Sir Francis Jeune P said: ‘But when in English Law fraud is spoken of as a ground for avoiding a marriage, this does not include such fraud as induces a consent, but is limited to such fraud as procures the appearance without the reality of consent. The simplest instance of such fraud is personation . . in every case where fraud has been held to be the ground for declaring a marriage null, it has been such fraud as has procured the form without the substance of agreement, and in which the marriage has been annulled, not because of the presence of fraud, but because of the absence of consent.’ and ‘Error about the family or fortune of the individual though procured by disingenuous representations does not at all affect the validity of the marriage’

Judges:

Sir Francis Jeune P

Citations:

[1897] P 263

Family

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.540363

A decree absolute of divorce which would otherwise be void, will still be void even though one of the parties has subsequently remarried and had a child.

Citations:

[1953] P 79

Cited by:

Cited – Rapisarda v Colladon (Irregular Divorces) FC 30-Sep-2014
The court considered applications to set aside some 180 petitions for divorce on the grounds that they appeared to be attempts to pervert the course of justice by wrongfully asserting residence in order to benefit from the UK jurisdiction.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.537230

Judges:

Sir John Arnold P

Citations:

[1983] 1 WLR 1336

Cited by:

Cited – Rapisarda v Colladon (Irregular Divorces) FC 30-Sep-2014
The court considered applications to set aside some 180 petitions for divorce on the grounds that they appeared to be attempts to pervert the course of justice by wrongfully asserting residence in order to benefit from the UK jurisdiction.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.537227

In the course of a settlement of divorce proceedings, a wife agreed to withdraw her claim for maintenance. She sought to re-open it.
Held: the principle of Hyman v. Hyman applied, notwithstanding that the agreement between the parties had been approved by the court, under section 5 of the 1963 Act.
Sir Gordon Willmer said: ‘There is no doubt that no agreement made inter parties can ever deprive the court of its right to review the question of maintenance for a wife, as was decided by the House of Lords in Hyman v. Hyman (1929) AC 601. I do not think that anything contained in the new provisions of the Act of 1965, giving the court the power to approve reasonable arrangements between the parties, is such as to cast any doubt at all upon the continuance in force of the doctrine enunciated by the House of Lords in Hyman v. Hyman (1929) AC 601. There is, therefore, scope for two diametrically opposite views. On the one hand, it may be said that the court has an absolute right to go behind any agreement between the parties so far as the question of maintenance for a wife is concerned. On the other hand, there is the judge’s approach to the problem, that is, that where there is an agreement between the parties approved by the court, effect must be given to it. Under the one view, the right to award maintenance would be completely uninhibited, whereas under the other it would be strictly curtailed by the arrangement made between the parties and approved by the court at the time of the trial.
Mr. Dean, as I understand his argument, contended for an intermediate position between those two extremes. As I followed him, he said that the fact of this arrangement having been made and having been approved by the court is merely one factor amongst the numerous factors that have to be taken into consideration when the court is called upon to award maintenance to a wife following a divorce case. I suppose the reait of this argument would be to limit or inhibit to some extent the generosity of the registrar or judge in making an award of maintenance; that is to say, supposing he would, without any such arrangement having been made, have been disposed to award X a week, he must now in deference to the arrangement made between the parties, to which some effect must be given, award only X minus Y. The difference between that and the judge’s view is that the judge held that it would not be right in the absence of proof of any unforeseen circumstances of the kind envisaged by the arrangement to make any award of maintenance at all.
On behalf of the husband, the judge’s conclusion was vigorously defended by Mr. Anns who said, and said very forcibly, that this was a perfectly valid agreement between two parties, both sui juris, arrived at with the assistance they had from their legal advisors and approved by the court. It was, therefore, something to which effect ought to be given unless compelling reasons to the contrary were shown. He added (I think with a good deal of force)ithat the fact that the court had given its approval to the proposed arrangement had put the stamp of reasonableness on the arrangement which was then being made, viz, that there should be no maintenance.’
and ‘I think . . that the existence of this agreement, having regard to the circumstances in which it was arrived at, at least makes it necessary for the wife, if she wants to justify an award of maintenance, to offer prima facie proof that there have been unforeseen circumstances in the true sense, which make it impossible for her to work or otherwise maintain herself. If that be right, I think it is quite plain that the wife here did not give such prima facie proof’.

Judges:

Sir Gordon Willmer

Citations:

[1970] 1 WLR 1219

Statutes:

Matrimonial Causes Act 1963 5

Cited by:

Cited – Brockwell v Brockwell CA 5-Nov-1975
Ormrod LJ said: ‘But it must be a matter entirely for the judge to look at all the facts and the financial situation of each party and taking into account the fact that they made this agreement which to my mind is a very important piece of conduct . .
Cited – S v S FD 14-Jan-2014
The court was asked to approve a settlement reached under the IFLA arbitration scheme.
Held: The order was approved, but the court took the opportunity to give guidance. . .
Cited – Edgar v Edgar CA 23-Jul-1980
H and W separated and in 1976, without any pressure H and at the instigation of W, signed a deed of separation negotiated through solicitors. H agreed to purchase a house for W, to confer on her capital benefits worth approximately andpound;100,000, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.519965

Ormrod LJ said: ‘But it must be a matter entirely for the judge to look at all the facts and the financial situation of each party and taking into account the fact that they made this agreement which to my mind is a very important piece of conduct under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 because what the court is required to arrive at eventually is such an order as will be just and practicable having regard, among other things, to the conduct of the parties, and clearly when people make an agreement like this it is a very important factor in considering what is the just outcome of the proceedings . . what they themselves felt to be fair at the time when they made the agreement and that is as good a guide to justice perhaps as anything.’ and ‘To decide what weight should be given, in order to reach a just result, to a prior agreement not to claim a lump sum, regard must be had to the conduct of both parties, leading up to the prior agreement, and to their subsequent conduct, in consequence of it. It is not necessary in this connection to think in formal legal terms, such as misrepresentation or estoppel; all the circumstances as they affect each of two human beings must be considered in the complex relationship of marriage. So, the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement are relevant. Undue pressure by one side, exploitation of a dominant position to secure an unreasonable advantage, inadequate knowledge, possibly bad legal advice, an important change of circumstances, unforeseen or overlooked at the time of making the agreement, are all relevant to the question of justice between the parties. Important too is the general proposition that formal agreements, properly and fairly arrived at with competent legal advice, should not be displaced unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that an injustice will be done by holding the parties to the terms of their agreement. There may well be other considerations which affect the justice of this case; the above list is not intended to be an exclusive catalogue.’
Stamp LJ, after citing Wright v Wright, said: ‘Nevertheless, the wife ought, in my judgment, to have the opportunity of showing that in all the circumstances, and notwithstanding the agreement, the court should exercise in her favour this discretion to award her some lump sum payment.’

Judges:

Ormrod LJ, Stamp LJ

Citations:

[1975] CAT 75/468, Unreported, 5 November 1975

Statutes:

Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 25

Citing:

Cited – Wright v Wright 1970
In the course of a settlement of divorce proceedings, a wife agreed to withdraw her claim for maintenance. She sought to re-open it.
Held: the principle of Hyman v. Hyman applied, notwithstanding that the agreement between the parties had been . .

Cited by:

Cited – Edgar v Edgar CA 23-Jul-1980
H and W separated and in 1976, without any pressure H and at the instigation of W, signed a deed of separation negotiated through solicitors. H agreed to purchase a house for W, to confer on her capital benefits worth approximately andpound;100,000, . .
Cited – S v S FD 14-Jan-2014
The court was asked to approve a settlement reached under the IFLA arbitration scheme.
Held: The order was approved, but the court took the opportunity to give guidance. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.519964

H had mortgaged the matrimonial home to release funds to support his lifestyle. The bank knew about the family circumstances and the mortgage was set aside at first instance. W applied to have the charge set aside.
Held: The application failed. The charge had been executed long before W had commenced her claims. The Court rejected the bank’s contention that actual knowledge was required but accepted that the bank was not put on notice of the husband’s intention to defeat the wife’s claim.
To show that a transaction by one of the divorcing parties was intended to defeat a claim for ancillary or financial relief, it did not have to be shown that the motive was the dominant motive in the transaction; if it is a subsidiary (but material) motive then that would suffice. Also, the notice did not have to be actual notice. It could be constructive notice.
Purchas LJ said: ‘The intention must be subjective to the party against whom the order is sought and limited to defeating the application’s claim for financial relief or reducing the amount of that relief. Frequently, the beneficiary of the disposition is that party himself, but this is not always the case, and persons in whose favour the disposition is made are often third parties, e.g., the husband’s mistress or her children. In these circumstances it would be open to the court in cases not involving the presumption in section 37(5) to conclude that in making the disposition either in favour of a third party – or to himself in order to support a lifestyle which could not otherwise be sustained – that the party making the disposition knew and intended the inevitable result of his action. If this caused the diminution or loss of an asset which otherwise would be available to the court in an existing or anticipate application for financial relief it would be open to the judge to infer that the party concerned had the intention necessary to justify an application under section 37.’
. . And ‘The basic concepts are ‘knowing something’ which ought to have stimulated enquiry or ‘wilfully abstaining from inquiry to avoid notice’. Both import that the enquiry, if made, would necessarily have revealed the knowledge, constructive notice of which is to be imported. As will be seen subsequently in this judgment it is important to distinguish this position from the position where the evidence establishes a state of affairs from which the court could infer actual knowledge, which would not necessarily be acquired by the further inquiries indicated. . . ‘With great respect to Balcombe J, whether or not the step should be taken must, in my judgment, depend on whether the results of those enquiries would necessarily have given the bank notice of the intention on the part of the husband to defeat his wife’s claims for financial relief within the provisions of s37(4). In order to have this knowledge it is necessary for the bank to know that the wife was making, or was about to make, a claim for financial relief. Once in possession of this knowledge, it might, in the circumstances of this case, be difficult for the bank to avoid a finding that they should then have realised that the husband had the intention to defeat or prejudice the wife’s claims. The fact that the wife may not have any equitable or proprietary interest in the s37 application is not directly relevant, nor may I add with deference to existing authority, to the fact that the wife had or had not registered her interest.’
Nourse LJ discussed the standard of proof, saying: ‘The submission here was that the standard of proof was higher than proof on the balance of probabilities. I do not accept the submission in that form, although I would agree that, since what had to be proved was not merely a dishonourable intention but a dishonest and fraudulent one, the evidence which was required to tip the balance had to be correspondingly more convincing.’
Lloyd LJ said that, in determining whether a spouse has the requisite state of mind, a court may have regard to the natural consequences of his act.

Judges:

Lloyd LJ, Purchas LJ, Nourse LJ

Citations:

[1988] 1 WLR 1307, [1988] 2 FLR 223

Statutes:

Matriminial Causes Act 1973 23(2)(a) 23(7)

Cited by:

Cited – Newlon Housing Trust v Alsulaimen CA 16-Jan-1997
The tenant had been joint tenant with his wife of a house. On the breakdown of the marriage, she left and gave notice to quit to the council. The council sought and obtained an order for possession, against which the husband now sought leave to . .
Cited – Dellal v Dellal and Others FD 1-Apr-2015
The families disputed a claim under the 1975 Act. The defendants now sought summary dismissal of the claim. . .
Cited – K v K FD 21-Apr-2015
F and M had been involved in protracted and bitter litigation on their divorce. They had come each to seek the committal of the other for alleged perjury and otherwise, but those applications were not being pursued.
Held: The father’s . .
Cited – Kremen v Agrest FD 15-Oct-2010
Application as to payment of funds held where the payer was a fugitive from justice, owing sums in maintenance to the claimant. W applied for an order setting aside a charge granted by H over property. In previous hearing the court had found that H . .
Cited – ABC v PM and Another FC 5-Mar-2015
The parties were involved in substantial ancillary relief disputes. W now complained that H had charged his only asset within the jurisdiction, the house in which she lived, to secure his legal fees. She had already asserted a claim against it . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.470597

There is no status recognised in law of being twice validly married under two chronologically separated marriage ceremonies in different places

Judges:

Bodey J

Citations:

[2006] 2 FLR 825

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Galloway v Goldstein FD 16-Jan-2012
The claimant sought a declaration of marital status. They had undergone marriage ceremonies first in Connecticut and then in the UK. In the second ceremony they had declared that they had not previously been married. The US marriage had been . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.450569

At the first ancillary relief application orders had been made but the registrar had postponed enforcement of a charge while the child was under age. Four years later, W returned for clarification of the order, but the judge dismissed her applications and ordered her to transfer the property to her former husband subject to a charge.
Held: W’s appeal was allowed. H had made no application for ancillary relief, the court had had no juridiction to make the orders. The original order having insufficient decipherable meaning, a retrial was ordered.

Citations:

[1983] 13 Fam Law 147, [1983] 4 FLR 632

Cited by:

Cited – Whitehouse-Piper v Stokes CA 15-Jul-2008
The court examined its jurisdiction to hear an appeal on an ancillary relief application where one party had remarried. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.445159

In an ancillary relief application, it was legitimate for the court to reflect in its award the fact that assets had been accumulated since separation by one party alone. Cairns LJ stated: ‘Another way in which the judgment is criticised is that it is said that the judge was wrong to take into account that the husband’s fortune had accrued to him since the parting. Again, I think that that is a proper circumstance to pay regard to. It was never suggested in this case, as it was in Jones v Jones, that the position ciystallised at the time of the parting and that thereafter any change in the husband’s means was irrelevant. The increase in the husband’s means is plainly relevant; but it is also, in my view, relevant to remember that it is something which has happened since the parting. And what is of much more importance here is that it is not merely something which has happened since the parting: it is something which has been brought about by the husband in co-operation and partnership with Miss Capozzi, who has indeed played a direct part in the business in which he has been engaged and which in the past has been the main source of his income which has provided the capital which has enabled substantial assets to accrue to the husband and Miss Capozzi in the shape of premises which they are now able to let at a quite comfortable rent.’

Judges:

Cairns LJ

Citations:

[1973] 3 All ER 325

Cited by:

Cited – Rossi v Rossi FD 26-Jun-2006
W sought to challenge transactions entered into by H anticipating ancillary relief proceedings on their divorce. Nicholas Mostyn QC J said: ‘While of course no rigid rule can be expressed for the infinite variety of facts that arise in ancillary . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.425601

H had entered into a separation agreement with his wife, but now sought a lump sum and property adjustment order when his circumstances changed as a result of being made redundant.
Held: Thorpe J cited Edgar v Edgar and Camm v Camm and said: ‘As a matter of general policy I think it is very important that what the parties themselves agree at the time of separation should be upheld by the courts unless there are overwhelmingly strong considerations for interference.’

Judges:

Thorpe J

Citations:

[1994] 2 FLR 1077

Cited by:

Cited – Radmacher (Formerly Granatino) v Granatino SC 20-Oct-2010
The parties, from Germany and France married and lived at first in England. They had signed a pre-nuptial agreement in Germany which would have been valid in either country of origin. H now appealed against a judgment which bound him to it, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.425368

A finding in ancillary relief proceedings is not binding on others who were not themselves parties, and third parties should be allowed to be joined if necessary.
Lord Denning MR said: ‘It seems to me that, under section 24 of the 1973 Act, if an intervenor comes in making a claim for the property, then it is within the jurisdiction of the Judge to decide on the validity of the intervenor’s claim. The Judge ought to decide what are the rights and interest of all the parties, not only of the intervenor, but of the husband and wife respectively in the property. He can only make an order for transfer to the wife, of property which is the husband’s property. He cannot make an order for the transfer to the wife of someone else’s interest.
It is to be emphasised, however, that the task of the judge determining a dispute as to ownership between a spouse and a third party is, of course, completely different in nature from the familiar discretionary exercise between spouses. A dispute with a third party must be approached on exactly the same legal basis as if it were being determined in the Chancery Division.’

Judges:

Brightman J, Lord Denning MR

Citations:

[1981] 2 All ER 238

Statutes:

Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 24

Cited by:

Cited – Baker v Rowe CA 6-Nov-2009
H and W, though very elderly, set out for a divorce. A former son-in-law now appealed against a costs order made against him as an intervener under the 1996 Act. The parties disputed his right to appeal without permission.
Held: Under the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.408501

An English court should recognise a divorce decree granted in a foreign country where there was a real and substantial connection between the petitioner for the divorce and the country exercising the jurisdiction.
Lord Wilberforce said: ‘In my opinion, it would be in accordance with the developments I have mentioned and with the trend of legislation – mainly our own but also that of other countries with similar social systems – to recognise divorces given to wives by the courts of their residence wherever a real and substantial connection is shown between the petitioner and the country, or territory, exercising jurisdiction.’

Judges:

Lord Wilberforce

Citations:

[1969] 1 AC 33

Statutes:

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1949

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal From – Indyka v Indyka CA 1966
The court was asked whether, and if so when, it should recognise a decree of divorce granted in a foreign jurisdiction.
Held: Diplock LJ said: ‘It is, I apprehend, a well established principle of public policy applied by English Courts that so . .

Cited by:

Cited – Agbaje v Akinnoye-Agbaje SC 10-Mar-2010
The parties had divorced in Nigeria, but the former wife now sought relief in the UK under section 10 of the 194 Act. The wife said that she lived here, but the order made in Nigeria was severely detrimental requiring her either to live here in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.406665

Citations:

[1742] EngR 33, (1742) 2 Atk 519, (1742) 26 ER 712

Links:

Commonlii

Family

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.384206

Divorce by reason of cruelty. What circumstances constitute cruelty in construction of law. Dismissed

Citations:

[1790] EngR 2448, (1790) 1 Hag Con 35, (1790) 161 ER 466

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Family

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.365501

Nullity of marriage, by reason of publication of banns in false names, not supported in fact. This was a suit of nullity of marriage, by reason of the publication of banns not being made in the true names of the parties. The suit was brought by the father of the husband, as his natural guardian. The libel stated the circumstances, in which it was alleged that the marriage was effected by artifices and misrepresentations, and in a, cladestine manner, and in a parish to which neither of the parties belonged, and entirely unknown to the father of the minor; and that it was celebrated by banns under a false designatdon of the woman.
‘The strongest case you could establish of the most deliberate plot, leading to a marriage the most unseemly in all disproportions of rank, of fortune, of habits of life, and even of age itself, would not enable this Court to release him from chains which, though forged by others, he had riveted on himself. If he is capable of consent and has consented, the law does not ask how the consent has been induced.

Citations:

[1818] EngR 533, (1818) 2 Hag Con 238, (1818) 161 ER 728

Links:

Commonlii

Family

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.332533

Nullity of marriage, by reason of fraud and alteration of licence, not sustained: ‘It is perfectly established that no disparity of fortune or mistake as to the qualities of the person will impeach the vinculum of marriage’

Citations:

[1814] EngR 357, (1814) 2 Hag Con 175, (1814) 161 ER 706

Links:

Commonlii

Family

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.337350

Citations:

[1865] EngR 690 (B), (1865) 4 Sw and Tr 113

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Family

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.281602

Lord Gill said: ‘The pursuer next relies on s 9(1)(b) (as read with s 9(2) and s 11(2).
She argues that the defender has enjoyed an economic advantage in that he has been able to further his career whereas she has prejudiced hers by bringing up the children. I accept that the pursuer has suffered an economic disadvantage in this respect. On the other hand in all the years during which they lived together, the defender contributed more than the pursuer to the household finances and during the period when she was out of employment, he supported the family on his own. It is not suggested that the defender ever failed to maintain the family in a good standard of living. In my view this is a counterbalancing consideration which I am entitled by section 11 (2) to apply. The pursuer’s economic disadvantage is not the worst that she could have suffered. She was able to return to her professional employment soon after the birth of each child and she has for some considerable time been in full-time pensioned employment and making her own contributions to a top up pension. I distinguish this case from a case such as Loudon v Loudon where the property was decided in the proportions 55/45 per cent in the pursuer’s favour largely on the basis that the pursuer was untrained and had no pension and that there was a great disparity between her assets and those of the defender (at 1994 SLT p 385C). I distinguish this case also from McCormick v McCormick, where the wife was at a disadvantage in that it would be difficult for her to gain employment at her age in her former profession (at p 10); and from Cunniff v Cunniff where the wife who received a transfer order had not worked for over 20 years, had an earning power not remotely comparable with that of her husband and, if not given the matrimonial home, would not have been able to afford alternative accommodation (at pp12-13). I conclude therefore that in this case an unequal division in the pursuer’s favour is not justified by s 9(1)(b).’

Judges:

Lord Gill

Citations:

1997 SLT 144

Jurisdiction:

Scotland

Citing:

Cited – Loudon v Loudon SCS 1994
Lord Milligan said: ‘I have considered carefully counsel’s submission on the question of the appropriate allocation of the matrimonial property. I am left in no doubt whatsoever that this should be an allocation in which, in the whole circumstances, . .

Cited by:

Cited – CM v STS SCS 2-Sep-2008
cm_stsSCS2008
The pursuer sought payment of substantial sums, having been disadvantaged by ceasing work to care for the parties’ children. She also asserted that the defender had been advantaged by her taking the care of the children. The parties were not married . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.277306

To succeed in an appeal against an ancillary relief order, the appellant should be able to show some procedural irregularity or that, in conducting the necessary balancing exercise, the district judge has taken into account matters which were irrelevant or ignored matters which were relevant or has otherwise arrived at a conclusion which was plainly wrong and could only have been reached if the Judge erred in the balancing exercise.

Citations:

[2002] 1 FLR 207

Statutes:

Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 25 25A

Cited by:

Cited – S v S FD 19-Mar-2008
The husband appealed against an ancillary relief order, and particularly as to an order that he should continue to pay maintenance for the joint lives of the parties rater than for five years. He was earning a substantial income but anticipated that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.266365

The Board was asked whether Fanny Allegri had died domiciled in France, where she had lived from 1842 until her death in 1853.
Held: Lord Wensleydale said: ‘Whatever question may have arisen, if the deceased had died in 1842, her subsequent residence for eleven years gave a character to her prior residence, and proved that domicile had commenced at that time.’ Conduct which took place after the date of the alleged acquisition of a domicile of choice was relevant to determining the character of a person’s residence.

Judges:

Lord Wensleydale

Citations:

(1857) 3 Moo PC 306

Cited by:

Cited – Gaines-Cooper v HM Revenue and Customs ChD 13-Nov-2007
The parties disputed the domicile of the tax-payer. He had a domicile of origin in the UK, but asserted that he had acquired a domicile of choice in the Seychelles. The Special Commissioners had allowed, in assessing the domicile at any time, of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.261299

A properly issued birth certificate is prima facie evidence of the matters stated.

Citations:

[1964] P 25

Cited by:

Cited – Brown v HM Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother, the Executors of the Estate of and others FD 5-Jul-2007
The plaintiff sought the unsealing of the wills of the late Queen Mother and of the late Princess Margaret, claiming that these would assist him establishing that he was the illegitimate son of the latter.
Held: The application was frivolous. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.254495

Exceptionally the court may look at the capacity of a party to marry in a particular jursidiction by reference to the intended family home rather than the ante-nuptial domicile.

Citations:

(1985) FLR 1097

Cited by:

Cited – Wilkinson v Kitzinger and others FD 31-Jul-2006
The parties had gone through a ceremony of marriage in Columbia, being both women. After the relationship failed, the claimant sought a declaration that the witholding of the recognition of same-sex marriages recoginised in a foreign jurisdiction . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.244723

Although the children spent weekdays in voluntary care because the parents were at work, their bedrooms were maintained, they saw their parents on the weekend, and the arrangement was not intended as permanent. The court was asked whether they remained members of the same household.
Held: They were: ‘children can remain members of the household even though temporarily absent as long as ties with the parents and home are sufficiently closely maintained.’

Judges:

Woolf J

Citations:

[1982] 3 FLR 222

Cited by:

Cited – Richards v The Legal Services Commission Admn 19-Jul-2006
The claimant challenged the inclusion in her gross income for calculation of her eligibility to legal aid of maintenance payments received for her children who were both at University. She said that since she had responsibility for their . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.243374

The courts power to order periodic payments to a wife derives from the fact that the husband typically owns the entirety of the family property.

Citations:

[1911] P 203

Cited by:

Cited – Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane HL 24-May-2006
Fairness on Division of Family Capital
The House faced the question of how to achieve fairness in the division of property following a divorce. In the one case there were substantial assets but a short marriage, and in the other a high income, but low capital.
Held: The 1973 Act . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.242162

Citations:

[1934] P 17

Cited by:

Cited – Agulian and Another v Cyganik CA 24-Feb-2006
The question was whether the deceased had lost his domicile of birth and acquired one of choice when living and working in the UK for 43 years. He had retained land in Cyprus, but lived here.
Held: He had retained his domicile of birth: . .
Cited – Holliday and Another v Musa and Others CA 30-Mar-2010
The adult children of the deceased appealed against a finding that their father had died domiciled in the UK, and allowing an application under the 1975 Act. He had a domicile of origin in Cyprus but had lived in England since 1958. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.238723

In ancillary relied proceedings the wife’s father was ordered to disclose his testamentary intentions toward his daughter.
Held: Such an order was oppressive, and he should be protected against it.

Citations:

[1977] Fam 122

Cited by:

Cited – Charman v Charman CA 20-Dec-2005
The court considered orders to third parties abroad to produce docments for use in ancillary relief proceedings. The husband had built up considerable assets within an offshore discretionary trust. The court was asked whether these were family . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.236601

If there was a general rule that the death of a party in a divorce case leads to the abatement of the action, then it cannot be supported.

Judges:

Shearman J

Citations:

[1916] P 326

Cited by:

Cited – Harb v King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz and Another CA 9-Nov-2005
The wife sought to continue her claim for ancillary relief despite the death of her husband, the former King of Saudi Arabia.
Held: The court’s jurisdiction over the King had been challenged. However the claimants claim now abated on the death . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235892

An order had been made against the husband, upon the dissolution of a marriage, securing an annual sum for the maintenance of the wife and their child that was to be agreed upon or referred to the district registrar. The order envisaged contuation after the husband’s death. The husband died before the security had been specified and the wife applied to enforce the order against the executor of the husband’s estate.
Held: The order had laid down what was to be done and how it was to be done, and on the basis of the maxim certum est quod certum reddi potest (it is certain if it is capable of being rendered certain), it was held that the order created an enforceable claim, which survived the husband’s death. On the true construction of the order the intention was initially to charge the entire estate, until specific security was granted.

Judges:

Sachs J

Citations:

[1956] P 26

Statutes:

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 1(1)

Cited by:

Cited – Harb v King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz and Another CA 9-Nov-2005
The wife sought to continue her claim for ancillary relief despite the death of her husband, the former King of Saudi Arabia.
Held: The court’s jurisdiction over the King had been challenged. However the claimants claim now abated on the death . .
Cited – Barder v Barder; Barder v Caluori HL 1988
Later Event no ground to appeal from consent order
The matrimonial home had been owned jointly by the husband and wife. In divorce proceedings, an order was made by consent that the husband should transfer his interest in the home to the wife within 28 days. Before the order had been executed, the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235889

The court considered the effect on an ancillary relief claim where one pary died: ‘In these circumstances, in my judgment, it is clear – as has been recognized and acknowledged without recorded dissent for over 40 years – that in matrimonial proceedings a claim for financial provision neither gives rise to nor becomes a ’cause of action’ within s. 1(1) of the 1934 Act unless an order has been made in respect of it before the death of the deceased: until such an order has been made, therefore, in remains a mere hope or contingency which survives neither against nor for the benefit of the deceased’s estate.’

Judges:

Sheldon J

Citations:

[1988] 2 FLR 263

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Harb v King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz and Another CA 9-Nov-2005
The wife sought to continue her claim for ancillary relief despite the death of her husband, the former King of Saudi Arabia.
Held: The court’s jurisdiction over the King had been challenged. However the claimants claim now abated on the death . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235893

The court considered the abatement of an application for financial relief in divorce proceedings on the death of one party.
Held: The wife’s claim to secured provision was not a cause of action within the terms of section 1(1). The wife only had the hope that the court would in its discretion order a secured provision. She had no right to it at all until the order was actually made, and hence she had no cause of action at his death. As to s190: ‘Sect. 190 of the Judicature Act, 1925, provides that the court may, if it thinks fit, order the husband to secure to the wife such a sum of money as the court may deem to be reasonable. The wife thus has merely the right to ask the court to exercise discretionary powers in her favour. This seems to me to be an essentially different thing from her having an enforceable claim against her husband.’

Judges:

Hodson J

Citations:

[1942] P 64

Statutes:

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 1(1), Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 190

Cited by:

Cited – Barder v Barder; Barder v Caluori HL 1988
Later Event no ground to appeal from consent order
The matrimonial home had been owned jointly by the husband and wife. In divorce proceedings, an order was made by consent that the husband should transfer his interest in the home to the wife within 28 days. Before the order had been executed, the . .
Cited – Harb v King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz and Another CA 9-Nov-2005
The wife sought to continue her claim for ancillary relief despite the death of her husband, the former King of Saudi Arabia.
Held: The court’s jurisdiction over the King had been challenged. However the claimants claim now abated on the death . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235827

When the husband’s sole asset is a business which cannot be sold for the ancillary relief proceedings, it would be pointless to order its valuation.

Judges:

Lincoln J

Citations:

[1988] 2 FLR 490

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – P v P (Financial Provision: Non-disclosure) 1994
The applicant wife had been shown to have been guilty of considerable misconduct of the financial case. It was submitted that, as a result of that misconduct, the court should reduce the wife’s award on the application of the Section 25(2)(g) . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235328

The general rule against becoming engaged whilst still married does not apply when a decree nisi has been pronounced. However, Lord Atkin said: ‘There is real substance in the objection that such a promise tends to produce conduct which violates the solemn obligations of married life.’ Lord Thankerton: ‘There can be little question as to the proper function of the Courts in questions of public policy. Their duty is to expound, and not to expand such a policy.’

Judges:

Lord Atkin, Lord Thankerton

Citations:

[1937] AC 1

Cited by:

Cited – J v S T (Formerly J) CA 21-Nov-1996
The parties had married, but the male partner was a transsexual, having been born female and having undergone treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria. After IVF treatment, the couple had a child. As the marriage broke down the truth was revealed in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235296

In the case of a marriage void for bigamy the court had no jurisdiction to withold a decree of nullity.

Citations:

[1962] P 224

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – J v S T (Formerly J) CA 21-Nov-1996
The parties had married, but the male partner was a transsexual, having been born female and having undergone treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria. After IVF treatment, the couple had a child. As the marriage broke down the truth was revealed in . .
Cited – Hudson v Leigh FD 5-Jun-2009
The claimant sought a decree of divorce. The ceremony had been a religious one in Cape Town. They had intended it to be followed by a ceremony in a register office in England, but this did not happen. The pastor in south Africa said that he had . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235321

The husband had left the wife for another woman. Adultery by the husband was not a ground for divorce absent aggravating circumstances, such as incest. The parties had entered into a deed of separation under which the husband had paid two lump sums and agreed to make weekly payments of andpound;20 for the life of the wife. The deed included a covenant by the wife that she would not institute any proceedings to make him pay more than this. The House was asked whether the wife was precluded from petitioning the court for permanent maintenance.
Held: An agreement to oust the jurisdiction of the court to grant ancillary relief is void as being against the public interest.
Lord Hailsham LC said: ‘It is sufficient for the decision of the present case to hold, as I do, that the power of the Court to make provision for a wife on the dissolution of her marriage is a necessary incident of the power to decree such a dissolution, conferred not merely in the interests of the wife, but of the public, and the wife cannot by her own covenant preclude herself from invoking the jurisdiction of the court or preclude the court from the exercise of that jurisdiction.’
Lord Atkin said: ‘In my view no agreement between the spouses can prevent the Court from considering the question whether in the circumstances of the particular case it shall think fit to order the husband to make some reasonable payment to the wife, ‘having regard to her fortune, if any, to the ability of her husband and to the conduct of the parties.’ The wife’s right to future maintenance is a matter of public concern, which she cannot barter away.’ and ‘Full effect has therefore to be given in all Courts to these contracts as to all other contracts. It seems not out of place to make this obvious reflection, for a perusal of some of the cases in the matrimonial Courts seems to suggest that at times they are still looked at askance, and enforced grudgingly. But there is no caste in contracts. Agreements for separation are formed, construed and dissolved and to be enforced on precisely the same principles as any respectable commercial agreements, of whose nature indeed they sometimes partake. As in other contracts stipulations will not be enforced which are illegal either as being opposed to positive law or public policy. But this is a common attribute of all contracts, though we may recognize that the subject-matter of separation agreements may bring them more than others into relation with questions of public policy.’
Lord Atkin also said: ‘We have to deal with a separation deed, a class of document which has had a chequered career at law. Not recognized by the Ecclesiastical Courts, such contracts were enforced by the common law. Equity at first frowned. Lord Eldon doubted but enforced them: cf. St. John v St. John ((1803-1805) 11 Ves Jr 526, 529 and Bateman v. Countess of Ross (1813) 1 Dow 235; and see the arguments of Sir Fitzroy Kelly and Mr Turner and of Mr Bethell in Wilson v. Wilson (1848) 1 H. L. C. 538, 550-553, 564, 565. Finally they were fully recognized in equity by Lord Westbury’s leading judgment in Hunt v. Hunt (1861) 4 D. F. and J. 221, in which he followed Lord Cottenham’s decision in Wilson v. Wilson (1846-1848) 1 HLCas 538, 550-553, 564, 565, where his argument for the respondent had prevailed. Full effect has therefore to be given in all courts to these contracts as to all other contracts. It seems not out of place to make this obvious reflection, for a perusal of some of the cases in the matrimonial courts seems to suggest that at times they are still looked at askance and enforced grudgingly. But there is no caste in contracts. Agreements for separation are formed, construed and dissolved and to be enforced on precisely the same principles as any respectable commercial agreement, of whose nature indeed they sometimes partake. As in other contracts stipulations will not be enforced which are illegal either as being opposed to positive law or public policy. But this is a common attribute of all contracts, though we may recognize that the subject-matter of separation agreements may bring them more than others into relation with questions of public policy.’

Judges:

Lord Hailsham LC, Lord Atkin

Citations:

[1929] AC 601

Cited by:

Cited – J v S T (Formerly J) CA 21-Nov-1996
The parties had married, but the male partner was a transsexual, having been born female and having undergone treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria. After IVF treatment, the couple had a child. As the marriage broke down the truth was revealed in . .
Cited – Soulsbury v Soulsbury CA 10-Oct-2007
The claimant was the first wife of the deceased. She said that the deceased had promised her a substantial cash sum in his will in return for not pursuing him for arrears of maintenance. The will made no such provision, and she sought payment from . .
Cited – Sutton v Sutton 1984
The husband and his wife agreed that in consideration, inter alia, of the wife consenting to the husband divorcing her on the ground of two years’ separation and consent, he would transfer the matrimonial home to her, and she would take over . .
Cited – Aribisala v St James Homes (Grosvenor Dock) Ltd ChD 12-Jun-2007
The parties had agreed in a contract for the sale and purchase of land to exclude the application of section 49(2). The buyer had failed to comply with a notice to complete.
Held: The parties cannot contract out of section 49(2). The . .
Cited – Macleod v Macleod PC 17-Dec-2008
(Isle of Man) The parties had signed a post-nuptial agreement.
Held: It was not open to the courts to find that such agreements might be enforced. They had been unenforceable under common law, and if the law was to be changed it must be by . .
Cited – Radmacher (Formerly Granatino) v Granatino SC 20-Oct-2010
The parties, from Germany and France married and lived at first in England. They had signed a pre-nuptial agreement in Germany which would have been valid in either country of origin. H now appealed against a judgment which bound him to it, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235294

Ancillary relief in marriage of short duration.

Citations:

[1976] FLR 640, [1977] Fam 127

Cited by:

Cited – Miller v Miller; M v M (Short Marriage: Clean Break) CA 29-Jul-2005
The parties contested ancillary relief where there had been only a short marriage, but where here were considerable family assets available for division. The wife sought to rely upn the husband’s behaviour to counter any argument as to the shortness . .
Mentioned – Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane HL 24-May-2006
Fairness on Division of Family Capital
The House faced the question of how to achieve fairness in the division of property following a divorce. In the one case there were substantial assets but a short marriage, and in the other a high income, but low capital.
Held: The 1973 Act . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235277

In a case alleging non-consummation of a marriage, the court discussed the purpose of the 1907 Act: ‘The object of that Act, so far as nullity suits are concerned, was to remedy a defect that previously existed. In some cases of nullity, for instance, a husband or wife of one of the parties turned up after a number of years, and there was no power, in the absence of a settlement, to do anything for the woman who had believed herself a wife, and perhaps had children, and who might be left destitute. There may, however, be a great distinction between one case and another.’ The court has a wide discretion: ‘Each case must depend on its own merits, and the court must be guided by the facts of the particular case before it.’

Judges:

Sir Gorell Barnes P

Citations:

[1909] P 90-91

Statutes:

Matrimonial Causes Act 1907

Cited by:

Cited – J v S T (Formerly J) CA 21-Nov-1996
The parties had married, but the male partner was a transsexual, having been born female and having undergone treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria. After IVF treatment, the couple had a child. As the marriage broke down the truth was revealed in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235265

An Ecclesiastical Court has power to order payment of alimony pending suit.

Citations:

(1898) 78 LT 472

Cited by:

Cited – J v S T (Formerly J) CA 21-Nov-1996
The parties had married, but the male partner was a transsexual, having been born female and having undergone treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria. After IVF treatment, the couple had a child. As the marriage broke down the truth was revealed in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235264

A delay in presenting or prosecuting a claim for ancillary relief and an inability to show need when the claim is determined may result in a smaller award or even a nil award.

Citations:

[1979] 1 FLR 10

Statutes:

Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

Cited by:

Cited – G v G and Another FdNI 25-Oct-2003
There had been a long but argumentative marriage, and the parties disputed distribution of the assets on an ancillary relief application.
Held: The husband could not claim to discount shareholdings as a minority shareholding where he also . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235257

H drank excessively and was unemployed. In the divorce he made an application for ancillary relief against the offer from W to share the proceeds of sale of the house equally.
Held: H was homeless and unemployed. His behaviour was such as should be taken into account, but his needs required provision of a sum which might enable him to get a home, and he was to receive more than 50% of the proceeds of sale.

Judges:

Scott Baker J

Citations:

[1990] 20 Fam Law 19

Statutes:

Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 25(2)(g)

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235274

Citations:

[1994] 2 FLR 801, [1994] 2 FCR 1031

Statutes:

Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 25(2)(g)

Cited by:

Cited – Miller v Miller; M v M (Short Marriage: Clean Break) CA 29-Jul-2005
The parties contested ancillary relief where there had been only a short marriage, but where here were considerable family assets available for division. The wife sought to rely upn the husband’s behaviour to counter any argument as to the shortness . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235275

Ancillary relief – short marriage.

Citations:

[1981] 2 FLR 392

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Miller v Miller; M v M (Short Marriage: Clean Break) CA 29-Jul-2005
The parties contested ancillary relief where there had been only a short marriage, but where here were considerable family assets available for division. The wife sought to rely upn the husband’s behaviour to counter any argument as to the shortness . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235278

W had been confined to a mental institution after being found not guilty of the murder of her two children by reason of insanity. Her release on conditional discharge was anticipated, and application was made to vary the maintenance order.
Held: Whilst her behaviour had been gross and obvious, no moral blame attached, and it would not be equitable that she should be punished financially, though it remained a substantial factor. A clean break order was made to provide a small lump sum for the wife, with the balance of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home divided equally.

Judges:

Reeve J

Citations:

(1982) 3 FLR 83, (1981) Fam Law 118

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Kyte v Kyte CA 22-Jul-1987
The parties disputed an ancillary relief claim on their divorce. The husband had been suicidally depressed. The wife had committed adultery over a long time and also assisted her husband’s failed suicide. The husband now sought to rely upon her . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235272

The parties had contracted a bigamous mariage, though each in fact believed it not to be so. As to the court’s powers to order maintenance under the 1907 Act: ‘It is quite clear that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1907 gives me power to grant maintenance, if thought desirable, in all suits for nullity of marriage. I cannot read into the Act any proviso concerning marriages void ab initio . This case comes within the Act…’

Judges:

Bargrave Deane J

Citations:

(1913) 108 LT 382

Statutes:

Matrimonial Causes Act 1907

Cited by:

Cited – J v S T (Formerly J) CA 21-Nov-1996
The parties had married, but the male partner was a transsexual, having been born female and having undergone treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria. After IVF treatment, the couple had a child. As the marriage broke down the truth was revealed in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235267

There had been a foreign marriage ceremony. The court applied the presumption of marriage from long cohabitation without ceremony.

Citations:

(1909) 25 TLR 222

Cited by:

Cited – Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath CA 28-Oct-1999
The claimant and her husband had been married at a Sikh temple, and lived together for many years before his death. The temple had not been accredited for marriages, and the Secretary of State resisted payment of benefits to the claimant as a widow, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.231666

The parties gave evidence that the only ceremony of marriage through which they went took place in France. The case was argued and decided on the basis, accepted by the learned judge, that expert evidence showed that the ceremony could not have been valid, and it was submitted that if the parties were not married by that ceremony they were not married at all. Nevertheless in the parties’ long cohabitation after the ceremony, a marriage was presumed.

Citations:

[1904] 1 Ch 456

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath CA 28-Oct-1999
The claimant and her husband had been married at a Sikh temple, and lived together for many years before his death. The temple had not been accredited for marriages, and the Secretary of State resisted payment of benefits to the claimant as a widow, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.231664

There had been ceremony of marriage which was prima facie valid. There was therefore a presumption of marriage.

Citations:

(1881) 6 App Cas 364

Cited by:

Cited – Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath CA 28-Oct-1999
The claimant and her husband had been married at a Sikh temple, and lived together for many years before his death. The temple had not been accredited for marriages, and the Secretary of State resisted payment of benefits to the claimant as a widow, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.231665

Acquisition of domicile of choice despite immigration status.

Citations:

(1948) 64 TLR 556

Cited by:

Cited – Mark v Mark HL 30-Jun-2005
The petitioner sought to divorce her husband. Both were Nigerian nationals, and had married under a valid polygamous marriage in Nigeria. She claimed that the courts had jurisdiction because of her habitual residence here despite the fact that her . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.228189

It is the intention of the deserting party which establishes desertion, and that the intention permanently to end a relationship can be readily inferred. Where a husband’s conduct towards his wife was such that a reasonable man would know, and that the husband must have known, that in all probability it would result in the departure of the wife from the matrimonial home, that, in the absence of rebutting evidence, was sufficient proof of an intention on his part to disrupt the home, and the fact that he nevertheless desired or requested her to stay did not rebut the intention to be inferred from his acts – that he intended to drive her out – and he was guilty of constructive desertion.

Citations:

[1955] AC 402, [1954] 3 All ER 571

Jurisdiction:

Commonwealth

Cited by:

Cited – Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v W CA 18-May-2005
The claimant had been married with children. Her husband was accused of abuse of the children, and bailed to live away from home, and then convicted and imprisoned. The claimant applied for income support on the basis that she had been abandoned . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.226123

The wife had been convicted of treason, and imprisoned. The husband claimed constructive desertion:
Held: A marriage partner’s criminal conduct can amount to constructive desertion if that conduct ‘strikes at the roots of the matrimonial relationship.’ Sachs J said: ‘The fact that she had incurred that conviction was, however, relied on as also being a ground upon which she was guilty of constructive desertion. That her conduct in incurring the conviction would, if it became known, render a joint life with him in the matrimonial home at Portsmouth impracticable, was something which in my view was not merely obvious but was something which, as above indicated, was well appreciated by her.’

Judges:

Sachs J

Citations:

[1956] P 390

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v W CA 18-May-2005
The claimant had been married with children. Her husband was accused of abuse of the children, and bailed to live away from home, and then convicted and imprisoned. The claimant applied for income support on the basis that she had been abandoned . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.226121

The separation element in desertion may result from a period of compulsory detention.

Citations:

[1948] P 302

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v W CA 18-May-2005
The claimant had been married with children. Her husband was accused of abuse of the children, and bailed to live away from home, and then convicted and imprisoned. The claimant applied for income support on the basis that she had been abandoned . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.226120

The court discussed the doctrine of constructive desertion in family law: ‘In most cases of desertion the guilty party actually leaves the other but it is not always or necessarily the guilty party who leaves the matrimonial home. In my opinion, the party who intends bringing the cohabitation to an end, and whose conduct in reality causes its termination, commits the act of desertion. There is no substantial difference between the case of a husband who intends to put an end to the state of cohabitation, and does so by leaving his wife, and that of a husband who with the like intent obliges his wife to separate from him.’

Judges:

Gorell Barnes J

Citations:

[1899] P 272

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v W CA 18-May-2005
The claimant had been married with children. Her husband was accused of abuse of the children, and bailed to live away from home, and then convicted and imprisoned. The claimant applied for income support on the basis that she had been abandoned . .
Cited – Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v W CA 18-May-2005
The claimant had been married with children. Her husband was accused of abuse of the children, and bailed to live away from home, and then convicted and imprisoned. The claimant applied for income support on the basis that she had been abandoned . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.226119