Appeal against conviction for causing death by dangerous driving – lorry driver having driven for 20 hours and also employer.
Mr Justice Butterfield Lord Justice Auld Mr Justice Hedley
[2004] EWCA Crim 3049
England and Wales
Updated: 27 June 2022; Ref: scu.220219
Motor insurer seeking to avoid policy for non-disclosure by insured that trainee golf-pro.
[2004] EWCA Civ 1600
England and Wales
Updated: 27 June 2022; Ref: scu.219898
The claimant’s husband died when his car skidded on hoar frost. She claimed the respondent was liable under the Act and at common law for failing to keep it safe.
Held: The respondent had not assumed a general responsibility to all road users to ensure that all or any trunk roads would be salted in freezing conditions. It is the primary responsibility of motorists to take care for their own safety and that of their passengers and other road users, and there was no evidence that the deceased had relied on an expectation that the road had been salted. Appeal dismissed.
Lord Justice Brooke Lord Justice May Lord Justice Thomas
Times 15-Nov-2004, [2004] EWCA Civ 1440
England and Wales
Cited – Goodes v East Sussex County Council HL 16-Jun-2000
The claimant was driving along a road. He skidded on ice, crashed and was severely injured. He claimed damages saying that the Highway authority had failed to ‘maintain’ the road.
Held: The statutory duty on a highway authority to keep a road . .
Cited – Cross v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council CA 27-Jun-1997
The Council’s duty to maintain a highway is not absolute. It must take reasonable steps to prevent or clear ice forming on pathway. Lord Justice Evans analysed the application of Section 41 to a situation which arose from ice and snow. In any case . .
Cited – Haydon v Kent County Council CA 1978
Impacted snow and ice had built up on a steep, narrow, made-up footpath from Monday to Thursday during a short wintry spell. The plaintiff slipped and broke her ankle. The highway authority operated a system of priorities. Their resources were fully . .
Cited – Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council HL 1-Apr-2004
Statutory Duty Not Extended by Common Law
The claimant sought damages after a road accident. The driver came over the crest of a hill and hit a bus. The road was not marked with any warning as to the need to slow down.
Held: The claim failed. The duty could not be extended to include . .
Cited – Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman and others HL 8-Feb-1990
Limitation of Loss from Negligent Mis-statement
The plaintiffs sought damages from accountants for negligence. They had acquired shares in a target company and, relying upon the published and audited accounts which overstated the company’s earnings, they purchased further shares.
Held: The . .
Appeal from – Sandhar, Murray v Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions QBD 19-Jan-2004
The claimant asserted a common law duty on the respondent to maintain a roadway free of frost.
Held: No such common law duty existed. Where parliament has conferred a discretionary power, ‘ . . the minimum preconditions for basing a duty of . .
Cited – Stovin v Wise, Norfolk County Council (Third Party) HL 24-Jul-1996
Statutory Duty Does Not Create Common Law Duty
The mere existence of statutory power to remedy a defect cannot of itself create a duty of care to do so. A highway authority need not have a duty of care to highway users because of its duty to maintain the highway. The two stage test ‘involves . .
Cited – Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council and others HL 31-Jul-2003
The claimant dived into a lake, severely injuring himself. The council appealed liability, arguing that it owed him no duty of care under the Act since he was a trespasser. It had placed warning signs to deter swimmers.
Held: The council’s . .
Cited – Bird v Pearce CA 1979
The plaintiff was a passenger in a car on a major road which who was injured in a collision with a car which emerged from a minor road. The driver of the second car, who was agreed (as between the two cars) to be 90% responsible, joined the County . .
Cited – Capital and Counties Plc and Another v Hampshire County Council; Etc CA 20-Mar-1997
Three cases were brought against fire services after what were said to be negligent responses to call outs. On one, the fire brigade was called to a fire at office premises in Hampshire. The fire triggered the operation of a heat-activated sprinkler . .
Cited – Larner v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council CA 20-Dec-2000
The duty on a local authority to promote road safety did not remove from them the discretion as to how that duty was to be implemented. A claim that the authority had failed to place certain signage, and that an accident had occurred which might not . .
Cited – Mercer v South Eastern and Chatham Railway Companies’ Managing Committee KBD 1922
A claimant was knocked down by a train when he went through an unlocked gate onto the railway line. The defendants were held liable, because it was their practice, known to the plaintiff, to keep the gate locked when trains were passing, but the . .
Cited – Merrett v John RH Babb CA 15-Feb-2001
The applicant had been employed as a surveyor by a firm which had subsequently become insolvent. The firm’s run off professional indemnity insurance had lapsed. He had provided the negligent survey, and he was sued in person.
Held: He was . .
Cited – Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd HL 25-Jul-1994
Lloyds Agents Owe Care Duty to Member; no Contract
Managing agents conducted the financial affairs of the Lloyds Names belonging to the syndicates under their charge. It was alleged that they managed these affairs with a lack of due careleading to enormous losses.
Held: The assumption of . .
Cited – Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council; Anderton v Clwyd County Council; Gower v Bromley London Borough Council; Jarvis v Hampshire County Council HL 28-Jul-2000
The plaintiffs each complained of negligent decisions in his or her education made by the defendant local authorities. In three of them the Court of Appeal had struck out the plaintiff’s claim and in only one had it been allowed to proceed.
Cited – OLL Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport QBD 22-Jul-1997
Coastguard Not liable in Negligence
Eight children with a teacher and two instructors set off on a canoeing trip but did not return. They got into difficulties at sea. Two became separated from the rest. The canoes capsized and sank. Some tried to swim ashore. Two more members became . .
Cited – Kent v Griffiths and Others (No 2) CA 10-Feb-2000
An ambulance service could be liable in negligence in respect of its response to an emergency call-out where for no good reason there was an unreasonable delay in responding, and the servivice had accepted the call. The ambulance service was . .
Cited – Michael Alexander Watson v British Boxing Board of Control Ltd, World Boxing Organisation Incorporated CA 19-Dec-2000
The claimant was seriously injured in a professional boxing match governed by rules established by the defendant’s rules. Ringside medical facilities were available, but did not provide immediate resuscitation. By the time he received resuscitation . .
Appealed to – Sandhar, Murray v Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions QBD 19-Jan-2004
The claimant asserted a common law duty on the respondent to maintain a roadway free of frost.
Held: No such common law duty existed. Where parliament has conferred a discretionary power, ‘ . . the minimum preconditions for basing a duty of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 June 2022; Ref: scu.219323
Ward, Potter, May LJJ
[2001] EWCA Civ 1527
England and Wales
Updated: 27 June 2022; Ref: scu.218436
[2002] EWCA Civ 1029
England and Wales
Updated: 27 June 2022; Ref: scu.217486
The claimant was severely injured when, as he emerged through traffic lights as they turned green. He was in a collision with a fire engine driving in response to an emergency call-out. The driver of the fire engine said the claimant should have seen the lights. The officers were not sounding the wailing alarm. The Regulations allowed a specific but limited exemption for emergency vehicles from compliance with traffic lights.
Held: The evidence from the fire officers to suggest that the claimant should have seen them coming was not convincing. The decision reached by the recorder was capable of being reached from the evidence before him. Both the regulations and the services own code of conduct required an emergency vehicle in this situation to give way. The driver had not done so. However: ‘With some hesitation, I am driven to conclude that a properly observant driver would and should have so noticed the fire engine and that Mr Purdue failed to do so. I think that this failure amounts to a want of observation and thus a want of due care. Accordingly, in my judgment there was a degree of contributory negligence but, for the reasons advanced by Mr Hillier, I do not think that that degree was great.’ The claimant was found to be 20% liable.
Lord Justice Thorpe, Lord Justice May And Mr Justice Bodey
[2002] EWCA Civ 1538
Traffic Signs And General Directions Order 1994 (1994 No 1519)
England and Wales
Cited – Griffin v Mersey Regional Ambulance CA 8-Oct-1997
A driver who had crossed through a green traffic light but had collided with an ambulance was 60 per cent contributorily negligent. He had failed to hear the ambulance, had failed to see it, and had ignored unusal driving of other motorists.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 June 2022; Ref: scu.217736
The motorist was to be asked to take a breath test at the police station. The defendant was asked if he was on medication, and he produced a pill. The officer went ahead wit the test. At court the defendant said that he should first have sought medical advice to see whether he was fit to be tested.
Held: The breath test was not as invasive as the blood test, and therefore less rigorous care was needed. There was no need for the officer to call a doctor in these circumstances. The Wade requirements applied only when the officer was requiring a blood sample.
Lord Justice Kennedy and Mr Justice Keith
Times 03-May-2002, Gazette 23-May-2002
Road Traffic Act 1988& 5(1)(a) 7(1) 7(3)(a) 7(4)
England and Wales
Cited – Wade v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 14-Feb-1995
The Police Constable had failed to enquire further on the issue of ‘taking tablets’ as a medical reason for refusing to give a breath test. The prosecution failed. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 June 2022; Ref: scu.170224
The claimant, who was drunk and a member of a group of people in a similar condition, asked the defendant, a lorry driver, for a lift. When the defendant refused, the claimant climbed onto the front bumper of the defendant’s lorry, holding on by the windscreen wipers, rather than by an adjacent handle. The defendant twice asked the claimant to move and, when the claimant did not, the defendant drove off very slowly, intending to find a quiet spot away from the claimant’s companions where he could persuade the claimant to get off the lorry. After the lorry had travelled about 100 metres, one of the windscreen wipers became detached, the claimant fell off and, although the defendant braked immediately, the lorry struck the claimant, causing serious internal injuries.
The trial judge had found that there had been ‘no pressing need’ for the defendant to take such a potentially dangerous step as to drive off with the claimant standing on the front bumper of the lorry. He concluded that, in doing so, the defendant had failed to exercise reasonable care. He found that the defendant was liable to the extent of 25%, the claimant’s contributory negligence being assessed at 75%. The defendant appealed.
Held: The appeal succeeded. There had been no breach of duty on the part of the defendant.
Hale LJ said: ‘It is interesting that in this case, when discussing contributory negligence, the judge remarked that it was extraordinary that the claimant did not get off the lorry the moment it started to move, when it was going very slowly indeed, and as indeed one of his own witnesses had also wondered. The judge also commented that the driver, although in breach of duty, was put in a difficult situation and his was an error of judgment.
It seems to me that the judge in this case applied too rigorous a standard of care when asking himself whether what the driver had done was reasonable in all the circumstances. He referred, as I have indicated, to the fact that there was ‘not such a pressing need.’ Later on he referred to the fact that ‘the exigencies of the situation did not . . require’ the driver to drive the lorry down the road. That is putting it too high. It seems to me that had the driver indeed done what the claimant said he had done, that is driven in such a violent and erratic way as to indicate that he was trying to dislodge the claimant from the front of the lorry, there could indeed have been a breach of the duty of care because he would have been going well beyond what could be considered a reasonable reaction to the difficult situation in which he was placed. But one has to take all the circumstances of that situation into account when deciding whether what he did do was such a reasonable reaction. These include the fact that he was put into the dilemma by the claimant himself who was behaving in an offensive and thoroughly irresponsible fashion, displaying a complete lack of regard for his own safety, let alone for the difficult position in which he had put the driver and his mate. One also has to take into account the surrounding circumstances. It is was late at night (just after the closing time for this particular establishment), there was a reasonably large group of people on the pavement, some of whom at least were friends of the claimant, some of whom had obviously been drinking, and even if the others were not actually aggressive, the claimant was. The claimant’s intention may only have been to hold up the lorry for five minutes but the driver and his mate had no means of knowing that and were put in a very difficult situation. In those circumstances I would not consider it unreasonable to drive off very slowly with a view to stopping at some quieter spot away from the group to persuade the claimant to get off.
Furthermore, the judge could have taken more account of the fact that the claimant only fell off when he was engaged in an even more stupid and dangerous act of pulling at the windscreen wiper on to which he was holding. I would agree with Mr Kilcoyne on behalf of the respondent claimant that that does not necessarily rob the driving of all causative effect, but it does indicate something about the reasonableness of the driver’s conduct up until that point.
For my part I would say that there was in the particular circumstances of this case, in the very difficult situation in which the driver found himself, no breach of the duty to take reasonable care. For that reason I would allow the appeal.’
Schiemann, Tucker, Hale LJJ
[2001] EWCA Civ 853
England and Wales
Cited – Ayres v Odedra QBD 18-Jan-2013
The claimant sought damages for serious personal injury, saying that the defendant had deliberately or recklessly driven at him as a pedestrian, knocking him over. The defendant had been tried and acquitted of motoring offences. He said that the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 June 2022; Ref: scu.218195
[2002] EWCA Civ 1449
England and Wales
Updated: 27 June 2022; Ref: scu.217778
[2002] EWCA Civ 1058
England and Wales
Updated: 23 June 2022; Ref: scu.217349
The motorist had been stopped. He had not failed the roadside breathalyzer test, but the officer continued and arrested him. He was acquitted. The prosecutor appealed.
Held: The use of the section 6 breathalyzer procedure did not exclude the officer relying on the powers contained in section 4 of the Act. Where the officer believed an offence had been committed, he did have power to use that section. Accordingly the arrest was lawful, and the evidence subsequently acquired should not have been excluded.
Times 13-Mar-2002, Gazette 11-Apr-2002
Road Traffic Act 1988 4 6, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 78(1)
England and Wales
Updated: 23 June 2022; Ref: scu.170040
The defendant appealed his conviction for failing a breath test. He said that since the meter could be affected by mouth alcohol, the prosecutor had a duty to show that the reading arose from a breath taken deep from the lung by a deep breath.
Held: Though the intoximeter made a distinction between deep lung breath and mouth breath, the Act did not. The word ‘breath’ had to be taken to have its dictionary meaning, which was ‘air exhaled from any thing’. The approval of the intoximeter could not be used as an aid to interpretation of the statute. Silber J said: ‘I conclude that there is nothing in the Road Traffic Act or in the Road Traffic Offenders Act which suggests that the word ‘breath’ should have a special meaning or that the dictionary definition of ‘breath’ should not apply. It is noteworthy that the statutory provision refers to ‘breath’ and not to ‘deep lung air’. What [counsel] is seeking to persuade us to do is to rewrite the statutory provision and that is not correct.’ The definition of ‘breath’ in section 5 of the Road Traffic Act included all of that which is exhaled and not just deep lung air.
Silber J, Gibbs J
Times 07-Jan-2005, [2004] EWHC 2468 (Admin)
England and Wales
Cited – O’Sullivan v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 25-Feb-2005
After routine procedures were followed at the police station, the police took a specimen of breath over two hours after those used for analysis to see if the defendant was then fit to leave. It showed a reading consistent with the analysis of the . .
Cited – Woolfe v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-Jun-2006
The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He claimed to have a medical condition under which the contents of his stomach would regurgitate into his mouth, and that this could exaggerate the alcohol reading.
Held: . .
Cited – Smith v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 30-Jan-2007
The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, arguing that the prosecution had failed to provide the roadside breath test figures.
Held: The appeal failed, and was indeed hopeless. Pill LJ said: ‘The specimens of . .
Cited – Rose v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 11-Mar-2010
The defendant appealed by case stated his conviction of driving with excess alcohol. He said that the device used was not an approved one. He also said that the reading was invaid in including a reading of mouth alcohol. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 June 2022; Ref: scu.220540
appli
Kennedy, Buxton, Keene LJJ
[2002] EWCA Civ 1526, [2003] LGR 47, [2003] RTR 122
England and Wales
Updated: 21 June 2022; Ref: scu.217708
Rose LJ, Pitchford J
[2004] EWHC 2914 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 21 June 2022; Ref: scu.220538
The applicant councils were host within their area the Clacton-On – sea Airshow, and sought an injunction against the world at large to prevent them causing disruption by the parking of mobile homes and similar on roads in the area
Knowles J
[2016] EWHC 2050 (QB)
England and Wales
Updated: 19 June 2022; Ref: scu.569081
The court rejected an application for leave to appeal. The defendant had turned right out of a slow moving land of traffic into the path of the plaintiff who was riding a motor cycle along the off-side of the queue of vehicles.
Held: It could not be said that the judge’s findings were inappropriate.
[2001] EWCA Civ 232
England and Wales
Updated: 18 June 2022; Ref: scu.217974
King J
[2017] EWHC 3773 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 17 June 2022; Ref: scu.628718
The claimant had been severely injured when hit by a car in Greece. The car’s driver was uninsured. The Court was now asked whether the scope of her claim to damages was to be determined in accordance with English or Greek law. The implementation of the European Regulations with UK law predated the Sixth Directive.
Held: ‘whichever special provision of the Fourth Directive the victim of a motor accident may have to have recourse, the compensation to which he or she is entitled is and remains the same. It is the same compensation as that to which the victim is entitled as against the driver responsible, or his or her insurer, or, that failing, as against the guarantee fund of the state of the accident. The compensation remains the same if and when the victim has recourse instead to the compensation body established in his own state of residence under article 6 or 7.’
‘the scheme of the Directives is clear, and that they do not leave it to individual member states to provide for compensation in accordance with any law that such states may choose. On the contrary, they proceed on the basis that a victim’s entitlement to compensation will be measured on a consistent basis, by reference to the law of the state of the accident, whichever of the routes to recovery provided by the Directives he or she invokes. In consequence, it also makes no difference to the measure of liability of the body or person ultimately responsible, which route is chosen. ‘
Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, Lord Toulson,Lord Hodge
[2016] UKSC 52, [2016] 1 WLR 3194, [2016] WLR(D) 453, UKSC 2015/0113, [2016] RTR 26, [2017] PIQR P3
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC
Sixth Directive 2009/103/EC, The Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003
England and Wales
At First Instance – Moreno v The Motor Insurers’ Bureau QBD 17-Apr-2015
The claimant suffered injury in a road traffic accident in Greece. The responsible driver was uninsured. She claimed here under the MIB scheme, and the court was now asked whether Greek or UK law governed the assessment of damages.
Held: The . .
Leave – Moreno v The Motor Insurers’ Bureau QBD 23-Apr-2015
Application for leave to appeal – granted . .
Overruled – Jacobs v Motor Insurers Bureau CA 27-Oct-2010
The claimant was injured when struck by a car in Spain, driven by an uninsured driver. He claimed here against the MIB. The 2003 Regulations under which he claimed had not been updated for the 2007 EU Regulations. The parties disputed which law . .
Cited – Harding v Wealands HL 5-Jul-2006
Claim in UK for Accident in Australia
The claimant had been a passenger in a car driven by his now partner. They had an accident in New South Wales. The car was insured in Australia. He sought leave to sue in England and Wales because Australian law would limit the damages.
Held: . .
Cited – Evans v The Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and The Motor Insurers’ Bureau ECJ 4-Dec-2003
ECJ Reference for a preliminary ruling: High Court of Justice (England and Wales), Queen’s Bench Division – United Kingdom. Approximation of laws – Directive 84/5/EEC – Compulsory insurance against civil . .
Overruled – Bloy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau CA 29-Nov-2013
. .
Cited – Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA ECJ 13-Nov-1990
Sympathetic construction of national legislation
LMA OVIEDO sought a declaration that the contracts setting up Commercial International were void (a nullity) since they had been drawn up in order to defraud creditors. Commercial International relied on an EC . .
Cited – The United States of America v Nolan SC 21-Oct-2015
Mrs Nolan had been employed at a US airbase. When it closed, and she was made redundant, she complained that the appellant had not consulted properly on the redundancies. The US denied that it had responsibility to consult, and now appealed.
Cited – Cox v Ergo Versicherung Ag SC 2-Apr-2014
The deceased army officer serving in Germany died while cycling when hit by a driver insured under German law. His widow, the claimant, being domiciled in England brought her action here, claiming for bereavement and loss of dependency. The Court . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 June 2022; Ref: scu.570159
The claimant was injured when struck by a car in Spain, driven by an uninsured driver. He claimed here against the MIB. The 2003 Regulations under which he claimed had not been updated for the 2007 EU Regulations. The parties disputed which law would apply to assessment of damages.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The Regulations provide for English law to govern the measure of recovery, and there was nothing in the Sixth Directive to the contrary.
Moore-Bick LJ concluded first that regulation 13 must contemplate the victim being able to show the existence of liability on the part of the person responsible for the accident. The answer on this point lay, he considered, in the words ‘shall compensate the injured party in accordance with the provisions of article 1’ of the Second Directive. He went on: ‘I think it is reasonably clear from the recitals to the Second Directive that its purpose was to assimilate the position of the victim of an unidentified or uninsured driver or vehicle to that of the victim of an identified and insured driver or vehicle; it is not its purpose to require the establishment of a system of no-fault compensation. It is, therefore, implicit in the scheme of the Second Directive that the victim must be able to establish that the driver is liable to him in respect of his injuries, but whether that requires proof of fault will depend on the law of the country in which the accident occurred. The reference in regulation 13(1)(c)(ii) to an insurance undertaking which insures the use of the vehicle assumes the existence of a liability on the part of the driver which ought to be, but is not, covered by insurance. It follows, in my view, that the obligation imposed on the bureau by regulation 13(2)(b) to compensate the injured party in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of the Second Directive carries with it the implicit proviso that the injured party must be able to show that the driver is liable to him. As in the case of a claim under regulation 12, that is a question to be determined by reference to the applicable law identified in accordance with the appropriate conflicts of laws rules. At the time the 2003 Regulations were made the applicable rules were those of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, but since the introduction of Rome II, the rules set out in that Regulation will apply and will normally lead to the application of the law of the country in which the accident occurred.’
Laws, Moore-Bick, Rimer LJJ
[2010] EWCA Civ 1208, [2011] 1 WLR 2609, [2011] 1 All ER 844, [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 445, [2011] RTR 2
Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003, Regulation EEC No. 864/2007
England and Wales
Appeal from – Jacobs v Motor Insurers Bureau QBD 16-Feb-2010
The UK claimant was seriously injured in Spain. The negligent car driver was not insured. The parties now disputed which law would apply in assessing the damages payable by the defendant. . .
Overruled – Moreno v The Motor Insurers’ Bureau SC 3-Aug-2016
The claimant had been severely injured when hit by a car in Greece. The car’s driver was uninsured. The Court was now asked whether the scope of her claim to damages was to be determined in accordance with English or Greek law. The implementation of . .
Followed – Bloy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau CA 29-Nov-2013
. .
Cited – Moreno v The Motor Insurers’ Bureau QBD 17-Apr-2015
The claimant suffered injury in a road traffic accident in Greece. The responsible driver was uninsured. She claimed here under the MIB scheme, and the court was now asked whether Greek or UK law governed the assessment of damages.
Held: The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 June 2022; Ref: scu.425585
Conviction for having driven a car whilst drunk in a public place, the car park of his employers.
Latham LJ, Fulford J
[2006] EWHC 3450 (Admin), [2007] RTR 28
England and Wales
Cited – Richardson v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 28-Feb-2019
Private Car park was not a public plae.
The defendant appealed from his conviction for being drunk in charge of a vehicle in a public place. The place was marked private but allowed for paring for designated businesses.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The phrase public phrase had to be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 June 2022; Ref: scu.249147
Appeal by way of case stated from a decision convicting the appellant, of driving a motor car when he had consumed alcohol in excess of the prescribed limit, contrary to the provisions of section 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and Schedule 2 Road Traffic Offenders’ Act 1988. The issue was whether the car park of a public house was a public place.
Davis J
[2004] EWHC 3081 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 17 June 2022; Ref: scu.226931
A private company car park, where there was no proof of use by the public, was not a public road, and a driver could not be convicted of dangerous driving whilst in it. There must be evidence that the public actually utilised premises before a court can conclude that they are a ‘public place’. It is not sufficient to say that the public could have access if they were so inclined.
Times 24-May-1999, [1999] EWCA Crim 808, [1999] RTR 353
England and Wales
Cited – May v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 15-Apr-2005
Whether the car park where the driving took place was a ‘public place’ within the meaning of section 3.
Held: The appeal failed.
Laws LJ set out the following propositions as accurately summarising the relevant legal principles:
a. . .
Cited – Richardson v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 28-Feb-2019
Private Car park was not a public plae.
The defendant appealed from his conviction for being drunk in charge of a vehicle in a public place. The place was marked private but allowed for paring for designated businesses.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The phrase public phrase had to be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 June 2022; Ref: scu.85567
Defendant pleaded guity to drink driving – claim for special reasons – appeal against finding of absence of special reasons to disqualify.
David J
[2004] EWHC 2505 (Admin)
England and Wales
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Bristow QBD 28-Oct-1996
The prosecutor appealed against the decision of the magistrates, having found the defendant guilty of driving with excess alcohol, then not to disqualify him, finding special reasons for so doing. He had gone in answer to a call that a child niece . .
Cited – Whittall v Kirkby 1946
Special reasons for non-disqualification of a driver were defined as being reasons which, first, constitute mitigating or extenuating circumstances; secondly, do not amount in law to a defence to the charge; thirdly, are directly connected with the . .
Cited – Taylor v Rajan 2-Jan-1974
The defendant had consumed alcohol so that the alcohol level was 102 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. An appeal was heard as to whether there existed special reasons for not disqualifying him.
Held: The court considered . .
Cited – Chatters v Burke QBD 1986
A car had rolled over and stopped in a field next to the highway and was then driven with a flat tyre a few yards from the field through a gate, onto the road and parked there.
Held: In determining whether special reasons existed to justify . .
Cited – Vaughan v Dunn 1984
Goff LJ considered the circumstances where, a defendant having been convicted of driving wih excess alcohol, the court could find special reasons for not disqualifying him. He referred to Taylor v Rajan and said: ‘The first is that the exercise of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 June 2022; Ref: scu.219264
[2004] EWHC 2416 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 13 June 2022; Ref: scu.219217
The court set out the circumstances in which it could find special reasons for not disqualifying a driver who had driven with excess alcohol.
[2000] NICA 5
Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1995
Cited – Taylor v Rajan 2-Jan-1974
The defendant had consumed alcohol so that the alcohol level was 102 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. An appeal was heard as to whether there existed special reasons for not disqualifying him.
Held: The court considered . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 13 June 2022; Ref: scu.201923
[2001] EWCA Civ 61, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 883, [2001] CLC 643, [2002] ILPr 26, [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 490
Convention for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 1956 31
England and Wales
Overruled – Frans Maas Logistics (UK) Ltd v CDR Trucking BV ComC 23-Mar-1999
CMR Convention: Articles 31(2) and 36 – relating on jurisdiction. Brussels Convention: Article 57. Applicability in cases covered by the CMR convention.
Article 31.2 of CMR to be limited to proceedings brought by same claimant against the same . .
Cited – British American Tobacco Denmark A/S v Kazemier Bv SC 28-Oct-2015
One container loaded with cigarettes was allegedly hi-jacked in Belgium en route between Switzerland and The Netherlands in September 2011, while another allegedly lost 756 of its original 1386 cartons while parked overnight contrary to express . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 June 2022; Ref: scu.200723
ECJ Reference for a preliminary ruling: High Court of Justice (England and Wales), Queen’s Bench Division – United Kingdom. Approximation of laws – Directive 84/5/EEC – Compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of motor vehicles – Damage or injury caused by unidentified or insufficiently insured vehicles – Protection of victims – Defective transposition of the directive – Liability of the Member State concerned.
The case concerned the United Kingdom’s implementation of a directive relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles. Implementation had been effected by means of a number of agreements between the Secretary of State and an existing body, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau. In considering the adequacy of such implementation, the ECJ stated: ‘As to whether it is sufficient, for the purposes of transposing the Second Directive, to rely on an existing body, it must be borne in mind that, whilst legislative action on the part of each Member State is not necessarily required in order to implement a directive, it is essential for national law to guarantee that the national authorities will effectively apply the directive in full, that the legal position under national law should be sufficiently precise and clear and that individuals are made fully aware of all their rights and, where appropriate, may rely on them before the national courts . . . In those circumstances, it must be held that a body may be regarded as authorised by a Member State within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the Second Directive where its obligation to provide compensation to victims of damage or injury caused by unidentified or insufficiently insured vehicles derives from an agreement concluded between that body and a public authority of the Member State, provided that the agreement is interpreted and applied as obliging the body to provide victims with the compensation guaranteed to them by the Second Directive and provided that victims may apply directly to that body’
The intention of the legislature in passing the Second Directive was ‘to entitle victims of damage or injury caused by unidentified or insufficiently insured vehicles to protection equivalent to, and as effective as, that available to persons injured by identified and insured vehicles’
C-63/01, Times 09-Dec-2003, [2003] EUECJ C-63/01, [2004] RTR 32, [2005] All ER (EC) 763, [2003] ECR I-14447, [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 391, [2004] 1 CMLR 47, [2004] RTR 534
European
Cited – Regina (Amicus etc) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Admn 26-Apr-2004
The claimants sought a declaration that part of the Regulations were invalid, and an infringement of their human rights. The Regulations sought to exempt church schools from an obligation not to discriminate against homosexual teachers.
Held: . .
Cited – Moreno v The Motor Insurers’ Bureau SC 3-Aug-2016
The claimant had been severely injured when hit by a car in Greece. The car’s driver was uninsured. The Court was now asked whether the scope of her claim to damages was to be determined in accordance with English or Greek law. The implementation of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 June 2022; Ref: scu.189877
A driver had deliberately driven at a building owned by the respondent company causing substantial damage. The driver’s insurer now appealed against a decision that it was liable to the respondent despite a clause excluding liability for deliberate acts of a driver.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and nor did a claim lie against the Motor Insurer’s Bureau.
Ward, McFarlane LJJ, Dame Janet Smith
[2012] EWCA Civ 1267, [2013] QB 806, [2012] WLR(D) 273, [2013] RTR 9, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep IR 351, [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 257, [2013] 1 QB 806, [2013] 2 WLR 1029
England and Wales
Updated: 11 June 2022; Ref: scu.464841
[2004] EWHC 1937 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 11 June 2022; Ref: scu.200007
Challenge to parking regulations.
Held: The appeal succeeded. In assessing the decision it was open to the court to consider and elucidate the reasoning behind the option of the parking scheme. Assuming that the 1975 Order was valid, the reasons for adopting the Directions were not reasons significantly concerned with the operation or management of the harbour, and insofar as the Directions affected Castle Terrace directly, no, or at any rate no proper, consideration was given to the fact that the adoption of the Directions might invade a property right of the appellants without adequate justification and without compensation.
Lord Justice Sedley P, Lord Justice Neuberger
[2004] EWCA Civ 1000
England and Wales
Leave – Richards and Another, Regina (on the Application of) v Pembrokeshire County Council CA 8-Jun-2004
Unlawfulness of parking regulations . .
Cited – Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v The Independent Reviewer of Advertising Standards Authority Adjudications Admn 10-Nov-2014
The two supermarkets had price matching comparison schemes. Sainburys complained that the Independent Reviewer’s decsion that the ASA’s response to is complant as to the Tesco scheme was itself flawed. They had complained that the selections for . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 June 2022; Ref: scu.199735
Cattle strayed from a field onto the road. A motorist was injured and claimed damages. The farmer appealed.
Held: the judge had been correct that the farmers should have recognised the risk, and taken simple and inexpensive steps to avoid the risk. The ancient common law immunity for animals was abolished in 1971. ‘. . the defendant is in business as a farmer, having therefore to exercise his mind about the risks inherent in his business and the means of protecting against such risks, whether such protection is to himself, the set-up of his farm or to third parties.’ Appeal dismissed.
Lord Justice Potter Lord Justice Rix Mr Justice Munby
[2004] EWCA Civ 972
England and Wales
Leave to Appeal – Donaldson v Wilson CA 26-Jan-2004
The owner of cattle sought leave to appeal a finding of negligence in his having failed to maintain the fences on his property, which in turn allowed his cattle to stray into the road and cause an accident in which the claimant was severely injured. . .
Cited – Searle v Wallbank HL 1947
There existed an ancient common law immunity in respect of animals straying onto a public highway. An owner or occupier of land adjacent to a highway has no legal obligation at common law to highway users so to keep and maintain his hedges, fences . .
Full Appeal – Donaldson v Wilson CA 26-Jan-2004
The owner of cattle sought leave to appeal a finding of negligence in his having failed to maintain the fences on his property, which in turn allowed his cattle to stray into the road and cause an accident in which the claimant was severely injured. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 June 2022; Ref: scu.199635
The claimant fell into a ditch by a path on the highway in the dark. She appealed a finding of no liability on the highway authority.
Held: The authority’s responsibility was as to the surface structures of the road way and not as to the layout.
Potter, Lord Justice Potter Lord Justice Rix Lord Justice Carnwath
[2004] EWCA Civ 1016, Times 14-Oct-2004
England and Wales
Cited – Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council HL 1-Apr-2004
Statutory Duty Not Extended by Common Law
The claimant sought damages after a road accident. The driver came over the crest of a hill and hit a bus. The road was not marked with any warning as to the need to slow down.
Held: The claim failed. The duty could not be extended to include . .
Cited – Goodes v East Sussex County Council HL 16-Jun-2000
The claimant was driving along a road. He skidded on ice, crashed and was severely injured. He claimed damages saying that the Highway authority had failed to ‘maintain’ the road.
Held: The statutory duty on a highway authority to keep a road . .
Cited – Department for Transport, Environment and the Regions v Mott Macdonald Ltd and others CA 27-Jul-2006
Claims arose from accidents caused by standing water on roadway surfaces after drains had not been cleared by the defendants over a long period of time. The Department appealed a decision giving it responsibility under a breach of statutory duty . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 June 2022; Ref: scu.199571
Unlawfulness of parking regulations
[2004] EWCA Civ 813
England and Wales
Leave – Regina (on the Application of P Richards and G Richards) v Pembrokeshire County Council CA 29-Jul-2004
Challenge to parking regulations.
Held: The appeal succeeded. In assessing the decision it was open to the court to consider and elucidate the reasoning behind the option of the parking scheme. Assuming that the 1975 Order was valid, the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 June 2022; Ref: scu.198511
The defendant appealed a conviction for driving with excess alcohol. She said she had not first been cautioned when interviewed after an accident and that her admission that she had been driving should not have been allowed in evidence.
Held: That admission had properly been admitted. An expert for the defence had said that the intoximeter device had been modified in answer to criticisms of its inability to differentiate the presence of mouth alcohol. The device was not the same as that which has been approved, the results of its use cannot be admissible even where it was substantially like an approved device, and even if its performance is the same as that of an approved device. Since it had been modified, it was no longer an approved device. However if the judge had accepted that it was not an approved device, the reading could not have been admitted.
[2004] EWHC 278 (Admin)
England and Wales
Cited – Breckon v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 22-Aug-2007
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol.
Held: There was no requirement that the prosecutor should produce the results of the roadside breath test in evidence, and the breathalyser was of the approved . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 June 2022; Ref: scu.197971
[2004] EWHC 1236 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 11 June 2022; Ref: scu.198217
A collision occurred between a motor car and a cyclist. The driver appealed a finding that he had been driving too quickly, and that that was a cause of the accident. The claimant had cut across a right hand corner of the narrow unmarked lane. The lane had high hedges. The cyclist was 60% to blame.
Held: The appeal failed. Rix LJ said: ‘So far as causation is concerned, I am similarly satisfied that it is impossible to say that the judge was wrong to conclude that the excessive speed was a cause of the collision. I accept [the] submission that, albeit, as the judge found, the motorist was properly keeping to his side of the road while taking this bend, nevertheless on such a road he had to be aware of the possibility of other users of the road who may be at risk if he drove too fast for those conditions. At a slower speed, alive to that danger, he could well have avoided a collision, even if he could not have stopped within the distance. It was for the judge to assess that matter: he assessed it as probable, and I cannot say he was wrong to do so.’
Rix LJ, Peter Gibson LJ, Longmore LJ
[2004] EWCA Civ 591
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 1(1)
England and Wales
Cited – Phethean-Hubble v Coles CA 21-Mar-2012
The claimant cyclist suffered serious injury in a collision with a car driven by the defendant. The defendant appealed against a finding that he was two thirds responsible. The case for the injured cyclist was that the motorist was going too fast. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 June 2022; Ref: scu.197045
(Judgment) Directive 91/439/EEC – Mutual recognition of driving licences – Residence requirement – Article 8(4) – Effects of withdrawal or cancellation of a previous driving licence – Recognition of a new driving licence issued by another Member State
C-476/01, [2004] EUECJ C-476/01, [2004] ECR I-5205
Updated: 10 June 2022; Ref: scu.196660
The claimant sought damages for increased road noise resulting from traffic control measures taken by the respondent.
Held: The defendants action to strike out the claim could not succeed. They had not shown that the claim was unarguable, however difficult were the prospects of success.
Mr Justice Collins
[2004] EWHC 970 (QB)
European Convention on Human Rights 8
England and Wales
Cited – Hatton and Others v The United Kingdom ECHR 8-Jul-2003
More Night Flights No Infringement of Family Life
The claimants complained that the respondent had acted to infringe their rights. They were residents living locally to Heathrow Airport. They claimed the respondent had increased the number of night flights, causing increased noise, but without . .
Cited – Anufrijeva v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 22-Mar-2002
Three asylum-seekers brought claims of breach of their Article 8 rights. One complained of a local authority’s failure to provide accommodation to meet special needs, the other two of maladministration and delay in the handling of their asylum . .
Cited – Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Anufrijeva HL 26-Jun-2003
The appellant challenged the withdrawal of her benefits payments. She had applied for asylum, and been granted reduced rate income support. A decision was made refusing her claim, but that decision was, by policy, not communicated to her for several . .
Cited – Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Limited HL 4-Dec-2003
The claimant’s house was regularly flooded by waters including also foul sewage from the respondent’s neighbouring premises. He sought damages and an injunction. The defendants sought to restrict the claimant to his statutory rights.
Held: The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 June 2022; Ref: scu.196629
The prosecution appealed by way of case stated a finding by the magistrates of special reasons for the non-disqualification of the respondent for driving with excess alcohol. The defendant had drunk acohol, but unknown to her a friend had added measures of spirits. She was twice the legal limit.
Held: The practice in O’Connor could not be turned into a rule of law. The magistrates bore the guidelines and statute in mind, and the evidence. Not every bench might have reached the same conclusion, but they were entitled to it. The appeal failed.
Mitting J
[2005] EWHC 879 (Admin)
England and Wales
Cited – Regina v David Newton 1974
The Lord Chief Justice was unable to accept that someone with 127 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, a little over half the legal limit, did not feel any effect. The process of considering whether special reasons might avoid a . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v O’Connor and Chapman and Others 1991
The court looked at the elements needed to be established to support a defence to a charge of driving with excess alcohol on the basis that the defendant’s drinks had been spiked: ‘On the authorities, it is now clearly established that the matters . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 June 2022; Ref: scu.225174
Davis J
[2004] EWHC 2484 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 10 June 2022; Ref: scu.219268
Forbes J
[2004] EWHC 2635 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 10 June 2022; Ref: scu.219718
Prosecutor’s appeal by way of case stated from a decision of the Birmingham Justices when they dismissed an information laid against the respondent under section 5(1)(b) Road Traffic Act 1988.
[2004] EWHC 2811 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 10 June 2022; Ref: scu.220281
There had been a Part 36 offer to settle the action. It was disclosed inadvertently to the judge.
Held: There had been no serious procedural irregularity, and fairness and justice did not require a rehearing before different judge.
Ward, Buxton, Dyson LJJ
[2004] EWCA Civ 341, Gazette 18-Mar-2004, [2004] 1 WLR 2152
England and Wales
Cited – Assicurazioni Generali Spa v Arab Insurance Group (BSC) CA 13-Nov-2002
Rehearing/Review – Little Difference on Appeal
The appellant asked the Court to reverse a decision on the facts reached in the lower court.
Held: The appeal failed (Majority decision). The court’s approach should be the same whether the case was dealt with as a rehearing or as a review. . .
Cited – Berg v IML London Ltd 2002
A judge should recuse himself in a civil case only if, subjectively, he considered that the knowledge he acquired of privileged communications disabled him from fairly continuing with the case or, objectively, a fair-minded and informed observer . .
Cited – Beasley v Alexander QBD 9-Oct-2012
The parties had disputed liability for personal injuries in a road traffic accident. The court had held the defendant liable, but held over the assessment of damages. The defendant sought to refer to the fact of his offer of settlement when . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 June 2022; Ref: scu.195527
[2004] ScotHC 19
Scotland
Updated: 10 June 2022; Ref: scu.195189
The defendant appealed against his conviction for having failed to identify the driver of a car caught speeding by a camera. He was the registered keeper. He completed and returned the form, but did not sign it. The statute imposed no explicit obligation to sign it. He also said that since he was already suspected of an offence, the form should have contained a caution under PACE.
Held: The appeal failed.
Lord Justice Kennedy Mr Justice Mackay
[2004] EWHC 591 (Admin)
Road Traffic Act 1988 172(3), Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 12(1), Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
Updated: 10 June 2022; Ref: scu.194839
[2004] EWCA Civ 250
England and Wales
Updated: 10 June 2022; Ref: scu.194416
The Director appealed dismissal of a charge. The defendant had accompanied a learner driver. He had too much alcohol in his blood. He denied that he was driving.
Held: There was no need to prove that the defendant was statutorily supervising. The precise skills of the learner driver were not relevant. The supervisor was clearly in charge of the vehicle, and the case was remitted to the magistrates
May LJ, Nelson J
[2004] EWHC 101 (Admin), Times 29-Jan-2004
England and Wales
Updated: 09 June 2022; Ref: scu.193503
The claimants were car auctioneers. They had been instructed to sell a car, but to withhold the cherished number plate. By mistake it was transferred with the car. Before the plate could be returned, the defendant had transferred it to his partner.
Held: The fact that it had been disposed of under circumstances where the purchaser could realise the benefit transferred, or recover it easily, meant that it should have been. Four questions were to be answered; had the defendant been unjustly enriched; was the enrichment at the expense of the claimant, was the enrichment unjust, and was there any defence available such as change of position.
Lord Justice Mance Lord Justice Thorpe Mr Justice Wilson
[2004] EWCA Civ 47, Gazette 11-Mar-2004, [2004] 1 WLR 2775
Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994 21
England and Wales
Cited – Charter Plc and Another v City Index Ltd and others ChD 12-Oct-2006
An employee of the claimant had fraudulently spent several million pounds of the claimant’s money on personal bets through the defendant company. The claimant said that the defendants knew the origin of the funds and were liable to repay them. . .
Cited – Benedetti v Sawiris and Others SC 17-Jul-2013
The claimant appealed against reduction of the sum awarded on his claim for a quantum meruit after helping to facilitate a very substantial business deal for the defendants.
Held: The correct approach to the amount to be paid by way of a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2022; Ref: scu.192640
The court looked at the elements needed to be established to support a defence to a charge of driving with excess alcohol on the basis that the defendant’s drinks had been spiked: ‘On the authorities, it is now clearly established that the matters which the defendant has to establish on the balance of probabilities in order to show special reasons are three-fold. By admissible and relevant evidence, the driver is required to show, first of all, that his drink had been laced; secondly, that he did not know or suspect his drink had been laced; thirdly, if he had not taken a laced drink, the level of alcohol in his body would have not have exceeded the prescribed limit. If authority was needed to establish the requirement to prove those three matters through it is to be found in Pugsley v. Hunter.’ Expert evidence will often be required to demonstrate those two facts, and the expert evidence may well impinge upon the credibility of the driver’s own evidence.
Woolf LJ, Leonard J
[1992] RTR 66
England and Wales
Cited – Pugsley v Hunter 1973
The court discussed the basis of a submission that there existed special reasons for non-disqualification for driving whilst under the influence of drink when the driver’s drinks had been spiked. It was necessary for the applicant to show first, . .
Cited – Regina v David Newton 1974
The Lord Chief Justice was unable to accept that someone with 127 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, a little over half the legal limit, did not feel any effect. The process of considering whether special reasons might avoid a . .
Cited – Regina v Gravesend Magistrates Court ex parte Baker Admn 16-Apr-1997
The defendant appealed a refusal of legal aid. She wished to establish that her drink had been spiked, and thus to establish special reasons for not being disqualified for driving with excess alcohol.
Held: Expert evidence would assist the . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Vincent QBD 1992
(Year?) ‘From the authorities the following principles can be established. Firstly, it is for the defendant on the balance of probability to establish that his drink had been laced unknown to him. Secondly, it is very rarely that a court will be . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions, Regina (on the Application of) v Sharma Admn 27-Apr-2005
The prosecution appealed by way of case stated a finding by the magistrates of special reasons for the non-disqualification of the respondent for driving with excess alcohol. The defendant had drunk acohol, but unknown to her a friend had added . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2022; Ref: scu.187416
May LJ, Nelson J
[2004] EWHC 83 (Admin)
England and Wales
Cited – Paterson v Director of Public Prosecutions 1990
. .
Cited – Regina v Jackson CACD 21-May-1996
Time should be saved by explicit admissions of all elements of expert case. . .
Cited – Tuck v Vehicle Inspectorate Admn 24-Mar-2004
The defendant appealed a conviction for exceeding the gross permitted weight on a goods vehicle. The magistrates having heard the case, the defendant submitted there was no case to answer, the prosecution having failed to bring evidence as to the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2022; Ref: scu.192342
[2004] EWCA Civ 6
England and Wales
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.192131
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He said that the machine used to measure the alcohol in his breath did not have type approval. The schedule to Approval 1998 for the purposes of section 7(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act referred to ‘the device known as the Intoximeter EC/IR manufactured by Intoximeters Inc, of St Louis, Missouri, United States of America, composed of the Intoximeter EC/IR, the Intoximeter EC/IR gas delivery system by BOC limited the software version EC/IR UK 5.23.’ The Sheriff held that the device conformed to type approval in terms of the manufacture, although it had not been manufactured by Intoximeters Inc of St Louis.
Held: The appeal failed. The Sheriff correctly determined that whether or not the particular device was approved did not turn on the identity of the manufacturer.
Lord Cameron Of Lochbroom And Lord Justice Clerk And Lord Maclean
[2002] ScotHC 125
Road Traffic Act 1988 5(1)(a), Breath Analysis Devices (Scotland) Approval 1998
Scotland
Cited – Coxon v Manchester City Magistrates Court Admn 11-Mar-2010
The defendant sought judicial review of the magistrate’s refusal to state a case for an appeal against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, saying that the intoximeter used had not received type approval as required. The defendant’s . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.190978
The plaintiff and a friend had spent the evening drinking at a disco before setting off on the friend’s motorcycle. The plaintiff was aware that the motorcyclist was neither licensed to ride a motorcycle nor insured. During the journey, the plaintiff had encouraged the cyclist to ride in a fast, reckless and hazardous manner, with the purpose of frightening members of the public. This conduct eventually led to a collision with an oncoming car in which the plaintiff was severely injured.
Held: In the circumstances the plaintiff could not recover; he played a full and active part in encouraging the young rider to commit offences which, if a death other than that of the young rider himself had occurred, would have amounted to manslaughter by the commission of a dangerous act. The plaintiff was precluded on grounds of public policy from recovering compensation for the injuries which he sustained in the course of the very serious offences in which he was participating. The Courts have adopted a pragmatic approach and it was not desirable to attempt to categorise the degree of seriousness involved in offences which will preclude recovery of compensation.
Beldam LJ, Balcombe LJ
[1991] 1 QB 24, [1990] 3 All ER 344, [1990] EWCA Civ 17
England and Wales
Dictum Disapproved – Ashton v Turner QBD 1981
The plaintiff sought damages after being injured as a passenger in a car. He and the driver had both just been involved in a burglary, and the driver, who had taken alcohol was attempting to escape. The driver was driving very dangerously in order . .
Cited – Saunders v Edwards CA 24-Mar-1986
The parties had agreed for the sale and purchase of land and chattels, but had deliberately misdescribed the apportionment so as to reduce tax liability. The purchasers then brought an action for misrepresentation. The vendor replied that the action . .
Cited – Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police CA 31-Jul-2001
The police were not under any duty to protect someone who had been arrested from injuring himself in an attempt to escape. The claimant had a history of seeking to avoid capture by jumping from his flat window. On this occasion he injured himself in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.190063
The defendant had been found sat in his car. He had been spinning its wheels, but not moving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of a charge of attempting to drive whilst under the influence of alcohol.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The defendant was driving. Although the car had not moved, his behaviour required him to have effective control over the movement of the vehicle, and his actions to prevent movement, and he was driving within the normal meaning of the word to drive. The justices erred in law in concluding that there had to be some movement of the vehicle before the respondent could be said to be driving it. Each case will depend on its own facts.
Harrison J said: ‘first, a test of degree of control over the movement and direction of the vehicle, there was a sufficient degree of control being exercised by the defendant, by ensuring that the handbrake prevented the movement of the vehicle despite the fact that the wheels were turning, to say that the defendant was driving the vehicle; that, applying, secondly, a test of whether what was being done fell within the ordinary meaning of ‘driving’, a person wheel spinning could properly be said to be ‘driving’ a vehicle within the ordinary meaning of that word, in that a person wheel spinning was driving a vehicle in such a way as to seek to ensure that it did not go forward whilst its wheels were turning; and that, therefore, the justices erred in law in concluding that there had to be some movement of the vehicle before the defendant could be said to be driving it, and the case would be remitted to the justices with a direction to convict.’
Harrison J
[2003] EWHC 2917 (Admin), Times 27-Nov-2003, [2004] RTR 23
Cited – Hoy v McFadyen HCJ 2000
The accused was charged with driving whilst disqualified. He had been in the driver’s seat and had started the engine. On turning off the engine the car lurched forward slightly. The handbrake was defective and would not hold the car on a slope. To . .
Cited – Regina v MacDonagh CA 1974
The Road Traffic Acts do not define the word ‘drive’ and in its simplest meaning it refers to a person using the driver’s controls for the purpose of directing the movement of the vehicle. It matters not that the vehicle is not moving under its own . .
Cited – Ames v MacLeod OHCS 1969
The accused, who was alleged to have been driving a motor car, had been walking beside it as it ran down a slight incline, and had steered it by placing his hand on the wheel. The car had run out of petrol.
Held: The question turned on whether . .
Cited – Blayney v Knight 1975
The driver of a car left it momentarily, during which time the defendant went and sat in the driver’s seat. When the driver returned, he attempted to remove the defendant and, in the ensuing struggle, the defendant’s foot accidentally depressed the . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Moore Admn 2-Mar-2010
The defendant appealed by case stated from his conviction of attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a public road, having consumed alcohol in excess of the prescribed limit on the same occasion. At the time he was said to have attempted to drive, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.189125
[2002] EWHC 2718 (Admin)
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.189106
[2003] EWHC 2718 (Admin)
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.188521
The court considered an application to quash an order requiring the attendance of the claimant to give evidence: ‘Normally this court will not entertain an application for a quashing order in relation to a decision made in a magistrates’ court where the proceedings in that court are not complete. In R v Rochford Justices ex-parte Buck (1978) 68 Cr App R 114 it was said that there is no jurisdiction to do so, and a distinction was drawn between an order to direct a magistrate to hear and determine a matter, which can be obtained if he refuses to do so, and an order, as Cockburn CJ put it in Carden (1879) 5 QBD 1 at 5, ‘to control the magistrate in the conduct of the case or to prescribe to him the evidence which he shall receive or reject.’ Such control, it was said, could only be exercised when the case was at an end. In Buck the prosecution had sought to introduce certain evidence which the justices ruled inadmissible. The matter was then adjourned to enable the prosecution to test the ruling in the Divisional Court. When giving the judgment in this court Lord Widgery CJ said that the decision to adjourn was wrong. The prosecution were asking this court to do what Cockburn CJ had said could not be done, that is to say to exercise a measure of control over the way the magistrates try the case. At page 118 he said: ‘The obligation of this Court to keep out of the way until the magistrate has finished his determination seems to me to be a principle properly to be applied both to summary trial and to committal proceedings.
Accordingly, I would be prepared to dispose of this matter on the first argued point, namely, that there was no jurisdiction in this Court to interfere with the justices’ decision, that not having been reached by termination of the proceedings below.’
Kennedy LJ
[2003] EWHC 2660 (Admin)
Cited – Carden 1879
Whilst an order may be available to oblige a magistrate to hear and determine a matter properly within his jurisdiction, an order will not be available which seeks ‘to control the magistrate in the conduct of the case or to prescribe to him the . .
Cited – Regina v Rochford Justices ex parte Buck 1978
The court considered the correctness of the Divisional Court interfering in interlocutory orders in magistrates court proceedings: ‘The obligation of this Court to keep out of the way until the magistrate has finished his determination seems to me . .
Cited – Cunliffe, Regina (on the Application of) v West London Magistrates’ Court Admn 6-Jul-2006
The claimant was an employee of the company manufacturing alcohol measuring devices. He sought judicial review of decisions by magistrates to require him to attend court to give evidence which would require him to breach obligations of confidence he . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.188319
[2003] EWHC 2481 (Admin)
England and Wales
Cited – Harvey Shopfitters Ltd v ADI Ltd CA 13-Nov-2003
The court dismissed the claimants appeal, but discussed the need now for the parties to file core bundles at least one week before the hearing. Additional agreed bundles of authorities should have the appropriate passages clearly marked and filed . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.187611
[2003] EWHC 2527 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.187614
[2003] EWHC 2354 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.187319
The claimant pedestrian had been injured when hit by a car driven by the defendant as she stepped into the roadway. Both parties appealed against the assessment of contributory negligence. The claimant had a blood alcohol level three times that which would have been lawful for a driver.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The judge’s apportionment could not be characterised as plainly wrong. Latham LJ said: ‘But nonetheless, bearing in mind the fact that this court has consistently imposed on the drivers of cars a high burden to reflect the fact that a car is potentially a dangerous weapon, I find it difficult to see how I could properly categorise the judge’s apportionment in this case as plainly wrong.’
An appeal court should not interfere with the judge’s assessment of contributory negligence unless his conclusion is plainly wrong.
Brooke LJ reiterated that it must be borne in mind always that a motor car is a potentially lethal instrument.
Latham LJ, Brooke LJ, Hart J
[2002] EWCA Civ 801
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 1(1)
England and Wales
Cited – Liddell v Middleton CA 17-Jul-1995
A husband and wife crossed a road. The wife, appreciating that the danger from the traffic, ran across. The husband stood in the middle of the road and then went ahead, but was struck by a vehicle and injured. He was significantly affected by . .
Cited – Toropdar v D QBD 2-Oct-2009
. .
Cited – Stoddart v Perucca CA 1-Mar-2011
The claimant was injured crossing a road when approached by the defendant’s campervan. The judge had taken avccount of another driver who said that he had slowed down anticipating the emergence of a second horse and rider (the claimant), but the . .
Cited – Phethean-Hubble v Coles CA 21-Mar-2012
The claimant cyclist suffered serious injury in a collision with a car driven by the defendant. The defendant appealed against a finding that he was two thirds responsible. The case for the injured cyclist was that the motorist was going too fast. . .
Cited – Sinclair v Joyner QBD 23-Jun-2015
The claimant cyclist sought damages from the defendant motorist after a collision in which she was severely injured. They approached each other on a narrow lane. The claimant said that the defendant did not pull over as much as she should, and the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.185856
The two appellant drivers had been sent forms requiring them to identify the drivers of vehicles identified by speed cameras. They had replied providing the requested information, but the forms were unsigned. They resisted use of the forms as evidence against them.
Held: The forms could not be used as evidence against the defendants on the charges of speeding. A form otherwise complete but unsigned did not satisfy the requirements of the section.
Owen J
[2003] EWHC 1586 (Admin), Times 11-Sep-2003
Motorways Traffic (Speed Limit) Regulations 1974 (1974 No 502) 3, Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 17(4), Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 12(1)(b) Sch 2
Cited – Stott (Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline) and Another v Brown PC 5-Dec-2000
The system under which the registered keeper of a vehicle was obliged to identify herself as the driver, and such admission was to be used subsequently as evidence against her on a charge of driving with excess alcohol, was not a breach of her right . .
Cited – Hayes v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 2004
Absence of caution from form requesting information form driver. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 June 2022; Ref: scu.185640
The defendants appealed convictions for operating vehicles without tachographs. The issue arose upon the combined weight of vehicle and trailer exceeding the maximum.
Held: The legislation seems to be directed at providing maximum driving periods for heavy vehicles, including relatively light vehicles which exceed certain weights when a ‘trailer’ is added. In the case of a vehicle drawing a trailer the relevant maximum weight is the aggregate relevant maximum weight of the vehicle and trailer. Where the maximum gross weight is marked on either, the relevant maximum weight is that weight.
The Honourable Mr Justice Mccombe
[2003] EWHC 1851 (Admin)
England and Wales
Cited – Small v Director of Public Prosecutions 1995
The expressions ‘permissible maximum weight’ and ‘maximum permissible weight’ are interchangeable. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 June 2022; Ref: scu.185046
The claimant was severely injured when run down by the defendant driving his car. She was in Blackpool, and drunk and wandering in the highway. The defendant was himself at or near the drink driving limit. She appealed against a finding that she was 60% to blame.
Held: Courts have consistently required drivers to recognise that they control dangerous machinery. It would be rare for a driver not to have greater responsibilty than a pedestrian for injury. In this case the claimant would be held 40% responsible.
Lady Justice Hale said: ‘The potential ‘destructive disparity’ between the parties can readily be taken into account as an aspect of blameworthiness’ and ‘It is rare indeed for a pedestrian to be found more responsible than a driver unless the pedestrian has suddenly moved into the path of an oncoming vehicle. That is not this case. The Court has consistently imposed upon the drivers of cars a high burden to reflect the fact that the car is potentially a dangerous weapon’.
Hale LJ said that the court could not avoid comparing the two parties: ‘We also accept that this court is always reluctant to interfere with the trial judge’s judgment of what apportionment between the parties is ‘just and equitable’ under the 1945 Act. But a finding as to which, if either, of the parties was the more responsible for the damage is different from a finding as to the precise extent of a less than 50 per cent contribution. There is a qualitative difference between a finding of 60 per cent contribution and a finding of 40 per cent which is not so apparent in the quantitive difference between 40 per cent and 20 per cent. It is rare indeed for a pedestrian to be found more responsible than a driver unless the pedestrian has suddenly moved into the path of an oncoming vehicle. That is not this case. The court ‘has consistently imposed upon the drivers of cars a high burden to reflect the fact that the car is potentially a dangerous weapon’: Latham LJ in Lunt v Khelifa [2002] EWCA Civ 801.’
Ward, Waller, Hale LJJ
[2003] EWCA Civ 1107, Times 01-Sep-2003, [2004] RTR 115
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 1(1)
England and Wales
Cited – Davies v Swan Motor Co (Swansea) Ltd CA 1949
A plaintiff brought an action for damages for personal injury against the drivers of two cars.
Held: There are two aspects to apportioning responsibility between a plaintiff and defendant in an action for negligence, the respective causative . .
Cited – Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd HL 25-Jun-1953
Plaintiff to take own responsibility for damage
The question was whether the fault of the deceased’s fellow workman, they both having disobeyed their foreman’s instructions, was to be regarded as having contributed to the accident.
Held: A plaintiff must ‘share in the responsibility for the . .
Cited – Chapman v Hearse, Baker v Willoughby HL 26-Nov-1969
The plaintiff, a pedestrian had been struck by the defendant’s car while crossing the road. The plaintiff had negligently failed to see the defendant’s car approaching. The defendant had a clear view of the plaintiff prior to the collision, but was . .
Cited – Fitzgerald v Lane HL 14-Jul-1988
The plaintiff crossed road at a pelican crossing. The lights were against him but one car had stopped. As he passed that car he was struck by another in the second lane and again by a car coming the other way. The judge had held the three equally . .
Cited – Brown v Thompson CA 1968
A car driver drove into the back of a stationary lorry but was nevertheless held only 20% responsible.
Held: A court of appeal should only exceptionally interfere with a judge’s apportinment of responsibility for an accident.
Winn LJ . .
See also – Eagle (By Her Litigation Friend) v Chambers CA 29-Jul-2004
The claimant had been severely injured, and a substantial damages award made. Cross appeals were heard as to the several elements awarded. The claimant sought as part of her award of damages for personal injuries the fees she would have to pay to . .
See also – Eagle (By Her Litigation Friend) v Chambers CA 29-Jul-2004
The claimant had been severely injured, and a substantial damages award made. Cross appeals were heard as to the several elements awarded. The claimant sought as part of her award of damages for personal injuries the fees she would have to pay to . .
Cited – Bailey v Warre CA 7-Feb-2006
The claimant had been severely injured in a road traffic accident. His claim was compromised and embodied in a court order, but later a question was raised as to whether he had had mental capacity at the time to make the compromise he had.
Cited – Phethean-Hubble v Coles CA 21-Mar-2012
The claimant cyclist suffered serious injury in a collision with a car driven by the defendant. The defendant appealed against a finding that he was two thirds responsible. The case for the injured cyclist was that the motorist was going too fast. . .
Adopted – Rehill v Rider Holdings Ltd CA 16-May-2012
The claimant had been injured, being hit by the defendant’s bus. . .
Cited – Ayres v Odedra QBD 18-Jan-2013
The claimant sought damages for serious personal injury, saying that the defendant had deliberately or recklessly driven at him as a pedestrian, knocking him over. The defendant had been tried and acquitted of motoring offences. He said that the . .
Cited – Jackson v Murray and Another SC 18-Feb-2015
Child not entirely free of responsibility
The claimant child, left a school bus and stepped out from behind it into the path of the respondent’s car. She appealed against a finding of 70% contributory negligence.
Held: Her appeal succeeded (Majority, Lord Hodge and Lord Wilson . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 June 2022; Ref: scu.184900
ECJ Failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations – Directive 91/439/CEE. The directive required member states to introduce a system to recognise community driving licences. The Netherlands had instituted a system which made difficult the continued use of a community licence.
Held: The system set down in Netherlands conflicted with the directive in several ways.
C-246/00, [2003] EUECJ C-246/00, [2003] ECR I-7485
Cited – Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos (Judgment) ECJ 29-Feb-1996
Any formalities required in order to have a driving licence issued in one Member State recognised in another Member State constitute an obstacle to the free movement of persons, and are in breach of the Treaty.
Commission v Spain ECJ 9-Sep-2004
The commission complained at the system introduced by the member that any driver taking up residence in Spain had to register his driving licence or lose the ability to use it as authority to drive.
Held: The system was contrary to the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 June 2022; Ref: scu.184687
[2003] EWHC 63 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 07 June 2022; Ref: scu.184631
Lord Justice Laws Lord Justice Schiemann Lord Justice Sedley
[2003] EWCA Civ 730
England and Wales
Updated: 07 June 2022; Ref: scu.183073
The House was asked whether a specimen of blood required under the regulations, having been requested at a hospital or health centre had to be taken there.
Held: The health centre was not a hospital within the regulations. However the request had already been made at a police station, which request had not been superseded.
Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hutton, Lord Millett
[2003] UKHL 24, [2003] NI 224, [2003] 1 WLR 1187, [2003] 2 Cr App R 26
Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (SI 1995/2994)
Northern Ireland
Cited – Butler v Easton QBD 1970
The initial formalities of a request for a specimen of blood from a driver took place at one police station, but no doctor was available there and the suspect was taken to another police station where a specimen was given. He challenged his . .
Cited – Milne v M’Donald HCJ 1971
The court was asked whether a blood specimen having been requested at one police station, it could be taken at another.
Held: The requirement to provide a specimen for a laboratory test is something different from the actual providing of the . .
Cited – Pascoe v Nicholson HL 1981
A specimen of blood was required at one police station but provided at another.
Held: The request was validly made. . .
Cited – Fox v Chief Constable of Gwent HL 1986
The driver left an accident. The police entered his home unlawfully, and on his refusal to supply a breath test, he was arrested and charged with faiing to supply.
Held: A lawful arrest is not an essential requirement before a breath test, and . .
Confirmed – Howard v Hallett QBD 1984
The police adduced in evidence against the defendant the analysis of a specimen of breath which was not the specimen required under the Act.
Held: The evidence of the analysis of the specimen relied on by the police was inadmissible in . .
Cited – Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1999) (Lynn) HL 15-Dec-2000
A DNA sample had been wrongfully retained after the suspect had been acquitted, and the sample had been used in a later investigation to identify him. A subsequent sample had been taken, and the result of that second test had been used as evidence . .
Cited – Murray v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 4-Feb-1993
The defendant claimed that a breathalyser procedure mistake vitiated the subsequent prosecution.
Held: It was essential that the motorist who was asked to provide a sample of breath be first warned that a failure to provide a specimen would . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 June 2022; Ref: scu.181924
The claimant had claimed aganst the driver, but gave notice of the intention to make a claim on his insurance by telephone only. The insurers repudiated liability.
Held: Whilst solicitors would be strongly advised to give such notice in writing, an oral notice given to a proper officer of the insurer could be sufficient. In this case oral notice to a legal secretary was sufficient.
Woolf LCJ, Kennedy, Scott Baker LJJ
Times 11-Mar-2003, [2003] EWCA Civ 316
England and Wales
Cited – Wake v Page and Another CA 9-Feb-2001
Insurers were quite entitled to insist upon service of the statutory seven day notice of an intention to sue. In the absence of a notice very were not liable even though they were fully aware of the possibility of action. However regrettable it was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 June 2022; Ref: scu.180112
The defendant challenged the application of the section, under which he was deemed to have intended to drive a vehicle whilst under the influence of alcohol, unless he could prove it was not his intent to drive, saying this infringed his right to a fair trial.
Held: The section must be read down to comply with the Convention. The burden to be placed on a defendant was the evidential burden only, and not the legal burden. Once he raised the issue, and pointed to some evidence that there was no likelihood of his driving, the burden of proving there was some real risk of him driving must fall on the prosecution. It was not necessary to impose the legal burden of proof on the defendant.
Lord Justice Clarke Mr Justice Henriques Mr Justice Jack
Times 25-Feb-2003, [2003] EWHC 273 (Admin), Gazette 03-Apr-2003, [2004] QB 487
European Convention on Human Rights 6.2, Road Traffic Act 1988 5(8)
Cited – Attorney General’s Reference No 4 of 2002 CACD 21-Mar-2003
The defendant had been tried for an offence under the Act of being a member of a proscribed organisation, and professing membership of Hamas. At trial the Crown accepted an evidential burden, that the offence had to be read down to comply with the . .
Appeal from – Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions; Attorney General’s Reference No 4 of 2002 HL 14-Oct-2004
Appeals were brought complaining as to the apparent reversal of the burden of proof in road traffic cases and in cases under the Terrorism Acts. Was a legal or an evidential burden placed on a defendant?
Held: Lord Bingham of Cornhill said: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 June 2022; Ref: scu.179573
The claimant appealed dismissal of his claim for damages. The defendant car driver had knocked him from his cycle. The only evidence of negligence was that the car driver was driving in excess of the speed limit.
Held: The former rule that breaches of traffic regulations were not ipso facto to be considered as evidence of negligence should not be followed. However, even though the car driver contributed, the cyclist claimant remained 80% responsible in this case.
Kennedy, Mantell, Mance, LJJ
Times 07-Feb-2003, [2003] EWCA Civ 177
England and Wales
Updated: 07 June 2022; Ref: scu.178998
The appellant challenged the fact that the details of his conviction for driving with excess alcohol had not been removed from his driving licence despite it being a spent conviction under the 1974 Act. The result was that he had been unable to find work as a driver.
Held: The retention of the records was not a breach of the applicant’s human right to privacy. The article was not engaged, although he might have considered an action for breach of statutory duty.
The claimant objected to having to effectively disclose a road traffic conviction to a new employer where though it would be spent under the 1974 Act, the 1988 Act required details of it to remain on his driving licence.
Held: Article 8 was not engaged. Maurice Kay J spoke of the 1974 Act: ‘The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act confers certain privileges . . It does not attempt to go beyond the grant of those limited privileges to provide a right of confidentiality in respect of spent convictions. While the 1974 Act in some respects may place an individual with spent convictions in the same position as someone with no convictions, it does not do so by rendering the convictions confidential; it does so simply by putting in place a regime which protects an individual from being prejudiced by the existence of such convictions. For these reasons I reject the submission that the 1974 Act renders the appellant’s convictions confidential.’
Maurice Kay J
Times 18-Nov-2002, [2002] EWHC 2482 (Admin)
Road Traffic Act 1988 44(1) 45(7), European Convention on Human Rights Art 8, Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, Road Traffic Offenders Act 1974 45(7), European Convention on Human Rights 8
England and Wales
Cited – NT 1 and NT 2 v Google Llc QBD 13-Apr-2018
Right to be Forgotten is not absolute
The two claimants separately had criminal convictions from years before. They objected to the defendant indexing third party web pages which included personal data in the form of information about those convictions, which were now spent. The claims . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 06 June 2022; Ref: scu.178196
[2002] EWHC 2297 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 06 June 2022; Ref: scu.178025
Collins J
[2004] EWHC 2432 (Admin)
England and Wales
Cited – Regina v Ferguson CACD 1970
The defendant was accused of failing to give a sample of breath for testing for alcohol. The defence was that there had been no failure because the appellant had reasonably asked that he should be able to consult with a doctor and a solicitor. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 06 June 2022; Ref: scu.219220
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He complained that the machine used to take his sample of breath did not conform to the necessary type. It had been manufactured by an independent company. Though not approved it was identical to the approved machine. He was convicted on the basis that approval was of a type of a machine, not of a machine.
Lord Cameron of Lochbroom and Lord Hamilton and Lord Morison
[2002] ScotHC 25
Scotland
Cited – Chief Constable of Northumbria v Brown 1986
The defendant had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol. He challenged the use of a machine for the breath test which was not an Intoximeter.
Held: The charge was valid. . .
Cited – Grant v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 22-Jan-2003
The appellant had been convicted of failing to give a breath test, and of driving with excess alcohol. He had falsely claimed that he had had a drink in the five minutes before being asked to take the test, and said the officer should not have . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 06 June 2022; Ref: scu.170500
[2004] EWCA Civ 802
England and Wales
Cited – Froom v Butcher CA 21-Jul-1975
The court asked what reduction if any should be made to a plaintiff’s damages where injuries were caused not only by the defendant’s negligent driving but also by the failure of the plaintiff to wear a seat belt. It had been submitted that, since . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 05 June 2022; Ref: scu.198507
The defendant was stopped pushing a motor-cycle along the road. It had been adapted for scrambling, and the registration plates lights and speedometer had been removed. He argued that it was no longer a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on a public road’. The prosecutor appealed against the magistrates finding that they had not proved that it was indeed such a vehicle.
Held: The appeal failed. The test was as set out in Burns v Currell.
Glidewell LJ added: ”I emphasise that that test is what would be the view of the reasonable man as to the general user of this particular vehicle; not what was the particular user to which this particular defendant put it, either at the time in question, or indeed, generally. In other words, if a reasonable man were to say: ‘Yes, this vehicle might well be used on the road’, then, applying the test, the vehicles is intended or adapted for such use. If that be the case, it is nothing to the point if the individual defendant says: ‘I normally use it for scrambling and I am only pushing it along the road on this occasion because I have no other means of getting it home’, or something of that sort.’
It was held in that case that the Justices were entitled to hold that, the onus of proof being on the prosecution to prove that the vehicle was a motor vehicle, they could not be satisfied that it was within the definition of a motor vehicle. The comparison of the facts in F with those in the present case would not be helpful. The Burns test, which has been applied for approaching forty years, should not readily be departed from.
For the respondent, Mr Reed stresses the limitations of the Go-ped. It has no efficient braking system, no pneumatic tyres, no clutch, lights or mirrors and has inadequate steering. It needs to be push started. It would not be accepted by the Department of Transport for registration, he submits, or for use on the roads under the Construction and Use Regulations. Mr Reed accepts that the intention of the manufacturer or seller is not conclusive but submits that general use on the roads cannot be contemplated as one of the uses of the Go-ped.
Miss Kelly, whilst also submitting that the Go-ped does not comply with the Construction and Use Regulations, was less inclined to belittle the attributes of the Go-ped. It is ironic that it is the defendant who is seeking to show how unsuitable, and indeed dangerous, the Go-ped is for use on the road in order to contest the charge that riding it on the road was unlawful. Miss Kelly submits that the scooter should be brought within the definition of motor vehicle so that its use can be regulated but has to accept that Lord Parker’s test does not directly depend on the degree of danger presented by the vehicle. I do not accept the Justices’ apparent view that the roadworthiness of a conveyance, which I understand to means its capability to be used safely on roads, is decisive on the question whether its use on the road must be contemplated.
Both parties have underlined the importance of the point at issue because of the large number of scooters of this kind in circulation. Many of them, we were told, are more sophisticated than this Go-ped in terms of the control systems provided.
This is not a case where some place other than a road is the obvious place of use. The Go-ped could not negotiate rough ground or soft or uneven surfaces. It is not a case where the vehicle is designed for use in a place other than a road, such as a dumper truck used for road construction work (MacDonald v Carmichael [1941] JC 27). Another example would be a motor cycle designed for use on a speedway track. Lord Parker’s test cannot, however, in my view be applied merely by a process of elimination; it cannot be said that because there is no place other than a hard, flat surface on which a Go-ped can be used, it must be intended for use on a road. It is in any event contended that the Go-ped can be used as a toy on hard surfaces on private land and for Go-ped competitions on such land.
We are told by Mr Reed and Miss Kelly that considerable numbers of scooters of this and similar design are in circulation. I would take judicial notice of that and would expect justices to do the same. The temptation to use Go-peds on the roads is considerable, notwithstanding their limitations. They provide a ready means of getting through traffic on short journeys on busy urban roads and, for that matter, on less busy suburban roads.
The test is not whether a reasonable person would use a Go-ped on a road, which in ordinary circumstances he probably would not because of the dangers involved. The test is whether a reasonable person would say that one of its uses would be use on the roads. That person must consider whether some general use on the roads must be contemplated and not merely isolated use or use by a man losing his senses. The design and capabilities of the Go-ped and the possibilities it offers will be considered and considered in the context of an assessment of people’s wish to get quickly through traffic and the pressure of time upon many people.
In my judgment the conclusion must be that general use on the roads is to be contemplated. The distributors’ advice not to use the Go-ped on the roads will in practice be ignored to a considerable extent. Surrender to the temptation to use it on the roads will not be an isolated occurrence even though the vehicle may not be roadworthy in the sense used by the Justices.’
Glidewell LJ
[1987] 1 All ER 318, [1987] RTR 378
England and Wales
Applied – Burns v Currell 1963
The defendant was accused of offences related to the driving on a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle, a Go-Kart.
Held: In fact it was not a motor vehicle within the statutory definition. The Court set out the test to be applied in . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Saddington; Chief Constable of the North Yorkshire Police v Michael Saddington Admn 1-Nov-2000
A motorised scooter of the type known as a ‘Go-Ped’ was a motor vehicle within the Act. Accordingly a driving licence and third party insurance were both required for its use on a public highway. The scooter required the passenger to stand on a . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v King Admn 13-Feb-2008
The defendant was charged after driving a ‘City Mantis Electric Scooter’. He was disqualified from driving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of the charges on the basis that the scooter was not of such a description as to require a licence . .
Cited – Coates, Regina v Misc 18-Jan-2011
(Barnsley Magistrates Court) The defendant owned a Segway, a two wheeled vehicle. He was charged with having driven it on a public footpath despite its being a motor vehicle. He denied that it was a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on the . .
Cited – Coates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 05 June 2022; Ref: scu.431822
A transport examiner investigating compliance with the drivers hours regulations was allowed to remove records from an office for examination, and a company refusing him to be allowed to do that committed an offence. Where removal was necessary, whether because of the number of documents or the absence of adequate copying facilities, an examiner must be allowed to remove papers. The provision allowing the inspector to give ten days notice did not exclude the possibility of allowing less notice.
Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Steyn, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Hutton and Lord Scott of Foscote
Times 28-Nov-2001, Gazette 24-Jan-2002, [2001] UKHL 60, [2002] RTR 8, [2001] 1 WLR 2288, [2002] 1 All ER 595, (2002) 166 JPN 550, (2002) 166 JP 423
Transport Act 1968 99 (1)(bb), Passenger and Goods Vehicles (Recording Equipment) Regulations 1979 (SI 1979 No 1746), Community Drivers’ Hours and Recording Equipment Regulations 1986 (SI 1986 No 1457)
England and Wales
Appeal from – Cantabrica Coach Holdings Ltd v Vehicle Inspectorate Admn 31-Mar-2000
Even though no underlying offence was suspected, the owner of tachograph records was required to hand them over to the inspector for inspection off the premises if necessary. An offer to allow inspection, but only at the record keeper’s offices was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 04 June 2022; Ref: scu.166875
[2001] NIECA 26
Northern Ireland
Updated: 04 June 2022; Ref: scu.166311
The defendant sought leave to appeal against a sentence of three and a half years for offences of escaping lawful custody, dangerous driving and driving whilst disqualified. The sentence included consecutive and concurrent sentences. After being sentence for one offence, he feigned disability, and escaped. He was later caught after serious dangerous drunk driving. Concurrent sentences should normally be used in road traffic sentencing where the offences are on one occasion. The sentence of 21 months on a guilty plea for dangerous driving was excessive, and 18 moths was substituted. The overall total was reduced to three years by also reducing the sentence for escaping custody to nine months.
[2001] NIECA 30
Updated: 04 June 2022; Ref: scu.166315
ECHR The victim of a motor accident was able to identify the offending car, or even whether the driver was male or female. The car was owned by the applicant’s mother, and he denied driving at the time. There was no evidence that he had been driving beyond unsupported police observations that the car was mainly driven by the applicant. His conviction at trial was upheld on appeal.
Held: The Court had to ascertain that the proceedings as a whole were fair. In a criminal trial that included observance of the presumption of innocence. A court should not start with the preconceived idea that the accused had committed the offence charged. The burden of proof was on the prosecution and any doubt should benefit the accused. The presumption of innocence is infringed where the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defence. The case was not one in which adverse inferences could properly be drawn from the silence of the accused.
[2001] ECHR 225, 33501/96, [2001] ECHR 228
Cited – Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions; Attorney General’s Reference No 4 of 2002 HL 14-Oct-2004
Appeals were brought complaining as to the apparent reversal of the burden of proof in road traffic cases and in cases under the Terrorism Acts. Was a legal or an evidential burden placed on a defendant?
Held: Lord Bingham of Cornhill said: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 04 June 2022; Ref: scu.166062
[2001] ScotHC 38
Scotland
Updated: 04 June 2022; Ref: scu.164700
ECJ Failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations – Failure to transpose Directive 97/24/EC – Components and characteristics of two or three-wheel motor vehicles.
C-83/00, [2001] EUECJ C-83/00
Updated: 04 June 2022; Ref: scu.162712
ECJ Compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of motor vehicles – Directives 84/5/EEC and 90/232/EEC – Minimum amounts of cover – Type of civil liability – Injury caused to a member of the family of the insured person or driver.
C-348/98, [2000] EUECJ C-348/98, [2000] ECR 1-6711
European
Cited – Knight v Axa Assurances QBD 24-Jul-2009
The claimant was injured in a car accident in France. The defendant insurer said that the quantification of damages was to be according to French law and the calculation of interest also. The claimant said that English law applied.
Held: The . .
Cited – Churchill Insurance Company Ltd v Wilkinson and Others CA 19-May-2010
The various insured defendants had been driven in the insured vehicles by a non-insured driver. Suffering injury at the negligence of the driver, they recovered variously damages. Their insurance companies sought recovery of the sums paid from their . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 04 June 2022; Ref: scu.162492
ECJ (Judgment) Directive 93/89/EEC – Carriage of goods by road – Vehicle tax – User charges for the use of certain roads – Heavy goods vehicles
P.J.G. Kapteyn (Rapporteur), acting as President
C-193/98, [1999] EUECJ C-193/98
Updated: 04 June 2022; Ref: scu.162400
ECJ Judgment – Directive 69/335/EEC – Regional charge on vehicle registration certificates
C-8/96, [1997] EUECJ C-8/96
Updated: 03 June 2022; Ref: scu.161759
Compulsory motor vehicle insurance – Directives 84/5/EEC and 90/232/EEC – Rules on civil liability – Passenger’s contribution to the loss or injury – Refusal or limitation of the right to compensation.
The drunken owner of a car allowed an uninsured but also drunken friend to drive it. The insurer sought to escape payment for his injuries.
Held: ‘The owner of the car who was travelling in the car as a passenger cannot therefore be treated more severely than the other passengers on the ground that he permitted his car to be driven by someone who was acting under the influence of alcohol.’
C-537/03, [2005] EUECJ C-537/03
European
Cited – Churchill Insurance Company Ltd v Wilkinson and Others CA 19-May-2010
The various insured defendants had been driven in the insured vehicles by a non-insured driver. Suffering injury at the negligence of the driver, they recovered variously damages. Their insurance companies sought recovery of the sums paid from their . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 03 June 2022; Ref: scu.228055
(Judgment) 1 Approximation of laws – Motor vehicles – Procedure for Community type-approval – Directive 70/156 – Right of the Member States to refuse to register vehicles with a valid Community type-approval certificate – Conditions – National rules subjecting the registration of motor vehicles to the production of a national certificate declaring that they comply with national exhaust emission rules – Not permissible (Council Directive 70/156, Art. 7(1) and (3))
2 Community law – Interpretation – Acts of the institutions – Declaration recorded in minutes – Whether to be taken into consideration – Not permissible where no reference is made to the declaration in the act itself
3 Directive 70/156 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the type-approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, as amended by Directive 92/53, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which motor vehicles covered by a valid Community type-approval certificate cannot be registered unless a national certificate is produced attesting to their conformity with national requirements concerning exhaust emissions.
It is clear from Article 7(1) and (3) of the directive that a Member State may refuse to register a vehicle with a valid Community type-approval certificate only if it finds that the vehicle is a serious risk to road safety. Refusal to register under the national rules on the basis of considerations of environmental protection does not satisfy the conditions governing the derogation provided for by that provision.
4 A declaration recorded in minutes is of limited value, since it cannot be used for the purposes of interpreting a provision of Community law where no reference is made to the content of the declaration in the wording of the provision in question and the declaration therefore has no legal significance.
C-329/95, [1997] EUECJ C-329/95
European
Updated: 03 June 2022; Ref: scu.161702
The appellant appealed by case stated against his conviction by the Haringey Justices or an offence of driving a motor vehicle, having consumed excess alcohol contrary to section 5(1)(a) of the 1988 Act. He said that no direct evidence had been given that he had been driving.
Held: The appeal succeeded: ‘The question is, therefore, whether the fact of the arrest on suspicion of driving proved to the requisite standard that he had been driving. That question has to be answered in the negative given the specific finding by the justices that the arrest was on suspicion of driving. Suspicion that the appellant was driving does not amount to evidence proving that he was. There was no other evidence to the effect that he was driving.’
Owen J
[2004] EWHC 870 (Admin)
England and Wales
Updated: 03 June 2022; Ref: scu.196102
ECJ (Judgment) Article 12 of Regulation No 3820/85 on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport, in the light of its wording and context, does not authorize a driver to derogate from the provisions relating to driving and rest periods in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of the regulation for reasons known before the journey commenced.
It is clear from Article 12 that a decision, taken in order to ensure the safety of persons, of the vehicle and of its load, to extend a driving period beyond that normally authorized under the regulation must be for the driver alone, must be taken when it unexpectedly becomes impossible for him to comply with the driving and rest periods laid down and must take into account the immediate requirements of road safety. Article 15(1), moreover, by requiring transport undertakings to organize work in such a way that drivers are able to comply with the regulation, precludes an undertaking from planning a derogation before the driver leaves.
C-235/94, [1995] EUECJ C-235/94
European
Updated: 03 June 2022; Ref: scu.161415
Europa In the preliminary-ruling procedure under Article 177 of the Treaty, it is for the national courts alone, before which the proceedings are pending and which must assume responsibility for the judgment to be given, to determine, having regard to the particular features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling to enable them to give judgment and the relevance of the questions which they refer to the Court. A request for a preliminary ruling from a national court may be rejected only if it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual nature of the case or the subject-matter of the main action.
Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, is to be interpreted as meaning that, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 2(1) of Directive 84/5 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, a compulsory insurance contract may not provide that in certain cases, in particular where the driver of the vehicle was intoxicated, the insurer is not obliged to pay compensation for the damage to property and personal injuries caused to third parties by the insured vehicle.
In view of the aim of ensuring protection, stated repeatedly in all the relevant directives, Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166, as developed and supplemented by the later directives, must be interpreted as meaning that compulsory motor insurance must enable third-party victims of accidents caused by vehicles to be compensated for all the damage to property and personal injuries sustained by them, without the insurer being able to rely on statutory provisions or contractual clauses to refuse such compensation. Any other interpretation would deprive that provision of its effectiveness, since it would have the effect of allowing Member States to limit payment of compensation to third-party victims of a road-traffic accident to certain types of damage, thus bringing about disparities in the treatment of victims depending on where the accident occurred, which is precisely what the directives are intended to avoid.
The compulsory insurance contract may, on the other hand, provide that in such cases the insurer is to have a right of recovery against the insured.
Times 06-May-1996, C-129/94, [1996] EUECJ C-129/94, [1996] I ECR 1829
Cited – Knight v Axa Assurances QBD 24-Jul-2009
The claimant was injured in a car accident in France. The defendant insurer said that the quantification of damages was to be according to French law and the calculation of interest also. The claimant said that English law applied.
Held: The . .
Cited – Churchill Insurance Company Ltd v Wilkinson and Others CA 19-May-2010
The various insured defendants had been driven in the insured vehicles by a non-insured driver. Suffering injury at the negligence of the driver, they recovered variously damages. Their insurance companies sought recovery of the sums paid from their . .
Cited – Bristol Alliance Ltd v Williams and Another QBD 1-Jul-2011
The driver had crashed into the insured’s building causing substantial damage. The court was asked which of the driver’s and building’s insurers should bear the costs. The driver’s insurers said that he had acted deliberately and therefore they were . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 03 June 2022; Ref: scu.161349
Appeal against parking ticket – disabled badge. The appellant had sought to use the badge in a resident’s parking bay. The Council said that it did not give exemption for that purpose.
Held: There was no requirement that the panel should include someone with medical qualifications. The issue of the claimant’s disability was not at issue or in doubt. Also the regulation under which the relevant scheme was in place struck: ‘a proper balance between all citizens, including conferring upon the disabled exemptions which other citizens do not have. It cannot be made possible for any citizen to park exactly where they wish and local authorities have difficult discretions to exercise as to where to draw the line in individual circumstances.’
McCombe J
[2004] EWHC 1839 (Admin)
Road Traffic Regulation Act of 1984
England and Wales
Updated: 03 June 2022; Ref: scu.199839
Europa The derogation from the requirement to install and use a tachograph in vehicles registered in a Member State which are used for the carriage of passengers or goods by road, laid down for vehicles used in connection with the gas service under Article 3(1) of Regulation No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport in conjunction with Article 4(6) of Regulation No 3820/85 on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport, applies solely to vehicles used, at the relevant time, for carriage wholly and exclusively in connection with the production, transport or distribution of gas, or the maintenance of the necessary installations for that purpose. However, that derogation does not apply to vehicles wholly or partly used at the relevant time in connection with the carriage of domestic gas appliances.
‘In that respect it is apparent from the list in Article 4(6) that the services envisaged by that provision are all general services performed in the public interest.’ and ‘The derogation from the requirement to install and use a tachograph . . . applies solely to vehicles used, at the relevant time, for carriage wholly and exclusively in connection with the production, transport or distribution of gas, or the maintenance of the necessary installations for that purpose. However, that derogation does not apply to vehicles wholly or partly used at the relevant time in connection with the carriage of domestic gas appliances.’
C-116/91, [1992] ECR I-4071, [1992] EUECJ C-116/91
Cited – Vehicle Inspectorate v Bruce Cook Road Planing Ltd and Another HL 8-Jul-1999
The transport of motorway maintenance vehicles and plant to and from sites on the back of a low loader is not sufficiently closely connected with the use of such machines on the motorways, to attract exemption as for such use from the general . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 June 2022; Ref: scu.160695
When requesting a drink driver suspect to give a specimen of blood, an officer’s failure to say that the specimen will be taken by a doctor was not fatal to the prosecution. The issue of whether the blood sample was to be taken had properly been described by the officer as a decision for the doctor to make. ‘But what is necessary is that the driver should be aware (whether or not he is told by the police officer) of the role of the doctor so that he does not suffer prejudice. Therefore, if the driver appreciates that a specimen of blood will be taken by a doctor and not by a police officer, the charge should not be dismissed by the justices because the police officer failed to tell the driver that the specimen would be taken by a doctor.’ and ‘the driver should be told of the role of the doctor at the outset before he has to make the decision to give blood. If the driver is not told at the outset of the role of the doctor it will be for the justices to decide whether that omission prejudiced the driver and deprived him of the opportunity to make an informed decision’. The omission of the warning required by section 7(7) ‘in a section 7(3) case’ should lead to an acquittal.
Lord Hutton
Gazette 03-Sep-1998, Times 30-Jul-1998, [1998] UKHL 31, [1999] 1 AC 406, [1998] 3 All ER 769, [1998] 3 WLR 514
England and Wales
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Warren HL 9-Dec-1992
It was a Police Constable’s responsibility to decide whether a blood or urine specimen was to be taken. He needn’t offer the urine option: ‘it is clear that under section 8(2) the driver, in order that he may decide whether or not to claim that the . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Orchard Admn 17-Oct-2000
The prosecution appealed a finding of no case to answer against a defendant accused of driving with excess alcohol. On being offered a choice of blood or urine test, he had asked ‘What is the quickest way out of here’ which the officer recorded as . .
Cited – Wright v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 25-May-2005
The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He complained that the device used to measure his breath at the police station, the EC/IR intoximeter, was not an approved device. The court had refused to accept evidence to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 31 May 2022; Ref: scu.158962
A driver was arrested for driving with excess alcohol. At the police station, he was to be tested with the Lion Intoximeter. The officer tested the machine and it calibrated correctly. This was at about a quarter after midnight; the sergeant’s watch said 00.13 am, but the time display on the machine read 23:00. Part of the discrepancy was explained by the fact that, as the print-out made plain, the machine was set to GMT. But there was no explanation for the balance of the difference.
Held: The failure of an internal computer clock was not a sufficient indication of a computer malfunction to make a reading from a breath analyzing machine inadmissible in evidence. The rule in section 16 is a specialist exception to the rule against admission of hearsay.
Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Mustill, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Clyde
Times 21-Feb-1997, [1997] UKHL 4, [1997] 1 All ER 737, [1997] 1 WLR 295, [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 155, [1997] Crim LR 522
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 69, Road Traffic Act 1988 7(1), Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 16, Magistrats’ Court Act 1980 97(1)
England and Wales
Cited – Castle v Cross 1984
First-hand evidence, in this case, a print-out from a device, of what is displayed or recorded on a mechanical measuring device is real evidence admissible at common law.
‘In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the courts will presume that . .
Cited – Regina v Skegness Magistrates’ Court ex parte Cardy 1985
Representations that the Intoximeter or other device used for measuring breath alcohol, should not have been approved or that the Secretary of State should have withdrawn approval in respect of the device should be addressed to the Secretary of . .
Cited – Haw, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Another CA 8-May-2006
The applicant had demonstrated continuously against the war in Iraq from the pavement outside the House of Commons. The respondent sought an order for his removal under the law preventing demonstrations near Parliament without consent which was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 31 May 2022; Ref: scu.158880
The court considered liability where a police car on emergency duty hit Mr Scutts causing very serious injuries. The officer appealed against a finding of liability saying that the judge had declared irrelevant the fact he was on an emergency response.
Held: The officer’s appeal was allowed: ‘even in an emergency, a driver is required to drive reasonably carefully in all the circumstances. One significant feature of such cases where the vehicle in question is deployed by one of the emergency services, is that the driver is normally entitled to assume that other road users will not ignore the unmistakable evidence of its approach, and where appropriate, temporarily at any rate, will use the road accordingly. Pedestrians can usually be expected to follow the relevant advice in the Highway Code . . although drivers should allow for the unexpected when they are at the wheel of a car, it would inhibit the valuable work done for the community as a whole, if drivers in the emergency services were not allowed to drive their vehicles on the basis that pedestrians would recognise their warning lights and sirens and give them proper priority by keeping out of their paths.’
Judge LJ, Latham LJ, Lloyd LJ
[2001] EWCA Civ 715
England and Wales
Cited – Marshall v Osmond CA 1983
The plaintiff was passenger in a stolen car seeking to escape the police as they chased. The car was stopped, the plaintiff got out of the car, and was hit by a police car. He sought damages.
Held: His appeal against dismissal of his claim was . .
Outdated – Gaynor v Allen 1959
McNair J considered that when looking at the driving of a police officer, the standard remained that of the experienced skilled and careful driver. McNair considered a submission: ‘that if the motor-cyclist had been a civilian he would undoubtedly . .
Cited – Armsden v Kent Police CA 26-Jun-2009
The claimants sought damages as personal representatives after the deceased died when her car was hit by a police car responding to an emergency call. The defendant appealed a finding of negligence.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The judge had . .
Cited – An Informer v A Chief Constable CA 29-Feb-2012
The claimant appealed against dismissal of his claim for damages against the police. He had provided them with information, but he said that they had acted negligently and in breach of contract causing him financial loss. The officer handling his . .
Cited – Smith v Nottinghamshire Police CA 23-Feb-2012
The claimant had been very severely injured when hit by a police car on an emergency call. She appealed against a finding that she was 75% to blame. The defendant argued that he was not liable at all.
Held:
Ward LJ discussed the Keyse . .
Cited – Macleod (By His Deputy and Litigation Friend, Macleod) v Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis QBD 3-Apr-2014
The claimant sought damages after being severely injured when knocked from his cycle by police officers in a car attending an emergency, and driving over the speed limit.
Held: The claim succeeded, and there had been no contributory negligence . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 31 May 2022; Ref: scu.147553
[2001] EWCA Civ 623
England and Wales
Updated: 31 May 2022; Ref: scu.147529
Where the issue was whether a temporary worker was to be deemed to be an employee (in this case for licensing purposes) of the main contractor, the proper test was the degree of control exercised by the deemed employer. The purpose of the section was to ensure that responsibility for the operation of a vehicle was known. This was a context of tort, rather than of contract.
Times 22-Mar-2001, Gazette 17-May-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 360
Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995
England and Wales
Updated: 31 May 2022; Ref: scu.147469
The claimant sought to recover damages following a road accident. The driver’s insurance was defective. The driver claimed under section 151, but proceedings were issued without formal notice of the issue of proceedings having been given to MIB. The claim proceeded for some time before objection was made.
Held: There was a clear distinction between notice of a claim, and a notice of proceedings. The notice need not be in any particular form, but must be an unconditional clear notice of the intention to commence formal proceedings. No sufficient notice had been given. The claimant alleged an estoppel against the defendant. The section is not a statutory defence, it is a condition precedent to liability, and accordingly no estoppel could arise.
Lord Justice Kennedy, Lord Justice Laws, And Lord Justice Rix
[2000] EWCA Civ 349
Road Traffic Act 1988 152(1)(a)
England and Wales
Cited – Herbert v Railway Passenger Assurance Company 1938
. .
Cited – Weldrick v Essex and Suffolk Equitable Insurance Society Ltd QBD 1950
Nine months before the writ was issued to make a claim against the insured under a motor policy, the plaintiff’s solicitors had written to the insurers: ‘We understand your Society has repudiated liability, and we shall be grateful to have your . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 31 May 2022; Ref: scu.147382
[2001] EWCA Civ 32, [2001] EWCA Civ 1211
England and Wales
Appeal from – White v White and The Motor Insurers Bureau HL 1-Mar-2001
The requirements as to the extent of knowledge in the mind of a passenger sufficient to defeat a claim against the Motor Insurers Bureau, of the driver’s lack of insurance, was actual knowledge. The rules implemented a European Directive which . .
See Also – Mighell v Reading and Another and Evans v Motor Insurers Bureau and White v White and Another CA 30-Sep-1998
Passengers were injured in motor vehicles. The drivers were uninsured, and the MIB had declined to make payment. The doctrine of direct effect did not apply where the allegation was that the Motor Insurers Bureau arrangement did not comply with a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 31 May 2022; Ref: scu.147396