Golubovich v Golubovich: CA 21 May 2010

The court was asked to rule as to the recognition of a foreign (Moscow) decree of divorce obtained in breach of an Hemain injunction. The Russian proceedings had got to a stage requiring H positively to apply to prevent the decree.
Held: The appeal was allowed, and the decree of the Russian court accepted. Thorpe LJ said: ‘where the applicant’s reliance is on subsection 51 (3)(c) the judge’s true task is to conclude whether ‘recognition of the divorce . . would be manifestly contrary to public policy.’ In reaching that conclusion, the judge is not exercising a discretion but forming a proportionate judgment, by which I mean a judgment which gives proper weight to all relevant factors and circumstances.
If a judge reaches the positive conclusion that recognition would be manifestly contrary to public policy, refusal of recognition must follow. It would be quite unrealistic to suggest that the positive conclusion only leads him into a second stage discretionary judgment as to whether or not to refuse recognition.’ As to the Russian Court: ‘the court regarded itself as having a straightforward jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage between two Russian citizens and, absent any treaty with the United Kingdom in this field, was not deterred by the London orders. To refuse recognition of the Moscow decree would disregard our obligation to respect the function of that court.’
Lord Neuberger MR, Thorpe, Etherton LJJ
[2010] EWCA Civ 831
Bailii
Family Law Act 1986 53
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedHemain v Hemain 1988
The court confirmed its the power to grant a temporary injunction restraining the party from pursuing proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction to prevent that party from obtaining unfair advantage. The injunction would typically preserve the status quo . .
CitedA v L FD 11-Mar-2010
Sir Mark Potter considered the validity of an Egyptian decree obtained in breach of a restraining injunction upon which the court had relied to preserve the status of marriage.
Held: Recognition was refused on the facts.
Sir Mark Potter P . .
CitedGray (orse Formosa) v Formosa CA 1963
Lord Denning MR said: ‘Suffice it to say that I am content to decide this case on the simple basis that the courts of this country are not compelled to recognise the decree of the court of another country when it offends against our ideas of . .
CitedAntaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB (‘the Antaios’) HL 1984
A ship charterer discovered that the bills of lading were incorrect, but delayed withdrawal from the charter for 13 days. They now sought leave to appeal the arbitration award against them.
Held: Though he deprecated extending the use of the . .
CitedJoyce v Joyce and O’Hare FD 1979
The Wife asked the court not to recognise a foreign decree of divorce, saying that it would deprive her of substantial fairness in ancillary relief.
Held: Lane J said: ‘If the courts of this country were empowered to grant ancillary relief on . .
CitedChaudhary v Chaudhary 1985
The Pakistani husband pronounced bare Talaq in Sharia form before witnesses in Kashmir, although administered by Pakistan a territory to which the Muslim Family Ordinance 1961 did not apply. Recognition of the Talaq divorce had been refused by Wood . .
CitedNational Navigation Co v Endesa Generacion Sa (The Wadi Sudr) CA 17-Dec-2009
natnav_endesCA2009
The court was asked whether a judgment of a fellow member state of the European Union ruling against a stay of proceedings on the basis that an arbitration clause was not incorporated in the contract can be relied on as creating an issue estoppel so . .
CitedKrombach v Bamberski ECFI 30-Mar-2000
Normally a court within the European community could not refuse to enforce a judgment of another members state. It could do so however where the judgment had been obtained by virtue of a procedure which denied the right of a defendant to appear . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 February 2021; Ref: scu.420972