References: July 11, 1989 unreported
It is a matter of construing the words of a contract used in accordance with their natural meaning and in the light of the surrounding circumstances in which the contract was made
This case is cited by:

• Cited – Brian McGowan -v- Summit at Lloyds SCS (ScotC, Times 11-Jul-02)
  The contract provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. The claimant challenged this under the Act. Held The 1982 Act modified art 17 of the Convention when putting it in effect. That difference did not lead to the conclusion . .

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 25-Oct-15 Ref: 181247

References: (1927) AC 1
A bailee may be exempted from liability by an exemption clause.
This case is cited by:

• Cited – George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd -v- Finney Lock Seeds Ltd CA (Bailii, [1982] EWCA Civ 5, [1983] 1 All ER 108, [1983] QB 284)
  The buyer bought 30lbs of cabbage seed, but the seed was not correct, and the crop was worthless. The seed cost £192, but the farmer lost £61,000. The seed supplier appealed the award of the larger amount and interest, saying that their . .

References: [1989] 1 Lloyds Rep 138
The plaintiffs had chartered a vessel to hirers to carry the defendants goods. The hirers defaulted and the plaintiffs were in turn obliged to carry the goods but at extra costs which they passed on to the defendants who agreed to pay extra costs and not to detain or arrest the vessel while in port. This agreement was secured through threats, including a statement that unless the defendants paid the extra costs they would not get their cargo. When the ship was in port and had commenced unloading the defendants ignored the agreement and arrested the ship. They pleaded duress to any breach of contract and claimed damages.
Held: The agreement had been made under economic duress. The plaintiffs had issued an unlawful threat against the goods, and they knew that, since they were legally obliged to carry the cargo, even if at a loss of profit to themselves, such a threat would be unlawful.

References: (1956) 99 CLR 362, [1956] HCA 81
Links: Austlii
Coram: Taylor J, McTiernan J, Fullagar J, and Kitto J
(High Court of Australia) Equity – Contract for sale and purchase of grazing property – Suit for specific performance brought by purchaser – Vendor aged and affected by long bout of rum drinking – Claim to set aside contract – Unconscionable bargain – Constructive fraud – Circumstances in which courts of equity will grant relief.
This case is cited by:

• Cited – Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd -v- Total Oil Ltd QBD ([1983] 1 All ER 944, [1983] 1 WLR 87)
  To establish that a contract was unconscionable, a party had to have made an unconscientious use of its superior position or superior bargaining power to the detriment of someone suffering from some special disability or disadvantage. This weakness . .
• Cited – Ramzan -v- Brookwide Ltd ChD (Bailii, [2010] EWHC 2453 (Ch), [2011] 2 All ER 38)
  The claimant owned a flying freehold room butting into the defendant’s property. Whilst the claimant’s property was unoccupied, the defendant broke through into the room, blocked off the door to the claimant’s property, and included the room in the . .

References: [1990] EWHC 1 (QB)
Links: Bailii
Coram: Otton J
The plaintiff had contracted to sell a vintage Bentley racing car ‘Old Number One’ for £10 million pounds. The buyer came to suspect its authenticity and refused to complete. The plaintiff sought specific performance.
Held: During the course of its life any such car would have alterations and replacements made, and by 1930, only one or two parts of the original would remain. Included was a radiator on which had been inscribed a list of the car’s racing successes. Even so, there was a continuous history of the car through the various events and repairs. The claim succeeded. Adopting the criteria suggested the car was the Old Number One: ‘The plaintiff has faithfully, sympathetically and accurately restored it to its last known racing form, i.e. the form it was in Brooklands in 1932 when it crashed. There has been no break in its historic continuity from the time when it first emerged from the racing shop in 1929 until today.’
This case is cited by:

• Cited – Lloyd -v- Svenby QBD (Bailii, [2006] EWHC 315 (QB))
  The two claimants sought title to a car registration plate and to a chassis number. They were to be applied to historic racing cars.
  Held: The power to assign registration marks lay with the Secretary of State. Any legal rights rested not with . .

References: [1843] EngR 704, (1843) 11 M & W 619, (1843) 152 ER 953
Links: Commonlii
A sheriff who has seized goods under a fi fa, and disposed of them by appraisement and bill of sale, is not entitled to deduct the expenses of the appraisement and sale ; the scale of fees framed under 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 55, applying to ‘sales by auction’ only.

References: [1855] EngR 266, (1855) 10 Exch 776, (1855) 156 ER 654
Links: Commonlii
To an action on a bill of exchange for 501., drawn by M. upon and accepted by the defendant, and by M. indorsed to the plaintiff, the defendant pleaded first, that the bill was drawn by M. and accepted by the defendant, and indorsed by M. to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff first held tbe same for the special purpose of getting the same discounted, and to hand the proceeds thereof to the defendant ; that the plaintiff, acting in fraudulent collusion with M, got the bill discounted and, contrary to and in violation of the special purpose for which the bill was drawn, accepted and indorsed, and for which the plaintiff first held the same, handed to the defendant 171. and no more, being part of the proceeds thereof; and that there never was any other consideration for the acceptance by him of the bill, or for the plaintiff being the holder thereof. Secondly, as to 171, a tender of that amount. Held, on motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, that the first plea, though informal, was good in substance, since it confessed a prima facie title in the plaintiff by indorsement, and avoided it by shewing that he was the holder of the bill for a special purpose only, and without consideration – Also that the second plea was had, for tbe acceptor of a bill of exchange cannot plead a tender after the day of payrnent. A plea of tender ought not to be joined with a plea containing a denial of the right of action for the same sum.

References: [1991] 4 All ER 871, [1992] 2 AC 152, [1992] 1 Lloyds Rep 115, [1992] IRLR 78, [1992] ICR 37, [1991] 3 WLR 875
Coram: Lord Goff of Chievely
The Plaintiff shipowners had been induced by industrial action against a vessel in Sweden, which actions would be lawful under Swedish law, to undertake to enter into written agreements with the ITF under which, inter alia, more generous agreements were to be entered into for payment of the crew, back-dated and back pay was to be paid under these. One of the documents signed provided that the undertaking was to be governed by English law. The Plaintiffs purported to avoid the agreements for duress and to recover the monies that they had paid under them.
Held: The House considered the developing law of economic duress. The contract had to be avoided before a claim for restitution could be maintained. The question of whether economic pressure constituted duress of such a kind as to entitle the innocent party to avoid the contract is to be determined by reference to the proper law of the contract. In order to justify avoidance of a contract, the economic pressure must be such as to be called illegitimate.
Lord Goff said: ‘I start from the generally accepted proposition, embodied in rule 184 set out in Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 11th ed. (1987), vol.2, p.1213, that the material or essential validity of a contract is governed by the proper law of the contract, which in the present case is English law. Rule 184 is one of a ground of rules (rules 181-187) concerned with the scope of application of the proper law of a contract. It is expressed to be subject to two exceptions. The first exception asserts that a contract is generally invalid in so far as its performance is unlawful by the law of the place of performance; with that exception we are not, in my opinion, here concerned. The second (which is not strictly an exception to rule 184) concerns the primacy of what used to be called the distinctive policy of English law over any provision of foreign law, in so far as such provision might be relevant to the validity or invalidity of a contract; to that topic, I will briefly return in a moment.
Accordingly in the present case we look to English law, as the proper law, to discover whether the contract may, as a matter of principle, be affected by duress and, if so, what constitutes duress for this purpose; what impact such duress must have exercised upon the formation of the contract; and what remedial action is available to the innocent party. We know, of course, that by English law a contract induced by duress is voidable by the innocent party; and that one form of duress is illegitimate economic pressure, including the blacking or the threat of blacking of a ship. I can see no reason in principle why, prima facie at least, blacking or the threat of blacking a ship should not constitute duress for this purpose, wherever it is committed – whether within the English jurisdiction or overseas; for in point of fact its impact upon the contract does not depend upon the place where the relevant conduct occurs.
It follows therefore that, prima facie at least, whether or not economic pressure amounts to duress sufficient to justify avoidance of the relevant contract by the innocent party is a matter for the proper law of the contract, wherever that pressure has been exerted. Here, of course, the proper law is English law. Moreover in the present case there was at the relevant time no applicable statutory provision of English law which required that blacking or the threat of blacking should not be regarded as duress. So, unencumbered by any such provision, we are left simply with an English contract which is voidable by the innocent party if the formation of the contract has been induced by duress in the form of blacking or the threat of blacking a vessel. The question then arises whether there is any basis in law for rejecting this simple approach, on the ground that the conduct in question was lawful by the law of the place where it occurred, viz. Swedish law.
Before your Lordships, it was the primary submission of Mr. Burton on behalf of the I.T.F. that in relation to any duress abroad, in English law the court should, subject to overriding questions of public policy, look to the law of the place of duress to test its lawfulness or legitimacy. I of course accept that, if Mr. Burton’s submission is correct, it must be subject to the qualification that, if it was inconsistent with the distinctive policy of English law to treat the relevant conduct as lawful, the English courts (consistently with the second exception to rule 184 in Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws) would refuse to do so. But the question is whether Mr. Burton’s submission is correct. I have to say that I know of no authority which supports his submission which, if correct, would require the recognition and formulation of a fresh exception to rule 184 in Dicey & Morris.’
This case is cited by:

• Cited – Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd -v- Tube City IMS Llc ComC (Bailii, [2012] EWHC 273 (Comm))
  The claimant sought to set aside an arbitration saying that the arbitrator had misapplied the test for economic duress. . .
• Cited – Adam Opel Gmbh and Another -v- Mitras Automotive (UK) Ltd QBD (Bailii, [2007] EWHC 3205 (QB), [2008] Bus LR D55)
  The parties had agreed for the supply of automotive parts by the defendant to the claimant under a sole supply arrangement. None were in fact ordered for the first few years. The manufacturer then changed its design and made a new arrangement with a . .
• Cited – DSND Subsea Ltd -v- Petroleum Geo Services Asa TCC (Bailii, [2000] EWHC 185 (TCC), [2001] BLR 23, [2000] BLR 530)
  Dyson J set out the principles applicable in establishing a pleading of commercial duress:
  (i) Economic pressure can amount to duress, provided it may be characterised as illegitimate and has constituted a ‘but for’ cause inducing the claimant . .

References: (1862) 4 De GF & J 401, [1862] EngR 604, (1862) 31 Beav 80, (1862) 54 ER 1067
Links: Commonlii
The court found a contract to be an unconscionable bargain where a poor and illiterate man was induced to enter into a transaction of an unusual nature, without proper independent advice, and in great haste; and the resulting transaction has been, not just hard or improvident, but overreaching and oppressive.
This case is cited by:

• Cited – Portman Building Society -v- Dusangh and Others CA (Bailii, [2000] Lloyd’s LR 19, [2000] EWCA Civ 142, [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221)
  The defendant sought to set aside an order for possession under a mortgage.
  Held: Where a case was strong enough on its face in terms of conduct and terms, unconscionable conduct could be inferred if there was no explanation offered to . .
• Cited – Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd -v- Total Oil Ltd QBD ([1983] 1 All ER 944, [1983] 1 WLR 87)
  To establish that a contract was unconscionable, a party had to have made an unconscientious use of its superior position or superior bargaining power to the detriment of someone suffering from some special disability or disadvantage. This weakness . .
• Cited – Strydom -v- Vendside Ltd QBD (Bailii, [2009] EWHC 2130 (QB))
  The claimant sought recovery of a sum paid to the defendant as a commission by his union during his claim for personal injuries at work, relying on a term he sought to have implied into his contract, that the costs position should not be . .

References: [1826] EngR 977, (1826) 5 B & C 628, (1826) 108 ER 234
Links: Commonlii
Where a contract was made between A. and B., whereby A., having a quantity of apples, agreed to sell his cyder to B. at a certain price per hogshead, to be delivered at T. at a future time, and to lend such pipes as he had for the use of the cyder, to be manufactured on his, A.’s premises, and to be paid for before it was removed, and A, in pursuance, delivered a quantity of juice expressed from’the apples to a servant hired by B. to manufacture the cyder on A.’s premises, and before the cyder was completely manufactured, it was seized by the Excise-officers, because the place where it was deposited had not been entered, and was condemned in the Exchequer as B.’s property, together with the casks, and in assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, brought by A. against B., it appeared that the word cyder, at the place where the contract was made, meant the juice of the apples as soon as it was expressed : it was thereupon held, that the contract must be construed to have been for the sale of cyder in that sense of the word, and that the property passed to B. as soon as the apple juice was delivered to his servant. Secondly, that it was B.’s duty to enter t,he premises, and as through his default it became impossible for A. to deliver the goods at T., the failure to do so did not bar his action. Thirdly, that A. might recover in this action the price of the casks lent to the defendant.
This case cites:

• See Also – Studdy -v- Sanders and others ([1823] 2 D and R 347)
  Legal professional privilege. . .

References: [1842] EngR 804, (1842) 3 QB 568, (1842) 114 ER 625
Links: Commonlii
Intestate granted an annuity to plaintiff. After his death, his administratix caused the annuity to be vacated for a defect in the memorial Plaintff to recover the balance of consideration money, brought indebitatus assumpsit against the admiriistratrix for money had and received by the intestate to plaintiff’s use, stating promises by intestate and by defendant. Held that, although a right to recover the consideration money became vested in plaintiff on the refusal to continue the annuity, such right did not go back, by relation, to the time when that money was originally paid : and therefore counts in the above forms were not applicable.

References: [1850] EngR 384, (1850) 8 Hare 131, (1850) 68 ER 302
Links: Commonlii
A bequest of annuity to the testator’s nephew for life, or until his bankruptcy or insolvency, and after his decease, bankruptcy or insolvency to be paid to his wife, for the personal support of herself, her husband and his children, during the life of his nephew and his wife, and the survivor of them ; and in case they, or either of them, should attempt to alienate the annuity, the trustees to be empowered to apply it towards the support of their children. The first wife of the nephew, to whom he was married before the date of the will, survived the testator, and the gift of the annuity was held not to extend to the widow of the nephew who was his second wife.

References: [1852] EngR 689, (1853) 7 Exch 862, (1852) 155 ER 1199
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Pollock, Baron Parke
The defendant had signed an undertaking to procure the acceptance of two bills for £200 and £146 for wine supplied to an MP and agreed to see that they were duly paid. The latter draft should have been for £150. The plaintiff drew bills for £200 and £500 and the defendant saw that they were accepted. The defendant wrote across the guarantee ‘I have received the two drafts, one being for £150, instead of £146, the other being an error in the invoice of £4’). The plaintiff signed this but the defendant did not. The guarantee as endorsed was treated as a valid memorandum of the contract since the endorsement had been made for the purpose of correcting the mistake and, being written by the defendant on the same piece of paper as he had originally signed, his original signature was plainly intended to authenticate the memorandum as amended, and could therefore be considered as doing so, notwithstanding that the words written on the paper by the defendant were written as the words of the plaintiff. Pollock CB said that the court had come to its conclusion not without some difficulty. Baron Parke said he had had great difficulty in bringing his mind to this conclusion.
This case cites:

• See Also – Bluck -v- Gompertz ([1851] EngR 878, Commonlii, (1851) 7 Exch 67, (1851) 155 ER 859)
  The court has power, independently of statute to compel the plaintiff to produce for the defendant’s inspection a document upon which the action is brought, where the defendant is a party to te document and has no copy of it. . .

This case is cited by:

• Cited – Golden Ocean Group Ltd -v- Salgaocar Mining Industries Pvt Ltd and Another ComC (Bailii, [2011] EWHC 56 (Comm), [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 95, [2011] 1 CLC 125, [2011] CILL 3022, [2011] 1 WLR 2575)
  The defendants sought to set aside orders allowing the claimants to serve proceedings alleging repudiation of a charterparty in turn allowing a claim against the defendants under a guarantee. The defendant said the guarantee was unenforceable under . .

References: [1790] EngR 2367, (1790) 3 TR 653, (1790) 100 ER 785 (B)
Links: Commonlii
A. having proposed to sell goods to B., gave him a, certain time at his request to determine whether he would buy them or not; B. within the time determined to buy them, and gave notice thereof to A. ; yet A. was not liable in an action for not delivering them, for B. not being bound by the original contract, there was no consideration to bind A.
This case is cited by:

• Explained – Byrne -v- van Tienhoven & Co ((1880) 5 CPD 344 (CP))
  The defendant offered by a letter to the plaintiffs to sell them goods at a certain price. They later wrote to the plaintiffs to withdraw the offer. Before they knew of the revocation, the plaintiffs accepted the offer by telegram. The defendants . .

References: [1786] EngR 210, (1786) 1 TR 454, (1786) 99 ER 1194
Links: Commonlii
A plea by an heir at law, who was sued by an obligee of his ancestor, that he claimed to retain a certain sum for money laid out in repairing the premises, cannot be supported.

References: [2008] EWHC 1785 (Comm)
Links: Bailii
Coram: Teare J
Application for summary judgment against second defendant – loan agreement.

References: [1812] EngR 114, (1812) 15 East 237, (1812) 104 ER 834
Links: Commonlii
Where an annuity was granted by three, one of whom was known to be only a surety for the other two, to whose use the consideration-money was in fact applied ; yet all three being present when the money was paid down upon the table, and counted over by them all, and the receipt of it sigped by all, it was properly stated in the memorial as a payment made to the three. And though the deed and memorial stated the consideration-money to have been paid by the grantee by the hands of W. his agent, yet as it also appeared by the same instruments that a part of it was the money of a third person ; that was held to be no objection : for either W. was the agent in fact of the sole grantee, or impliedly the agent, through the medium of the grantee, for such third person also, whose interest was stated in the deed and memorial according to the truth. And one stamp as for one annuity is sufficient.
Last Update: 19-Nov-15 Ref: 338600

References: 97 ER 787, (1761) 2 Burr 1198, [1761] EngR 56, (1761) 2 Burr 1198, (1761) 97 ER 787
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Lord Mansfield
The daily negotiations and property of merchants ought not to depend upon subtleties and niceties; but upon rules, easily learned and easily retained, because they are the dictates of common sense, drawn from the truth of the case.
This case is cited by:

• Cited – Homburg Houtimport BV -v- Agrosin Private Ltd (the ‘Starsin’) HL (House of Lords, [2003] UKHL 12, Bailii, Times 17-Mar-03, Gazette 15-May-03, [2003] 2 WLR 711, [2004] 1 AC 715, [2003] 1 CLC 921, 2003 AMC 913, [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 571, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 625, [2003] 2 All ER 785, [2003] 1 LLR 571)
  Cargo owners sought damages for their cargo which had been damaged aboard the ship. The contract had been endorsed with additional terms. That variation may have changed the contract from a charterer’s to a shipowner’s bill.
  Held: The specific . .

References: [1850] EngR 620, (1850) 9 CB 701, (1850) 137 ER 1067
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Wilde CJ, Maule J
The plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, ordered goods of W & R, telling them the purpose for which they were wanted. Before the order was given the plaintiff asked W & R for a list of prices, and, having obtained it, shewed it to the defendant, who, seeing that the price was such that the order could not possibly have been understood, asked the plaintiff if he thought W & R knew what was wanted ; whereupon the plaintiff said, ‘Oh yes. If anything is wrong, of course you will see me all right.’ To which the defendant answered, ‘Yes, I will bear you harmless.’ In consequence of some misunderstanding, arising in part probably from a verbal innacuracy in the letters conveying the order, the goods suppleid were useless to the defendant, and were returned to the sellers, who (the intrinsic value of the goods being only about 3l) expended in labour about 42l to make them correspond with the intention of the defendant, but, in so doing, reduced their substance so as to render them useless for his purpose. – The defendant, after considerable delay, persisting in his refusal to take the goods, W & R sued the plaintiff, and he (as the jury found, with the implied authority of the defendant) compromised the action by the payment to them of 22l 10s, and afterwards brought an action for money paid against the defendant, to recover that sum : Held, by Wilde, CJ Maule, J, and Talfourd, J, that the action lay. Held, by Cresswell, J., that the plaintiff should have defended the action brought against him by W. & R., and that there was no implied authority from the defendant to compromise it.

References: [1818] EngR 676, (1818) 6 Price 111, (1818) 146 ER 757
Links: Commonlii
One of two drawers of a joint promissory note, payable twelve months after date, who is surety for the other to the amount, is not discharged by the drawee not having demanded paymenit from the surety wheri due, nor till after having entered into a deed of composition with the principal and his other creditors, and received the compositiori money.

References: [2000] EWCA Civ 252, [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 532
Links: Bailii
Coram: Rix LJ
This case is cited by:

• Cited – Kamidian -v- Holt (on Behalf of Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s) and others ComC (Bailii, [2008] EWHC 1483 (Comm))
  The claimant claimed to have bought what he believed to be a genuine Faberge Egg Clock, but which his insurers said was a copy. It was loaned to an exhibition, and insured, and damaged twice. The parties disagreed as to the disappreciation value, . .

References: [1842] EngR 260, (1842) 2 QB 851, (1842) 114 ER 330
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Patteson J, Lord Denman CJ
A promisee can only enforce a promise if in return for it he gave something of value in the eyes of the law. Consideration need not be ‘valuable’ for it to be valid or effective to form the basis for a contract. It merely needs to be ‘legally sufficient’; and this criterion may be met even by purely nominal consideration.
Lord Denman CJ said: ‘There is nothing in this case but a great deal of ingenuity, and a little wilful blindness to the actual terms of the instrument itself. This is in terms on express agreement, and shews a sufficient legal consideration quite independent of the moral feeling which disposed the (defendant) to enter into such a contract.’
Last Update: 11-Jan-16 Ref: 307215

References: Times 08-Jan-1788
Ratio The plaintiff sold 13 mahogany logs to the defendant. The defendant was to use them for cabinet making and inspected a sample, declaring them not to be of the best but adequate for chairs. When the entire consignment was delivered, he refused to pay saying that they had holes ‘so big you could put your head in them’. Held; The plaintiff succeeded. The logs delivered were of the same quality as inspected, and so the buyer knew what he was getting.

Last Update: 25-Mar-16
Ref: 270278

References: (1789) 3 TR 148, [1789] EngR 2443, (1789) 100 ER 502 (B)
Links: Commonlii
Ratio The defendant’s bid for a worm-tub, and a pewter worm was highest at the auction, but he withdrew his bid before the hammer fell. The auction was under standard conditions.
Held: No contract had been made. The bid was an offer which could be withdrawn at any time before acceptance by the auctioneer’s hammer. The auctioneer’s request for bids is not an offer which can be accepted by the highest bidder.

Last Update: 25-Mar-16
Ref: 252546

References: (1802) 2 East 469, [1802] EngR 245, (1802) 102 ER 448
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Lord Ellenborough CJ
Ratio An underwriter paid a claim under a policy which he was entitled in law to repudiate for non-disclosure. Although he knew the relevant facts, he was not aware of their legal significance. He claimed back the money he had paid.
Held: A contract cannot be set aside on the grounds of a mistake as to the law. Whereas money paid under a mistake of fact is generally recoverable, as a general rule money is not recoverable on the ground that it was paid under a mistake of law.
Lord Ellenborough asked counsel for the plaintiff: ‘whether he could state any case where if a party paid money to another voluntarily with a full knowledge of all the facts of the case, he could recover it back again on account of his ignorance of the law.’ In the absence of an answer, judgment was given for the defendant: ‘Every man must be taken to be cognisant of the law; otherwise there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance might not be carried. It would be urged in almost every case.’
This case cites:

• Cited – Lowry -v- Boirdeau ((1780) 2 Doug KB 468)
  ‘ignorantia juris non excusat’ – ignorance of the law is no excuse. . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

• Overruled – Hazell -v- Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council HL ([1992] 2 AC 1, [1991] 2 WLR 372, [1991] 1 All ER 545)
  The authority entered into interest rate swap deals to protect itself against adverse money market movements. They began to lose substantial amounts when interest rates rose, and the district auditor sought a declaration that the contracts were . .
• Cited – Andre & Cie -v- Michel Blanc CA ([1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427)
  The court criticised the doctrine that a mistake as to the law, common to the parties, does not vitiate a contract. . .
• Cited – The Amazonia CA ([1991] Lloyd’s Rep 236)
  The court rehearsed the doctrine that a common mistake as to the law would vitiate a contract, Though the rule was well established, the particular contract was void on the basis of a mistake as to foreign law because foreign law is to be treated by . .
• Cited – Brennan -v- Bolt Burdon and Others, London Borough of Islington, Leigh Day & Co CA (Bailii, [2004] EWCA Civ 1017, Times 27-Aug-04, [2005] QB 303, [2004] 3 WLR 1321)
  The claimant sought damages for injury alleged to have been suffered as tenant of a house after being subjected to carbon monoxide poisoning, and also from her former solicitors for their delay in her claim. The effective question was whether the . .
• Overruled – Kleinwort Benson Ltd -v- Lincoln City Council etc HL (Gazette 18-Nov-98, Gazette 10-Feb-99, Times 30-Oct-98, House of Lords, Bailii, [1998] UKHL 38, [1999] 2 AC 349, [1998] 4 All ER 513, [1998] 3 WLR 1095, [1998] Lloyds Rep Bank 387)
  Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap agreements were . .
• Cited – Woolwich Equitable Building Society -v- Inland Revenue Commissioners (2) HL ([1993] AC 70, [1992] 3 All ER 737, (1992) 3 WLR 366)
  The society had set out to assert that regulations were unlawful in creating a double taxation. It paid money on account of the tax demanded. It won and recovered the sums paid, but the revenue refused to pay any interest accrued on the sums paid. . .
• Applied – Brisbane -v- Dacres ((1813) 5 Taunt. 143)
  The commander of a naval vessel, HMS Arethusa, had paid to the Admiral in command a proportion of freight received for the carriage of publicly owned bullion on board the Arethusa in the belief that this was due to the Admiral as a matter of usage. . .
• Cited – Kelly -v- Solari CexC ((1841) 9 M & W 54)
  Recovery was sought of money (£200) paid an error of fact. There had been a life policy, but it had lapsed before the death of the life assured. The policy had been marked ‘lapsed’ but the marking had been overlooked.
  Held: Where money . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 25-Mar-16
Ref: 199748