The defendant was charged after driving a ‘City Mantis Electric Scooter’. He was disqualified from driving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of the charges on the basis that the scooter was not of such a description as to require a licence or insurance.
Held: If the case was remitted, and the magistrates properly directed they would be impelled to find the scooter to be a vehicle within section 185.

Maurice Kay LJ, Walker J
[2008] EWHC 447 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 185
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Saddington; Chief Constable of the North Yorkshire Police v Michael Saddington Admn 1-Nov-2000
A motorised scooter of the type known as a ‘Go-Ped’ was a motor vehicle within the Act. Accordingly a driving licence and third party insurance were both required for its use on a public highway. The scooter required the passenger to stand on a . .
Cited – Burns v Currell 1963
The defendant was accused of offences related to the driving on a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle, a Go-Kart.
Held: In fact it was not a motor vehicle within the statutory definition. The Court set out the test to be applied in . .
Cited – Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Fleming QBD 1987
The defendant was stopped pushing a motor-cycle along the road. It had been adapted for scrambling, and the registration plates lights and speedometer had been removed. He argued that it was no longer a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on . .

Cited by:
Cited – Coates, Regina v Misc 18-Jan-2011
(Barnsley Magistrates Court) The defendant owned a Segway, a two wheeled vehicle. He was charged with having driven it on a public footpath despite its being a motor vehicle. He denied that it was a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on the . .
Cited – Coates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 13 December 2021; Ref: scu.266224

The defendant appealed, by case stated, against his conviction of failing to stay to the left of a continuous white line. An intermittent white line had been placed between the two continuous white lines. The magistrates convicted saying that the meaning had been clear.
Held: The road marking was not a sign prescribed by regulation, and the conviction was quashed. Unless the marking complies with the regulations it is not an offence to disobey it.

[1971] Crim LR 244, [1971] RTR 145
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Power v Davidson 1964
The appellant appealed his conviction for parking between a line of parking studs and a crossing. The studs were on a street running across the street where the crossing was set out and at right angles to the actual crossing.
Held: The . .
Applied – James v Cavey QBD 1967
The council introduced regulations restricting parking at a site on alternate weeks between certain hours. The ‘no parking’ signes were covered over with an unrestricted parking sign when parking was permitted. The defendant parked and left his car . .

Cited by:
Applied – Moss, Regina (on The Application of) v KPMG Llp Admn 14-Oct-2010
The claimant objected to accounts drawn by the defendant auditors for Bolton Council, saying that they had wrongfully included sums from parking fines which had (he said) been unlawfully claimed by the Council. He contended that because parking . .
Not Followed – Herron and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v The Parking Adjudicator CA 27-Jul-2011
The claimant appealed against refusal of judicial review of decisions of the parking adjudicator as to the correctness of 39 penalty charge notices. In each case, they said that the signage supporting the notice, in particular single and double . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.251456

Employers were alleged to have caused or permitted an employee to drive a vehicle on the road while not holding a driving licence authorising him to do so. When the employee had entered the employment, the employers had ensured that he held a valid driving licence but it was not their practice to check thereafter that employees renewed their driving licences.
Held: the appeal was dismissed. The employer ‘had failed to adopt any system with a view to ensuring that reasonable checks were made’.

Waller LJ, Park J
[1980] RTR 139
Road Traffic Act 1972 84(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Baugh v Crago QBD 1975
The defendant believed that a driver was the holder of a driving licence and permitted him to use the vehicle, when the driver was not in fact such a holder. The prosecutor appealed his acquittal.
Held: Considering Newbury v Davis. The . .
Cited – Newbury v Davis QBD 1974
newbury_davisQBD1974
The owner of a vehicle agreed to lend it to someone else on condition that that person insured against third party risks. In the owner’s absence, that person drove the car on a road without insurance.
Held: The appeal against conviction was . .

Cited by:
Cited – Philip Owen Lloyd-Wolper v Robert Moore; National Insurance Guarantee Corporation Plc, Charles Moore CA 22-Jun-2004
The first defendant drove a car belonging to his father and insured by his father. The father consented to the driving but under a mistaken belief that his son was licensed. The claimant was injured by the defendant in a road traffic accident.
Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.199927

The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving whilst disqualified. He had driven on a roadway within a caravan park. A public footpath (a highway) went through the park. There were gates at the entrance but these were kept open. The defendant argued that the fact of it being a footpath did not allow it to be considered a public place.
Held: The appeal failed. The cases cited by the defendant did not assist the appellant since in this case he accepted that this was a public place. It was also a road in the normal sense.

Scott Baker LJ, David Clarke J
[2009] EWHC 423 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutins v Vivier QBD 1991
There had been a traffic accident in a large privately owned caravan park.
Held: Premises will be private where they are entered for reasons beneficial to the occupier. Referring to Harrison v Hill: ‘What Lord Sands, and indeed Lord Clyde, say . .
Cited – Suffolk County Council v Mason HL 1979
The House considered the status of a pedestrian right of way through a caravan site to a beach, and the 1949 Act: ‘The sections which follow section 27 deal with the further steps which have to be taken before the definitive map is completed and . .
Cited – Dunmill, Regina (On the Application of) v Director Of Public Prosecutions Admn 5-Jul-2004
The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He had driven his car within a camping site at Hayling Island. He might have been charged with driving on a road or other public place, but was charged with driving on a road. It . .
Cited – Brewer v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 11-Feb-2004
The defendant was a disqualified driver. He was seen to be driving slowly across a railway station car park. He was found to have excess alcohol in his blood.
Held: Allowing his appeal against conviction. The magistrates had found that the car . .
Cited – Lang v Hindhaugh QBD 1986
A public footpath four to five feet in width had been tarmaced but had deteriorated with potholes and bushes to the extent that it would not naturally be called a road. The appellant rode a motorcycle along it with excess alcohol and when . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.317979

The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He said that the ‘service road’ on which he had driven was not a ‘road or public place’.
Held: ‘The issue in this case being narrow, help to be derived from the relevant authorities can be summarised as follows. Any road may be regarded as one to which the public has access if the public is there without overcoming physical obstruction or in defiance of a prohibition: Harrison v Hill 1932 JC 13. Whether a place is public will generally be a question of fact and degree: Montgomery v Loney [1959] NI 186. Help may also be derived from asking whether access is meant only for a special class of members of the public, including for example guests of residents, postmen, milkmen and so forth: Harrison; DPP v Planton [2001] EWHC Admin 450. A sign or barrier lends weight to restriction of the area to a special class and thus to its being private but the absence of such is not determinative: Edwards v DPP unreported 10 March 1994 QBD.’

Rafferty DBE J
[2011] EWHC 488 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Bowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.430372

Mr Harrison was convicted by the Sheriff-substitute of an offence under section 7(4) of the 1930 Act on the ground that, while disqualified from holding a driving licence, he had driven a vehicle on a specific road. The Sheriff-substitute stated a case for appeal to the High Court. The facts admitted or proved included the following:
‘[O]n the road leading from Drygate Road to Auchenames Farm House, occupied by Robert Middlemas, in the Parish of Kilbarchan, appellant drove a motor vehicle, namely, a motor lorry. There was no evidence to show that appellant drove said motor vehicle on any other road, nor was he charged with driving on any other road . . The said Drygate Road is a public highway. Said road leading therefrom to said farmhouse is a road leading only to said farmhouse, and there are no houses other than said farmhouse on said road. Said road is part of the farm of Auchenames aforesaid, and goes no further than said farmhouse. It is not maintained by any public authority, but the said Robert Middlemas is bound under the lease of said farm to maintain said road. There is no gate on said road, nor, except as aftermentioned in the summer time, any obstacle to prevent members of the public going on to it from the said highway, nor was there any intimation that it was not open to the public. In the summer time, when the farmer’s cattle are at the grass in the fields adjoining said road, the farmer puts a pole across the entrance to said road to prevent his cattle straying on to the said Drygate Road. Any member of the public desiring to call at said farmhouse for any purpose uses said road to get to the farmhouse, and members of the public not having business at said farm frequently walk, on said road. . . The said farmer has on several occasions put members of the public off said road when he had reason to believe that they were likely to do damage to his crops in the field adjoining said road.’
The primary question of law stated for the opinion of the High Court was whether the Sheriff-substitute had been entitled to hold that the road was a ‘road’ to which the 1930 Act applied.
Lord Clyde said: ‘There must be, as matter of fact, walking or driving by the public on the road, and such walking or driving must be lawfully performed – that is to say, must be permitted or allowed, either expressly or implicitly, by the person or persons to whom the road belongs.’
and ‘I think that, when the statute speaks of ‘the public’ in this connection, what is meant is the public generally, and not the special class of members of the public who have occasion for business or social purposes to go the farmhouse or to any part of the farm itself; were it otherwise, the definition might just as well have included all private roads as well as all public highways.
I think also that, when the statute speaks of the public having ‘access’ to the road, what is meant is neither (at one extreme) that the public has a positive right of its own to access, nor (at the other extreme) that there exists no physical obstruction, of greater or less impenetrability, against physical access by the public; but that the public actually and legally and legally enjoys access to it. It is, I think, a certain state of use or possession that is pointed to. There must be, as matter of fact, walking or driving by the public on the road, and such walking or driving must be lawfully performed — that is to say, must be permitted or allowed, either expressly or impliedly, by the person or persons to whom the road belongs.’ Lord Sands: ‘Any road may be regarded as a road to which the public have access upon which members of the public are to be found who have not obtained access either by overcoming a physical obstruction or in defiance of prohibition express or implied.’
Lord Sands expressed his own reasoning as follows: ‘As may be clearly gathered from the terms of the Act here in question, the object of the special legislation in regard to certain prosecutions and offences was the protection of the public. This clearly explains why the prohibition here dealt with is not limited to public highways but extends to any road to which the public have access. It is the public who are to be protected, and the provisions of the Act are made to apply to all roads on which the motorist may encounter members of the public.
The learned Sheriff-substitute has found that the road here in question was a road answering that description. I think that, on the facts stated, he was entitled so to find. In my view, access means, not right of access, but ingress in fact without any physical hindrance and without any wilful intrusion. In one view, it is a technical trespass for any person to put a foot upon an owner’s land without the owner’s permission. But, as is matter of common knowledge, there are many roads upon which members of the public enter without any sense of wilful intrusion. In my view, any road may be regarded as a road to which the public have access upon which members of the public are to be found who have not obtained access either by overcoming a physical obstruction or in defiance of prohibition express or implied.’
Lord Blackburn gave a very short judgment: ‘I concur. I have no doubt that the definition of a ‘road’ in section 121 of the Road Traffic Act is wide enough to cover the road in question in this case, and that the conviction was justified. The definition applies to all roads, whether public or private, ‘to which the public has access,’ and it appears to me that any driver of a motor car whose licence had been withdrawn would contravene the Act if he entered upon a private avenue and drove a car thereon without the express permission of the owner of the avenue.’

Lord Justice-General (Clyde), Lord Sands
1932 JC 13
Scotland
Cited by:
Cited – Clarke v Kato and Others; Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd HL 25-Nov-1998
Save exceptionally, a car park is not a road for the purposes of road traffic legislation on obligatory insurance. It is an unjustified strain on the language. A distinction made between the road ways and the parking bays was artificial and . .
Cited – May v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 15-Apr-2005
Whether the car park where the driving took place was a ‘public place’ within the meaning of section 3.
Held: The appeal failed.
Laws LJ set out the following propositions as accurately summarising the relevant legal principles:
a. . .
Cited – Harriot v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 4-May-2005
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction under the 1988 Act of possessing a bladed article in a public place. He had been found in the forecourt of a hostel by the police seeking to re-enter after being excluded. He said that it . .
Cited – Tichborne v Weir CA 1892
The 1833 Act provided that after 20 years of adverse possession ‘the Right and Title’ to the land ‘shall be extinguished’.
Held: By barring the remedy and extinguishing the title of the person out of possession, the Act did not create a new . .
Cited – Houghton v Scholfield QBD 1973
The Court was asked whether the cul-de-sac to which the TRO applied was a ‘road’ within the definition in section 104 of the 1967 Act. At 243-244 Lord Widgery CJ, with whom Melford Stevenson and Brabin JJ agreed, said:
‘On the question of what . .
Cited – Bowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .
Cited – Spence, Regina v CACD 23-Mar-1999
There was an allegation of an offence of dangerous driving contrary to section 2 of the 1988 Act. The issue was whether the car park where the driving had taken place, not being a road, was an ‘other public place’. The case turned on the fact that . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.194254

Judicial review of the decision by a review adjudicator to uphold a penalty notice issued by a local authority to the claimant for parking on a pavement forming part of a road. For part of its width, including the part where the vehicle had been parked, the pavement was owned by the claimant. The relevant definition of ‘road’ was the same as in the 1984 Act; it therefore included both highways and any other road to which the public had access. The review adjudicator upheld the penalty notice under the ‘highway’ limb, on the grounds that there had been a deemed dedication of the relevant part of the pavement as a highway. Having done so, the review adjudicator found it unnecessary to reach a decision under the ‘public access road’ limb. Fordham J allowed the claim for judicial review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration, essentially on the grounds that it had not been open to the review adjudicator to rely on a deemed dedication.

Mr Justice Fordham
[2020] EWHC 811 (Admin), [2020] 4 WLR 134, [2020] WLR(D) 539, [2020] 2 P and CR 15, [2021] RTR 5
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Bowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.649805

When asking whether a roadway is a public road, one asks whether there is about those who obtain permission to enter ‘some reason personal to them for their admittance’, and ‘Generally, the decision will be a matter of fact and degree, but whether the material for consideration suffices to support one view or the other is a matter of law. ‘

Lord MacDermott CJ
[1959] NI 171
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutins v Vivier QBD 1991
There had been a traffic accident in a large privately owned caravan park.
Held: Premises will be private where they are entered for reasons beneficial to the occupier. Referring to Harrison v Hill: ‘What Lord Sands, and indeed Lord Clyde, say . .
Cited – Richardson v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 28-Feb-2019
Private Car park was not a public plae.
The defendant appealed from his conviction for being drunk in charge of a vehicle in a public place. The place was marked private but allowed for paring for designated businesses.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The phrase public phrase had to be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.231477

Private Car park was not a public plae.

The defendant appealed from his conviction for being drunk in charge of a vehicle in a public place. The place was marked private but allowed for paring for designated businesses.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The phrase public phrase had to be read ejusdem generis with ‘road’. Whether or not a particular place was public was a question of fact and degree in each case. Here the public were not invited to park, and it was not a place to which the public had access..

Julian Knowles J
[2019] EWHC 428 (Admin), [2019] 4 WLR 46, [2019] WLR(D) 170
Bailii, WLR
Road Traffic Act 1988 4(2)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Spence CACD 24-May-1999
A private company car park, where there was no proof of use by the public, was not a public road, and a driver could not be convicted of dangerous driving whilst in it. There must be evidence that the public actually utilised premises before a court . .
Cited – Filmer v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 1-Nov-2006
Conviction for having driven a car whilst drunk in a public place, the car park of his employers. . .
Cited – Montgomery v Loney CANI 1959
When asking whether a roadway is a public road, one asks whether there is about those who obtain permission to enter ‘some reason personal to them for their admittance’, and ‘Generally, the decision will be a matter of fact and degree, but whether . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutins v Vivier QBD 1991
There had been a traffic accident in a large privately owned caravan park.
Held: Premises will be private where they are entered for reasons beneficial to the occupier. Referring to Harrison v Hill: ‘What Lord Sands, and indeed Lord Clyde, say . .
Cited – May v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 15-Apr-2005
Whether the car park where the driving took place was a ‘public place’ within the meaning of section 3.
Held: The appeal failed.
Laws LJ set out the following propositions as accurately summarising the relevant legal principles:
a. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.634215

The Commissioner had been wrong to conclude that he could not bring prosecutions in respect of driving on a certain road because it was not a ‘road’ within the definition of the Road Traffic Act 1972. Having observed that ‘[c]ounsel and solicitors in magistrates’ courts, in the Divisional Court and in the Crown Courts can quite easily get confused with much learning’, Jupp J referred to the Lord Chief Justice’s judgment in Cox v White, which he optimistically called a ‘salutary clearing away of the complications which have arisen around this matter’.

Jupp J
[1980] RTR 289
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Bowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.670323

There had been a traffic accident in a large privately owned caravan park.
Held: Premises will be private where they are entered for reasons beneficial to the occupier. Referring to Harrison v Hill: ‘What Lord Sands, and indeed Lord Clyde, say in Harrison v Hill can really be summarised thus. A road is one to which the public have access if (a) it is in fact used by members of the public and (b) such use is expressly or implicitly allowed — or, putting it the other way round, not achieved by overcoming physical obstruction or defying express or implied prohibition.
Factor (b) presents no problem. But factor (a) does. In particular, as it seems to us, (a) essentially begs rather than answers the other crucial question whether those who use the road are members of the public. Take our case. We have not the least hesitation in accepting that the only material use of this caravan park was by those who had complied with the various site requirements and been properly admitted, in short those who had been expressly or implicitly allowed into the caravan park, either as caravaners or campers or as their bona fide guests. We think it right to ignore both the few trespassers who escaped the security controls and also the users of the bridleway (which in any event could not affect the character of the park as a whole). And, indeed we do not understand Mr Glen for the prosecutor to contend otherwise.
What that leaves outstanding, however, is the critical question: are the caravaners, campers and guests to be regarded, within the park, still as members of the general public, or are they instead, as the justices found, at that stage a special class of members of the public?
Upon that question, Harrison v Hill helps but little: there is simply Lord Clyde’s reference to ‘the special class of members of the public who have occasion for business or social purposes’ to use the farm road.’ and
‘How then, in some particular road or place is used by an identifiable category of people, should justices decide whether that category is ‘special’ or ‘restricted’ or ‘particular’ such as to distinguish it from the public at large? What, in short, is the touchstone by which to recognise a special class of people from members of the general public?
Some light is thrown upon the problem by the passage already cited from Lord MacDermott CJ’s judgment in Montgomery v Loney [1959] NI 171 at 177: one asks whether there is about those who obtain permission to enter ‘some reason personal to them for their admittance’. If people come to a private house as guests, postmen or meter readers, they come for reasons personal to themselves, to serve the purposes of the occupier.
But what of the rather different type of case such as the present where those seeking entry are doing so for their own (rather than the occupier’s) purposes and yet are screened in the sense of having to satisfy certain conditions for admission. Does the screening process operate to endow those passing through with some special characteristic whereby they lose their identity as members of the general public and become instead a special class?
Our approach would be as follows. By the same token as one asks in the earlier type of case whether permission is being granted for a reason personal to the user, in these screening cases one must ask: do those admitted pass through the screening process for a reason, or on account of characteristic personal to themselves? Or are they in truth merely members of the public who are being admitted as such and processed simply so as to make them subject to payment and whatever other conditions the landowner chooses to impose?

Simon Brown J, Mann LJ
[1991] 4 All ER 18, [1991] RTR 205
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Montgomery v Loney CANI 1959
When asking whether a roadway is a public road, one asks whether there is about those who obtain permission to enter ‘some reason personal to them for their admittance’, and ‘Generally, the decision will be a matter of fact and degree, but whether . .
Cited – Panama (Piccadilly) Ltd v Newbury 1962
The court was asked whether club membership as a precondition to admission to a strip show would preclude its being held a public entertainment.
Held: It would not: ‘there being no evidence whatsoever of any selective process and indeed a rule . .

Cited by:
Explained – Planton v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 6-Jun-2001
The defendant was found by police sat in the driving seat of a car parked on an isthmus which would be submerged at high tide. The engine was running, and the car lights were on. He failed a breath test, but argued at trial that since the car had . .
Cited – May v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 15-Apr-2005
Whether the car park where the driving took place was a ‘public place’ within the meaning of section 3.
Held: The appeal failed.
Laws LJ set out the following propositions as accurately summarising the relevant legal principles:
a. . .
Cited – Barrett v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 10-Feb-2009
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving whilst disqualified. He had driven on a roadway within a caravan park. A public footpath (a highway) went through the park. There were gates at the entrance but these were kept open. The . .
Cited – Richardson v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 28-Feb-2019
Private Car park was not a public plae.
The defendant appealed from his conviction for being drunk in charge of a vehicle in a public place. The place was marked private but allowed for paring for designated businesses.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The phrase public phrase had to be . .
Cited – Bowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.231474

A 15-year old (Deacon or Deakin) who drove a motor car on a Council housing estate was charged with offences of driving a vehicle on a road A road in a housing estate, used only by those who resided in the estate or the visitors, and not by the public generally was held not to be a road. The fact there is neither physical obstruction nor any sign forbidding entry to those with no business there did not itself mean the public had access. There must be evidence that the public utilises that access. The conviction was overturned.
Widgery CJ said:
‘I may add that of course the best way of showing that a member of the general public has access to a road with at least the tolerance of the owner of the property is to show that a member of the public does in fact so use it . . There was not one witness called who said that one single member of the public in the wide sense, that is to say, a person who was not a resident or who was not a visitor to a resident on the estate, in fact used the road of this estate.’
May LJ observed: ‘There was not one witness called who said that one single member of the public in a wide sense, that is to say a person who is not a resident or who is not a visitor to a resident on the estate, in fact used the road for this estate. If there had been any such evidence before the justices I think that their conclusion must have been that this particular road was a road within section 196(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972. However, looking at the case as stated as carefully as I can, I cannot find any finding of the Justices that any member of the public in that general sense used this particular road. Accordingly, though it may very well be that this road can be proved to be a road within the Road Traffic Act 1972, I cannot see that, on the evidence that these Justices had before them or on the facts, they found that they erred in law.’

May J, Widgery LJ
[1976] RTR 244
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Harriot v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 4-May-2005
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction under the 1988 Act of possessing a bladed article in a public place. He had been found in the forecourt of a hostel by the police seeking to re-enter after being excluded. He said that it . .
Cited – Bowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.512349

Motoring offences under the 1972 Act were alleged. Justices dismissed the charges on the ground that the driving had not been proved to be on a ‘road’ within the statutory definition.
Held: The prosecutor’s appeal succeeded. the Divisional Court remitted the case to the justices to clarify their findings of fact and their reasoning. Kilner Brown J, with whom Watkins J and Lord Widgery CJ agreed, explained what the proper approach should be and where the justices had got themselves into difficulties: ‘The justices heard argument. They were referred to a number of authorities, including the well-known Scottish case of Harrison v Hill, 1932 JC 13, passages from which have been cited with approval on more than one occasion in this court and the effect of which is broadly speaking that all questions of whether or not the public have a right of access are questions of fact.
The justices may, as they purported to do in this case, use their local knowledge. That has been decided in this court. They have to take into account matters such as the existence of other premises, maybe private residences, maybe shops and matters of that kind. In the end it comes down to a simple question of fact. The law is quite plain that a mere slight degree of access would not be sufficient to justify the finding that it was a road.
The trouble in this case, as I see it, is that the justices, instead of applying their minds to the critical issue which was the degree of user and the nature of the user by members of the public, allowed themselves to be confused by an irrelevant issue: ‘We were of the opinion that the road was used by the public as members of the public but that the attitude of the owners of the road to that use, to bring it within the scope of the Act, must be consent, rather than tolerance. We accepted the defendant’s contentions 5(b) and (c) above [to the effect that the distinction between the road in question and the public highways was readily apparent, and that there were no premises on the road to which the public in general had any right of access], applying our own local knowledge of the area. We were, therefore, of the opinion that this was not a road to which the relevant sections of the Act applied and accordingly dismissed the three informations’.
The question posed for the court is whether No 2 Road, Colwick Estate is a road within the scope of the relevant sections of the Road Traffic Act 1972. That was a question of fact for the justices to decide along the general lines which I have just indicated.
Speaking for myself, I find myself in this difficult position that I do not understand precisely how the justices went about coming to their final opinion. The introduction of this question of whether the use should be by consent of the owners of the road rather than tolerance seems to be something which they themselves must have allowed themselves to think was a relevant issue, no doubt by consideration of the authorities which were put to them.’
Lord Widgery CJ said: ‘I agree that the case must be remitted for reconsideration by the same bench of the matters referred to in the judgment of Kilner Brown J. I would only add this. I have a great deal of sympathy with the justices in this case because by one means or another they have been persuaded to think that the issues are far more complicated than they ever possibly could be if they were properly instructed. I would invite the justices next time, and other justices charged with this same question, to look at the very brief statement of Lord Sands in Harrison v Hill, 1932 JC 13 , 17 which I am reading at the moment from Houghton v Schofield [1973] RTR 239 , 244A-B. Lord Sands said:
‘In my view, any road may be regarded as a road to which the public have access upon which members of the public are to be found who have not obtained access either by overcoming a physical obstruction or in defiance of prohibition express or implied.’
I think that in 99 cases out of 100 that direction is all the justices need to decide whether a road is a ‘road’ for current purposes.’

Kilner Brown J, Watkins J and Lord Widgery Cj
[1976] RTR 248
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Bowen and Others v Isle of Wight Council ChD 3-Dec-2021
What makes a road a Road?
The Court was asked whether a Road was a ‘road’ for the purposes of the 1984 Act’
Held: It has often been said that the public access mentioned in the definition of ‘road’ must be both actual access and legal or lawful access. However, simple . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 December 2021; Ref: scu.670322

The DPP appealed against dismissal of summonses alleging that the defendant had wrongly used a vehicle displaying a blue ambulance light.

Rafferty LJ, Jay J
[2014] EWHC 669 (Admin)
Bailii

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 December 2021; Ref: scu.522543

A trailer used to transport goods between this country and continental Europe as found to be without a plate as required by regulation 3. The defence claimed the trailer was exempted by Schedule 2 of the regulations as it fell within the class of trailers ‘Temporarily in Great Britain a period of 12 months not having elapsed since the vehicle in question was last brought into Great Britain’. He appealed a finding that ‘temporarily’ meant for a limited time. They heard nothing to the effect that the time during which the trailer had been or would be in this country was limited and therefore it followed that it ought to have been plated.
Held: There is implicit in the phrase ‘temporarily in Great Britain’ an element other than simply a time element. The trailer in question, was not here casually but regularly, as part of its regular habits of life so far as a trailer can have such habits. ‘If you have here, as you have, a trailer regularly travelling between England and the Continent so that its presence in England is intermittent but regular and repeated, I do not think that it can, on a fair use of language and in particular upon a true construction of this regulation, be said to be a trailer temporarily in Great Britain at any relevant time. I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.’

Lord Widgery CJ
[1971] 1 WLR 1508
Goods Vehicles (Plating and Testing) Regulations 1968 3
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved – Inland Revenue v Cadwalader 1904
An American citizen, with his ordinary residence and indeed practising the law in New York, took a three-year lease of a furnished shooting lodge in Scotland. He resided at the shooting lodge for a period of two months in each year during the . .

Cited by:
Cited – Stena Rederi Aktiebolag and Another v Irish Ferries Ltd CA 6-Feb-2003
A ferry plied its way between Dublin and Holyhead, coming into English territorial waters three or four times a day, and for up to three hours on each occasion. The claimants asserted that the construction of the hull infringed its patent.
Road Traffic

Updated: 30 November 2021; Ref: scu.195482

Renewed application for permission to appeal against a judgment following a trial relating to liability only in a personal injury action arising out of a road traffic accident which occurred on the M27 motorway

Tomlinson LJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 896
Bailii
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 27 November 2021; Ref: scu.518984

The driver appealed against a finding that he had breached traffic regulations as to zebra crossings.

Haddon-Cave J
[2013] EWHC 3735 (Admin)
Bailii

Road Traffic

Updated: 26 November 2021; Ref: scu.518559

Richards, Toulson, Sullivan LJJ
[2010] EWCA Civ 808, [2011] RTR 1
Bailii
Transport Act 1985, Road Traffic Act 1988 123
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 23 November 2021; Ref: scu.420768

ECJ Compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles – Directive 72/166/EEC – Article 3(1) – Directive 90/232/EEC – Article 1 – Road traffic accident – Death of a passenger – Right to compensation of the partner and of the child, who is a minor – Non-material damage – Compensation – Cover by compulsory insurance

C-22/12, [2013] EUECJ C-22/12
Bailii
Directive 72/166/EEC 3(1), Directive 90/232/EEC 1
European

Road Traffic

Updated: 22 November 2021; Ref: scu.516983

[2013] UKUT 387 (AAC)
Bailii

Road Traffic

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.514387

Statutory review pursuant to section 124 and Schedule 9 paragraph 35 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 in relation to four traffic regulation orders adopted by Slough Borough Council in 2012 which concern four roads in a largely residential area within the Slough conurbation.

[2014] EWHC 1127 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 15 November 2021; Ref: scu.524653

UTAA Transport – Traffic Commissioner cases

[2013] UKUT 198 (AAC)
Bailii

Road Traffic

Updated: 12 November 2021; Ref: scu.510290

Appeal against conviction for driving over the speed limit.

Wyn Williams J
[2011] EWHC 158 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 12 November 2021; Ref: scu.428866

The claimant sought judicial review of a decision not to review the claimant’s parking fine.
Held: There had been a delay of two years, and the request was on a ground available to him at the time of the first review. Refused

[2008] EWHC 2141 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.276230

dpp_hill1991

The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of a summons alleging that the driver had driven with excess alcohol. The magistrates had concluded that the intoximeter must have been faulty.
Held: The conclusion that the device was unreliable was based on evidence which did not justify it.
Neill LJ said: ‘In this case it seems to us that if the defendant were to be believed, however credible a witness he appeared to be and however well he gave his evidence, it would involve three very surprising consequences: (1) that the intoximeter itself was faulty; (2) that not only was that faulty but the Drager Alert Device was also faulty, and finally that there was some explanation other than drink to account for the evidence of glazed vision which was not only given by the police, but was accepted by the Justices.’

Neill LJ
[1991] RTR 35
Cited by:
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Spurrier QBD 21-Jul-1999
It was not absolutely necessary for a defendant who asserted that a Lion Intoximeter was faulty because of a disparity between the reading and what had been drunk, to bring expert evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the Intoximeter was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.276431

The defendant, a road traffic camera campaigner appealed against his conviction for contravening a red light traffic signal, saying that the camera was not approved.
Held: The appeal failed. A ‘prescribed device’ was a ‘device of a description specified in an order made by the secretary of state’. The camera had been so specified in 1992.
Davis J considered the approval process: ‘As I see it, this section connotes a two stage process. Generically (and this has to be approved by Parliament in the form of a statutory instrument) a description has to be specified in an order. Once that is done as a first stage then the Secretary of State may then as a second stage approve the type in question. So one goes from the general, in the sense of the specified description, to the specific, in the sense of an approved type. That makes perfectly good sense. It is, in fact, no departure in any significant way from that which existed under the previous legislation, save only in this respect: Parliament has now taken upon itself at least to wish to sanction the actual description of the device in question, in respect of which the Secretary of State may thereafter issue an approval as to type.’

Davis J
Times 14-May-2009
Road Traffic Act 1988 36(1), Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2001 (SI 2002 No 3113) 10, Road Traffic Offenders (Prescribed Devices) (No 2) Order 1992 (SI 1992 No 2843)
England and Wales
Cited by:
See Also – Robbie the Pict v The Procurator Fiscal, Dumfries HCJ 15-May-2009
The defendant appealed against his conviction for speeding. He said that the speed gun used was not a device of a type approved by the Secretary of State since the regulationas allowed approval of speed measuring mechanisms activated by light, . .
Cited – Brotherston and Others v The Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 3-Feb-2012
Four drivers said that the use of approved speed cameras for evidential purposes was unlawful. They argued that the cameras used were not ‘of a description specified’ under an Order.
Held: The appeals failed. The different speed trap . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.343071

Uninsured Driver Not Guilty of Causing Death

The appellant though an uninsured driver, was driving without fault when another vehicle veered across the road. The other driver died from his injuries, and the appellant convicted of causing his death whilst uninsured. At trial he succeeded in arguing that he had not caused the death, but the prosecutor’s appeal had succeeded.
Held: The appeal succeeded. ‘This is a statute creating a penal provision, and one of very considerable severity. The offence created is a form of homicide. To label a person a criminal killer of another is of the greatest gravity. The defendant is at risk of imprisonment for a substantial term. Even if, at least in a case of inadvertent lack of insurance or venial lack of licence, a sentence of imprisonment were not to follow, the defendant would be left with a lifelong conviction for homicide which would require disclosure in the multiple situations in which one’s history must be volunteered, such as the obtaining of employment, or of insurance of any kind. Nor should the personal burden or the public obloquy be underestimated; to carry the stigma of criminal conviction for killing someone else, perhaps a close relative, perhaps as in the kind of situation referred to in para 19 an innocent child, is no small thing. A penal statute falls to be construed with a degree of strictness in favour of the accused. It is undoubtedly open to Parliament to legislate to create a harsh offence or penalty, just as it is open to it to take away fundamental rights, but it is not to be assumed to have done so unless that interpretation of its statute is compelled, and compelled by the language of the statute itself. The rule of construction which applies to penal legislation, and a fortiori to legislation which carries the penalty of imprisonment, is not identical to, but is somewhat analogous to, the principle of statutory interpretation known as the principle of legality.’
‘ in order to give effect to the expression ’causes . . death . . by driving’ a defendant charged with the offence under section 3ZB must be shown to have done something other than simply putting his vehicle on the road so that it is there to be struck. It must be proved that there was something which he did or omitted to do by way of driving it which contributed in a more than minimal way to the death. The question therefore remains what can or cannot amount to such act or omission in the manner of driving. ‘

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Hughes, Lord Toulson
[2013] UKSC 56, [2013] WLR(D) 324, [2013] 1 WLR 2461, [2013] 4 All ER 613, [2013] RTR 31, [2014] 1 Cr App R 6, [2014] Crim LR 234, UKSC 2011/0240
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC
Road Traffic Act 1988 3ZB
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Planton v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 6-Jun-2001
The defendant was found by police sat in the driving seat of a car parked on an isthmus which would be submerged at high tide. The engine was running, and the car lights were on. He failed a breath test, but argued at trial that since the car had . .
Cited – Meeking, Regina v CACD 29-Feb-2012
The defendant passenger pulled on the handbrake at speed and caused a crash which her husband, the driver could not prevent. She was charged with manslaughter. . .
Cited – Williams, Regina v CACD 2-Nov-2010
The offence of causing death by driving while unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured, is committed if the driver is unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured and if the driving is a cause of death in the sense that it was ‘more than negligible or de . .
Cited – Galoo Ltd and Others v Bright Grahame Murray CA 21-Dec-1993
It is for the Court to decide whether the breach of duty was the cause of a loss or simply the occasion for it by the application of common sense. A breach of contract, to found recovery, must be shown to have been ‘an ‘effective’ or ‘dominant’ . .
Cited – Regina v Kennedy HL 17-Oct-2007
The defendant had been convicted of manslaughter. He had supplied a class A drug to a friend who then died taking it. The House was asked ‘When is it appropriate to find someone guilty of manslaughter where that person has been involved in the . .
Cited – Regina v Marsh CACD 19-Jul-1996
Damage caused after the taking of a car need not be at the fault of the driver defendant for the offence of aggravated vehicle taking to have been committed by him. The sole requirement of the subsection was that the driving of the vehicle should . .
Cited – Regina v Secretary of State for The Home Department Ex Parte Simms HL 8-Jul-1999
Ban on Prisoners talking to Journalists unlawful
The two prisoners, serving life sentences for murder, had had their appeals rejected. They continued to protest innocence, and sought to bring their campaigns to public attention through the press, having oral interviews with journalists without . .

Cited by:
Cited – Taylor, Regina v CACD 9-Apr-2014
. .
Cited – Taylor, Regina v SC 3-Feb-2016
No Liability Extension on Taking Without Consent
Appeal by leave of the Court of Appeal on a point of law arising in the course of the trial of the appellant for aggravated vehicle taking, contrary to section 12A of the Theft Act 1968. The defendant had taken a vehicle without the owner’s consent, . .
Cited – Lane and Another, Regina v SC 11-Jul-2018
The defendants were to be tried for allegedly sending funds abroad to support terrorism. The court now considered the meaning of the phrase ‘reasonable cause to suspect’ in the context of the anticipated use of the funds: ‘Does it mean that the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.514219

Stolen cars had been recovered by the police, incurring the costs of removal. The insurers (now the owners) objected to the payment of fees before the cars were restored. They said that as owners they were exempt from mcharges imposed by section 102 of the 1984 Act. The defendant recoveryy service appealed.
Held: The appeal succeeded: ‘The provision exempting innocent vehicle owners from charges is confined to section 102 itself. No similar saving provision appears or is applied to section 101 and if it had been intended that the exemption in section 102 should extend to the circumstances covered by section 101 the section would have been drafted accordingly.’ The court distinguished between recovery of stolen cars and of cars removed as waste or inappropritely parked.

Butler-Sloss, Thorpe, Judge LJJ
[1997] EWCA Civ 2073
Bailii
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 99 101 102, Removal, Storage and Disposal of Vehicles (Prescribed Sums and Charges) Regulations 1993
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.142470

Appeal by Devon County Council (the defendant) against a decision of the Administrative Court quashing a traffic regulation order.

Jackson, Kitchin, Briggs LJJ
[2016] EWCA Civ 419
Bailii
Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996, Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 122
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.563081

Four drivers said that the use of approved speed cameras for evidential purposes was unlawful. They argued that the cameras used were not ‘of a description specified’ under an Order.
Held: The appeals failed. The different speed trap mechanisms were lawful and specified wihin the regulations. The court discussed the stages involved in the designation of a system within the regulations.

Toulson LJ, Cranston J
[2012] EWHC 136 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 89, Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 20, Road Traffic Offenders (Prescribed Devices) Order 1992 SI 1992 No 1209, Road Traffic Offenders (Prescribed Devices) Order 1993 SI 1993 No 1698
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Robbie the Pict v The Procurator Fiscal, Dumfries HCJ 15-May-2009
The defendant appealed against his conviction for speeding. He said that the speed gun used was not a device of a type approved by the Secretary of State since the regulationas allowed approval of speed measuring mechanisms activated by light, . .
Cited – Robbie the Pict v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 26-Apr-2009
The defendant, a road traffic camera campaigner appealed against his conviction for contravening a red light traffic signal, saying that the camera was not approved.
Held: The appeal failed. A ‘prescribed device’ was a ‘device of a description . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.451360

The driver was caught using a bus lane and issued with a fixed penalty notice. He appealed to the adjudicator. The Council now appealed against a finding that the area was not a designated bus lane allowing enforcement by civil penalty rather than being enforceable only by criminal process. It was also found that the signage was inadequate, giving drivers insufficient opportunity to avoid the lane. Other cities had adopted similar signage systems.
Held: Different Acts making up the bus lane regulation system had different definitions of what vehicles might use them. The vehicles to be allowed to use the bus lanes in Oxford were not as indicated on the prescribed signs. The council obtained the Minister’s consent to use variant signs. The adjudicator had however erred in construing the phrase ‘any other circumstances whatever’ in the 1984 Act so as not to apply to the purposes of the restriction.
Nor was the signage inadequate. It was irrational to differentiate the requirements for signage according to the mode of enforcement.

Beatson J
[2010] EWHC 894 (Admin)
Bailii
Transport Act 2000 144(5), Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 1 2, Traffic Signs Regulation and General Directions 2002 (SI 2002 No. 3113), Bus Lane Contraventions Regulations 2005 (SI 2005 No. 2757)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Herron and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v The Parking Adjudicator CA 27-Jul-2011
The claimant appealed against refusal of judicial review of decisions of the parking adjudicator as to the correctness of 39 penalty charge notices. In each case, they said that the signage supporting the notice, in particular single and double . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.408642

The claimant appealed against refusal of judicial review of decisions of the parking adjudicator as to the correctness of 39 penalty charge notices. In each case, they said that the signage supporting the notice, in particular single and double yellow lines and flashes was inadequate or wrong. It was said that a failure of any part of the signage vitiated enforcement anywhere in the zone.
Held: The appeal failed. A parking control zone had been properly designated. Some irregularites had been accepted by the adjudicator but were not seen to be such as to invalidate the enforcement of restrictions within the zone. Regulation 4 does not require that every part of every street is signed in the manner it specifies. Applying the statutory construction princile exemplified in Soneji, the court rejected the submission that any departure beyond the trivial invalidated the zone: ‘The test for invalidity is not ‘Are the irregularities trivial?’, but whether there is substantial compliance with the statutory definition.’ and ‘If the situation, viewed as a whole, is that the motorist is adequately informed of the parking restriction, there is in my judgment no good reason to render the restriction ineffective.’

Stanley Burnton, Aikens LJJ, Sird David Keene
[2011] EWCA Civ 905, [2011] RTR 34, [2012] PTSR 1257
Bailii
Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 4, Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, Road Traffic Act 1988, Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996, Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) Representations and Appeals Regulations 2007
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Soneji and Bullen HL 21-Jul-2005
The defendants had had confiscation orders made against them. They had appealed on the basis that the orders were made more than six months after sentence. The prosecutor now appealed saying that the fact that the order were not timely did not . .
Appeal from – Herron and Another v The Parking Adjudicator Admn 25-May-2010
The claimant sought judicial review of decisions of the parking adjudicator as to the commission of parking offences. He said that failures in ceratiin parts of a controlled parking zone in Sunderland invalidated parking controls in the entire zone. . .
Cited – Cannadine v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 2007
The fact that the back of a road sign showing a speed limit had been painted the wrong colour did not make the road de-restricted. There had been no question of the driver being misled. The law was not troubled by trivialities. . .
Cited – Macleod v Hamilton 1965
Unless an authority which makes a traffic control order complies with the requirements imposed on the making of such an order and the publication of the order is adequate, any offence which it purports to create cannot be effectively prosecuted.
Cited – Oxfordshire County Council, Regina (on The Application of) v The Bus Lane Adjudicator Admn 26-Apr-2010
The driver was caught using a bus lane and issued with a fixed penalty notice. He appealed to the adjudicator. The Council now appealed against a finding that the area was not a designated bus lane allowing enforcement by civil penalty rather than . .
Cited – James v Cavey QBD 1967
The council introduced regulations restricting parking at a site on alternate weeks between certain hours. The ‘no parking’ signes were covered over with an unrestricted parking sign when parking was permitted. The defendant parked and left his car . .
Not Followed – Davies v Heatley QBD 1971
The defendant appealed, by case stated, against his conviction of failing to stay to the left of a continuous white line. An intermittent white line had been placed between the two continuous white lines. The magistrates convicted saying that the . .
Incorrect – Moss, Regina (on The Application of) v KPMG Llp Admn 14-Oct-2010
The claimant objected to accounts drawn by the defendant auditors for Bolton Council, saying that they had wrongfully included sums from parking fines which had (he said) been unlawfully claimed by the Council. He contended that because parking . .
Cited – Hassan v Director of Public Prosecutions 1992
The defendant said there had been no sign plate displaying the times of restricted parking.
Held: That was a failure to provide adequate information, and the motorist’s conviction was quashed. . .
Cited – Cotterill v Chapman 1984
A trivial departure from the statutory specification for a road sign did not invalidate the sign nor exculpate the defendant. . .
Cited – Canadine and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 14-Feb-2007
The defendant drivers appealed against convictions for speeding, saying that the speed signs did not have the correct width of black border.
Held: The appeals failed. The signs were in casings the lip of which did not form a background which . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.442232