The defendant had ridden a motor-cycle and hit a pedestrian. The court asked whether he had been reckless.
Held: The House understood recklessness as ‘a state of mind stopping short of deliberate intention, and going beyond mere inadvertence’ and ‘It is for the jury to decide whether the risk created by the manner in which the vehicle was being driven was both obvious and serious and, in deciding this, they may apply the standard of the ordinary prudent motorist as represented by themselves. If satisfied that an obvious and serious risk was created by the manner of the defendant’s driving, the jury are entitled to infer that he was in one or other of the states of mind required to constitute the offence and will probably do so; but regard must be given to any explanation he gives as to his state of mind which may displace the inference.’
Lord Diplock: ‘Recklessness on the part of the doer of an act does presuppose that there is something in the circumstances that would have drawn the attention of an ordinary prudent individual to the possibility that this act was capable of causing the kind of serious harmful consequences that the section which creates the offence was intended to prevent, and that the risk of those harmful consequences occurring was not so slight that an ordinary prudent individual would feel justified in treating them as negligible. It is only when this is so that the doer of the act is acting ‘recklessly’ if before doing the act, he either fails to give any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or, having recognised that there was such risk, he nevertheless goes on to do it.’
Judges:
Lord Diplock and Lord Roskill, Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone LC
Citations:
[1981] 2 WLR 524, [1982] AC 510, (1981) 73 Cr App R 1, [1981] 1 All ER 974
Statutes:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Commissioner of Police v Caldwell HL 19-Mar-1981
The defendant got drunk and set fire to the hotel where he worked. Guests were present. He was indicted upon two counts of arson. He pleaded guilty to the 1(1) count but contested the 1(2) charge, saying he was so drunk that the thought there might . .
Cited by:
Confirmed – Regina v Hinks HL 27-Oct-2000
A woman befriending an older man of limited intelligence accepted daily cash payments from his building society over eight months, claiming them to be gifts. She now appealed against her conviction for theft.
Held: (Lord Hutton dissenting) For . .
Approved – Regina v G and R HL 16-Oct-2003
The defendants, young boys, had set fire to paper and thrown the lit papers into a wheelie bin, expecting the fire to go out. In fact substantial damage was caused. The House was asked whether a conviction was proper under the section where the . .
Applied – Regina v Miller HL 17-Mar-1982
The defendant, a vagrant, fell asleep in an empty house. His lighted cigarette fell onto his mattress, and a fire started. Rather than put it out, he moved to another room. He was accused of arson.
Held: He was guilty. A defendant would be . .
Cited – Elliott v C 1983
A 14-year old girl of low intelligence entered a shed, poured white spirit on the floor and set it alight. The fire destroyed the shed after she left. The allegation was that she was reckless. The justices applied Caldwell but inferred that in his . .
Cited – Regina v Reid HL 1992
The defendant, convicted of causing death by reckless driving contrary asked the House to reconsider its decision in Lawrence on which the trial judge’s jury direction had been based.
Held: Lawrence remained good. (Lord Keith) ‘where the . .
Cited – Data Protection Registrar v Amnesty International (British Section) Admn 8-Nov-1994
The defendants had been charged with recklessly holding and then disclosing information about named individuals. It had exchanged a list of potential addressee’s for use in mailing lists with another charity.
Held: Recklessness is defined by . .
Cited – Regina v Goodfellow CACD 1986
The defendant had failed to get re-housed. He planned to burn down his present lodgings, rescuing the other inhabitants. Three died in his attempt. He appealed a conviction for manslaughter.
Held: The case was either an unlawful act or . .
Cited – Brown v The Queen (Jamaica) PC 13-Apr-2005
A police officer appealed against his conviction for manslaughter after being involved in a road traffic accident. Two were killed. The policemen complained as to the direction given on gross negligence manslaughter.
Held: Adomako could not . .
Applied – Kong Cheuk Kwan v The Queen PC 10-Jul-1985
Two hydrofoils collided, causing deaths. The officers were charged with manslaughter.
Held: The Board applied to the situation the law which had developed for road traffic accidents. . .
Cited – Regina v Conway CACD 28-Jul-1988
The defendant appealed against his conviction for reckless driving. He said the offence was committed out of necessity, since his passenger’s life was under threat.
Held: Necessity can only be a defence to a charge of reckless driving where . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Crime, Road Traffic
Updated: 27 April 2022; Ref: scu.179855
