The court considered the relationship between the offences of manslaughter and causing death by reckless driving. The applicant argued that recklessness in a manslaughter case bore a different meaning from that which applied in respect of the statutory offence.
Held: Though rejecting that proposition, the House held that the degree of recklessness required for conviction of the statutory offence was less than that required for conviction of the common law crime of manslaughter. Lord Roskill said the jury was to perform the duty of assessing the degree of wickedness exhibited by the accused in order to decide which offence (if any) he has committed: ‘If any modification of the ‘Lawrence direction’ is appropriate in a case where manslaughter alone is charged, it would be to add a warning to the jury that before convicting of manslaughter they must be satisfied that the risk of death being caused by the manner of the accused’s driving was very high. Such a direction will, of course, always be necessary where the common law crime and the statutory offence are charged alternatively, but where, as in this case, the common law crime is charged alone, it may be unnecessary and inappropriate.’
Lord Roskill contrasted the culpability underlying the two offences: ‘Parliament must however be taken to have intended that ‘motor manslaughter’ should be a more grave offence than the statutory offence. While the former still carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life, Parliament has thought fit to limit the maximum penalty for the statutory offence to five years’ imprisonment, the sentence in fact passed by the learned trial judge upon the appellant upon his conviction for manslaughter. This difference recognises that there are degrees of turpitude which will vary according to the gravity of the risk created by the manner of a defendant’s driving. In these circumstances your Lordships may think that in future it will only be very rarely that it will be appropriate to charge ‘motor manslaughter’: that is where, as in the instant case, the risk of death from a defendant’s driving was very high.’ andwent on to answer the question certified for the House: ‘Where manslaughter is charged and the circumstances are that the victim was killed as a result of the reckless driving of the defendant on a public highway, the trial judge should give the jury the direction suggested in Reg. v Lawrence but it is appropriate also to point out that in order to constitute the offence of manslaughter the risk of death being caused by the manner of the defendant’s driving must be very high.’
Lord Roskill, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
[1983] 2 AC 493, [1983] 2 All ER 1058
England and Wales
Cited by:
Applied – Kong Cheuk Kwan v The Queen PC 10-Jul-1985
Two hydrofoils collided, causing deaths. The officers were charged with manslaughter.
Held: The Board applied to the situation the law which had developed for road traffic accidents. . .
Cited – Brown v The Queen (Jamaica) PC 13-Apr-2005
A police officer appealed against his conviction for manslaughter after being involved in a road traffic accident. Two were killed. The policemen complained as to the direction given on gross negligence manslaughter.
Held: Adomako could not . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Road Traffic, Crime
Updated: 20 December 2021; Ref: scu.226126
