The claimant said that she was unintentionally homeless and in priority need. She suffered several substantial disabilities, and said that the accommodation offered was not suitable to those needs. She used a wheelchair, but there was no wheelchair access and had the bedrooms on the first floor. The authority said it had discharged its duties, and that a laundry room downstairs could be occupied as a bedroom, and that adaptations were minimal.
Held: The suitability of accommodation was to be judged anticipating promised adaptations, but not those proposed only after the decision letter but before the review. The recorder had erred in this respect. In particular the claimant had referred to the absence of an access ramp, but this was not addressed until after the authority had decided that the accomodation was appropriate. Also any promise was by a third party, and not the authority which was making the offer. The claimant’s appeal was allowed.

Wall LJ, Toulson LJ, Rimer LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 1176, Times 11-Nov-2008, [2009] BLGR 65, [2009] 2 All ER 383, [2009] PTSR 439, 2008] NPC 114, [2009] HLR 22
Bailii
Housing Act 1996 175 201
England and Wales

Housing

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.277310

The claimant wished to be rehoused by the defendant authority. He complained that their allocations policy was unlawful. Once an applicant was deemed in priority need, he entered a pool if such persons and houses were allocated (save in extreme cases) to the persons longest on that list. He said that the policy should have taken account of his personal circumstances.
Held: Policies which were otherwise lawful should only exceptionally be interfered with by courts. The policy plainly satisfied the statutory requirements and was lawful. Further investigation of the circumstances of all those in the pool of those in housing need would exhaust resources and invite further doubt. Earlier cases had been superceded by the amendments to the section. The courts should be very slow indeed to interfere with a local housing authority’s allocation policy, unless it breached the requirements of Part 6. Provided that ‘reasonable preference’ is given to all those who are homeless within the meaning of Part 7, there is no reason why an authority should not decide to give some homeless groups priority over others, as long as the decision is not irrational.

Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
[2009] UKHL 14, [2009] 3 All ER 755, [2009] PTSR 632, [2009] NPC 36, [2009] BLGR 627
Bailii, HL, Times
Housing Act 1996 167
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Lambeth London Borough Council, ex parte Ashley 1996
. .
Appeal from – Ahmad, Regina (on the Application Of) v London Borough of Newham CA 29-Feb-2008
. .
At First Instance – Ahmad, Regina (on the Application of) v London Borough of Newham Admn 11-Sep-2007
The claimant challenged the council’s policy for allocating council houses. The policy would allocate applicants to a class, and once a property was available to that class, it was given to the person longest on the list within that class. . .
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Islington ex parte Terry Margaret Reilly ex parte Sandra Mannix Admn 2-Oct-1998
. .
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Tower Hamlets ex parte Uddin Admn 5-May-1999
. .
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Barnet ex parte G; Regina v London Borough of Lambeth ex parte W; Regina v London Borough of Lambeth ex parte A HL 23-Oct-2003
The applicants sought to oblige the local authority, in compliance with its duties under the 1989 Act, to provide a home for children, and where necessary an accompanying adult.
Held: There were four hurdles for the applicants to cross. They . .
Cited – London Borough of Lambeth v A CA 23-Jul-2002
The court considered the lawfulness of the defendant authority’s housing policy. Collins J said: ‘Unless it is clear that no applicants who are not entitled to preference are able to compete on equal terms with those who are, the scheme cannot . .
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Lambeth ex parte Uddin Admn 5-May-1999
. .
Cited – Regina v Lambeth London Borough Council, ex parte Ashley 1996
. .
Cited – London Borough of Lambeth v A CA 23-Jul-2002
The court considered the lawfulness of the defendant authority’s housing policy. Collins J said: ‘Unless it is clear that no applicants who are not entitled to preference are able to compete on equal terms with those who are, the scheme cannot . .
Cited – Wahid v London Borough of Tower Hamlets CA 7-Mar-2002
Gilliatt The appellant suffered from schizophrenia. He was refused permission to apply for judicial review and for orders requiring the local authority not just to provide suitable accommodation but better . .

Cited by:
Cited – Birmingham City Council v Ali and Others; Moran v Manchester City Council HL 1-Jul-2009
Homelessness Status Requires LA Action
The House considered appeals challenging whether local authorities who gave unacceptable housing to the homeless had satisfied their obligations to them as homeless people. What was meant by the phrase ‘accommodation which it would be reasonable for . .
Mentioned – Birmingham City Council v Qasim and Others CA 20-Oct-2009
The council argued that the defendant was not a tenant granted to him as a secure tenancy since he had not been granted the tenancy in accordance with its policies. An employee had manipulated the Council’s system to grant tenancies to bypass the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.314312

The claimant said that the defendant had acted unlawfully in finding her to homeless intentionally. Her landlord had said that she was to leave. She sought housing but did not at first follow the homelessness procedure. She left the house though before a court order, being ignorant of her rights.
Held: The failure to look for advice after being given informal advice did not make the applicant homeless intentionally.

Sedley LJ, Jacob LJ, Lloyd LJ
[2009] EWCA Civ 31, Times 18-Feb-2009
Bailii
Housing Act 1996 191
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham ex parte Lusi 1991
The applicants who were Turkish, and had moved from England to Turkey in order to undertake a business activity there, but it had not proved successful and they then returned to England, and sought to be treated as homeless.
Held: The court . .
Cited – Central Estates (Belgravia) Ltd v Woolgar (No 2) CA 20-Jun-1972
Right to forfeit waived by rent demand
The landlords’ managing agents learned that the tenant had been convicted of keeping a brothel at the premises and served a section 146 notice intending to forfeit the tenancy. He told his staff and instructed them not to demand or accept rent. But . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.282607

The tenant appealed against refusal of penalties impose for the non-securing of a tenants deposit. The deposit had been secured, and the court had found that the landlord had substantially complied with the notice requirements by matters in the tenancy agreement.
Held: The tenant’s appeal was allowed. The judge had reached a conclusion quite outside a proper exercise of judgment and evaluation.
Etherton LJ said: ‘It is no answer for the respondent to assert that the information could have been obtained by the appellant making her own enquiries by means of the internet or telephoning the respondent’s agent or the scheme’s administrator or in some other way. Section 213(5) of the 2004 Act requires the information to be provided by the landlord.’ and ‘it is doubtful whether the distinction between . . mere procedural provisions and other provisions is justified in a case where the legislation has prescribed all the different categories of information which are required to be provided in order to comply with the statutory obligation . .’

Etherton, Lewison LJJ
[2012] EWCA Civ 1789
Bailii
Housing Act 2004 8213, Localism Act 2011, Housing (Tenancy Deposits) (Prescribed Information) Order 2007
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Tiensia v Vision Enterprises Ltd (T/A Universal Estates) CA 11-Nov-2010
The court was asked whether, where a landlord had failed to comply with the requirement to place a deposit received with a tenancy deposit scheme within fourteen days, the tenant was entitled to the penalties imposed by the Act despite later . .
Cited – Ravenseft Properties Ltd v Hall; White v Chubb; similar CA 19-Dec-2001
Parties appealed decisions as whether assured shorthold tenancy notices were valid despite errors.
Held: If, notwithstanding errors or omissions, the substance of the notice was sufficiently clear to the reasonable person reading it, then the . .
Cited – Suurpere v Nice and Another QBD 27-Jul-2011
The tenant appealed against refusal of her claim for damages under sections 213 and 214 of the 2004 Act, saying that the notice as to the protection of her deposit had been inadequate on the grant of an Assured Shorthold Tenancy to her.
Held: . .
Cited – Tegerdine v Brooks CA 1977
The court was asked as to the validity of a section 24 notice. In his notice the landlord had stated that he would not oppose the grant of a new tenancy. The tenant failed to serve a counter-notice but then contended that the section 24 notice was . .
Cited – Kahlon v Isherwood CA 19-May-2011
Tenant’s appeal against order for possession. The question arose wheher a noice remained defective even where the information omitted was known to the tenant. Patten LJ said: ‘Relevance or materiality has to be assessed by reference to the purpose . .
Cited – Manel and Others v Memon CA 20-Apr-2000
A landlord gave notice to quit to a tenant subject to an assured shorthold tenancy.
Held: The notice did not include the instructions and advice required by the Regulations, and so could not be said to be substantially in the same form. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.470111

The council sought possession of the property saying that the three bedroomed property was underused by the tenant and his sister. The respondents said that it was not too extensive, and that no satisfactory alternative accommodation had been offered.
Held: The council’s appeal failed. The lower court had correctly applied the law, and it was not for an appellate court to substitute its own judgment of the facts. To upset the evaluation made by the trial judge. It must be shown that he acted under an error of principle or that his decision was obviously wrong.

Mummery LJ, Collins LJ, Rimer LJ
[2009] EWCA Civ 238, [2009] CP Rep 31, [2009] PTSR CS49, [2009] NPC 45, [2009] HLR 38
Bailii
Housing Act 1985 84(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Cumming v Danson CA 1942
The court considered what amounted to reasonable alternative accomodation.
Held: it was the judge’s duty to take into account all relevant circumstances as they exist at the date of the hearing. There is a fundamental difference in the Rent . .
Cited – Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd CA 26-Mar-1999
The claimant alleged copying of designs. The defendant appealed a finding that copying had taken place.
Held: The rejection of the dissection test in Ladbroke was as to the subsistence of copyright and not as to infringement. Evidence of those . .
Cited – In re Grayan Building Services Ltd CA 1995
The degree to which an appellate court will be willing to substitute its own judgment for that of the tribunal will vary with the nature of the question. Hoffmann LJ said: ‘The concept of limited liability and the sophistication of our corporate law . .
Cited – George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd CA 29-Sep-1982
The buyer bought 30lbs of cabbage seed, but the seed was not correct, and the crop was worthless. The seed cost andpound;192, but the farmer lost andpound;61,000. The seed supplier appealed the award of the larger amount and interest, saying that . .
Cited – Enfield London Borough Council v French CA 1984
In considering a request for a possession order for which it was a requirement that an odder of suitable alternative accomodation, the question of whether the accommodation was suitable should be decided before the question whether it was reasonable . .
Cited – George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd HL 1983
A seedsman sought to rely upon an exclusion clause preventing any claim by a purchaser by way of set off against its sales invoices. The House was asked whether a contractual term was ‘fair and reasonable’ within the meaning of section 55 of the . .

Cited by:
Cited – Whitehouse v Lee CA 14-May-2009
The tenant appealed against an order requiring her to give up possession of her flat, held under the 1977 Act, saying that the court should not have found it reasonable to make an order after finding alternative accommodation suitable.
Held: . .
Cited – Metropolitan Housing Trust v Hadjazi CA 1-Jul-2010
The Trust appealed against refusal of an order for possession against its periodic assured tenant. The grounds were 14 (nuisance or annoyance), and 14A (domestic violence). The judge had found that the violence complained of occurred only after the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.323725

Housing – Civil Penalty – Houses In Multiple Occupation – breaches of Management of Houses in Multiple Occupation (England) Regulations 2006 – application of local housing authority policy on civil penalties – whether remedial works carried out after date of offences is relevant to assessment of seriousness of offences – whether works carried out to comply with improvement notices amounting to mitigation – consideration of totality of penalties for similar offences in adjoining HMOs – section 249A, Housing Act 2004 – regs 4, 7 and 8, Management of Houses in Multiple Occupation (England) Regulations 2006 – appeal allowed

[2020] UKUT 292 (LC)
Bailii
Management of Houses in Multiple Occupation (England) Regulations 2006, Housing Act 2004 249A
England and Wales

Housing

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.655560

The council appealed against a decision that having found Ms Sharif to be homeless, they had a duty also to house her sick father and sister as family members in one accomodation unit.
Held: The Council’s appeal succeeded (Lord Kerr dissenting). Though a fundamental aim of the legislation was to keep families together, section 176 did not prevent the Council deciding as a matter of fact two separate units might be so close that their provision would not breach that aim.
The Act required the accomodation to be suitable. Neither of the terms ‘accomodation’ or the phrase ‘together with’ could be read to imply a need for the accomodation to be in one unit.
Lord Kerr said: ‘if the opportunity is available to house families in different living units, there is every reason to suppose that local authorities, with the pressures that are placed on them to meet housing need, will, perfectly understandably, seek to exploit that opportunity to the fullest extent. There is therefore a real risk that one of the principal purposes of the legislation (that of bringing and keeping families together) will be, if not undermined, at least put under considerable strain. ‘

Lord Hope, Deputy President, Lord Walker, Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord Carnwath
[2013] UKSC 10, [2013] PTSR 343, UKSC 2011/0117
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC
Housing Act 1996 176
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Langford Property Co Ltd v Goldrich CA 1949
The premises consisted of two flats in a single block, which had previously been separately let. They were on the same floor but not next to each other. The tenant had taken these two flats ‘as a home for himself and some relatives . . his father, . .
Appeal from – AS v London Borough of Camden CA 20-Apr-2011
The claimant appealed against rejection of her objection to the defendant’s decision that it had discharged its housing duties toward her.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Etherton LJ said: ‘The accommodation offered by Camden to the applicant . .
Cited – Uratemp Ventures Limited v Collins HL 11-Oct-2001
Can a single room within a hotel comprise a separate dwelling within the 1988 Act and be subject to an assured tenancy?
Held: A single room can be a dwelling. Each case must be interpreted in its own light as a question of fact, but respecting . .
Cited – Ealing London Borough Council v Surdonja etc CA 21-Jan-2000
When a local authority came to make the decision about the extent of the local connection of the homelessness applicant with the area, the assessment was to be made as regards the situation at the date of that decision. Where there was a review, the . .
Cited – Din (Taj) v Wandsworth London Borough Council HL 26-Nov-1981
The appellants had applied for emergency housing as homeless persons, anticipating loss of their secure accomodation after falling into arrears. The Council reject their application, but a County Court quashed that decision. The Court of Appeal . .
Cited – Regina v Hillingdon London Borough Council Ex parte Puhlhofer HL 2-Jan-1986
Not Homeless Even if Accomodation Inadequate
The applicants, a married couple, lived with a young child and later also a baby in one room of a guest house. They were given breakfast but had no cooking or washing facilities. They succeeded on a judicial review of the housing authority’s . .
Cited – Regina v Ealing London Borough Council Ex Parte Nicola Surdonja Admn 20-Oct-1998
The homeless applicant family were housed in two hostels approximately a mile apart.
Held: A housing authority’s duty to provide interim accommodation pending homelessness decision extended to the provision of suitable accommodation. There was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.471050

fallon_wilsonUTLC1407

UTLC HOUSING – house in multiple occupation – rent repayment orders in favour of occupiers – Residential Property Tribunal ordering repayment of 100% of rent during the relevant period – whether approach correct – held that it was not – relevant considerations – appeal allowed – Housing Act 2004 ss 73 and 74

Judge Edward Cousins
[2014] UKUT 300 (LC)
Bailii
Housing Act 2004 73 74
England and Wales

Housing

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.535660

Housing – Civil Penalty – Selective Licencing

Selective licencing – local housing authority’s policy always to try to resolve issues informally before resorting to enforcement action – property managed by agent on behalf of landlord resident abroad – landlord unaware of need for licensing – whether policy applied – whether penalty consistent with policy – ss.95, 249A, Housing Act 2004 – appeal allowed

[2021] UKUT 180 (LC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Housing

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.666468

The appellant was a non-secure tenant of the respondent. It had served a notice to quit and he now appealed against an order for possession on public law grounds.
Held: There had been a delay between the issue of the notice to quit and the issue of possession proceedings. It was possible that a reasonable decision maker would have have made further enquiries as to the presence of any continuing need for possession before issuing proceedings. The appeal succeeded.

Toulson LJ
[2009] EWCA Civ 285
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Doherty and others v Birmingham City Council HL 30-Jul-2008
The House was asked ‘whether a local authority can obtain a summary order for possession against an occupier of a site which it owns and has been used for many years as a gipsy and travellers’ caravan site. His licence to occupy the site has come to . .
Cited – Smart v Sheffield City Council: Central Sunderland Housing Company Limited v Wilson CA 25-Jan-2002
Each tenant had become unintentionally homeless, and was granted a non-secure tenancy of accommodation under section 193. Complaints of nuisance were received from neighbours. Possession orders were obtained and now challenged under the Human Rights . .
Cited – Kay and Another v London Borough of Lambeth and others; Leeds City Council v Price and others and others HL 8-Mar-2006
In each case the local authority sought to recover possession of its own land. In the Lambeth case, they asserted this right as against an overstaying former tenant, and in the Leeds case as against gypsies. In each case the occupiers said that the . .
Cited – Doran v Liverpool City Council CA 3-Mar-2009
The claimant sought to set aside an order requiring him to give up possession of a caravan pitch held under the 1968 Act.
Held: The decision to serve a notice to quit which was reasonable on the facts known to the local authority at the time . .
Cited – Smith (on Behalf of the Gypsy Council) v Buckland CA 12-Dec-2007
The defendants appealed an order requiring them to leave caravan pitches managed by the council.
Held: The court referred to the absence of procedural safeguards to which, in view of their vulnerable position, gipsies were entitled. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Central Bedfordshire Council v Housing Action Zone Ltd, Taylor and Others; Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government intervening CA 23-Jun-2009
The authority had granted a lease to a housing society who had in turn granted the occupants’ leases. A successor then revoked the head lease. The occupiers appealed against possession orders, saying that they had come to acquire article 8 rights in . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.328886

The House considered situations where a secure or assured tenancy had been made subject to a suspended possession order and where despite the tenant failing to comply with the conditions, he had been allowed to continue in occupation.
Held: Mrs White remained an assured tenant despite the continued suspended possession order. Mr Porter was entitled to return to court and request the discharge of the possession order. The appeal in Honeygan-Green was dismissed.
Parliament had empowered the court in subsection (3) to ‘impose conditions’ and, in the next subsection, ‘if the conditions are complied with’ to discharge or rescind the order. On a fair and practical reading, the 1988 Act leads to the conclusion that an assured tenancy subject to a possession order does not end until possession is delivered up. The wording of the 1985 Act contained no similar provision for secure tenancies. However it would be wrong to revisit the decision of the House in Burrows that Thompson and Hall were correctly decided, and ‘on a fair reading of section 85, it is open to the court to include a proleptic discharge provision in a suspended order for possession. The section should be construed, as far as permissible, to confer as much flexibility as possible on the court, and in such a way as to minimise future uncertainty and need for further applications. The section permits a proleptic discharge provision, in my view, not least because the court can always revisit the provision, effectively at the suit of the landlord, as already mentioned, if the terms of the suspension are not complied with. ‘ and
‘The terms of a suspended order are to be literally applied and precisely complied with. Accordingly, if a tenant fails to comply strictly with any of the terms of suspension, the landlord can apply for a warrant. However, if the tenant then applies to the court for relief, the court may suspend or discharge the warrant (and may vary the order). Indeed, if the court considers the landlord’s application for a warrant, or his resistance to the tenant’s application, to have been unreasonable, then the landlord may very well find itself paying the tenant’s costs. ‘

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, Lord Mance, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
[2008] UKHL 70, [2009] UKHRR 450, [2008] NPC 137, 25 BHRC 663, [2009] 2 WLR 48, [2009] PTSR 281, [2008] 50 EG 73, [2008] NPC 136, [2009] 2 All ER 829, [2009] AC 636
Bailii, HL, Times
Housing Act 1985 85(2) 85(4), Housing Act 1988
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – White v Knowsley Housing Trust and Another CA 2-May-2007
The tenant was an assured tenant. She fell into arrears of rent and a possession order was made, but suspended on terms. The court considered whether she continued to be an assured tenant, and could assert a right to buy the property as an assured . .
Appeal from – Porter v Shepherds Bush Housing Association CA 19-Mar-2008
. .
Appeal from – Honeygan-Green v London Borough of Islington CA 22-Apr-2008
The claimant was a council tenant with the right to buy her property. A possession order was made, but then discharged.
Held: On the revival of the tenancy her right to buy and discount was also revived, and there was no need to serve a fresh . .
Cited – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council HL 31-Oct-1996
The authority had obtained a possession order from its secure tenant but then agreed to accept payments toward the arrears. The tenant applied for and was granted a declaration that she had on that agreement acquired a new tenancy. The authority . .
Cited – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council CA 21-Jul-1995
. .
Cited – Greenwich London Borough Council v Regan CA 31-Jan-1996
The authority had taken possession proceedings against the secure tenant for non-payment of rent, and obtained an order, suspended on condition as to payments. He again fell into arrears, and the authority made a further agreement. They now sought . .
Cited – Payne v Cooper CA 1958
An absolute possession order had been made against the statutory tenant, but, on later application to suspend, vary or discharge this order under section 4 of the 1923 Act, the statutory tenant obtained a further order postponing the date for . .
Cited – Marshall v Bradford Metropolitan District Council CA 27-Apr-2001
There were three issues; (1) whether it was proper for the judge to have struck out disrepair proceedings when it could be seen that an application to discharge or rescind a suspended possession order would be likely to succeed (2) whether the . .
Cited – Bristol City Council v Hassan and Glastonbury CA 23-May-2006
The council had obtained possession orders for two properties from secure tenants, but the orders were suspended for so long as rent arrears were being discharged. The judges had understood that a date must appear on the possession order.
Cited – Islington London Borough Council v Honeygan-Green (Honeygan) QBD 25-May-2007
The court considered whether the determination of a secure tenancy by the granting of a possession order, brings to an end an existing application which has established the right to buy at a particular time and at a particular price, or whether such . .
Cited – Swindon Borough Council v Aston CA 19-Dec-2002
The tenant had fallen into arrears, and a possession order had been made. Having cleared the arrears, the possession order fell, but the landlord purported to issue a new tenancy agreement, with no security of tenure. They now sought possession . .
Cited – Sherrin v Brand CA 1956
The landlord had obtained a possession order against his secure tenant. The order was suspended, but the landlord then failed to enforce the order after the date and when the tenant had failed to comply with the terms of the suspension. The tenant . .
Cited – Winchester Court Ltd v Miller CA 1944
MacKinnon LJ described the effect of the several attempts to consolidate and amend the laws protecting residential tenants as ‘that chaos of verbal darkness.’ . .
Cited – American Economic Laundry Ltd v Little CA 1950
An unconditional order for possession was made against a statutory tenant under the Rent Acts, and execution of the order was then suspended by the court from time to time pursuant to powers contained in s 5(2). The court distinguished between an . .
Cited – Baker v Turner HL 1950
The House set out the conditions for deciding whether rooms within a house were let as a separate dwelling. The time at which it has to be judged whether premises are entitled to protection is when the action is brought.
Lord Porter said that: . .
Cited – Kay and Another v London Borough of Lambeth and others; Leeds City Council v Price and others and others HL 8-Mar-2006
In each case the local authority sought to recover possession of its own land. In the Lambeth case, they asserted this right as against an overstaying former tenant, and in the Leeds case as against gypsies. In each case the occupiers said that the . .
Cited – Doherty and others v Birmingham City Council HL 30-Jul-2008
The House was asked ‘whether a local authority can obtain a summary order for possession against an occupier of a site which it owns and has been used for many years as a gipsy and travellers’ caravan site. His licence to occupy the site has come to . .
Cited – London Borough of Harrow v Qazi HL 31-Jul-2003
The applicant had held a joint tenancy of the respondent. His partner gave notice and left, and the property was taken into possession. The claimant claimed restoration of his tenancy saying the order did not respect his right to a private life and . .
Cited – Thompson v Elmbridge Borough Council CA 1987
The wife was the secure tenant of the premises, against whom the local authority landlord obtained a possession order on grounds of arrears of rent, not to be enforced on payment of a weekly sum off the arrears in addition to what the order . .
Cited – Harlow District Council v Hall CA 28-Feb-2006
The defendant had been subject to a possession order in respect of his secure tenancy. He was later adjudged bankrupt. He asserted that the bankruptcy specifically prevented other action to enforce the debt, and the suspended possession order was . .
Overruled – Artesian Residential Investments Limited v Beck CA 19-Mar-1999
The tenant sought relief from forfeiture under section 138 against a landlord seeking possession of his assured tenancy. There were arrears of rent which he believed he could pay.
Held: The grounds for possession were statutory, and had been . .
Cited – Canas Property Co v K L Television Services CA 1970
The rent under the lease was payable in advance on the usual quarter days and the landlord forfeited the lease by serving a writ ‘for instance on 25 April’.
Held: At common law on the breach of a covenant by a lessee, a lessor is entitled to . .
Cited – Brent London Borough Council v Knightley and Another CA 26-Feb-1997
The daughter of a deceased tenant claimed succession to her mother’s interest in a tenancy which was subject to a possession order.
Held: There can be no succession to a tolerated trespasser under a former secure tenancy. . .
Mentioned – Brikom Investments Ltd v Seaford 1981
‘swords with a little ingenuity can be beaten into shields’ . .
Cited – Rogers v Lambeth London Borough Council CA 10-Nov-1999
A local authority landlord had obtained a possession order against the tenant, for arrears of rent, but allowed the tenant to continue in possession, and eventually agreed to the order for possession being revoked. At that time the tenant became a . .
Cited – Pemberton v Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Southwark CA 13-Apr-2000
A tenant had continued in occupation as a tolerated trespasser after a possession order. She made regular payments but failed to comply with the order setting terms for suspension. She sought damages from the landlord for nuisance for not dealing . .
Cited – City Council of Bristol v Lovell HL 26-Feb-1998
A County Court may stay a right to buy application by the tenant, even though terms had been agreed, in order to await the result of court proceedings for possession against the secure misbehaving tenant. A court’s case management powers can be . .
Cited – Harrow London Borough Council v Tonge CA 2-Dec-1992
An already established right to buy a council property was enforceable even after the death of the tenant. . .
Cited – Muir Group Housing Association Ltd v Thornley and Another CA 25-Nov-1992
The tenant’s right to buy the property held under a secure tenancy was lost when, even after the start of the procedure for purchase, the Tenant had let out the house to another, and so ceased to be a secure tenant. . .
Cited – Enfield London Borough Council v McKeon CA 1986
In order to enforce the right to buy, a person must normally be a secure tenant throughout the period from service of the original notice, exercising the right to buy, until completion is effected. Each part of the process is an ‘exercise’ of the . .

Cited by:
Cited – Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Southwark SC 23-Jun-2010
The appellant’s brother had been the secure tenant of the respondent Council which had in 1987 obtained an order for possession for rent arrears suspended on condition. The condition had not been complied with, but the brother had continued to live . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.278661

UTLC LANDLORD AND TENANT – Rent Determination – application for determination of rent under section 14, Housing Act 1988 – First-tier Tribunal declining jurisdiction on grounds that tenancy was a regulated tenancy under Rent Act 1977 – nature of tenancy – appeal allowed

Martin Rodger QC, Deputy President
[2015] UKUT 69 (LC)
Bailii
Housing Act 1988 14, Rent Act 1977
England and Wales

Housing

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.544261

The claimant appealed against an order confirming a review of the decision that the local authority owed no futher duty to her under section 193. She had rejected the house offered as unsuitable for medical reasons.
Held: The tenant’s appeal succeeded. The offer being of a permanent home, ‘Unless bound by authority to reach a different conclusion, we would not accept Lewisham’s argument that an offer of permanent accommodation under section 193(7) can, if refused, nevertheless lead to a discharge of the authority’s duty under section 193 by virtue of the provisions of section 193(5) and did so in the present case irrespective of whether the reasonableness requirement under section 193(7F) was satisfied.’
The court summarised the principles: (1) Section 193(5) is concerned with offers of temporary accommodation to meet a local housing authority’s duty under Part VII of the 1996 Act. Section 193(7) is concerned with offers of permanent accommodation pursuant to the authority’s allocation scheme under Part VI of the 1996 Act.
(2) An authority making an offer of accommodation, the refusal of which it intends to rely upon in discharge of its duty under section 193(2), should always make clear to the applicant whether the offer is intended to be within section 193(5) or within section 193(7). Where the authority makes clear that the offer is intended to be within section 193(7), it cannot subsequently treat the offer, and any refusal of it, as made under section 193(5).
(3) In the case of an offer under section 193(7), section 193(7F) requires the authority to be satisfied that, in addition to the accommodation being suitable for the applicant, it would also be reasonable for the applicant to accept the offer. Although there is a significant area of overlap between the suitability of accommodation and the question whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to accept the accommodation, these are distinct and different requirements.
(4) The reasonableness requirement in section 193(7F) is not satisfied merely by the authority making an offer which it considers reasonable. What is required is an offer which it would be reasonable for the applicant to accept.
(5) The applicant is entitled to a review of the suitability requirement in section 193(7F) by virtue of section 202(1)(f) of the 1996 Act and of the reasonableness requirement in section 193(7F) by virtue of section 202(1)b). It is both possible and desirable for both requirements to be reviewed at the same time. The right to a review of both requirements, and the intention to review both at the same time, should be made clear to the applicant.
(6) The applicant is also entitled to a review of the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) by virtue of section 202(1)(b). If the review takes place before refusal of the final offer of accommodation, it will strictly be a review of the intention that the offer will, on refusal, result in cessation of the authority’s duty. If the review takes place after the refusal of accommodation, it will be a review of the authority’s confirmation that its duty has ceased by virtue of satisfaction of the statutory pre-conditions for such cessation. The applicant should be informed of the right to such review.
(7) It is desirable that such a review of the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) takes place at the same time as the review of the suitability requirement and the reasonableness requirement in section 193(7F). If it is intended that it will take place at the same time, the applicant should be so informed.
(8) If the review of the suitability requirement and the reasonableness requirement and the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) take place at the same time, by virtue of section 202(2) there will be no further right to review of the decisions on any of those matters. If, however, the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty does not take place at the same time as either the review of the suitability requirement or the reasonableness requirement, matters relevant to those requirements which were not taken into account on the earlier review must be taken into account by the authority on the decision review if the matters existed prior to the refusal of the offer, even though they were not raised by the applicant at the earlier review.

Stanley Burnton, Etherton LJJ, Sir Mark Waller
[2010] EWCA Civ 755, [2010] WLR (D) 170, [2010] NPC 75
Bailii, WLRD
Housing Act 1996 193, Homelessness Act 2002
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Brent London Borough Council Ex Parte Awua HL 6-Jul-1995
The term ‘Accommodation’ in the Act was to be read to include short term lettings, and was not to be restricted to secure accommodation, and the loss of such accommodation can be counted as intentional homelessness. If a person who had been provided . .
Cited – Tower Hamlets v Begum (Rikha) CA 23-Mar-2005
Neuberger LJ said: ‘ I turn to the text of the letter of 25 January 2002. It referred to the Council ‘making a reasonable and suitable offer of permanent accommodation’, but it made no reference to the opinion that it was or would be reasonable for . .
Cited – Ahmed v Leicester City Council CA 27-Jun-2007
. .
Applied – Warsame and Warsame v London Borough of Hounslow CA 25-Jun-1999
The appellants refused the authority’s offer of accommodation under Part VI of the 1996 Act, saying it was not suitable. After the authority had informed them that if they did not accept the offer, the authority’s duty to house them would cease, . .
Cited – Griffiths v St Helens Council CA 7-Mar-2006
The applicant had been agreed to be homeless with priority need, and had been provided with an assured shorthold tenancy.
Held: The Legislation now allowed broadly three classes of accomodation as suitable: (1) accommodation owned by the local . .
Cited – Omar v Birmingham City Council CA 7-Jun-2007
The claimant said the authority had not discharged its duty to him in considering his application for housing. It had written to him saying ‘this is your one and final offer’, and that the council was satisfied that the accommodation was suitable . .
Cited – Slater v London Borough of Lewisham CA 12-Apr-2006
The applicant was heavily pregnant when she was offered a first floor one bedroomed flat. She rejected it.
Held: When a housing authority reviewed its decision on the applicant’s decision not to accept the accommodation offered, that review . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.420208

UTLC HOUSING – Enforcement Action -improvement notice – appeal to RPT – notice ‘withdrawn’ before appeal – effect of ‘withdrawal’ – whether appellant entitled to determination quashing notice – sections 11-16 Housing Act 2004 – appeal allowed

Martin Rodger QC DP
[2010] UKUT 488 (LC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Housing

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.517605

The claimant said that he was homeless and in priority need. He was seeking judicial review of the Council’s decision otherwise and now sought continuation of an order that he be provided with housing until the review at least was heard.
Anthony Thornton QC
[2013] EWHC 1273 (QB)
Bailii
Housing Act 1996 184

Updated: 30 October 2021; Ref: scu.510021

The court was asked whether, when assessing an applicant’s ‘priority need for accommodation’ under section 189(1)(c) Housing Act 1996 (that is, whether the applicant is ‘vulnerable’ by reason of old age, mental illness or handicap or physical disability or other special reason), the housing authority is entitled to have regard to the personal support and assistance which has been and will continue to be provided to the applicant, if made street homeless, by a family member with whom the applicant is currently living.
Moore-Bick, Richards, Pitchford LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 515, [2013] WLR(D) 180, [2013] PTSR 1338
Bailii, WLRD
Housing Act 1996189(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Camden ex parte Pereira CA 20-May-1998
When considering whether a person was vulnerable so as to be treated more favourably in applying for rehousing: ‘The Council should consider such application afresh applying the statutory criterion: The Ortiz test should not be used; the dictum of . .

Cited by:
Appeal from – Hotak and Others v London Borough of Southwark and Another SC 13-May-2015
The court was asked as to the duty of local housing authorities towards homeless people who claim to be ‘vulnerable’, and therefore to have ‘a priority need’ for the provision of housing accommodation under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. Those . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 October 2021; Ref: scu.509254

The applicant, a gypsy had been living for some years on an illegal site with her children. The council closed the site down and she sought assistance as a homeless person. The council accepted her priority need, but she refused the property offered saying that it was very rough and subject to high crime levels. As a gypsy, she said her requirement was not for bricks and mortar housing.
Held: The claimant’s appeal failed. ‘Where land is not available or cannot readily be made available on which a gypsy applicant could stage his or her caravan, it is open to a local authority to provide other accommodation of the conventional bricks and mortar kind provided that it satisfies the Wednesbury minimum line of suitability.’
Laws, Longmore, Richards LJJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 1013
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Codona v Mid-Bedfordshire District Council CA 15-Jul-2004
A homeless gypsy caravan dweller applied for housing. The authority offered temporary bed and breakfast accomodation. She complained that she had an aversion to living in bricks and mortar.
Held: The authority had discharged its function. The . .
Cited – Chapman v United Kingdom; similar ECHR 18-Jan-2001
The question arose as to the refusal of planning permission and the service of an enforcement notice against Mrs Chapman who wished to place her caravan on a plot of land in the Green Belt. The refusal of planning permission and the enforcement . .
Cited – Regina (Price) v Carmarthenshire County Council 2003
A gypsy applied for housing with the respondent authority, but did not wish to live in a house. They suggested that if the claimants had an aversion to accommodation in bricks and mortar then the offer of such accommodation could not amount to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 13 October 2021; Ref: scu.276401

[2011] EWHC 1739 (Admin)
Bailii
Housing Act 2004
England and Wales

Updated: 12 October 2021; Ref: scu.441554

The applicant sought leave to apply for a judicial review of a decision that she was not a person with a sufficient interest to challenge a scheme of management proposed under the Act. She was a lessee of a property affected, but had sought to make representations out of time.
Held: The Act allowed notice to be given by advetisement. That she may not have received an additional letter did not make the notice ineffective. The tribunal had considered her application to be heard, and the tribunal could properly take the view that her voice could be heard through the residents’ association. Her delay added to the view that she should not be allowed a judicial review.
Mr Justice Dyson
[1998] EWHC Admin 614
Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 70
England and Wales

Updated: 10 October 2021; Ref: scu.138735

[2020] EWHC 2117 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 10 October 2021; Ref: scu.652955

The court was asked as to the circumstances in which, for the purposes of sections 198(2) and 199 of the Housing Act 1996 (as amended by the Homelessness Act 2002) (‘the 1996 Act’), an applicant for housing assistance has a local connection with the district of the authority to which his or her application is referred pursuant to section 198(1) of the 1996 Act. In particular this case raises the question whether a person’s residence in a refuge in a particular local authority district, as a result of having been the victim of domestic violence, is a ‘residence of his own choice’ within the meaning of section 199(1)(a) of the 1996 Act.
Lewison, Kitchin, Gloster LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 1373, [2014] HLR 6
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 08 October 2021; Ref: scu.517464

[2015] ScotSC 7
Bailii
Tenancy Deposit Schemes (Scotland) Regulations 2011
Scotland

Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.542854

The court was asked whether the appellant has a priority need for homelessness accommodation on the basis that he is vulnerable within the meaning of section 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996.
Lord Justice Henderson
[2019] EWCA Civ 1758
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 30 September 2021; Ref: scu.642669

A group of five students was held to form a single household. The court identified the factors to assist in identifying whether a house was being occupied as a single household or not: the origin of the tenancy; whether the residents arrived in a single group or were independently recruited by the landlord; the extent to which the facilities were shared; whether the occupants were responsible for the whole house (including the common parts) or just their particular rooms; the extent to which the residents can and do lock their doors; the responsibility for filling vacancies: whether that of the existing occupants or the landlord; the allocation of rooms: whether by the occupants or the landlord; the size of the establishment; the stability of the group; the mode of living: to what extent communal and to what extent independent.
Held: The power to impose conditions permitted a condition defined by reference to the general characteristics and activities of an occupier. A restriction of occupation to ‘occupation by students’ was a restriction on ‘occupation by persons’. The conditions imposed by the FTT were not unreasonable.
Sir Thomas Bingham MR
(1995) 27 HLR 719
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Guy Rogers v London Borough of Islington CA 30-Jul-1999
A house had ten bedrooms. One was retained by the owner for use some two months a year, the other nine were let to people in their twenties who had just completed their further education and were embarking on careers in the professions or banking . .
Cited – Hossack, Regina (on the Application of) v Kettering Borough Council and Another Admn 25-Mar-2002
The landowner sought to use houses as temporary accommodation for young people in need. The council asserted that this use of each of the properties was ‘use as a dwelling house by the residents living together as a single household’ under class C3. . .
Cited – Regina (on the application of Hossack) v Kettering Borough Council and another CA 25-Jun-2002
A neighbour challenged the use of houses as temporary accommodation for homeless youths. The properties housed up to six youths, who, the council claimed lived together as a single unit, and therefore came within Class C3.
Held: Nothing in the . .
Cited – Hossack, Regina (on the Application of) v Kettering Borough Council and Another Admn 31-Jul-2003
The claimant lived near houses used for the occupation by troubled youths. She complained that the occupation was in breach of planning control.
Held: The authority had properly considered the issues it was required to consider and the . .
Cited – Nottingham City Council v Parr and Another SC 10-Oct-2018
The Council appealed from refusal of conditions it had attached on licensing houses wit multiple accommodation.
Held: The power to impose conditions under sections 64 and 67, Housing Act 2004, in order to make an HMO suitable for a particular . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.180694

The Council appealed from refusal of conditions it had attached on licensing houses wit multiple accommodation.
Held: The power to impose conditions under sections 64 and 67, Housing Act 2004, in order to make an HMO suitable for a particular number of households or persons, can be used so as to limit the class of persons for whom the HMO is suitable. The conditions imposed by the Tribunals and the Court of Appeal, considered cumulatively, in respect of the properties were entirely lawful. Accordingly, the court varied the conditions to delete the requirement of occupation for only ten months in each year but otherwise dismissed the appeal.
Lady Hale, President, Lord Wilson, Lord Carnwath, Lady Black, Lord Lloyd-Jones
[2018] UKSC 51, [2019] 1 All ER 1103, [2018] 1 WLR 4985, [2019] LLR 63, [2018] PTSR 1871, [2018] HLR 48, UKSC 2017/0073
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary, SC Video Summary, SC 2018 Jun 13 am Video, SC 2018 Jun 13 pm Video
Licensing and Management of Houses in Multiple Occupation and Other Houses (Miscellaneous Provisions) (England) Regulations 2006
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Nottingham City Council v Dominic Parr Trevor Parr Associates Ltd CA 29-Mar-2017
The court considered the extent of the power to impose conditions in licences of houses in multiple occupation. The FTT found that the conditions attached to the licences were incorrect and had substituted its own.
Held: The personal . .
Cited – Barnes v Sheffield City Council CA 1995
A group of five students was held to form a single household. The court identified the factors to assist in identifying whether a house was being occupied as a single household or not: the origin of the tenancy; whether the residents arrived in a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.625429

A young unmarried couple H and S occupied a double bedsitting room for which they paid a weekly rent. The landlord did not provide services or attendance and the couple were not lodgers but tenants enjoying exclusive possession.
Held: The agreements granted licences only rather than tenancies because the landlord reserved the right to allow others to share the property, and the arrangements were created by separate agreements which could be ended seperately.
[1978] 1 WLR 1014
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Sturolson v Weniz CA 1984
The plaintiffs took occupation under an agreement which purported to grant a non exclusive right of possession of the flat, and to be personal. Occupation could only be shared with persons approved in advance by L. L’s agent had said the agreement . .
Cited – A G Securities v Vaughan; Antoniades v Villiers and Bridger HL 10-Nov-1988
In Antoniades, the two tenants occupied an attic, living together. Each had at the same time signed identical agreements purporting to create licences. The landlord had reserved to himself the right to occupy the property and to allow others to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 September 2021; Ref: scu.221739

Housing – Civil Penalty – Case Struck Out By Ftt for Failure To Pay The Hearing Fee – Criteria for Relief From Sanctions
[2021] UKUT 206 (LC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 20 September 2021; Ref: scu.667580

Housing Act 2004 and Housing and Planning Act 2016 – Houses In Multiple Occupation – Licensing
[2019] UKFTT RP – LON – 00AG –
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.647929

Rents – Fair Rent
[2019] UKFTT RP – MAN – 00BY –
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.645339

The applicant was headmaster of a boarding school. The contract of employment did not require him to occupy the house, but a new house was built for the headmaster and he moved into it. It was not necessary for him to occupy the house for his duties, but it was advantageous. He sought the right to buy the house.
Held: The authority appealed a finding that he was a secure tenant. A term can only be implied that he should occupy a particular house wher this was essential. It could not be implied where occupation would be for the better performance of his duties..
[1992] 65 P and CR 12, [1992] 24 HLR 805 CA
Housing Act 1985 79
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Commissioner of Valuation for Northern Ireland v Fermanagh Protestant Board of Education CA 1965
. .

Cited by:
Cited – Europhone International Ltd v Frontel Communications Ltd ChD 25-Jul-2001
Although the VAT regime required all commercial enterprises to issue VAT invoices in a timely way, that is not sufficient, of itself, to create an implied term into contracts between businesses, that invoices should be issued in a way which would . .
Appeal from – Hughes and Another v Greenwich London Borough Council HL 26-Oct-1993
A headmaster’s occupation of a house in the school was not ‘for the better performance of his duties’, and so was not a tied house, and so he had the right to buy it. A term could not be implied into his contract to require him to occupy the house. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.183483

[2003] EWHC 101 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 14 September 2021; Ref: scu.184948

[2003] EWHC 481 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 12 September 2021; Ref: scu.185025

Housing Act 2004 and Housing and Planning Act 2016 – Civil Financial Penalties
[2019] UKFTT RP – VG – LON – 0
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 12 September 2021; Ref: scu.645284

Lewis J
[2015] EWHC 2657 (Admin), [2016] PTSR 389
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 10 September 2021; Ref: scu.552608

Professional Regulation
[2015] UKFTT PR – 2015 – 0002
Bailii
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2013 83
England and Wales

Updated: 08 September 2021; Ref: scu.644190

Renewed application for leave to appeal against homelessness decision.
Rimer LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 963
Bailii
Housing Act 1996 204
England and Wales

Updated: 05 September 2021; Ref: scu.272853

Housing – Rent Repayment Order – section 44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 – starting point – basis of deductions
[2020] UKUT 183 (LC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 03 September 2021; Ref: scu.652536

The court was asked whether the plaintiff, a tenant of rooms to which (once enacted) the Act of 1920 applied and who had been excluded from possession by the landlord’s re-entry on the day that the Act came into force following service of a notice to quit, was entitled to an injunction restraining the landlord from interfering with his quiet enjoyment of the premises. Re-entry had been obtained forcibly, by the landlord breaking the locks.
Held: Although the contractual tenancy had come to an end with expiry of the notice to quit, nevertheless, at the time of the re-entry, the plaintiff was to be treated as a tenant who by virtue of the provisions of the Act had retained possession for the purposes of section 15(1); and so was a person entitled to the benefit of the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment under that subsection. As a residential tenant even though only having a tenancy at will, may have the protection of the Rent Acts, including protection against rent increases.
Scrutton LJ said: ‘The question is whether, his tenancy by agreement having expired at a time when no Rent Restriction Act gave him any right to stay on, and the landlords having got into the premises without any assistance from the Court, he can claim any right to stay on or to ask the Court to restrain landlords from interfering with his possession.’ and ‘The object of the various Rent Restrictions Acts is clear. It was intended to prevent the tenant from having his rent raised against him, or from being turned out, though his tenancy by agreement had expired, so long as he was willing to pay the rent authorised by statute. He was originally presented by Parliament with a statutory tenancy at the will of the tenant for so long as he liked and no longer. But Parliament did not in terms say that though his tenancy by agreement has expired, he had a statutory right to stay in on specified terms; it provided that no order for recovery of possession should be made, and omitted expressly to provide what sort of legal interest the person who stayed in by permission of Parliament and against the will of the landlord should have, nor did Parliament expressly provide for the case where the landlord by his own action and without obtaining the order of the Court, got into possession of his own premises.’ and ‘Yet I think it is clear Parliament had intended to confirm these people in a statutory tenancy and speak of their position as ‘a letting’. Mr Romer [counsel for the landlords] argued very forcibly to us that though the policy were clear yet the courts ought not to give effect to it unless they could find words apt in their ordinary meaning to justify them in so doing, and that the case of landlord getting into possession of premises which under the agreement of tenancy he had a right to enter had not been dealt with by Parliament. I do think it has expressly; and I feel I am straining language in speaking of a person whose tenancy has expired and who stays in against the active protest of the landlord as ‘tenant’, and of the landlords’ relation to him as ‘letting’; but such a person appears to be within the clear intention of the legislature, and where the statute has forbidden any process of court to be used to eject him, I think it must have intended and be taken to forbid ejection by the private action of the landlords without the aid of the Court. ‘
Bankes LJ accepted that in no ordinary sense of the word was the respondent a tenant of the premises on the coming into force of the Act. But: ‘It is however clear that in all the Rent Restrictions Acts the expression ‘tenant’ has been used in a special, a peculiar sense, and as including a person who might be described as an ex-tenant, someone whose occupation had commenced as a tenant and who had continued in occupation without any legal right to do so except possibly such as the Acts themselves conferred upon him. The respondent therefore on the coming into operation of the new Act was a tenant within the meaning of that expression in the Act . . .’ Lord Justice Bankes held that the plaintiff had the protection of section 15: ‘Section 15 is intended to supply something that was wanting in the previous Acts, namely, an indication as to the legal position of a person who continued in occupation of premises merely by reason of the protection afforded by those Acts. The opening words of section 15 are words of description of the person to whom the conditions of the statutory tenancy apply. He is described as a tenant who by virtue of the provisions of the Act retains possession of a dwelling house to which the Act applies. As pointed out by Mr Romer in his argument the Legislature in section 5 was apparently only contemplating eviction by legal process. A person therefore who is protected by the Act from eviction by legal process from his dwelling house may not inaccurately be described as a person who by virtue of the Act retains possession of his dwelling house. The respondent being obviously a person protected by section 5 from eviction by legal process, comes in my opinion within the description contained in section 15, and is therefore entitled to the benefit of the Act, assuming that his premises come within the Act.’
Scrutton LJ, Bankes LJ, Atkin LJ
[1921] 1 KB 49
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 5
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Parker v Parker ChD 24-Jul-2003
Lord Macclesfield claimed a right to occupy a castle. The owners claimed that he had only a mere tenancy at will. The exact rooms in the castle which had been occupied had varied over time.
Held: The applicant was entitled to reasonable . .
Cited – Cadogan Estates Limited v McMahon HL 26-Oct-2000
When a tenancy was terminated and was followed by a statutory tenancy, a term in the contractual tenancy that the tenancy should be forfeit on the tenant’s bankruptcy was continued in and inherited by the statutory tenancy. Though perhaps in . .
Explained – Harrison v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council CA 1981
The court considered the relationship between statutory provisions and the terms of a tenancy agreement.
Held: Brandon LJ said: ‘In the various Housing and rent Acts the legislature did not seek to interfere with the common law principles on . .
Cited – Banjo v London Borough of Brent CA 17-Mar-2005
The tenant had occupied the premises under a long lease which expired by effluxion of time. The landlord failed to take any steps to retake possession, and the tenant continued as a tenant at will, paying no rent. The landlord eventually issued . .
Criticised – Ropaigealach v Barclays Bank plc CA 6-Jan-1999
The applicant’s property was charged to the defendant. At the time it was not occupied. The mortgage fell into arrears, and after serving notice at the property, the bank took posssession and sold the property at auction. The claimants said the bank . .
Cited – Cruise v Terrell CA 1922
The plaintiffs stayed at weekends at a cottage let for a fixed term of one year. The contractual term ended on 25 March 1921 and was not renewed. On 7 April, in the absence of the plaintiffs, the defendant sent the local blacksmith to the cottage, . .
Cited – Lavender v Betts 1942
The landlord, served a notice to quit, and obtained entry to the property without force and removed the doors and windows so that it could no longer be used as a dwelling. The plaintiff brought an action for trespass.
Held: After referring to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 August 2021; Ref: scu.192086

The issue on this appeal is whether a notice served by the Respondent Landlords on the Appellant under section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 was invalid because no energy performance certificate had been served by the Landlords on the Tenant prior to the service of the section 21 notice. That depends on whether service of an EPC was required at the relevant time by virtue of the 1988 Act, the Deregulation Act 2015 and the Assured Shorthold Tenancy Notices and Prescribed Requirements (England) Regulations 2015. District Judge K. Harper held that service of an EPC was required and therefore the section 21 notice was invalid, whereas His Honour Judge Simpkiss held that service of an EPC was not required and therefore the section 21 notice was valid. Nugee LJ granted permission for a second appeal because the issue is one which has divided judges and commentators.
[2021] EWCA Civ 936
Bailii, Judiciary
Housing Act 1988 21, Deregulation Act 2015, Assured Shorthold Tenancy Notices and Prescribed Requirements (England) Regulations 2015
England and Wales

Updated: 16 August 2021; Ref: scu.663466

The claimant challenged a decision to refuse to accept a fresh homelessness application from him following an alleged change in his circumstances. The short point in this matter can be stated as follows namely, whether the Claimant acquired a local connection for the purposes of establishing that he was ‘normally resident’ having occupied temporary accommodation provided by the defendant in discharge of an interim duty under the Housing Act 1996 for more than six months when that continued occupation was after any housing duty owed to him had expired, a referral to another Housing authority (HA) had been made and accepted, and after the right of occupation had been terminated and he occupied the accommodation without permission
His Honour Judge Lickley QC
[2021] EWHC 211 (Admin), [2021] PTSR 1144
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 16 August 2021; Ref: scu.658038

The landlord, served a notice to quit, and obtained entry to the property without force and removed the doors and windows so that it could no longer be used as a dwelling. The plaintiff brought an action for trespass.
Held: After referring to the landlord’s right, at common law, to retake possession of the demised premises peaceably after the determination of the tenancy, the court pointed out that, following the enactment of the 1920 Act, the position was regulated by section 15(1). The provisions are ‘quite clear’, and ‘A statutory tenancy is created, and the terms of the statutory tenancy are to be the same as those which have prevailed during the contractual tenancy. At the expiration of the notice the plaintiffs were in possession. They retained possession, and they were there on the terms of their original tenancy. They were under a legal obligation to carry out the obligations which had rested on them, and the landlord was under the same obligation; and the plaintiffs had the benefit of any terms and conditions which formed part of the contract of tenancy. No one disputes that one of the obligations resting on the landlord, of which the plaintiffs had the benefit, was an undertaking for quiet enjoyment. It is perfectly clear from the two cases which have been cited to me – Remon v City of London Real Property Co Ltd and Cruise v Terrell – that the effect of the section is that a statutory tenancy is created on the terms which I have stated. The statutory tenant has the same rights and is subject to the same obligations as prevailed during the tenancy. Therefore the landlord has no conceivable right to interfere with their possession or to trespass on the premises occupied by them, unless he obtains an order giving him possession of the premises.’
Atkinson J
[1942] 2 All ER 72
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 815(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Remon v City of London Real Property Co Ltd CA 1921
The court was asked whether the plaintiff, a tenant of rooms to which (once enacted) the Act of 1920 applied and who had been excluded from possession by the landlord’s re-entry on the day that the Act came into force following service of a notice . .
Cited – Cruise v Terrell CA 1922
The plaintiffs stayed at weekends at a cottage let for a fixed term of one year. The contractual term ended on 25 March 1921 and was not renewed. On 7 April, in the absence of the plaintiffs, the defendant sent the local blacksmith to the cottage, . .

Cited by:
Cited – Ropaigealach v Barclays Bank plc CA 6-Jan-1999
The applicant’s property was charged to the defendant. At the time it was not occupied. The mortgage fell into arrears, and after serving notice at the property, the bank took posssession and sold the property at auction. The claimants said the bank . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 August 2021; Ref: scu.230372

Secure tenancy obtained by misleading application – grant of possession order
Lord Justice Peter Gibson Lord Justice Sedley The Honourable Mr Justice Newman
[2004] EWCA (Civ) 940
Bailii
Housing Act 1985
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Edgington v Fitzmaurice CA 7-Mar-1885
False Prospectus – Issuers liable in Deceit
The directors of a company issued a prospectus, falsely stating that the proceeds were to be used to complete alterations to the buildings of the company, to purchase horses and vans and to develop the trade of the company. In fact it was to pay off . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 August 2021; Ref: scu.198842

[2014] ScotSC 100
Bailii
Scotland

Updated: 16 August 2021; Ref: scu.538380

The council appealed against a finding of a duty to house the claimant under the homelessness provisions of the 1996 Act.
Pill, Jackson, Tomlinson LJJ
[2011] EWCA Civ 609, [2012] PTSR 40, [2011] HLR 35, [2011] NPC 51, [2012] 1 WLR 203
Bailii
Housing Act 1996
England and Wales

Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.439870