Not Homeless Even if Accomodation Inadequate
The applicants, a married couple, lived with a young child and later also a baby in one room of a guest house. They were given breakfast but had no cooking or washing facilities. They succeeded on a judicial review of the housing authority’s decision that they had accommodation. They now appealed reversal of that decision by the Court of Appeal.
Held: The appeal failed. A person was not homeless even if it was not reasonable for her to have to continue to occupy the accommodation to which she was entitled. The question of suitability of housing offered to a claimant is one for the authority alone, to be set aside only if its decision is verging on the absurd. The 1985 Act: ‘is an Act to assist persons who are homeless, not an Act to provide them with homes . . It is intended to provide for the homeless a lifeline of last resort; not to enable them to make inroads into the local authority’s waiting list of applicants for housing. Some inroads there probably are bound to be, but in the end the local authority will have to balance the priority needs of the homeless on the one hand and the legitimate aspirations of those on their housing waiting list on the other hand.’ and ‘Although the action or inaction of a local authority is clearly suseptible to judicial review where they have misconstrued the Act, or abused their powers or otherwise acted perversely, I think that great restraint should be exercised in giving leave to proceed by judicial review. The plight of the homeless is a desperate one, and the plight of the applicants in the present case commands the deepest sympathy. But it is not, in my opinion, appropriate that the remedy of judicial review, which is a discretionary remedy, should be made use of to monitor the actions of local authorities under the Act save in the exceptional case. The ground upon which the courts will review the exercise of an administrate discretion is abuse of power – eg bad faith, a mistake in construing the limits of the power, a procedural irregularity, or unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense – unreasonableness verging on an absurdity: see the speech of Lord Scarman in Reg. v Secretary of State for the Environment, Ex parte Nottinghamshire County Council [1986] AC 240, 247-248. Where the existence or non-existence of a fact is left to the judgment and discretion of a public body and that fact involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the debatable to the just conceivable, it is the duty of the court to leave the decision of that fact to the public body to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision-making power save in a case where it is obvious that the public body, consciously or unconsciously, are acting perversely.’
Lord Brightman said: ‘My Lords, I am troubled at the prolific use of judicial review for the purpose of challenging the performance by local authorities of their function under the Act of 1977. Parliament intended the local authority to be the judge of fact. The Act abounds with the formula when, or if, the housing authority are satisfied as to this, or that, or have reason to believe this, or that. Although the action or inaction of a local authority is clearly susceptible to judicial review where they have misconstrued the Act, or abused their powers or otherwise acted perversely, I think that great restraint should be exercised in giving leave to proceed by judicial review. The plight of the homeless is a desperate one, and the plight of the applicants in the present case commands the deepest sympathy. But it is not, in my opinion, appropriate that the remedy of judicial review, which is a discretionary remedy, should be made use of to monitor the actions of local authorities under the Act save in the exceptional case. The ground upon which the courts will review the exercise of an administrative discretion is abuse of power- e.g. bad faith, a mistake in construing the limits of the power, a procedural irregularity, or unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense – unreasonableness verging on an absurdity: see the speech of Lord Scarman in Reg. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Ex Parte Nottinghamshire County Council [1986] A.C. 240, 247-248. Where the existence or non-existence of a fact is left to the judgment and discretion of a public body and that fact involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the debatable to the just conceivable, it is the duty of the court to leave the decision of that fact to the public body to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision-making power save in a case where it is obvious that the public body, consciously or unconsciously, are acting perversely.’
Lord Brightman, Lords Keith, Roskill, Brandon and Mackay
[1986] AC 484, [1986] UKHL 1, [1986] 2 WLR 259, [1986] 1 All ER 467
Bailii
Housing Act 1985, Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Nottinghamshire County Council HL 12-Dec-1985
The House heard a judicial review of the Secretary of State’s assessment of the proper level of expenditure by a local authority.
Held: A ‘low intensity’ of review is applied to cases involving issues ‘depending essentially on political . .
Cited by:
Cited – Ali v Westminster City Council; Nairne v Camden London Borough Council CA 24-Jul-1998
The County Court had no power to grant an interim injunction without statutory provision. No power existed either to order the Local Authority to provide accommodation to a homelessness applicant pending a decision on the review.
Held: . .
Cited – Regina v Brighton and Hove Council ex parte Nacion (2) CA 1-Feb-1999
The applicant sought review of a decision not to offer him temporary accomodation pending an appeal following a review of a refusal to offer him emergency accomodation. He had become homeless as a result of imprisonment.
Held: The section gave . .
Cited – Office of Fair Trading and others v IBA Health Limited CA 19-Feb-2004
The OFT had considered whether it was necessary to refer a merger between two companies to the Competition Commission, and decided against. The Competition Appeal Tribunal held that the proposed merger should have been referred. The OFT and parties . .
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Camden ex parte Pereira CA 20-May-1998
When considering whether a person was vulnerable so as to be treated more favourably in applying for rehousing: ‘The Council should consider such application afresh applying the statutory criterion: The Ortiz test should not be used; the dictum of . .
Cited – ex parte Di Dominico 1989
The applicant was an epileptic who required careful medical supervision, but the local authority did not regard her as vulnerable for housing purposes.
Held: Review was declined. The matter was one for the authority exercising its discretion. . .
Cited – Braintree District Council v Alisdair Stuart Thompson CA 7-Mar-2005
Recovery of excess housing benefit paid under fraudulent claim. A social security commissioner could substitute jis own judgment on a question of law to that of the appeal tribunal, but on a question of fact it should not interfere. . .
Cited – Regina v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ex p Bayani 1990
The court set out authoritative guidance as to the scope of a reviewing court’s power to interfere on the ground of the insufficiency of inquiry by a local authority to whom a homelessness application had been made. Neill LJ said: ‘(1) The duty to . .
Cited – Cramp v Hastings Borough Council CA 29-Jul-2005
Cases challenged successful appeals by applicants for housing for homelessness, where a county court had ordered a second review of the application. . .
Cited – Calgin, Regina (on the Application of) v London Borough of Enfield Admn 29-Jul-2005
The claimant complained that having applied for housing in the borough they had in fact housed him outside the borough.
Held: The authority had a duty to house the applicant so far it was reasonably practicable within its borders. The policy . .
Cited – Desnousse v London Borough of Newham and others CA 17-May-2006
The occupier had been granted a temporary licence by the authority under the homelessness provisions whilst it made its assessment. The assessment concluded that she had become homeless intentionally, and therefore terminated the licence and set out . .
Cited – Lambeth London Borough Council v Ireneschild CA 16-Mar-2007
The tenant held a secure tenancy of a first floor flat of the Council. She was severely disabled and argued that the danger of injury meant that she should be allowed to occupy the empty ground floor flat. She complained at the way the authority had . .
Cited – London Borough of Wandsworth v Allison CA 15-Apr-2008
The claimant had applied for emergency housing, saying that he had suffered a deep vein thrombosis, and was vulnerable under the 1996 Act. The authority said that its finding that the VT would not put him at additional risk if homeless, was one of . .
Cited – Manchester City Council v Moran and Another; Richards v Ipswich Borough Council CA 17-Apr-2008
The two applicants had occupied a women’s refuge. They appealed against a refusal to consider them as homeless when they acted in such a way as to be evicted from the refuge, saying that the refuge did not constitute ‘accommodation . . which it . .
Cited – Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond Upon Thames HL 4-Feb-2009
The father had been awarded shared residence for three children. He asked the local authority to provide appropriate housing.
Held: The authority’s appeal succeeded.
‘When any family court decides with whom the children of separated . .
Cited – Birmingham City Council v Ali and Others; Moran v Manchester City Council HL 1-Jul-2009
Homelessness Status Requires LA Action
The House considered appeals challenging whether local authorities who gave unacceptable housing to the homeless had satisfied their obligations to them as homeless people. What was meant by the phrase ‘accommodation which it would be reasonable for . .
Cited – A, Regina (on the Application of) v London Borough of Croydon SC 26-Nov-2009
The applicants sought asylum, and, saying that they were children under eighteen, sought also the assistance of the local authority. Social workers judged them to be over eighteen and assistance was declined.
Held: The claimants’ appeals . .
Cited – Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow SC 26-Jan-2011
The appellant sought housing after leaving her home to escape domestic violence. The violence was short of physical violence, and the authority had denied a duty to rehouse her. She said that the term ‘domestic violence’ in the Act was not intended . .
Cited – Regina (on the application of) Awua v Brent London Borough Council HL 6-Jul-1995
Tower Hamlets, having determined the applicant to be homeless, in priority need and not intentionally homeless. After she occupied temporary accomodation she was offered an alternative being told it was the council’s policy only to make one such . .
Cited – Waltham Forest v Maloba, The Law Society CA 4-Dec-2007
The applicant had been refused accomodation as homeless after disclosing the ownership of a family home in Uganda. He had lived and worked in the UK for 15 years. The authority did not accept that it had later been repossessed. The council now . .
Cited – Sharif v The London Borough of Camden SC 20-Feb-2013
The council appealed against a decision that having found Ms Sharif to be homeless, they had a duty also to house her sick father and sister as family members in one accomodation unit.
Held: The Council’s appeal succeeded (Lord Kerr . .
Cited – Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest SC 20-May-2015
‘The question in this case is whether the appellant falls within the scope of section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 as amended, which applies, by virtue of subsection (1), where the local housing authority are satisfied that ‘an applicant is homeless, . .
Cited – Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest SC 20-May-2015
‘The question in this case is whether the appellant falls within the scope of section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 as amended, which applies, by virtue of subsection (1), where the local housing authority are satisfied that ‘an applicant is homeless, . .
Cited – Poshteh v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea SC 10-May-2017
The appellant, applying for housing as a homeless person, had rejected the final property offered on the basis that its resemblance to the conditions of incarceration in Iran, from which she had fled, would continue and indeed the mental . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Housing, Judicial Review
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.200288
