Jones v Challenger: CA 1960

The test under the section was whether it was inequitable to make the order for sale where one of the joint beneficiaries, who in that case were ex-husband and wife, wished to realise their investment in the property.
Held: Referring to the statement of principle in in re Mayo, described as ‘a simple uncomplicated case of a trust for sale of freehold property, where the beneficiaries were brother and sister, and where there was no suggestion that either of them were intended or even wished to occupy the property . . But this simple principle cannot prevail where the trust itself in the circumstances in which it was made show that there was a secondary or collateral object besides that of sale . . it is at any rate wrong and inequitable for one of the parties to the trust to invoke the letter of the trust in order to defeat one of its purposes, whether that purpose be written or unwritten, and the court will not permit it.’

Judges:

Devlin LJ

Citations:

[1960] 1 All ER 785, [1961] 1 QB 176

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 30

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedIn re Mayo ChD 1943
The court discussed the duty of trustees to sell in the absence of unanimity: ‘The trust for sale will prevail, unless all three trustees agree in exercising the power to postpone.’ . .

Cited by:

CitedWilkinson v Chief Adjudication Officer CA 24-Mar-2000
The claimant owned a half share in a property. It was said that this brought her disposable capital above the limit to make a claim. She had inherited it, but had transferred it to her brother in satisfaction of her mother’s wishes. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Trusts

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.189980

Edwin Shirley Productions Ltd v Workspace Management Ltd: 2001

So familiar is the use of the phrase ‘subject to contract’ in the conveyancing context that its effect is, without proof, to be taken to be known to the parties.

Citations:

[2001] 2 EGLR 16

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedGonthier and Another v Orange Contract Scaffolding Ltd CA 25-Jun-2003
The question of a proprietary estoppel as between landlord and tenant arose. An agreement had been reached subject to contract for the grant of a lease, with an option to purchase. The tenant was allowed into possession before the documentation was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.188285

Island Holdings Ltd v Birchington Engineering Co Ltd: 7 Jul 1981

Two prospectively separate purchasers in a later ‘subject to contract’ arrangement between them had replaced their earlier concluded agreement as to how a property, if acquired, would be dealt with.
Held: Effect was to be given to the agreement by way of constructive trust, not to the ‘subject to contract’ arrangement but simply to the notion that the two parties should be obliged to share.

Judges:

Goulding J

Citations:

Unreported, 7 July 1981

Cited by:

CitedBanner Homes Group Plc v Luff Developments and Another CA 10-Feb-2000
Competing building companies agreed not to bid against each other for the purchase of land. One proceeded and the other asserted that the land was then held on trust for the two parties as a joint venture.
Held: Although there was no formal . .
CitedGonthier and Another v Orange Contract Scaffolding Ltd CA 25-Jun-2003
The question of a proprietary estoppel as between landlord and tenant arose. An agreement had been reached subject to contract for the grant of a lease, with an option to purchase. The tenant was allowed into possession before the documentation was . .
CitedThames Cruises Limited v George Wheeler Launches Limited, Kingwood Launches Limited ChD 16-Dec-2003
The parties had previously worked to gether to provide ferry services on the Thames. A new tender to operate the services was not submitted. It was alleged that the Defendants had inequitably seized for themselves a business opportunity which the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Contract, Trusts

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.188287

Derby and Co Ltd v ITC Pension Trust Ltd: 1977

The court considered a party resisting a claim to an estoppel: ‘where parties negotiate on a basis ‘subject to contract’ everybody knows there is a risk that, at the end of the day, either side may back out of negotiations, up to the point where leases are exchanged.’

Judges:

Oliver J

Citations:

[1977] 2 All ER 890

Cited by:

CitedGonthier and Another v Orange Contract Scaffolding Ltd CA 25-Jun-2003
The question of a proprietary estoppel as between landlord and tenant arose. An agreement had been reached subject to contract for the grant of a lease, with an option to purchase. The tenant was allowed into possession before the documentation was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.188286

Napier’s Trustees v Morrison: 1851

Dealing with a public right of way, and holding that the defenders had possessed a road ‘by no trespass or tolerance, but as a public road’the court deprecated the citation in the Court of Session of authorities from England. He really wished, he said – taking a swipe at a future Lord President among others – that Scottish counsel and judges: ‘could imitate the example set us by the counsel and the judges of that kingdom, who decide their causes by their own rules and customs, without exposing themselves by referring to foreign systems, the very language of which they do not comprehend.’

Judges:

Lord Cockburn

Citations:

(1851) 13 D 1404

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRegina v City of Sunderland ex parte Beresford HL 13-Nov-2003
Land had been used as a park for many years. The council land owner refused to register it as a common, saying that by maintaining the park it had indicated that the use was by consent and licence, and that prescription did not apply.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Scotland, Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.187792

Burrows v Lang: 1901

Discussing the book de legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae by Bracton, and its discussion of the meaning of ‘precario’ saying it was the same as de gratia, of grace, and in the context of a watercourse. The court asked ‘What is precarious?’ and answered his own question: ‘That which depends, not on right, but on the will of another person.’

Judges:

Farwell J

Citations:

[1901] 2 Ch 502

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRegina v City of Sunderland ex parte Beresford HL 13-Nov-2003
Land had been used as a park for many years. The council land owner refused to register it as a common, saying that by maintaining the park it had indicated that the use was by consent and licence, and that prescription did not apply.
Held: . .
CitedOdey and Others v Barber ChD 29-Nov-2006
The claimants sought a declaration that they had two rights of way over a neighbour’s land. One was claimed by continuous use for twenty years, and the second was said to have been implied under the 1925 Act. No express grant was suggested. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.187791

Meftah v Lloyd’s TSB Bank Plc: 2001

A short delay in the sale of a property by a mortgagee was appropriate to allow proper advertising of a property.

Citations:

[2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 741

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedDen Norske Bank Asa v Acemex Management Company Ltd CA 7-Nov-2003
Money had been loaned for the purchase of three ships,and mortgages over the ships had been given given. The borrowers were in default, and the lender sought to arrest the vessels. The defendant argued that the way the arrest had been undertaken . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Equity

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.187672

Orr Ewing v Colqhoun: 1887

In the case of tidal rivers the public right of way extends over the whole watercourse but in the case of non-tidal rivers the public rights (at least ordinarily) are confined to the channel of the river.

Judges:

Lord Blackburn

Citations:

(1887) 2 App Cas 839

Cited by:

CitedRowland v The Environment Agency ChD 19-Dec-2002
Public rights of Navigation have since time immemorial at common law existed over the Thames including (unless and until extinguished or ceasing to be exercisable) Hedsor Water. The claimant sought a declaration that rights of navigation over that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Transport

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.187531

Tse Kwong Lam v Wong Chit Sen: PC 1983

For a mortgagee in possession selling a property, it does not matter that the time may be unpropitious and that by waiting a higher price could be obtained: he is not bound to postpone in the hope of obtaining a better price.

Citations:

[1983] 1 WLR 1349

Cited by:

CitedSilven Properties Limited, Chart Enterprises Incorporated v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, Vooght, Harris CA 21-Oct-2003
The claimants sought damages from mortgagees who had sold their charged properties as receivers. They said they had failed to sell at a proper value. They asked whether the express appointment in the mortgage of receivers as agents of the mortgagor . .
CitedBradford and Bingley Bplc v Ross CA 11-Mar-2005
The appellant had charged his property to the claimant, and had then fallen into arrears. The property was sold, and the lender sought the balance outstanding from him. The bank failed to disclose that they had sold the property to an associated . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.187037

Long Eaton Recreational Ground Co v Midland Railway: 1902

Citations:

[1902] 1 KB 574

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedWrotham Park Settled Estates v Hertsmere Borough Council CA 12-Apr-1993
Land had been purchased under compulsory purchase powers. It had been subject to restrictive covenants in favour of neighbouring land which would have prevented the development now implemented. The question was how the compensation should be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.186375

Westminster City Council v Quereshi: 1961

Citations:

[1991] CLY 461

Cited by:

Not followedCo-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Hastings Borough Council ChD 23-Jun-1993
The local authority made a CPO in 1981 in respect of a sports ground. The applicants later acquired the land. In 1989 the order was confirmed and in March 1989 a vesting order was made. The authority was unable to afford to complete the purchase. In . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Local Government

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.186342

Metropolitan Board of Works v McCarthy: HL 1874

Compensation was awarded to the owner of a warehouse near Blackfriars because the construction of the Victoria Embankment cut off his access across the public highway to a dock on the river. Lord Cairns LC quoted Thesiger QC as saying: ‘Where by the construction of works there is a physical interference with any right, public or private, which the owners or occupiers of property are by law entitled to make use of, in connection with such property, and which right gives an additional market value to such property, apart from the uses to which any particular owner or occupier might put it, there is a title to compensation, if, by reason of such interference, the property, as a property, is lessened in value.’ and ‘The word ‘physical’ is here used in order to distinguish the case from cases of that class where the interference is not of a physical, but rather of a mental, nature, or of an inferential kind, such as those of a road rendered less agreeable or convenient, or a view interfered with, or the profits of a trade, by the creation of a new highway or street, diminished in the old one. And in like manner the words ‘a right, public or private, which the owner of property is entitled to make use of,’ apply to this case and distinguish it from such cases as Hammersmith Railway Co. v. Brand. There no right, public or private, was interfered with, and the claim for compensation was made in respect of the injury to the enjoyment of the property.’

Judges:

Lord Cairns L.C

Citations:

[1874] LR 7 HL 243

Statutes:

Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 68

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedWrotham Park Settled Estates v Hertsmere Borough Council CA 12-Apr-1993
Land had been purchased under compulsory purchase powers. It had been subject to restrictive covenants in favour of neighbouring land which would have prevented the development now implemented. The question was how the compensation should be . .
CitedMoto Hospitality Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport CA 26-Jul-2007
The company sought damages to its business on a motorway service station when works closed an access road.
Held: The Secretary of State’s appeal succeeded. A claim for compensation under section 10 had not been established, at least in respect . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Damages

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.186376

G W H Riddell, Petitioner: IHCS 1874

The date of the deed must be taken to be the date when the trust deed was made and executed, which is the literal meaning of the words used

Judges:

Lord President Inglis

Citations:

(1874) 1 R 462

Statutes:

Entail Amendment (Scotland) Act 1848 47

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Cited by:

CitedEarl of Balfour v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland and Others HL 6-Nov-2002
The applicant sought a declaration that he was the owner of land by virtue of the 1848 Act, claiming that a series of grants of liferent were ineffective to restrict the title transferred.
Held: Miller’s Trustees was to be applied in to the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.186368

Argyle Motors (Birkenhead) v Birkenhead Corporation: HL 1974

The House described the way that the 1845 Act continued to affect the calculation of compensation: ‘The relevant section of the Act of 1845 (section 68) has, over 100 years, received through a number of decisions, some in this House, and by no means easy to reconcile, an interpretation which fixes upon it a meaning having little perceptible relation to the words used. This represents a century of judicial effort to keep the primitive wording – which itself has an earlier history – in some sort of accord with the realities of the industrial age.’

Judges:

Lord Wilberforce

Citations:

[1974] CLY 374, [1975] AC 99

Statutes:

Land Compensation Act 1965 10

Cited by:

CitedWrotham Park Settled Estates v Hertsmere Borough Council CA 12-Apr-1993
Land had been purchased under compulsory purchase powers. It had been subject to restrictive covenants in favour of neighbouring land which would have prevented the development now implemented. The question was how the compensation should be . .
CitedWestminster City Council v Ocean Leisure Limited CA 21-Jul-2004
The claimant company owned property next to land which had been acquired to build a new bridge across the Thames. It sought compensation for disturbance to its business from the works.
Held: The state of the law was complicated and . .
CitedWiltshire County Council v Crest Estates Ltd. and others CA 5-Aug-2005
The builders had agreed as part of the planning process to indemnify the council against all claims incidental to the carrying out of the works for which permission was given. The council had to compulsorily purchase land, and sought repayment from . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.186371

Collis v Amphlett: CA 1918

‘There is undoubtedly a popular belief in some parts of the country which has found its way into books that the owner of a hedge is also the owner of a space outside it; sometimes said to be four feet from the base of the bank on which the hedge stands. I am not aware of any legal authority for this broad proposition.’ ‘This matter of the respective positions of the fence and the ditch as affording evidence of the boundary was referred as a custom. It is not a custom at all when rightly understood, but it is a mere presumption. It is a very different thing from a custom. This presumption is very often decisive where there is no evidence at all as to what the boundaries are, but, like any other presumption it is rebuttable, and very often it can easily be rebutted by the production of title deeds. In this case, when the title deeds are examined, there is no room for the operation of the presumption at all.’

Judges:

Scrutton LJ, Goddard LJ

Citations:

[1918] 1 Ch 232

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedAlan Wibberley Building Ltd v Insley CA 12-Nov-1997
Where adjoining fields are separated by a hedge and a ditch, who owns the ditch?
Held: The old presumption as to the location of a boundary based on the layout of hedges and ditches is irrelevant where the conveyance was by reference to an OS . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.183679

The Earl of Craven v Pridmore and others: CA 1902

The well established presumption that the boundary of plots of land separated by a hedge and ditch, that the boundary is the hedge on the far side of the ditch is a rebuttable presumption. The question was ‘how far the presumption had been displaced by evidence of acts of ownership on the part of the defendants.’

Judges:

Collins MR

Citations:

[1902] 18 Times LR 282

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedVowles v Miller 9-Jul-1810
Lawrence J said: ‘The rule about ditching is this. No man, making a ditch, can cut into his neighbour’s soil, but usually he cuts it to the very extremity of his own land: he is of course bound to throw the soil which he digs out, upon his own land; . .

Cited by:

CitedAlan Wibberley Building Ltd v Insley CA 12-Nov-1997
Where adjoining fields are separated by a hedge and a ditch, who owns the ditch?
Held: The old presumption as to the location of a boundary based on the layout of hedges and ditches is irrelevant where the conveyance was by reference to an OS . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.183678

Chivers and Sons Ltd v Air Ministry: 1955

The liability of the lay impropriator to pay the cost of repairing the chancel has been part of ecclesiastical law for many centuries. It rests on the maxim, which has long been recognised, that he who has the profits of the benefice should bear the burden. The burden is imposed for the benefit of the parishioners. The liability to repair the chancel is not a charge on the rectorial property, but a personal liability imposed on the owner or owners for the time being of the rectorial property. If there is more than one owner, each is severally liable.

Judges:

Wynn-Parry J

Citations:

[1955] 1 Ch 585

Cited by:

CitedParochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, Warwickshire v Wallbank and another HL 26-Jun-2003
Parish Councils are Hybrid Public Authorities
The owners of glebe land were called upon as lay rectors to contribute to the cost of repairs to the local church. They argued that the claim was unlawful by section 6 of the 1998 Act as an act by a public authority incompatible with a Convention . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Ecclesiastical, Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.184041

Re Daniel, Daniel v Vassall: 1917

The vendor of land who, whether through innocent or wiful default, or with or without bad faith, fails to do everything possible to make good title, makes himself liable in damages for the general losses of the purchaser, including any loss of bargain.

Citations:

[1917] 2 Ch 405, 87 LJ Ch 69, 117 LT 472, 33 TLR 503, 61 Sol Jo 646

Citing:

CitedEngell v Fitch ChD 1869
The lease of land was sold at auction. The conditions of sale provided for possessionto be given on completion. The vendors, mortgagees with the right of sale, were unwilling to incur the expense of recovering possession.
Held: The vendor was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Contract

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.183265

In re Chewton Common: 1977

Citations:

[1977] 3 All ER 509, [1977] 1 WLR 1242

Cited by:

CitedG and K Ladenbau (UK) Ltd v Crawley and De Reya QBD 25-Apr-1977
The defendant solicitors acted for the plaintiff in the purchase of land, but failed to undertake a commons search which would have revealed an entry which would prevent the client pursuing his development. The defect was discovered only when . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.183168

Macedo v Stroud: PC 1922

(Trinidad) The donor purported to give real property (in part) by memorandum which was not registered. Under the law of Trinidad the transfer did not pass any estate or interest in the land. The donor delivered the instrument to his solicitor telling him to keep the document and not to register it. The document accordingly remained in the solicitor’s custody unregistered until the death of the donor, who during his life continued to receive the rents. The judge found that the instrument was intended to operate as an immediate and unconditional gift to the donee.
Held: The memorandum not having been registered nor delivered to the donee for that purpose there was an imperfect gift of the properties with which it dealt to which equity could not give effect: ‘The memorandum of transfer was never made the subject of registration, nor did the donor present it, or hand it to the transferee, for that purpose. It therefore, having regard to the terms of the ordinance, transferred no estate or interest either at law or in equity. At the most it amounted to an incomplete instrument which was not binding for want of consideration. Had it been in terms a declaration of trust, a Court of equity might have compelled the trustee to carry out the trust, which would have been binding on him, even if voluntary. But it does not purport to be a declaration of trust, or anything else than in inchoate transfer. As such, and as it is voluntary, it is no more than an imperfect gift of which a Court of equity will not compel perfection.’

Citations:

[1922] 2 AC 330

Citing:

CitedMilroy v Lord CA 26-Jul-1862
The donor executed a transfer of 50 shares. The shares were only transferable by entry in the books of the bank. No such transfer was ever made. The defendant had a power of attorney authorising him to transfer the donor’s shares and after the deed . .

Cited by:

CitedPennington and Another v Waine, Crampton and others CA 4-Mar-2002
The deceased had made a gift of shares. She had executed a transfer, and acting upon the promise, the donee had agreed to become a director which he could only do if he also became a shareholder. The transfer was delivered to the deceased’s agent, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Commonwealth, Land, Equity, Registered Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.183418

Dennis v Malcolm: 1934

The court considered the way in which the 1841 Act might operate as to a reversion of the title. Clauson J said: ‘In my view it is plain that the deed is intended to operate and operate only under the [1841] Act, and the effect of dealing with the matter as if the Act had not been passed is to destroy the authority under which and under which alone the grant was intended to operate : the result is therefore in my view precisely the same as if the statute had said the reverter is to take place as if the grant had not been made.’

Judges:

Clauson J

Citations:

[1934] Ch 244

Statutes:

School Sites Act 1841

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRector of Wrington and The Bath and Wells Diocesan Board of Finance v Jenkinson and Others ChD 26-Feb-2002
Land having been conveyed under the Act, and it no longer being needed as a school, it had to be decided to whom the land reverted.
Held: The tracing of beneficiaries had to be in the basis under section 2, that the land had never been so . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.183014

Excelsior Wire Rope Co Ltd v Callan: HL 1930

The House dismissed an appeal by an occupier of land against a finding that he was liable for an injury occasioned to a child trespassing on his land.

Citations:

[1930] AC 404 HL(E)

Cited by:

CitedBritish Railways Board v Herrington HL 16-Feb-1972
Land-owner’s Possible Duty to Trespassers
The plaintiff, a child had gone through a fence onto the railway line, and been badly injured. The Board knew of the broken fence, but argued that they owed no duty to a trespasser.
Held: Whilst a land-owner owes no general duty of care to a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Torts – Other

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.182866

Williams v James: 1867

A right of way had been granted over the plaintiff’s land for the benefit of ‘Nine acre field’ in its ordinary use as a field. Hay grown on both Nine acre field and the adjoining ‘Parrott’s land’ had been mowed and stored on Nine acre field in the summer of 1866, and in September 1866 its whole bulk was sold to the defendant who carted it away over the plaintiff’s land to the highway. The jury held that the original storage on Nine acre field had been done honestly and not in order to gain the advantage of the right of way. The stacking and subsequent dealing with the hay must have been regarded by the jury as being in the ordinary and reasonable use of Nine acre field.
Held: The test identified judgments was whether Nine acre field was being used for purposes others than those included in its ordinary and reasonable use.
However, Bovill CJ said: ‘If no additional burthen was cast upon the servient tenement the jury might well find that there had been only the ordinary and reasonable use of the right of way’. A right of way obtained by prescription for the purpose of carting hay to field ‘cannot be increased so as to affect the servient tenement by imposing upon it any additional burthen’ and ‘[i]n all cases of this kind which depend upon user the right acquired must be measured by the extent of the enjoyment which is proved’.

Judges:

Bovill CJ, Willes J

Citations:

[1867] LR 2 CP 577

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRichard Jonathan Brett Guise v John Drew ChD 8-Jun-2001
A right of way had been acquired by prescription, but its extent was disputed. It had been used for mainly residential purposes, but then to a greater extent for a different business use.
Held: A right of way may be for one purpose, to the . .
AppliedWimbledon and Putney Commons Conservators v Dixon CA 1875
A prescriptive right of way had been enjoyed in connection with the use of the dominant land for agricultural purposes, which had included enlarging the farmhouse and rebuilding a cottage. The dominant owner could not use the way for carting . .
CitedMcAdams Homes Ltd v Robinson and Another CA 27-Feb-2004
The defendant blocked the line of a sewer. The claimant alleged that it had an easement and sought the cost of building the alternative pipe. The question to be answered was ‘Where an easement is granted by implication on the sale of a property, . .
CitedWood v Saunders 1875
The dominant land at the time of sale contained a house ‘adapted for about twenty-five inmates, and only part of the drainage of the house rain into the ditch or moat’ on land retained by the vendor. The purchaser subsequently extended the house, . .
CitedHarris v Flower CA 1904
The servient land-owner alleged an excessive user by which it was attempted to impose an additional burden on the servient tenement in the use of a right of way for obtaining access to a factory erected partly on the land to which the right of way . .
CitedBramwell and Others v Robinson ChD 21-Oct-2016
Interference with right of way
Neighbour dispute as to right of way.
Held: The defendant had failed to establish the ‘swing space’ he asserted, but otherwise the claimant had in several ways behaved unreasonably and interfered with the use of the right and harrassed the . .
CitedLynn Shellfish Ltd and Others v Loose and Another SC 13-Apr-2016
The court was asked as to the extent of an exclusive prescriptive right (ie an exclusive right obtained through a long period of use) to take cockles and mussels from a stretch of the foreshore on the east side of the Wash, on the west coast of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.181798

Baker v Bethnal Green Corporation: CA 1945

The plaintiff sought damages after a relative died in the stairwell of an underground tube station taken over by the defendant for use as an air raid shelter. The steps down to the station were known to be unsafe, being wide without protective railings and subject to risks where a large flow of people used the steps at the same time. The defendant replied that it had not been negligent, that it had not altered the station, that it was exempt under the 1939 Act, and that it was an injury of war.
Held: The defendant was properly the occupier of the premises, and responsible. The dangers were known, and particularly at the start of an air raid, the dangerous conditions would arise. The injuries received were not war injuries, and the 1939 Act did not provide the exemption sought. The defendants were liable.

Citations:

109 JP 72 CA, [1945] 1 All ER 135, [1945] 43 LGR 75

Statutes:

Civil Defence Act 1939

Cited by:

CitedBritish Railways Board v Herrington HL 16-Feb-1972
Land-owner’s Possible Duty to Trespassers
The plaintiff, a child had gone through a fence onto the railway line, and been badly injured. The Board knew of the broken fence, but argued that they owed no duty to a trespasser.
Held: Whilst a land-owner owes no general duty of care to a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Negligence, Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.180680

Bethnal Green Vestry v London School Board: HL 1898

The owner of a block of houses laid a pipe in the yards at the rear of the houses to carry off their drainage and connected the pipe with a sewer belonging to the Vestry in a neighbouring street. No notice was been given to the Vestry or of any order having been made by them as required by section 74, nor was there evidence of approval having been obtained of the Metropolitan Board of Works under section 69. The block was acquired by the school and when the pipe was found to be defective the school called upon the Vestry to repair it. The Vestry declined to do so on the ground that the pipe was not a sewer vested in or repairable by them. The issue was whether the pipe came within the definition of ‘sewer’ in section 250.
Held: No appropriate order had been made. The work was done with the sanction and authority both of the Vestry and of the Metropolitan Board of Works. If vested in the Vestry this was repairable by the Vestry. Therefore the only question was whether it was so vested in the Vestry. The words absolutely wide and unlimited, ‘all sewers’ thereafter to be made, and it is only sought to cut down those words by suggesting it must mean all sewers lawfully made. There was in this case good ground for presuming that the connection of this sewer for draining the houses with the sewer received the sanction of the Vestry, and, in the absence of any distinct proof to the contrary, received the sanction of the Metropolitan Board of Works. However, even if this could not be made out, it would not follow, if the sanction of the Vestry was given, that the sewer could be held not to be a sewer within the meaning of s.68 merely because the Vestry had failed to perform their statutory duty of first submitting the plans to the Metropolitan Board of Works and obtaining their sanction. It does not follow that because the requisite sanctions have not been obtained the thing constructed is not a sewer. In the language of this legislation I think it is nonetheless a sewer within the meaning of the Act even though that sewer may have come into existence without an assent or approval which, as between public bodies, the statute requires.

Judges:

Lord Herschell

Citations:

[1898] AC 190

Statutes:

Metropolis Local Management Act 1855 69 74

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Utilities

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.179847

Tehidy Minerals Ltd v Norman: CA 1971

The fact that land had been requisitioned by the Ministry of Agriculture between 1941 and 1960 and the 20-odd years’ user relied on as having created the rights had preceded 1941 was a bar to a prescriptive claim to grazing rights under the Prescription Act 1832 but not at common law. Discussing Angus v Dalton, applying the doctrine of lost modern grant: ‘where there has been upwards of 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, such enjoyment having the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some reason . . the existence of such a grant is impossible, the law will adopt a legal fiction that such a grant was made, in spite of any direct evidence that no such grant was in fact made.’

Judges:

Buckley LJ

Citations:

[1971] 2 QB 528

Statutes:

Prescription Act 1832

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

ExplainedDalton v Henry Angus and Co HL 14-Jun-1881
The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some . .
CitedDalton v Henry Angus and Co 1877
Fry J said: ‘ . .I cannot imagine any case of acquiescence in which there is not shown to be in the servient owner: 1, a knowledge of the acts done; 2, a power in him to stop the acts or to sue in respect of them; and 3, an abstinence on his part . .
CitedDalton v Henry Angus and Co CA 1878
. .

Cited by:

CitedRoland Brandwood and others v Bakewell Management Ltd CA 30-Jan-2003
House owners had used vehicular access across a common to get to their houses for many years. The commons owner required them to purchase the right, and they replied that they had acquired the right by lost modern grant and/or by prescription.
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
CitedOdey and Others v Barber ChD 29-Nov-2006
The claimants sought a declaration that they had two rights of way over a neighbour’s land. One was claimed by continuous use for twenty years, and the second was said to have been implied under the 1925 Act. No express grant was suggested. . .
CitedPolo Woods Foundation v Shelton-Agar and Another ChD 17-Jun-2009
The court considered whether the claimant had established a profit a prendre against the defendant neighbour’s land in the form of a right of pasturage, acquired either by lost modern grant or by prescription.
Held: The appeal succeeded, but . .
CitedLawrence and Another v Fen Tigers Ltd and Others QBD 4-Mar-2011
The claimants had complained that motor-cycle and other racing activities on neighbouring lands were a noise nuisance, but the court also considered that agents of the defendants had sought to intimidate the claimants into not pursuing their action. . .
CitedLynn Shellfish Ltd and Others v Loose and Another SC 13-Apr-2016
The court was asked as to the extent of an exclusive prescriptive right (ie an exclusive right obtained through a long period of use) to take cockles and mussels from a stretch of the foreshore on the east side of the Wash, on the west coast of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.179838

Neaverson v Peterborough Rural District Council: ChD 1902

The 1812 Act provided for the draining, enclosing and improving of a fen which was common land. Under the Act the grass growing on various roadways was vested in the surveyor of highways, who had power to let it for the pasturage of ‘sound and healthy sheep’ but with an express prohibition of other animals. Nevertheless the land was in the event used, for over sixty years, for the pasturage of horses and cattle, despite the fact that this involved a danger of damage to the drainage system.
Held: If a lost modern grant is to be presumed, it is essential to consider who are to be the supposed grantors and grantees. The defendants’ counsel found themselves in considerable difficulties in this respect. The Court is endowed with a great power of imagination for the purpose of supporting ancient user. But, in inferring a legal origin for such user, it cannot infer one which would involve illegality. A lost grant cannot be presumed where such a grant would be in contravention of a statute: ‘If such a grant could not have had a legal origin, then it is not competent for us to presume its existence. On the other hand, if it could have had a legal origin, then we ought to presume the existence of such a grant, when there is evidence of user for such a long period.’ and ‘such a grant as is here suggested would have been illegal, whoever is supposed to have made it.’

Judges:

Sir Richard Henn Collins MR

Citations:

[1902] 1 Ch 557

Statutes:

Newborough Inclosure Act 1812

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedGeorge Legge and Son Ltd v Wenlock Corporation HL 1938
The question was whether the status of a natural stream could be changed to that of a sewer by the unlawful discharge for a long period of sewage into the stream. The claimant asserted that a right by way of an easement could be acquired despite the . .
CitedGlamorgan County Council v Carter QBD 1962
A caravan owner appealed against an enforcement notice on the basis that no planning permission was required because the parking of caravans was the purpose for which the land had been last used.
Held: Factually that was correct. Prima facie . .

Cited by:

CitedRoland Brandwood and others v Bakewell Management Ltd CA 30-Jan-2003
House owners had used vehicular access across a common to get to their houses for many years. The commons owner required them to purchase the right, and they replied that they had acquired the right by lost modern grant and/or by prescription.
CitedTinsley v Milligan CA 1992
The court considered the defence of illegal user to a claim to have established an easement by prescription: ‘These authorities seem to me to establish that when applying the ‘ex turpi causa’ maxim in a case in which a defence of illegality has been . .
CitedHanning and Others v Top Deck Travel Group Ltd CA 9-Jun-1993
The owner of a common appealed a finding that the neighbouring land owner had acquired by prescription a right of way across the common to use a track for commercial vehicles (buses) to get to the property (the bus depot).
Held: An easement . .
CitedBakewell Management Limited v Brandwood and others HL 1-Apr-2004
Houses were built next to a common. Over many years the owners had driven over the common. The landowners appealed a decision that they could not acquire a right of way by prescription over the common because such use had been unlawful as a criminal . .
AppliedHulley v Silversprings Bleaching and Dyeing Co Ltd ChD 1992
A lower riparian owner sued the Silversprings company for nuisance.
Held: The fact that the plaintiff’s predecessors had acquiesced in pollution for twenty years was no defence, because the plaintiff was not the only person affected by the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.179840

Langley v Earl of Oxford: 1743

Specific devisee of a mortgage is not bound by an account settled between the representatives of the mortgagor and those of the mortgagee.

Citations:

[1743] EngR 14, (1743) Amb 17, (1743) 27 ER 9

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.383682

Harrison v Duke of Rutland: CA 8 Dec 1893

H used a public highway crossing the defendant’s land, to disrupt grouse-shooting upon the defendant’s land. He complained after he had been forcibly restrained by the defendant’s servants from doing so. The defendant justified his actions saying that the plaintiff was a trespasser upon the highway.
Held: Insofar as the plaintiff was upon a highway for purposes other than its use as a highway, he was a trespasser.
Lord Esher MR said: ‘on the ground that the plaintiff was on the highway, the soil of which belonged to the Duke of Rutland, not for the purpose of using it in order to pass and repass, or for any reasonable or usual mode of using the highway as a highway, I think he was a trespasser.’ and ‘Highways are, no doubt, dedicated prima facie for the purpose of passage; but things are done upon them by everybody which are recognised as being rightly done, and as constituting a reasonable and usual mode of using a highway as such. If a person on a highway does not transgress such reasonable and usual mode of using it, I do not think that he will be a trespasser.’
Lopes LJ said: ‘if a person uses the soil of the highway for any purpose other than that in respect of which the dedication was made and the easement acquired, he is a trespasser. The easement acquired by the public is a right to pass and repass at their pleasure for the purpose of legitimate travel, and the use of the soil for any other purpose, whether lawful or unlawful, is an infringement of the rights of the owner of the soil.’
Kay LJ said: ‘the right of the public upon a highway is that of passing and repassing over land the soil of which may be owned by a private person. Using that soil for any other purpose lawful or unlawful is a trespass.’

Judges:

Lord Esher MR, Lopes LJ, Kay LJ

Citations:

[1893] 1 QB 142, (1893) The Times LR 115, [1892] UKLawRpKQB 217

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedRegina v Pratt 1855
‘I take it to be clear law that, if a man use the land over which there is a right of way for any purpose, lawful or unlawful, other than that of passing and repassing, he is a trespasser.’ . .

Cited by:

AppliedHickman v Maisey CA 16-Mar-1900
A racing tout used the public highway which crossed the plaintiff’s property to watch racehorses being trained on the plaintiff’s land. On a particular occasion he walked backwards and forwards on a portion of the highway 15 yards long for a period . .
AppliedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Jones and Lloyd HL 4-Mar-1999
21 people protested peacefully on the verge of the A344, next to the perimeter fence at Stonehenge. Some carried banners saying ‘Never Again,’ ‘Stonehenge Campaign 10 years of Criminal Injustice’ and ‘Free Stonehenge.’ The officer in charge . .
CitedHerrick and Another v Kidner and Another Admn 17-Feb-2010
Psychological Obstruction to Public Footpath
A public footpath crossed the appellants’ land. They constructed a gateway across it which they now accepted had been a significant obstruction of the right of way. The local authority served a notice requiring its removal, including the stone . .
CitedJones and Lloyd v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-Jan-1997
The appellants had been peacefully protesting at Stonehenge. They were among others who refused to leave when ordered to do so under an order made by the police officer in charge declaring it to be a trespassory assembly under the 1986 Act. They . .
CitedCity of London v Samede and Others QBD 18-Jan-2012
The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either . .
CitedRodgers v Ministry of Transport QBD 20-Feb-1952
A cafe operated by the trunk road. Lorry drivers when pulling off to stop, damaged the verge, along which ran a public footpath. The defendant constructed a lay-by for the lorries, re-routing the footpath around it, purporting tu use powers under . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.192188

Langley v Earl of Oxford: 1748

A specific legatee of part of a sum due to testator on mortgage, bound by an account settled between the mortgagor and the executor of the mortgagee. Bequest over on a general failure of issue is void.

Citations:

[1748] EngR 105, (1748) Amb 795, (1748) 27 ER 505 (B)

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Wills and Probate, Land

Updated: 12 May 2022; Ref: scu.379667

Skerritts of Nottingham Limited v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions, Harrow London Borough Council: Admn 22 Mar 1999

The curtilage of a building is a small area around it. An assessment of whether a separate structure was within the curtilage which did not consider the distance between the various buildings must be incorrect in that it had omitted an essential consideration. A stable block lying some distance from a listed building should only be deemed to be within the curtilage with care. The intention was to affect only a small area about the building. This mistake amounted to an error of law.

Citations:

Times 25-May-1999, Gazette 31-Mar-1999, [1999] EWHC Admin 250

Statutes:

Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 65

Citing:

AppliedDyer v Dorset County Council CA 1988
The court discussed what was meant by the curtilage of the appellant’s house: ‘Thus the sole issue is whether Mr Dyer’s house is or is not within the curtilage of another building or, by the application of section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1978, . .
CitedAttorney-General ex relater Sutcliffe and Others v Calderdale Borough Council CA 1982
The court discussed whether a terrace of cottages was within the curtilage of an old factory which was a listed building. At first instance, Skinner J had held that they were, and that permission could not be granted for their demolition. The . .

Cited by:

Appeal FromSecretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions and Another v Skerritts of Nottingham Ltd CA 25-Feb-2000
The meaning of ‘curtilage’ whilst not strictly a term of art had caused considerable difficulties. There was nothing inherent in the concept to imply any limitation that the area should be small. In this case the curtilage of a manor house could . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Land, Planning

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.139514

Regina v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council: Admn 11 Jul 1996

The Parish Council sought judicial review of the county council’s decision to reject a regristation of land as a Common on the ground that the user of the land by the villagers had not been shown to be ‘as of right.’
Held: Leave to bring the review was refused, applying the Steed case.

Judges:

Buxton J

Citations:

[1996] EWHC Admin 28

Statutes:

Commons Registration Act 1965 13(b)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

AppliedRegina v Suffolk County Council Ex Parte Steed and Another CA 2-Aug-1996
Customary rights over land were not defeated by failure to register as common. ‘As of right’ meant that the right must be exercised in the belief that it is a right enjoyed by the inhabitants of the village to the exclusion of all other people. ‘it . .

Cited by:

Appeal fromRegina v Oxfordshire County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council CA 24-Nov-1997
The Parish Council appealed against refusal of leave to seek judicial review of a decision to reject an application for certain land to be registered as a common. . .
At first instanceRegina v Oxfordshire County Council and Another, Ex Parte Sunningwell Parish Council HL 25-Jun-1999
When setting out to establish that a piece of land has become a village green with rights of common, the tests are similar to those used in the law of prescription and adverse possession. Accordingly, there is no need to establish a belief in those . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.136576

Thomas v Secretary of State for Wales and Another: QBD 13 Mar 1996

Local Authority need not show intention to build on all parts of land being compulsorily purchased under the Act. The object of section 89 was to allow a local authority to purchase land which was unsightly, neglected or derelict to put it to use. The authority’s proposed use was to clear and stabilise the area and make it a heritage site. The section allowed them to buy the land to execute ‘such works on that land or any other land as appears to them expedient’.

Judges:

ustice Macpherson of Cluny

Citations:

Times 08-Apr-1996

Statutes:

National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 89

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.89867

Kenneth Starling v Lloyds TSB Bank plc: CA 10 Nov 1999

The setting aside of the statutory power of a mortgagor in possession to grant a lease, by the mortgage itself did not create in the lender a duty of good faith properly to consider a request from the mortgagor for permission to let the property. It was wrong to attempt to import such a duty from a very different area of law.

Judges:

29 October 1999

Citations:

Times 12-Nov-1999, Gazette 10-Nov-1999

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 99

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

FollowedMedforth v Blake and others CA 26-May-1999
A receiver appointed to manage a business had duties over and above those of mere good faith. A receiver who failed to obtain discounts normally obtainable for supplies to the business might be liable for that failure. when considering the position . .

Cited by:

CitedNiru Battery Manufacturing Company, Bank Sepah Iran v Milestone Trading Limited CA 23-Oct-2003
The claimant had contracted to purchase lead from some of the defendants. There were delays in payment but when funds were made available they should have been repaid. An incorrect bill of lading was presented. The bill certified that the goods had . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Banking, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.89505

Layard v Maud: 1867

Wood borrowed money from Austen to complete the purchase of an advowson, covenanting that he would within six months complete the purchase and give a legal mortgage to secure the loan. Two years later, Austen not having required the delivery of the title deeds or taken any other steps to perfect his security, Wood completed the purchase and obtained the deeds, and after another four months had passed he deposited the deeds with the defendants as security for a loan. The defendants had no notice of the prior equitable mortgage. Austen had taken no steps to possess himself of the deeds over a long period of time.
Held: Though Malins VC did not found himself on this delay, saying, at 406: ‘I have not a shadow of doubt that where there is merely an equitable mortgage . . ., in every case where the equitable mortgagee either omits to get, or having got, gives up possession of the deeds, he must always be postponed.’
Where two equities are equal, possession of the title deeds gives priority.

Judges:

Malins VC

Citations:

(1867) LR 4 Eq 397

Equity, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.554687

UCB Bank plc v Beasley: 1995

Citations:

[1995] NPC 144

Cited by:

CitedScott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd and Others SC 22-Oct-2014
The appellant challenged a sale and rent back transaction. He said that the proposed purchaser had misrepresented the transaction to them. The Court was asked s whether the home owners had interests whose priority was protected by virtue of section . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.553543

Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi: 7 Oct 2003

High Court of Australia – Vendor and purchaser – Contracts for sale of land – Default by purchaser – Notice of termination – Supplemental deed requiring completion by stipulated date – Time of essence – Default by purchaser – Notice of termination – Purchase price available following day – Specific performance – Whether unconscientious for vendors to exercise right of termination – Whether relief on the ground of ‘accident’ available in face of essential time stipulation.
Equity – Relief against forfeiture – Contracts for sale of land – Default by purchaser – Whether unconscientious for vendors to exercise right of termination – Whether default occasioned by ‘accident’ – Whether relief on the ground of ‘accident’ available in face of essential time stipulation.

Judges:

Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon JJ

Citations:

(2003) 217 CLR 315, [2003] HCA 57

Links:

Austlii

Cited by:

CitedScott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd and Others SC 22-Oct-2014
The appellant challenged a sale and rent back transaction. He said that the proposed purchaser had misrepresented the transaction to them. The Court was asked s whether the home owners had interests whose priority was protected by virtue of section . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Commonwealth, Land, Contract

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.553537

Re Birmingham, deceased; Savage v Stannard: 1957

An unpaid vendor’s lien arises the moment the contract is entered into. It is discharged on completion to the extent that the purchase money is paid.

Citations:

[1959] Ch 523, [1958] 2 All ER 397

Cited by:

ApprovedLondon and Cheshire Insurance Co Ltd v Laplagrene Property Co Ltd ChD 1971
. .
CitedScott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd and Others SC 22-Oct-2014
The appellant challenged a sale and rent back transaction. He said that the proposed purchaser had misrepresented the transaction to them. The Court was asked s whether the home owners had interests whose priority was protected by virtue of section . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.553542

Hartley v Mayoh and Co: 1954

The expression ‘persons employed’ does not extend to a fireman who enters a factory in order to put a fire out, though the occupier may well have a duty to warn firemen of an unexpected danger or trap of which he knows or ought to know.

Citations:

[1954] 1 QB 383

Cited by:

CitedMcDonald v National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc SC 22-Oct-2014
Contact visiting plants supported asbestos claim
The deceased had worked as a lorry driver regularly collecting pulverized fuel ash from a power station. On his visits he was at areas with asbestos dust. He came to die from mesothelioma. His widow now pursued his claim that the respondent had . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Health and Safety, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.538252

St Edmundsbury v Clark (No 2): ChD 1973

Megarry J described the presumption that a conveyance of land abutting a highway or river passes with it the the adjoining half of that road or river: ‘Various reasons had been given for the presumption. It has been based on convenience and the prevention of disputes, and in the case of public highways on a supposition that the proprietors on each side of the road each contributed half of it. Theobald’s Law of Land, 2nd ed. (1929), p. 235, states:
‘It is unlikely that the grantor intended to reserve the narrow strip under the road or stream ad medium filum; there is therefore a presumption that such strip was intended to pass, but the presumption may be rebutted by the language of the conveyance, or the surrounding circumstances.’
This, perhaps, is an expansion of ‘convenience’: it also may be based on intention. It seems in some degree improbable that a grantor of land should intend to retain for himself an adjoining long thin strip of land over which there is a public highway or an easement of way. When from a practical point of view such a strip of land is unlikely ever to be capable of beneficial enjoyment by anyone save the grantee of the adjoining land and his successors in title, not only is it improbable that the grantor intended to retain the strip but also it would not be very long before serious difficulties in tracing the title to the strip might arise. As Lord Moulton said in City of London Land Tax Commissioners v Central Railway Co [1913] AC 364, 384, ‘The law cannot permit that the land under the highway should belong to nobody.’ This consideration seems to me to apply with equal force whether the thin strip is subject to a highway or an easement of way over its whole width, or whether the way merely runs down the middle with thinner strips on each side of it. ‘

Judges:

Megarry J

Citations:

[1973] 1 WLR 1572

Cited by:

Appeal fromSt Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocesan Board of Finance v Clark (No.2) CA 1973
When looking at a contract ‘one must construe the document according to the natural meaning of the words contained in the document as a whole, read in the light of surrounding circumstances.’
The contra preferetem rule can only come into play . .
CitedPaton and Another v Todd ChD 11-May-2012
The claimants sought leave to appeal against rejection of their request made to the Deputy Adjudicator for the rectification of the title to land they claimed title to land which was registered to the respondent neighbour.
Held: The claimant’s . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.515412

Rodgers v Ministry of Transport: QBD 20 Feb 1952

A cafe operated by the trunk road. Lorry drivers when pulling off to stop, damaged the verge, along which ran a public footpath. The defendant constructed a lay-by for the lorries, re-routing the footpath around it, purporting tu use powers under the 1936 Act. The plaintiff objected.
Held: The action for an injunction failed. The verge was part of the highway, and it was a proper use of the highway to pull over on to it for a temporary stop for a legitimate purpose, provided that he caused no obstruction to either the highway, or in this case the footpath. The works had not amounted to the construction of a car park, but were merely levelling and widening the highway. The defendant had not exceeded his powers.

Judges:

Lord Goddard CJ

Citations:

[1952] 1 All ER 634, (1952) 116 JP 200, [1952] 1 TLR 625, (1952) 96 Sol Jo 197, (1952) 50 LGR 520

Statutes:

Trunk Roads Act 1936, Highway Act 1864 47 48

Citing:

CitedHarrison v Duke of Rutland CA 8-Dec-1893
H used a public highway crossing the defendant’s land, to disrupt grouse-shooting upon the defendant’s land. He complained after he had been forcibly restrained by the defendant’s servants from doing so. The defendant justified his actions saying . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.460434

Redstone v Welch and Jackson: 2009

Judges:

Worster J

Citations:

[2009] EG 98

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedCook v The Mortgage Business Plc CA 24-Jan-2012
The land owners sought relief from possession orders made under mortgages given in equity release schemes: ‘If the purchaser raises all or part of the purchase price on mortgage, and then defaults, the issue arises whether the mortgagee’s right to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.450471

Sargaison v Roberts: ChD 1969

The court was asked as to a taxpayer’s entitlement to tax allowances under section 314 of the 1952 Act, and whether, for the purposes of the legislation, a transfer by the taxpayer into trust of a farm and the simultaneous grant by the trustees to him of a lease resulted in the whole of the taxpayer’s interest in the land being transferred to another person (which would have disentitled him to his tax allowance) or operated to reduce his interest from ownership of a freehold to ownership of a lease.
Held: Megarry J took the latter view. He said that the taxpayer’s interest had uno ictu merely been reduced from ownership of the freehold to ownership of a lease. The effect of the transaction was that the taxpayer’s interest had been reduced from ownership of the freehold to ownership of a lease.

Judges:

Megarry J

Citations:

[1969] 3 All ER 1072, [1969] 1 WLR 951

Statutes:

Income Tax Act 1952 314

Cited by:

CitedCook v The Mortgage Business Plc CA 24-Jan-2012
The land owners sought relief from possession orders made under mortgages given in equity release schemes: ‘If the purchaser raises all or part of the purchase price on mortgage, and then defaults, the issue arises whether the mortgagee’s right to . .
CitedScott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd and Others SC 22-Oct-2014
The appellant challenged a sale and rent back transaction. He said that the proposed purchaser had misrepresented the transaction to them. The Court was asked s whether the home owners had interests whose priority was protected by virtue of section . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Income Tax, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.450473

City of London v Samede and Others: QBD 18 Jan 2012

The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either regularly or from time to time, as overnight accommodation, and several larger tents used for other activities and services including the holding of meetings and the providing other facilities. The size and extent of the camp varied over time. Shortly before the hearing its footprint receded in some places. At an earlier stage some adjustments had been made to it in an effort to keep fire lanes open.’ The court was asked as to the claimant’s rights to the land, whether orders should be made, and if so whether orders would be a proportionate necessary and lawful interferebce in the defendant’s rights.
Held: The Order was granted. Part of the land occupied was a public highway, and the claimant had a power to keep it open. The right to obstruct a highway did not extend to a right to a long term bstruction.

Judges:

Lindblom J

Citations:

[2012] EWHC 34 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

European Convention on Human Rights 9 10 11, Highways Act 1980 130, Public Health Act 1936 269, Human Rights Act 1998 13

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedZana v Turkey ECHR 25-Nov-1997
Turkey – prison sentence imposed by Diyarbakir National Security Court on account of a statement to journalists (Articles 168 and 312 of the Criminal Code) – accused unable to appear at hearing in that court (Article 226 – 4 of the Code of Criminal . .
CitedHarrison v Duke of Rutland CA 8-Dec-1893
H used a public highway crossing the defendant’s land, to disrupt grouse-shooting upon the defendant’s land. He complained after he had been forcibly restrained by the defendant’s servants from doing so. The defendant justified his actions saying . .
CitedHandyside v The United Kingdom ECHR 7-Dec-1976
Freedom of Expression is Fundamental to Society
The appellant had published a ‘Little Red Schoolbook’. He was convicted under the 1959 and 1964 Acts on the basis that the book was obscene, it tending to deprave and corrupt its target audience, children. The book claimed that it was intended to . .
CitedHall and Others v Mayor of London (on Behalf of The Greater London Authority) CA 16-Jul-2010
The appellants sought leave to appeal against an order for possession of Parliament Square on which the claimants had been conducting a demonstration (‘the Democracy Village’).
Held: Leave was refused save for two appellants whose cases were . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Jones and Lloyd HL 4-Mar-1999
21 people protested peacefully on the verge of the A344, next to the perimeter fence at Stonehenge. Some carried banners saying ‘Never Again,’ ‘Stonehenge Campaign 10 years of Criminal Injustice’ and ‘Free Stonehenge.’ The officer in charge . .
CitedScott v Mid-South Essex Justices and Keskin Admn 25-Mar-2004
The private prosecutor appealed against the dismissal by the magistrates of his allegation that the defendant had unlawfully obstructed the highway. In essence the question was whether Mr Keskin should have been found to have a lawful excuse. He . .
CitedTabernacle v Secretary of State for Defence CA 5-Feb-2009
The claimant sought judicial review to test the validity of the bye-laws which prohibited them from camping on public land to support their demonstration.
Held: The bye-laws violated the claimant’s right to freedom of assembly and of . .
CitedSouthwark London Borough Council v Williams CA 1971
No Defence of Homelessness to Squatters
The defendants, in dire need of housing accommodation entered empty houses owned by the plaintiff local authority as squatters. The court considered the defence of necessity.
Held: The proper use of abandoned council properties is best . .
CitedBegum (otherwise SB), Regina (on the Application of) v Denbigh High School HL 22-Mar-2006
The student, a Muslim wished to wear a full Islamic dress, the jilbab, but this was not consistent with the school’s uniform policy. She complained that this interfered with her right to express her religion.
Held: The school’s appeal . .
CitedLaporte, Regina (on the application of ) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire HL 13-Dec-2006
The claimants had been in coaches being driven to take part in a demonstration at an air base. The defendant police officers stopped the coaches en route, and, without allowing any number of the claimants to get off, returned the coaches to London. . .
CitedDickson and Another v United Kingdom ECHR 15-Dec-2007
(Grand Chamber) The complainants were husband and wife. They had been married whilst the husband served a sentence of life imprisonment. They had been refused suport for artificial insemination treatment.
Held: The claim succeeded. The refusal . .
CitedSecretary of State for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs v Meier and Others SC 1-Dec-2009
The claimant sought a possession order to recover land from trespassers. The court considered whether a possession order was available where not all the land was occupied, and it was feared that the occupiers might simply move onto a different part. . .
CitedPowell v McFarlane ChD 1977
Intention to Establish Adverse Possession of Land
A squatter had occupied the land and defended a claim for possession. The court discussed the conditions necessary to establish an intention to possess land adversely to the paper owner.
Held: Slade J said: ‘It will be convenient to begin by . .
CitedWiltshire County Council v Frazer CA 1984
For a party to avail himself of the Order he must bring himself within its words. If he does so the court has no discretion to refuse him possession. The rules require: ‘(1) of the plaintiff that he should have a right to possession of the land in . .
CitedBuckinghamshire County Council v Moran CA 13-Feb-1989
The parties’ respective properties were separated by a fence or hedge and the true owner had no access to the disputed land. In 1967 the Defendants’ predecessors in title began to maintain the land by mowing the grass and trimming the hedges and . .

Cited by:

Appeal fromThe Mayor Commonalty and Citizens of London v Samede (St Paul’s Churchyard Camp Representative) and Others CA 22-Feb-2012
The defendants sought to appeal against an order for them to vacate land outside St Paul’s Cathedral in London which they occupied as a protest.
Held: The application for leave to appeal failed. The only possible ground for appeal was on the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Constitutional, Human Rights

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.450508

Coventry Permanent Economic Building Society v Jones: ChD 1951

The contracting purchaser of a property agreed, prior to completion, to let the ground floor of the property to two tenants. She subsequently borrowed a sum of money from the plaintiffs to enable her to complete the purchase. On completion, she granted the plaintiffs a mortgage which contained a prohibition on the creation of tenancies. On a claim for possession by the plaintiffs, the tenants argued that a tenancy by estoppel had been created prior to completion
Held: The grant of the tenancies conferred on the prospective tenants an equitable interest.
Harman J said: ‘The question is whether I must assume the scintilla temporis and assume that because of the obligations of the landlord she must be held to have defrauded her mortgagee by creating a tenancy which is good against the society although it was not willing to lend the money except on the footing that she had no such right. I do not see why I need postulate this. The whole transaction was one transaction. The vendor would not sell without receiving his purchase money, and the mortgagee would not provide the purchase money without receiving the term of years. The money, in fact, went straight – as is the universal practice – from the mortgagee to the vendor, and not until it was in the vendor’s hands would a legal state be created wither in favour of the landlord or of the mortgagee. It seems to me that the whole thing is one transaction in substance, and I am not constrained to introduce an artificiality so as to affect the rights of the building society. Consequently, I reject the argument that the doctrine of estoppel must have created in the tenants an estate in priority to that of the building society. The grantor of the so-called tenancy would never have acquired the estate which she did acquire but for that mortgage money, and it would not be right, therefore, to introduce a fiction in the manner suggested.’

Judges:

Harman J

Citations:

[1951] 1 All ER 901

Cited by:

CitedCook v The Mortgage Business Plc CA 24-Jan-2012
The land owners sought relief from possession orders made under mortgages given in equity release schemes: ‘If the purchaser raises all or part of the purchase price on mortgage, and then defaults, the issue arises whether the mortgagee’s right to . .
CitedCook v The Mortgage Business Plc CA 24-Jan-2012
The land owners sought relief from possession orders made under mortgages given in equity release schemes: ‘If the purchaser raises all or part of the purchase price on mortgage, and then defaults, the issue arises whether the mortgagee’s right to . .
DistinguishedUniversal Permanent Building Society v Cooke CA 1951
The mortgagor agreed to buy a shop with living accommodation above. She let the flat to her sister before completion, and by the date of the mortgage, the sister was in possession. After default, the lender sought possession under the mortgage, but . .
ApprovedScott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd and Others SC 22-Oct-2014
The appellant challenged a sale and rent back transaction. He said that the proposed purchaser had misrepresented the transaction to them. The Court was asked s whether the home owners had interests whose priority was protected by virtue of section . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.450472

Kotegaonkar v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Another: Admn 19 Jul 2012

The court was asked: ‘can a way which is not connected to another public highway, or to some other point to which the public have a right of access, itself be a public highway?’ A path had been registered over part of te claimant’s land, but with no connection to any route back to the highway save over a privately owned parade of shops.
Held: ‘Where, as here, the only people who can lawfully pass or repass along the relevant route are those with a licence to enter and cross other land, the public do not have a right to pass over that route ‘freely and at their will’. They can only do so at the will of the owners of the land over which they have to exercise a license to get to the way. As a matter of law, those owners may, if they wish, withdraw the licence at any time; or, in more practical terms, physically block access to the way by walls, fences or other hindrances, with the result that the way is unusable by all or possibly any members of the public. A highway, once in existence, has the additional characteristic of permanence, in the sense that it cannot cease to exist at common law, short of physical destruction. Where access to the way might lawfully be blocked at any time by adjacent landowners, the public’s ability to pass along the way is not as of right and is of such fragility that it simply does not and cannot have the necessary characteristics of a highway.’

Judges:

Hickinbottom J

Citations:

[2012] EWHC 1976 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, Rights of Way (Hearings and Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2007

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedPoole v Huskisson 1843
At common law a public right of way cannot be limited iin its use for a particular group of people (here the members of a parish). . .
CitedEx parte Lewis (The Trafalgar Square Case) QBD 2-Jul-1888
L sought to assert a right to hold public meetings in Trafalgar Square.
Held: (obiter) There was no public right to occupy Trafalgar Square for the purpose of holding public meetings. The Commissioners of Works and Public Buildings (in whom . .
CitedEyre v New Forest Highway Board 1892
Wills J said: ‘All highways, all rights of passage over the property of individuals, have their actual or presumed origin, although it is not often the origin in point of fact, in a dedication by the owner of the soil, that is to say he either says . .
CitedMoser v Ambleside Urban District Council CA 1925
Atkin LJ said: ‘It has been suggested that you cannot have a highway except insofar as it connects two other highways. That seems to me that too wide a proposition. I think you can have a highway leading to a place of popular resort even though when . .
CitedBailey v Jamieson CCP 1875
There was a public highway, a footpath from Sheepcote Rectory to the village of Bothal, in Northumberland. However, as a result of stopping up orders properly made by the local quarter sessions in respect of other highways, there ceased to be any . .
Not appliedGreat Central Railway Company v Balby-with-Hexthorpe Urban District Council 1912
The court was asked to settle the status of various sections of a highway. One issue was whether the extinguishment of public rights of way over one section (the yellow section) resulted in the extinguishment of such rights in another section (the . .
CitedAttorney-General v Antrobus ChD 1905
The owner of Stonehenge had enclosed the monument by fencing for its protection. The Attorney-General wished to remove the fencing in order to keep the place open so that the public could visit it.
Held: The court rejected a suggestion that . .
CitedNewhaven Port and Properties Ltd v East Sussex County Council and Others Admn 21-Mar-2012
The company objected to the proposed registration by the defendant Council of a strip of beach land as a common. They said that it was not a ‘town or village green’ within the 2006 Act.
Held: The court rejected all grounds of objection, save . .

Cited by:

CitedCarter-Brown and Others v Crown Prosecution Service QBD 31-Jul-2017
Obstruction of Highway – Highway not clear
The apellant protesters had been convicted of obstructing the highway by affixing themselves to a fence by a roadway by the Atomic Weapons Establishment. They argued that the road was not a highway and that any obstruction was de minimis. In . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.462978

In re Sneyd; Ex parte Fewings: CA 1883

The mortgagee’s costs, whether costs of an enforcement or a redemption action or included in ‘costs, charges and expenses’, are not recoverable from the mortgagor personally, but both as against the mortgagor and other persons interested in the equity of redemption, they are added to the amount due under the mortgage and must be paid as a condition of redeeming.
Fry LJ said: ‘When there is a covenant for the payment of a principal sum, and that judgment has been obtained upon the covenant for that sum, it is plain that the covenant is merged in the judgment, and, if there is a covenant to pay interest which is merely incidental to the covenant to pay a principal debt, that covenant also is merged in a judgment on the covenant to the principal debt. Of course a covenant to pay interest may be so expressed as not to merge a judgment for the principal; for instance, if there was a covenant to pay interest so long as any part of the principal should remain due either on the covenant or on a judgment.’

Judges:

Cotton, Fry LJJ

Citations:

(1883) 25 Ch D 338

Cited by:

ApprovedEconomic Life Assurance Society v Usborne HL 1902
If the loan agreement provides that the contract term for payment of interest survives judgment, then the contract term remains enforceable after judgment. Lord Halsbury said: ‘My Lords, it seems to me that Fry LJ in the case of Ex parte Fewings . . . .
CitedDirector General of Fair Trading v First National Bank HL 25-Oct-2001
The House was asked whether a contractual provision for interest to run after judgment as well as before in a consumer credit contract led to an unfair relationship.
Held: The term was not covered by the Act, and was not unfair under the . .
CitedDirector General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc CA 15-Sep-1999
A bank had a clause in its standard terms which provided that it could continue to recover interest at the contract rate after judgment for default. The clause was an unfair term. The clause allowed a bank to impose an arrangement for repayment by . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.445463

Dalton v Henry Angus and Co: CA 1878

Citations:

(1878) 4 QBD 162

Citing:

Appeal fromDalton v Henry Angus and Co 1877
Fry J said: ‘ . .I cannot imagine any case of acquiescence in which there is not shown to be in the servient owner: 1, a knowledge of the acts done; 2, a power in him to stop the acts or to sue in respect of them; and 3, an abstinence on his part . .

Cited by:

Appeal fromDalton v Henry Angus and Co HL 14-Jun-1881
The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years’ uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some . .
CitedTehidy Minerals Ltd v Norman CA 1971
The fact that land had been requisitioned by the Ministry of Agriculture between 1941 and 1960 and the 20-odd years’ user relied on as having created the rights had preceded 1941 was a bar to a prescriptive claim to grazing rights under the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.430351

Greenhalgh v Brindley: 1901

Citations:

[1901] 2 Ch 324

Citing:

CitedHepworth v Pickles ChD 2-Nov-1899
The parties contracted for the sale and purchase of a shop which had been used continuously and openly with an off-licence for the sale of alcohol for twenty four years. After exchange, a restrictive covenant was revealed against the use of land as . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.425245

Leeman v Stocks: 1951

The plaintiff’s was the highest bid for premises at an auction. The auctioneer used a borrowed form for sale by private treaty, though some clauses were inappropriate. A solicitor present edited the document and put in the date for completion. The auctioneer put in the vendor’s initials and surname (‘W.E.Stocks’). After the bidding, the auctioneer inserted his details, a description of the premises and the auction price and, when he had obtained it, the purchaser’s solicitors name. The document ended with the words ‘As witness the hand of the parties hereto the day and year before written. Purchaser’s solicitor, R.A.C. Symes and Co, Southampton’. The purchaser signed the document over a stamp. The auctioneer told the vendor of the sale but did not show him the document. Neither he nor the vendor signed the document in the ordinary sense of the word. The vendor refused to complete alleging that there was no note or memorandum.
Held: The auctioneer was agent for both parties; and had authority to put before the purchaser, as he did, a document containing the name of the vendor as the party with whom the contract had been made, and the terms of the contract which had been made, for him to agree in writing. The placing of the name ‘W.E. Stocks’ as the name of the vendor with whom the contract was made by the auctioneer was sufficient to count as a signature of a memorandum by an authorised agent.
Although the vendor’s name was not inserted in the first instance with reference to a contract with the purchaser, nevertheless when it was put before the purchaser for signature, the vendor’s name was in the document in relation to a contract which had become binding, albeit not actionable without a memorandum satisfying the statute.
The court was troubled that the document by its own terms contemplated that it should be signed by both parties, from which it could be said that until then it had not been signed at all. As to that he held that when the auctioneer obtained the purchaser’s signature neither he, on behalf of the vendor, nor the purchaser intended any other signature ever to be added; but that both intended the document with the purchaser’s signature to be the final written record of the contract. The court could examine the evidence to see if the document relied on came into being as a ‘perfect instrument’ i.e. as the intended final embodiment of the agreement and, if it found that it did, the court was not prevented from holding it to be a sufficient memorandum. The ‘authenticated signature fiction’ will only have application where it is intended by each party to the contract that the memorandum or note relied upon ‘should be the final written record of the contract’.

Judges:

Roxburgh J

Citations:

[1951] 1 Ch 941

Citing:

AppliedEvans v Hoare 1892
A defendant sought to deny liability under a document relying on the 1677 Statute. the relevant document had been drawn up by a duly authorised agent of the Defendants. The document was a letter from the Plaintiff and the words ‘Messrs Hoare, Marr . .

Cited by:

CitedGolden Ocean Group Ltd v Salgaocar Mining Industries Pvt Ltd and Another ComC 21-Jan-2011
The defendants sought to set aside orders allowing the claimants to serve proceedings alleging repudiation of a charterparty in turn allowing a claim against the defendants under a guarantee. The defendant said the guarantee was unenforceable under . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.430071

Becker v Partridge: CA 1966

The contract for sale of an underlease provided that the vendor’s title ‘has been accepted . . and the purchaser shall raise no requisition or objection thereto’. there had been breaches of covenant in the superior lease giving grounds for forfeiture. Although the vendor did not have actual knowledge, he had ‘constructive notice’, because his solicitor had neglected to inspect the superior lease, as he would have been entitled to do when taking the underlease.
Held: The clause was ineffective. A purchaser of a leasehold title is concerned to ascertained that the lease (or any superior lease) is not liable for forfeiture for breach of covenant already committed. It is the duty of the vendor to deduce and then convey a good title and if he relies upon the terms of the contract to shift the risk of any defect in title to the purchaser, the language must clearly do so. General words which did not identify any specific defect in title were inadequate to protect the vendor against liability for a serious defect which he could easily have discovered.

Judges:

Danckwerts LJ

Citations:

[1966] 2 QB 155

Cited by:

CitedArea Estates Ltd v Weir CA 20-Jul-2010
The parties contracted for the sale and purchase of land with vacant possession. It was subject to a lease which the seller said had been surrendered, and it refused to accept any requisitions of objections. After exchange it appeared that the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.420981

Dalton, Weaton v Maple and Co.: CA 1983

The plaintiff claimed to have acquired a right of light against the defendants.
Held: Lord Justice Lindley said: ‘The whole theory of prescription at common law is against presuming any grant, or covenant not to interrupt, by or with anyone except an owner in fee.’ In this case no grant could be presumed: ‘A grant from the Crown, as distinguished from its tenant, cannot be presumed, for there has been no enjoyment against the Crown itself; and without it there is no foundation for such a presumption.’
Lopes LJ decided on the facts that the fiction would not stand scrutiny because he could not believe that the Crown would have made a grant after 1852 which had been lost by 1893: ‘For convenience sake the fiction of a lost grant is very often pressed into the service; but to presume a lost grant made by the Crown, or the lessees of the Crown, since 1852 and lost, would be overtaxing the credulity of the most credulous, and would be making a demand too extravagant even for the elasticity of this patient and accommodating fiction.’

Judges:

Lindley LJ, Lopes LJ, A L Smith LJ

Citations:

[1893] 3 Ch 48

Cited by:

CitedOdey and Others v Barber ChD 29-Nov-2006
The claimants sought a declaration that they had two rights of way over a neighbour’s land. One was claimed by continuous use for twenty years, and the second was said to have been implied under the 1925 Act. No express grant was suggested. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.381615

West v Sharp: CA 1999

Mummery LJ set out the test to be applied when asking whether there had been a substantial interference in the exercise of an easement so as to be actionable: ‘Not every interference with an easement, such as a right of way, is actionable. There must be a substantial interference with the enjoyment of it. There is no actionable interference with a right of way if it can be substantially and practically exercised as conveniently after as before the occurrence of the alleged obstruction. Thus, the grant of a right of way in law in respect of every part of a defined area does not involve the proposition that the grantee can in fact object to anything done on any part of the area which would obstruct passage over that part. He can only object to such activities, including obstruction, as substantially interfere with the exercise of the defined right as for the time being is reasonably required by him. Authority for that is to be found in the judgment of Russell L.J. in Keefe v. Amor [1965] 1 Q.B. 334 at 347. As Scott J. held in Celsteel Ltd v. Alton House Ltd [1985] 1 W.L.R. 204 at 217: ‘There emerge from the three cases I have cited two criteria relevant to the question whether a particular interference with a right of way is actionable. The interference will be actionable if it is substantial. And it will not be substantial if it does not interfere with the reasonable use of the right of way.’

Judges:

Mummery LJ

Citations:

(1999) 79 P and CR 32

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedB and Q Plc v Liverpool and Lancashire Properties Ltd ChD 26-Jul-2000
The dominant owner wished to deal with delivery vehicles in a manner where they were left parked awaiting emptying. The servient owner (a lessee) wanted to construct buildings over a large part of the land. The servient owner objected.
Held: . .
CitedWilkinson and The Estate of Brian Wilkinson v Farmer CA 22-Oct-2010
The court considered whether there was a compelling reason to allow a second application for leave to appeal against an order settling the width of a right of way.
Held: The appeal was allowed. Very limited facts could be established from the . .
CitedEmmett v Sisson CA 3-Feb-2014
Appeal against judgment in boundary dispute involving a private driveway.
Held: The appeal failed. ‘The respondents are entitled to exercise the ‘relative luxury’ of the ample right to gain both vehicular and pedestrian access to their land . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.375071

Tasker v Small: 3 Jun 1836

The words in a Settlement to raise Money by ‘Mortgage, Annuity or otherwise,’ authorises a Sale of a reversionary Estate.
Lord Cottenham LC said that the rule by which a purchaser becomes in equity the owner of the property sold ‘applies only as between the parties to the contract, and cannot be extended so as to affect the interests of others.’

Judges:

Lord Cottenham LC

Citations:

[1836] EngR 780, (1836) Donn Eq 82, (1836) 47 ER 241 (B)

Links:

Commonlii

Cited by:

Appeal fromTasker v Small And Matilda, His Wife, Charles S Ashford, B R Baker, Thomas Mann, Thomas Phillips, Joseph Wakeford, Thomas Hawkins, And Sarah Baker 18-Nov-1837
One Defendant appeals. Order made thereupon dismissing bll upon grounds equally applicable to other Defendants who did not join in the appeal. Such other defendants can have no benefit of such order, although it renders the decree useless. . .
CitedScott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd and Others SC 22-Oct-2014
The appellant challenged a sale and rent back transaction. He said that the proposed purchaser had misrepresented the transaction to them. The Court was asked s whether the home owners had interests whose priority was protected by virtue of section . .
CitedInland Revenue Commissioners v G Angus and Co CA 1889
Lord Esher MR rejected an argument that a specifically enforceable contract or agreement for the sale of land is in truth a conveyance: ‘And it is said that, when an agreement is such that equity will grant specific performance of it, it is to be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Equity

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.315112

Thomas v Gwynne; Thomas v Thomas: 17 Feb 1846

An infant devisee had been ordered to convey real estate sold for payment of the testator’s debts. He made default, and was not amenable to process. The Court, under the 1 W 4 c 60 s 8, directed a person to convey in his place.

Citations:

[1846] EngR 424 (A), (1845-1846) 9 Beav 275

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

See AlsoThomas v Gwynne; Thomas v Thomas 3-Jul-1845
Process by attachment to compel an infant to convey estates sold in a creditor’s suit. It is a contenpt to interfere and prevent an infant obeying the the order of the court to convey. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.302319

The Queen, On The Prosecution Of The Llanelly Railway And Dock Company v The South Wales Railway Company: 26 Feb 1850

The South Wales Fiailway Company, having power to take and purchase lands and to construct a railway according to the plans and books of reference deposited under their Act, gave notice to the Llanelly Railway and Dock Company that they (the South Wales Railway Company) required to purchase a small piece of land, on part of which the Llanelly Railway was actually constructed, such piece of land being set out, in the said plans and books of reference, as part of the proposed line of the South Wales Railway : but they afterwards refused to issue their warrant to the sheriff to assess the amount of purchase moriey, on the ground that the Llanelly Railway and Dock Company had no power under their Act to sell any portion of land on which their railway was constructed. Held, on mandamus to the South Wales Railway Company to issue their warrant, that, as there was no express clause in any special or general Act of Parliament, which authorised either the Llanelly Railway and Dock Company to sell any part of their actual line of railway, or the South Wales Railway Company to purchase it, the authority was not to be implied from the general power given to the South Wales Railway Company to make their line, and to purchase lands, according to their deposited plans and books of reference.

Citations:

[1850] EngR 364, (1850) 14 QB 902, (1850) 117 ER 346

Links:

Commonlii

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.297711

Thomas v Thomas: 18 Feb 1856

A mortgagee may tack simple contract debts to his mortgage as against the heir where the property descended is assets in his hands for payment of simple contract debts, and consequently since the stat. 3 and 4 Will. 4, c. 104, a mortgagee of freeholds may tack his simple contract debt as against the heir.

Citations:

[1856] EngR 277, (1856) 22 Beav 341, (1856) 52 ER 1139

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.291032

Cuthbertson v Irving: 24 Jun 1859

Martin B said: ‘There are some points in the law relating to estoppels which seem clear. First, when a lessor without any legal estate or title demises to another, the parties themselves are estopped from disputing the validity of the lease on that ground; in other words a tenant cannot deny his landlord’s title, nor can the lessor dispute the validity of the lease. Secondly, where a lessor by deed grants a lease without title and subsequently acquires one, the estoppel is said to be fed, and the lease and reversion then take effect in interest and not by estoppel . . .’

Judges:

Martin B

Citations:

[1859] EngR 767, (1859) 4 H and N 742, (1859) 157 ER 1034, (1859) 4 Hurl and N 742

Links:

Commonlii

Cited by:

CitedScott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd and Others SC 22-Oct-2014
The appellant challenged a sale and rent back transaction. He said that the proposed purchaser had misrepresented the transaction to them. The Court was asked s whether the home owners had interests whose priority was protected by virtue of section . .
Appeal fromCuthbertson v Irving 7-Jul-1860
Held: Decision affirmed. Neither the lessee nor the lessor can dispute one another’s title and if the lessor without a legal estate later acquires one, the estoppel is ‘fed’ . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Estoppel, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.288119

William Farquharson v Dwarkanath Singh And The Government Of India: PC 1 Jul 1871

ER Suit by an Auction Purchaser of a Putnee, sold under Ben. Reg. VIII. of 1819, for possession of 3000 beegahs of land within his Putnee, and to enhance the rent against a Ghatwal, and the Government, charging encroachment against the Ghatwal beyond the quantity of 100 beegahs held ghatwally, according to a return made by a former Ghatwal. The only evidence of encroachment consisted of the Isumnovisee returns made by the Thanadars to the Magistrates in the years 1811, 1813, 1813, from which it appeared, that the quantity of land the then Ghatwal held ghatwally was 100 beegahs. Held, that the evidence of the Defendants of long-interrupted possession of the 3000 beegahs, presumably before the Decennial Settlement, outweighed the effect of the Isumnovisee returns, which were, though prima facie, not conclusire evidence of the quantity of the land held ghatwally; and further that, though such return was not objected to by the then Ghatwal, it did not affect the right of the Ghatwal in possession.

Citations:

[1871] EngR 26, (1871) 14 Moo Ind App 259, (1871) 20 ER 784

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

Commonwealth

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.280207

Wood v Cooper: 1894

There was a long lease of land with a dwellinghouse built on it. The lease contained covenants: ‘not to erect or build or cause to be erected or built upon the said piece of ground thereby demised, without the previous license in writing of the lessor parties, ‘any other building whatsoever,’ and ‘not to do or suffer to be done on the said premises or any part thereof any act, matter, or thing which may be or become an annoyance, nuisance, or disturbance to the neighbourhood or to any tenant of the lessor parties.’ A neighbour built a house on neighbouring land in accordance with approved plans. Shortly after he went into occupation the Defendant commenced to erect a substantial trellis-work screen on the northern side of his land fronting the new house. This screen stood on the Defendant’s land about a foot from the boundary fence (which was a brick wall eight feet high) and was fifty-eight feet six inches in length, and stood twelve feet above the boundary wall.
Held: The claim for an injunction succeeded on 2 grounds. The trellis was held to be a building within the meaning of the covenant, and it was an annoyance within the meaning of the covenant.
Romer J said: ‘In the second place, I have no doubt whatever in my own mind, that it is a breach of the covenant that the lessee ‘will not do or suffer to be done on the premises, any act, matter, or thing which might be or become an annoyance to any tenant of the lessor.’ To my mind, undoubtedly, what the Defendant has done is an annoyance to Mr Neale, the tenant of the lessor. I think, in the first place, that it does substantially interfere with the access of light to the windows on the ground floor of this building, and that, notwithstanding some parts of the expert evidence; and I feel satisfied beyond that, and irrespective of that, that it causes an annoyance to Mr Neale, the tenant, within the meaning of the words used in the covenant. It falls within the definition of the word ‘annoyance,’ in a covenant like this, which was given by the three Lords Justices in the case of Tod-Heatly v. Benham 40 Ch. D. 80. In the first place, to adopt the language of Lord Justice Cotton, I am satisfied by the evidence before me that reasonable people, having regard to the ordinary use of Mr Neale’s house for pleasurable enjoyment, would be annoyed and aggrieved by what has been done by the Defendant. It would be an annoyance or grievance to reasonable, sensible people. It is an act which is an interference with the pleasurable enjoyment of the house. Then, to adopt the words of Lord Justice Lindley, I think it does raise an objection in the minds of reasonable men, and is an annoyance within the meaning of the covenant. Lastly, as pointed out by Lord Justice Bowen, ‘ ‘Annoyance’ is a wider term than nuisance, and if you find a thing which reasonably troubles the mind and pleasure, not of a fanciful person or of a skilled person who knows the truth, but of the ordinary sensible English inhabitant of a house – if you find there is anything which disturbs his reasonable peace of mind, that seems to me to be an annoyance, although it may not appear to amount to physical detriment to comfort.’
I have come to the conclusion, therefore, that this is a clear breach of the last-mentioned covenant as well as of the first, and on both grounds I think the Plaintiff is entitled to succeed.’

Judges:

Romer J

Citations:

[1894] 3 Ch 671

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedTod-Heatley v Benham 1888
What was ‘annoyance’ between neighbours
The court considered how to construe a covenant in a lease ‘nor do or wittingly or willingly cause or suffer to be done any act, matter, or thing in or upon or about the said premises, which shall or may be or grow to the annoyance, nuisance, . .

Cited by:

CitedDennis and Another v Davies (B20 (Ch)) ChD 21-Nov-2008
The claimants sought to enforce a restrictive covenant to restrain a neighbour building an extension.
Held: A building could be a source of annoyance and therefore a breach of the particular covenant. The requirement for the builder’s . .
CitedDavies v Dennis and Others CA 22-Oct-2009
The land owner appealed against an injunction given to prevent him carrying out building works which the neighbours said would breach a restrictive covenant. The covenants negatived a building scheme.
Held: The appeal failed. Covenants of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.280410

Alderdale Estate Company v McGrary: CA 1917

Judges:

Lord Cozens-Hardy MR, Warrington LJ. and Lawrence J

Citations:

[1917] 1 Ch 414

Cited by:

Appeal fromMcGrory v Alderdale Estate Co HL 1918
Lord Finlay LC discussed the evidence required in an enquiry as to the vendor’s title to be made on an order for specific performance: ‘if the contract is open, the obligation which the law would import into it to make a good title in every respect . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Contract

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.280274

Blount v Layard: CA 1888

The court said how unfortunate it would be if the owner of an exclusive fishery were forced to insist on his rights by reason of a fear that tolerated fishing by members of the public might crystallise into a public right of fishing, which it would not do.

Judges:

Bowen LJ

Citations:

[1891] 2 Ch 681

Cited by:

CitedBarton v The Church Commissioners for England ChD 15-Dec-2008
The commissioners claimed a right by prescription to all fish to be taken in a stretch of the River Wye. The claimant was to moor a barge on the river.
Held: The court explained the nature and legal status of fisheries in the law going back to . .
FootnoteSmith v Andrews 1891
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.279923

Hirst and Agu v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire: QBD 1987

The defendants were arrested after distributing leaflets outside a furriers, and appealed against convictions for obstructing the highway.
Held: The appeals succeeded. In deciding whether there was a lawful excuse for a technical obstruction of the highway, the Court rejected the test that a use of the highway which was not incidental to passing along it could not give rise to a lawful excuse, and applied the test whether the use of the highway (even though not incidental to passage) was reasonable or not.
Glidewell LJ said: ‘As counsel pointed out to us in argument, if that is not right, there are a variety of activities which quite commonly go on in the street which may well be the subject of prosecution under section 137. For instance, what is now relatively commonplace, at least in London and large cities, distributing advertising material or free periodicals outside stations, when people are arriving in the morning. Clearly, that is an obstruction; clearly, it is not incidental to passage up and down the street because the distributors are virtually stationary. The question must be: is it a reasonable use of the highway or not? In my judgment that is a question that arises. It may be decided that if the activity grows to an extent that it is unreasonable by reason of the space occupied or the duration of time for which it goes on that an offence would be committed, but it is a matter on the facts for the magistrates. magistrates, in my view.
To take another even more mundane example, suppose two friends meet in the street, not having seen each other for some time, and stop to discuss their holidays and are more or less stationary for a quarter of an hour or 20 minutes. Obviously, they may well cause an obstruction to others passing by. What they are discussing has nothing to do with passing or re-passing in the street. They could just as well have the conversation at the home of one or other of them or in a coffee shop nearby. Is it to be said that they are guilty of an offence and the reasonableness of what they are doing is not in issue? In my judgment it cannot be said.
Some activities which commonly go on in the street are covered by statute, for instance, the holding of markets or street trading, and thus they are lawful activities because they are lawfully permitted within the meaning of the section. That is lawful authority. But many are not and the question thus is (to follow Lord Parker’s dictum): have the prosecution proved in such cases that the defendant was obstructing the highway without lawful excuse? That question is to be answered by deciding whether the activity in which the defendant was engaged was or was not a reasonable use of the highway.
I emphasise that for there to be a lawful excuse for what would otherwise be an obstruction of the highway, the activity in which the person causing the obstruction is engaged must itself be inherently lawful. If it is not, the question whether it is reasonable does not arise. So an obstruction of the highway caused by unlawful picketing in pursuance of a trade dispute cannot be said to be an activity for which there is a lawful excuse. But in this case it is not suggested that the activity itself – distributing pamphlets an displaying banners in opposition to the wearing of animal furs as garments – was itself unlawful.’

Judges:

Glidewell LJ

Citations:

(1987) 85 Cr App R 143

Statutes:

Highways Act 1980 137(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

AppliedNagy v Weston QBD 1965
The defendant was prosecuted after selling hot dogs from a van parked on a busy street in Oxford. The court was asked when such would become an illegal obstruction.
Held: Such a use ‘could not . . be said to be incidental to the right to pass . .
CitedDuncan v Jones KBD 1936
The appellant was about to make a public address in a situation in which the year before a disturbance had been incited by her speaking. A policeman believed reasonably that a breach of the peace would occur if the meeting was held, and ordered the . .

Cited by:

CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Jones and Lloyd HL 4-Mar-1999
21 people protested peacefully on the verge of the A344, next to the perimeter fence at Stonehenge. Some carried banners saying ‘Never Again,’ ‘Stonehenge Campaign 10 years of Criminal Injustice’ and ‘Free Stonehenge.’ The officer in charge . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on the Application of) v The Land Registry (Peterborough Office) Admn 13-Feb-2009
The applicant sought judicial review of the cancellation of his application for first registration of land by adverse possession. The application had been rejected because a public right of way existed through it, and the claimant had not shown the . .
CitedJones and Lloyd v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-Jan-1997
The appellants had been peacefully protesting at Stonehenge. They were among others who refused to leave when ordered to do so under an order made by the police officer in charge declaring it to be a trespassory assembly under the 1986 Act. They . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.192190

Wilson v Liverpool Corporation: CA 1971

The claimants owned 74 acres of an area of 391 acres in Liverpool which the Corporation wanted to acquire for residential development. The authority acquired the land by agreement and made a compulsory purchase order in respect of the remainder.
Held: The purpose of the Pointe Gourde principle is to prevent the compensation for the value of the land on compulsory acquisition from being inflated by the very scheme which gives rise to the acquisition. An enhancement in value resulting entirely from the underlying scheme has to be ignored. In assessing compensation, the Tribunal was required to assume that planning permission for residential development would have been granted on his land, but to make appropriate deductions from the ‘dead ripe value’ in the real world, in order to reflect the enhancement of value due to the public’s knowledge of the authority’s involvement in the scheme, including its investment in infrastructure, and also to the consequent acceleration of development.
Widgery LJ spoke of: ‘the well known rule of practice that if a point is not taken in the court of trial, it cannot be taken in the appeal court unless that court is in possession of all the material necessary to enable it to dispose of the matter finally, without injustice to the other party, and without recourse to a further hearing below.’ and ‘Whenever land is to be compulsorily acquired, this must be in consequence of some scheme or undertaking or project. Unless there is some scheme or undertaking or project, compulsory powers of acquisition will not arise at all, and it would, I think, be a great mistake if we tended to focus our attention on the word ‘scheme’ as though it had some magic of its own. It is merely synonymous with the other words to which I have referred, and the purpose of the so called Pointe Gourde rule is to prevent the acquisition of the land being at a price which is inflated by the very project or scheme which gives rise to the acquisition.
The extent of the scheme is a matter of fact in every case, as is shown by the decision in Fraser v Fraserville City [1917] A.C. 187 to which Lord Denning M.R. has referred. It is for the tribunal of fact to consider just what activities-past, present or future-are properly to be regarded as the scheme within the meaning of this proposition.’
Lord Denning MR: ‘A scheme is a progressive thing. It starts vague and known to few. It becomes more precise and better known as time goes on. Eventually it becomes precise and definite and known to all. Correspondingly, its impact has a progressive effect on values. At first it has little effect because it is so vague and uncertain. As it becomes more precise and better known, so its impact increases until it has an important effect. It is this increase, whether big or small, which is to be disregarded at the time when the value is to be assessed.’

Judges:

Widgery LJ, Lord Denning MR, Megaw LJ

Citations:

[1971] 1 WLR 302

Statutes:

Land Compensation Act 1961 6(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

ExplainedPointe Gourde Quarrying and Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendant of Crown Lands PC 29-Jul-1947
Under a wartime agreement in 1941 the UK government agreed to lease to the US Government land in Trinidad on which the US could establish a naval base. To do this the Crown acquired the Pointe Gourde land for its limestone quarry which would be used . .
CitedFraser v City of Fraserville PC 1917
One ground on which the arbitrators’ valuation award on a compulsory purchase, was set aside was that, in valuing the falls of a river and adjacent land acquired for electricity generation purposes, the arbitrators had taken into account the . .

Cited by:

CitedBolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Tudor Properties Ltd and Others CA 19-Apr-2000
The court had to consider the compensation to be awarded on the compulsory purchase of land.
Held: The appeal failed. The tribunal had not erred in ascertaining the extent of the underlying scheme. In deciding that, they were entitled to have . .
CitedWaters and others v Welsh Development Agency HL 29-Apr-2004
Land was to be compulsorily purchased. A large development required the land to be used to create a nature reserve. The question was how and if at all the value of the overall scheme should be considered when assessing the compensation for this . .
CitedKing v Jackson (T/a Jackson Flower Company) CA 16-Jul-1997
The defendant appealed an award of pounds 11,000 damages for unlawful eviction of his tenant. The tenant had found herself unable to pay the rent and had given notice to quit. She was then told to leave immediately. The judge awarded statutory . .
CitedJones v Governing Body of Burdett Coutts School CA 2-Apr-1998
The Employment Appeal Tribunal must give reasons for its decision, if it chooses to allow the amendment of appeal the papers in order to hear a point of law which had been conceded in the industrial tribunal. Citing Liverpool Corporation v Wilson, . .
CitedJ A Pye (Oxford) Limited v Kingswood Borough Council CA 6-Apr-1998
The purchase of land which was to form the last part of a development was to be valued without taking account of the enhanced value which would be attributed to the much larger scheme of development. To ascertain what is to be ignored by the valuer . .
CitedTransport for London (London Underground Ltd) v Spirerose Ltd HL 30-Jul-2009
Compulsory Purchase Compensation – Land As it Is
The House considered the basis of calculation of compensation on the compulsory purchase of land without planning permission, but where permission would probably be granted. The appellant challenged the decision which had treated the probability as . .
CitedOakland v Wellswood (Yorkshire) Ltd CA 30-Jul-2009
The employer was in financial difficulties. A new company was formed by a customer to acquire its assets, and the employees, including the claimant were taken on by the new company. The claimant was dismissed within a year after. On claiming unfair . .
CitedMyers v Milton Keynes Development Corporation CA 1974
Land was to be acquired for the development of a new town. The court faced the issue, in the context of a valuation for compulsory purchase, of whether the required disregard of any increase in value attributable to the ‘scheme’ meant that the . .
CitedRoberts and Another v South Gloucestershire Council CA 7-Nov-2002
The landowner appealed against the compensation awarded for the compulsory acquisition of his land for use as a road. The owners had been compensated only for its agricultural value, but said that it should have allowed for its value for minerals . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Damages

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.188871

Nagy v Weston: QBD 1965

The defendant was prosecuted after selling hot dogs from a van parked on a busy street in Oxford. The court was asked when such would become an illegal obstruction.
Held: Such a use ‘could not . . be said to be incidental to the right to pass and repass along the street.’
Lord Parker CJ said: ‘It is undoubtedly true – counsel for the appellant is quite right – that there must be proof that the user in question was an unreasonable use. Whether or not the user amounting to an obstruction is or is not an unreasonable use of the highway is a question of fact. It depends on all the circumstances, including the length of time the obstruction continues, the place where it occurs, the purpose for which it is done, and, of course, whether it does in fact cause an actual obstruction as opposed to a potential obstruction.’

Judges:

Lord Parker CJ

Citations:

[1965] 1 All ER 78, [1965] 1 WLR 280

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

AppliedHirst and Agu v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire QBD 1987
The defendants were arrested after distributing leaflets outside a furriers, and appealed against convictions for obstructing the highway.
Held: The appeals succeeded. In deciding whether there was a lawful excuse for a technical obstruction . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Jones and Lloyd HL 4-Mar-1999
21 people protested peacefully on the verge of the A344, next to the perimeter fence at Stonehenge. Some carried banners saying ‘Never Again,’ ‘Stonehenge Campaign 10 years of Criminal Injustice’ and ‘Free Stonehenge.’ The officer in charge . .
CitedJones and Lloyd v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-Jan-1997
The appellants had been peacefully protesting at Stonehenge. They were among others who refused to leave when ordered to do so under an order made by the police officer in charge declaring it to be a trespassory assembly under the 1986 Act. They . .
CitedScott v Mid-South Essex Justices and Keskin Admn 25-Mar-2004
The private prosecutor appealed against the dismissal by the magistrates of his allegation that the defendant had unlawfully obstructed the highway. In essence the question was whether Mr Keskin should have been found to have a lawful excuse. He . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.192191

Regina v Pratt: 1855

‘I take it to be clear law that, if a man use the land over which there is a right of way for any purpose, lawful or unlawful, other than that of passing and repassing, he is a trespasser.’

Judges:

Crompton J, Erle J

Citations:

(1855) 4 E and B 860

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHarrison v Duke of Rutland CA 8-Dec-1893
H used a public highway crossing the defendant’s land, to disrupt grouse-shooting upon the defendant’s land. He complained after he had been forcibly restrained by the defendant’s servants from doing so. The defendant justified his actions saying . .
CitedDirector of Public Prosecutions v Jones and Lloyd HL 4-Mar-1999
21 people protested peacefully on the verge of the A344, next to the perimeter fence at Stonehenge. Some carried banners saying ‘Never Again,’ ‘Stonehenge Campaign 10 years of Criminal Injustice’ and ‘Free Stonehenge.’ The officer in charge . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Torts – Other

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.192193

Director of Public Prosecutions v Jones and Lloyd: HL 4 Mar 1999

21 people protested peacefully on the verge of the A344, next to the perimeter fence at Stonehenge. Some carried banners saying ‘Never Again,’ ‘Stonehenge Campaign 10 years of Criminal Injustice’ and ‘Free Stonehenge.’ The officer in charge concluded that they constituted a ‘trespassory assembly’ and told them so. When asked to move off, many did, but some, including the Appellants were determined to remain and put their rights to the test. They were later convicted.
Held: The appeal was allowed. A peaceful assembly on the highway, which did not unreasonably interfere with or obstruct the highway, was not a trespassory assembly. Old rules limiting lawful uses of the highway to passing and repassing, no longer apply and modern ranges of uses were wider. The existence of a public right of way entitled the public not merely to pass and repass, but may include the right of public assembly so long as such assembly does not unreasonably obstruct the highway.
(Lord Irvine; minority) The public might use and enjoy the highway for any reasonable purpose provided that the activity did not constitute a nuisance or obstruct the highway. Section 14A ‘brings into the arena of the criminal law the rights, if any, which the public have as against the occupier of the land in private law. It does so by enabling the police to take action against those taking part in an assembly if the occupier of the land would be entitled to treat the assembly as trespassing on his land. But the police may exercise their powers independently of the occupier, whose knowledge of or consent to the action which they are taking is not required.’ Public rights over land acquired by user or by dedication are limited as against the owner. They are granted or acquired for a particular purpose only, and they are not to be confused with the use of the land for other purposes.

Judges:

The Lord Chancellor Lord Slynn of Hadley Lord Hope of Craighead Lord Clyde Lord Hutton

Citations:

Times 05-Mar-1999, Gazette 17-Mar-1999, Gazette 31-Mar-1999, [1999] 2 AC 240, [1999] UKHL 5, [1999] 2 WLR 625, [1999] 2 All ER 257, (1999) 6 BHRC 513, (1999) 3 CHRLD 4

Links:

House of Lords, Bailii

Statutes:

Public Order Act 1986 14A 14B(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedEx parte Lewis (The Trafalgar Square Case) QBD 2-Jul-1888
L sought to assert a right to hold public meetings in Trafalgar Square.
Held: (obiter) There was no public right to occupy Trafalgar Square for the purpose of holding public meetings. The Commissioners of Works and Public Buildings (in whom . .
AppliedHarrison v Duke of Rutland CA 8-Dec-1893
H used a public highway crossing the defendant’s land, to disrupt grouse-shooting upon the defendant’s land. He complained after he had been forcibly restrained by the defendant’s servants from doing so. The defendant justified his actions saying . .
CitedHickman v Maisey CA 16-Mar-1900
A racing tout used the public highway which crossed the plaintiff’s property to watch racehorses being trained on the plaintiff’s land. On a particular occasion he walked backwards and forwards on a portion of the highway 15 yards long for a period . .
Appeal fromJones and Lloyd v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-Jan-1997
The appellants had been peacefully protesting at Stonehenge. They were among others who refused to leave when ordered to do so under an order made by the police officer in charge declaring it to be a trespassory assembly under the 1986 Act. They . .
CitedNagy v Weston QBD 1965
The defendant was prosecuted after selling hot dogs from a van parked on a busy street in Oxford. The court was asked when such would become an illegal obstruction.
Held: Such a use ‘could not . . be said to be incidental to the right to pass . .
CitedHirst and Agu v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire QBD 1987
The defendants were arrested after distributing leaflets outside a furriers, and appealed against convictions for obstructing the highway.
Held: The appeals succeeded. In deciding whether there was a lawful excuse for a technical obstruction . .
CitedRegina v Pratt 1855
‘I take it to be clear law that, if a man use the land over which there is a right of way for any purpose, lawful or unlawful, other than that of passing and repassing, he is a trespasser.’ . .
CitedRegina v Cunningham Graham and Burns 1888
The court rejected a suggestion that there was a right of public meeting in Trafalgar Square or any other thoroughfare. ‘So far as I know the law of England, the use of public thoroughfares is for people to pass and repass along them. That is the . .
CitedAttorney-General v Antrobus ChD 1905
The owner of Stonehenge had enclosed the monument by fencing for its protection. The Attorney-General wished to remove the fencing in order to keep the place open so that the public could visit it.
Held: The court rejected a suggestion that . .
CitedRandall v Tarrant CA 1955
The defendant had crashed into the plaintiff’s parked vehicle as he tried to pass. The defendant denied negligece.
Held: A driver on a highway who sees a stationary vehicle has to take all possible care to avoid a collision. If there is . .
CitedIn re Ellenborough Park CA 15-Nov-1955
Qualifying Characteristics ofr Easement
Parties claimed a public right to wander through the grounds of the park.
Held: No such right could have been granted or was properly claimed. Lord Evershed MR said: ‘There is no doubt, in our judgment, but that Attorney-General v. Antrobus . .
CitedLowdens v Keaveney 1903
There had been a prosecution for wilfully preventing and interrupting the free passage of persons in a public street. There had been a procession with a band playing.
Held: It was a question of fact and degree whether such a use of the street . .
CitedAttorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (‘Spycatcher’) HL 13-Oct-1988
Loss of Confidentiality Protection – public domain
A retired secret service employee sought to publish his memoirs from Australia. The British government sought to restrain publication there, and the defendants sought to report those proceedings, which would involve publication of the allegations . .
CitedDerbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others HL 18-Feb-1993
Local Council may not Sue in Defamation
Local Authorities must be open to criticism as political and administrative bodies, and so cannot be allowed to sue in defamation. Such a right would operate as ‘a chill factor’ on free speech. Freedom of speech was the underlying value which . .
CitedDerbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others CA 19-Apr-1992
In two issues of ‘The Sunday Times’ newspaper on 17 and 24 September 1989 there appeared articles concerning share deals involving the superannuation fund of the Derbyshire County Council. The articles in the issue of 17 September were headed . .
CitedDuke of Athol v Torrie 1849
. .
CitedMann v Brodie HL 1885
The court analysed the differences between Scottish and English land law with regard to rights acquired by prescription. Although in both countries a right of public way may be acquired by prescription, it was in England never practically necessary . .
CitedMacPherson v Scottish Rights of Way and Recreation Society Ltd 1887
. .
CitedLlandudno Urban District Council v Woods 1899
A clergyman set up a pulpit and was holding services and delivering addresses on the seashore.
Held: An injunction was refused. The court discouraged actions for trespass on public highways where the inteference was trivial. In this case, . .
CitedFielden v Cox 1906
The defendants had set up appliances on the highway for the purpose of catching moths.
Held: The court discouraged actions for minimal obstructions. . .
CitedMcAra v Magistrates of Edinburgh 1913
The pursuer challenged the rights of the Magistrates to issue a proclamation ordering that ‘persons shall not assemble or congregate or hold meetings’ in certain streets of the city unless they had been licensed to do so.
Held: They indeed had . .
CitedHubbard v Pitt CA 1976
Protesters handed out leaflets and carried posters outside the plaintiff’s estate agency. He claimed in trespass over the public footpath outside his premises. The defendants appealed the grant of an interlocutory injunction to prevent their . .
CitedWills Trustees v Cairngorm Canoeing and Sailing School HL 1976
The public right of navigation (PRN) is a right to public use of the river. The river may be used by the public for purposes of exercise and recreation as well as transport and commerce. At common law PRN cannot be lost by lack of use over time. ‘A . .
CitedLiddle v Yorkshire (North Riding) County Council 1934
The court described the right of the public to use the highway: ‘. . it is well established that a highway must not be used in quite a different manner from passage along it and the pretext of walking up and down along it will not legitimise such a . .
CitedDuncan v Jones KBD 1936
The appellant was about to make a public address in a situation in which the year before a disturbance had been incited by her speaking. A policeman believed reasonably that a breach of the peace would occur if the meeting was held, and ordered the . .
CitedC (A Minor) v Director of Public Prosecutions HL 17-Mar-1995
The House considered whether the long established rule of the criminal law presuming that a child did not have a guilty mind should be set aside.
Held: Doli incapax, the presumption of a child’s lack of mens rea, is still effective and good . .

Cited by:

CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council, Catherine Mary Robinson ChD 22-Jan-2004
Land had been registered in part as a common. The council appealed.
Held: The rights pre-existing the Act had not been lost. The presumption against retrospectively disapplying vested rights applied, and the application had properly been made. . .
CitedHerrick and Another v Kidner and Another Admn 17-Feb-2010
Psychological Obstruction to Public Footpath
A public footpath crossed the appellants’ land. They constructed a gateway across it which they now accepted had been a significant obstruction of the right of way. The local authority served a notice requiring its removal, including the stone . .
CitedSmith, Regina (on The Application of) v Land Registry (Peterborough Office) and Another CA 10-Mar-2010
The appellant had lived in a caravan on the verge of a byway and had been here for more than twelve years. He appealed against rejection of his request for possessory title. He said that there was no support in law for the maxim that adverse . .
CitedN. Parsooramen and Co Ltd v Nahaboo and Others PC 29-Jun-2010
(Mauritius) . .
CitedMowan v London Borough of Wandsworth and Another CA 21-Dec-2000
The claimant tenant sought damages from the landlord and neighbour and fellow tenant for nuisance caused by the neighbour’s aberrant behaviour.
Sir Christopher Staughton said: ‘there is a strong trend in the cases in favour of the landlord who . .
CitedWestminster City Council v Haw QBD 4-Oct-2002
The court was asked as to the interaction between the right and the duty of a local authority to remove obstructions from its highways, on the one hand, and the right of the individual citizen to use those highways to exercise his or her right to . .
CitedOxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council and Another CA 24-Feb-2004
Application was made to register the ‘trap grounds’ as a village green.
Held: Carnwath LJ: ‘The 1965 Act created no new legal status, and no new rights or liabilities other than those resulting from the proper interpretation of section 10. . .
CitedScott v Mid-South Essex Justices and Keskin Admn 25-Mar-2004
The private prosecutor appealed against the dismissal by the magistrates of his allegation that the defendant had unlawfully obstructed the highway. In essence the question was whether Mr Keskin should have been found to have a lawful excuse. He . .
CitedHamilton v Dumfries and Galloway Council SCS 24-Feb-2009
The petitioner sought a declarator that an area of land on the edge of the village of Collin was not a ‘road’ capable of being added by the respondents, Dumfries and Galloway Council, to their list of public roads under section 16 of the 1984 Act. . .
CitedCity of London v Samede and Others QBD 18-Jan-2012
The claimant sought an order for possession of land outside St Paul’s cathedral occupied by the protestor defendants, consisting of ‘a large number of tents, between 150 and 200 at the time of the hearing, many of them used by protestors, either . .
CitedKind v Northumberland County Council Admn 14-Mar-2012
The appellant landowner had a public bridleway over his land. It passed over an old cattle grid. He had constructed a gate to the side of the track. It was not part of the public highway. He now appealed from a refusal of an order for the Council to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.158988

Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council and Another: CA 14 Mar 2002

The claimant was injured swimming in a lake in a park. Warning signs clearly indicated that the lake was dangerous for swimming.
Held: The authority were liable. They knew that the lake was attractive to swimmers, and that the signs were ineffective, but had not yet carried out landscaping works to deter swimmers. Under the Act they could be liable to trespassers. The court drew a distinction between approaching 1(3) as a duty owed to a claimant as a member of a class, and 1(4) which focussed on the individual claimant. What was reasonably required could not be discovered without first deciding that it was reasonable to offer protection to that person.

Judges:

Lords Justices Ward, Sedley and Longmore

Citations:

Gazette 23-May-2002, [2002] EWCA Civ 309

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Occupiers Liability Act 1984 1

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Leave givenTomlinson v Congleton Borough Council and Cheshire County Council CA 18-Jun-2001
The appellant sought leave to appeal against an order dismissing his claim for damages. He had been injured swimming in water on the defendant’s land. The defendant asserted that they had no duty of care to those who came onto the land and imperiled . .

Cited by:

DoubtedDonoghue v Folkestone Properties Limited CA 27-Feb-2003
The claimant had decided to go for a midnight swim, but was injured diving and hitting a submerged bed. The landowner appealed a finding that it was 25% liable. The claimant asserted that the defendant knew that swimmers were common.
Held: The . .
Appeal fromTomlinson v Congleton Borough Council and others HL 31-Jul-2003
The claimant dived into a lake, severely injuring himself. The council appealed liability, arguing that it owed him no duty of care under the Act since he was a trespasser. It had placed warning signs to deter swimmers.
Held: The council’s . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Negligence, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.168088

Regina v Northumbrian Water Ltd Ex Parte Able UK Ltd: QBD 18 Dec 1995

A notice to treat on compulsory purchase can be withdrawn even after possession has been taken. The acquiring authority acquires an equitable interest in such land when the compensation has been assessed.

Judges:

Carnwath J

Citations:

Times 18-Dec-1995, (1995) 72 PCandR 95

Cited by:

CitedRhondda Cynon Taff Borough Council v Watkins CA 12-Feb-2003
Land had been purchased compulsorily, but the respondent unlawfully returned to possession in 1966, and now claimed title by adverse possession. The Council executed a vesting deed poll in 1988. The Council asserted that he could not be in adverse . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.87476

Regina v Braintree District Council, ex parte Malcolm William Halls: CA 1 Mar 2000

When selling a house to its tenant under the right to buy legislation, the council had imposed a restrictive covenant preventing the new owner developing the land by further building. The purchaser later approached the council for its release so as to allow further building. He had obtained planning permission for the proposed development. When the council refused, the surviving purchaser sought judicial review of that refusal.
Held: The purchaser’s appeal succeeded. The council had confirmed that the property had been sold at its full market value, without any adjustment to reflect any possible development value, but then adjusted with the appropiate discount. The council now said that it had imposed the covenant in order to retain to itself any development value. It is established law that a council may act under any Act only for purposes allowed by that enabling Act. Despite its assertion, the council had not imposed the covenant with a view to assist in making the properties more affordable generally. The Act set out the elements to be considered in setting the valuation. The purpose of reserving any development value to itself was not one permitted by the Act under which it had been sold. The purpose of the Act was to permit former tenants to enjoy the full range of benefits of land ownership as were enjoyed by other land owners. What was reasonable was what would be reasonable to both parties, not just one. The council might reserve rights which properly affected its remaining estate, for example in the control of noise or other nuisance, but this was not such a purpose. The restrictive covenant was void and the council could not demand any payment for its removal.
Laws LJ considered the principle in Padfield: ‘The rule is not that the exercise of the power is only to be condemned if it is incapable of promoting the Act’s policy, rather the question always is: what was the decision-maker’s purpose in the instant case and was it calculated to promote the policy of the Act?’

Judges:

Laws LJ, Jonathan Parker LK, Evans LJ

Citations:

Times 15-Mar-2000, (2000) 32 HLR 770

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 127(2) Sch6 para 5

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromRegina v Braintree District Council ex parte Halls Admn 2-Jul-1999
Where a local authority had sold a property to a tenant, and the tenant later came back to request the release from one of the covenants given on the sale, the council was free to charge an appropriate sum for that release. It was not a covenant . .
AppliedPadfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food HL 14-Feb-1968
Exercise of Ministerial Discretion
The Minister had power to direct an investigation in respect of any complaint as to the operation of any marketing scheme for agricultural produce. Milk producers complained about the price paid by the milk marketing board for their milk when . .

Cited by:

Appealed toRegina v Braintree District Council ex parte Halls Admn 2-Jul-1999
Where a local authority had sold a property to a tenant, and the tenant later came back to request the release from one of the covenants given on the sale, the council was free to charge an appropriate sum for that release. It was not a covenant . .
CitedCala Homes (South) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another Admn 7-Feb-2011
The claimant sought judicial review of a statement and letter by the respondent making a material consideration for planning authorities the intended revocation by the Respondent of Regional Spatial Strategies. The effect would be to allow the . .
CitedCala Homes (South) Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another CA 27-May-2011
The respondent had circularised local authorities to say that when assessing future local housing needs a proper material consideration was the proposed Localism Bill which would lead to the replacement of ‘Regional Spatial Strategies’ on which such . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Local Government, Housing, Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.85141

Pole and Another v Peake and Another: CA 22 Jul 1998

Where land had been sold subject to a reservation back of sporting rights those rights were not limited to reasonable amount or so as not to allow interference with normal agricultural activities. Nor damage claimable from escaping game birds.

Citations:

Times 22-Jul-1998

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.84782

Palmer and Another v Bowman and Another: CA 27 Oct 1999

There is no easement of right for an owner of higher land for water naturally to drain off over neighbouring lower land, and nor was an easement required. The doctrine of lost modern grant need not be applied. Although the higher land owner had no right, the owner of the lower land had no right to complain of such run off. The owner of the higher land had no right to come on to the other land to improve drainage, nor to require the owner of the lower land to maintain drains. The natural flow of water is an incident of the ownership of the land and is inherent in it, and as such is not capable of being the subject-matter of an easement.

Citations:

Gazette 27-Oct-1999, Times 10-Nov-1999, [2000] 1 WLR 842, [2000] 1 All ER 22

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedLambert and Others v Barratt Homes Ltd (Manchester Division) and Another QBD 17-Feb-2009
The claimant sought damages in nuisance and negligence saying that in constructing a new housing estate, they had altered the land in such a way as to lead to the repeated flooding of their home.
Held: Both the developer and the council were . .
CitedLambert and Others v Barratt Homes Ltd and Another CA 16-Jun-2010
The claimants had bought houses from the first defendants, who in turn had bought the land from Rochdale, the second defendants. In preparing the land for construction the first defendants were said to have negligently filled in a drainage culvert . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.84539

Nutt and Another v Read and Another: CA 3 Nov 1999

The parties had contracted for the letting of land and transfer as in personam of a chalet erected upon it. The parties having completed the deals could not then agree what was to have been paid.
Held: The first agreement was void for common mistake and that the second should be set aside or rescinded in equity. They had both acted in ignorance of the chalet having become part of the land, and that though a statutory tenancy had come into being, it was right to unravel the arrangement even after some considerable time and after improvements.

Judges:

Chadwick LJ, Thorpe and Morritt LJJ

Citations:

Gazette 03-Nov-1999, Gazette 03-Dec-1999, (1999) 32 HLR 716

Statutes:

Housieng Act 1988

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedIslington v Uckac and Another CA 30-Mar-2006
The council’s tenant had unlawfully secured assignment of a secure tenancy to the defendant. The council sought possession.
Held: A secure tenancy granted by an authority pursuant to a misrepresentation by the tenant is nonetheless valid. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.84392

Pagenor Ltd v Ryan: ChD 18 Mar 1998

A contract void for illegality was entirely void, and monies were repayable even though there had been part performance by way of possession of land.

Citations:

Gazette 18-Mar-1998

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 11 May 2022; Ref: scu.84538

In Re University of Westminster: CA 3 Sep 1998

Where a notice of application to modify or discharge a restrictive covenant is ambiguous as to whether full discharge is wanted and no notice of opposition was received, the court could not assume the covenant could be discharged entirely.

Citations:

Gazette 03-Sep-1998

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.82256

Hanina v Morland: CA 7 Dec 2000

The respondent was tenant of premises with exclusive access to an area of the roof which had been used by her for leisure purposes. The freeholder objected, and she claimed that the use was in the nature of an easement which had passed to her under the section when she took a transfer of the lease. The right she claimed was an exclusive and unrestricted one. The section could not include such a right in the grant of the lease. However since she had the only access, nominal damages were substituted.

Citations:

Gazette 07-Dec-2000

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 62

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.81217

Hillingdon London Borough Council v ARC Ltd: ChD 12 Jun 1997

The Council had taken possession of the company’s land under compulsory purchase powers, but the company delayed its claim for compensation, and the Council now said that the claim was time barred.
Held: The claim was indeed time barred. The cause of action for an entry under a compulsory purchase arose at the date of entry even though compensation not yet assessed. The assumption that no limitation period began to run until the amount of compensation had been agreed was incorrect.

Judges:

Stanley Burnton QC J

Citations:

Times 25-Jun-1997, [1998] 1 WLR 174

Statutes:

Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 11, Limitation Act 1980 9

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedTurner v Midland Railway Company 1911
No limitation period is applicable until the amount of the compensation has been agreed or determined. . .
CitedSwansea City Council v Glass CA 1992
The defendant had failed himself to repair his property, and the Local Authority carried out the work itself under the 1957 Act. It sought to recover the associated costs from the defendant, but he said that their claim was time barred, being more . .

Cited by:

Appeal fromLondon Borough of Hillingdon v ARC Limited CA 7-Apr-1998
The company sought compensation for land taken under compulsory purchase powers by the defendants several years before. It now appealed against the defeat of its claim as time-barred.
Held: The appeal failed. The limitation period for a claim . .
CitedHalstead v Council of City of Manchester CA 23-Oct-1997
Land had been compulsorily purchased, and the compensation agreed, but after long delays in payment, not as to the calculation of interest.
Held: Interest would be payable from the date of entry. The limitation period arose only once the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Limitation

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.81379

Habermann v Koehler and Another (No 2): CA 22 Nov 2000

A house owner allowed occupiers in and gave a informal option for them to buy it. He later charged it and sold the property to the chargee in satisfaction of the debt. Before buying it the mortgagee enquired of the occupiers as to whether they intended to purchase the property, and their reply did not mention the option. The court held that the enquiry was sufficient enquiry and that though the option was capable of being an overriding interest, the reply was in terms which did not protect that option. The land was taken not subject to the option. The relevant time was on the purchase, not the taking of the mortgage.

Citations:

Times 22-Nov-2000

Statutes:

Land Registration Act 1925 70(1)(g)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land, Registered Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.81109

Countryside Residential (North Thames) Ltd v Tugwell: CA 4 Apr 2000

A company was granted a licence to enter on land, for surveys and technical investigations, with a view eventually to its purchase. The land was occupied by protesters, and the company sought an injunction to exclude them. It was held that the licence did not give a right to occupy the land to the exclusion of others, and therefore, they had insufficient degree of occupation of the land to found an application to exclude the protesters. Something beyond just the right to enter the land is required. ‘he places emphasis on the fact that the right is to enter and occupy. It seems to me that there is a clear difference between a licence granted for the purpose of access, which does not provide effective control over the land, and a license to occupy which does.’

Judges:

Aldous and Waller LJJ and Rougier J

Citations:

Gazette 28-Apr-2000, Times 04-Apr-2000, (2001) 81 PandC R 10

Statutes:

Rules of the Supreme Court Order 113

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedManchester Airport Plc v Dutton; Longmire; Stoddard; Maile and Persons Unknown CA 4-Mar-1999
The claimant wished to construct a new runway on its own land, and it was necessary to carry out works, namely, that trees on nearby land should be lopped or felled so that they would not constitute an obstruction to the flight path. The claimant . .

Cited by:

CitedAlamo Housing Co-operative Ltd v Meredith and others CA 4-Apr-2003
The local authority had let a row of houses to the claimant who then sublet the individual houses to the defendant tenants. The authority obtained possession under the head lease for redevelopment, but the tenants resisted giving possession, saying . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Litigation Practice

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.79535

AIB Group (Uk) Ltd (Formerly Allied Irish Banks Plc and AIB Finance Ltd) v Martin and Another: CA 13 Jul 2000

Partners borrowed substantial sums from the claimant bank. A charge on the property made each jointly and severally liable for the debts. After default, the bank sought repayment from one partner of sums lent outside the partnership to the other. The appellant asserted that this made him guarantor of the partner, and that any ambiguity should be construed in the surety’s favour. The court held that the words were clear and imported the necessary meaning throughout the charge, and the meaning was not outside the parties intentions.

Citations:

Gazette 13-Jul-2000, Gazette 27-Jul-2000

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.77683

Shuttleworth v Le Fleming: 1865

The provisions of the Prescription Act 1832 do not apply to profits a prendre in gross.

Citations:

(1865) 19 CBNS 687

Statutes:

Prescription Act 1832

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedBarton v The Church Commissioners for England ChD 15-Dec-2008
The commissioners claimed a right by prescription to all fish to be taken in a stretch of the River Wye. The claimant was to moor a barge on the river.
Held: The court explained the nature and legal status of fisheries in the law going back to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.279915

Cole v Rose: 1978

The vendor had purported to rescind the contract and retain the deposit, while selling to another purchaser at a higher price.
Held: The purchaser was entitled to return of the deposit, because the notice to complete had been ineffective. After referring to Schindler, Mervin Davies J said: ‘With those observations in mind, it seems that one can contemplate an order under s 49(2) only if there are some special circumstances in the particular matter, being circumstances that suggest that it is perhaps unfair or inequitable that the purchaser should lose his deposit. I cannot see any special circumstances in the present case. It is a straightforward case of a contract for sale that was not completed because the purchaser could not find the purchase price in time.’

Judges:

Mervyn Davies QC J

Citations:

[1978] 3 All ER 1121

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 49(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedSchindler v Pigault 1975
The purchaser of land had not completed and sought return of the deposit paid claiming default by the vendor, or alternatively under section 49(2).
Held: He was entitled to the repayment of the deposit on the first ground. The court went . .

Cited by:

CitedMIDILL (97Pl) Ltd v Park Lane Estates Ltd and Another CA 11-Nov-2008
Refusal to return Land Contract Deposit
The court was asked as to whether a seller could retain a deposit paid by the claimant on a sale where contracts had been exchanged but the buyer had proved unable to go ahead.
Held: The appeal against refusal of return of the deposit failed. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.279044

James Macara v Barclay: CA 1944

The court declined to express a view on the use of section 49(2) to order the return of a deposit.

Citations:

[1944] 2 All ER 31

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 49(1)

Cited by:

CitedMIDILL (97Pl) Ltd v Park Lane Estates Ltd and Another CA 11-Nov-2008
Refusal to return Land Contract Deposit
The court was asked as to whether a seller could retain a deposit paid by the claimant on a sale where contracts had been exchanged but the buyer had proved unable to go ahead.
Held: The appeal against refusal of return of the deposit failed. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Contract

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.279043

Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v London Rent Assessment Committee Chairman: QBD 25 Feb 2005

The parties agreed in principle that there would be an application for planning permission, and that if granted the land would be bought and the profits shared. Considerable work was undertaken and permission achieved, but the seller then sought to vary the terms of the agreement.
Held: An estoppel had been created against the buyer. The minimum equity to do justice to Mr Cobbe required that he be awarded one-half of the increase in value of the property brought about by the grant of planning permission and that he be granted a lien over the property to secure that interest. He would have been entitled to relief on his constructive trust claim but that relief on the basis of proprietary estoppel was the more satisfactory way of satisfying the equity to which the facts of the case entitled him.

Judges:

Etherton J

Citations:

Unreported, 25 February 2005

Cited by:

At First InstanceYeoman’s Row Management Ltd and Another v Cobbe HL 30-Jul-2008
The parties agreed in principle for the sale of land with potential development value. Considerable sums were spent, and permission achieved, but the owner then sought to renegotiate the deal.
Held: The appeal succeeded in part. The finding . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Contract, Estoppel

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.276427

Whitbread and Co Ltd v Watt: ChD 1901

The purchaser contracted to purchase a plot on a building estate belonging to the vendor. The contract provided that ‘the purchase is to be completed as soon as 300 houses shall have been erected on the said estate’. Thus the contract was one under which completion was conditional. It also contained a provision entitling the purchaser to rescind the contract by giving notice to that effect ‘if 300 houses shall not be erected on the said estate within two years from the date of this agreement’. The purchaser rescinded the contract and claimed a lien to secure repayment to him of the deposit paid by him on signing the contract. The vendor contended that there was no lien as the contract had not gone off due to any default of his.
Held: It was not necessary for the purchaser to show any fault on the part of the seller. Farwell J said: ‘The lien is created by the contract under which the money is paid as part of the purchase-money, and on the faith that the contract will be carried out, and not by default of the vendor. The default gives rise to the necessity for enforcing the lien, but the lien arises from the contract. I see no reason why a condition that, if 300 houses are not built, the purchaser may rescind should be held to differ in any way from the ordinary condition in a contract that, if the purchaser makes or insists upon any requisition or objection to the title which the vendor is unable or unwilling to comply with, the vendor may rescind.’

Judges:

Farwell J

Citations:

[1901 1 Ch 911

Cited by:

Appeal fromWhitbread and Co Ltd v Watt CA 1902
The buyer agreed to buy a house when the developer had finished 300 houses on the site, but now sought return of his deposit.
Held: The developer’s appeal against an order for the return of the deposit failed.
Williams LJ said: ‘The lien . .
CitedChattey and Another v Farndale Holdings Inc and others CA 11-Oct-1996
The plaintiffs had paid deposits for apartments which were to be built. After the developer became insolvent the plaintiffs sought recovery of the deposits, saying they had a lien which preceded the claims of chargees.
Held: The one appeal . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.259717

Reilly v Booth: 1890

The express grant of a right over land which would place the dominant owner in such occupation of the servient land as to bar the servient owner from possession or control of the land may not constitute the grant of an easement but may be construed as a grant of the fee simple.

Judges:

Lopes LJ

Citations:

(1890) 44 Ch D 12

Cited by:

CitedMoncrieff and Another v Jamieson and others HL 17-Oct-2007
The parties disputed whether a right of way over a road included an implied right for the dominant owner to park on the servient tenement.
Held: The appeal failed. ‘The question is whether the ancillary right is necessary for the comfortable . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.260029

Barry v Hasseldine: 1952

The grantee’s land was surrounded partly by land of the vendor, and partly by that of other parties, including a disused airfield owned by a third party. For some time following the grant they had been able to obtain access over the airfield by permission of the owner. There was an argument, rejected by the judge, that he had agreed to abandon any claim to access over the vendor’s land. The issue therefore arose as to his legal rights in the event of the permissive right being unavailable.
Held: Where a freehold site is land-locked, there is normally implied a right of way irrespective of any common intention of the parties as to its creation or otherwise. There was a finding of a ‘conditional abandonment’ of a way of necessity, the need for which might or might not arise if the permissive way were lost. If the land is partly bounded by the vendor’s land and partly by the land of a third party, a merely permissive way over the third party’s land (as the only means of access) will not prevent the purchaser acquiring a right over the vendor’s land. The acid test of whether a person needs a way is whether he can compel an adjoining owner to grant him a legal right.
Danckwerts J said: ‘the law would clearly have implied in favour of the grantee of the triangular piece of land a way of necessity – that is to say, a right of way to enable the grantee to obtain access over the grantor’s land in some line to be chosen by the grantor; so that the triangular piece of land would be of some use to the grantee instead of being useless, as it would be if no right of way existed. I am satisfied that the law would have implied such a right notwithstanding that the piece of land granted by the conveyance of 1947 was not completely surrounded by the grantor’s land, but on three sides abutted on to land which belonged to other persons.’ and
‘There is therefore no express authority on the point. In my opinion, however, if the grantee has no access to the property which is sold and conveyed to him except over the grantor’s land or over the land of some other person or persons whom he cannot compel to give him any legal right of way, commonsense demands that a way of necessity should be implied, so as to confer on the grantee a right of way, for the purposes for which the land is conveyed, over the land of the grantor; and it is no answer to say that a permissive method of approach was in fact enjoyed, at the time of the grant, over the land of some person other than the grantor because that permissive method of approach may be determined on the following day, thereby leaving the grantee with no lawful method of approaching the land which he has purchased.’

Judges:

Danckwerts J

Citations:

[1952] Ch 835

Cited by:

CitedAdealon International Proprietary Ltd v London Borough of Merton ChD 12-Apr-2006
The claimant had bought land originally bought from the defendant, but after a long series of events, the only available access was over the retained land. It sought a right of way of necessity.
Held: At the time of the grant, other access was . .
CitedAdealon International Proprietary Ltd v London Borough of Merton CA 25-Apr-2007
The claimant had bought land from the council. The only means of access was over land retained by the council but there was no grant of a right of way. The claimant now appealed refusal of a right of way by necessity.
Held: At the time of the . .
CitedSweet and Another v Sommer and Another ChD 25-Jun-2004
Part of land had been sold off. By oversight no right of way had been taken in favour of the retained land. The dominant owner argued that by demolition of a building a means of access could be found and that therefore no right of way by necessity . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.253249

Dunford v McAnulty: HL 1883

Lord Blackburn: ‘in ejectment, where a person was in possession those who sought to turn him out were to recover upon the strength of their own title ; and consequently possession was at law a good defence against anyone, and those who sought to turn the man in possession out must shew a superior legal title to his .’

Judges:

Lord Blackburn

Citations:

(1883) 8 AC 456

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedManchester Airport Plc v Dutton and others CA 23-Feb-1999
The claimant sought an order requiring delivery of possession of land occupied by the respondent objectors. They needed to remove trees from the land in order to construct a runway on their own adjacent land. The claimant had been granted a licence . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Litigation Practice

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.247618