissing a summons alleging a contravention of s. 143 Road Traffic Act 1988, namely use of a motor vehicle on a road without a policy of insurance. The defendant appeared to be using a van for commercial purposes, but had only private and domestic insurance.

Beatson LJ, Blake J
[2015] EWHC 1850 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 143
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 January 2022; Ref: scu.550018

Davies v Forrett and Others: QBD 23 Jun 2015

The claimant had been very severely injured as a passenger in a car (uninsured) which had attempted an overtaking manouvre past three cars. One pulled out, and the car in which he was a passenger swerved off the road and crashed. Damages were now sought against the car which had pulled out. A settlement had been all but reached with the defendant accepting some responsibility. The court now considered liability for costs.
Held: The defendant and his insurers had behaved in a way which was designed to secure an advantage to which they were not entitled, increasing costs.

Edis J
[2015] EWHC 1761 (QB)
Bailii
Citing:
Cited – Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Company CA 1903
Where a party sues two or more defendants and succeeds against one but fails against one or more other defendants, the court has a discretion to order the unsuccessful defendant to pay the costs of the claimant in pursuing the successful defendant . .
Cited – Bullock v London General Omnibus Company 1907
An order was made for the payment of the successful defendants’ costs, but with liberty to the plaintiff to include those costs in the costs of the action recoverable by the plaintiff from the unsuccessful defendant. The plaintiff had been unable . .
Cited – Symphony Group Plc v Hodgson CA 4-May-1993
Nine rules were set out for allowing a costs order against someone who is not a party to the action. Such orders should be exceptional. The normal rule is that witnesses in either civil or criminal proceedings enjoy immunity from any form of civil . .
Cited – Irvine v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, Carillion Plc, Town and Country Flooring Limited CA 3-Feb-2005
Peter Gibson LJ said: ‘There is no doubt that the jurisdiction to make a Bullock or Sanderson order has survived the introduction of the CPR, though the exercise of discretion to make such an order must be guided by the overriding objective and the . .
Cited – Moon v Garrett and others CA 28-Jul-2006
The defendant appealed a finding that he was liable for the personal injury to the claimant. The claimant was employed to collect blocks and bring them to the site. He fell and injured himself.
Held: The defendant, the occupier of the land, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Negligence, Road Traffic, Personal Injury, Costs

Updated: 01 January 2022; Ref: scu.549417

Post Office v Richmond Upon Thames London Borough Council: QBD 17 May 1994

A criminal penalty may still follow from the operator of a goods vehicle breaking the conditions of an access permit even though there was also a procedure to allow the revocation of permits for their misuse.

Times 17-May-1994
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 8(1)
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 January 2022; Ref: scu.84815

Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos (Judgment): ECJ 29 Feb 1996

Any formalities required in order to have a driving licence issued in one Member State recognised in another Member State constitute an obstacle to the free movement of persons, and are in breach of the Treaty.
Europa 1. As Community law stands, and prior to the implementation of Directive 91/439 on driving licences, Article 52 of the Treaty does not preclude a Member State from requiring the holder of a driving licence issued by another Member State to exchange that licence for a licence of the host Member State within one year of taking up normal residence in that State in order to remain entitled to drive a motor vehicle there.
In view of the complexity of the matter and the differences between the legislation of the Member States, the Council, which had the task of achieving harmonization of the conditions governing the issue of driving licences and of providing that driving licences issued by the Member States should be mutually recognized in order to remove the obstacles to the free movement of persons resulting from the obligation to obtain a driving licence issued by the host Member State, was empowered to achieve that harmonization progressively and was therefore entitled to allow Member States temporarily to impose an obligation to exchange licences.
2. In view of the consequences which may result from the existence of a criminal record for the exercise of a trade or profession by an employed or self-employed person, particularly with regard to access to certain activities or certain offices, which would constitute a further, lasting restriction on freedom of movement, Article 52 of the Treaty precludes the driving of a motor vehicle by a person who could have obtained a licence from the host State in exchange for the licence issued by another Member State but who did not make that exchange within the prescribed period from being treated as driving without a licence and thus rendered punishable by imprisonment or a fine.
The Member States, which, in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, remain competent to impose penalties for breach of the obligation to exchange driving licences which they may impose under Directive 80/1263 on the introduction of a Community driving licence, may not, however, impose a disproportionate penalty which, in view of the effect which the right to drive a motor vehicle has on the actual exercise of the rights relating to the free movement of persons, creates an obstacle to such free movement. Treatment of failure to exchange licences as equivalent to driving without a licence, thereby giving rise to criminal penalties, even if only financial in nature, is disproportionate on two grounds. First, it is disproportionate because the issue of a driving licence by a Member State in exchange for a licence issued by another Member State does not constitute the basis of the right to drive a motor vehicle in the territory of the host State, which is directly conferred by Community law, but evidence of the existence of such a right, and the obligation to exchange is therefore essentially a way of meeting administrative requirements. Second, it is disproportionate by reason of the consequences which it may have for the future prospects of the person concerned in his trade or profession.

C-193/94, [1996] ECR I-929, [1996] EUECJ C-193/94
Bailii
European
Cited by:
Cited – Commission v Netherlands ECJ 10-Jul-2003
ECJ Failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations – Directive 91/439/CEE. The directive required member states to introduce a system to recognise community driving licences. The Netherlands had instituted a . .
Cited – Zalewska v Department for Social Development HL 12-Nov-2008
(Northern Ireland) The claimant challenged the rules restricting payment of benefits to nationals from the 8 latest European Accession states to those with an unbroken 12 month working record. The applicant came from Poland and worked at two . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 January 2022; Ref: scu.161386

Ram (Administrator of The Estate of Pearl Baboolal) v Motor and General Insurance Company Ltd: PC 18 May 2015

Trinidad and Tobago – There had been a road traffic accident leading to the loss of several lives. The insurer of the negligent party resisted paying out more in damages, saying that its liability was limited to $1m, and: ‘The principal issue in this appeal is whether an insurance company, before it pays third party claims under an insurance policy which has a contractual monetary limit on the aggregate of claims arising out of one event which equates with the statutory minimum cover, must (a) ascertain the total claims arising from the event and (b) where the total exceeds the limit, devise a scheme for the proportionate payment of the claims.’

Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath, Lord Hodge
[2015] UKPC 22
Bailii
Commonwealth

Insurance, Road Traffic

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.546864

The Presidential Insurance Company Ltd v Mohammed and Others: PC 3 Feb 2015

(Trinidad and Tobago) The principal issue in the appeal is whether the MVIA enables someone who has suffered property damage caused by a motor vehicle accident to obtain indemnity from the vehicle owner’s insurers when the driver, who caused the damage, was not authorised by the insurance policy to drive the vehicle.

Lord Mance, Lord Wilson, Lord Carnwath, Lord Toulson, Lord Hodge
[2015] UKPC 4
Bailii

Commonwealth, Insurance, Road Traffic

Updated: 27 December 2021; Ref: scu.542233

Maddox v Storer: QBD 1962

The defendant had a minibus carrying 11 people. The Act made it an offence to drive at over 30mph in a vehicle ‘adapted’ to carry more than seven people.
Held: The phrase in Sch 1 to the Road Traffic Act 1960 was to be interpreted as follows: ‘constructed or adapted for use . . has been interpreted over and over again by the courts to mean ‘originally constructed or altered later so as to make the vehicle fit for the particular use.”

Lord Parker
[1963] 1 QB 451, [1962] 1 All ER 831, [1962] 2 WLR 958
Road Traffic Act 1960
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 27 December 2021; Ref: scu.190017

Webster v Regina: CACD 3 Mar 2006

The appellant challenged his conviction for aiding an abetting the causing of death by dangerous driving as a passenger. The driver had been drunk.
Held: The mere intoxication of the driver was not of itself and alone sufficient to establish dangerous driving. Woodward decided only that evidence of drinking was admissible, not that it was evidence capable of determining the standard of driving. In his summing up, the judge twice referred to whether it had been wise of the defendant to allow the driver to drive given his state. This was not the question posed by s2A: ‘The question was whether the appellant recognised, by virtue of what he saw to be Westbrook’s drunken condition, that Westbrook was likely to drive dangerously. It is one thing to set out to prove that it was dangerous to permit Westbrook to drive because he had been drinking or was drunk. It is a quite different question whether, by virtue of the amount it was apparent to the appellant that Westbrook had drunk, the appellant realised Westbrook was likely to drive dangerously. ‘ The conviction was unsafe.

Moses LJ, Jack J, Royce J
[2006] EWCA Crim 415, Times 15-Mar-2006
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 2A
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v McBride 1961
Evidence that a driver had been drinking was admissible when the driver faced a charge of dangerous driving. . .
Cited – Regina v Woodward (Terence) CACD 7-Dec-1994
On a prosecution for causing death by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1 of the 1988 Act, the fact that the driver was adversely affected by alcohol was a relevant circumstance in determining whether he was driving dangerously.’The fact (if it . .
Cited – Johnson v Youden KBD 1950
For a charge of aiding and abetting, the defendant must be shown to have been aware of the essential elements of his acts which constituted the complete crime. However, that may be inferred if a defendant shuts his eyes to the obvious.
Lord . .
Cited – Regina v Powell (Anthony) and Another; Regina v English HL 30-Oct-1997
When the court looked at the issue of foreseeability of murder in an allegation of joint enterprise, there was no requirement to show intent by the secondary party. The forseeability of the risk of the principal committing the offence from the point . .

Cited by:
Cited – Martin v Regina CACD 6-Jul-2010
The defendant had been a passenger on a car driven by a learner driver. The car crashed killing the driver and seriously injuring another. He appealed against his conviction for aiding and abetting dangerous driving.
Held: The appeal . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Road Traffic

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.239058

London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames v London Concrete Ltd: Admn 13 Dec 2001

The respondent company was acquitted after its vehicle, exceeding the maximum weight, was driven on a restricted street in contravention of the regulations. No unrestricted street allowed access to the destination. The delivery was on the company’s business, but the driver was self employed. The district judge had held that it was sufficient of the lorry was being used ‘ for the purposes of the Respondent company’s business’, but that the company had discharged the burden of showing it was not itself using the vehicle. The prosecutor appealed.
Held: The offence in question is one of strict or absolute liability. This is best not seen as a case of vicarious liability, but rather of a special use of the word ‘use’ in road traffic law. The test was ‘Is the owner reasonably capable of giving instructions and exercising control over the driver to ensure compliance with Article 3?’ In this case the district judge had applied the wrong test, and the appeal was allowed.

The Honourable Mr Justice Hooper
[2001] EWHC Admin 1077
Bailii
Greater London (Restriction of Goods Vehicles) Traffic Order 1995 Art 3, Road Traffic Regulations Act 1984 8(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Richmond v Jon Morton (T/a Morts Trucking Co) Admn 20-Jul-1999
. .
Cited – Hallett Silbermand Limited v Cheshire County Council 1993
. .
Cited – JG Williams (T/A Wiltrans International) v Harboard for the London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames QBD 20-Feb-1996
The court considered the liability of an employer for a road traffic offence committed by his employee: ‘I am of the view that it is not appropriate to think in terms simply of basing this conviction on vicarious liability. That is a concept which . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Crime

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.167364

Aykul v Land Baden-Wurttemberg: ECJ 4 Sep 2014

ECJ Advocate General’s Opinion – Preliminary ruling – Directive 91/439/EEC and 2006/126 / EC – Driving license – Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Directive 91/439 and Article 11, paragraph 4, second paragraph, of Directive 2006/126 – refusal of a Member State to recognize, to a person who leads its territory under the influence of drugs, the validity of a driving license issued by another Member State – offending behavior of the licensee’s license post the issuance of this permit – Withdrawal of driving license – Procedure for verification skills – Competent authorities – Improved safety of road traffic

Bot AG
C-260/13, [2014] EUECJ C-260/13 – O, [2015] EUECJ C-260/13
Bailii, Bailii
Directive 91/439/EEC

European, Road Traffic

Updated: 21 December 2021; Ref: scu.536483

Ministere public v Lahousse And Lavichy: ECJ 18 Nov 2010

ECJ Directives 92/61/EEC and 2002/24/EC – Type-approval of two- or three-wheel motor vehicles – Vehicles intended for use in competition, on roads or in off-road conditions – National legislation prohibiting the manufacture, marketing and use of equipment designed to increase the engine power and/or speed of mopeds

A Tizzano P
[2010] EUECJ C-142/09
Bailii
Directive 92/61/EEC, Directive 2002/24/EC
Citing:
Opinion – Ministere public v Lahousse And Lavichy ECJ 16-Sep-2010
ECJ (Approximation Of Laws) Type-approval of two- or three-wheel motor vehicles – Exclusion of vehicles intended for use in competition, on roads or in off-road conditions – National legislation prohibiting the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

European, Road Traffic

Updated: 21 December 2021; Ref: scu.536460

Carr v East Sussex Fire and Rescue Authority: CA 8 Feb 2008

The caimant appealed refusal of his claim against the defendant. Each driver claimed to have entered a junction controlled by traffic lights when the lights were at green. The judge had accepted that the driver of the fire engine went through at green, and gave judgment accordingly, but also said that the claimant went through only just after the lights had turned red against him. The claimant said that these findings were inconsistent.
Held: The judge had failed to grapple with the sequencing of the lights, and made inconsistent findings. It was not for the court of appeal to choose between them, and the case was remitted.

[2008] EWCA Civ 157
Bailii
England and Wales

Road Traffic, Negligence

Updated: 20 December 2021; Ref: scu.268700

Regina v Government of Holloway Prison, Ex parte Jennings: HL 1983

J sought habeas corpus to avoid her extradition to California on a charge of manslaughter arising from a motor accident. Her counsel argued that the unlawful killing of another by the reckless driving of a motor vehicle on a road was no longer manslaughter by the law of England, since the enactment of the Road Traffic of 1956 and 1977 Acts, saying reckless driving and motor manslaughter were synonymous, and since reckless driving was not an offence for which a person could be extradited under the treaty with the USA, the applicant could not be extradited on the charge of manslaughter.
Held: The argument was rejected, after a review of the legislative history, The common law offence of manslaughter remained intact. The ingredients of the statutory offence of reckless driving causing death were co-extensive with the ingredients of the common law offence of manslaughter.
Lord Roskill discussed the presumption against the implied repeal of a common law offence: ‘My Lords, counsel for the defendant also referred your Lordships to a number of cases in the last century and indeed before on the subject of the implied repeal of an earlier by a later statute, as, for example, Henderson v Sherborne (1837) 2 M and W 236, 150 ER 743 and Michell v Brown (1858) 28 LJMC 53. An even more striking example can be found in the earlier case of R v Davis (1783) 1 Leach 271, 168 ER 238, where a statute creating a capital offence was, perhaps not surprisingly, held to have been impliedly repealed by a later statute carrying a penalty of only andpound;20. My Lords, I do not doubt that the principles applicable to the implied repeal of an earlier by a later statute are well established. But today those old cases must be approached and applied with caution. Until comparatively late in the last century statutes were not drafted with the same skill as today.’ and
‘In a field so complex as the criminal law as it exists today, frequently changing society, a crucial change of this kind was, if counsel’s submission is right, left only to implication. The 1977 Act, on s. 50 of which counsel relied so strongly as giving rise to an implied repeal of the relevant part of the common law of manslaughter, itself contains an express repeal of the common law offence of conspiracy in clear and explicit language. I refer to s. 5 which provides that ‘the offence of conspiracy at common law is hereby abolished’. If Parliament had in the 1977 Act intended to abolish the relevant part of the common law offence of manslaughter I should have expected to find a similar provision somewhere in the legislation between 1956 and 1977. My Lords, there is none. On the contrary there are, as I have shown, plenty of indications of an intention that that common law offence should remain fully intact after 1956 and after 1977 as it had before the successive statutory offences had ever been created. The fact that Parliament made it possible in those years for prosecuting authorities to choose to prosecute for a lesser offence carrying a lesser penalty does not seem to me to militate against the correctness of the view I have formed. No doubt the prosecuting authorities today would only prosecute for manslaughter in the case of death caused by the reckless driving of a motor vehicle on a road in a very grave case.’

Lord Roskill
[1982] 3 All ER 104, [1983] RTR 1, (1982) 75 Cr App R 367, [1983] 1 AC 624, [1982] 3 WLR 450, (1982) 146 JP 396
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Brown v The Queen (Jamaica) PC 13-Apr-2005
A police officer appealed against his conviction for manslaughter after being involved in a road traffic accident. Two were killed. The policemen complained as to the direction given on gross negligence manslaughter.
Held: Adomako could not . .
Cited – Wilkinson, Regina (on The Application of) v HM Coroner for The Greater Manchester South District Admn 11-Oct-2012
The court was asked whether evidence of the commission of the criminal offence of causing death by careless driving contrary to section 2B of the 1988 Act is capable of justifying a verdict of ‘unlawful killing’ at an inquest.
Held: The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Constitutional

Updated: 20 December 2021; Ref: scu.226127

Regina v Seymour: HL 1983

The court considered the relationship between the offences of manslaughter and causing death by reckless driving. The applicant argued that recklessness in a manslaughter case bore a different meaning from that which applied in respect of the statutory offence.
Held: Though rejecting that proposition, the House held that the degree of recklessness required for conviction of the statutory offence was less than that required for conviction of the common law crime of manslaughter. Lord Roskill said the jury was to perform the duty of assessing the degree of wickedness exhibited by the accused in order to decide which offence (if any) he has committed: ‘If any modification of the ‘Lawrence direction’ is appropriate in a case where manslaughter alone is charged, it would be to add a warning to the jury that before convicting of manslaughter they must be satisfied that the risk of death being caused by the manner of the accused’s driving was very high. Such a direction will, of course, always be necessary where the common law crime and the statutory offence are charged alternatively, but where, as in this case, the common law crime is charged alone, it may be unnecessary and inappropriate.’
Lord Roskill contrasted the culpability underlying the two offences: ‘Parliament must however be taken to have intended that ‘motor manslaughter’ should be a more grave offence than the statutory offence. While the former still carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life, Parliament has thought fit to limit the maximum penalty for the statutory offence to five years’ imprisonment, the sentence in fact passed by the learned trial judge upon the appellant upon his conviction for manslaughter. This difference recognises that there are degrees of turpitude which will vary according to the gravity of the risk created by the manner of a defendant’s driving. In these circumstances your Lordships may think that in future it will only be very rarely that it will be appropriate to charge ‘motor manslaughter’: that is where, as in the instant case, the risk of death from a defendant’s driving was very high.’ andwent on to answer the question certified for the House: ‘Where manslaughter is charged and the circumstances are that the victim was killed as a result of the reckless driving of the defendant on a public highway, the trial judge should give the jury the direction suggested in Reg. v Lawrence but it is appropriate also to point out that in order to constitute the offence of manslaughter the risk of death being caused by the manner of the defendant’s driving must be very high.’

Lord Roskill, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
[1983] 2 AC 493, [1983] 2 All ER 1058
England and Wales
Cited by:
Applied – Kong Cheuk Kwan v The Queen PC 10-Jul-1985
Two hydrofoils collided, causing deaths. The officers were charged with manslaughter.
Held: The Board applied to the situation the law which had developed for road traffic accidents. . .
Cited – Brown v The Queen (Jamaica) PC 13-Apr-2005
A police officer appealed against his conviction for manslaughter after being involved in a road traffic accident. Two were killed. The policemen complained as to the direction given on gross negligence manslaughter.
Held: Adomako could not . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Crime

Updated: 20 December 2021; Ref: scu.226126

A M Richardson t/a D J Travel Consultants v Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions: 11 May 2001

(Transport Tribunal) The burden of proof for the purpose of a section 27 revocation issue is on the licence holder to prove its continuing good repute.

Unreported, 11 May 2001, Appeal 65/2000
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Muck It Ltd v Merritt and others; traffic Commissioner v Muck It Ltd and Others, Secretary of State for Transport intervening CA 15-Sep-2005
The applicant appealed revocation of its operator’s licence.
Held: The Commissioner had erred. When revoking an existing goods vehicle licence the burden was on the commissioner to establish that there was good cause to revoke the licence, and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Licensing

Updated: 18 December 2021; Ref: scu.231175

Bryan Haulage Ltd v Vehicle Inspectorate (No2) [Appeal 217/2002]: 1 Apr 2003

(date?) (Transport Tribunal) ‘In applying the Crompton case it seems to us that the traffic commissioners and the Tribunal have to reconsider their approach. In cases involving mandatory revocation it has been common for findings to have been made along the lines of ‘I find your conduct to be so serious that I have had to conclude that you have lost your repute: accordingly, I have also to revoke your licence because the statute gives me no discretion.’ The effect of the Court of Appeal’s judgment is that this two-stage approach is incorrect and that the sanction has to be considered at the earlier stage. Thus the question is not whether the conduct is so serious as to amount to a loss of repute but whether it is so serious as to require revocation. Put simply, the question becomes ‘is the conduct such that the operator ought to be put out of business?’ On appeal, the Tribunal must consider not only the details of cases but the overall result.’

[Appeal 217/2002]
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Crompton T/A David Crompton Haulage v Department of Transport North Western Area CA 31-Jan-2003
The claimant challenged the revocation of his operator’s licence. At an earlier tribunal hearing concerning his licence, he had behaved in a loutish manner, and the revocation was based on that behaviour.
Held: The operator’s licence is a . .

Cited by:
Cited – Muck It Ltd v Merritt and others; traffic Commissioner v Muck It Ltd and Others, Secretary of State for Transport intervening CA 15-Sep-2005
The applicant appealed revocation of its operator’s licence.
Held: The Commissioner had erred. When revoking an existing goods vehicle licence the burden was on the commissioner to establish that there was good cause to revoke the licence, and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Licensing

Updated: 18 December 2021; Ref: scu.231174

Muck It Ltd v Merritt and others; traffic Commissioner v Muck It Ltd and Others, Secretary of State for Transport intervening: CA 15 Sep 2005

The applicant appealed revocation of its operator’s licence.
Held: The Commissioner had erred. When revoking an existing goods vehicle licence the burden was on the commissioner to establish that there was good cause to revoke the licence, and not on the operator to demonstrate the contrary. This was clear from the Directive implemented by the Act. Even so that burden had in fact been discharged, and the decision stood, save as to the disqualification of the directors.

Tuckey, Rix LJJ, Wilson J
Times 13-Oct-2005, [2005] EWCA Civ 1124
Bailii
Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – In the matter of Anglorom Trans (UK) Limited; Paramount Kitchens Ltd CA 30-Jul-2004
Laddie J, after citing the Bryan Haulage case, explained the need to consider separately the positions of operator and transport manager: ‘If a company breaches the rules set down by the Act, for example if it or its directors are convicted of a . .
Cited – Crompton T/A David Crompton Haulage v Department of Transport North Western Area CA 31-Jan-2003
The claimant challenged the revocation of his operator’s licence. At an earlier tribunal hearing concerning his licence, he had behaved in a loutish manner, and the revocation was based on that behaviour.
Held: The operator’s licence is a . .
Cited – Bryan Haulage Limited v Vehicle Inspectorate (No 1) 2002
(Transport Tribunal) The tribunal set out the correct approach to findings involving revocation of an operator’s licence (or disqualification): ‘However, in order to take action under s. 26 or to make a finding of loss of good repute under s. 27 or . .
Cited – A M Richardson t/a D J Travel Consultants v Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 11-May-2001
(Transport Tribunal) The burden of proof for the purpose of a section 27 revocation issue is on the licence holder to prove its continuing good repute. . .
Cited – Bryan Haulage Ltd v Vehicle Inspectorate (No2) [Appeal 217/2002] 1-Apr-2003
(date?) (Transport Tribunal) ‘In applying the Crompton case it seems to us that the traffic commissioners and the Tribunal have to reconsider their approach. In cases involving mandatory revocation it has been common for findings to have been made . .
Cited – Gudmundsson v Iceland ECHR 1996
A revocation of a licence is not a deprivation of property, but rather a control of its use within the second paragraph of article 1 under a proportionate and Convention compliant scheme . .
Cited – Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Limited HL 4-Dec-2003
The claimant’s house was regularly flooded by waters including also foul sewage from the respondent’s neighbouring premises. He sought damages and an injunction. The defendants sought to restrict the claimant to his statutory rights.
Held: The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Licensing, Human Rights

Updated: 18 December 2021; Ref: scu.230032

Bryan Haulage Limited v Vehicle Inspectorate (No 1): 2002

(Transport Tribunal) The tribunal set out the correct approach to findings involving revocation of an operator’s licence (or disqualification): ‘However, in order to take action under s. 26 or to make a finding of loss of good repute under s. 27 or make an order of disqualification of directors under s. 28 of the Act, the Traffic Commissioner was obliged to make an assessment of the nature, number and gravity of the breaches of regulations revealed by Mr Prime’s investigations and whether there was any evidence of instruction, encouragement or acquiescence on the part of the Appellant . . It is a further requirement that the Traffic Commissioner consider the weight, if any, to be attached to the Appellant’s general record, performance, reputation and enforcement history.’

[TT 1 of 2002]
England and Wales
Cited by:
Approved – In the matter of Anglorom Trans (UK) Limited; Paramount Kitchens Ltd CA 30-Jul-2004
Laddie J, after citing the Bryan Haulage case, explained the need to consider separately the positions of operator and transport manager: ‘If a company breaches the rules set down by the Act, for example if it or its directors are convicted of a . .
Cited – Muck It Ltd v Merritt and others; traffic Commissioner v Muck It Ltd and Others, Secretary of State for Transport intervening CA 15-Sep-2005
The applicant appealed revocation of its operator’s licence.
Held: The Commissioner had erred. When revoking an existing goods vehicle licence the burden was on the commissioner to establish that there was good cause to revoke the licence, and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Licensing

Updated: 18 December 2021; Ref: scu.231173

Partingdale Lane Residents’ Association, Regina (on the Application of) v Barnet London Borough Council: Admn 2 Apr 2003

Complaint was made that a Councillor had closed his mind to any arguments and had predetermined the decision on a proposed road re-opening order.
Held: The application was allowed. Councillor Coleman had himself gone beyond a legitimate predisposition or even giving strong weight to his own manifesto commitment that Partingdale Lane should be re-opened, and had predetermined the issue of principle as to its re-opening before consultation ever took place. That predisposition was not cured by subsequent council processes.

Rabinder Singh QC
[2003] EWHC 947 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, Local Government Act 2000 10 11 13
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina (on the Application of Wainwright) v Richmond Upon Thames London Borough Council CA 20-Dec-2001
A local authority was under a statutory duty to consult before undertaking road improvements. Because of the chaotic mail administration systems, the consultation had been ruled unlawful. The council appealed.
Held: The council had in fact . .
Cited – Regina v Brent London Borough Council ex parte Gunning 1985
The demands of fair consultation procedures will vary from case to case and will depend on the factors involved. The requirements are: ‘First, that consultation must be at a time when proposals are still at a formative stage. Second, that the . .
Cited – Regina v Camden London Borough Council Ex Parte Cran and Others QBD 25-Jan-1995
A designation of an area as a controlled parking area was vitiated by the failure of the Local Authority to consult locally. The court expanded on the principles for consultation set out in Gunning: ‘What kind and amount of consultation is required . .
Cited – Lower Hutt City Council v Bank 1974
(New Zealand Court of Appeal) The court was asked about the validity of a decision of a local council where it was said that a councillor had already made up his mind: ‘It cannot be doubted that one of the cardinal principle of natural justice, and . .
Cited – Bovis Homes Ltd v New Forest District Council Admn 2002
An allegation of bias was based on the participation by a councillor in the meeting which adopted the council’s local plan who was a member of a committee and had been involved in a meeting of that committee which had supported the proposed . .
Cited – Regina v Amber Valley District Council ex parte Dickson QBD 1984
One group on the council decided to support a proposed planning application. It was then asked whether that prevented a member of the group sitting on the committee which would assess it. There was an affidavit from the leader of the majority group . .
Cited – Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council HL 17-Dec-1981
Councillors’ Duties replace Election Promises
Bromley complained of a supplementary precept issued by the respondent to implement a commitment, contained in an election manifesto for the election in May 1979, upon which the majority on the GLC had been elected.
Held: In making choices of . .

Cited by:
Cited – Island Farm Development Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v Bridgend County Borough Council Admn 25-Aug-2006
The claimant applied for a review of a decision by the respondent council not to sell it land.
Held: The challenge failed. The councillors had acted in accordance with advice given to them by officers, and ‘the committee was concerned only to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Local Government

Updated: 18 December 2021; Ref: scu.185034

Lagden v O’Connor: HL 4 Dec 2003

The parties had been involved in a road traffic accident. The defendant drove into the claimant’s parked car. The claimant was unable to afford to hire a car pending repairs being completed, and arranged to hire a car on credit. He now sought payment of the cost of the credit agreement.
Held: A negligent driver must take his victim as he finds him. Mr Lagden’s claim was, in essence, a claim for the loss of use of his car while it was in the garage undergoing the repairs as a result of the accident. He had no choice but to hire the vehicle, and to do so on credit. The cost of the credit was recoverable.

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe
[2003] UKHL 64, Times 05-Dec-2003, [2004] 1 AC 1067, [2004] 1 All ER 277, [2003] 3 WLR 1571, [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 315, [2004] RTR 24
House of Lords, Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Clark v Ardington Electrical Services; Dennard v Plant; Sen v Steelform Engineering Company Ltd; Lagden v O’Connor CC 3-Aug-2001
The several claimants had hired motor vehicles following accidents, being re-assured that the costs would be recovered from defendant insurers. The agreements would not comply with the requirements of the Consumer Credit Act. They each envisaged . .
Cited – Cartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd HL 1963
The plaintiffs were steel dressers who, in the course of their employment, had inhaled quantities of noxious dust which had caused them to suffer from pneumoconiosis. They issued proceedings on 1 October 1956 but were unable to show any breach of . .
Cited – Dimond v Lovell HL 12-May-2000
A claimant sought as part of her damages for the cost of hiring a care whilst her own was off the road after an accident caused by the defendant. She agreed with a hire company to hire a car, but payment was delayed until the claim was settled.
Overruled – Liesbosch Dredger (Owners of) v Owners of SS Edison, The Liesbosch HL 28-Feb-1933
The ship Edison fouled the moorings of the Liesbosch resulting in the total loss of the dredger when it sank. It had been engaged on work in the harbour under contract with the harbour board. All the owners’ liquid resources were engaged in the . .
Cited – Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica Inc v Herbert Broderick PC 20-Mar-2000
(Jamaica) Damage had been caused to the claimant’s property, but, because of his lack of funds, he was dependent upon the receipt of the damages to carry out the works of repair necessary. By the time the matter came to trial, inflation meant that . .
Appeal from – Burdis v Livsey QBD 2001
The several cases claimed the cost of provision by credit hire companies of car hire and repair services to the innocent victims of road accidents. The transactions were ‘res inter alios acta’ – collateral to the commission of the tort. . .
Cited – The Gazelle 1844
A vessel was damaged by collision. What was the amount to be paid to the owners of the damaged vessel for its repair?
Held: The measure of the indemnification to which the owner of the damaged vessel was entitled was co-extensive with the . .
Cited – British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co v Underground Electric Railways Co (London) Limited HL 1912
The plaintiffs purchased eight steam turbines from the defendants. They later proved defective, and the plaintiffs sought damages. In the meantime they purchased replacements, more effective than the original specifications. In the result the . .
Cited – Derbyshire v Warren 1963
The plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant by way of damages any sum greater than what is reasonably necessary for the purpose of making good his loss. . .
Cited – Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank and Pump Co Ltd CA 1970
The plaintiffs’ factory in an old mill, burned down because Wayne Tank had installed a pipeline made of unsuitable and dangerous plastic material and wrapped in heating tape attached to a useless thermostat. It had been switched on and the plant . .
Cited – Clippens Oil Co v Edinburgh and District Water Trustees HL 1907
A wrongdoer must take his victim as he finds him, and be answerable for the consequences which actually flow from his wrongful act.
Lord Collins said: ‘In my opinion the wrongdoer must take his victim talem qualem, and if the position of the . .
Cited – Ramwade Ltd v W J Emson and Co Ltd CA 1987
The plaintiffs had been obliged to hire vehicles to perform the work carried out by their skip lorry which had been damaged beyond repair in a road accident. Their insurance brokers had, contrary to instructions, failed to procure a comprehensive . .
Mentioned – In re Polemis and Furness, Withy and Co CA 1921
A wrongdoer was liable for all the direct consequences of his negligent act, even though those consequences could not reasonably have been anticipated. ‘Once the act is negligent, the fact that its exact operation was not foreseen is immaterial.’ . .
Cited – Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound No 1) PC 18-Jan-1961
Foreseeability Standard to Establish Negligence
Complaint was made that oil had been discharged into Sydney Harbour causing damage. The court differentiated damage by fire from other types of physical damage to property for the purposes of liability in tort, saying ‘We have come back to the plain . .
Cited – Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Oljefabriker A/B HL 1949
Damages were sought for breach of contract.
Held: After reviewing the authorities on remoteness of damage, the court reaffirmed the broad general rule that a party injured by the other’s breach of contract is entitled to such money . .
Cited – Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd CA 1952
Lord Justice Denning said: ‘It was also said that the damages were the result of the impecuniosity of the sellers and that it was a rule of law that such damages are too remote. I do not think there is any such rule. In the case of a breach of . .
Cited – Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd v Canterbury City Council CA 21-Dec-1979
The defendants had, in the course of building operations, caused nuisance and damage to the plaintiff’s building. The dispute was very lengthy, the costs of repair increased accordingly, and the parties now disputed the date at which damages fell to . .
Cited – Perry v Sidney Phillips and Son CA 1982
In 1982 the surveyor failed to observe serious defects, including a leaking roof and a septic tank with an offensive smell. The plaintiff purchaser could not afford major repairs and executed only minor repairs himself. At the date of the trial the . .
Cited – Chanthall Investments Ltd v F G Minter Ltd OHCS 22-Jan-1976
The court considered the approach to claims for damages which had been made worse because of the impecuniosity of the victim: ‘I am of opinion that in each case where the matter arises it is a question of fact, in the particular circumstances, . .
Cited – Mattocks v Mann CA 2-Sep-1992
The plaintiff was able to recover the cost of a car hire till his repair bill had been paid by the insurers, where he was himself unable to pay the bill. ‘. . . at the present day it is generally accepted that, in what Lord Wright termed ‘the varied . .
Cited – Margrie Holdings Ltd v City of Edinburgh District Council IHCS 1994
When asking whether a claim for damages could properly include an additional element to recover additional costs of an impecunious pursuer, the proper approach, consistent with the modern authorities, was to ask whether the loss was or was not . .
Cited – Prehn v Royal Bank of Liverpool CE 31-Jan-1870
The defendants, bankers at Liverpool, by their letter of credit to the plaintiffs, grain merchants at Alexandria and Liverpool, undertook to accept the drafts of the plaintiffs’ Alexandria firm, the plaintiffs undertaking to put them in funds to . .
Cited – The Owners of No 7 Steam Sand, Pump Dredger v The Owners of SS ‘Greta Holme’ HL 1897
The plaintiff’s vessel, a sand dredger, was being used to deepen the river near the landing stage. It was damaged in a collision with the ‘Greta Holme’, for which the latter was solely responsible. The dredger was out of action for fifteen weeks and . .
Cited – The Owners of the Steamship Mediana v The Owners, Master and Crew of the Lightship Comet HL 1900
A lightship was damaged by negligence. The plaintiff harbour board kept a ship ready for emergencies, and consequently the damaged ship was replaced with the spare while she was being repaired. The question was whether the claimant could recover . .
Cited – Admiralty Commissioners v Owners of the Steamship Susquehanna; The Susquehanna HL 1926
An Admiralty oiler, the ‘Prestol’, was damaged in a collision with the defendants’ vessel in the Baltic. Her place was taken by another oiler, the ‘Belgol’, which was withdrawn from service on the Clyde. In effect, the Admiralty was able to make do . .
Cited – Radford v De Froberville 2-Jan-1977
A contract was made for the sale of a plot of land adjoining a house belonging to the plaintiff (the vendor) but occupied by his tenants, under which the defendant (the purchaser) undertook to build a house on the plot and also to erect a wall to a . .
Cited – McAuley v London Transport Executive CA 1957
A plaintiff in a claim for personal injuries may be deemed to have failed to mitigate his losses by an unreasonable refusal to undergo free surgical treatment after a bodily injury, and the damages he may recover from the tortfeasor are to be . .
Cited – Koch Marine Inc v D’Amica Societa Di Navigazione ARL (The Elena d’Amico) QBD 1980
The ship owners wrongfully repudiated a charterparty in March 1973, 14 months after its inception. The charterers did not hire a substitute but claimed damages for the loss of profits they would have made between January and April 1974, during which . .

Cited by:
Cited – Vision Golf Ltd v Weightmans (A Firm) ChD 26-Jul-2005
A lease had been forfeited. The defendant firm of solicitors had negligently failed to apply for relief. They argued that that failure had in fact caused no loss to the claimants, since they would have lost the lease anyway.
Held: The ‘but . .
Cited – Bee v Jenson ComC 21-Dec-2006
The defendant objected to paying the plaintiff the costs of a replacement hire car after the accident for which he was liable. He said that the plaintiff was in any event insured to recover that cost, and the insurance company were subrogated to the . .
Cited – Bee v Jenson CA 13-Sep-2007
The claimant hired a car whilst his own, damaged by the defendant, was being repaired. His insurer sought to recover the cost from the other driver. The insurer had first arranged te hire with one company, but then another provided a finacial reward . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Damages, Road Traffic, Costs

Updated: 18 December 2021; Ref: scu.188543

Beasley v Alexander: QBD 27 Jul 2012

Sir Raymond Jack
[2012] EWHC 2197 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Liability – Beasley v Alexander QBD 9-Oct-2012
beasley_alexanderQBD2012
The parties had disputed liability for personal injuries in a road traffic accident. The court had held the defendant liable, but held over the assessment of damages. The defendant sought to refer to the fact of his offer of settlement when . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic, Negligence, Personal Injury

Updated: 13 December 2021; Ref: scu.463325