The question was whether the deceased had lost his domicile of birth and acquired one of choice when living and working in the UK for 43 years. He had retained land in Cyprus, but lived here.
Held: He had retained his domicile of birth: ‘marriage by a man with a domicile of origin in one country to a woman domiciled in another country and post-matrimonial residence with his wife in that other country for many years are important considerations, but they are not conclusive.’ A later choice by the defendant was not sufficient to displace his domicile of origin: ‘If, as is agreed, Andreas did not acquire a domicile of choice in England between 1958 and 1995, because he did not intend to live in England permanently or indefinitely, it could not reasonably be inferred from what happened after 1995 that he had formed a different intention about his permanent home before he died.’ and ‘. . It is easier to show a change from one domicile of choice to another domicile of choice than it is to show a change to a domicile of choice from a domicile of origin.’
Mummery LJ said: ‘Positioned at the date of death in February 2003 the court must look back at the whole of the deceased’s life, at what he had done with his life, at what life had done to him and at what were his inferred intentions in order to decide whether he had acquired a domicile of choice in England by the date of his death. Soren Kierkegaard’s aphorism that ‘Life must be lived forwards, but can only be understood backwards’ resonates in the biographical data of domicile disputes.’
Mummery LJ, Longmore LJ, Lewison J
[2006] EWCA Civ 129
Bailii
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Inland Revenue Commissioners v Bullock CA 1976
The court was asked to decide whether the taxpayer’s house was his principal home. Buckley LJ discussed the nature of ‘residence’: ‘A man may have homes in more than one country at one time. In such a case, for the purpose of determining his . .
Cited – In the Estate of Fuld, decd (No 3) ChD 1967
The deceased had spent relatively equal periods in two or more countries. The parties disputed his domicile.
Held: A blind adherence to foreign law can not be always expected of an English Court. The legal relationship between a person and the . .
Cited – Barry v Butlin PC 8-Dec-1838
The testator, who had one son, bequeathed legacies to Percy, his attorney, one Butlin, to whom he also bequeathed the residue of his estate, and Whitehead, his butler. The will was upheld by the judge in the Prerogative Court and the son appealed. . .
Cited – Udny v Udny HL 1869
Revival of domicile of origin after loss of choice
The House considered the domicile of the respondent’s father at the time of the respondent’s birth. The father had been born in Scotland but had left Scotland and taken a lease of a house in London. He had a castle in Scotland but that was not . .
Cited – Aitchison v Dixon 1870
The testator, William Allan, had been Lord Provost of Edinburgh and unmarried. When 40 he moved to England ‘for a wife’ and ‘had the good fortune to win the hand of a widow . . of considerable wealth and expectations’. They lived for a while in . .
Cited – Atorney-General v Yule and Mercantile Bank of India 1931
The court considered the shifting burden of proof when the question arose of an intention to change a domicile of origin. . .
Cited – Forbes v Forbes 3-Mar-1854
General Forbes died. It became necessary to decide what was his domicile at the date of death. He had been born in Scotland, but then served for 35 years in India, before retirng to live in London.
Held: The domicile in India was a domicile of . .
Cited – Winans v Attorney-General HL 1904
A domicile of origin can only be replaced by clear cogent and compelling evidence that the relevant person intended to settle permanently and indefinitely in the alleged domicile of choice. A domicile of origin is tenacious; the character of . .
Cited – Abraham v Attorney-General 1934
. .
Cited – Cordell v Second Clanfield Properties Ltd 1969
In a fast developing area of law, judges should acknowledge the value of ‘fertilisers of thought’: ‘argued law is tough law . . I would expose those views to the testing and refining process of argument. Today, as of old, by good disputing shall the . .
Cited – Todd v Adams and Chope (Trading as Trelawney Fishing Co) (The ‘Margaretha Maria’) CA 2002
Where the correctness of a finding of primary fact or of inference is in issue (on appeal), it cannot be a matter of simple discretion how an appellate court approaches the matter. Once the appellant has shown a real prospect (justifying permission . .
Cited – In re Grayan Building Services Ltd CA 1995
The degree to which an appellate court will be willing to substitute its own judgment for that of the tribunal will vary with the nature of the question. Hoffmann LJ said: ‘The concept of limited liability and the sophistication of our corporate law . .
Cited – G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) HL 25-Apr-1985
The House asked when a decision, on the facts, of a first instance court is so wrong as to allow it to be overturned on appeal.
Held: The epithet ‘wrong’ is to be applied to the substance of the decision made by the lower court. ‘Certainly it . .
Cited – AEI Rediffusion Music Ltd v Phonographic Performance Ltd CA 1-Feb-1999
The copyright tribunal was given a wide discretion for the awarding of costs on applications made to it for licenses. The nature of the applications and the different basis makes it dangerous to import rules for awards from the general rules on . .
Cited by:
Cited – Gaines-Cooper v HM Revenue and Customs ChD 13-Nov-2007
The parties disputed the domicile of the tax-payer. He had a domicile of origin in the UK, but asserted that he had acquired a domicile of choice in the Seychelles. The Special Commissioners had allowed, in assessing the domicile at any time, of . .
Cited – Barlow Clowes International Ltd and Others v Henwood CA 23-May-2008
The receiver appealed against an order finding that the debtor petitioner was not domiciled here when the order was made. The debtor had a domicile of origin in England, but later acquired on in the Isle of Man. He then acquired a home in Mauritius . .
Cited – Holliday and Another v Musa and Others CA 30-Mar-2010
The adult children of the deceased appealed against a finding that their father had died domiciled in the UK, and allowing an application under the 1975 Act. He had a domicile of origin in Cyprus but had lived in England since 1958. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Wills and Probate, Family
Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.238704
