The husband had left the wife for another woman. Adultery by the husband was not a ground for divorce absent aggravating circumstances, such as incest. The parties had entered into a deed of separation under which the husband had paid two lump sums and agreed to make weekly payments of andpound;20 for the life of the wife. The deed included a covenant by the wife that she would not institute any proceedings to make him pay more than this. The House was asked whether the wife was precluded from petitioning the court for permanent maintenance.
Held: An agreement to oust the jurisdiction of the court to grant ancillary relief is void as being against the public interest.
Lord Hailsham LC said: ‘It is sufficient for the decision of the present case to hold, as I do, that the power of the Court to make provision for a wife on the dissolution of her marriage is a necessary incident of the power to decree such a dissolution, conferred not merely in the interests of the wife, but of the public, and the wife cannot by her own covenant preclude herself from invoking the jurisdiction of the court or preclude the court from the exercise of that jurisdiction.’
Lord Atkin said: ‘In my view no agreement between the spouses can prevent the Court from considering the question whether in the circumstances of the particular case it shall think fit to order the husband to make some reasonable payment to the wife, ‘having regard to her fortune, if any, to the ability of her husband and to the conduct of the parties.’ The wife’s right to future maintenance is a matter of public concern, which she cannot barter away.’ and ‘Full effect has therefore to be given in all Courts to these contracts as to all other contracts. It seems not out of place to make this obvious reflection, for a perusal of some of the cases in the matrimonial Courts seems to suggest that at times they are still looked at askance, and enforced grudgingly. But there is no caste in contracts. Agreements for separation are formed, construed and dissolved and to be enforced on precisely the same principles as any respectable commercial agreements, of whose nature indeed they sometimes partake. As in other contracts stipulations will not be enforced which are illegal either as being opposed to positive law or public policy. But this is a common attribute of all contracts, though we may recognize that the subject-matter of separation agreements may bring them more than others into relation with questions of public policy.’
Lord Atkin also said: ‘We have to deal with a separation deed, a class of document which has had a chequered career at law. Not recognized by the Ecclesiastical Courts, such contracts were enforced by the common law. Equity at first frowned. Lord Eldon doubted but enforced them: cf. St. John v St. John ((1803-1805) 11 Ves Jr 526, 529 and Bateman v. Countess of Ross (1813) 1 Dow 235; and see the arguments of Sir Fitzroy Kelly and Mr Turner and of Mr Bethell in Wilson v. Wilson (1848) 1 H. L. C. 538, 550-553, 564, 565. Finally they were fully recognized in equity by Lord Westbury’s leading judgment in Hunt v. Hunt (1861) 4 D. F. and J. 221, in which he followed Lord Cottenham’s decision in Wilson v. Wilson (1846-1848) 1 HLCas 538, 550-553, 564, 565, where his argument for the respondent had prevailed. Full effect has therefore to be given in all courts to these contracts as to all other contracts. It seems not out of place to make this obvious reflection, for a perusal of some of the cases in the matrimonial courts seems to suggest that at times they are still looked at askance and enforced grudgingly. But there is no caste in contracts. Agreements for separation are formed, construed and dissolved and to be enforced on precisely the same principles as any respectable commercial agreement, of whose nature indeed they sometimes partake. As in other contracts stipulations will not be enforced which are illegal either as being opposed to positive law or public policy. But this is a common attribute of all contracts, though we may recognize that the subject-matter of separation agreements may bring them more than others into relation with questions of public policy.’
Judges:
Lord Hailsham LC, Lord Atkin
Citations:
[1929] AC 601
Cited by:
Cited – J v S T (Formerly J) CA 21-Nov-1996
The parties had married, but the male partner was a transsexual, having been born female and having undergone treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria. After IVF treatment, the couple had a child. As the marriage broke down the truth was revealed in . .
Cited – Soulsbury v Soulsbury CA 10-Oct-2007
The claimant was the first wife of the deceased. She said that the deceased had promised her a substantial cash sum in his will in return for not pursuing him for arrears of maintenance. The will made no such provision, and she sought payment from . .
Cited – Sutton v Sutton 1984
The husband and his wife agreed that in consideration, inter alia, of the wife consenting to the husband divorcing her on the ground of two years’ separation and consent, he would transfer the matrimonial home to her, and she would take over . .
Cited – Aribisala v St James Homes (Grosvenor Dock) Ltd ChD 12-Jun-2007
The parties had agreed in a contract for the sale and purchase of land to exclude the application of section 49(2). The buyer had failed to comply with a notice to complete.
Held: The parties cannot contract out of section 49(2). The . .
Cited – Macleod v Macleod PC 17-Dec-2008
(Isle of Man) The parties had signed a post-nuptial agreement.
Held: It was not open to the courts to find that such agreements might be enforced. They had been unenforceable under common law, and if the law was to be changed it must be by . .
Cited – Radmacher (Formerly Granatino) v Granatino SC 20-Oct-2010
The parties, from Germany and France married and lived at first in England. They had signed a pre-nuptial agreement in Germany which would have been valid in either country of origin. H now appealed against a judgment which bound him to it, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Family
Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.235294
